



Documentation of the Simulation of the

Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT)*



Conference A

29 March - 2 April 2026

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NPT

Committee Staff

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|---------------------------|--------------------|
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| Chair | Alesia Babich |

Agenda

1. Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East
2. Safeguards and Verification Measures for Nuclear Disarmament

Resolutions adopted by the Committee

| Code | Topic | Vote (In favor - Against - Abstention) |
|-------------|--|---|
| NPT/1/1 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 98 in favor, 17 against, 48 abstentions |
| NPT/1/2 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 89 in favor, 34 against, 40 abstentions |
| NPT/1/3 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 73 in favor, 49 against, 41 abstentions |
| NPT/1/4 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 81 in favor, 38 against, 44 abstentions |
| NPT/1/5 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 85 in favor, 31 against, 47 abstentions |
| NPT/1/6 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 99 in favor, 14 against, 50 abstentions |
| NPT/1/7 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 73 in favor, 22 against, 68 abstentions |
| NPT/1/8 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | Adopted without a vote |
| NPT/1/9 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | Adopted without a vote |
| NPT/1/10 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free | 77 in favor, 31 against, 55 abstentions |

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|----------|--|---|
| | zone in the Middle East | |
| NPT/1/11 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | Adopted without a vote |
| NPT/1/12 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 89 in favor, 16 against, 58 abstentions |
| NPT/1/13 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | Adopted without a vote |
| NPT/1/14 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | Adopted without a vote |
| NPT/1/15 | Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East | 68 in favor, 50 against, 45 abstentions |

Summary Report for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held its quinquennial session to consider the following agenda items:

1. Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East
2. Safeguards and Verification Measures for Nuclear Disarmament

The session was attended by representatives of 163 Member States, as well as two Observers.

On Sunday, all the delegates were looking forward to the productive days of work ahead and adopted the agenda in the provisional order. This day focused on establishing Member States' positions on the first topic, forming groups and beginning work on the first proposals. By Tuesday, the dais received a total of 16 proposals. They contained a wide range of topics including confidence-building measures, strengthening of regional collaboration, as well as strengthening verification measures for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

On Wednesday, a total of 16 draft resolutions were accepted by the dais, with 15 proposals being adopted as resolutions by the committee. Five were adopted by acclamation. The work in the committee was characterized by a high degree of collaboration and an overall positive atmosphere.



Code: NPT/1/1

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Expressing concern to the stability of the global system, expressing grave concern for the well-being of all peoples in the face of threats to their inherent dignity, security, and standard of living,

Emphasizing the importance of establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East as a crucial step in creating stability in the region,

Emphasizing on the importance of properly addressing problems from multiple perspectives, and believing this way conflicts, and problems can be addressed on a multidimensional level, and regionally effective,

Respecting states right to withdraw from the treaty in which extraordinary event happened, stated under the NPT Article X(1) where the treaty acknowledges that each state, can exercise its national sovereignty to withdraw if it decides, the events on the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the interests of its country,

Affirming Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, present in regions such as Latin America, and recently with General Assembly resolution 80/14 in Africa, play a critical role to be used as an example in peace, and desescalation measures,

Highlighting the 1995 NPT resolution on the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East goal on endorsing the establishment of a main negotiation table as a priority measure to facilitate communication between Middle East member states,

Recognizing the annual United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, convened in accordance with General Assembly resolution 73/546, as an existing multilateral platform for dialogue, and negotiation,

Recalling the Treaty of Bangkok (1995), which established the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, as a regional precedent demonstrating example which can be developed through dialogue, legal commitment, and sustained regional agreement,

Further recalling the agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Non-Proliferation Treaty Member states, outlined in INFCIRC/153, require non-nuclear-weapon states to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful activities to verify its non-diversion to weapons,

Appreciating the efforts put by the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) to build a stable, interconnected, and prosperous Middle East grounded in human, and environmental security by eliminating weapons of mass destruction, advancing peace, and strengthening security in the Middle East,

Keeping in mind the importance of any future nuclear weapon-free zone framework should rely on neutral international verification, especially through the UN body of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to ensure credible oversight of peaceful nuclear activities,

Recognizing that Modified Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs) involve the reporting of initial nuclear material by the Member States, which is essential to the process of building transparency for regional security,

Highlighting the importance of the Treaty of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) ability to fund voluntary mechanisms to increase accession to the NPT particularly for member states unwilling to join,

Acknowledging the contributions of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in capacity-building, and supporting peaceful technological advancement in Member States,

Stressing the importance of education, youth engagement, and public awareness in fostering a culture of non-proliferation, and supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Taking into consideration that the IAEA offers education, and training activities which include face-to-face training courses, online learning, and programmes, and schools such as the School of Drafting Regulations on Nuclear Safety, and Security on various nuclear-related topics,

Further emphasizing the mandate of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in promoting education, scientific cooperation, and youth engagement to raise awareness on nuclear safety and disarmament,

1. *Affirms* that the existing United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and free from other weapons of mass-destruction should serve as the primary multilateral forum for future negotiations, and *encourages* the Conference to progressively develop a more structured, and reformed framework, for:
 - a. Developing structured tracks for regional confidence building, and the sustained participation of all Member States in the Middle East, currently treaty states to the NPT;
 - b. Proposing to reform the Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone conference to allow participation of Member States outside the region as non-party observers, with the option to provide technical expertise, facilitation support, or other mutually agreed contributions in support of future treaty negotiations, while maintaining its core constituency of the Middle East Member States;
 - c. Inviting non-parties to the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* to participate as observers to foster dialogue, and mutual understanding, through attention to the legitimate security concerns of all the states in the region, and reaffirming their rights to sovereignty, and self-defense, whilst encouraging inclusive dialogue involving all regional states, to ensure a balanced, and comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament;
 - d. Considering actual technical, and legal elements, including lessons drawn from existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and other relevant regional arrangements, to forge a future treaty framework, the actors part of the Middle East Treaty Organization, such as civil societies, academics, and experts, should be invited, during a conference held by METO, to:
 - i. Discuss the promotion of transparency, and trust-building at every step of the process that leads to the implementation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
 - ii. Write a draft of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East developed through an inclusive, and freely agreed upon by relevant governments, and stakeholders process,

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) crucial knowledge on how to address the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, by:

- a. Proposing the creation of an advisory regional body for the Middle East, promoted, and directed by a region constituting a nuclear-weapon-free zone such as through ASEAN, and others collaborators like Japan to promote voluntary transparency measures like:
 - i. Encouraging the voluntary exchange of best practices, and lessons learned from existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, and adapt them to the respective context of each country particularly from ASEAN, and other regional frameworks, in order to strengthen confidence-building measures, and institutional capacity in the Middle East;
 - ii. Evaluating the context of each country in the region, in order to provide guidelines, and frameworks for the transparency reports that can be submitted to the entity, thus obtaining constant monitoring of progress, and updates;
7. *Calls for* active, and concrete steps to signify recommitments to the 1995, and NPT resolution on the Middle East as essential elements of integrity, and credibility measures, by:
 - a. Encouraging long-term trust-building work in partnership with the UNESCO Framework for Intercultural Dialogue, leaning into structural approach launched in 2023 aiming to build trust, address social cohesion, and foster collaboration across Middle East states;
 - b. Affirming initiatives like the Wilson Center's Middle East Dialogue, and proposals from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to bring together policymakers and experts to build confidence, aiming to create soft security structures, such as in the Middle East Program;
8. *Proposes* the establishment of a regional knowledge hub under IAEA supervision in order to centralize data on nuclear research, safety standards, and non-military nuclear activities to support verification, and compliance;
9. *Further recommends* that this knowledge hub provide technical guidance, and capacity-building support to Member States in implementing peaceful nuclear projects, in coordination with the UNODA, and the United Nations Procurement Division (UNPD);
10. *Recommends* strengthening research collaboration among regional universities, and scientific institutes to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, promote transparency, and build regional trust, through joint research initiatives, academic exchange programs, and the development of shared scientific frameworks focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and safeguards implementation;
11. *Encourages* the development of informative, and accessible campaigns in schools, and universities on nuclear safety and disarmament, supported by UNICEF, and UNESCO, recognizing the critical role of education in reducing misinformation, fostering transparency, and building long-term trust necessary for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
12. *Recommends* investment in the digitalization of education networks, which include schools, high schools, and universities by United Nations Educational Scientific, and Cultural Organization standard, to provide training, and education in defense, and digital security fields, contributing to long-term employment solutions, and regional security capacity, by:
 - a. Promoting the creation of programs focused on poverty reduction, education, and job creation with the purpose to reduce the appeal of extremist recruitment, especially among youth;

- b. Promoting the expansion of cultural, and education exchanges including through programs such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), to strengthen people-to-people ties, and mutual understanding across regions;
- 13. *Suggests the* creation of an office within the Middle East for recording nuclear disarmament processes which also helps to comply with the IAEA Model;
- 14. *Calls for* the establishment of a voluntary fund, contributed to by Member States, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to be administered under the framework of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, aimed at supporting the universalization of the Treaty; particularly by assisting Middle Eastern states in developing a clear, and structured pathway toward the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone Zone.



Code: NPT/1/2

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Emphasizing the importance of respecting the United Nations Charter,

Determined to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda,

Recognizing the need for a regional nuclear disarmament amendment that secures sovereignty by establishing Institutional-Parity, and Non-Discrimination as legal prerequisites for treaty legitimacy, while fostering Trans-boundary Trust, and Operational-Safety to protect the security of all States through a framework of Asymmetric-Defense, and Connectivity designed to mitigate Middle Eastern vulnerabilities against foreign influence, and force,

Cognizant of the need for exploratory programs in accordance with the regulations set forth under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide the backbone for the establishment of subsidiary bodies to oversee, and strongly endorse Middle Eastern sovereignty,

Considering a yearly report to the United Nations General Assembly, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that assesses regional advancements in safeguards implementation, transparency, and, confidence-building initiatives,

Believing that neutral Member States have a vital role to play as mediators in alignment with Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, and underlining the importance of developing inclusive dialogue, engagement, and global coordination to improve verification, and reporting consistency, the Committee underscores that ensuring Member States feel secure is essential to the ultimate success of the nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Bearing in mind that the global connectivity spanning food security, maritime transit, and digital infrastructures renders all the states vulnerable to the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear detonation, whether intentional or accidental,

Acknowledging the successful creation of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific as models of regional disarmament frameworks,

Noting the success of the IAEA inspections until the trust between Middle East Member States started decreasing, and noting trust as a critical limiting factor in nuclear nonproliferation, and the rest of them on the actual transparency system that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) of the IAEA provide, due to the possible unfair information exchange, and the lack of transparency of the Members States,

Noting direct attention goes to the formalization of security assurances through binding protocols attached to a future treaty formalizing the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,

Taking note of the significance of measures targeted at fostering confidence, transparency, and regional collaboration as crucial steps in the creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,

Noting with disappointment western nations' continuously unfulfilled obligations as per the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in which their lack of cooperation has been a continued threat to the prosperity of the Middle East,

Highlighting the United Nations Security Council resolution 1450, and the frameworks outlined within,

Affirming the unity of Member States party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and their ability to influence policy on and trade of nuclear materials,

Noting with concern that the uncontrolled destruction of nuclear power plants, and nuclear research facilities can produce as much destruction as a small nuclear warhead,

Recalling the success of the Pelindaba Treaty, specifically the inclusion of a clause in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty of Pelindaba prohibiting the destruction and, or intentional targeting of nuclear power plants, and nuclear facilities, as well as the establishment of African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), and the positive impacts regionally specific initiatives have on the effort for disarmament,

Recalling further UNGA resolution 73/546 of 2018, which decided to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons, and other WMD, and the subsequent conferences held in 2019, 2021, and 2023 under this mandate,

Welcoming the convening of trust-building conferences as a constructive step toward creating the diplomatic conditions necessary for all regional states to engage in good-faith negotiations on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East,

Aware that significant knowledge, and contributions on nuclear disarmament verification have been generated through previous, and ongoing initiatives, and partnerships among Member States, and stressing the need to incorporate their experiences, and lessons learned into future multilateral discussions under the United Nations,

Welcoming the fostering of educational efforts to further understanding, and awareness regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East,

Reaffirming the universal implementation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East as an important first step alongside peaceful nuclear development, which, when conducted under strict international safeguards, can serve as a foundation for regional stability, and cooperation,

1. *Recommends* the development of a Middle East Nuclear Technical Advancement Committee (MENTAC), which will be held under the mandate of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), composed of technical experts, and diplomatic representatives from participating Middle Eastern States, would take into consideration the following measures for the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, by:
 - a. Creating initiatives to strengthen regional states' confidence, working in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), such as voluntary transparency reports on nuclear facilities;
 - b. Encouraging all Member States in the Middle East to adopt individualized Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements;
 - c. Implementing CSAs in collaboration with the IAEA to promote trust between Member States in the region;

- d. Acting as the executive arm of the Conference on the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction;
 - e. Introducing yearly regional gatherings to assess the development of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in the Middle East;
 2. *Advises* Member States to create regional mechanisms, such as a proposed Middle East Nuclear Technical Advancement Committee, that can strengthen trust in the region by institutionalizing transparency, safeguards, and credible verification within a regionally owned framework that complements the IAEA oversight committee, by:
 - a. Having technical cooperation, shared standards, collaboration, standardized reporting, information-sharing, and early notification;
 - b. Adhering to the full scope IAEA safeguards, but also need layered international, and regional oversight that all countries must voluntarily agree to, no coercion or political pressure;
 3. *Agrees* to create a Qualified Group of Experts for nuclear disarmament in the Middle East (STRATEGY), under the mandate of the MENTAC, as mentioned in clause 1, used to evaluate how the sharing of nuclear technology, or the establishment of new nuclear facilities, affects global security networks:
 - a. Reminds the importance of separating nuclear energy from military application;
 - b. Notes the restriction of the use of fissile material for only peaceful purposes under the supervision of the STRATEGY, and the IAEA;
 - c. Suggests STRATEGY should act collaboratively with the MENTAC by providing technical information to the committee to facilitate their decision-making, and as an executive arm of the MENTAC decisions;
 - d. Invites all the Member States to implement the STRATEGY system on their own nuclear-weapon-free zone proprietary to promote the United Nations equality;
 4. *Endorses* the implementation of the Asymmetric-Defense; Connectivity; Trans-boundary-Trust; Institutional-Parity; Operational-Safety; Non-Discrimination (A.C.T.I.O.N) framework as the primary mechanism for the establishment, and sustainability of a Regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, structured through:
 - a. Developing a regional security architecture that offsets the absence of nuclear deterrence through enhanced conventional defense cooperation, and deep economic integration to safeguard the Zone from foreign great power intervention;
 - b. Mandating shared monitoring protocols, and standardized safety benchmarks for dual-use technologies to ensure absolute transparency, and prevent accidental escalation within the Zone's borders;
 - c. Guaranteeing that all signatory States, regardless of technological advancement, possess equal legal standing, and access to peaceful nuclear energy, ensuring that the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, remains a platform for collective security rather than geopolitical marginalization;
 5. *Trusts* the inclusion of experts within negotiation, and advisory processes to ensure regional socio-cultural sensitivities are properly handled, and accounted for by:

- a. Following the framework of the Middle Eastern Treaty Organization (METO) by fostering peace through policy, and research;
 - b. Welcoming experts from both political, and religious backgrounds, familiar with the history, and culture of Member States involved;
 - c. Calling for these qualified experts to come from academic, civil society, governmental, and other backgrounds;
 - d. Looking towards groups such as the GGE on Nuclear-Weapons Free Zones in all its aspects as a model for addressing topics such as regional arrangements;
 - e. Recognizing the benefit of regionally sensitive experts for consultation, such as United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research's work on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East;
 - f. Collaborating with METO, and other civil society groups to provide funding for this panel, as well as voluntary contributions from benefiting Member States;
6. *Clarifies* that the Connectivity Impact Assessment, linked to the A.C.T.I.O.N plan, measures three specific types of fallout, which consist of:
- a. Logistical Fallout, which would prevent a nuclear risk in this region that triggers an immediate spike in maritime insurance premiums, and shipping reroutes, quantifying this specific dollar loss in the process;
 - b. Digital, and Financial Fallout, in which this assessment treats data connectivity as a sovereign right that is threatened by nuclear proliferation, as the Middle East is a hub for undersea data cables, and a disruption to this infrastructure would sever digital banking, and "fintech" access for emerging markets;
7. *Calls* upon Member States to introduce mutual agreement frameworks between one another to prohibit the deliberate attack on nuclear power plants, and nuclear research facilities, including:
- a. All nuclear energy sites, whether fully constructed or not, whether they are suspected to power military facilities or not, and whether or not they are currently supplying power;
 - b. Medical nuclear research sites, including radiation therapy, diagnostic imaging, and sterilization;
 - c. Scientific nuclear research sites researching peaceful uses of nuclear technology, such as nuclear energy, agricultural purposes, and more, yet to emerge technologies;
 - d. Nuclear storage facilities which contain enriched, and unenriched uranium;
8. *Calls for* the expansion of the IAEA's monitoring, and verification capacities to incorporate Trans-boundary-Trust metrics, utilizing environmental, and satellite data to monitor the cross-border movement of radiological isotopes;
9. *Proclaims* that all participating Member States will fully commit to the adoption, and implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 as the foundational framework for this Middle Eastern coalition, and its neighboring states, including but not limited to:

