



Documentation of the Simulation of the

Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT)*



Conference B

6-10 April 2026

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Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT)

Committee Staff

Director	Kaytlyn Marcotte
Assistant Director	Hat Alzahrani
Chair	Diya John

Agenda

1. Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East
2. Safeguards and Verification Measures for Nuclear Disarmament

Resolutions adopted by the Committee

Code	Topic	Vote (In favor - Against - Abstention)
NPT/1/1	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	77 in favor, 8 against, 26 abstentions
NPT/1/2	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	Adopted without a vote
NPT/1/3	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	73 in favor, 10 against, 28 abstentions
NPT/1/4	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	67 in favor, 14 against, 30 abstentions
NPT/1/5	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	69 in favor, 18 against, 24 abstentions
NPT/1/6	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	71 in favor, 14 against, 26 abstentions
NPT/1/7	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	66 in favor, 17 against, 28 abstentions
NPT/1/8	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	62 in favor, 20 against, 29 abstentions
NPT/1/9	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	67 in favor, 17 against, 27 abstentions
NPT/1/10	Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East	72 in favor, 12 against, 27 abstentions

Summary Report for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

1. Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East
2. Safeguards and Verification Measures for Nuclear Disarmament

The session was attended by representatives of 103 Member States and 1 Observer.

On Monday, the committee adopted the agenda of 1, 2, beginning discussion on the topic of “Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.” By Tuesday, the Dais received a total of 13 proposals covering a wide range of sub-topics, including regional safeguards and verification mechanisms, capacity building, and education. There was a strong spirit of collaboration, with delegates working diligently to merge similar ideas into writing. Their analysis of the varied approaches to the topic brought out vigorous and stimulating discussions.

On Thursday, 10 draft resolutions had been approved by the Dais, 0 of which had amendments. The committee adopted 10 resolutions following voting procedure, 1 of which received unanimous support by the body. The resolutions represented a wide range of issues, including confidence-building measures, regional cooperation and education, and accountability through verification and monitoring measures. Throughout the week, the committee demonstrated a steadfast commitment to expanding nuclear education programs within the Middle East whilst promoting collaboration. The body was able to facilitate a powerful discussion by supporting regional frameworks that facilitate peacebuilding and non-proliferation.



Code: NPT/1/1

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Cognizant of the necessity for gradual denuclearization rather than instantaneous change to avoid undue pressure on individual Member States,

Recognizing the paramount need to preserve Middle Eastern state sovereignty, as well as understanding the risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of non-state actors,

Affirming the need for ongoing regional communication on the perspectives and approaches to denuclearization in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the importance of Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and voluntary regional dialogue among Middle Eastern Member States, particularly through conferences that offer incentives to encourage participation in nuclear non-proliferation efforts,

Conscious of the current United Nations (UN) definition of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), as outlined in A/RES/3472 B (XXX) as “any zone recognized by the General Assembly which, through the decision of their sovereignty and the establishment of a treaty, which calls for the complete absence of nuclear weapons in an internationally recognised zone” and is generally considered to be the most effective method for promoting non-proliferation internationally,

Recalling existing international treaties, such as the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1986), *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1995), and the *Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia* (2014), which established NWFZs in regional areas around the world, creating guarantees for security for all Member States in the regions where such NWFZs have been established and in the broader international community,

Mindful of the resources available to assist in the documentation of nuclear disarmament, including the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Reports, INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540, the A/CONF.236 conference report series, and the UNIDIR Middle East WMD-Free Zone Compass,

Guided by the importance of equitable access to diverse energy resources to support peaceful development and international cooperation,

Adhering to SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions), focused on reinforcing peace, justice, and strong institutions, and the increasing role of nuclear materials in this vision,

Deeply concerned by the mere 12.5% success rate of sanctions on nuclear disarmament,

Remembers United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) development incentive-based systems for attendance and cooperation between Middle Eastern Member States,

Noting the Libyan precedent, in which the 2003 nuclear disarmament initiative demonstrated that economic incentives, the lifting of sanctions, and greater integration into the global economy can play a

meaningful role in promoting compliance to disarmament,

Aware of the efforts of the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO) and the Conference on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East and their efforts to promote dialogue and collaborations between Middle Eastern Member States,

Taking into consideration the need for increased Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 diplomatic channels to provide representatives and experts from Member States to communicate with each other on neutral ground, especially on the topic of nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a NWFZ,

Acknowledging the successful impact of the United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement (1993), which converted excess highly enriched weapons-grade material from former nuclear weapons into low-enriched material for civilian energy production,

1. *Expresses its hope for the eventual creation of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East through gradual denuclearization;*
2. *Calls for consistent expansion of membership and reinforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including recognition by Middle Eastern Member States who have as yet failed to do so;*
3. *Supports a gradual approach, as will be hereafter demonstrated, towards nuclear disarmament that recognizes and accommodates the legitimate security concerns of all Member States;*
4. *Endorses the following incentive-based framework rather than a sanction or penalty-based model to encourage Member States toward establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East;*
5. *Encourages Member States to recommit to existing dialogues carried out in the six prior Conferences on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons to appease tensions in the region;*
6. *Looks favorably upon the creation of the Middle Eastern Incentivized Denuclearization Committee (ME-IDC), which regional Member States will fully organise with the primary focus of organizing financial incentives and documenting denuclearization developments alongside requested guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to encourage the diminution of nuclear weapons production and proliferation while maintaining regional sovereignty amongst Member States by:*
 - a. *Consisting of all Member States recognized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as being located in the Middle East which have ratified the NPT, including: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen;*
 - b. *Acknowledging that Member States within the region of the Middle East which have not signed onto the NPT would not be a party to this committee until they have ratified the NPT in its entirety;*
 - c. *Noting that other Member States may be present as observers, they may not be recipients of the fiscal incentives detailed hereafter;*

- d. Considering the establishment of a scrutinized panel composed of two selected experts per Member State tasked with helping the ME-IDC maintain a detailed database of the recommendations and assistance towards denuclearization mirroring past successes by:
 - i. Recommending that the qualifications of experts to be selected for the panel be determined by members of the ME-IDC during the first official summit of the committee;
 - ii. Suggesting that experts hold their position for terms of four years to encourage varying perspectives over prolonged periods;
7. *Suggests* the following framework for investment in peaceful use infrastructure be adopted by the ME-IDC upon its establishment, inspired by the Libyan precedent but adapted to the Middle Eastern model, and designed to complement and work within existing UN disarmament financing mechanisms rather than duplicate them by:
 - a. Designating a dedicated Middle East denuclearization window, herein referred to as the Fund for Disarmament Investment (FDI), within the existing UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities, administered by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA);
 - b. Encouraging Member States to direct extrabudgetary contributions to the FDI in proportion to their existing UN assessment rates, as determined in ST/ADM/SER.B/1096, such that the relative burden of funding between Member States mirrors established UN financial practices while noting that extrabudgetary contributions to UNODA trust funds represent an established and functioning UN financing mechanism;
 - c. Highly encouraging Middle Eastern Member States to demonstrate a minimum three-year period of verified compliance, monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), before becoming eligible to access FDI funds to first ensure a non-nuclear trajectory;
 - d. Suggesting offering annually, the financial development incentive following this three year period, contingent upon continued verified compliance which:
 - i. Acknowledges that the financial incentive will account for 70% of the income in the FDI at the time of distribution and will be divided between qualifying member states evenly;
 - ii. Ensures that 30% of the income in the FDI from the previous year remains to promote substantial increase in the FDI funds over time;
 - e. Supporting the allowance of funding by the ME-IDC upon confirmation of qualifiable denuclearization efforts and monetary transfer from UNODA, Middle Eastern Member States may direct these funds towards:
 - i. Supporting further funding in existing IAEA technical cooperation programmes for peaceful nuclear energy;
 - ii. Financing the conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) with IAEA technical assistance;

- iii. Enhancing national safeguards infrastructure to meet IAEA verification standards;
8. *Affirms* numerous approaches to denuclearization in the Middle East which may qualify for the financial incentive, including:
 - a. Gradually reducing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium by a 5% fixed amount per year determined by the specific Member States surplus under IAEA supervision;
 - b. Halting the production of missile material for nuclear weapons purposes;
 - c. Converting 5% of highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear use;
 - d. Dismantling 5% of nuclear warheads annually under the verification of the NPT, through the:
 - i. Determination that 5% as a target number offers a significant adjustment towards nuclear disarmament without resulting in increased instability, as reviewed through the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI, or undue pressure on individual Member States with varying nuclear programs;
 - ii. Recognition that the determined outcomes encourage full denuclearization in a twenty-year period for the Middle East to begin on the first meeting of the ME-IDC summit after the Member State in question commits to full disarmament;
 - iii. Acknowledgment that the ME-IDC may adjust target numbers during summit meetings;
9. *Strongly recommends* that Member States support initiatives to convert weapons-grade HEU into civilian-grade LEU based on the established framework of the *United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement* (1993), as an economic incentive for Member States and to boost development and energy production to Member States which convert their stockpiles of HEU to LEU;
10. *Further encourages* the inclusion of developmental incentives within the voluntary conference framework, such as infrastructure funding, energy partnerships, and trade benefits to increase participation among Middle Eastern Member States in nuclear risk reduction initiatives;
11. *Promoting* and respectfully *upholding* the sovereign rights of Member States, supporting their ability to peacefully and independently guide the management of their own energy resources, including nuclear energy, in a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding;
12. *Requests* that the proposed financial incentives should also support the physical and cybersecurity protection of nuclear materials to prevent access by non-state actors, such as by enhancing cooperation with the IAEA for technical assistance and information sharing to prevent illicit trafficking, as well as strengthening cybersecurity measures and the resilience of nuclear facility monitoring and control systems;
13. *Promotes* the increased usage of Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 diplomatic channels among diplomats, topic experts, and government officials between respective Member States in the Middle East to promote secure methods for representatives of Member States within the Middle

East to encourage communication on the topics of disarmament and the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East;

14. *Recommends* that the ME-IDC utilize documentation to confirm efforts to denuclearize or the lack of a nuclear weapons program using existing IAEA documentation;
15. *Designates* that the summits of the ME-IDC will occur annually, with locations being determined by a rotating pool of volunteer Member States, as determined during the proceedings of the previous committee, alongside annual UNODA conferences.



Code: NPT/1/2

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Expresses its utmost concern for the requirement of sufficient confidence to join a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) and in pursuit of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968) which recognizes the right of all parties of the NPT to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Appreciating the Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), which guarantee NWSs don't use nuclear weapons on non-NWSs,

Highlighting that not all Middle Eastern States have equal access to the previously existing forums due to factors beyond their control and to an inability to access said forum aims to,

Stressing its desire to establish a forum for Middle Eastern Member States to deliberate on disarmament and non-proliferation that includes participation from trained civilian groups in neutral states that are already party to NWFZ, effectively,

Emphasizing the global safeguards that are mentioned under Article III of the NPT that aims at acknowledging the past efforts of the Trilateral Initiative in nuclear verification to remain,

Aware of the fact that the NPT has faced failure and/or delay in the past due to lack of negotiation, additionally,

Establishing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to compliment global safeguards and regional verifications, while,

Underlining specialized IAEA-led workshops and efforts to embed Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) standards into local communities thus,

Affirming that a regional State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) emphasizes the importance of long-term trust, enhances transparency, strengthens safeguards compliance, and helps prevent the diversion and illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials within the NWFZ,

Noting that a coordinated SSAC strengthens safeguards, enhances transparency, and prevents diversion and illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials within the NWFZ,

Noting that the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) is funded by annual voluntary contribution by Member States party to the NPT,

Conscious of Peaceful Uses Initiative (PCI)'s additional contributions to the TCF,

Understanding that the IAEA already serves as an oversight committee with yearly funds allocated for new initiatives,

1. *Invites* a conference to be held between NWSs and potential Middle Eastern NWFZ Member States which:
 - a. Takes place in a neutral non-nuclear weapon Member State;
 - b. Focuses on negotiating risk reduction measures such as NSAs and emergency plans which are to be decided upon by the negotiating Member States;
2. *Calls for* the establishment of a forum, which will first convene on 1 April 2027 and meet annually thereafter, providing educational opportunities such as webinars on proper nuclear safeguards and mechanisms to help implement and maintain a Middle East NWFZ, while also promoting discussions in Southeast Asia and African NWFZs including but not limited to the following activities:
 - a. Convening in alternating states signatories to the aforementioned treaties;
 - b. Understanding the necessity for the forum to take place under the oversight of an established NWFZ in order to: allow for cooperative negotiations outside the umbrella of a nuclear weapon state, equal representation of all Middle Eastern states in the region, and establish a relationship of fair and equal discussion regarding disarmament under the oversight of NWFZ Member States;
 - c. Represents civilian groups such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons to promote nuclear disarmament and to garner support among civilians for a NWFZ despite rising tensions through:
 - i. Active discussions between Middle East Member States and civilian groups that is overseen by the IAEA;
 - ii. Suggesting partnerships between Middle East Member States and civilian groups like the Open Government Partnership (OGP) to promote transparency of nuclear resources that will help progress towards peaceful uses of nuclear resources;
 - d. Funded by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) to provide flights to NWFZ for Member States that do not have the ability to travel and financial incentive to attend the annual forum;
3. *Encourages* Member States of the *Treaty of Tlateloco*, *Treaty of Rarontonga*, *Treaty of Bangkok*, *Treaty of Palindaba*, and *Treaty on Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia* which will:
 - a. Meet and discuss initiatives to foster a NWFZ over the Middle East;

