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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2019 National Model United Nations New York Conference (NMUN•NY)! We are pleased to welcome you to the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). This year's staff are: Directors Maïke Weitzel (Conference A) and Saeko Yoshimatsu (Conference B). Maïke completed her BA in European Studies in 2016 and is now pursuing a MA in International Relations at the Technical University of Dresden, focusing on international law and politics. Saeko completed her BA in International Relations in 2018 and now pursuing a MA in International Relations and Comparative Politics at Kobe University.

The topics under discussion for the Peacebuilding Commission are:

1. Partnerships for Sustainable Peace
2. Peacebuilding and Security Sector Reform
3. Implementing the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS)

Acting as an advisory body for the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the Security Council, the PBC plays a unique role in supporting peace efforts in conflict-impact countries around the world. As such, the PBC is responsible for bringing together relevant actors and proposing strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery efforts. The PBC fills a unique role in the UN system in the relief-to-development continuum, bringing together the government of a particular country with all appropriate international and national actors to establish long-term peacebuilding strategies.

This Background Guide serves as an introduction to the topics for this committee. However, it is not intended to replace individual research. We encourage you to explore your Member State's policies in depth and use the Annotated Bibliography and Bibliography to further your knowledge on these topics. In preparation for the Conference, each delegation will submit a [Position Paper](#) by 11:59 p.m. (Eastern) on 1 March 2019 in accordance with the guidelines in the [NMUN Position Paper Guide](#).

Two resources, available to download from the [NMUN website](#), that serve as essential instruments in preparing for the Conference and as a reference during committee sessions are the:

1. [NMUN Delegate Preparation Guide](#) - explains each step in the delegate process, from pre-Conference research to the committee debate and resolution drafting processes. Please take note of the information on plagiarism, and the prohibition on pre-written working papers and resolutions. Delegates should not start discussion on the topics with other members of their committee until the first committee session.
2. [NMUN Rules of Procedure](#) - include the long and short form of the rules, as well as an explanatory narrative and example script of the flow of procedure.

In addition, please review the mandatory [NMUN Conduct Expectations](#) on the NMUN website. They include the Conference dress code and other expectations of all attendees. We want to emphasize that any instances of sexual harassment or discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, age, or disability will not be tolerated. If you have any questions concerning your preparation for the committee or the Conference itself, please contact the Under-Secretaries-General for the Peace and Security Department, Leah Schmidt (Conference A) and Alexander Rudolph (Conference B), at usg.ps@nmun.org.

We wish you all the best in your preparations and look forward to seeing you at the Conference!

Conference A

Maïke Weitzel, Director

Conference B


Saeko Yoshimatsu, Director

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United Nations System at NMUN•NY

This diagram illustrates the UN system simulated at NMUN•NY and demonstrates the reportage and relationships between entities. Examine the diagram alongside the Committee Overview to gain a clear picture of the committee's position, purpose, and powers within the UN system.



Committee Overview

Introduction

Post-conflict peacebuilding is a crucial and multifaceted task involving a wide range of stakeholders.¹ Peacebuilding as a concept first emerged in the 1970s with Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung, who urged for the creation of peacebuilding structures that remove causes of conflicts to promote sustainable peace.² Since its creation, the concept of peacebuilding has covered various facets, stretching from disarming warring factions to rebuilding political, economic, judicial, and civil society institutions.³ In former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding is defined as the "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."⁴ Boutros-Ghali emphasized that in cases where preventive diplomacy fails and conflict erupts, the UN must respond through the combined mechanisms of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.⁵

The definition of these concepts was further detailed in the 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, referred to as the Brahimi Report, which outlined the findings of a high-level panel chaired by former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi to review UN peacekeeping and security activities.⁶ According to the report, peacemaking focuses on attempting to end conflicts through diplomacy and mediation, while peacekeeping refers to a "primarily military model" of ceasefires as well as military and civilian cooperation to build sustain peace in the aftermath of conflict.⁷ Peacebuilding, meanwhile, denotes rebuilding the foundations of peace and providing the tools to do so in post-war environments.⁸ The report notes that the scope of peacebuilding activities should include: holding "free and fair elections" to ensure the legitimacy of a post-conflict government, building governmental institutions, "upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights," and promoting national reconciliation.⁹

In response to calls from both the Brahimi Report and the 2004 *Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* to develop a body to facilitate and streamline peacebuilding activities, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in 2005 through General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005).¹⁰ Created during the General Assembly's reform process initiated in its 60th session as part of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the PBC acts as an intergovernmental advisory body for the promotion and support of peacebuilding efforts and the broader international peace agenda.¹¹

¹ UN PBSO, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, 2010, p. 1.