- a. Establishing, and strengthening mechanisms to ensure that all nuclear materials are subject to comprehensive safeguards, inspections, and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency as per the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;
 - b. Enhancing regional security measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring, possessing, or trafficking nuclear materials, and weapons, particularly within politically volatile states;
 - c. Encouraging volatile regional actors to engage in structured, good-faith negotiations aimed at facilitating their accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons through the provision of inclusive terms, security assurances, and diplomatic incentives;
10. *Encourages* Member States, and relevant regional actors to pursue a dual-track process as a foundational framework for the future negotiations in implementing a legally binding nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, including:
 - a. Establishing Track I: Legal, Technical, and Verification Negotiations by structured working-level negotiations on the core legal architecture of a future Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, including its scope, definitions, and territorial applicability;
 - b. Establishing Track II: Inclusive Regional Security Dialogue, through convening regular, inclusive multilateral consultations that address the broader security environment, including conflict drivers, asymmetric threat perceptions, and unresolved regional disputes;
 - c. Collaborate with Member States, and observers to provide the necessary mechanisms for funds to be dispersed in a match-funding manner, such as Peter's Pence, the funding offered through the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and many others, to support, and enable inclusive regional dialogue;
11. *Affirms* the principle of mutual reinforcement, and non-conditionality between Track I, and Track II, in such ways, but not limited to:
 - a. Stating explicitly that progress in negotiations under Track I shall not be made a precondition for engagement in dialogue under Track II, and vice versa;
 - b. Suggesting regular joint briefings, and reporting cycles to ensure alignment of objectives, identify gaps, and prevent duplication of efforts between the two tracks;
12. *Intends* for preexisting Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones to serve as a model, and aspiration for the cultivation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, recalling the Pelindaba Treaty as well as the Treaty of Tlatelolco to be used as the foundation for a treaty in the Middle East, ensuring that vital structures from previous treaties, such as maintaining IAEA standards, and making industrial, social, and economic advancements through non-militarized nuclear energy;
13. *Invites* Member States situated in strategically significant Member State zones to host permanent IAEA liaison offices in order to streamline the verification of nuclear material movements, and bolster regional safeguards implementation;
14. *Supports* the creation of a regional cooperation mechanism, whereby nuclear-weapons States legally guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a state, which would:
 - a. Call for all Member States in the region to fully cooperate with the IAEA;
 - b. Include the adoption of Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements;

- c. Encourage the Security Council to consider appropriate measures, including sanctions, in case of non-compliance with the IAEA by encouraging Member States to implement possible financial restrictions, such as asset freezes, and limitations on funding, against entities, and individuals involved in unauthorized nuclear weapons development programs, in accordance with international law;
 - d. Call upon all states to strengthen export controls, and prevent the transfer of materials, technology, or expertise that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons, in line with existing non-proliferation obligations;
15. *Recommends* the implementation of further educational programming for accessible education regarding nuclear weapons, and nuclear disposal:
- a. Encourages the adoption of an Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone educational framework that is not concentrated on governmental figures;
 - b. Establishes a dedicated educational content development body with the cooperation of the United Nations International School, and UNODA, mandated to develop, and standardize accessible, and evidence-based educational materials;
 - c. Tasks the aforementioned body to develop curriculum modules, and academic materials examining the negotiation process, implementation mechanisms, and long-term impacts of previous successful Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties, such as the Treaty of Pelindaba, and the Treaty of Tlateloco;
16. *Welcomes* Member States to work together on the creation of exploratory programs which include the establishment of subsidiary bodies, existing to promote the sovereignty of Middle Eastern Member States, and increase collaboration:
- a. Increasing collaboration efforts by giving the Member States in the Middle East the option to join the subsidiary bodies, which would help the region find common ground on which they can then start to establish the NFWZ;
 - b. Encouraging the sovereignty of Middle Eastern Member States by enabling self-advocacy through the establishment of subsidiary bodies, which would allow Member States to voice their opinions regarding, and in support of the formation of the NFWZ;
 - c. Recommends Member States with nuclear influence to have negotiations with non-nuclear states routinely in order to maintain inclusivity, up-to-date conditions, and transparency within the NFWZ, and such exploratory programs;
17. *Urges* Nuclear-Weapon States to create legally binding negative assurances to all Middle-East States wanting to join the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone;
18. *Suggests* that such assurances include a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in the area as long as they are compliant with the NPT, and nuclear-weapon-free zones;
19. *Recommends* that future Review Conferences include a dedicated "Connectivity Impact Assessment" to quantify the socioeconomic fallout of nuclear risks on developing economies, as developing economies are often the most "connected" to global trade but have the least "cushion" to survive a disruption;

20. *Supports* the expansion of peaceful nuclear cooperation initiatives aiming at energy diversification, particularly in water desalination, sustainable development, and the development of nuclear energy under full compliance with the IAEA guidelines, and other organisation:
 - a. Recognizes the International Atomic Energy Agency's Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) as a valuable mechanism for promoting the peaceful application of nuclear science, and technology, and emphasizes its contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals;
 - b. Recognizes the role of the World Nuclear Association in supporting peaceful nuclear development, particularly through its promotion of safe, responsible, and sustainable nuclear energy practices, and emphasizes its capacity to contribute to international cooperation;
 - c. Facilitating knowledge-sharing, and best practices among states, and industry actors in the field of civilian nuclear energy;
 - d. Supporting capacity-building, and technical expertise in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including energy diversification, and climate mitigation;
 - e. Encouraging adherence to high standards of safety, security, and non-proliferation in alignment with International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines;
 - f. Seeking the help from the European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN, as a model of international collaboration in advanced scientific research, for its neutrality, and scientific credibility, and its advanced technological infrastructure, which together enable reliable knowledge-sharing, innovation-driven solutions, and confidence-building measures essential for the peaceful development of nuclear energy;
 - g. Emphasizing its potential to provide technical expertise, capacity-building, and innovation in areas such as data analysis, radiation detection, and scientific exchange;
 - h. Complementing the existing frameworks of the International Atomic Energy Agency while promoting trust, transparency, and sustainable development within the region;
21. *Invites* the establishment of a region-wide commitment requiring full transparency regarding nuclear capabilities, particularly those that remain undeclared nuclear-weapon states;
22. *Encourages* the establishment of a "Digital Transparency Platform" under IAEA supervision, the aim of which is to strengthen trust, transparency, and regional cooperation:
 - a. Allowing Member States to voluntarily upload, and regularly update non-sensitive data relating to civil nuclear activities, nuclear power generation, safety measures, and the status of facilities;
 - b. Ensuring that all information shared respects the national security considerations, and sovereignty of each member;
 - c. Integrating secure digital infrastructures, and protocols with the aim of preventing unauthorized access or improper use of data;
 - d. Supporting the development of analytical tools to identify irregularities, and strengthen verification efforts in coordination with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs;
23. *Calls* upon the convening of a Regional Nuclear Trust Building Conference (RNTBC) under the auspices of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), with the following parameters:

- a. Convening on a biannual basis, with a mandatory five-year programmatic review to assess progress, and determine continuation, ensuring accountability to participating Member States, and continued commitment;
 - b. Hosted on a rotating basis among GCC Member States, which by virtue of their geographic centrality, bridging Arab, and Persian spheres, their established records of hosting multilateral diplomatic sessions, and their positioning as states with active, and constructive regional diplomacy, represent suitable neutral assembling environments conducive to confidence building dialogue;
 - c. Administered by a standing secretariat housed within UNODA, funded through voluntary contributions from participating Member States, and existing United Nations disarmament trust funds, with a mandate to produce a publicly available summary report following each conference session;
24. *Focuses* exclusively on confidence-building measures, open dialogue, and the legal architecture of a future Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and expressly excludes bilateral political disputes so as to ensure a productive common ground for all participating parties;
25. *Encourages* the Middle Eastern countries to be voluntarily transparent in their civil nuclear programs, in order to avoid misunderstanding, mistrust and potential proliferation concerns, which is beneficial by increasing regional confidence, strengthening regional security, and facilitating scientific, and technological cooperation by:
- a. Publishing annual reports about the uses of nuclear energy, especially nuclear materials, and technologies, through accessible, and internationally recognized platforms such as official government websites, and submission to the IAEA, which would review, and certify these reports to ensure credibility with a “Transparent State” certification, allowing the international community to verify peaceful use;
 - b. Ensuring that no undeclared materials are used, in order to help prevent proliferation, with confidence-building measures aimed at detecting, and preventing the use of undeclared nuclear materials;
 - c. Sharing voluntary information about future civil nuclear programs within the Middle East region, and with other regions, in order to further collaboration, and enrichment by exchanging results;
 - d. Establishing confidence-building measures, including regular regional dialogue forums, and joint review mechanisms, to foster trust, and prevent misunderstanding of nuclear activities;
26. *Strongly encourages* all regional Member States that aren’t currently part of the NPT to join the Treaty, and in the meantime, to also take measures, and adopt policies aligned with the goals of the treaty, as universal application is an important step in achieving a stable, and equitable environment in the Middle East.



Code: NPT/1/3

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Recalling the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which calls for the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destructions,

Reaffirming the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, while promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Highlighting that joint anti trafficking initiatives can address the current lack of political will and trust between Middle Eastern Member States,

Expressing support towards the Sustainable Development Goal 4 (quality education), be integrated into nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as well as in peaceful purposes of nuclear energy,

Noting with concern that over 4,000 reported incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking occurred from 1993 to 2025 according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

Recognizing the importance of Middle Eastern regional security, stability and full respect for national sovereignty of all Member States involved in nuclear-weapon-free zones' campaigning and discussion,

Affirming the inalienable right of all states party to the NPT on the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

Hoping for the expansion of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to Nuclear Weapon States,

Concerned by the international security environment being marked by renewed geopolitical tensions, regional instability, and continued modernization of nuclear arsenals,

Noting the role that ongoing armed conflict in the Middle East poses in inhibiting political will to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Exhorting collaboration between the IAEA and regional bodies, such as the Middle Eastern Treaty Organisation and Arab League, to ensure non-proliferation efforts for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East stem from and directly reflect the voices of Middle Eastern societies,

Recognizing that nuclear energy represents a reliable and low carbon source of power that can contribute to sustainable development, particularly in developing countries facing energy shortages,

Deeply aware that access to clean and reliable energy is essential for economic growth, poverty reduction, and the achievement of global development goals,

Stressing the importance of dialogue and regional cooperation while cautioning against approaches that could undermine confidence amongst Member States,

Recognizing the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia demonstrating the effectiveness of regional cooperation and legally binding agreements in achieving nuclear disarmament,

Recognizing that the dismantlement of nuclear weapons contributes to reducing the risk of catastrophic shocks to the global economy, particularly for small, open economies that are highly exposed to disruptions in trade, finance, energy markets, food systems, tourism, and insurance,

1. *Supports* the expanded membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the totality of the region to enable cohesive long-term economic and political integration, for the purpose of creating cultural transparency and diplomacy which will be able to maintain nuclear-weapon-free zone, by:
 - a. *Recommending* that the GCC convenes at least twice per year in a location rotating between member states to discuss issues which arise over infrastructure and security, information sharing;
 - b. *Suggesting* that the GCC adopt a single currency to create monetary union which will ease investment burdens;
 - c. *Affirming* the work of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Common Market, and other shared market programs, in forwarding political and economic integration, suggesting that the GCC follow its example;
 - d. *Requesting* that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) conduct research into more specific improvements to the economic integration framework of the GCC aimed at fostering confidence and communication between Middle Eastern Member States to promote domestic constituencies and support economic institutions that require transparency;
2. *Encourages* the GCC to adopt a treaty that establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone, drawing on successful models such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Pelindaba, and the Treaty of Rarotonga, by:
 - a. Using GCC multilateral communication mechanisms to support nuclear trust and transparency in the Middle East;
 - b. Drawing on regional data-sharing mechanisms, such as data pre-notification requirements, data exchange, and voluntary nuclear de-classification measures;
 - c. Engaging in multilateral security conferences such as the Baku Security Forum to promote interstate dialogue and form shared initiatives with focus on discussing the strengthening of IAEA regulations on the extraction, enrichment, and transportation of nuclear material;
 - d. Requests all Member States to honor their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by advancing the peaceful application of nuclear energy in full compliance with non-proliferation commitments and safeguard agreements;
3. *Recommends* that the GCC create a subcommittee on nuclear dialogue to facilitate an inclusive process between Member States, promoting transparency, confidence-building, and respect for the principles of the NPT, by:
 - a. Utilising a balanced, inclusive, and consensus-based procedure, conducted in full respect the principles of the NPT, in order to assure respect of national sovereignty of Member States, to ensure long-term stability, and equal representation, to avoid political tension and establish procedural rules destined to encourage compromise and negotiation;

- b. Aiming to organize regular multilateral meetings annually as well as the inclusion of thematic working groups with the aim of identifying common priorities in nuclear non-proliferation;
 - c. Requesting that the subcommittee promotes voluntary participation and mutual consent with the objective of fostering information-sharing practices, joint policy consultations, and coordinated transparency initiatives;
 - d. Affirming the fundamental need to respect national sovereignty of Member States while reinforcing long-term regional and global stability, and asks the United Nations to collaborate in these efforts through monitoring, guiding, and constant review;
4. *Supports* the expansion and utilization of existing GCC regional education and awareness programs on nuclear non-proliferation:
- a. Including training for professionals working in areas in which nuclear energy applications are used, including medicine, health, agriculture, food, and environmental conservation;
 - b. Consolidating efforts to promote public understanding of humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons by integrating regulations and non-proliferation education into school curriculums, seminars, and conferences to emphasize the importance of nuclear safety;
 - c. Aiming to integrate regulations and non-proliferation education into school curriculums, seminars, and conferences to emphasize the importance of nuclear safety;
 - d. Utilizing the IAEA online and in-person training courses on nuclear safety, radiation protection, and technical cooperation;
 - e. Including the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) youth engagement programs and simulation exercises to help raise awareness about Non-proliferation movements;
 - f. Encouraging collaboration between government and non-government organizations (Middle Eastern states and IAEA);
 - g. Encourages the creation of regional and technical exchange programs between members of the GCC to promote peaceful nuclear education, training, professional development, and skills-building in cooperation with the IAEA, by:
 - i. Extending the work easy-access visas already existing in the GCC to include student visas in order to increase knowledge sharing and collaboration;
 - ii. Encouraging GCC Member States to create direct exchange programs for students and young professionals;
 - iii. Including access the IAEA Low-enrichment Uranium Bank for hands on experience for professional development;
 - h. Offering to utilize the *Laudato Si'*, the Holy See will provide funding to ensure the environmental stewardship, sustainable living, social justice of those living in the Middle East, which will provide openings for diplomatic channels;

5. *Recommends* that the GCC further develop basic infrastructure to improve trade and investment for the purpose of improving economic and cultural integration which aid in the maintenance of a Nuclear Weapon free Zone, by:
 - a. Strengthening cross-border infrastructure for trade, including air and maritime channels, railways, and oil and gas pipes, to facilitate easier regional commercial activity;
 - b. Ensuring the safety of the Red Sea-Indian Ocean trade routes, which are vital for the regional logistics and energy infrastructure;
 - c. Adopting transparent and fair regulations for foreign and private investment;
6. *Suggests* Middle Eastern Member States engage with anti-nuclear trafficking initiatives such as the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database by providing information on illicit nuclear trafficking to said shared database as the first step in building trust, communication, and transparency between Middle Eastern Member States;
7. *Encourages* the creation of a IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in the Middle East with a financial cooperation offered by the Holy See, promoting maintained trust in the mutual security of the Middle Eastern region and an ethical use of atomic energy, by:
 - a. Integrating the nuclear economy the Middle East to supplying low-enriched uranium at constant prices;
 - b. Mirroring the IAEA shared nuclear fuel bank model;
 - c. Supporting cooperation and effective communication among the Member States, advocating for safety and peace in the territory;
 - d. Discouraging misuse of uncontrolled Uranium supplies, such as the creation of nuclear weapons, through a deep and formal monitoring directed by the IAEA;
 - e. Utilizing greater use of shared nuclear bank institutions which enshrine necessary communication and mutual verification among Member States surrounding the nuclear economy;
 - f. Encouraging action with individual funding with NGOs and observer states, such as the Holy See, to pledge a matching program and offering economic support while implementing Laudato Si;
8. *Encourages* the establishment of formal regional monitoring and reporting mechanisms, including periodic compliance reviews and standardized reporting procedures, to enhance transparency and strengthen confidence-building among Middle Eastern Member States, by:
 - a. Facilitating regular information exchanges and dialogue among Member States to build trust and improve transparency in nuclear reporting processes;
 - b. Implementing periodic peer-review processes for voluntary reporting on compliance with non-proliferation commitments;
 - c. Developing standardized reporting guidelines and timelines to ensure consistency and accountability among Member States;
9. *Encourages* all Member States to honor their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by advancing the peaceful application of nuclear energy in full compliance with

non-proliferation commitments and safeguard agreements;

10. *Reminds* Member States party to the NPT to fulfill their commitments to the implementation of Article IV of the treaty, which reaffirms the inalienable right of all State Parties, to access, develop, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes including applications in medicine, agriculture, and sustainable development without discrimination and under effective IAEA safeguards;
11. *Suggests* that all Member States party to the NPT work within the General Assembly's Intergovernmental Negotiation to raise motions regarding ongoing security risks that they face compared with non-party Member States with Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements.