- b. Convene for the first time upon passing this resolution, and will only convene there on out in the event a member state fails to meet/violates the agreed upon amendments of the NWFZ;
 - c. Engage in oversight and management through a neutral nonaligned NGO such as the National Threat Initiative (NTI);
- 4. *Proposes* the formation of a regional working group composed of representatives of Middle Eastern NWFZ Member States that:
 - a. Recommends biannual training seminars with verifications facilitated by the IAEA Department of Safeguards focusing on the standardization of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) and the technical exigencies of decommissioning non-civilian infrastructure;
 - b. Facilitates specialized IAEA-led workshops on the regulatory transition from military to civilian nuclear oversight and the implementation of Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) standards;
 - c. Coordinates the regional integration of a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), requiring participating States to:
 - i. Maintain standardized, regularly updated inventories of all nuclear and radioactive materials;
 - ii. Establish real-time reporting of material transfers between facilities;
 - iii. Implement cross-border customs screening protocols with radiation detection equipment at major entry points;
 - iv. Conduct joint inspections and data-sharing between national regulatory authorities in order to detect, track, and prevent the illicit trafficking or smuggling of radioactive sources across NWFZ borders;
- 5. *Building upon* the pre-existing frameworks of the Trilateral Initiative, but addressing the shortcomings that led to its brief existence, and expanding it to a global scale to include NWS and NNWS by:
 - a. Utilizing the Model Verification Agreement, a successful mechanism of the aforementioned program, which prioritizes verification without revealing sensitive nuclear weapon and information;
 - b. Making humanitarian pledges to promote new initiatives that have been brought to the NPT by Member States who are parties to the treaty;
 - c. Using the past actions of the IAEA as an oversight committee and its annual operational regular budget which can be assessed by participating member states to mitigate security concerns and the need for funds in terms of any new technology required for implementation;

- d. Requesting that additional funding be provided by the TCF and the PCI for verification technology.



Code: NPT/1/3

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Recalling the directives and obligations established under the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) (1968),

Reaffirming the sovereign right of all Member States of the Middle East to determine their own security policies, free from foreign intervention, and the right to manage their own energy supplies, including nuclear energy, while recommending adherence to pre-existing frameworks presented by the NPT,

Bearing in mind Article 2 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), which protects sovereignty and peaceful conflict resolution,

Keeping in mind General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) (1974) and its intentions to encourage a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and the urgent need for multilateral cooperation,

Cognizant of the current recognized definition of a NWFZ by the United Nations, as established by General Assembly resolution 3472 B (XXX), which determines a NWFZ as any zone recognized by the General Assembly, determined by the Member States within their own sovereignty and treaty, to call for the complete absence of nuclear weapons and material within the internationally recognized zone,

Reaffirming that any verification practice within a Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) must implement identical obligations on all participating states equally, rejecting any politically motivated two-tiered system of compliance,

Acknowledging the necessity for a phased, trust-based approach to establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East through incremental steps, by having an official document signed by participating states that will ensure verification and transparency,

Noting further that transparency over nuclear arsenals is the foundation of trust and effectiveness in the creation of NWFZs, as witnessed in the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), the *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1985), and the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996),

Guided by the *Charter of the United Nations* art. 39-59, defending the Security Council's right to restore international peace,

Believing in the United Nations Security Council as a "peace corps" that desires to ward off any acts of aggression against Middle Eastern Member States,

Emphasizing the effectiveness of any future regional arrangement and sustainable disarmament depends on the equal application of obligations, transparency, and verification measures, such as the exchange of

non-sensitive nuclear data and declarations of peaceful nuclear activities, based on cooperation across all states of the region,

Bringing attention to the necessity of the involvement of all Member States and bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) and other bodies involved in the regulation of enriched uranium, in the United Nations, to facilitate NWFZs,

Seeking to prioritize the implementation of the IAEA safeguards and consensual Additional Protocol through Middle Eastern communication to promote multilateral initiatives and the management of highly enriched uranium under the IAEA's standards, under strict adherence to the NPT,

Stresses the 90 million people who would face a humanitarian crisis, according to a UN-supported Science and Global Security study known as "Plan A," within hours of swift action towards nuclear disarmament,

Recognising General Assembly resolution 73/546 (2018), NPT/RES/73, calling for annual conferences regarding NWFZ, calling for nuclear-ambivalent states, causing high tensions to follow NPT responsibilities,

Taking into account the annual Conference of Disarmament hosted by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs at Geneva, which focuses on providing a multilateral disarmament discussion forum among the international community,

Understanding the essential nature of neutral ground for negotiations, which helps to enable quick resolutions, and motivated by the absence of regional dialogue within the Middle Eastern Countries, exacerbated by continued feelings of distrust and interventions in the region by non-signing parties of the NPT regarding nuclear proliferation,

1. *Recommends* the implementation of the Regional Diplomatic Compliance Network (RDCN) in charge of encouraging transparent dialogue, through multilateral cooperation along the Middle East which:
 - a. Urges for the creation of a multilateral group based on previous summits or diplomatic initiatives done to address complicated relations between key Middle Eastern powers would efficiently communicate, expedite productive dialogue and efficiently better their resources to reach an agreement on nuclear disarmament;
 - b. Designates specialists, scrutinized by the Regional Members of this Network, who will have work coming from peace-seekers, will work in coordination with regional members of various groups, such as but not limited to the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Groups, the European Union External Action, and the *Wassenaar Arrangement* (1996);
 - c. Emphasizes the importance of sharing information and mechanisms used in other nuclear zones around the world through the Regional Diplomatic Compliance Network;
 - d. Recommends the implementation of incremental Confidence-Building Measures, such as:

- i. Enhanced regional transparency through the voluntary exchange of technical data regarding civilian nuclear energy programs;
 - ii. Joint workshops on nuclear forensics and illicit trafficking prevention to foster technical cooperation;
- 2. *Proposes* the creation of the Middle Eastern Organization for Nuclear Energy (MEONE) as a subcommittee of the IAEA which:
 - a. Endorses the development of stations for monitoring in every uranium enrichment facility in the Middle East;
 - b. Suggests that monitoring be done by other Member States of MEONE, guaranteeing oversight of nuclear facilities;
 - c. Instructs violations of guidelines which might endanger peace and security, to be reported to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly;
 - d. Calls upon transparency from Middle Eastern states regarding the level of enrichment of the uranium being produced by:
 - i. Reassuring that Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) complies with IAEA guidelines;
 - ii. Further reminds that uranium dilution is a cheap and simple process;
 - e. Supports the use of LEU for the production of clean energy;
 - f. Expresses concern about the humanitarian crises provoked by the unregulated production of High Enrichment Uranium;
 - g. Further recommends placing 20% limits on enriched uranium to ensure peace, allowing for peaceful use of nuclear energy, and easing the minds of Member States within the region;
 - h. Presents results and technical developments in civilian nuclear facilities everywhere in the country to demonstrate compliance;
 - i. Ensures that civilian programs remain efficient and protected from external political interference through suspending the interventions of the lobbies in those programs;
- 3. *Establishes* a safe area in the Middle East by spreading the NPT ideas in the Middle East region through a global consequences operation by:
 - a. Setting up every year in September United Nations conferences about the NWFZ with both Middle East countries and external ones that are not part of the NPT yet, discussions to make those countries implement the NPT depending on their capacities;
 - b. Ensuring that nuclear civil programs, which are the use of nuclear energy to produce electricity, conduct scientific research and develop medical or industrial applications

without military objectives, can still be efficient if they remain for civilian utilization, through showing our results and our development regarding civilian nuclear facilities;

- c. Negotiating with regional and international actors to make this free zone a safer place for all civilians and countries, through the creation of regional conferences that will be held from one country to another every year;
4. *Underlines* United Nations Member States with nuclear weapon armament from both signatories of the NPT and Non-Signatories to follow Article 4 of the NPT to stop the proliferation in the objective to achieve the goal of the *Charter of the United Nations* regarding disarmament affairs and the goal of achieving global safety all around the world;
 5. *Urges* all Member States to adhere to the IAEA's standards as well as compliance to the Additional Protocol and inspections by:
 - a. Ensuring Member States will be obligated to provide information within 30 days;
 - b. Provide locations of the original documents;
 - c. Allowing access to workers of the state's nuclear facilities for questions;
 - d. Further recommends and highlights the importance of sovereign decision-making, pointing out the fact that international intervention slows down the progress of the MENWFZ, including but not limited to surrounding areas such as the North African Region;
 6. *Strongly urges* the creation of an NWFZ in the Middle East that:
 - a. Consists of Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (hereafter referred collectively as "listed Member States") and encourages Member States that are not party to the NPT to join;
 - b. Does not take effect until all listed Member States are party to the NPT;
 - c. Is to be guided in structure by the existing NWFZ treaties, such as the *Treaty of Tlatelolco*, the *Treaty of Rarotonga*, the *Treaty of Pelindaba*, and *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995);
 7. *Recommends* negotiations take place in Indonesia for three days every other month following the adoption of this resolution, with an emphasis on joint dialogue between the nation's political and religious leaders, as well as experts in nuclear research for agriculture, energy and medicine, and:
 - a. Encourages all United Nations Member States to participate in the creation and fulfilment of financial and humanitarian incentives for those who participate with suggestions such as:
 - i. A nuclear power sharing program to further electrify the region and create financial interconnection;

- ii. A financial pot funded by Recognized Nuclear Weapons States to be distributed to listed Member States that sign onto the NWFZ treaty;
 - iii. The loosening of sanctions on listed Member States that sign onto the NWFZ treaty;
 - b. Promotes conversation through a dialogue with listed Member States that are not party to the NPT on the possibility of any such Member State joining the NPT;
- 8. *Supports* Middle Eastern Member States to establish direct diplomatic channels for guaranteed diplomatic access through:
 - a. A direct landline between Member States in need of crisis communications between government leaders to ensure completely secure communications;
 - b. A Secure video conferencing to ensure rapid face-to-face communication from diplomats when physical appearance is not possible;
- 9. *Encourages* the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to create a youth initiative program to increase inclusive regional dialogue on nuclear disarmament within all members of society within the Middle East by:
 - a. Inviting UNIDIR to help educate civil society on the enrichment of uranium, regional security issues, and promote conflict prevention and peace building;
 - b. Inviting Member States protected under the African NWFZs to share expertise on confidence-building measures, transparency in regional dialogue, and to host annual conferences for the youth initiative program for open discussion on regional disarmament efforts;
 - c. Inviting the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons to share expertise on the mission of the campaign and to stigmatize the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons;
- 10. *Suggests* that the United Nations Security Council strengthens its role in maintaining international peace and security by actively working to prevent and deter acts of aggression against Middle Eastern nations, promoting cooperation and dialogue among Member States, and ensuring that all actions taken fully respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each state by:
 - a. Encouraging the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions in areas at risk of conflict to help stabilize regions and protect civilians;
 - b. Ensuring that conflict is met with strong dialogue between nations without overstepping sovereignty;
- 11. *Promotes* diplomatic dialogue and mediation between conflicting parties to resolve disputes peacefully before escalation occurs;
- 12. *Trusts* in the creation of a Middle Eastern delegation to discuss their terms for a NWFZ.