² Peacebuilding Initiative, *History*, 2013.

³ UN PBSO, *Peacebuilding & the United Nations*, 2017.

⁴ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (A/47/277-S/24111)*, 1992, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809)*, 2000.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005; UN Security Council, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (S/RES/1645(2005))*, 2005; UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809)*, 2000; UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, 2004, pp. 83-85.

¹¹ UN PBC, *The Peacebuilding Commission*, 2017.

Governance, Structure, and Membership

The work of the PBC is carried out by the PBC Organizational Committee, which includes 31 Member States.¹² Seven Member States are elected by the UN General Assembly, seven are elected by the Security Council, and seven are elected by the Economic and Social Council.¹³ The remaining ten Member States are comprised of five of the top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions, as well as the five top providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and of voluntary contributions to UN funds, programmes, and agencies.¹⁴ Members of the Organizational Committee serve for renewable terms of two years in accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005).¹⁵ At the same time, resolution 60/180 and resolution 1645 (2005) outlines that the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the World Bank can participate in all PBC meetings in a “manner suitable to their governing arrangements.”¹⁶

Currently, the chair of the PBC is held by Romania, while the vice-chair positions are held by Germany and the Republic of Korea.¹⁷ The Organizational Committee, which adopts all decisions by consensus, is responsible for determining the agenda.¹⁸ If the Committee deems that a country is on the verge of conflict, it may establish a Country-Specific Configuration (CSC) to carry out peacebuilding efforts in that specific country.¹⁹ Membership in the CSCs is made up of the members of the Organizational Committee as well as: the country under consideration; neighboring states involved in post-conflict peacebuilding; the major financial, troop, and civilian police contributing countries; relevant UN representatives; and relevant regional and international financial institutions.²⁰

The PBC works alongside several entities to ensure the promotion of peace efforts around the world. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) was established with the purpose of supporting and assisting the PBC with strategic advice, administering the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and coordinating with UN agencies in peacebuilding efforts.²¹ Funding for peacebuilding efforts, like country-specific missions, comes chiefly from the PBF, the UN’s global multi-donor trust fund; it fills a critical gap in supporting countries between conflict and recovery for which no other funding mechanism provides.²² From 2006 to 2017, the PBF supported 41 countries with \$772 million.²³ The PBC and PBF act in close coordination with each other, with the PBC receiving briefings from the Chair of the PBF’s Advisory Group on PBC-specific country priorities and missions.²⁴

Additionally, the PBC collaborates with external stakeholders such as the International Peace Institute, a non-profit think tank dedicated to conflict resolution both between and within states through strengthening international peace and security institutions.²⁵ The PBC also works with various UN missions in countries where it plays a role in peacebuilding efforts, such as the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).²⁶

¹² UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ UN PBC, *Membership*, 2018.

¹⁶ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005; UN Security Council, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (S/RES/1645(2005))*, 2005.

¹⁷ UN PBC, *Membership*, 2018.

¹⁸ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005.

¹⁹ Peace Portal, *Country-Specific Configurations*, 2018.

²⁰ UN PBSO, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, 2010, p. 37.

²¹ UN PBSO, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, 2010, p. 37; UN PBSO, *Peacebuilding Support Office*, 2018.

²² UN PBSO, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, 2010, p. 37.

²³ UN PBF, *United Nations Peacebuilding Fund*, 2018.

²⁴ Peace Portal, *PBF Overview*, 2018.

²⁵ International Peace Institute, *Mission & History*, 2017.

²⁶ Security Council Report, *The Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council: From Cynicism to Synergy?*, 2017.