Code: NPT/1/4

Committee : Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Fully alarmed by the ongoing geopolitical tensions and destabilization within the Middle East and around the world,

Noting with deep concern the threat that persistent tensions and geopolitical security challenges ongoing within the Middle East pose to the security of civilians and states throughout the world, which are further exacerbated by the continued presence of nuclear weapons in the region, underscoring the urgent need to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East,

Alarmed by the ability of nuclear weapons to cause catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and security disasters, due to their indiscriminate destructive impact on urban centers, the large-scale loss of innocent civilian lives, and the long-term consequences for human rights, environmental degradation, and regional and international security,

Recognizing the strength of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which cover nearly 50% of all land mass and were created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985), the Treaty of Bangkok (1995), the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996), and the Treaty of Semipalatinsk (2006),

Considering the complexities of the current strategic environment and the lessons learned from prior agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,

Recognizing that effective verification and regulatory standards in the Middle-East require sustained and equitable financial and resource support to ensure that they can be conceivably achieved by participating Member States,

Recognizing Actions 16, 18, 21, 25, and 26 of *The Pact for the Future* (2024) as guiding principles for moving towards a non-nuclear Middle East,

Deeply convinced that the universal adoption of agreements based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol is essential to maintaining strategic stability and global non-proliferation,

Recalling the successful implementation of regional confidence-building measures under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework as a pragmatic model of transparency and deeply convinced that the universal adoption of agreements based on the IAEA Additional Protocol is an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Underlining the importance of technical assistance in bridging gaps in national capacity and enabling all states to meet international verification standards, thereby supporting the effective establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Reaffirming the obligations under Article III of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) concerning safeguards and verification, as well as Article VI on the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the 1995 resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which calls for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East,

Recognizing the importance of allowing states to maintain their right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy programs as a means to pursue sustainable and efficient sources of energy in line with SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy),

Recognizing the potential of emerging technologies, including satellite-based monitoring and artificial intelligence, to enhance impartial and non-intrusive verification mechanisms,

Acknowledging that enduring security concerns and limited transparency among Member States in the Middle East continue to impede progress toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, while recognizing the importance of measurable confidence-building mechanisms to reduce miscalculation and foster cooperation,

Concerned by the limited state of good faith diplomatic relations between Member States in the Middle East and the ongoing tensions that have characterized the region for more than 70 years, which continue to impede the mutual trust necessary for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Fully aware of the vulnerabilities within global shipping networks and the severe security risks associated with the illicit maritime transport of nuclear materials by non-state actors,

Recognizing the importance of advanced signal processing, such as Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) based spectral analysis, in distinguishing between natural tectonic activity and clandestine nuclear tests,

Convinced that the adoption of the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) is a fundamental step in ensuring the universality of the safeguards regime under the NPT,

Reaffirming the IAEA classification of U-235 (Uranium-235) at any enhancement at or over 20% as a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) source, being classified as weaponizable nuclear material,

1. *Urges* the establishment of a voluntary joint monitoring pilot program between the IAEA and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to enhance the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, building upon existing verification tools which, while already in use, remain fragmented, unevenly implemented, and limited in detecting non-declared facilities, including:
 - a. Using satellite imagery and remote sensing with built-in human oversight in accordance with existing IAEA safeguard mandates, to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguard inspection and reporting mechanisms;
 - b. The integration of AI-assisted anomaly detection to strengthen analytical capacity and early warning, with participation based on a tiered transparency framework that incentivizes compliance while respecting national sovereignty, thereby strengthening diplomatic relations amongst Middle Eastern Member States and verifying credibility, facilitating the conditions for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East;
2. *Calls for* the establishment of a regional nuclear risk reduction and transparency mechanism, coordinated by the United Nations and the IAEA, based on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

(OSCE), to which Member States may accede upon ratification of the relevant Additional Protocols; this program would include:

- a. Establishing direct communication hotlines between Member States to enable voluntary pre-notification of sensitive nuclear-related activities and encourage nuclear data exchange between regional states;
 - b. Developing an annual, state-led, and consensus-based Middle East Nuclear Transparency Index based on key performance indicators such as compliance with IAEA safeguards, increasing reporting frequency, participation in inspection mechanisms, rather than imposed mechanisms;
3. *Supports* increased financial assistance for nuclear education programs in Middle Eastern states that are parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, facilitated through the International Atomic Energy Agency Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF); strengthening educational initiatives in peaceful nuclear applications promotes regional stability, safety, and scientific development:
- a. Supporting these educational programs across the Middle East, programs like the Holy See's Peter's Pence, which funds aid for victims of war, oppression, and natural disasters, will be utilized;
 - b. Allocating direct voluntary financial contributions specifically designated for energy nuclear education, technical training, and capacity building programs, implemented through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and supported by partnerships like the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation;
 - c. Helping provide broader access to nuclear education required for the implementation of functional verification standards and disarmament protocols;
4. *Calls upon* Member States to increase funding and resources for the recruitment of specialized researchers in the field of nuclear verification, including seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations, specifically focusing on the application of FFT for spectral analysis to enhance transparency by objectively distinguishing natural seismic activity from undeclared nuclear tests;
5. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to continue providing the necessary administrative support to the annual Conference sessions toward a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction;
6. *Supports* the creation of a new subsidiary body to complement existing international non-proliferation and verification frameworks by addressing the absence of a region-specific, confidence-building mechanism in the Middle East, in collaboration with Member State governments, relevant United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, private think tanks, and academic institutions, to facilitate inclusive dialogue, promote transparency, monitor voluntary commitments, and lay the institutional groundwork for long-term disarmament and regional stability;
7. *Invites* the UNODA, in close coordination with the IAEA, to expand technical assistance programs aimed at achieving the universal adoption of an Agreement based on the Additional Protocol by 2030;
8. *Encourages* all Member States to adopt agreements based on the Additional Protocol as well as the Safeguards Agreements, such as the Small Quantities Protocol, to improve the transparency regarding Uranium-235 threshold dangerousness above 1.5 kg or 20% enhancement;
9. *Supports* the voluntary tasking of the IAEA to monitor a Uranium tracking system, where each container of Uranium gets its own code towards tracking the shipment and destination of Uranium, by:

- a. Using the code is to be issued in the country of mining and indicate the origin country, if purchased from a member state outside the IAEA mandate, the first state the shipment passes through shall be considered the country of origin;
 - b. Using the code is to be tracked and reported to the IAEA in the alignment of legitimate use, member states are to keep records on the codes of shipments within their borders, from where these were imported and if they are exported, to whom;
 - c. Using any quantity of Uranium split from the original shipment is to be designated with a unique code derived from the original;
 - d. Using an unticketed shipment be discovered, it is the responsibility of the Member State on whose territory it is found to seize the shipment;
10. *Calls for* the creation of a Maritime Nuclear Security Initiative, operating under the technical guidance of the IAEA and the IMO, to standardize cargo monitoring protocols and enhance real-time intelligence sharing among coastal and flag states, thereby ensuring all nuclear transit remains strictly for peaceful purposes;
11. *Affirms* the rights of all states to pursue peaceful nuclear energy operations, provided that these programs remain fully transparent and in compliance with all international safeguards and supportive of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT framework;
12. *Stresses* that further resources are needed for nuclear-related education in order to create a sustainable culture of non-proliferation, including:
- a. The development of standardized and specialized curricula for experts, including government officials, scientists, and industry actors who will focus on nuclear security, safeguards, and dual-use risks;
 - b. The provision of continuous professional training, technical capacity building programs, and knowledge-sharing platforms for such experts;
 - c. The promotion of public education and awareness initiatives aimed at citizens, including projects offered through schools, universities, and media to foster societal understanding of non-proliferation norms and spread knowledge on the matter, strongly encouraging the continued implementation and expansion of accessible online and in-person training programs, as well as academic and institutional partnerships, particularly in regions where technical expertise and regulatory frameworks remain underdeveloped;
13. *Welcomes* the creation of a legally binding protocol for future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East that would secure negative security assurances from all nuclear-weapon states, by:
- a. Creating political and institutional conditions for subsequent treaty negotiations by establishing regional dialogue formats, transparency measures, and enhanced technical cooperation by 2028;
 - b. Initiating formal multilateral negotiations to establish a legally binding treaty framework that includes robust verification and security guarantee mechanisms by 2032;
 - c. Focusing on the national ratification of the treaty, institutional implementation, and the operational monitoring necessary for its full entry by 2035.



Code: NPT/1/5

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Recognizing the critical and immediate need for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Deeply concerned by the ongoing risks of nuclear proliferation and recognizing the need for trust-building as a *foundational* aspect for the establishment thereof,

Reaffirming Articles I and II about not transferring nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear-weapon states, and VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), encouraging State Parties to negotiate in good faith,

Reaffirming the right of all states to the safe with the controlled use of nuclear energy,

Recalling the precedent set by the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which called for the establishment of a NWFZ in the region,

Recognizing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in facilitating the cooperative progression of nuclear nonproliferation,

Concerned by the limited number of Middle Eastern Member States that have ratified the (IAEA) Additional Protocol to strengthen nuclear transparency in the case of suspected deceitful activity,

Recalling the success of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission as an example of a domestic energy organization that collaborates closely with the IAEA,

Guided by the resolutions of the 67th IAEA General Conference in 2023 to implement a financial shielding system for Member States in conflict,

Having considered the Report of the Secretary General on the 77th session of the General Assembly as it highlights the United Nations' willingness to provide assistance to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

1. *Recommends* several reforms to the IAEA to encourage Middle Eastern Member States to consistently and reliably engage with the Agency, including:
 - a. The extension of the number of seats on the Board of Governors, and the addition of a proportional representation system in which a certain number of Member States must be elected to the Board from each major region, a reform aimed at bolstering popular legitimacy of the Board's resolutions;
 - b. The reworking of the IAEA annual contribution scheme to temporarily shift a portion of the contribution from Middle Eastern Member States in zones facing imminent conflict to all other IAEA Member States outside such zones until 2035 by a decreasing amount each year until said

date, thus providing financial shielding from the effects of rapid inflation and currency devaluation that can ensue from regional conflict;

2. *Urges* Member States in the Middle East to ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol, therefore allowing the IAEA to further investigate suspicious nuclear activities by proposing incentives to its ratification, such as receiving the aforementioned financial shielding which consists of receiving a right to reduced IAEA contributions when being actively in conflict as proposed in clause 1 and receiving negative security assurances by nuclear weapons states;
3. *Advises* the IAEA to hold an annual conference, additional to its General Conference, to discuss IAEA operations specific to the Middle East, and for which:
 - a. All Middle Eastern Member States to the IAEA are strongly encouraged to participate in negotiations;
 - b. The financing of this conference would come from the IAEA annual budget;
 - c. The specific topics of discussions would be:
 - i. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
 - ii. The renewal of the formation of other regional multilateral agreements to encourage diplomatic, economic, security ties and normalizing relations in the region;
 - iii. Working toward the formation of centralized domestic nuclear energy organisations in Middle Eastern Member States' without one already in order to facilitate efficient collaboration with the IAEA;
4. *Suggests* tasking the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (TACC) with the responsibility of regional oversight in the Middle East to monitor compliance and foster cooperation that would:
 - a. Create a cooperation and transparency score on their nuclear activities, similar to the Human Development Index for Member States, on criteria such as the number of verifications, participation in international dialogue, and other criteria to be determined by the TACC;
 - b. Participate in a panel of experts for the annual conference that would support and foster discussion by providing relevant data;
5. *Calls for* periodic data collecting measures negotiated between the IAEA and the Middle Eastern Member States to increase transparency and trust among Member States by registering all nuclear activity and the information related to it within each Member State of the region, such as:
 - a. The production or non-production of nuclear weapons by a Member State;
 - b. The provenance of nuclear weapons if purchased from a Member State;
 - c. The type of nuclear weapons owned by a Member State;
 - d. The quantity of nuclear weapons possessed by a Member State;

6. *Invites* the IAEA to disclose data on nuclear weapons collected from Middle Eastern Member States on a voluntary basis to all other Middle Eastern Member States in order to reduce fear associated with the hiding of nuclear weapons and therefore increase transparency by providing incentives such as:
 - a. Offering eligibility for elections to the Board of Governors only to Member States in compliance with IAEA Safeguards and other mechanisms established by the agency;
 - b. Making data sharing an additional stipulation to receiving the financial advantages as proposed in clause 1;

7. *Recommends* that Member States in the region that are currently under or wish to have a Small Quantities Protocols (SQP) follow a mandatory verification as per the standard practice of their nuclear facilities and materials once every five years to ensure compliance with SQP's legal thresholds.



Code: NPT/1/6

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Referring to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on reducing the potential threat of a nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and promoting the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security,

Underscoring Article VII of the NPT, which promotes nuclear-weapon-free zones to advance global disarmament and prevent nuclear weapons within designated regions,

Guided by United Nations General Assembly resolution 3263 (1975), which stresses the necessity to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Taking into consideration the political conditions and danger which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

Calling attention to NPT resolution 1995/32 (1995) on the Middle East, which indefinitely extends the NPT on the condition of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone within the Middle East region, furthering the importance of complete implementation with a solidified framework,

Cognizant of General Assembly resolution 73/546 (2018) on Convening a Conference on the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,

Acknowledging General Assembly resolution 79/241 (2024), which gathered up to 25 experts to promote another comprehensive study on a nuclear-weapon-free zone with a specific focus on the Middle East,

Bearing in mind the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnership for the Goals),

Recognizing SDG Target 16.1 on reducing all forms of violence and related death rates anywhere,

Further recognizing SDG Target 17.2 asking developed countries to implement their official development assistance commitments fully,

Reaffirming the successful experience of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, which have been widely recognized by the international community and contributed to regional peace and set global non-proliferation norms,

Emphasizing the significance of the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) and Treaty of Bangkok (1995) which ensures that Africa and Southeast Asian regions are nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Alarmed by the lack of diplomatic relations between Member States in the Middle East, and the ongoing tensions and historical grievances that have plagued the region for more than 70 years,

Recognizing the importance and the utility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as its role in the peaceful use of nuclear material,

Aware of the IAEA promoting partnerships within nuclear education and training activities, as well as fellowship programmes and schools on various nuclear-related topics,

Reinforcing the preventive logic underpinning the NPT framework, whereby effective non-proliferation is achieved through upstream monitoring of pre-weaponisation activities - including uranium enrichment, reprocessing technologies, and dual-use material transfers - rather than through reactive measures following weapons development,

Re-emphasizing the importance of key treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including the *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (CTBT), and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) to enhance verification under the International Monitoring System (IMS),

Taking note of the outcomes of the United Nations Fifth Session Conference on the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, addressing the need for verification mechanisms and the integration of the NPT, the *Biological Weapons Convention* (BWC; 1972), and the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC; 1993) into the framework,

Underlining the existence of regional research projects in the Middle East, such as the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East based in Jordan, providing a foundation for intergovernmental research in the region,

Conscious of the work of the Low Enriched Uranium Bank (IAEA LEU Bank) in Oskemen, Kazakhstan, in producing low-enriched uranium to distribute for peaceful, civilian use under the guidelines of the Additional Protocol overseen by the IAEA,

Reiterating the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor managed by Norwegian People's Aid, including a broad range of external experts and institutions, that tracks state compliance with the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW),

Ensuring "Disarmament by 2050" as an ultimate goal to make concrete, realistic, and feasible milestones,

1. *Recommends* that the General Assembly establish a provisional regional working group until a regional nuclear leadership is formed, in joint effort with Middle Eastern Member States, to create a platform for inclusive regional dialogue and the development of verification and confidence-building measures, by:
 - a. Conducting technical assessments related to external nuclear assistance and material inputs to nuclear facilities in the Middle East, with the objective of enhancing transparency and addressing concerns over the expansion of nuclear weapon infrastructure, by:
 - i. Establishing an inclusive group of independent experts drawn from IAEA-accredited inspectors and regional scientific institutions;
 - ii. Creating a technical assessment to be within the time frame, no later than 45 days after the original inspection;
 - b. Establishing a graduated, non-escalatory compliance procedure under the working group's conduct, by:
 - i. Requiring that any State with a compliance concern first submit a formal clarification request to the working group, initiating a 90-day bilateral consultation period during which

the State of concern is obligated to provide technical explanations and supporting documentations;

- ii. Granting one extension up to 60 additional days upon written request with stated justification, but no further extension will be provided without convening a full technical consultative panel;
 - iii. Providing that, where bilateral clarification proves insufficient, the working group shall convene a technical consultative panel composed of independent experts drawn from IAEA-accredited inspectors and roll-taking regional scientific institutions;
 - c. Holding an annual conference that presents the work and recommendations of the working group, with a period dedicated to negotiations of these recommendations;
 - d. Modeling the working group after existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zone and organizations such as African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCON) and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL);
 - e. Guaranteeing long-term institutional resilience by insulating technical and consultative functions from political suspension;
2. *Suggests* the creation of the framework for Nuclear End-State Transformation (NEST) as a permanent multilateral framework, monitoring the final step of nuclear disarmament, by:
 - a. Involving all Middle Eastern States as well as other Member States, supported by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the IAEA, as well as the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council;
 - b. Transforming plutonium and highly enriched uranium irreversibly into fuel for peaceful nuclear energy by converting these materials into a civilian, IAEA-monitored cycle and transforming it from weapons-usable material into nuclear reactor fuel;
 - c. Creating a multilateral nuclear fuel bank for the Middle East, administered by the IAEA, which will provide regional Member States with a reliable, inexpensive and depoliticized supply of low-enriched uranium, ensuring the uninterrupted development of peaceful nuclear energy;
 - d. Implementing NEST in two phases, with the first being the proposal of NEST at the 2026 NPT Review Conference where general outlines of the proposal will be discussed, and the second being the utilization of remote sensing technology, satellite imagery, and antineutrino detectors to monitor nuclear facilities without requiring personnel presence in sensitive areas;
 - e. Making use of a blockchain ledger, a decentralized, tamper-proof record-keeping system, in order for every participating State to recognize that nuclear substances have been successfully “down-blended” into fuel for energy purposes;
 - f. Utilizing Member States’ monetary contributions to UNODA and the IAEA regular programme in order to launch NEST after the next Review Conference of the parties to the NPT in 2026 and before 2030 to comply with the SDG agenda;
3. *Encourages* cooperation between civil society research initiatives, IAEA, UNODA, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to expand funding for the creation of a single, unified, independent-style tracker like the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, by:

- a. Emphasizing the creation of a fellowship program similar to the African Union Fellowship Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (2025) in order to increase nuclear safeguards expertise in Middle Eastern Member States;
 - b. Authorizing the creation of a joint regional scientific research centre dedicated to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, modelled after regional collaborative projects like the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East, to build bridges between rival countries and support regional cooperation and stability;
4. *Proposes* the establishment of an IAEA-supported Digital Nuclear Transparency Platform (DNTP) to enhance trust and prevent escalation through voluntary information-sharing, by:
- a. Allowing Member States to submit standardized reports on peaceful nuclear activities, including civilian nuclear use, safety measures, and material storage;
 - b. Implementing a phased participation model, where states may initially share limited, non-sensitive data, with gradual expansion based on trust and reciprocity;
 - c. Ensuring strict data confidentiality through restricted access systems, with sensitive information only accessible to IAEA-certified experts and integrating submitted data with existing IAEA verification mechanisms, including inspections and satellite monitoring, to ensure credibility;
 - d. Linking participation to incentive-based benefits, including financial assistance, technical support, and access to peaceful nuclear energy programs and allowing hesitant states to participate as observers before committing to full transparency, which would encourage gradual engagement;
 - e. Establishing periodic review cycles, where submitted data is assessed by IAEA technical bodies to ensure consistency and identify potential risks;
 - f. Collaborating with the IAEA to establish a digital roadmap that creates clear deadlines for reducing nuclear weapons and stockpiles, building off the IPNDV's 14-step model for nuclear disarmament;
5. *Encourages* voluntary financial support for educational initiatives in the Middle East, aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and confidence-building, including:
- a. Developing training programs for technical experts and national authorities in nuclear safety, safeguards and verification mechanisms, in cooperation with IAEA;
 - b. Seeking the production and distribution of educational materials highlighting the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons;
 - c. Facilitating capacity building initiatives focused on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the promotion of transparency among states in the region;
6. *Calls upon* Member States to engage in confidence-building measures, such as voluntary transparency in the sharing of data, regional technical workshops, structured reporting and diplomatic encounters between states, as well as direct communication between Member States through ways, such as:
- a. Requesting IAEA to be involved in supporting verification procedures through ways such as regulation of the expanded adoption of CSAs and implementation of confidence-building transparency measures;

- b. Developing standardized methodologies and shared data-collection practices across Member States to ensure that any unified tracking mechanism produces transparent and verifiable assessments of nuclear-related activities, compliance, and security;
7. *Calls upon* all Member States, particularly those in regions of heightened proliferation concern, to reference existing frameworks such as the CTBT, and IAEA's CSA and AP, to strengthen global non-proliferation norms and verification through the IMS to enhance regional and international security, by:
 - a. Welcoming the adoption of the IMS, which grants the CTBT's Preparatory Commission the ability to conduct field work at newly established facilities meant to confirm compliance with the CTBT;
 - b. Encouraging to include the provisions of the outcomes of NPT resolution 32 (1995) on the Middle East, where any viable framework should explicitly address chemical and biological weapons, furthering the possibility of a truly safe weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone;
8. *Suggests* that the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) considers the creation of an inner exchange supply group between Middle Eastern States to build cooperation and trust, as well as ensure distance-related costs are limited by further economic cooperation as well as active dialogue between the states;
9. *Recommends* that Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) should establish and abide by concrete and verifiable commitments to guarantee confidence and security in the Middle East through ways such as ensuring that effective negative security guarantees from Nuclear Weapons States are necessary in order to have concrete engagements from Middle East states for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, such as:
 - a. Prohibiting the development of nuclear fissile material used in nuclear weapons;
 - b. Respecting the already existing restrictions and obligations created by the NPT;
10. *Suggests* the revision of the existing dual-track framework that creates two parallel processes that reinforce each other for the future negotiation of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, building upon the precedents such as the AFCONE, in ways such as but not limited to:
 - a. Establishing Track I with a focus on legal, technical, and verification negotiations by:
 - i. Focusing on structured working-level negotiations on the criteria of scope, definitions, territorial applicability, and status of all states within existing non-proliferation instruments;
 - ii. Ensuring data transparency through pilot verification mechanisms that are consistent with IAEA safeguards standards and existing nuclear-weapon-free-zone models, including the Treaty of Pelindaba and Bangkok specifically;
 - iii. Harmonizing technical obligations across existing non-proliferation commitments to reduce ratification barriers, including addressing the status of non-NPT states;
 - b. Ensuring Track II to focus on inclusive regional security dialogue through regular multilateral consultation on the broader security environment and collaborative inspection through ways, such as:
 - i. Advising that dialogue be focused on transparency, technical consultations and information-sharing;

- ii. Noting the participation in joint inspections and data sharing protocols, modeled after the AFCONE, integrating the IAEA safeguards with regional oversight bodies;
- iii. Exchanging among regional research institutions, scientific communities, and civil society to build shared analytical frameworks, as well as long-term support for disarmament norms;
- iv. Exchanging in-person academic resources to proceed independently of political deadlock;

11. *Encourages* Middle Eastern Member States to be voluntarily transparent in their civil nuclear programs, by:

- a. Publishing annual reports about the uses of nuclear energy, especially nuclear material and technologies, these reports will be certified by the IAEA to give to countries a certification "Transparent State";
- b. Ensuring that no undeclared materials are used by allowing IAEA safeguards inspections;
- c. Considering sharing voluntary information about the future civil nuclear programs of Middle East states in the region and with other regions, in order to be able to collaborate on them and enrich them by exchanging results;

12. *Recommends* that the proposals made in this resolution be put forward and made into an acceptable broad technical handbook on nuclear verification, including previously agreed upon verification scope and procedures based on the recommendations of states already party to a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the recommendations of NWS, where the handbook shall be:

- a. Structuring around agreed, optional and unresolved verification elements, compiling them into technical modules, to facilitate gradual regional agreement and provide preparatory groundwork for future regional negotiations;
- b. Ensuring the implementation on a state-by-state basis to allow them to accommodate these ideas into a regional framework, not only by the working group but also as a reference on an international scale.



Code: NPT/1/7

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Guided by Sustainable Development and their Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 16.1 which urgently calls upon Member States to reduce violence and related death rates and 16.6, highlighting the importance of inclusive dialogue among Member States and equal participation,

Reaffirming SDG 16.7 which aims to ensure responsive participation even during conflicts while nurturing States' right to sovereignty and autonomy,

Recognising the importance of the the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) in successfully overseeing the Latin American NWFZ implemented by the Treaty of Tlatelolco since 1969,

Recognising the benefits of nuclear energy utilised for peaceful purposes following International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols by establishing procedures through the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) frameworks to facilitate beneficial implementation,

Affirming the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT) Review's role as an influential body regarding policy and trade on nuclear fissile materials,

Recognising SDG 16.a to strengthen national institutions though international cooperation in order to prevent nuclear violence within all Member States,

Recognising the overarching goal of General Assembly resolution 80/93 is non-proliferation to be achieved gradually through inclusive phased frameworks of safeguards and verification measures, while moving towards nuclear disarmament,

Understanding that nuclear-weapon-free zones are the method for achieving the final goal of longstanding peace within a region,

Acknowledging resolution 2200 A of the *Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination* which centers on the balancing state autonomy with holistic transparency is a necessary goal,

Recognising the tensions created as a result of lack of communication which is what causes most of armed conflicts and ultimately the impact it has on the role of trust, most recently reflected in the Human Rights Activists report in 2024,

Reaffirming the supportive role of educational programmes such as the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) in their work in providing educational resources and tools that support to include the public in making educated decisions regarding disarmament and peace,

Recognising the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) for its training programmes contributing to nuclear disarmament,

Highlighting that economic interdependence can result in decreased military spending in conjunction with strengthened regional trust,

Supporting IAEA regional nuclear fuel bank institutions and their dedication to upholding SDG 7.4, thereby blending cooperation with increasing clean energy,

Acknowledging the required Middle Eastern representation while establishing the new institutions to promote the awareness of NPT,

Emphasising the critical role of the IAEA in monitoring nuclear activities, verifying compliance, and promoting transparency among Member States,

Promoting SDG 4.7 to encourage the use of educational programmes to enhance future understanding in order to prevent the usage of nuclear weapons,

Underlining that expanding access to information and communications technology under SDG 9.C, is crucial to enhancing transparency and reinforces safeguard implementation within NPT,

Strongly aligning with the UN facilitated conference established by General Assembly decision 73/546 (2018) as a constructive multilateral mechanism for advancing the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction,

Applauding the work of the IAEA in promoting technical cooperation, safeguards implementation, and nuclear safety standards, particularly for smaller developing states that lack the extensive domestic regulatory infrastructure,

Commending the contributions of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in partnership with regional networks, for facilitating inclusive workshops and side events that advance legal frameworks and confidence-building measures relevant to the formal negotiation process,

Reaffirming the principles and ideals of the New Agenda Coalition and the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW) (2017),

1. *Strongly encourages* Member States to support the multilateral non-proliferation agreements without conforming to NPT standards that Member States may not be in accordance with, creating a specific treaty would allow for a strong mandate to secure a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East:
 - a. Outlining the agreement to determine how terms can differ between Member States so that everyone agrees to the regulations, with:
 - i. Member States willing to commit to the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons to be highly encouraged to do so;
 - ii. Member States being able to commit to the safeguards and regulations determined by the terms of the agreement;
 - b. Encouraging Member States to engage in an annual regional summit led by a coalition of regional and global alliances to continue good faith dialogue about nuclear disarmament and normalise diplomatic relations, building off of the success of the 2019 UNODA conference and encouraging the involvement of new participants;
 - c. Inviting Nuclear Weapons States to establish a multilateral agreement within the Middle East to incentivise non-proliferation safeguards without having to submit to the NPT and to ensure worldwide safety and control regarding nuclear warheads;

2. *Provides* clear and defined borders for the Middle Eastern region, specifying the Member States that would be impacted by the NWFZ within the region, by:
 - a. Providing adjustments to the preexisting definition of the Middle East and North Africa (the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)) by the United Nations to exclude North African states;
 - b. Creating a new voluntary committee composed of Middle Eastern states that allows the opportunity for frequent regional dialogue;
3. *Recommends* the creation of an organization similar to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, (OPANAL), the Middle East Non-Proliferation Agency (MENPA), whose mandate is to build and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and its Treaty, as a multilateral agreement like the ones proposed prior that will include all concerned Member States in the Middle East;
4. *Suggests* that the Conference for the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East established in General Assembly resolution 80/1, becomes an organ of MENPA and that it has to go through an unanimous vote to incentivise all Middle Eastern Member States to:
 - a. Participating with the primary purpose of the General Conference of MENPA, which will take place in Dubai every two years, to establish procedures regarding the redaction, control and enforcement of the new nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaty;
 - b. Participating with the secondary purpose of the General Conference to establish the annual budget of MENPA and fix the annual contributions of Member States;
5. *Suggests* the installation within MENPA of a Council consisting of annually rotating representatives from 5 different Member States of MENPA with Member States from both sides of the bilateral peace negotiations concerning the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East:
 - a. With the purpose of the council to ensure the proper operation of the procedures regarding the control and enforcement of the Treaty established by the General Conference of MENPA;
 - b. With a group of experts (aidMENPA) affiliated with the IAEA that would serve as an intermediary agent within the Council between both sides of the bilateral peace negotiations in Middle East;
6. *Emphasizes* international cooperation by prioritising adherence to safety measures and collaboration with IAEA, by:
 - a. Facilitating safety training events supported by Member States national centre for nuclear sciences and IAEA to expand international safety protocol;
 - b. Utilising the National Nuclear Energy Commission to regulate amicable nuclear international activities;
7. *Reaffirming* the supportive role of educational programmes in disarmament and non-proliferation to include the public in making educated decisions, by:
 - a. Utilising the in-person and online trainings provided by the IAEA and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP);
 - b. Supporting the expansion of educational programmes to the professional field, schools, and government institutions, with:

- i. Programmes provided by the METO that include youth engagement programmes and simulation exercises to help raise awareness about disarmament;
 - ii. Programmes that include training for professionals working in areas in which nuclear applications are used;
 - iii. Integration of disarmament and non-proliferation in seminars and conferences to emphasize the importance of nuclear safety;
 - c. Supported by Peters' Pence and moved to establish an initial endowment fund for educational efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation training programmes;
8. *Invites* the private sector and the IAEA to work on the promotion of educational, non-polarising content to help build a sustainable, amicable nuclear-weapon-free zone by establishing a Board of Nuclear Understanding (BNU) which will include diplomats from all over the world knowledgeable in nuclear energy and weapons:
 - a. As a benevolent initiative from the private sector actors and from the experts in Nuclear diplomacy;
 - b. With locations and procedures of the meeting established by the IAEA diplomats and submitted to the private sector six months before their meeting;
9. *Requests* NPT Member States to place limits on sale of weapons grade nuclear fissile materials to Member States who are either not signatories of the NPT, or refuse to declare their nuclear weapons status;
10. *Encourages* the Middle Eastern countries to be voluntarily transparent in their civil nuclear programs, in order to avoid misunderstanding, mistrust and potential proliferation concerns, which is beneficial by increasing regional confidence, strengthening regional security, and facilitating scientific and technological cooperation, by:
 - a. Ensuring undeclared materials are used, which helps prevent proliferation, with confidence-building measures aimed at detecting and preventing the use of undeclared nuclear materials;
 - b. Sharing voluntary information about the future civil nuclear programs of Middle East states in the region and with other regions, in order to be able to collaborate on them and enrich them by exchanging results;
 - c. Welcoming collaboration with the IAEA and METO to establish quarterly verification procedures to ensure compliance through technical experts from the region;
 - d. Implementing comprehensive safeguard agreements, protocols and technical assistance to support the development of peaceful nuclear energy;
 - e. Establishing a regional transparency voluntarily database, accessible to participating states, where verified information on nuclear facilities, materials, and peaceful uses of nuclear technology can be shared and regularly updated;
11. *Implores* Member States to collaborate with ECOSOC to begin researching a new programme of action to increase economic interdependence within the region with the aim to bolster regional sovereignty and cooperation through informed organizations such as the UNAI;

12. *Suggests* Member States engage with research through ECOSOC to integrate the nuclear economy in the region by developing nuclear fuel banks mirroring the IAEA's to provide a reliable supply of low enriched uranium following the success of the Latin American region and granting preferential trading;
13. *Incentivizes* Member States to strengthen the TPNW to prioritise the development of education to reinforce its role as a critical tool for establishing a nuclear free future by:
 - a. Implanting aspects of SDG 4.7 in order to promote peaceful and culturally inclusive educational programmes in order to develop a culture of peace;
 - b. Collaborating with the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to promote public awareness and education on the benefits of Nuclear Free Zones;
14. *Encourages* the establishment of targeted capacity-building programmes aimed at supporting Member States lacking experience in nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards implementation, in order to facilitate their effective participation in the future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, including through:
 - a. The pre-existing experience of organisation of specialized training initiatives and knowledge-sharing platforms under the supervision of the IAEA;
 - b. The voluntary secondment of trained experts and technical personnel from experienced Member States to those requiring institutional and scientific support;
 - c. Ensuring that all participating Member States become transparent, accountable, and technically capable actors in the implementation and monitoring of non-proliferation commitments;
 - d. With the aim of building trust, reducing asymmetries in technical capacity, and creating the necessary conditions for an effective, credible, and universally accepted NWFZ in the Middle East, with the goal of:
 - i. Establishing achievable implementation benchmarks within a defined timeframe to strengthen global safeguards participation;
 - ii. Providing legal and technical assistance to establish Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) and also to level the current operations of Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs) in the region;
15. *Promotes* the collaboration between Member States, specifically between Non-Nuclear-States and Nuclear-States, through the Collaborative Plants (CP) programme, which fosters the construction of co-owned nuclear facilities:
 - a. Following a comprehensive guide detailing the general framework to ensure compliance with IAEA regulations and bypass political differences;
 - b. Being supervised by a committee composed of 20 voluntary experts including experts from Member States for each initiatives reporting to the IAEA through bi-annual recommendations and improvements on the operations of the facilities;
 - c. Distributing power output proportionally to the contribution of each Member State where each one provides resources such as but not limited to expertise, staff, land, materials or monetary funds;
16. *Affirms* the establishment of cooperative mechanisms among Member States to implement advanced ICT-based monitoring including shared satellite data and real time information platforms;

17. *Strongly encourages* the establishment of a 24/7 voluntary, technically focused regional Incident Notification and Communication Line (INCL), in coordination with the IAEA, to enhance transparency and reduce escalation risks, which:

- a. Connects national nuclear regulatory authorities with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, as well as relevant UN bodies, to administer regular multilateral simulation exercises, including annual and ad-hoc, aimed at:
 - i. Strengthening national and regional emergency preparedness frameworks;
 - ii. Improving cross-border coordination and response interoperability;
 - iii. Building technical capacity in incident response, crisis communication, and early warning systems;
- b. Facilitates real-time, secure, and confidential communication channels in the event of radiological incidents, nuclear safety breaches, or suspicious nuclear activities, through:
 - i. The use of encrypted communication systems and designated national focal points;
 - ii. Clearly defined thresholds for incident reporting to prevent both underreporting and unnecessary escalation;
 - iii. Welcoming the UNIDIR involvement in providing constant up-to-date information, with the purpose of being an operational tool to prevent miscalculation, reduce escalation risks, and protect civilian populations from radiological harm;
- c. Developed a standardised and voluntary reporting protocol within the INCL framework, aligned with existing IAEA guidelines, including:
 - i. Immediate and time-bound notification procedures for radiological accidents and nuclear safety concerns;
 - ii. Information-sharing guidelines regarding potential threats to nuclear facilities, including cyber intrusions, system anomalies, or monitoring disruptions;
 - iii. Provisions for the protection of sensitive national security information while maintaining transparency;
- d. Establishes a centralised, secure, and access-controlled technical repository, maintained in coordination with the IAEA, for:
 - i. Verified incident data and post incident assessments;
 - ii. Best practices and lessons from simulation exercise and real-world responses;
 - iii. Voluntary data contributions from participation Member States to support coordinated emergency response efforts;
- e. Encourages capacity-building support, including technical assistance and training programmes, particularly for developing states, to ensure equitable participation and effective utilization of the INCL framework.