Code: NPT/1/4

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Emphasizing the importance of Sustainable Development Goals 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and 17 (partnership for the goals),

Reaffirming Article 3 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), which states that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person, all of which are threatened by potential nuclear proliferation in the region,

Guided by General Assembly resolution 73/546 (2018), which calls for the formation of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, which helps to promote consensus within the region,

Aware of the currently recognised definition of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) by the United Nations, established by General Assembly resolution 3472 B (XXX) (1975), which calls for the complete absence of nuclear weapons within any zone recognised by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention,

Deeply concerned by the growing threat of a nuclear conflict due to the ambiguous nuclear stockpiles and verification measures of some Middle East Member States,

Expressing its deep concern about the stagnant issue that is the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension conference, where a resolution was adopted, which calls for the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), nuclear, chemical, and biological, and their delivery systems,

Calling attention to pre-existing frameworks such as the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW) (1968) and the Nuclear Weapons Convention working groups, demonstrating that both the global momentum toward disarmament and the existing gaps in participation must be addressed through regionally driven initiatives, as well as legal, technical, and institutional cooperation,

Recognizing that according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2024, over 3,000 verification activities were conducted on more than 1,300 nuclear facilities worldwide by IAEA experts, none of which were the facilities owned and operated by Nuclear Weapon States (NWS),

Acknowledging the fact that, according to the IAEA in 2023, all declared nuclear material activities in 74 States remained peaceful, with ongoing evaluations for 61, and 45 States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in force that lack the heightened oversight of the Additional Protocol,

Further recognizing the importance of the Group of 77 National Data Centers For All initiative, which promotes capacity building in Least Developed Countries to improve capabilities in meeting

non-proliferation verification commitments by providing States that have limited resources access to global monitoring data, comprehensive data storage, and data sharing technology,

Affirming the essential role of civil society organizations, given their effective representation of diverse perspectives amongst stakeholders within the Middle East, in fostering nonstop inclusive dialogue, public confidence, and transparent negotiation towards the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East,

1. *Recommends* the creation of a regional IAEA-led program called SHIELD-ME (Safeguards, Honesty, Inspections, and Exchange for Lasting Disarmament in the Middle East), which would:
 - a. Monitor local nuclear facilities and information, and would be run by experts in the nuclear information field, International Nuclear Information System liaison officers, and volunteer neutral third-party observers, who will then report to the IAEA;
 - b. Allow Member States to independently and regionally monitor and share data through an online IAEA archive;
2. *Suggests* the IAEA Director General convene an annual study, with the goal of further assessing how current Member State compliance and adherence to IAEA safeguards in the region impact the ongoing process of establishing a NWFZ, hosted by willing Member States in current NWFZ's to:
 - a. Use financial incentives funded by the World Bank to encourage Member States to show proof by declaration of implementation and assurance of compliance with the IAEA's nuclear safeguards;
 - b. Provide Member States engaged in nuclear activity with the option to place their activity under further IAEA review and approval to allow for more frequent inspections and safeguards visits;
3. *Advocates* that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) propose to the GA a joint Middle East Non-Proliferation Verification Infrastructure Program (MENVIP), which will:
 - a. Provide a non-proliferation verification infrastructure (NVI) audit and report to Member States who request one, administered by IAEA and UNODA verification experts to identify key gaps in NVI and technical capabilities regarding verification;
 - b. Consider NVI to include, but not be limited to: radiation detectors, tamper-indicating seals, satellite imaging technology, and laboratories for environmental impact sampling;
 - c. Seek a budget for loans and funding from any sources that UNDP and UNODA organizers see fit, including but not limited to the General Assembly Fifth Committee, the World Bank, or the UN Capital Development Fund;
 - d. Accept applications from willing Member States who wish to benefit from loans approved to be drawn from MENVIP's budget, as well as development plans, in which applying Member States will:

- i. Justify the need for loans regarding restrictions on domestic funding, preventing the development of NVI;
 - ii. Provide specific plans for the usage of the requested amount, as well as an anticipated timeline for the completion of said infrastructure;
 - e. Improve confidence in the non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East by providing Member States the capacity to effectively and consistently verify their compliance with the NPT;
- 4. *Further recommends* that the General Assembly First Committee amend the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ Conference) structure to:
 - a. Increase meetings to occur tri-annually to give representatives more time to reach consensus on confidence and capacity building agreements, as well as allow for ad-hoc emergency meetings at the discretion of UNODA based on regional emergencies, such as:
 - i. Impending or active use of WMDs, particularly nuclear weapons;
 - ii. Regional conflicts or wars that could escalate to nuclear war;
 - iii. Other non-proliferation emergencies determined to be urgent by UNODA, the UN Security Council, or the IAEA;
 - b. Expand the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO), representatives from relevant United Nations Organs that focus on issues of disarmament, and Member States that attend the conference in a technical advising or a limited Observer State role to ensure ongoing negotiations and prevent stagnation in dialogue;
 - c. Put a greater emphasis on the monitoring of fissile material, their transfer, and highly enriched uranium stockpiles, to account for the lack of binding Fissile Material Cut-off agreements, by encouraging Member States to implement verification practices such as Differential Die Away and Neutron Gamma Emission Tomography through technical cooperation with the IAEA and other Member States, as issues regarding unverified fissile material are unique to the region;
- 5. *Advises* IAEA to more comprehensively pursue accountability regarding undeclared and unconfirmed nuclear materials and stockpiles while prioritizing sovereignty, through means including but not limited to:
 - a. Encouraging all States that currently claim Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) status to adopt modified SQP (MSQP) status as established by the IAEA in 2005;
 - b. Voluntary bilateral agreements between Member States as supplemental safeguards to existing IAEA measures:
 - i. As a means of confidence-building between individual States, as a parallel endeavor to ongoing multilateral negotiations;

- ii. With the purpose of creating State-to-State peaceful use conditions for nuclear and radioactive materials traded and transported between borders;
 - c. The development of infrastructure and investment packages by developed Member States to incentivize initial adoption of the recommendations above, with more aid packages to follow after comprehensive adoption of these suggestions;
- 6. *Encourages* Member States to agree on establishing further regulations towards limiting the use of nuclear weapons, such as:
 - a. Reaffirming negative security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State (NNWS) by NWS, ensuring that NWS cannot threaten NNWS with the use of nuclear weapons;
 - b. Establishing a no-first-use policy by using a collective security framework, which ensures that an NWS will not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, ensuring better regional security from Member States currently engrossed in conflict, as they will not be threatened by a nuclear war;
- 7. *Proposes* using the process established by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as a framework for nuclear weapon disarmament in the Middle East, considering its success in verifying the destruction of 99% of known chemical weapon stockpiles globally, integrating into current nuclear disarmament processes specific OPCW focuses such as:
 - a. The destruction of existing weapon stockpiles in addition to non-proliferation efforts;
 - b. The creation of personalized disarmament plans for each Middle Eastern State with unique timelines;
 - c. Securing the preemptive support of State and non-State stakeholders and agencies with enforcement power;
- 8. *Encourages* that all States in the Middle East consider committing to legally binding obligations that prohibit the development, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the TPNW, to:
 - a. Reiterate the importance of Member States in the Middle East engaging with the Nuclear Weapons Convention Working Groups to foster multilateral communication;
 - b. Advance pre-emptive measures, harmonize domestic legal non-proliferation frameworks, and improve institutional coordination mechanisms;
- 9. *Further invites* civil society organizations with regional expertise in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to participate as official observers, specifically in all sessions of the NPT review conferences pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 73/546 (2018), including:
 - a. The Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), considering its past decade-long record of facilitating track 1.5 and track 2 diplomatic dialogue between regional experts, diplomats, and security professionals;

- b. Other NGOs as subject to accreditation criteria established by UNODA, to ensure transparency, credibility, and accountability amongst Member States within the negotiation process;
10. *Encourages* the establishment of a voluntary Middle East Nuclear Dialogue Forum (MEND-F), convening biannually under NPT review conference facilitation to serve as a continuous platform for addressing regional nuclear security concerns with participation open to all States in the region, and structured to:
- a. Ensure equal speaking opportunities by allowing each State the platform to speak without the enforcement of outcomes without further deliberation with the NPT review conference in order to prevent dominance by larger States with more political and economic power;
 - b. Include optional yearly technical briefings from the IAEA to support informed discussion without imposing binding obligations;
 - c. Operate on consensus-based dialogue, maintain broad participation, as this forum is purely based on nuclear activity dialogue and suggestive outcomes to be sent to the NPT review conference;
 - d. Call upon participating States to engage in structured, voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures within the MEND-F, including:
 - i. Sharing general nuclear activity information regarding civilian nuclear activities, safeguards, and practices;
 - ii. Participating in dialogue on regional security perceptions, nuclear threat assessments, and nuclear doctrines;
 - iii. Submitting optional, periodic reports on safeguards, implementation, and compliance efforts;
 - iv. Engaging in voluntary nuclear energy, workshops, simulations, and technical exchanges related to verification and monitoring practices;
 - v. Emphasizing communication on upcoming nuclear projects, including any usage of nuclear energy for war technology, WMDs, and nuclear power plants, all plans for future development must be reported to the forum three years before the initiative begins;
 - e. Further implores the development of joint regional statements and multilateral declarations produced through the MEND-F, including:
 - i. Amplifying the collective voice of non-nuclear-weapon and underrepresented States with less infrastructure for nuclear activity within the region;
 - ii. Consolidating regional positions to increase diplomatic pressure through unified consideration for nuclear applications to then transmit agreed outcomes to NPT review conferences and the United Nations General Assembly to enhance

visibility and specifically outline political accountability in the Middle East for the potential bases for a NWF;

11. *Endorses* the creation of The Sanqiang Sustainable Nuclear Energy Development Grant, a multilateral grant to provide support in constructing, maintaining, and funding nuclear energy and power facilities in the region, which will:
 - a. Be managed as a Multilateral Neutral Escrow under the IAEA's Division of Budget and Finance, ensuring autonomous and consistent financing for regional safety by:
 - i. Implementing a Diversity Cap where no single donor State may provide more than 35% of the total annual budget for a facility, ensuring that no individual State can exercise financial leverage or veto power;
 - ii. Encouraging contributions from Middle Power States outside the region and non-governmental scientific foundations to further dilute the influence of regional rivals and ensure the fund remains capital-neutral;
 - b. Work with the IAEA Technical Cooperation program to conduct routine checks of active projects, ensuring that all facilities and nuclear projects remain accountable;
 - c. Accept Applications for the grant on an annual basis and reviewed by Member State donors through the IAEA's Division of Finance and Budget;
 - d. Work under the provision that all facilities receiving funding:
 - i. Continue to comply with existing IAEA oversight and potential specific additional donor State oversight requests;
 - ii. Publish in-depth yearly facility-specific progress reports to donors to ensure that grant funds are being used appropriately and responsibly;
 - iii. Maintain enriched uranium levels below 5%, as confirmed and reported by bi-annual IAEA inspections.



Code: NPT/1/5

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Reaffirming Sustainable Development Goal 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (2015), which promotes peace, justice, and strong institutions,

Recognizing the danger that continued nuclear proliferation poses to illicit trafficking, regional arms races, and catastrophic humanitarian consequences,

Further recognizing the importance of international cooperation and dialogue in addressing nuclear proliferation challenges,

Acknowledging the role of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in facilitating dialogue and supporting global disarmament initiatives, including conferences on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone,

Recognizing the role of international organizations, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in promoting safeguards, verification, and peaceful nuclear cooperation,

Concerned by the high potential of escalated attacks on nuclear-rich regions within the Middle East, to include civilian infrastructure such as mines and power grids,

Upholds the role of the IAEA safeguards in providing monitoring, verification, and oversight of nuclear activities in the Middle East, contributing to the detection of potential non compliance,

Recognizing the role of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and the Caribbean in implementing the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Latin America and the Caribbean through verification, cooperation, and regional confidence-building measures,

Bearing in mind the annually adopted *General Assembly resolution 3263* (1974) reinforced the message for the establishment of an NWFZ in the region of the Middle East,

Acknowledging the sovereignty of Middle Eastern Member States and welcoming their efforts to enhance regional cooperation while respecting national autonomy,

Reaffirming that all measures undertaken within the Middle East NWFZ shall fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all participating States,

Inspired by Indonesia's National Research and Innovation Agency (BRNI) and Joint Center for Research, focused on developing a nuclear verification training workshop, expansion, and reintegration of nuclear energy in the Middle East,

Recognizing that the path toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East requires phased and multiphased agreements tailored to regional dynamics due to the complexity of the relationships in the region,

Remembering the success of existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, particularly the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996), as a model for regional disarmament which was done through phased agreement and regional cooperation which created a path for peace, security, and stability,

Recognizing the essential role of maritime routes in the transport of nuclear and radioactive materials for peaceful purposes,

Recognizing the risks of illicit trafficking, particularly within heavily trafficked maritime transit corridors including the smuggling and diversion of nuclear and radioactive materials and the exploitation of weak inspection systems,

Highlighting the need for dedicated national, regional, and international budgetary mechanisms to strengthen infrastructure in Middle Eastern States, monitoring technologies, and emergency response capacities, to ensure the safe transport of nuclear materials and the protection of IAEA Member States,

1. *Strongly recommends* the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction make the following changes to their program to better serve the creation of said zone, particularly through:
 - a. Open enrollment to any and all member or observer states of the United Nations to observe, and for states outside the region being able to freely and voluntarily participate;
 - b. Focusing on reviewing past frameworks and processes, and then creating a comprehensive framework and step-by-step process for the implementation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, as well as setting a timeline for implementing this system would:
 - i. Act like a benchmark system that sets clear policy objective and a timeline in which the IAEA will have complete oversight over both fissile material stock and peaceful nuclear energy use;
 - ii. Be reviewed by nuclear energy experts to create a Management Performance Board under the Secretary General and staffed by IAEA;
 - c. Continuing after the previously stated meeting this conference should continue meeting annually and focus on reviewing reports from the International Atomic Energy Association on the progress of middle eastern states have made and evaluating if changes are necessary;
 - d. Incentivizing progress on this framework and process, this conference should also serve the function of establishing which states are complying with the framework agreement, make recommendations to IAEA on what states should receive technology and information sharing to reward them as well as providing a forum technology sharing and scientific cooperation between Member States that are in compliance;
 - e. Recommending the conference provide supervision of the implementation of EU inspired collective action packs designed to facilitate step by disarmament through country specific plans; plans will include concrete objectives policy goals, and deadlines with

oversight from the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Implementation Organisation Secretary General aiming to build trust and create a benchmark for cooperation;