Mandate

As an intergovernmental advisory body, the PBC is mainly responsible for providing support to peace efforts in conflict-affected countries.²⁷ Through General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), the PBC is mandated with: coordinating between all relevant actors to organize resources; advising on and proposing cohesive strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; focusing on reconstruction and institution-building efforts for post-conflict recovery while laying the groundwork for sustainable development; and, offering recommendations and information to improve the coordination and cooperation of all involved actors both within and outside the UN.²⁸ The PBC also monitors progress, gathers financial support for peacebuilding, and works with partners in the UN system.²⁹

Functions and Powers

General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) emphasize the significance of the PBC in fulfilling several functions with regards to its mandate:

- To bring long-term international attention to sustaining peace and to provide political support and advocacy to conflict-affected countries, with their consent;
- To promote an cohesive, strategic, and coherent approach to peacebuilding, that recognizes the close link between security, development and human rights;
- To serve as a bridging and coordinating actor for the principal UN organs and relevant UN entities by sharing advice on peacebuilding needs and priorities and providing recommendations based on the competencies and responsibilities of these entities;
- To serve as platform for cooperation by convening all relevant actors within and outside the UN to provide recommendations to improve their coordination. to develop and share best practices in peacebuilding to improve mission success, and to ensure reliable financing for peacebuilding.³⁰

Further, the PBC's Organizational Committee can establish CSCs to look at peacebuilding issues in particular countries.³¹ Bringing together both local and regional representatives as well as a representative of the Secretary-General, the CSC drafts a Strategic Framework for the focus country to establish peacebuilding priorities, objectives, and risks.³² Based on the principles of national ownership, coordination, and commitment among all partners, the Strategic Framework serves as an action plan for UN bodies to carry out PBC recommendations.³³

The resolutions establishing the PBC dictate that a country can be included in the PBC's agenda via requests for advice from the Security Council or the Secretary-General, and via requests for advice from ECOSOC, the General Assembly, or, in exceptional circumstances, Member States that are on the verge of conflict and not on the agenda of the Security Council.³⁴ Currently, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are on the PBC's agenda.³⁵

²⁷ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005.

²⁸ UN PBC, *Mandate*, 2018.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ UN General Assembly, *Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (A/RES/70/262)*, 2016; UN Security Council, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (S/RES/2282(2016))*, 2016.

³¹ Peace Portal, *Country-Specific Configurations*, 2018.

³² UN PBSO, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, 2010, p. 37.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005; UN Security Council, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (S/RES/1645(2005))*, 2005.

³⁵ Peace Portal, *Country-Specific Configurations*, 2018.

Recent Sessions and Current Priorities

In 2015, the PBC undertook a comprehensive review of the UN peacebuilding architecture that was a two-part process intended to review the role of the PBC, PBF, and PBSO.³⁶ According to the report released in 2015 by a seven-member Advisory Group of Experts, one of the biggest challenges facing the UN peacebuilding architecture is the existence of deep fragmentation within the UN system, which can be seen, for example, in the differing mandates between relevant UN peacebuilding entities.³⁷ In its recommendations, the report emphasizes the importance of coherence at the intergovernmental level to strengthen partnerships in peacebuilding, provide more predictable peacebuilding funding, and broaden inclusion in peacebuilding efforts to eliminate fragmentation.³⁸

In light of the review, the PBC has made strides to address existing challenges and priorities. In September 2016, the PBC became the first UN intergovernmental body to adopt a gender strategy.³⁹ Taking into account the call for gender inclusion in the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture, the PBC Gender Strategy highlights priority areas of strategic action for the PBC's gender-responsive engagement at the country, regional, and global levels.⁴⁰ In 2017, the chair of the PBC participated in the high-level meeting convened by the President of the General Assembly, which included the President of the Security Council and the President of the Economic and Social Council, concerning sustainable development and sustainable peace.⁴¹ This meeting was held to eliminate fragmentation and promote coordination and coherence across peace and development efforts within the UN system.⁴²

The PBC's 2017 annual session, which took place 30 June 2017 with the theme of "partnerships for financing for peace," provided PBC with the opportunity to convene all relevant actors to discuss coordination for sustaining peace.⁴³ Three priority areas that marked the work of the PBC in 2017 were: enhancing the advisory and bridging role of the PBC, redefining partnerships, and improving the flexibility of the PBC.⁴⁴ At the request of the Security Council, the PBC held a meeting considering the situation in the Sahel, which highlighted the importance of mobilizing the participation of relevant actors in the work of UNOWAS.⁴⁵ Due to the importance of partnerships as a broader goal of the PBC, it also adopted a joint statement with the World Bank reaffirming the importance of a strong relationship between the two bodies, highlighting the prominence of national ownership and leadership in peacebuilding while emphasizing the role of the PBC as an advisory body to support and promote peacebuilding efforts.⁴⁶

At the first meeting of PBC's 2018 session, the Chair outlined five priorities for the 2018 session: the PBC's commitment to a regional approach, enhancing partnerships, implementing peacebuilding and sustaining peace, strengthening the relationship between the PBC and the PBF, and improving visibility as well as communication of the PBC's work.⁴⁷ The Chair emphasized the importance of the PBC's engagement, particularly in the Sahel and the Great Lakes regions, in addressing root causes of conflict

³⁶ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490)*, 2015.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Lebada, *PBC Adopts First Gender Strategy for Intergovernmental Body*, 2016.