Code: NPT/1/8

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Alarmed by the continued existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the severe risks and existential threat they pose to global security and human life, as demonstrated by the disastrous happenings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

Cognizant of Art. 2.4 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), committing Member States to refrain from the use of force,

Understanding the current and historical context surrounding the tensions in the Middle East and prioritizing measures that seek to monitor and reduce tensions in the region,

Noting that the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the Middle East by Member States that store them as a deterrent is not deemed peaceful,

Identifying that joint anti trafficking initiatives can serve to form common ground and build a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ),

Convinced that the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons in the Middle East will keep their territories free of nuclear weapons and rule out the ownership, creation, or trade of nuclear weapons within their territory,

Affirming that the stockpiling of highly enriched uranium (above 20%) creates worry of the expansion of nuclear weapons and is unnecessary for civilian use,

Recalling the Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) which demands that every Member State establishes legal mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring regional cooperation from Middle Eastern states on policies mirroring the preexisting regional NWFZ agreements, as well as the agreed-upon disarmament regulations and safeguards,

Reaffirming the right of any group of states to conduct regional treaties under Article VII of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT),

Recalling further the 1995 Review and Extension Conference that created the basis for the political commitment for a NWFZ in the Middle East,

Confident in voluntary financial contributions by invested Member States,

Calling attention to the non-assessment to the NPT of states within the region and their absence from dialogue forums,

Highlighting the effectiveness and importance of regional organizations, similar to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and

multilateral security initiatives as trust-building methods that strengthen and oversee international cooperation, and ensure compliance from signatory states,

Expressing appreciation for the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) which has drafted treaties and organized summits relating to a Middle Eastern NWFZ,

Reaffirming the essential work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and cooperation in the atomic field and ensures compliance through effective safeguards and verification mechanisms,

Emphasizing the need for a more robust IAEA budget with the goal of strengthening verification measures and safeguards, especially recognizing the IAEA's additional protocol,

Acknowledging the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which supports disarmament measures of Member States, and the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities, which they manage and that specifically supports projects towards the Security Council resolution 1540,

Affirming the efforts of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in conducting research on disarmament and international security as well as their programme on promoting a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East through dialogue, research, arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament,

Recognizing the grievous threat posed by nuclear smuggling as a shared issue, with the IAEA reporting over 4626 trafficking incidents occurring from 1993 to 2025,

Bearing in mind that with over 55% of nuclear smuggling incidents occurring as a result of insecure transportation,

Noting the success of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization's (CTBTO) International Monitoring Systems (IMS), which feature 275 stations worldwide primed to detect nuclear explosions,

Having considered the important role Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) play in the fostering of global discussion on nuclear disarmament and the creation of NWFZs,

Welcoming the generous support of Peter's Pence as a collection for humanitarian relief to fund the necessary steps towards a NWFZ in the Middle East,

1. *Recommends* the UNODA to establish a regional coordination framework comprised of Middle Eastern states for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, inspired by the structure and successful practices of OPANAL, to enhance cooperation among participating states through:
 - a. Facilitating regular dialogue and consultation through biannually scheduled conferences on a rotating location basis among regional Member States to promote trust and transparency;
 - b. Supporting the IAEA safeguards and verification mechanisms through coordinated action to confirm compliance with disarmament measures;
 - c. Promoting secure and standardized information-sharing on peaceful nuclear activities for Middle Eastern Member States with no nuclear weapon arsenals and no build-up initiatives of;
 - d. Supporting the gradual development of confidence-building measures such as inspections of nuclear facilities and reporting nuclear material to the Regional Disarmament Branch (RDB) of the UNODA;

- e. Ensuring voluntary participation by providing incentives of shared knowledge of nuclear activities while fully respecting national sovereignty;
2. *Encourages* the United Nations Secretariat to convene a multi-lateral international summit for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and thereafter by having delegations made up of at least one third of the Member States included in the Middle East and other NWFZ's, alongside IAEA representatives from every NWFZ to discuss successful implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation from their treaties by:
 - a. Showing cooperation with other NWFZ regions by exchanging knowledge without legal obligations;
 - b. Inviting knowledge exchange, like the NPT Review Conference, biennially for Member States from the Middle East to meet in a Capital rotating between Member States in the region;
 - c. Recommending delegations signed to the Treaties of Bangkok, Tlatelco, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, and Semipalantinsk review the treaty implementation in the Middle East for a sustainable long-term commitment and Member States outside of the specified NWFZ as observers with the consent of the body;
3. *Highlights the importance of* METO's continued involvement in multilateral conferences, such as the Middle East NWFZ Conference held by UNODA, for the purpose of providing technical support and representing the concerns of regional civil society initiatives by:
 - a. Presenting METO's current Draft Treaty, which outlines preliminary guidelines relating to a Middle East NWFZ;
 - b. Showcasing current and original METO research related to the establishment of NWFZs;
 - c. Sharing best practices in including the concerns of women and youth in NWFZ diplomacy in Middle Eastern Member States;
4. *Encourages* every Member State to submit annual, transparent reports to the IAEA on its nuclear-related activities and commitments by:
 - a. Modelling an Executive Committee for the Middle East, modeled after pre-existing Executive Committees under the treaty of Bangkok and Tlatelolco, aimed at facilitating dialogue, confidence-building, and peer review;
 - b. Ensuring technical verification, accuracy, and international credibility;
5. *Encourages* all Member States, especially Middle Eastern states, to join and participate in conferences regarding nuclear disarmament, such as the Conference on Disarmament under UNODA;
6. *Designates* third-party oversight committees through the IAEA, such as the METO, to inspect nuclear facilities in Middle East Member States by:
 - a. Strengthening and harmonizing radiation protection, nuclear safety, and security regulatory infrastructure, safety, and security culture among its Member States;
 - b. Providing technical cooperation and alignment with the IAEA's safeguards;
 - c. Strengthening the partnership and capacity building in the Middle East Member States;

- d. Aligning with Sustainable Development Goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) to promote peace through regional oversight committees;
7. *Recognizes* the importance of multilateral collaboration on the shared issue of anti-nuclear trafficking initiatives to build communication, confidence, and trust between Middle Eastern Member States through initiatives through measures such as:
 - a. The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, which provides transparency through information exchange as a first step in building trust and communication between Middle Eastern Member States;
 - b. The participation in neutral security conferences such as the Baku Security Forum which addresses common issues, promotes interstate dialogue, and forms shared initiatives through consensus building;
 - c. The pursuance of Member States' own National or Joint National Action Plans to specifically target nuclear smuggling;
 - d. The Maritime Nuclear Security Initiative (MNSI) in coordination with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to counter non-state actor trafficking of illicit nuclear material over sea within the Eastern Mediterranean;
8. *Suggests* the strengthening of IAEA oversight and regulations on the extraction, enrichment, and transportation to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear material between Member States by:
 - a. Calling on the IAEA's Operational Safety Review Team which conducts on-site reviews of nuclear power plants worldwide;
 - b. Requesting IAEA legislative missions to hold stakeholder workshops to align national nuclear safety agencies with IAEA standards;
 - c. Suggesting that Member States submit information about national competent authorities who are authorized to handle nuclear transport to the IAEA to ensure that all transport is safely accounted for;
9. *Underlines* the importance of aiding transparency measures through the CTBTO by:
 - a. Encouraging Member States to support the CTBTO's goal of achieving 321 IMS systems to create a comprehensive global security network;
 - b. Further dissuading Member States from performing unauthorized nuclear testing to comply with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT's) initial framework;
 - c. Supporting Member States for their ratification of the CTBT, bringing the world closer to a legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing;
10. *Calls upon* all Member States to follow all NPT and IAEA protocols and to stop the buildup of highly enriched uranium through the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty:
 - a. To suggest that Member States have the IAEA to inspect all uranium stockpiles to investigate if they are building up stockpiles of highly enriched uranium;

- b. To request that Member States do not stockpile highly enriched uranium past the necessary amounts for civilian usage in research and technology with the IAEA overseeing production, storage, and usage;
 - c. The IAEA decides and reports what amount of highly enriched uranium would be required for peaceful purposes within Member States;
 - d. To allow IAEA inspections into uranium enrichment facilities to report on the amount and percentage of their uranium enrichment to ensure transparency;
11. *Encourages* the Middle Eastern Member States to be voluntarily transparent in their civil nuclear programs by publishing annual reports to the IAEA which would include:
- a. The uses of nuclear energy, especially nuclear material, and technologies, allowing the international community to verify peaceful use; these reports will be certified by the IAEA to give countries a certification “Transparent State”;
 - b. The verification undeclared materials not being used, which helps prevent proliferation, with confidence-building measures aimed at detecting and preventing the use of undeclared nuclear materials;
 - c. Sharing voluntary information about the future civil nuclear programs of Middle East states in the region and with other regions, in order to be able to collaborate on them and enrich them by exchanging results;
12. *Suggests* that the IAEA’s Regular Budget Fund is provided by additional voluntary contributions from Member States, and the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament, is utilized by:
- a. Compensating the lack of the IAEA’s funding due to the zero real growth limitation, and unresolved payments of Member States;
 - b. Focusing the IAEA’s budget for their additional protocol on the efficiency of verification measures and safeguards for Middle Eastern nuclear facilities and programs;
13. *Recommending* the UNIDIR to expand their programme on the Middle East NWFZ with the Summit of NWFZ Member States to exchange knowledge and to provide guidance for the Middle East NWFZ by:
- a. Expanding their current efforts with analytical and technical capacity with the Summit of NWFZ Member States;
 - b. Adding dialogue regarding a NFWZ in the Middle East with their current conversations with their policymakers and experts;
 - c. Furthering the objectives to promote a NWFZ in the Middle East by the proposed expansion of the programme to include successful NWFZ in the process of the establishment;
14. *Recommends* the Contracting Parties to abide by agreements set by a combination of Middle Eastern Member States who comprise the regional branch for the Middle East through UNODA;
15. *Expresses its hope* for financial support by the Holy See through approval for the establishment of an endowment funded by Peter’s Pence for the purpose of regional disarmament in the Middle East.



Code: NPT/1/9

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Reaffirming Art. 1 para. 2 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) to promote friendly relations, respect for equal rights and self-determination, and measures to maintain universal peace,

Believing in the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) in force since 1970, represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of the disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS),

Stressing the importance of the approaches of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, seen in General Assembly resolution 3263 (1976), based on the advances that have been made since,

Acknowledging that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would strengthen the NPT's universality by creating conditions conducive to the accession of regional Member States not yet signatories to the Treaty,

Urging all Member States working towards the common goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East to provide financial support for efforts working towards this goal to the extent of their capabilities,

Highlighting the importance of addressing issues from multiple perspectives and believing that such an approach enables conflicts and challenges to be tackled in a multidimensional and regionally effective manner,

Recognizing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985) as a leading example of a successfully implemented nuclear-weapon-free zone among many other treaties that demonstrate such zones are achievable and effective non-proliferation tools,

Recalling the 2010 NPT Action Plan, which reaffirms the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East through a process based on dialogue, inclusivity, and consensus,

Emphasizing the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Encouraging the inclusion of the Middle Eastern Treaty Organization (METO) as a Civil Society regional body that can aid in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

Regretting the shared history of environmental damage and displacement the South-Pacific region experienced through the testing of nuclear weapons during the Cold War,

1. *Encourages* the foundation of a new working group within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Committee of Middle East Fissile Material Providers (CMEFMP), that would be composed of

representatives of key uranium and plutonium exporters in the region of the Middle East and would be funded collectively by its members with the shared mandate of working towards a peaceful nuclear future, by:

- a. Regulating and reporting the export of fissile material;
 - b. Managing a specific Member States access to fissile material if they are shown to use the material for military purposes;
 - c. Ensuring equitable access to fissile materials for peaceful purposes, particularly for Developing States, in order to prevent supply concentration and monopolistic control;
 - d. Establishing pricing transparency and multilateral review processes in order to ensure fair distribution;
 - e. Requesting the establishment of an independent oversight mechanism, in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the activities of the CMEFMP;
2. *Calls* for the creation of a Qualified Group of Experts for Nuclear Disarmament in the Middle East (STRATEGY), encouraging the Secretary General to do so by a General Assembly resolution, including:
- a. A group composed of 25 experts from all around the world specialized in Nuclear Disarmament could discuss advances and study the regulation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the Middle East;
 - b. An approach to a more transparent data exchange putting in common crucial safety information of Member States in the region and a nuclear capacity sharing for a uniform global security;
 - c. An annual panel where these experts have the opportunity to share their knowledge with leaders and legislators and, through discussion, build regional support for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, held in a capital of a Middle Eastern State;
3. *Recommends* the United Nations General Assembly to appoint a Special Rapporteur to represent the United Nations Secretary-General in facilitation of negotiations within the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East conference no later than December 2026, who shall:
- a. Develop a conference agenda acceptable to all parties in the region;
 - b. Convene the regional conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
 - c. Report progress to the United Nations Secretary-General every three months;
 - d. Report any obstruction by any party publicly to the General Assembly;
 - e. Mandate continues until a successful conference is held;
4. *Encourages the* United Nations Security Council for the establishment of a permanent framework for negotiations between States in conflict in the Middle East to strengthen multilateral dialogue, by:
- a. Recommending urgent action, having a regional effective dialogue between Member States by the assistance of the UNODA, creating dialogue panel programs to give the voice to every Member State in conflict;

- b. Trusting all Member States to reach a common understanding of conditions for the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with IAEA protocols;
 - c. Requesting all Member States in the Middle East to join the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) for controlling the export of sensitive materials;
 - d. Designing confidence-building measures through transparency and communication with the help of the United Nations Institution for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), achieving the objective of a clear vision of the nuclear capacities of the Nuclear Weapon States in the region;
5. *Strengthens* the diplomatic relations of the Member States of that region, through encouragement of mutual recognition and cordial communication, while emphasizing diplomatic agreements and advances through peaceful means, through compliance of the already existing international law to guarantee security in the region;
6. *Supports* the establishment of a Technical Assistance Hub (TAH) through the United Nations Security Council to strengthen national capacities for nuclear verification safeguards implementation, by:
 - a. Coordinating with the IAEA to ensure new treaties align with existing safeguard systems, securing consistency, transparency, and reporting verification;
 - b. Facilitating the transfer of technical expertise and verification technologies to developing States, particularly those with limited infrastructure;
 - c. Providing training programs for national authorities on safeguards implementation and compliance procedures, funded by the Holy See through the Papal Foundation;
 - d. Ensuring equitable access to assistance, particularly for developing states and small island nations;
7. *Further requests* NWS within the framework of the NPT to negotiate and adopt legally binding Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) applicable to a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, by:
 - a. Committing to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Member States within the zone;
 - b. Establishing a coordinated framework, facilitated by UNODA in cooperation with the IAEA, aimed at supporting negotiations between relevant Member States, providing technical expertise and guidance, as well as ensuring the monitoring of nuclear materials, while contributing to the development of standardized NSA structures applicable to the region;
 - c. Encouraging Member States to formalize these assurances through multilateral agreements and protocols linked to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
 - d. Recommending that such assurances be conditional upon full compliance with NPT obligations and IAEA safeguards, ensuring the oversight of comprehensive Safeguard Agreements (CSAs) in the Middle East, while at the same time ensuring accountability, credibility and trust among regional states;
 - e. Recognizing NSAs as a key confidence-building measure that reduces regional security concerns and incentivizes participation in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts;

8. *Promotes* confidence-building measures (CBMs) to reduce tensions and prevent misinterpretation of military activities, including:
 - a. Advance notification of military exercises and missile tests to increase transparency and predictability;
 - b. Cooperation with relevant international organizations, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), to support monitoring and verification;
 - c. The establishment of communication mechanisms, such as hotlines, between states;
9. *Emphasizes* the necessity of clearly separating civilian nuclear energy from military applicants including:
 - a. The development of enhanced information sharing mechanisms to ensure transparency between states and international monitoring bodies regarding nuclear activities;
 - b. Strict safeguards on dual-use technologies to prevent their diversion toward military applications;
 - c. International monitoring of nuclear energy facilities, in coordination with the IAEA, to ensure compliance with peaceful-use commitments;
10. *Encourages* Member States increased transparency in national military doctrines related to nuclear capabilities to reduce ambiguity and prevent escalation, including:
 - a. The voluntary disclosure of national nuclear policies, including doctrines on deterrence, first use, and second strike-capabilities;
 - b. The establishment of standardized reporting frameworks, in coordination with the IAEA, to ensure consistency and compatibility of disclosed information;
 - c. The facilitation of bilateral and multilateral transparency agreements between states in regions of heightened tensions, particularly in the Middle East;
 - d. The development of secure communication channels and hotlines between states to prevent misinterpretation of military activities;
 - e. The encouragement of periodic peer review mechanisms, allowing Member States to assess and provide feedback on transparency practices;
 - f. The integration of transparency commitments into regional frameworks, including efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
11. *Directs attention* to the work of METO and the prospect of further collaboration to:
 - a. Include METO in the mediation of negotiations between states in the Middle East through further encouragement to engage in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, providing reports on progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
 - b. Encourage the inclusion of METO as a supplementary, non-governmental platform to facilitate both informal and technical decisions, as well as trust-building measures with formal intergovernmental negotiations;

- c. Support funding and resource mobilization efforts that advance disarmament, non-proliferation, and verification capacity including regional training programs, technical workshops and institution-capacity building efforts;
- d. Support prospective organizations within this paper with both collaborative efforts and funding efforts;
- e. Utilize METO as a regional institution to facilitate the writing and implementation of an eventual treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in collaboration with the IAEA and UNODA.