- f. Further encouraging, NPT recommends that the conference be able to determine which states do not meet agreed-upon disarmament benchmarks transparency requirements, or inspection protocols, recommended through the discretion of the Security Council, may face possible graduated economic and diplomatic sanctions; measures may include the temporary suspension of financial assistance, limitations on access to development funding, restrictions on trade cooperation agreements, and reduced eligibility for economic investment partnerships facilitated through participating states and international institutions; non-compliant states may face suspension from annual summits, reduced access to shared technological resources, and/or public reporting of non-compliance; these sanctions would be implemented progressively, allowing states the opportunity to return to compliance, while ensuring that continued economic benefits, financial support, and regional cooperation remain tied to measurable progress toward nuclear disarmament and long-term regional stability;
 - g. Further suggesting that the conference create the Salgado human rights review program to evaluate the current standing of human rights in the region, and evaluate and formally recognize the relationship between nuclear proliferation and human rights abuses, and then use that research to further promote and motivate the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East;
2. *Establishes* a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Implementation Organization (MENWFZ-IO) under the auspices of the League of Arab States, modeled after the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), with the objective of facilitating the standardization of state cooperation standardization of state cooperation across the region through:
- a. Filling a geographic void in the NPT architecture, therefore expanding the total population and areas protected by Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, bringing the international community closer to the creation of a 'Global NWFZ';
 - b. Encouraging the dialogue of ascension of all regional states to the NPT and relevant safeguards agreements, including Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) and additional protocols with IAEA;
 - c. Expands the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament for Asia and the Pacific to provide voluntary contributions to economic development observers, non-governmental organizations (World Nuclear Association), academic institutions, and regional bodies like The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) along to address political and security concerns hindering its adherence and participation;
 - d. Further invites technical and institutional frameworks established from previously established Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and OPANAL through capacity-building programs, joint workshops, and advisory missions to share best practices on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone implementation;
 - e. Promoting the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSAs) transparency and confidence-building through measures of including voluntary declarations of non-sensitive

nuclear activities and regional reporting frameworks aligned with IAEA safeguards; Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements;

- f. Ensuring continuous monitoring and evaluation of progress through periodic regional reports submitted to the NPT Review Conference and relevant United Nations bodies;
3. *Calls for* the development of regionally tailored security and inclusivity mechanisms to support the long-term sustainability of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone through:
- a. Deploying a cross-border, cryptographically secure radiation monitoring network around civilian nuclear infrastructure to guarantee transparent, continuous verification and facilitate automatic, joint fact-finding inquiries during radiological anomalies;
 - b. Considering legally binding negative security assurances with nuclear-weapon states to guarantee that States within the zone will not be subject to nuclear threats or attacks, ensuring that they trigger immediate United Nations Security Council intervention and multilateral economic sanctions in case they were to take place;
 - c. Integrating civil society participation in disarmament processes through structured consultative platforms that enhance transparency and public trust, specifically by institutionalizing a permanent civil society advisory council endowed with official observer status and the legal mandate to submit independent compliance audits;
 - d. Promoting the meaningful inclusion of women in line with international frameworks by enforcing mandatory gender party quotas within regional delegations in direct accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security, achieved;
 - e. Recognizing the disproportionate and scientifically proven vulnerability to conflict and nuclear risks that women and children experience, alongside the economic and humanitarian burdens they endure during conflict and displacement;
 - f. Partnering with academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and youth initiatives to raise awareness by integrating nuclear disarmament education into regional university curricula and establishing joint research fellowships for emerging scholars;
4. *Encourages* formal documentation of maritime activities through a cooperative framework allowing for the submission, evaluation, revision, and strengths with technical input by:
- a. Implementing the use of the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) amended international law to form compliance mechanisms facilitating reports on illicit movement of nuclear materials, using standardized submissions and technical review procedures;
 - b. Assisted by the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) to provide regional maritime information-sharing centers to ensure transparent documentation of maritime operations that support the establishment and maintenance of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone;
5. *Endorses* the adoption of a Mediterranean Maritime Nuclear Security Initiative, that:
- a. Draws attention to the risks of maritime nuclear transport by:

- i. Preparing coordinated response to accidents during maritime transport involving nuclear-powered ships due to the potential for radioactive contamination of coastal ecosystems;
 - ii. Understanding that loss of valuable nuclear material, for weapons or otherwise, is a potential risk of maritime transport;
 - b. Embraces a transparent approach for coordinated maritime monitoring based on the voluntary action of coastal Mediterranean states through:
 - i. Developing optional port authority training programs for Mediterranean coastal states in nuclear weapon identification and safe procedure;
 - ii. Utilizing technologies including passive radiation detectors, radiation portals, and advanced spectroscopic portals in processing maritime cargo;
 - iii. Instituting a stratified nuclear inspection protocol at ports, implementing an ordered process of primary inspection, secondary inspection, and further investigation;
 - iv. Implementing coordinated pre-notification protocols in case of nuclear weapon identification and shared tracking mechanisms regarding nuclear weapon transport;
 - v. Collaborating with Maritime state intelligence agencies and agencies from other states on a volunteer basis to maintain transparency as to the location and trajectory of ships containing nuclear weapons;
 - vi. Maintaining cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regarding tracking and navigational safety;
 - c. Designates an annual regional forum to host a communications meeting annually, promoting collaborative naval initiatives to build trust among Member States by:
 - i. Being hosted by a cycling rotation of participating Mediterranean coastal states;
 - ii. Designating forum time for sharing military information and communication protocols in shared waters;
 - iii. Providing additional shared maritime security training to enhance regional security and diplomatic ties;
 - d. Establishes this approach based on the voluntary action of coastal Mediterranean States as a preliminary benchmark in the gradual process for Middle Eastern nuclear disarmament;
 - e. Working in cooperation with pre-existing agencies such as IAEA and the European Union;
- 6. *Further encourages* Member States to begin transitioning and start implantation of down-blending stockpiled Nuclear warheads offering a gateway transition away from arms and to Atomic energy, and encourages the transition of nuclear warheads into peaceful nuclear energy use by:

- a. Including the limiting of the purchase and sale of Uranium;
 - b. Implementing down-blending for current nuclear stockpiles to encourage conversion from nuclear arms to clean nuclear energy;
 - c. Implementing a system where each Member State should continuously submit to the IAEA annual inspections;
7. *Further encourages* clear, explicit language to reflect and clarifies the implications of illicit attacks on civilian infrastructure by use of nuclear weaponry;
8. *Emphasizes* that all maritime security measures related to nuclear materials should remain strictly civilian in nature and should not contribute to the militarization of strategic waterways, and furthermore:
 - a. Requesting the development of transparency and reporting mechanisms, including the voluntary submission of information on maritime nuclear activities, in coordination with IAEA;
 - b. Encouraging the use of peer review processes and the linkage of compliance to access to technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives under the framework of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (1968);
9. *Calls for* the convening, under the auspices of the Middle East Nuclear- Weapon-Free zone Implementation Organization (MENWFZ - IO) established in Operative Clause 2, of a Regional Nuclear Transparency Assembly, open to all Member States of the League of Arab States and other States with a direct security and interested in the region, with the purpose of providing structured and accessible transparency on nuclear activities directly to Arab League Member States, the reporting and verification functions of IAEA and annual Zone Conference under the following conditions, including, but not limited to:
 - a. The Regional Nuclear Transparency Assembly to operationalize, within the framework of the IAEA Voluntary Reporting Scheme (INFCIRC/549), a regionally accessible transparency portal administered by IAEA Secretariat and accessible to all Member States of the League of Arab States, through which participating States may submit enhanced voluntary declaration beyond minimum treaty obligations, including:
 - i. The operational status and estimated annual production capacity of declared nuclear facilities;
 - ii. Nuclear fuel-cycle related research and development activities not involving nuclear material, consistent with Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540);
 - iii. Exports and imports of items listed under Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger List;
 - iv. Summary reports derived from such submissions be presented at each session of the Assembly for collective review;
 - b. Participating Member States mandate the MENWFZ-IO to be established, within its first year of operation, a Working Group of Geographic Delimitation, tasked with producing a

legally precise, mutually recognized, and operational definition of the proposed Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by:

- i. Reconciling existing international formulations, including prior technical and United Nations studies on regional delimitation;
 - ii. Resolving ambiguities related to maritime zones, Exclusive Economic Zone, and island territories, in accordance with international law and relevant treaty precedents;
 - iii. Ensuring that delimitation language remains inclusive, neutral, and non-accusatory toward all States with a legitimate regional security interest;
 - iv. Seeking a preliminary report to the Zone Conference within eighteen months of its establishment;
 - c. The geographic scope developed under sub-clause (b) be guided by baseline parameters, subject to negotiation, including:
 - i. All Member States of the League of Arab States as the primary regional grouping;
 - ii. Additional States with a demonstrated security nexus to the region, consistent with prior United Nations frameworks and participation in relevant regional conferences;
 - iii. The inclusion of maritime zones and Exclusive Economic Zones as defined under international law;
 - d. The establishment, under the MENWFZ-IO, of a Regional Nuclear Information Exchange (RNIE) as a confidence-building mechanism complementary to existing monitoring and verification structures, through which:
 - i. Participating States may formally request supplementary information regarding nuclear activities beyond treaty minimums, with responding States retaining discretion over sensitive disclosures;
 - ii. A non-attack pledge on nuclear facilities is formalized as a political declaration and submitted to the Zone Conference for endorsement;
 - iii. A direct communication channel is established between designated national nuclear authorities for rapid notification of nuclear incidents or radiological emergencies with potential cross-border impact;
10. *Supports* the creation of an annual Middle East Verification Training Program based on the structure of the Joint Research Center and BRNI focused on developing a nuclear verification training workshop, expansion and integration of nuclear energy in the Middle East overseen jointly with IAEA to increase confidence and trust in the non-proliferation regime in the region by:
 - a. Joint cooperations between nations for water desalination technology and nuclear-aided agriculture BRNI is focused on the expansion and integration of nuclear energy in the Middle East region to build trust amongst nations:

- i. With the cooperation of Indonesia's advancements in nuclear-aided agriculture and Morocco's cooperation on their water desalination technology both nations would be able to provide the framework of their technology to verified Middle Eastern Members;
 - ii. Where Japan's cooperation in funds and their JICA exportations program facilitate transport in nuclear technology such as Nuclear Desalination Technology to Middle Eastern Member States;
 - b. Creating a joint task force in order to work in tandem with the BRNI and verify these countries receiving training are using it accordingly, including, but not limited to:
 - i. Oversight by a representative from each state within the BRNI and Joint Resolution Center any decisions will be made in a democratic matter;
 - ii. Requiring BRNI Member States to go to the annual training sessions hosted by the Joint Research Center;
 - iii. Monthly reports of how the operations are going, and the use of the technology;
 - iv. Inviting IAEA nuclear verification experts to provide training workshops on verification measures and usage on modern verification tools;
 - c. Providing a final report to all Member States who have attended the forum regarding advancements made in verification systems and non-proliferation best practices;
11. *Urges* all Member States, in accordance with their respective national capacities and existing legal frameworks, to establish or strengthen dedicated budgetary allocations within their national financial architectures directed toward the following objectives:
- a. The commitment of measurable financial resources (expense of utility fees, costs of transportation, expense of labor, expense of construction materials, etc.) toward the construction, maintenance, and regulatory oversight of infrastructure systems designated for the safe and secure transportation of nuclear materials, in full conformity with applicable IAEA safety standards and international legal instruments;
 - b. Active utilization of the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulations (UNSCAR) as the primary multilateral funding channel for obligations arising under this resolution, and further instructs the MENWFZ-IO Secretariat to facilitate access to supplementary financing through bilateral agreements and voluntary contributions to designated IAEA Trust Funds, so that no State Party is structurally precluded from fulfilling its obligations solely on the basis of budgetary constraints, by:
 - i. Formally notifying UNSCAR of funding gaps identified through the biennial financial progress reports submitted to the IAEA Director General under Operative Clause 10;
 - ii. Actively brokering cost-sharing arrangements between States with greater fiscal capacity and those whose developmental circumstances limit independent compliance, using the MENWFZ-IO's institutional framework as the coordinating mechanism;

- iii. Ensuring that all supplementary funding arrangements are transparently documented and reported to the Zone Conference annually;
- c. Member States considering voluntary contributions to technical expertise (stockpile data, remote monitoring) directed toward capacity-building initiatives;
- d. Ensuring that the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) programming and reporting process shares a transparent financial progress report to the Director General of IAEA, detailing budgetary commitments undertaken in furtherance of the objectives set forth herein.