Code: NPT/1/10

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Acknowledging the progress towards nuclear disarmament through the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

Recalling the 2013 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals 2030 (SDG), SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions), and SDG 17 (Partnership for Goals),

Viewing with appreciation the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA's safeguards, and verification measures that are already in place, though also acknowledging the need to strengthen the pre-existing safeguards, and verification measures for non-proliferation,

Deeply disturbed by the ongoing conflicts, and loss of life in the Middle East, and that not establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone would be detrimental to the establishment of global norms, and bring condemnation in the Middle East,

Recognizing the individual sovereignty of Middle Eastern States,

Understanding that peaceful dialogue is necessary to the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East,

Deeply concerned by the security dilemma in the Middle East hindering trustbuilding,

Recognizing that the sheer existence of nuclear weapons is posing a worldwide threat especially in unstable regions such as the Middle East,

Cognizant of the grave consequences of potential nuclear conflict, such as the mass displacement of humans, and the destruction of vital infrastructure,

Noting that not establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone would further endanger the lives of the peoples in the Middle East,

Fully aware of the need to expand technical cooperation as necessary to future progress,

Recognizing the need for effective, and efficient safeguards, and verification measures that incorporate remote monitoring to move ahead a peer-reviewed system to establish transparency among Member States,

Recognizing further that sustainable disarmament efforts must be voluntary, and rooted in mutual trust among regional actors in order to ensure long-term compliance,

Emphasizing the need to establish training mechanisms for third party nuclear weapon identification systems,

Convinced that education surrounding the NPT, and the ideas surrounding change to peaceful nuclear energy systems is the key to disarmament, and non-proliferation,

Acknowledging the urgent need for peaceful nuclear energy, and the related education required,

Stressing that all states not yet party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, by encouraging conflicting Member States to establish ceasefires that allow for meaningful dialogue to commence Track II diplomacy that invites unofficial but influential figures from opposing groups,

1. *Calls* upon the universality of Non-Proliferation Treaty through the admission of Non-Member States to the NPT by encouraging conflicting Member States to establish ceasefires that allow for meaningful dialogue to commence Track II diplomacy that invites unofficial but influential figures from opposing groups;
2. *Urges* Middle Eastern States to engage in regional dialogue in regards to their collective security concerns in the region that coincide with already established United Nations security frameworks including but not limited to the NPT, the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements, and UN Security Council resolutions;
3. *Endorses* the universal adherence to the NPT, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as the fundamental pillars for regional stability in the Middle East;
4. *Encourages* Member States to implement the Stockholm Initiative, and its 22 steps to foster regional bodies across the globe including the Middle East to effectively, and cohesively work towards the final goal of the NPT, and to expand nuclear disarmament in Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones;
5. *Recommends* the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), both financially, and technically, to be the verification authority, in order to improve its capability to conduct inspections that verify non-proliferation, and the maintenance of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones;
6. *Proposes* the adaptation of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) model to the Middle East to create a multilateral framework for nuclear safety, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, by:
 - a. Conducting third-party financial management with donor states, and international organisations to fulfill fund insurance;
 - b. Involving other cooperation such as agricultural, and water waste management around nuclear facilities;
 - c. Calling for the implementation of a Laudato Si' Action Platform by The Holy See in the Middle East, which guides communities through a 7-year journey focused on sustainable production, consumption, and the promotion of ecological education;
7. *Draws attention to* strengthen IAEA safeguards, and verification measures by incorporating AI technology in the Middle East, to establish a new method to establish transparency between Member States in order to create a collaborative environment within the Middle East using enhanced verification measures, and monitoring systems for the more efficient use of reporting by:
 - a. Ensuring that all final decisions, and verification findings remain under the ultimate control of human experts;
 - b. Encouraging transparency among Member States in the Middle East, the implementation of AI software into IAEA safeguard mechanisms can be used as an unbiased, third-party source as a

means for verification to confirm between Member States the adherence to the NPT, and IAEA safeguards;

- c. Implementing AI technologies into the IAEA safeguard mechanism systems for the Middle East can create transparency, and further communication through the voluntary creation Member State reports on their nuclear facilities, and related practices in order to create an accessible report that is available to all, and will be able to be discussed in timely manners among Middle Eastern Member States;
 - d. Including the use of AI-assisted text analysis of information given through documentations of willing Member States, and self-reporting on the peaceful use of nuclear technologies encouraging efficient communication mechanisms between Middle Eastern states;
 - e. The incorporation of AI technology will only be used for the detection for nuclear facilities, and nuclear waste, and will not be used for detecting nuclear missile launch sites to develop, as the Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) accept that AI technology capable of detecting nuclear missile launches or sites shall not be developed;
8. *Calls upon* Member States to build upon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by integrating IAEA inspections with a regional peer-review process, by:
- a. Establishing Member State specific efforts to apply the IAEA's Additional Protocol, and welcome inspections across border range sites;
 - b. Encouraging Member States to support related programs under the Additional Protocol to establish transparency in regional territories;
9. *Strengthening* common nuclear energy initiatives through the incorporation of educational, and capacity building efforts by implementing the Executive Programme for Educators (EPE), and the voluntary sharing of technological expertise between member states for the Promotion of sharing technical expertise within the confines of a member state's national security by establishing information sharing procedures between member states in order to expand technical cooperation, and create joint nuclear infrastructure projects within the Middle East.



Code: NPT/1/11

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Recalling the obligations and objectives stated in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),

Recognizing the three core pillars of the NPT, disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy mentioned in Articles 6 and 5 of the NPT as the foundation of this committee's work,

Reaffirming the long-term viability of the NPT depends on the provision of effective security guarantees to non-nuclear states,

Recalling that, under the NPT, all Member States are obligated to refrain from developing nuclear weapons and to subject their fissile materials to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards,

Appreciating the made efforts of the United Nations International Computing Centre to support general cybersecurity through the United Nations International Computer Centre's Cybersecurity Fund (CSF),

Acknowledging the footage provided from the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (SPIDER),

Noting Article III of the IAEA Statute, which outlines the agency's function as a vehicle for capacity building and technical support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and materials,

Reminding Member States of the immense benefits that civilian nuclear programs can provide, especially to developing countries, and the value of clean and affordable energy sources in the fight against climate change laid out in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

Mindful of the importance to separate nuclear energy from military application,

Alarmed by the intensification of undeclared nuclear capabilities and the lack of a unified regional security since the 1960s, contributing to continued security asymmetries and reinforcing a cycle in which states perceive nuclear capability as a necessary deterrent,

Concerned about the lack of trust by regional actors and unresolved conflicts, obstructing the progress toward disarmament,

Noting with concern the findings of the 2023 IAEA Report on the Application of Safeguards in the Middle East, which identified significant inconsistencies in regional safeguards implementation including states without any safeguard agreements in force,

Alarmed by the ongoing and open international conflict in the Middle East, which is exacerbating the danger of undermining progress towards non-nuclear proliferation and peacebuilding initiatives, such as the NPT and the 1995 resolution of the Middle East,

Alarmed by the deterioration of security in the Middle East exacerbated by the restrictions on oil and economic maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz as a tool of warfare in the current conflict in the Middle East,

Concerned about the repeated violations of limits on nuclear fuel enrichment quantities and subsequent declaration of enrichment facilities, capacities, and inventories in the Middle East, in accordance with the NPT and IAEA's 2026 NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran,

Reaffirming the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF/1995/32), which called for universal NPT accession and IAEA safeguards for all regional states,

Conscious of the previous attempts to reach a legally binding obligation on international adherence of the NPT, such as draft resolution 1219 (2003), presented before the United Nations Security Council to establish that all countries of the Middle East, without exceptions, should accede to the NPT,

Emphasizing that reducing incentives for nuclear weapons development requires addressing the underlying security concerns of Member States at the regional level,

Noting the Group of Governmental Experts report 78/120, which highlights the importance of regional approaches to Capacity Building,

Recognizing the importance of the UNODA Annual Conference on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East,

Recalling Goal 16 of Agenda 2030, regarding the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,

Noting the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3472 B of December 11, 1975, which considers NWFZs one of the most effective means for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Highlighting the success of the previous NWFZ in different regions of the world like the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985), the Treaty of Bangkok (1995), Treaty of Pelindaba (1996), Treaty of Semipalatinsk (2006),

Acknowledging the NWFZs established by the Treaties of Pelindaba (1996) and Tlatelolco (1967) in promoting stabilization among feuding MS and voluntary transparency measures,

Inspired by the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP) and believing that its foundations would be relevant and usefully applied to the current Middle East,

Considering the complexities of the current strategic environment and the lessons learned from prior agreements such as the 2015 JCPOA,

Remembering the success of global non-nuclear campaigns, like the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN),

Viewing with appreciation that in between 1993 and 2013, 500 tons of Russian highly-enriched uranium (HEU) were down-blended to low-enriched uranium and used by civilian Power Reactors,

Welcoming the General Assembly to assist in facilitating talks with all member states regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region,

Underscoring the importance of key programmes within the IAEA, such as the Development and Implementation Support Programme, which ensures that experts conduct annual verification of nuclear activities,

Noting that ongoing regional conflicts, political tensions, and security disagreements can be confronted by developing confidence-building measures, transparency, and inclusive dialogue,

Recognizing the need to balance non-proliferation obligations with the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

Affirming the necessity for nuclear transparency, set forth in the three-point plan proposed by this subcommittee, ensuring the trust and security of nuclear nations,

Concerned about the continued lack of transparency, trust, and legally binding commitments regarding nuclear weapons in the Middle East,

1. *Encourages* fissile material providers to expand existing their cooperation within the already operating Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a collective of nuclear supplier states who works towards nuclear non-proliferation, into a more comprehensive and inclusive realm, by:
 - a. Working to include all large exporters of fissile material, such as uranium and plutonium;
 - b. Stipulating a shared mandate in which Member States pledge to be equitable in distributing fissile material to developing states and small island nations and prioritizing projects that respect human rights and environmental concerns; and promote transparency in pricing and distribution;
2. *Recommends* the development of a Middle East Nuclear Technical Advancement Committee (MENTAC), which will be held under the mandate of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which comprises the following measures for the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone under the direction of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the following functions:
 - a. Fosters the advancement of capacity building in the Middle Eastern Region, promoting:
 - i. Technical advancements in the infrastructure;
 - ii. Knowledge and capacity building for the future implementation of verification mechanisms under the NWFZ;
 - b. Requests all regional Member States currently operating under modified Small Quantities Protocols to rescind those modifications and implement full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, with undue delay;
 - c. Recommends the voluntary publication of annual nuclear transparency reports by all regional Member States detailing the scope and purpose of their declared civilian nuclear programs; (CSAs) in collaboration with the IAEA to promote trust between Member States in the region needed to foster broader, durable regional stability;
 - d. Recommends increasing transparency among the states voluntarily by exchange of information in the case when the nuclear ambiguous events happen with the support of IAEA;
 - e. Promotes the sharing resources of skillbuilding and finances from the Cyber Security Fund for Member States independence in digital protection of critical infrastructure and in sites of nuclear power plants;
 - f. Encourages multilateral cooperation for the peaceful usage of nuclear energy via the MENTAC initiative by promoting, along the IAEA, the usage of Down-Blending Techniques (DBT) as the obligatory method for the elimination of HEU, ensuring its conversion for civilian purposes;

3. *Agrees* to create a Qualified Group of Experts for the nuclear disarmament in the Middle East (STRATEGY) under the MENTAC committee to evaluate and monitor how the sharing of nuclear technology, or the establishment of new nuclear facilities, affects global security networks and fulfilling the lack between the exchanged information and the reality, by:
 - a. Reminding the importance of separating nuclear energy from military application;
 - b. Noting the restriction of the use of fissile material for only peaceful purposes under the supervision of the IAEA;
 - c. Suggesting that STRATEGY should act collaboratively with the MENTAC committee by providing professional information and advice;
 - d. Inviting all the Member States to implement the STRATEGY system on their own NWFZ proprietary to promote united nations equality;
4. *Suggests* that all Middle-Eastern Member States participating in the MENTAC committee have the right to observe the efforts of other Middle-Eastern Member States, modeling frameworks from the START-treaties, taking into account regional security concerns and based on systematic reciprocity;
5. *Suggests* the implementation of a Middle East Commission on Nuclear Energy based on the framework of the already existing African Committee on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) with the aim of replicating the success of the Treaty of Pelindaba, in order to:
 - a. Recommend that a set number of member parties would be selected for a fixed term on basis of equal geographical distribution and nuclear-advanced countries;
 - b. Facilitate the exchange of information;
 - c. Review periodically the implementation of peaceful nuclear activities within member parties in regulation with IAEA safeguards;
 - d. Encourage regional and sub-regional programmes on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology in accordance with article IV of the IAEA Safeguards;
 - e. Facilitate the exchange of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
 - f. Act as a neutral ground for dialogue and exchange of information, furthering cross-border relations and transparency on each state's nuclear programmes;
6. *Recommends* to the Director General of the IAEA to have a "phased implementation" of the NWFZ in the Middle East through confidence-building measures with the Goal to build trust between regional members in a time frame of 10 years, through:
 - a. Implementing a phased plan over a 10-year period to build trust gradually, including:
 - i. Phase I (Years 1–3): voluntary transparency measures and data-sharing on nuclear activities;
 - ii. Phase II (Years 4–7): reduction of sensitive nuclear activities and increased inspection, alongside the implementation of mutual verification measures;

- iii. Phase III (Years 8–10): full compliance with NWFZ obligations and regional verification system;
 - b. Establishing of a regional diplomatic forum under UNODA to promote sustained dialogue among Member States;
 - c. Committing on voluntary transparency measures, including annual national declarations on civilian nuclear activities submitted to the IAEA;
 - d. Committing on joint workshops supported by MENTAC to align technical understanding with political commitments;
 - e. Suggesting the expansion of IAEA inspection mechanisms through region-specific verification arrangements;
 - f. Gradually limiting sensitive nuclear activities in line with mutually agreed benchmarks;
 - g. Technically supporting of MENTAC to assist states in meeting verification and compliance requirements;
 - h. Negotiating a legally binding regional NWFZ treaty facilitated by UNODA;
 - i. Fully implementing IAEA safeguards and a regional verification system;
 - j. Continued technical monitoring and support provided by MENTAC to ensure long-term sustainability;
- 7. *Affirms* that the full and transparent implementation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol is the bedrock for institutional trust and provides the necessary model for achieving a stable and long-term regional confidence-building process through a three-phased implementation plan in the Middle East;
- 8. *Advises* for the creation of the framework for Nuclear End-State Transformation (NEST) as a permanent multilateral framework, monitoring the final step of nuclear disarmament, by:
 - a. Requesting the involvement of the Middle Eastern States, supported by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council;
 - b. Recommending to transform weapon grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium irreversibly into fuel for peaceful nuclear energy to:
 - i. Convert these materials into a civilian, IAEA-monitored cycle;
 - ii. Transform it from weapon material into nuclear reactor fuel, therefore rendering it useless from being repurposed into nuclear weapons;
 - c. Implementing NEST in two phases:
 - i. The first phase to propose NEST at the 2026 NPT Review Conference where general outlines of the proposal will be discussed;

- ii. The second phase, if the Member State would allow it, entailing the implementation of remote sensing, as well as the use of satellite imagery and antineutrino detectors to monitor facilities without requiring personnel presence in sensitive areas;
9. *Introduces* yearly regional gatherings to assess the development of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East; establishment of a periodic review mechanism as well as a full report to assess the overall progress;
10. *Calls for* the continuation and strengthening of annual UNODA conferences on the NWFZ in the Middle East, including through:
 - a. Fixed timelines and measurable benchmarks;
 - b. Annual progress reports coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and ISU;
11. *Requests* the IAEA to conduct a comprehensive regional safeguards assessment of all Middle Eastern Member States and report findings annually to the UNODA weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone conference;
12. *Supports* the development of an independent regional inspection board tasked with conducting periodic verification visits to all declared civilian nuclear facilities across the region in accordance with Article IV of NPT;
13. *Recommends* with the consent of host country, a status-confirming team governed by the IAEA may be sent on a status-confirming team after the consent of the receiving State Party to clarify a nuclear ambiguous situation and will be financed by ad hoc contributions, made by the State Parties, which are interested in the fact-finding mission;
14. *Underlines* the necessity for effective monitoring of the exchange of nuclear materials regionally through measures including but not limited, to:
 - a. Capacity building of the IAEA via the establishment of permanent missions in the critical ports of volunteering states as implemented by other states within the region and international community;
 - b. Deploying advanced verification technologies including satellite imaging and AI-supported monitoring tools to strengthen detection of potential safeguards violations;
15. *Calls for* transparency by encouraging states to voluntarily share information about nuclear-related activities such as civilian and military, also ensuring confidence-building by reducing mistrust through dialogue, inspections, and communication channels, crisis prevention will also help create mechanisms to avoid escalation during conflicts and a long-term disarmament vision to lay groundwork for a potential NWFZ in the Middle East, by:
 - a. Participating states shall commit to the voluntary exchange of information regarding civilian nuclear programs, including reactor operations, fuel cycles, and safety protocols;
 - b. Encouraging Member States, where politically and legally feasible, to voluntarily provide limited disclosures concerning military-related nuclear activities to reduce ambiguity and misperception while establishing hotlines between state crisis communication of military exercises regarding emergency responses, as well as illegal usage of uranium/radioactive material;

- c. Recommending joint training programs and workshops on nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation shall be encouraged to promote shared standards and trust;
16. *Encourages* Middle Eastern Member States to adopt measures ensuring transparency regarding nuclear security such as the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, to:
 - a. Engaging in information sharing on illicit trafficking issues involving unauthorized acquisition of nuclear material;
 - b. Identifying and analyzing trends for potential security threats and vulnerabilities that meet the IAEA's goal of strengthening nuclear security;
17. *Supports* the ideal of having voluntary concessions from the international community in exchange for transparency of nuclear programs, which include funding for nuclear-armed nations in the Middle East for things like nuclear education and funding for the responsible use of nuclear energy;
18. *Recommends* implementation of the SPIDER crisis response monitoring mechanism for quick response to dangerous activities and individuals near nuclear power plants and storage of nuclear fissile materials;
19. *Encourages* the development of regionally adapted extended deterrence arrangements, established under internationally recognised and transparent frameworks, as a means to reduce incentives for independent nuclear weapons development in the Middle East, while contributing to regional stability and strategic balance, by:
 - a. Recommending Nuclear-Weapon States to provide negative and positive security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States in compliance with international law;
 - b. Emphasizing that such arrangements must remain strictly defensive in nature, aimed solely at preserving regional stability, provide balance and prevent escalations;
 - c. Affirms that extended deterrence mechanisms should be voluntary, consent-based, and region-specific, respecting the sovereignty and security perceptions of participating states;
20. *Recommends* the MENTAC to use a tiered scaled system to assess current nuclear crisis levels Nuclear De-Escalation Framework (NuDEF) following Level 1-4, specifically through:
 - a. Entailing routine monitoring and dialogue, in which Member States are encouraged to share data on nuclear postures and maintain open communication channels (Level 1);
 - b. Focusing on negotiations in response to escalating tensions, relying on agreements to limit or postpone destabilizing actions (Level 2);
 - c. Inviting all relevant stakeholders and observers to an urgent crisis summit if credible evidence of an imminent escalation is presented (Level 3);
 - d. Recommending an immediate appeal from the Secretary-General and the Security Council urging the suspension of any nuclear deployment and calling on all Member States to participate in emergency talks (Level 4);
21. *Calls* upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to do so as non-nuclear-weapon States:
 - a. Within full compliance with Articles I, II, and III of the NPT;

- b. Verification procedures must respect national sovereignty and non-interference for all States;
22. *Promoting* the development of peaceful nuclear energy via international collaboration, technical support, and civilian access to nuclear fuel under IAEA oversight;
23. *Calls* for strengthened international cooperation with the IAEA to enhance regional nuclear and radiation safety systems, by:
- a. Encouraging Member States to prioritize nuclear safety, radiation protection, and environmental monitoring by incorporating these objectives into national legislation, strengthening regulatory institutions, and aligning implementation strategies with IAEA standards in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals;
 - b. Utilizing existing IAEA frameworks to identify priority areas for technical support and joint development projects;
 - c. Expanding peaceful nuclear applications in healthcare, agriculture, energy, and environmental protection;
 - d. Supporting long term improvements to nuclear infrastructure such as nuclear power plants to support the growth of clean nuclear energy;
24. *Encourages* collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council to advocate for the peaceful use of nuclear energy while opposing nuclear proliferation;
25. *Invites* states from existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including African States under the Treaty of Pelindaba, to share best practices and technical expertise with Middle Eastern States;
26. *Recommends* the United Nations General Assembly to facilitate inclusive dialogue with all relevant regional actors, including non-NPT Member States, in order to advance discussions towards the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, by:
- a. Encouraging the coordination between the UNGA, the IAEA, and the annual conference on the establishment of a Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone to develop technical and diplomatic pathways for the gradual inclusion of non-NPT Member States in transparency, verification, and reporting mechanisms;
 - b. Recommending the adoption of incremental confidence-building measures, including voluntary information-sharing on peaceful nuclear activities and participation in regionally coordinated dialogues, as a step forward fostering trust and enabling non-NPT Member States to constructively engage in the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone;
27. *Encourages* collaboration with regional organizations and international bodies, including UNODA, to support dialogue, education, and implementation efforts;
28. *Proposes* to the judges of the annual UNDEF to choose a Middle Eastern Member State to support funding education for democratic foreign and domestic institutions for individuals living in rural areas;
29. *Encourages* the implementation of training programs for local and regional nuclear specialists in collaboration with civil society organizations and the IAEA to ensure that Member States are empowered to adhere to existing IAEA frameworks;

30. *Advises* Member States to adopt programs that seek to educate the public on the benefits of civilian nuclear programs, in order to dispel fears and misconceptions about nuclear programs, through academia, scholarship opportunities, and digital awareness campaigns, modeling initiatives like ICAN, on a regional scale;
31. *Endorses* Observer States as facilitators of dialogue and bridge-building with the interest of de-escalating potential nuclear conflicts in the region of the Middle East.



Code: NPT/1/12

Committee: The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Acknowledging the safeguard and verification tools from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for nuclear power plants,

Taking into consideration the central role the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in ensuring transparency and verification through its safeguard systems and technical assistance programs,

Acknowledging the work needed to improve transparency and trust through the use of monitoring systems to enhance nuclear non-proliferation,

Highlighting the success of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (nuclear-weapon-free zones), that now covers over 50% of the earth landmass, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Treaty of Pelindaba that prohibits the testing, development, and acquisition of nuclear weapons,

Recalling the principles established under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which provide the legal framework for safeguards and the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones,

Further recalling the 1995 NPT review conference that created the basis for the political commitment for a nuclear weapon free zone in the middle east,

Recognizing the unique security challenges in the Middle East and the necessity of a phased approach to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone that respects the security interests of all regional stakeholders,

Underlining the role of technical assistance in bridging the gaps between national capacity and international verification standards, such as quick disaster quick response mechanisms and monitoring from space provided by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UN-SPIDER),

Bearing in mind the threat of unilateral intrusion into state sovereignty and the need to reinforce IAEA authority in the Middle Eastern region,

Noting the pre existing regional tensions within the Middle East due to longstanding conflicts and difficulties regarding cultural, religious and territorial matters and the extension of the zone in conflict in the region of Western Asia,

Affirming the employment of IAEA Safeguards Training Initiatives for scientists to create an atmosphere of regional cooperation,

Emphasizing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) actively promotes partnerships among nuclear education and training institutions worldwide,

Affirming the success of *The IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs,*

Keeping in mind that incentives such as economic development, technological cooperation, and educational assistance are essential in encouraging voluntary participation in the disarmament process,

Appreciating the secondary effects of education about democracy in trustbuilding processes on national and international matters supported by the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF),

Underlining education as a fundamental element for confidence building and building inter-regional cooperation in the Middle East,

Noting with approval the current efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the current regional educational networks and partnerships, such as the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology,

Takes note of the successfully established nuclear education networks such as the Asian Network for Education (ANENT) and the Latin American Network for Education in Nuclear Technology (LANENT) in facilitating diplomatic exchange and creating regional consensus on the management of nuclear weapons,

Cognizant of the impact of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all,

Recognising the United Nations Democracy Fund in championing the positive effects that general education has on citizen's perception of domestic and foreign defence,

Focusing on achievable outcomes such as subsidies on education at STEM universities and the PoweringME training initiative that maintain momentum even when political negotiations stall,

Guided by United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) initiatives such as Youth4Disarmament that educates and empowers youth as a way of transforming young people from passive beneficiaries to active stakeholders in regards to nuclear energy on a regional level,

Concerned with the further need for detecting undeclared nuclear activity through the use of technology,

Deeply convinced that the universal adoption of an agreement based on the IAEA nuclear safeguards is essential for maintaining strategic stability and global non-proliferation,

Supporting language that promotes voluntary participation, verifiable cooperation, and confidence-building measures,

Observing nuclear weapon usage within the Middle East through the International Atomic Energy Agency through collaboration with regional experts on encouraging a transition towards peace,

Reiterating Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that emphasizes a State's inalienable right to producing and developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

1. *Encourages* the further expansion of systems throughout the Middle East, such as International Monitoring System stations and laboratories to verify compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as a means of expanding verification;
2. Suggests the use of technologies using Open-Source Intelligence technology to enhance nuclear disarmament verification through the public records collection and analysis;
3. *Establishes* the creation of a Middle East Network for Education in Nuclear Technology (MENENT) under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), modeled after ANENT and LANENT, to expand training, education, and capacity-building programs on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, by:

- a. Establishing partnerships between Middle Eastern institutions and IAEA Collaborating Centres, including regional universities, to develop nuclear safety curricular;
 - b. Promoting collaboration between MENENT member organizations and other regional and global networks;
 - c. Attracting talented youth through mentorship from senior nuclear professionals;
 - d. Developing and sharing educational materials, virtual tools, and outreach resources;
 - e. Integrating nuclear science into academic curricular in partnership with universities and training institutions;
 - f. Organizing international workshops and exchange programs to promote knowledge-sharing and capacity building;
 - g. Encouraging international education initiatives and public awareness campaigns on peaceful nuclear applications in energy, medicine, and agriculture;
 - h. Supporting subsidized scholarship programs at accredited institutions, funded through IAEA Technical Cooperation funds and bilateral partnerships;
 - i. Implementing safeguards to prevent proliferation by restricting content to peaceful applications, requiring IAEA oversight of research, and mandating background checks and end-use certifications for participants;
4. *Strongly advises* Member States to design a virtual database collects data in accordance with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to align with NPT guidelines for a nuclear-weapon-free zone, by:
- a. Utilising experts within the Middle East region, to translate and report current concerns and threats within the area, which would be integrated into a IAEA Database to calculate the urgency of the situation in a particular area;
 - b. Monitoring the inventory and usage of uranium (LEU), specifically Uranium-235, collecting information on parts of the nuclear fuel cycle that aligns with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) restrictions;
 - c. Incorporating this networking system through IAEA inspections, Member States can be provided with specific needs on an annual basis based on the data collected and a universal cooperation of nuclear usage;
5. *Implements* the SPIDER crisis response monitoring mechanism for quick response to terrorist activities and individuals near nuclear power plants and storage of nuclear fissile materials;
6. *Suggests* the creation of the Nuclear End State Transformation (NEST) as a permanent multilateral framework to explicitly monitor the final step of Nuclear disarmament, by:
- a. Involving parties that are the middle eastern states, supported by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the IAEA, as well as the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council;

- b. Transforming weapon grade plutonium and high enriched uranium irreversibly into fuel for peaceful nuclear energy by:
 - i. Converting these materials into a civilian, IAEA-monitored cycle;
 - ii. Transforming it from weapon-usable material into nuclear reactor fuel;
 - c. Implementing NEST in two phases:
 - i. Firstly, proposing NEST at the 2026 NPT Review Conference where general outlines of the proposal will be discussed;
 - ii. Secondly, implementing of remote sensing technology, as well as the using of satellite imagery and antineutrino detectors to monitor facilities without requiring personnel presence in sensitive areas;
 - d. Making use of blockchain ledger, a decentralized, tamper-proof record-keeping system in order for every participating State to recognize that nuclear substances have been successfully “down-blended” into fuel for energy purposes;
 - e. Falling under the mandate of the UNODA and IAEA and utilizing of their budgets as well as incentivizing voluntary contributions from NPT member states in order to:
 - i. Launching NEST after the next Review Conference of the parties to the NPT in 2026;
 - ii. Implementing NEST before 2030 to comply with the SDG Agenda;
7. *Recommends* developing specialized training programs for safeguard inspectors on the use of AI with guidance from the IAEA and the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to train inspectors and scientists from developing countries in the responsible use of AI:
- a. Promotes partnerships between international organisations and academic institutions to provide technical training related to AI monitoring technologies such as Incorporating the UNODA and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s handbook on Responsible Innovation in AI for International Peace and Security;
 - b. Work with Belizean government to strengthen regulatory frameworks such as the IAEA Safety Standards framework alongside the Convention on Nuclear Safety to integrate AI regulation into policymaking;
8. *Recommends* that Member States create a platform to voluntarily report military expenditures and related activities, thereby fostering greater transparency in defence-related communication and reducing regional tensions;
9. *Encourages* the irreversible transformation of weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium into fuel for ensuring peaceful nuclear energy through coordination and verification to the IAEA to ensuring the Peaceful Uses Initiative is being upheld;
10. *Encourages* collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide economic and technological incentives for participating States, including:
- a. Infrastructure development to support national regulatory and monitoring capacities in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts;

- b. Capacity-building efforts that include training on emerging technologies, including the responsible use of artificial intelligence;
11. *Encourages* the development of a structured and regionally-led Middle East Nuclear Confidence Building Framework (MENCBF), using information and communication technologies to build upon existing measures to facilitate trust and transparency as a preparatory step for the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, which would:
- a. Establish annual regional regional transparency meetings where Member States voluntarily present information on their nuclear programs;
 - b. Create a real-time regional communication hotline between participating states to facilitate and promote voluntary participation in quick information sharing based on the OSCE confidence building practice to standardise military reporting, inspections and data exchange reducing the possibility of miscalculation errors and prevent unintentional escalation related to nuclear activities in order to and achieve:
 - i. Measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used;
 - ii. Efforts to promote broad-based participation;
 - iii. Competence- and capacity-building in the areas of disarmament and arms control;
 - c. Utilize the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiatives for SSACs and SRAs (COMPASS) program for increased verification training between Member States;
12. *Encourages* Member States to increase collaborative efforts in Member States across the Middle East to further education and research towards nuclear technology in peaceful uses such as in energy, medical technologies, or agriculture to move away from the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and create collaboration and transparency between Member States, particularly in the Middle East to further transparency efforts across Middle Eastern States, by:
- a. Establishing further funding and educational efforts towards nuclear conferences such as conducted by the UNODA, and by Member States, such as the Finnish Nuclear Science and Technology Symposium;
 - b. Increasing conference accessibility to future diplomats, engineers, and students in order to expand their knowledge on non-proliferation efforts and nuclear-weapon-free zone, as well, as to foster communication, relationships, and transparency between leaders, experts, and citizens;
 - c. The increase in educational efforts echos its significant through the continual acknowledgement for the need for transparency and communication between Member States in the Middle East, with education regarding peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and nuclear-weapon-free zone being towards the forefront of the conversation;
 - d. Supporting efforts to increase dialogue and educational efforts by the Holy See and strongly appeals to all Middle Eastern Member States to participate in doing so;
13. *Calls* upon the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), in close coordination with the IAEA, to expand technical assistance programs aimed at achieving the universal adoption of a voluntary, consensus-based Agreement based on the Additional Protocol, and a suspected Ratification until 2030;

14. *Welcomes* a voluntary, consensus-based protocol for a future Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone that would secure negative security assurances from all nuclear-weapon states, by:
 - a. Creating political and institutional conditions for subsequent treaty negotiations by establishing regional dialogue formats, transparency measures and enhanced technical cooperation by 2028;
 - b. Initiating formal multilateral negotiations to establish a legally binding treaty framework that includes robust verification and security guarantee mechanisms by 2032;
 - c. Focusing on the national ratification of the treaty, institutional implementation and the operational monitoring necessary for its full entry by 2035.