Code: NPT/1/6

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Referring to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (1968), particularly Article VI that mandates all Member States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures,

Viewing with appreciation the outstanding success of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone created by the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) and its focus on regional growth and stability,

Stressing the importance of supporting Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) being included into the discussion of disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy,

Re-emphasizing the goals set forth by United Nations Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) to uphold International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations and oversight for safeguards on nuclear development,

Having examined Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources as an already existing framework of safety for import and export, with an option to further expand,

Having studied the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and its innovation in developing disarmament verification tools and bridging the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear states,

Taking into account the sovereignty of Member States and the necessity to respect the right of Member States to maintain existing nuclear defense operations,

Noting the benefit for Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to collaborate with Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) to participate in trust-building initiatives in the region,

Considering the importance of aligning efforts toward the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ) with broader United Nations disarmament initiatives following the procedures set forth by the simulated Ipindovia case by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV),

Underlining the importance of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) and 17 (partnership for the goals) while implementing nuclear policy,

Reiterating the necessity to build broad support amongst civil society to strengthen domestic legitimacy and generate greater support for negotiations,

Taking note of General Assembly Resolution 3263 (XXIX) (1974), which called upon all States of the Middle East to initiate the development of an NWFZ,

Keeping in mind the Nuclear Trade Controls Course developed by the IAEA with the goal of supporting the transfer of nuclear materials between Member States,

Appreciating the work of the European Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative in assisting other Member States in their mission to promote the safe use and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in exercises such as Project 060,

Having examined the Technical Working Group for Nuclear Knowledge Management and its support of the IAEA in nuclear knowledge management for safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Observing the efficacy of the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in providing information on illicit trafficking and unauthorised uses of nuclear materials, as well as its current inability to track shipping point and destination inventory,

Acknowledging the results of the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) in prevention of nuclear material trafficking through recording inventory of nuclear material before and after shipping,

Recalling the United Nations *General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX) (1974)*, which provided expert consensus that accession to the NPT is an essential aspect of the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ),

Reaffirming the work of the African Union and its successful work in South Africa's wilful disarmament, which developed from strengthened economic and political ties,

Appreciative of the role that the review conferences for the *Pelindaba Treaty (1996)* and the *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (1967)* plays in establishing transparency and encouraging multilateral dialogue,

Pursuant of the *1995 Resolution on the Middle East* from the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which is the original agreement to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East,

Emphasizing that the Middle East demographic includes 60% of the population under 25 and has immense potential for the youth to foster conversation, regulation, and scientific development as common ground for trust building,

Fully aware that many states seeking to establish a NWFZ may require technical assistance and resources for a broad range of institutional avenues as seen with the *Pelindaba Treaty* and the *Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) (1995)* who were provided direct assistance in the forms of safety assessments, expertise for negotiations, and reporting structure in order to facilitate their respective treaties,

Considering that ongoing tensions, security dilemmas, and lack of trust within the region continues to prevent progress toward disarmament,

Calling for the implementation and advancement of focus groups for raising awareness modeled on United Nations Institute for Disarmament Initiative (UNIDIR) Nuclear Risk Reduction meetings both to commemorate an inclusive environment and promote emerging technologies such as medical and energy production applications,

Acknowledging the work of the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) and their mission of establishing an NWFZ in the region,

Recognizing the success of the IAEA's INPRO School on Strategic Planning for Sustainable Nuclear Energy (INPRO) in training Member States to build their expertise on sustainable nuclear energy development,

Bearing in mind that the creation of NWFZ must be pursued through inclusive dialogue that respects the security concerns of all states in the region, whilst upholding the principles of international law and sovereignty realized through a phased approach that is regionally owned,

1. *Requests* all Middle Eastern Member States to accede to the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* as a vital step toward a NWFZ in the Middle East;
2. *Proposes* the creation of the Middle East Nuclear Disarmament Initiative (MEND), a new Inter-Governmental organization modeled after the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), which supports the NWFZ created by the *Tlatelolco Treaty* which:
 - a. Seeks to include all members of the Middle East, as defined by a voluntary ad hoc committee to which all NPT signatories are invited and which shall assemble within 30 days of the passing of this resolution and return a decision to the NPT within 180 days of that assembly;
 - b. Meets biannually through rotating summit locations agreed upon by the Member States of MEND;
 - c. Facilitates the free flow of information and ideas across the Middle East through hosting conferences and sponsoring working groups that will discuss future plans for disarmament and trade discussions through knowledge sharing;
 - d. Develops a unified regional Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense strategy and standardized training programs on forensics in CBRN environments and catastrophe response;
 - e. Facilitates the implementation of verification measures by negotiating specific processes to carry out inspections and other technical approaches for verification, as well as foster trust building through facilitating dialogue and both economic and diplomatic integration;
 - f. Is organized and chaired by its Member States and operates without interference from external states;
 - g. Is funded voluntarily by its Member States, and will accept donations from other NPT Member States without gaining organizational power to prevent corruption and imposition on sovereignty;
3. *Incentivizes* Middle Eastern Member States to join and fund MEND, as well as the NPT, and submit their nuclear programs to the IAEA, urging all NPT Member States to:

- a. Aid in open trade agreements and communications with MEND Member States, for eventual progress towards sanctions relief for MEND states which offer the IAEA their full cooperation;
 - b. Refrain from taking adverse actions against any Member State which are revealed to have possessed a nuclear weapons program that signs an additional protocol and allows the IAEA access to official and unofficial nuclear sites and other sites suspected of possessing nuclear weapons activity by the Agency;
 - c. Form non-aggression pacts with MEND states that submit to IAEA inspections so as to protect maritime and land-based trade routes;
4. *Endorses* MEND creating an incentives program for NNWS non-nuclear-weapon states as a reward for those States which are seeking technology and information sharing platforms, for seeking the purposes of continual advancement towards disarmament in the region by:
 - a. Creating the pathway for a platform focused on civilian nuclear programs education, nuclear technology information systems informing of its aids and dissents, and providing unity through mutual collaboration amongst sovereign NWS and those affected by the MENWFZ;
 - b. Seeking to be introduced as an incentive to those who currently view the MENWFZ as a danger to their sovereignty and security;
 - c. Considering including nuclear-weapon-states within the program, but recognizes that the nuclear-weapons states wishing to participate, first begin focusing on disarmament before attempting to access this program;
 - d. Emphasizing focus on creating said platform through the UN rather than being owned by Member States themselves to increase ability and confidence building;
 - e. Moving towards deeper economic, social, and governmental commitments between states in order to build mutual trust and achieve the MENWFZ;
5. *Considers* the development of specialized national nuclear energy-focused agencies in Member States, as seen with the Liberian Environmental Protection Agency, primarily in the Middle East as an extension of the IAEA in order to:
 - a. Improve direct access to IAEA tools such as the Incident Emergency Centre (IEC) to aid Member States with the handling, removal, and care of radioactive materials and nuclear weapons disarmament through the sharing of knowledge experts and IAEA representatives between participating Member States using these national agencies as a tool of collaboration;
 - b. Focus on advancing nuclear safety in compliance with the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (NUSCC) as an extension of the IAEA to create nation-specific tangible policy;

- c. Implement specific Country Programme Frameworks (CPF) for Middle Eastern states to support the continuous transfer of technical expertise regarding disarmament and the handling of sensitive radioactive materials from IAEA to Member States;
 - d. Suggest the development of specialized training programs focused on developing preventative and emergency protocols for Member States through operations such as simulation-based learning environments, specifically through scenario modeling of nuclear crisis escalation for government officials, policymakers, and scientists on nuclear safeguards and verification mechanisms in collaboration with the IAEA;
 - e. Help train national representatives through the completion of these programs in nuclear competence and knowledge to support the development of nuclear policy in Member States with tactile knowledge;
 - f. Reinforce cross-border collaboration by bringing forth IAEA and NWFZ experts (from areas such as the African NWFZ to provide insight into how the continent overcame regional differences to achieve consensus) alongside country representatives to aid in the current development of a Middle East NWFZ with acknowledgement of ongoing tensions while protecting Member State interests, as seen in the 2011 IAEA Forum on Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone for the Middle East;
6. *Suggests* the implementation of regional youth initiatives modeled after the UN's Youth4Disarmament framework and Liberia's National Action Plan on Youth Peace and Security (NAP-YPS) to involve the youth of all regions in a collaborative effort in incentivizing nuclear non-proliferation and scientific development by:
- a. Focusing on solutions and common ground issues, such as food scarcity through shared geographical agriculture to allow countries with similar issues to grow economically through shared innovation, and discussing the safe use of nuclear energy to increase regional collaboration to build trust and create more opportunities to decrease conflict in the Middle East;
 - a. Ensuring meaningful participation, leadership, education, and economic empowerment by using youth training programs that discuss Security Council topics and resolutions as seen by the Model United Nations to transform youthful collaborators to be knowledgeable future leaders on security topics and humanitarian issues;
 - b. Aiding in educating the youth on how to replace using radioactive sources for nuclear weapons to instead be implemented into peaceful uses of technology to support health, energy, and agriculture industries specifically to achieve awareness and economic growth within Member States;
 - c. Encouraging the increase of trade, collaboration, scientific transfer, and co-operation holding annual conventions held by the UN Department of Global Communications (DGC) to discuss new findings in the safe use Nuclear technology for economic growth to fostering joint innovation between Member States;
 - d. Suggesting the creation of national nuclear education hubs as seen in the United States' national laboratory systems, specifically Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia

National Laboratories, for their university-to-lab pipelines to train specialized labor pools, specialized nuclear infrastructure, as well as plutonium science and research facilities;

7. *Calls upon* the integration of nuclear expertise into Member States from the IAEA and relevant nuclear organizations such as the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) in order to support the position of youth in the present and future by:
 - a. Implementing nuclear safety programs and majors into higher education, as seen with AFCONE and the University of Liberia in order to see a global growth of nuclear knowledge;
 - b. Aiding the supplementation of technical expertise flow from international to national to local levels;
 - c. Preparing the future generation in advance regarding nuclear weaponry, disarmament, and peaceful uses to enhance public policy and the future sessions of the NPT by discussion on Security Council topics, measured by the levels of successful implementation in Member States;
 - d. Developing capacity building and training measures, and the ability for youth to advocate for a more peaceful world;
8. *Recommends* the integration of non-governmental actors and civil society organizations into educational initiatives by expanding upon:
 - a. Current collaborative workshops, cross-border dialogue programs, and seminars run by IAEA to further promote regional trust, understanding, and cooperation in the Middle East;
 - b. The reduction of barriers to IAEA educating programs through collaboration with civil society actors ensuring full and equal public participation;
 - c. Programs for civilian-focused industries, such as nuclear medicine and technical skill development projects;
9. *Reaffirms* the importance of having specialists from NWS to train NNWS in the Middle East on nuclear safety, disarmament, and general nuclear power by:
 - a. Encouraging NWS, particularly with advanced nuclear energy and medical programs, to share efforts that improve nuclear safety standards and emergency procedures, primarily through joint forums and workshops;
 - b. Calling upon participating Member States in the Middle East to expand upon the aforementioned education programs taught by responsible Member States with nuclear programs, for the benefit of increased knowledge of the general public, politicians, and scientists working with medical/energy uses of nuclear material;
 - c. Promoting knowledge transfer between NWS and NNWS through workshops and joint research initiatives by increasing dialogue and discussion between NWS and NNWS;

10. *Recommends* IAEA expand the Incident and Trafficking Database's (ITDB) role to track the inventory of nuclear and radioactive material at the shipping point and destination, taking inspiration from countries with pre-existing tracking systems by:
 - a. Encouraging the IAEA to promote knowledge dissemination through expert knowledge sharing in practices surrounding databases by:
 - i. Inviting multiple experts in nuclear policy from countries with well-developed nuclear agencies to consult on best practices for transit policy;
 - ii. Endorsing the building of incentives programs to draw talented individuals in the world of database creation and maintenance;
 - b. Proposing knowledge sharing through dignitaries from countries with an effective tracking database, such as the United States and their NMMSS, to aid this transition;
 - c. Suggesting that the system adapt to track the quantity and weight of nuclear material in cross-border transit while it is in the inventory of shipping point, as well as that of the destination to ensure trafficking and dumping are more accurately recorded and prevented;
 - d. Further encouraging uniform reporting of nuclear material in transit by parties in possession to create broader transparency through these systems with the goal of building greater confidence in neighboring countries in the Middle East and Black Sea region;
11. *Requests* IAEA to extend the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources already in place within the IAEA, extending protections to the importing and exporting of radioactive goods by:
 - a. Asking that these shipments be monitored for protection of said radioactive goods with consistent communication between Member States to aid in cross-country travel;
 - b. Seeking that this program is aiding in the lessening of trafficking of nuclear goods for the betterment of implementing and keeping the MENWFZ;
 - c. Proclaiming this would be a principal of transparency and asking that this option be voluntary while increasing awareness of its importance;
 - d. Requesting to name this specific division 'Security and Logistics for Guarded Atomic Distribution and Oversight' otherwise known as "SALGADO";
12. *Suggests* Middle Eastern Member States to prioritise the safeguarding of their nuclear materials' trade routes, and preventing illicit trafficking and theft by:
 - a. Collaborating with regional capacity-building and knowledge sharing programmes, taking inspiration from the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence's Project 060 to assist domestic training in nuclear material monitoring;

- b. Co-operating with IAEA's Technical Working Group for Nuclear Knowledge Management to develop and implement safer trade routes for nuclear materials and greater co-operation with IAEA in the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology and material;
 - c. Endorsing a new module under IAEA's INPRO regarding export controls, illicit trafficking, and theft of nuclear material in transit;
13. *Promotes* continued work towards global adherence to Article VI of the NPT, which encourages both NWS and NNWS to pursue negotiations towards complete nuclear disarmament through:
- a. NWS communication with MEND to provide preemptive negative security assurances upon the creation of an NWFZ through communication with the MEND Initiative;
 - b. The *Treaty of Bangkok* organization and NWS, working together to establish a way to provide negative security assurances for SEANWFZ;
 - c. Continued promotion for the peaceful use of nuclear energy through technology exchanges such as IAEA nuclear reactor feasibility support;
 - d. Promoting Northeast African States and all others within NWFZs that have not yet ratified their respective treaties do so.



Code: NPT/1/7

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Appreciating the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) that have already been established and their proficiency in maintaining global safety, such as the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), the *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1985), the *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996), and the *Treaty of Semipalatinsk* (2006),

Recalling the provisions of Article VI of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) (1968) that obliges the parties to the treaty to negotiate effectively on measures relating to nuclear non-proliferation worldwide,

Aware of the alarming situation in the Middle East that has gone on for decades without resolution, and a lack of a NWFZ, affecting peace and trust among states, which has been further exacerbated by historical conflicts and regional tensions, and addressing concerns over regional Member State nuclear weapon possession, creation, and potential threats that threaten nuclear non-proliferation and international peace and security,

Emphasizing the importance of supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) efforts to monitor and verify Member States' adherence to their existing obligations under the NPT, as a confidence-building measure toward the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,

Keeping in mind the right of all Member States to utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including energy production and research, in accordance with international law and non-proliferation commitments,

Acknowledging the need for comprehensive dialogue to bolster transparency and trust, and cognizant of the positive implications of domestic nuclear programs insofar as promoting sustainable energy solutions,

Deeply aware that confidence-building, transparency, and regionally accepted verification measures are essential foundations for the eventual establishment of a MENWFZ, while also underscoring that independent technical verification is a fundamental prerequisite for trust and the eventual realization of the NWFZ,

Noting the need to address both the technical aspects, such as the IAEA procedures, and confidence-building mechanisms that rely on dialogue, reconciliation, and mutual comprehension to achieve peace and prosperity,

Emphasizing the long-term health risks involved with extensive nuclear testing, such as the exponential growth of thyroid cancer within local populations surrounding those sites,

Further emphasizing that according to the 2021 NPT Report, out of the 23 NPT Non-Nuclear Weapon State Parties in the Middle East, 21 have comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but only 10

have additional Protocols in place,

Seriously alarmed by the past and ongoing ideological and religious conflicts in the Middle East that threaten to erode confidence and obstruct any future efforts in the achievement of a NWFZ in the region,

Satisfied with the peaceful communication-driven programs run by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), like the council of bi-monthly meetings to ensure continued cooperation,

Acknowledging the crucial contributions made by civil society organizations, religious communities, and inter-religious movements towards dialogue and conflict resolution in the areas plagued by historical divisions,

Noting that 60% of Member States in the Middle East have adopted the *Small Quantities Protocol* (SQP) (1974) that limits reporting and safeguards obligations, while 1 Member State did not comply with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) obligations in 2024, as reported in UNIDIR's *Harmonizing the Minimum Non-Proliferation Commitments of States in the Middle East* (2025),

1. *Encourages* future regional councils of Middle Eastern Member States to model agencies and programs in existing NWFZs, per the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967) and the *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), by personalizing them to the specific needs of the region, by:
 - a. Modelling the Latin American Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, which brought together rival Member States to inspect facilities, enhancing transparency through innovative confidence-building measures (CBM), including joint inspections and information-sharing platforms;
 - b. Modelling also the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Agency, which focuses on forging regional cooperation and capacity in terms of nuclear safety, emergency readiness, and monitoring;
2. *Calls upon* all Member States in the region, including those that have yet to do so, to engage constructively with the United Nations-mandated Conference on the establishment of a MENWFZ, and encourages the Conference to model its framework after the Helsinki Process as a foundation for inclusive dialogue and phased technical verification;
3. *Strongly recommends* the establishment of a voluntary summit named the Salgado Summit for Peace in the Middle East, held annually, to further multilateral conversation on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East by:
 - a. Recognizing the fact that the Middle East is a unique region with unique challenges to establish a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, this summit will have the goals of bringing all Middle Eastern States to the table to create trust and encourage collaboration on the issue;
 - b. Recommending the inclusion of all relevant actors, including states not party to the NPT, non-member observer states adversely impacted by ongoing conflict, and delegations operating under heightened international scrutiny;

- c. Focusing on diplomatic discussion to create a framework and step-by-step process for the establishment of a MENWFZ, as well as a timeline for implementation;
 - d. Focusing also on reviewing the progress and ensuring that Middle Eastern states are meeting deadlines set out by the conference;
 - e. Calling for an observant group composed of members from the Zanginger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Stockholm conference, which will be heavily examined and approved by members of the Salgado Summit to come in and advise and help with their expertise;
4. *Strongly encourages* expanding upon the IAEA to strengthen benchmarks and timelines to be more efficient and effective for Member States to adhere to the implementation of safeguard systems in the region, through:
- a. Promoting additional voluntary reports of the safeguard mechanisms Member States are implementing and monitoring;
 - b. Reviewing reporting monthly;
 - c. Inspecting nuclear weapon sites, having Member States keep records of their nuclear materials, implementing sensors or monitoring systems, and having emergency protocols;
5. *Further invites* for the collaboration and support of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), which created an International Task Force for Peaceful Nuclear Development (ITFPND) aimed at supporting the safe, secure, and transparent use of nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes and scientific advancement;
6. *Requests* the United Nations to establish the Middle East Nuclear Monitoring Council (MENMC), composed of key regional stakeholders, and the permanent members of the Security Council serving in an advisory capacity, with the primary mandate of enhancing transparency and coordination in tracking the development, possession, and proliferation of nuclear weapons within the region, applicable to all regional states regardless of their status under the NPT, and operating in a complementary capacity to existing institutions, including the IAEA, by focusing on:
- a. Information-sharing, confidence-building measures, and regional dialogue rather than duplicating inspection or verification mechanisms already in place;
 - b. Having voting rights with the key regional states and an advisory role and access to information with the permanent Security Council members;
 - c. Requiring a consistent workforce to go into the region and implement an agenda with realistic, ongoing goals for the members to utilize;
 - d. Emphasizing the need for key regional stakeholders to participate in the activities of this council to allow for greater outcomes to be achieved, which would mean a Middle East free of nuclear weapons;
 - e. Facilitating capacity building through the exchange of scientific expertise, ensuring that all

participating Member States in the region possess the infrastructure necessary to maintain a high standard of nuclear security and management for peaceful nuclear usage;

- f. Providing, with the IAEA, technical support, training, and additional independent inspections;
7. *Calls* for a Joint Plan of Action that is aimed at reducing fissile material within the regions by:
 - a. Monitoring in the interim, using the Additional Protocol, regarding the current fissile material in the region comprehensively;
 - b. Encouraging Member States in the region to establish direct, voluntary data-sharing agreements between their National Regulatory Authorities on civilian nuclear programs, as a regional transparency measure complementary to, and beyond, their existing obligations under IAEA safeguards frameworks;
 8. *Requests* the development and reinforcement of the Middle Eastern Cooperation Coalition (MECC) under the IAEA, which will be responsible for:
 - a. Meeting bi-yearly to create and amend solutions that will help create a lasting NWFZ with the goal for the MECC to meet every 5 years once a more stable region is reached;
 - b. Communicating with each Member State through one-on-one meetings and inspections to ensure compliance with agreed-upon terms;
 - c. Encouraging an inclusive and cohesive environment for all stakeholder countries post, pre, and during, and post-emergencies;
 - d. Reporting violating Member States to the IAEA for violations that are not resolved and escalating to the Security Council for emergencies;
 9. *Calls* for the voluntary establishment of a regional Verification Working Group (VWG) as an independent technical body hosted under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Department, tasked with providing impartial advisory services for the Middle East by:
 - a. Appointing a panel of 12-15 independent nuclear scientists and legal experts through a Veto-Neutral Consensus Model to ensure international acceptability;
 - b. Nominating a Roster of Excellence of 50 globally recognized experts vetted by the IAEA Director General, excluding individuals with current government or intelligence affiliations;
 - c. Requiring all appointed experts to take an Oath of Supranationality, mandating they serve in their individual professional capacities and reject instructions from national governments, modeled after the European Commission;
 10. Recommends the regional implementation of the IAEA's International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ), by:
 - a. Encouraging Member States in the region to voluntarily request INSServ missions;

- b. Developing and sharing national action plans in response to mission findings;
 - c. Reporting on implementation progress through a regionally coordinated mechanism facilitated by the IAEA;
11. *Suggests* the United Nations Environment Assembly's existing nuclear weapons soil testing practices be implemented into a structured framework in the context of the Middle East for verification as an incentive for signatories by:
- a. Analyzing radioactive materials such as Cesium-137 and Plutonium to assess environmental contamination and long-term health risks from past nuclear testing;
 - b. Using nucleotide tracers to track soil degradation and the spread of radioactive material, which provides substantial evidence for verification;
 - c. Utilizing frameworks from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO) to monitor for violations;
 - d. Evaluating, through environmental surveys, risks to local populations with contaminated food and water;
 - e. Encouraging the strengthening of frameworks of the NPT and complementary documents, such as the CTBTO, to support the transparency provided by IAEA safeguards and verification measures;
12. *Calls upon* Member States for the reduction of access to importable nuclear materials for the use of weapon development in the Middle East, strengthening the implementation of Article III of the NPT through making the IAEA's safeguards more effective, efficient, and tailored to each country;
13. *Recommends*, following the efforts of existent organization as Abolition 2000, the formalization of an interfaith board for building a better relationship between the states in an annual international summit to pave the way for NWFZ creation in the future, by:
- a. Inviting religious leaders of the countries in the region to participate voluntarily in debates regarding the creation of the NWFZ;
 - b. Inviting also IAEA members to participate in conversations and provide a perspective on current regional amendments towards the NWFZ;
14. *Incentivizes* the voluntary inclusion of religious leaders, civil society, and relevant United Nations bodies to participate in the NPT Review Conference to contribute to dialogue within the Interfaith Board to serve as a confidence-building measure through:
- a. Inviting appropriate personnel, experts, and key members of society to contribute to the debate;
 - b. Coordinating between the Interfaith Council and relevant international organizations, including but not limited to: The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), IAEA, NGOs and faith-based peace organizations, such as the UN Interagency Task Force on Religion and Development and the Committee of Religious NGOs at the United

Nations;

- c. Facilitating diplomatic work towards the creation of an NWFZ;
- d. Creating regular dialogue between faiths and cultures within the region;
- e. Educating about the importance of peace, coexistence, and mutual security;
- f. Contributing a unique faith-based perspective to a multifaceted approach to such a complex issue;
- g. Meeting during the NPT Review Conference to debate important topics to achieve the NWFZ at a site to be determined by the region Member States wishing to attend the summit;
- h. Producing, as the end goal of this summit, a report after each meeting that would be delivered to the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction.



Code: NPT/1/8

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) (1974) and its intentions to encourage a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East;

Understanding the value of neutral ground for negotiations, and the need for rapid negotiations that enable a treaty to come to fruition;

Bringing attention to the necessity of the involvement of all Member States in the United Nations (UN) to facilitate NWFZs;

1. *Requests* the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East through joint negotiations which consists of Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkiye, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (hereafter referred collectively as “listed Member States”), that is to not take effect until all listed Member States are party to the NPT, and is to be guided in structure by the existing NWFZ treaties, such as the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), the *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1985), and the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (2009);
2. *Strongly urges* negotiations for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East to take place in Indonesia as a neutral location for three days every other month following the adoption of this resolution, to include:
 - a. Joint dialogue between representatives of all listed Member States;
 - b. An interfaith dialogue between faith leaders from each listed Member State selected by representatives of that Member State;
 - c. Dialogue on shared nuclear research for agriculture, energy, and medicine;
 - d. Conversations with agencies and bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), National Center for Nuclear Radiological Security (NCNRS), and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) on security regarding nuclear material;
 - e. Discussing the formation of a regional working group composed of representatives of listed Member States considering joining an NWFZ that would be trained by the IAEA on its standards in order to encourage Middle East NWFZ Member States to mutually:
 - i. Conduct additional reciprocal NWFZ and safety compliance inspections by IAEA certified inspectors of NWFZ Member States’ peaceful nuclear facilities as a possibility;

- ii. Develop nuclear material accounting systems to maintain accountability for fissile material within the NWFZ;
 - iii. Create emergency plans in case of accidents involving any nuclear technology being used for peaceful purposes that may be activated quickly for collective and collaborative responses to emergencies;
 - iv. Establish a hotline to reach designated leaders in NWFZ Member States for immediate communication within the NWFZ in event of any emergencies;
3. *Encourages* all United Nations Member States to participate in the creation and fulfilment of incentives for those that participate and follow the rules of the treaty, with suggestions such as:
- a. Formation of a nuclear power sharing program where Member States sell and buy power generated by nuclear power plants that intends to increase peaceful use of nuclear material in a mutually beneficial manner by providing value from further electrification and benefits from peaceful fissile material use;
 - b. Creation of an educational support fund voluntarily funded by Recognized Nuclear Weapons States to be distributed to assist in civilian use nuclear education and overseen by the IAEA;
 - c. Requesting the United Nations Security Council conduct a limited removal of sanctions for listed Member States that sign onto the NWFZ treaty;
 - d. Facilitating negotiations and supporting valuable conversations between leaders inside and outside of the region by continuing the conversation outside the bi-monthly negotiations and facilitating cooperation;
 - e. Promoting conversation through a dialogue with listed Member States that are not party to the NPT on the possibility of any such Member State joining the NPT.