Code: NPT/1/13

Committee: The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Emphasizing the importance of international cooperation under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system,

Appreciating the 1995 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, which calls for universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and weapons of mass destruction free zone in the region,

Affirming that increased transparency and accountability are essential steps toward establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Recognizing the importance of United Nations facilitated programs on the regional level to advance and increase stability and security of Member States, which have been promoted greatly by the three Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament already stationed in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa,

Concerned over the lack of comprehensive communication mechanisms for the transport of radioactive materials,

Taking into account the importance of existing channels such as the State Declarations Portal (SDP),

Considering the complexities of the current strategic environment and the lessons learned from prior agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,

Recognizing the versatility of uranium and the multitude of utilizations for the material that go beyond nuclear weapon development,

Expressing its deep concern for the deteriorating relations between Middle Eastern States, resulting in the obstruction in the execution of obligations under the NPT,

Recalling that the United Nations Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) is legally binding but has not been enforced by the affected actors,

Further believing in the work of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) regarding international peace and security through disarmament as well as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities), which promotes inclusive, safe, and resilient human settlements, and SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong Institutions), which encourages international legal disarmament architecture, as well as SDG 17 (global partnership for the goals),

Recalling IAEA General Conference resolution 69/15 (2025), General Assembly resolution 3263, General Assembly resolution 4365, and General Assembly resolution 77/38, which call for the establishment of a

nuclear-weapon-free one in the Middle East and further calls for the better implementation of IAEA safeguards and regulations,

Fully aware that successful regional disarmament models, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) in Latin America, show that flexible ratification procedures and gradual entry into force can effectively overcome regional divisions and promote broader participation,

Noting that in order to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, nuclear disarmament must be at its foundation and continued implementation,

1. *Supports* strengthening the authority and resources of the IAEA to ensure effective monitoring and verification of nuclear programs, while ensuring all activities are conducted with the explicit consent of member states and in full respect of national sovereignty;
2. *Recommends* establishing an IAEA Subsidiary Body on Regional Verification (SBRV) mandated to support Member States in enhancing voluntary transparency measures in the Middle East, by:
 - a. Operating as the liaison between the IAEA and Middle Eastern Member States to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and build stability in the region through direct verification measures;
 - b. Preventing undue interference in the international affairs of other Member States, especially those that may be involved in or affected by such initiatives;
 - c. Encouraging the establishment of confidence building measures and peaceful cooperation between member states before establishing the SBRV;
3. *Recommends* regional Member States to expand upon their IAEA protocols to their safeguards agreements by:
 - a. Expanding upon the IAEA's authority to conduct complementary access inspections similar to those within a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East being able to achieve information exchanges;
 - b. Improving detection capabilities for undeclared nuclear activities and facilities;
4. *Suggests* the creation of a Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in the Middle East which would assist in increasing region based disarmament and security-related projects through the UNODA, by:
 - a. Encouraging all Middle Eastern and bordering neighbor states to create and submit a regional initiative to the Secretary-General for the importance of a center to serve the region;
 - b. Inviting all Middle Eastern states including non-treaty states to voluntarily join and gain membership to the Regional Centre without prejudice to their existing position;
 - c. Accepting and utilizing voluntary contributions of Member States and other regional body partners for operations in line with other preexisting Regional Centres funding programs such as the Africa and Asia-Pacific Centers;
 - d. Conducting operations out of capital city Manama hosted by Member State Bahrain;
5. *Calls upon* all Member States to voluntarily cooperate in the establishment of a transparent data-sharing platform with the aim of reporting nuclear weapons supplies, and disarmament efforts, thereby ensuring

accessible and equitable data use among Member States, with the goal of strengthening international trust and collaboration which can be achieved, by:

- a. Requesting that the UNODA develop a universal reporting form be created for the purposes of global understanding and ease of reporting, formatted similarly to the UNROCA;
 - b. Asking that each year, the reports submitted voluntarily by nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike are made available to the United Nations body through IAEA publication;
 - c. Establishing a data sharing network with the IAEA that would compile pertinent statistics to make the best profile available to increase transparency at a regional and international level;
6. *Encourages* all Middle Eastern states to engage in a flexible phased approach for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, considering national security concerns, by:
- a. Implementing gradual ratification procedures that allow Member States to join the agreement step by step;
 - b. Establishing interim verification and reporting mechanisms under the supervision of the IAEA to build confidence at each phase;
7. *Proclaims* the establishment of a secure channel of communication that encompasses the transit, disposal, and usage of radioactive materials by allowing regional Member States to volunteer points of access to an IAEA centralized hub that follows an exchange protocol, by providing their own information for access;
8. *Further invites* Member States to utilize existing forums like the State Declarations Portal to facilitate trust building through the sharing of information, by:
- a. Supplying a transparent venue for Member States to detail their usage of radiological material;
 - b. Providing knowledge based incentives through the portal for participation with non nuclear Member States who have previously been excluded from collaboration efforts;
9. *Supports* voluntary state-led confidence building measures inspired by the JCPOA Commission Model, integrating IAEA inspections with a new regional peer review process to meet quarterly that would:
- a. Promote regional technical workshops overseen by relevant scientific experts, Think Tanks, and NGOs that are in line with the JCPOA, to guide Member States in strengthening their technical monitoring architecture;
 - b. Operate within existing IAEA authorities to encourage regional cooperation on best practices for verifying the absence of undeclared nuclear material;
 - c. Ensure neutral, verifiable data to resolve security concerns while creating a conducive atmosphere for a phased entry force of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;
10. *Encourages* Middle Eastern Member States to utilize controlled uranium, processed for safe and reliable electricity generation through a Low Enrichment Uranium Bank (LEUB) in Bahrain, to prevent enrichment beyond the peaceful threshold which is currently at 20%, per the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, subject to future revision, by:

- a. Encouraging Member States that are not in the Middle East to contribute financially to the Low Enrichment Bank to maintain the infrastructures:
 - i. According to an annual fee, which is set by the IAEA following a financial evaluation, for the Member States meant to use the Low Enrichment Uranium Bank;
 - ii. Having the Member State that hosts the LEUB to report directly to the IAEA to outline the process of their controlled-enrichment, which would increase transparency;
 - a. Ensuring that in the event that the necessary funds provided by Member States are not met, the Peter's Pence as well as NGO's and civil organizations fund shall be incited to voluntarily aid in the establishment of the LEUB and subsidize the required funds to assist;
11. *Suggests* the creation of the framework for Nuclear End-State Transformation (NEST) for the Middle East as a permanent multilateral framework, monitoring the final step of nuclear disarmament, by:
- a. Involving all Middle Eastern States, supported by the UNODA and the IAEA, as well as the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council;
 - b. Transforming weapon grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium irreversibly into fuel for peaceful nuclear energy, by:
 - i. Converting these materials into a civilian, IAEA-monitored cycle;
 - ii. Transforming it from weapon material into nuclear reactor fuel whereafter it cannot be used for nuclear weapons anymore;
 - c. Implementing NEST in two phases, by:
 - i. Proposing NEST at the 2026 NPT Review Conference in the first phase where general outlines of the proposal will be discussed;
 - ii. Entailing the implementation of remote sensing in the second phase, as well as the use of satellite imagery and antineutrino detectors to monitor facilities without requiring personnel presence in sensitive areas;
 - d. Making use of blockchain ledger technology, used to track radioactive material movement in order for every participating State and manufacturer to recognize if the nuclear substances and nuclear grade have been successfully "down-blended" into fuel for energy and civilian purposes;
 - e. Taking funds from UNODA and IAEA budgets as well as voluntary contributions from MS achieved by incentives in order to be:
 - i. Launching NEST following the 2026 NPT Review Conference;
 - ii. Implementing NEST before 2030 to comply with the SDG agenda;
12. *Further recommends* adherence mechanisms to encourage Member State compliance, including:
- a. Nuclear energy education programs that would guide relevant policymakers and local NGOs in strengthening their national verification processes;

- b. Independent collaborative research facilities established by the SBRV that would employ scientific experts from Member States with nuclear capabilities;
- 13. *Recommends* regional actors in the Middle East to resume talks on the Abraham Accords, which would normalize relations between Israel and Arab States and build on the foundation that Member States in the Middle East such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, who are already part of the Abraham Accords, can act as a bridge between Iran and Israel, while resembling, respectively, the culture and ideology and the interests.



Code: NPT/1/14

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Understanding the pressing and ongoing security risks due to nuclear weapons in the Middle East and prioritizing the integration of Member States with nuclear weapons within the region into the NPT,

Emphasizing the contents of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted with the intention of prohibiting all nuclear explosions and aimed towards banning nuclear testing worldwide,

Appreciating the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification's (IPNDV) 14-step model for nuclear disarmament which highlights possible solutions including verification objectives, information requirements, and potential inspections,

Stressing that, in order to foster confidence and guarantee the long-term sustainability of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, non-discriminatory commitments, equal safeguarding requirements, and transparency among all states are crucial,

Reinforcing the call for a digital and technological initiatives such as a digital roadmap and monitoring systems which are designed to reduce tensions in the Middle East, assists other Member States with monitoring both climate and nuclear activity, and serving as an efficient tool for dialogue,

Fostering educational efforts in the Middle East relating to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

Highlighting that, in compliance with Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, every Member States has the basic right to produce and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

1. *Encourages* fissile material providers to expand existing their cooperation within the already operating Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a collective of nuclear supplier states who works towards nuclear non-proliferation, into a more comprehensive and inclusive realm, by:
 - a. Working to include all large exporters of fissile material, such as uranium and plutonium;
 - b. Stipulating a shared mandate in which Member States pledge to be equitable in distributing fissile material to developing states and small island nations and prioritizing projects that respect human rights and environmental concerns; and promote transparency in pricing and distribution;
 - c. Promoting awareness on the global humanitarian risks posed by nuclear proliferation;
 - d. Working to systematically prioritize Member States who have shown peaceful use of nuclear energy;
2. *Calls for* the expansion of current IAEA reporting systems regarding the import and export of fissile materials to and from Middle Eastern Member States to foster trust between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states and ensure that materials have legitimate peaceful uses, expanding reporting

through guaranteed continual remote monitoring for lower-risk fissile materials, including Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) and natural uranium;

3. *Recommends* that should a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East be established, its participating Member States to implement consistent, non-discriminatory safeguards practices to foster transparency, foster regional trust, and guarantee equal responsibilities, and suggests that this process be coordinated through yearly regional safeguards and transparency conferences held under the guidance of the IAEA and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), by:
 - a. Encouraging all contributing Member States to use uniform reporting frameworks created in collaboration with the IAEA in order to apply common reporting requirements for nuclear materials and facilities;
 - b. Suggesting that safeguards by design principles be used to newly built nuclear plants in order to incorporate monitoring and verification procedures from the outset of development;
 - c. Creating an optional regional peer-review system to encourage technical collaboration and openness by having technical experts from participating Member States evaluate safeguards implementation reports;
 - d. Requesting that a regional safeguards and transparency report be created and presented to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference based on the conclusions and suggestions of these yearly sessions;
4. *Suggests*, with the goal of synthesizing confidence between Member States, the adoption of the International Monitoring System (IMS) to the IAEA which grants the CTBT's Preparatory Commission the ability to conduct field work at newly established facilities in regions, such as the Middle East meant to confirm compliance with the CTBT, and intends to reduce tensions in regions, such as the Middle East, through:
 - a. Allowing for experts and researchers from the CTBT's Preparatory Commission to access these facilities and partner with the IAEA to assist in field research, share knowledge, and provide their expertise in diplomatic discussions with Member States in the respective region;
 - b. Monitoring all levels of environmental data through satellite technology and high-end equipment such as radiation poisoning, uranium concentration, and chemical particles in the atmosphere which provides safeguards for neighboring Member States of nuclear testing and activity;
5. *Collaborates* with the IAEA under the oversight of UNODA and directed by a joint task force made up of members from both non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states to establish a digital roadmap that creates clear deadlines for reducing nuclear weapons and stockpiles, building off the IPNDV's 14-step model for nuclear disarmament;
6. *Calls for* cooperation and educational efforts among Member States where disarmament and adherence to the NPT and IAEA are at the forefront of enabling the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, by:
 - a. Suggesting accessibility of resources in order to foster better global understanding of the IAEA;
 - b. Encouraging the spread of awareness regarding the previous outcomes of accepting safeguards of the IAEA to increase confidence-building and verification measures for nuclear weapons;

7. *Suggests*, in line with Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the growth of peaceful nuclear energy cooperation in the Middle East to foster regional cooperation, offer incentives for joining a nuclear-weapon-free zone Middle East and guarantee that nuclear technology is used only for peaceful purposes, such as:
 - a. Encouraging cooperative regional peaceful nuclear energy projects to promote reliance, cooperation, and transparency among Member States;
 - b. Fostering technical cooperation programs that help Member States develop peaceful nuclear applications in energy, medicine, agriculture, and water desalination;
 - c. Increasing access to civilian nuclear fuel and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards to minimize incentives for self-sufficient enrichment programs;
 - d. Seeking voluntary reporting on peaceful nuclear activity from Member States in order to foster openness and regional confidence-building;

8. *Endorses* the establishment of education and research centers where participating countries can host regional research centers for AI under the Middle East Network for Education in Nuclear Technology (MENENT) under the IAEA, by:
 - a. Providing access of Members of MENENT to Middle Eastern Universities and national educational networks;
 - b. Integrating available resources for education, training, and outreach in synergy with existing IAEA and other mechanisms;
 - c. Encouraging the use of information and communication technologies, in particular web based training and education to a maximum possible extent;
 - d. Encouraging senior nuclear professionals to share their experience and knowledge with younger generations to improve regional competency and increase awareness about diversion of nuclear power from weapons to peaceful purposes.



Code: NPT/1/15

Committee: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Topic: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,

Recalling decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference including those for the reform of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Recalling Article VIII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows the amendment of the Treaty text by calling a Treaty Amendment Conference, provided a majority of signatories, and the votes of the nuclear five are in favour,

Recalling Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which states that “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories”,

Recalling Article VIII paragraph 3, which sets the interval between meetings at 5 years,

Recalling Article IX paragraph 3 defines a Nuclear Weapon State as one which has manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon before 1st January 1967,

Recognizing the gap of recognition between Nuclear Weapon States as defined by the NPT and Member States who have developed nuclear weaponry after 1st January 1967,

Reaffirming its commitment to the constant and effective nuclear disarmament,

Reaffirming the right of all states parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Emphasizing the role of the IAEA in ensuring compliance through safeguards and verification mechanisms,

Reaffirming the Importance of transparency and confidence-building measures regarding building trust and cooperation among participating states,

Recognizing the importance and potential of nuclear energy as a solution to global energy challenges,

Believing that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East cannot be completed and maintained without including the Middle Eastern Member States in it, including the State of Israel,

Regretting heavily that certain Member States raise concerns about the development of nuclear weapons as a justification for acts of military aggression,

Emphasizing that catastrophic results of acts of aggression may be avoided in the future in case the Middle East becomes nuclear-free and commits to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in full,

Underlining that the current text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty may be and has to be modified for the accession of and other current non-members,

Calling for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 44/108 on “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” and General Assembly resolution 45/63 on “Israeli nuclear armament”,

Reaffirming commitment to the final decisions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, particularly the Resolution on the Middle East, which emphasizes the necessity of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the application of safeguards to all states in the region,

Recognizing the persistent security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon states in the Middle East regarding the potential use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Concerned by the absence of universally binding and legally enforceable negative security assurances for States in the region,

Reaffirming the importance of security assurances in strengthening the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting regional confidence and stability,

Noting with consideration the 64-Point Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, particularly measures related to nuclear disarmament and regional security,

Affirming that the implementation of enhanced safeguards shall not infringe upon the inalienable right of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT,

1. *Recommends that* the Non-Proliferation Treaty Member States call a specialized Treaty Amendment Conference (TAC NPT);
2. *Calls* TAC NPT *to amend* Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by adding a second clause, containing “The parties to the treaty recognize the value of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in their contribution to limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each party to the treaty undertakes to encourage the establishment of such zones through negotiations in good faith.”;
3. *Calls* TAC NPT to amend Article VIII, clause 3, by substituting the phrase “At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.” with the phrase “At intervals of two years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.”;
4. *Suggests* the adoption of the term Late Nuclear Weapon State (LNWS) as describing member states who developed and detonated a nuclear weapon after 1st January 1967, which is distinct to the term of Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), having developed and detonated a nuclear device prior to 1st January 1967;
5. *Calls* TAC NPT to amend Article IX of the Non-Proliferation Treaty substituting definition of nuclear weapon state (NWS) with a definition of nuclear-weapon State based on the decision of the NPT Commission on Recognition consisting of IAEA and UNODA technical experts acting under international authority and provisions of Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol of Non-Proliferation Treaty;
6. *Encourages* the development of supplemental informal recognition and engagement framework within the context of the NPT to address the emergence of nuclear-armed states not formally recognized under Article IX with next actions proposed, through:

- a. Requesting the International Atomic Energy Agency, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, to develop technical assessment reports on nuclear capabilities and associated proliferation risks posed by such states;
 - b. Recommending the establishment of a voluntary transparency and confidence-building mechanisms through which such states may engage with the international community without prejudice to their legal status under the Treaty;
 - c. Inviting consideration of additional protocols or informal arrangements aimed at extending safeguards, verification standards, and non-proliferation norms to nuclear-armed states outside the formal NPT framework;
 - d. Urging states accessing the NPT to declare their nuclear armament and their status within the treaty upon entry, and calling TAC NPT to amend provisions of the NPT with the intention of granting a status of Late Nuclear Weapon States (LNWS) to Member States which will join NPT under the provisions of the new edition of Article IX;
7. *Calls* TAC NPT and the next NPT Review Conference to discuss the issue of LNWS and special provisions regarding them and their operational capacity within NPT;
8. *Calls* TAC NPT to consider amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty with the Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol urging following, by:
- a. Recommending the Non-Proliferation Treaty Commission on Recognition is established under the auspices of the NPT;
 - b. Recommending that the Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol consists of 3 UNODA international experts appointed by the UNODA Secretariat, 2 IAEA international experts appointed by the IAEA Secretariat;
 - c. Recommending that the Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol acts only as a technical body without any political influence or reasoning allowed;
 - d. Recommending that the Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol is financed by NPT members in direct proportion to their GDP;
 - e. Recommending that the Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol its own rules of procedure and technical protocols during its Foundational Session;
 - f. Recommending that the Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol submits the aforementioned rules and protocols to the NPT Member States;
 - g. Recommending that the Commission on Recognition Additional Protocol is the sole body under the NPT that can officially determine possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons by the Member State;
9. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of all Member States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, contingent upon full compliance with Article III obligations, including the conclusion and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.