Code: NPT/1/9

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Considering the rising tensions in the Middle East and the necessity of working towards the stabilization of nuclear non-proliferation,

Expressing concern about nuclear weapon transparency, possession, acquisition, and development in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the importance of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East as a key measure to strengthen regional and international peace, security, and stability,

Conscious that sustainable progress toward a Middle East NWFZ requires inclusive regional dialogue and mutual trust among Member States,

Aware of concerns of external States' involvement in the Middle East as related to national sovereignty and internal decision-making,

Bearing in mind the persistent gap in the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, noting that while 144 States have brought the Additional Protocol (AP) into force as of late 2025, several regional actors in the Middle East have either not yet signed or have failed to achieve entry into force of these essential safeguards,

Encouraging the inclusion of Middle Eastern states in dialogue and cooperative, incentive-based frameworks, including engagement with institutions such as the World Bank, as a bilateral pathway to establish trust, promote participation in nuclear-weapon-free initiatives, and contribute to the broader multi-lateral solutions,

Observing the strategic latency from Member States in the Middle East to enter into non-proliferation agreements, such as an NWFZ, without treaty-based assurances from nuclear-armed Member States to not use said arms in conflict against them,

Appreciating the 191 Member States that agreed to the obligation outlined in the NPT, particularly in Article VI, which calls for negotiation on nuclear disarmament and encourages member states to create agreements in good faith, and additionally Article VII, which allows any member to implement Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) in their respective regions and territories,

Reminding that Article IV of the NPT provides a basic framework against discrimination against the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that cooperation between Middle Eastern states serves as a vital step for confidence-building foundations for the establishment of a regional safeguard framework,

Acknowledging that the possession of nuclear weapons threatens the sovereignty, self-determination, transparency, and security of Member States, and that commitment to the pillars of the *Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) (1968) addresses this threat,

Endorsing the consolidation of region-based nuclear weapons treaties under the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) to create educational dialogue in the Middle East,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 77/38, which underscores the importance of the NPT framework in promoting nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 76/63 which calls upon Member States to recognize the serious threat nuclear proliferation in the Middle East poses to the international community,

Expressing its appreciation of General Assembly resolution 72/67 (2017) and previous international efforts, including United Nations General Assembly resolutions 3263 (XXIX) (1974), 79/404 (2024), and 80/17 (2025) to establish an NWFZ, while noting the region's uneven safeguard implementation,

Concerned regarding the illicit trafficking of nuclear material due to its adverse effects on regional stability,

Noting with approval the strides made by numerous Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements (CSA) towards standardizing verification and information gathering methods to reduce the presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and globally,

Taking into account that the World Bank and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on nuclear energy financing, following the World Bank lifting its ban on funding nuclear energy in 2025,

Having considered that reciprocating agreements between existing and aspiring nuclear-armed Member States accelerates global non-proliferation efforts and disincentivize the production of nuclear weapons for existing nuclear-armed Member States,

Underlining the necessity of proper incentive structures, such as security assurances and credible commitment mechanisms, to reward non-proliferating behavior from Member States,

Mindful of the importance of structured transparency and confidence-building mechanisms, which include a technical dialogue forum that invites all Member States and more structured security measures on the transfer of nuclear energy that show transparency, while sharing information voluntarily on a reliable forum that can allow for trust to be built continuously,

Having examined the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials as a bilateral verification model that successfully works to create unity, in the belief that a reiteration of this approach could be the first step to creating an NWFZ in the Middle East,

Guided by successful treaties, such as the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967) and the *Andean Charter for Peace and Security* (2002), which established an NWFZ through a gradual ratification process and the first WMD-free zone in the world, both of which would be useful as a framework to build confidence among Member States throughout the Middle East via an intimate and focused multilateral approach,

Calling attention to the rising tensions in the Middle East and the necessity of working towards the

stabilization of nuclear non-proliferation,

Welcoming rigid technical debates to foster inclusive, multilateral dialogue to actively engage regional organizations and empower civil society to help build transparency from the ground up,

Convinced that civil society organizations, academic institutions, and youth-led movements represent indispensable partners in building a culture of transparency and mutual trust necessary to sustain a lasting NWFZ, recognizing that top-down governmental frameworks alone have historically proven insufficient to resolve the deep-rooted security asymmetries of the region,

1. *Recommends* that NPT States Parties expand on IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme utilization for regional projects to support voluntary transparency measures, safeguards implementation, and capacity-building by:
 - a. Targeting collective allocation of 1.5 million USD by 2028, funded through assessed and voluntary contributions by NPT States Parties and existing IAEA mechanisms;
 - b. Monitoring progress through participation metrics, including a minimum 70 percent attendance rate in annual workshops and voluntarily adopting a permanent declaration of its civil and military nuclear stockpiles;
2. *Proposes* a step-by-step ratification process modeled after the past regional NWFZ agreements, ensuring that Member States can join NWFZs gradually as regional security asymmetries are resolved;
3. *Encourages* the development of academic partnerships and training initiatives in nuclear security and safeguards, involving universities, research institutions, civil society, and relevant non-governmental organizations, through the creation of region specific committee by the IAEA and Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA) and the participation of all regional actors, to:
 - a. Conduct joint research on advanced verification technologies;
 - b. Provide regional training and capacity-building programmes through on-site training, advisory missions, and technical assistance, to strengthen the effective implementation of verification obligations;
 - c. Promote scientific cooperation and confidence-building among Member States;
4. *Expresses its hope* for the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to expand access to information and resources on nuclear non-proliferation, so that NGOs working on the issue can effectively distribute information across the region, including:
 - a. Specialized resources based upon the region's technological infrastructure and scientific understandings;
 - b. Integrating policy discussions between Member States and civil society organizations with the creation of an inclusive forum within the framework of the conference for establishing NWFZ by:

7. *Suggests* the expansion of the current CSAs in concordance with IAEA standards, in an effort to verify compliance and streamline transparency initiatives via the following:
 - a. Implementing new technologies, such as improved surveillance imagery, satellite tracking, and other emergent technologies modeled after the Republic of Korea “K-Safeguards” monitoring system already applied in the Korean Peninsula to provide a unified framework;
 - b. Furthering surveillance and record keeping for detailed records of nuclear material quantities, transfers of nuclear material, and nuclear processing facilities;
 - c. On-site inspections to ensure countries are honoring multi-lateral commitments by:
 - i. Verifying records;
 - ii. Collecting environmental samples;
 - iii. Furthering remote monitoring;
8. *Invites* the continuation of multilateral discussions through UNFOLD ZERO’s Nuclear Free Middle East that mediates dialogue to support a gradual integration into a sustainable NWFZ that:
 - a. Includes regular consultations by high-level chairs to address concerns and allow for Member States to discuss ideas and achieve mutual understanding;
 - b. Creates communication channels through UN frameworks and Middle Eastern Member States that allow for technology transfers to be public knowledge to hold Member States accountable and to foster more trust in the maneuvering of nuclear energy throughout the international community;
9. *Strongly encourages* the expansion of the UNIDIR Dialogue on Regional Security and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to become an annual Middle East Non-Proliferation Dialogue Conference, a specialized committee of the NPT to meet biannually with the purposes of:
 - a. Engaging Middle East NPT parties in open dialogue about joint non-proliferation responsibilities and efforts;
 - b. Facilitating the creation of bilateral and small-scale multilateral treaties to improve confidence in the non-proliferation regime;
 - c. Recommending action to the larger NPT review conference through joint resolutions;
 - d. Conducting yearly meetings to review progress and make changes;
10. *Supports* the establishment of a reciprocative transparency clause within any NWFZ created amongst Member States in the Middle East, affirming that Member States with existing arsenals of nuclear weapons will not utilize them in conflicts with Member States in the Middle East that voluntarily enter into a NWFZ with:

- a. The reciprocity agreement between states providing reasonable assurance for Member States in the Middle East that voluntarily enter into an NWFZ agreement that their voluntary non-proliferation efforts will not become a strategic disadvantage in potential conflicts with existing nuclear-armed Member States by:
 - i. Establishing a security guarantee wherein any use of nuclear weapons on a non-nuclear Member State signed onto the NWFZ is direct noncompliance with the reciprocation transparency clause and constitutes as an infringement of signed agreements and national security guarantees;
 - ii. Opening diplomatic channels between Member States with existing civilian nuclear facilities and Member States that are actively developing some, with the expectation that further dialogue is facilitated formally through the UNODA;
 - b. Nuclear-armed Member States being party to any agreements settled in the establishment of a Middle Eastern NWFZ, providing that they agree to aid Middle Eastern countries in fissile material transfer verification standardization through:
 - i. Promoting standardized fissile material classification codes;
 - ii. Promoting information sharing for effective nuclear energy infrastructure development that does not prioritize investment into weapons manufacturing;
 - iii. Establishing bilateral data exchanges between Member States;
11. *Calls for* an expansion of the Capacity Development Initiative (CDI) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which provides support for training and courses on legal, technical, and political aspects of nonproliferation through expansion, which would include a subprogram of the CDI, which would focus specifically on intervention, aiming towards collegiate and graduate students in law and public policy, considering the future of policy, to provide increased awareness on disarmament through FFcourses or modules, targeted towards non-proliferation within the Middle East;
12. *Further invites* that the World Bank establish issuable “Nuclear Energy Development Credits” (NEDCs) to increase the flow of capital from international financial institutions to Member States that are developing sustainable nuclear energy programs, by:
- a. Making NEDCs available by application and interview, both reviewed by the World Bank in collaboration with the IAEA for Member States that seek to develop infrastructure regarding sustainable nuclear energy development, by:
 - i. Categorizing NEDCs as a credit program under the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), maintaining current sovereign lending structures used by the World Bank to finance development programs globally;
 - ii. Following standard IBRD funding program protocol for applications and credit contract negotiation, wherein Member States present project information to IBRD funding administrators and negotiate the terms of the contract itself, including funding amount, time length, and options for renewing the contract;

- b. Subjecting NEDC recipient Member States to mandatory facility inspection, program evaluation, and IAEA Additional Protocol application to allow Member States to access capital for development, subject to their willingness to maintain nuclear energy development without the goal of proliferating nuclear weapons development by:
 - i. Facility inspection and program evaluation administered by the IAEA, who collaborated with the World Bank specifically for properly administering funds and verifying contract adherence for nuclear energy funding from the World Bank;
 - ii. Contract termination and immediate suspension of credit disbursement following failure to comply with mandatory inspections;
 - iii. World Bank referral for action to the UN Security Council following repeated egregious mandatory inspection failures;
- c. Allowing for the dispersal of NEDCs through the governments of Member States to internal policy bodies that work on infrastructure or energy development by:
 - i. Following the standards set for other development-focused funding mechanisms in the World Bank, recipients of NEDCs will have the ability to disburse funds internally across government agencies that will be involved in the development of nuclear energy infrastructure;
 - ii. Detailing on which government agencies each recipient can disburse funds to will be determined during contract negotiation with the IBRD;
- d. Maintaining that privatized development be included in the credit contract, providing that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) agrees to enter into negotiations alongside the IBRD for a particular recipient of NEDCs and:
 - i. All privatized development projects involving NEDC funding would involve a partnership between the IBRD and the IFC, which is standard for bringing private firms into World Bank development projects;
 - ii. Where each recipient contract is unique in that the IFC reserves the right to refuse or allow the disbursement of NEDCs for privatized development projects;
 - iii. Where states are still eligible to reapply for NEDCs without a privatized development plan if said privatized development plan is not approved by the IFC.



Code: NPT/1/10

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Keeping in mind General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015), which establishes the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and specifically SDG 4 quality education, 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies and 17 on partnerships for the goals,

Appreciating General Assembly resolution 73/546 (2018), which requests the Secretary-General to convene annual sessions of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction until a legally binding treaty is concluded,

Recalling the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization *Recommendation on Education for Peace and Human Rights, International Understanding, Cooperation, Fundamental Freedoms, Global Citizenship, and Sustainable Development* (2023), which calls on Member States to ensure that their education policies are guided by a global perspective and a commitment to international solidarity,

Recognizing the importance of educating policymakers and nuclear regulators on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) obligations to promote responsible nuclear practices,

Aware that the digital revolution and rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and dual use technologies have significantly complicated traditional nuclear safeguard frameworks, requiring the adoption of updated verified methods and modernized educational curricula to prepare the next generations of policymakers with the tools they require,

Expressing appreciation for the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles School on Strategic Planning for Sustainable Nuclear Energy,

Acknowledges with deep gratitude the work of the International Centre for theoretical physics in the European Union in enhancing nuclear education for youth,

Reminded by Article I of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) (1968) which promises members to not transfer or give control of nuclear explosive devices, directly or indirectly, to any recipient and to not encourage, assist, or induce a non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons/nuclear explosive devices,

Recognizing the lack of transparency and accountability within the Middle East regarding the use of Nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the sovereignty of Middle Eastern Member States while encouraging cooperation within the region,

Observing that not all states who are part of the Middle East are members to the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*,

Acknowledging the importance of confidence-building measures to promote regional peace and security in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the need to enhance trust in the Middle Eastern region, while emphasising the importance of transparency and verification measures consistent with the NPT, and compliance with the Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty which aims to address issues regarding the risk of existing stockpiles,

Acknowledging that the absence of a shared information baseline among Middle Eastern states remains a fundamental obstacle to confidence-building and the eventual establishment of an NWFZ,

Guided by the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the NPT Review Conference, which recognises that interim measures and the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction are essential for regional peace and security,

Observing that a gradual and sustainable adoption approach, where all decisions are formulated with cohort policy guidelines allow for successful implementation,

Emphasizing the importance of Comprehensive IAEA Safeguard Agreements and their work to engage in a more cooperative framework within the Middle East,

Conscious of the threats posed by state and non-member states possessing nuclear capabilities in the Middle East,

Denouncing the defense strategy of nuclear ambiguity, as it may limit mutual cooperation and progression to a Middle Eastern NWFZ,

Affirming that regional ownership of verification mechanisms strengthens compliance, builds confidence among states, and complements the work of the IAEA,

Concerned by the instances of nuclear energy being misused by States which jeopardizes the security of other States, thus necessitating the need for domestic agreements such as the 123 agreement (1954), which states the requirement for the conclusion of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement for significant transfers of nuclear material or equipment,

Recalling the successful establishment of regional verification bodies in other NWFZ, notably the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCON) under the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, as well as UN organizations such as the IAEA and United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in global disarmament measures,

Noting with appreciation the role of the IAEA in encouraging member states to adopt annual reports, launch investigations if member states fail to meet these audits, and report these member states to the United Nations Security Council,

Validating that dual-tracking verification models, combining IAEA international inspections with regional peer review processes, have proven effective in other NWFZ contexts,

Acknowledging the lack of cooperation between the Middle Eastern states, which affects the development of the pillars of the NPT mandate, and the diplomacy of the international community, which may have discourse among each other and the importance of full and complete compliance with the IAEA in promoting nuclear disarmament,

Alarmed that 400 kg of 60% enriched uranium is being stockpiled in the Middle East region in 2025 alone according to the statement of the Director General of IAEA,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all Member States in the region to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT, IAEA safeguards, and international law,

Acknowledging the difficulty of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East without concrete verifications and safeguards measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in violation of Article I of the NPT through IAEA, such as onsite inspections, environmental sampling, and remote monitoring,

Noting with appreciation the work of the IAEA Computer Security for Nuclear Security programme in the prevention of nuclear cyber data attacks, as well as the IAEA nuclear trade Export Controls online course, which highlights the leakage between safeguards and export controls, including their mutually reinforcing role,

Recognizing the value of the *modified Small Quantities Protocol* (2005) in closing verification loopholes,

Concerned by the instances of nuclear energy being misused by Member States which jeopardizes the security of other States,

Suggesting Member States to further cooperate with an already existing VCDNP Task Force on Peaceful Uses, including expanded and improved partnership, Safety and Security and Safeguard, Sustainability and Access to technology,

Affirming regional ownership of verification mechanisms strengthens compliance, builds confidence among states, and complements the work of the IAEA,

1. *Recommends* the vast expansion of existing international and regional nuclear education programs in order to expand coordinated educational initiatives across the Middle East region by:
 - a. Pursuing further collaborations and expansions within existing international Nuclear Education programs facilitated through the United Nations bodies;
 - b. Implementing outreach programs in partnership with universities, modeled on the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, to build nuclear knowledge among students;
 - c. Recommending that the UNODA facilitate specific regional and community-based educational programs for regions directly affected by nuclear materials or development;
 - d. Partnering the IAEA with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) for the establishment of educational curriculum and programs directed towards education on clean nuclear energy through collaboration between IAEA, UNESCO and UNICEF to create a school curriculum relevant to the goals of disarmament in the region, as well as encouraging science learning to help the next generation better understand the benefits of clean nuclear energy;
 - e. Instructing UNESCO and IAEA to create accessible resources that allow individuals to educate themselves on the importance and possibilities of clean nuclear energy;
2. *Draws the attention* to Member States to further expand upon specifically Nuclear Education programs facilitated by the IAEA, through:

- a. The expansion of capacity-building and educational initiatives, partnering with the IAEA's computer security for Nuclear Security Programme to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear material to further train nuclear inspectors, educate policymakers, and promote awareness of peaceful nuclear technology and verification measures;
 - b. The creation of a Middle Eastern Network for Education in Nuclear Technology, following the tradition of the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology, African Network for Education in Nuclear Science and Technology;
 - c. Supporting the expansion of IAEA's nuclear trade Export Controls online course to streamline education on dual-use items to prevent the misuse of these technologies in the middle east for military use;
 - d. Expanding IAEA's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles university workshops to high schools across the Middle East, to enhance youth participation in civic nuclear activities;
 - e. Adding additional means of Nuclear Education programs, specifically calling for the expansion of Nuclear Education within the region of the Middle East targeted towards the civilian population to bridge the knowledge gap between professional and mass populations, and these programs, including seminars and routine meetings, are intentionally rooted within local organizations (ex: the Stimson Program) as well as funded through the Arabs Foundations Forum;
 - f. Creating an accredited program for secondary schools, within in the middle eastern region, this focuses on a grassroots approach this will be funded through targeted grants throughout the Middle East;
 - g. Suggests that Member States within the Middle East region work collaboratively with localized organizations, such as the Maddad Foundation, to create programs for youth education within the Middle East on Nuclear Education;
3. *Asks* the IAEA Technical Working Group for Nuclear Knowledge Management to expand their scope to include export regimes in the peaceful use of nuclear technology to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to the Middle East for military purposes;
 4. *Recommends* the establishment of a Joint AU–League of Arab States Dialogue Platform, in cooperation with UNODA and the IAEA and facilitated by UNODA, mandated to:
 - a. Convene annual consultations;
 - b. Provide technical advisory support through a standing panel of experts, including former Treaty of Pelindaba negotiators;
 - c. Develop model treaty provisions and a shared glossary to facilitate negotiations;
 - d. Conduct negotiation simulations and confidence-building workshops;
 - e. Maintain a secure digital platform for continuous knowledge-sharing throughout the roadmap toward a Middle East NWFZ;

- f. Create open summits addressing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East that emphasizes security concerns, which have incentivized countries in the region to embark on nuclear proliferation and to be reluctant to sign onto the NPT and encourages Member States outside the region to participate and establish the groundwork for an Regional Diplomatic Compliance Network (RDCN) that centers cooperation amongst Member States;
5. *Requests* that the IAEA expand the comprehensive roadmap for the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ, to incorporate specific, time-bound during 2027-2028 and measurable indicators of progress there by strengthening and building upon existing ones by:
 - a. Cooperating with the IAEA, recommending to cap the enrichment level of uranium to 20% as well as the stockpiling to 300g in 2029;
 - b. The initiation and completion of negotiations aimed at producing a draft treaty text by 2030;
6. *Requests* IAEA to introduce a voluntary biannual report for countries to report on nuclear materials, safeguard and verification process expenditure, modelled off of the European Union's program MilEx;
7. *Encourages* all Middle Eastern states, in collaboration with the IAEA, to build upon existing information exchange practises, such as the Safeguard Support Programme Information and Communication System, and develop a structured regional data-sharing platform about nuclear activities to go beyond current IAEA reporting and ensure transparency through:
 - a. The Investigation of Member States in the Middle East to see if they have nuclear weapon capabilities for transparency purposes and the utilisation of nuclear energy for only peaceful uses modeled on already existing frameworks such as the *123 agreement*, which in agreement with the United States, works to expand the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only;
 - b. Submitting declarations of their nuclear facilities and material inventories;
 - c. Facilitating real-time information sharing of potential nuclear related threats;
 - d. Providing advanced notification of missile tests and military exercises to enhance regional confidence building among states;
8. *Calls upon* all Middle Eastern states to explore, in consultation with the IAEA, the feasibility of establishing a regional verification body modelled off pre-existing frameworks such as the AFCONE, to complement IAEA safeguards with a peer-based compliance layer which would give ownership to Middle Eastern States and protect their sovereignty, including:
 - a. Conducting mutual inspections among member states of this verification body;
 - b. Running peer review processes to assess compliance with agreed nuclear obligations;
 - c. Receiving IAEA technical support and independent cross-checking to ensure international standards are maintained;
 - d. Holding conferences where the regional states can report on their nuclear energy every four years;

9. *Urges* all Middle Eastern states that have signed but not yet ratified the *Additional Protocol* (1995) to bring it into force without further delay, therefore enhance transparency and confidence-building among regional states through:
 - a. Encouraging the expansion of the scope of verifiable information available to IAEA inspectors across the region;
 - b. Prioritising Middle Eastern states that have ratified the Additional Protocol for enhanced participation in its Technical Cooperation Programme in the IAEA, including access to training and civilian energy partnership;
10. *Recommends* an efficient IAEA program that establishes and publishes transparent information that fellow Member States with Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements can view and consider, and would include:
 - a. Specific regulations and for the submissions of IAEA Safeguard Agreements;
 - b. Specifying nuclear non-proliferation priorities within their voluntary commitments;
 - c. Suggesting that the IAEA uphold these rules and regulations that have been approved for the specific Member State;
11. *Encourages* the creation of an RDCN to, which would have roles such as but not limited to:
 - a. Being a multilateral group modelled off previous summits or diplomatic initiatives done to remedy complicated relations between key Middle Eastern powers and would have the responsibilities including:
 - i. Efficient communication;
 - ii. Expediting productive dialogue;
 - iii. Efficient improvement of resources to reach an agreement on nuclear disarmament;
 - b. Be a professional peace-seekers that will work in coordination with regional members of various groups, such as but not limited to:
 - i. The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom);
 - ii. The Zangger Committee;
 - iii. The Nuclear Supplier Groups;
 - iv. The European Union External Action;
 - v. The Wassenaar Arrangement;
 - c. Sharing information and mechanism used in other nuclear zones over the world through the Regional Diplomatic Compliance Network;
 - d. Recommend the implementation of incremental Confidence-Building Measures, such as:

- i. Enhanced regional transparency through the voluntary exchange of technical data regarding civilian nuclear energy programs;
 - ii. Joint workshops on nuclear forensics and illicit trafficking prevention to foster technical cooperation;
- 12. *Invites* all Nuclear-Weapon States to adopt negative security assurances, and to report on related doctrinal measures at future NPT Review Conferences, as a confidence-building step toward reducing nuclear risks and advancing nuclear disarmament;
- 13. *Encourages* all regional Member States to model the Middle East WMD-zone Track II dialogue initiative into a digital platform for easier access to all Middle Eastern Member States to any security threats to strengthen the collaboration and therefore confidence building in the region;
- 14. *Calls for* the establishment of an International Task Force for Peaceful Nuclear Development aimed at supporting the safe, secure, and transparent use of nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes and scientific advancements;
- 15. *Calls upon* the IAEA to enhance the digital safeguards program to modernize verification and compliance reporting by providing member states with a secure, standardized digital portal that aims to:
 - a. Establish annual safeguard reports that can be submitted, peer-reviewed, and evaluated with independent technical input;
 - b. Incorporate AI satellite security monitoring specifically trained to flag dual use technology transfer and anomalous nuclear movement, with findings reported directly to the IAEA Director General;
- 16. *Proposes* confidence-building measures, including the voluntary declaration of nuclear facilities and the adoption of mutual inspection agreements by:
 - a. Coordinating with United Nations Mechanisms, including the United Nations Peacekeeping and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, recognizing that regional stability underscores the implementation of such measures and promoting stability is essential for enabling effective dialogue and non proliferations;
 - b. Developing voluntary, financial based incentive frameworks in which each Member State demonstrating an increase in transparency, cooperation, and compliance may receive expanded access to peaceful nuclear energy technology and production, an increment in technical assistance by the IAEA and organizational development support for nuclear safety, and infrastructure development and security to promote participation and trust without coercion.