⁴⁰ UN PBC, *Peacebuilding Commission's Gender Strategy*, 2016.

⁴¹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: Report of the Secretary-General (A/72/707-S/2018/43)*, 2018.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ UN PBC, *Partnerships for Financing for Peace Concept Paper and Programme*, 2017.

⁴⁴ Tae-yul, *General Assembly debate on the PBC and PBF annual reports 24 May 2018: Statement of the former Chair of the PBC*, 2018.

⁴⁵ Tae-yul, *General Assembly debate on the PBC and PBF annual reports 24 May 2018: Statement of the former Chair of the PBC*, 2018; UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its eleventh session (A/72/721-S/2018/83)*, 2018.

⁴⁶ UN DPI, *Peacebuilding Commission Reaffirms Strong Commitment to United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations (PBC/124)*, 2017.

⁴⁷ Jinga, *Peacebuilding Commission Formal meeting 31 January 2018 Statement of the Chair*, 2018.

as well as providing information to the Security Council.⁴⁸ The PBC plans to further enhance partnerships and collaboration by inviting Member States, representatives of countries from the Sahel, UN senior officials, representatives of regional organizations, and civil society organizations to discuss the situation in the Sahel region in the annual session that will be convened in the fall of 2018.⁴⁹

Conclusion

The PBC is a key player in post-conflict reconstruction and development as well as peace and security, both in terms of the UN's peacebuilding architecture and in its efforts with the countries on its agenda.⁵⁰ As an intergovernmental advisory body, the PBC, alongside other relevant entities such as the PBF and PBSO, is crucial in providing advice and support for peacebuilding activities.⁵¹ It has also made strides in promoting gender inclusion and equality in the context of peacebuilding efforts.⁵² The PBC, however, is not without its challenges. Its review of the UN peacebuilding architecture has shown the need to address deep fragmentation within the UN system as well as the need to promote more partnerships and inclusion in peacebuilding efforts.⁵³

Annotated Bibliography

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https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/51704877_statement_of_the_incoming_pbc_chair.pdf

The statement of the Chair of PBC lays out the priorities for the PBC session in 2018. The five core priorities of PBC are as follows: situations in the Sahel and the Great Lakes regions, strengthening further collaborations with regional as well as subregional organizations, supporting conflict-affected areas at all stages of conflict, strengthening synergies between PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund, and raising awareness on the work of PBC. This resource is useful for delegates to begin their research on PBC's agenda for 2018 and to begin to understand current approaches on each priority.

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-ninth session & United Nations, Security Council. (2015). *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490)*. Retrieved 11 August 2018 from:

<http://undocs.org/A/69/968>

This report, prepared by a seven-member Advisory Group of Experts, is the first part of a two-stage review of the role and positioning of the PBC, PBF, and PBSO. The report, part of the UN's "Peacebuilding Architecture" review, presents an overview of peacebuilding in the global context, offers an assessment of UN peacebuilding activities, and outlines proposals for coherence in sustainable peacebuilding. This report critically points out that solving the deep fragmentation of the UN is the key to building sustainable peace. Delegates should turn to this resource to understand what the UN has done so far to achieve sustainable peacebuilding.

United Nations, General Assembly, Seventy-second session & United Nations, Security Council. (2018). *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its eleventh session (A/72/721-S/2018/83)*. Retrieved 7 July 2018 from: www.undocs.org/a/72/721

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Jinga, *Security Council Briefing on the PBC annual report 29 June 2018 Statement of the current Chair of the PBC*, 2018.

⁵⁰ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005.

⁵¹ UN PBC, *The Peacebuilding Commission*, 2017.

⁵² UN PBC, *Peacebuilding Commission's Gender Strategy*, 2016.

⁵³ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490)*, 2015.

The report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its eleventh session covers the work implemented by PBC in 2017 along the review of the peacebuilding architecture, which was described in the report of the Commission's tenth session. Furthermore, this report also provides information on challenges across a range of issue areas, including country-specific configurations, regional situations, and thematic issues such as gender. Delegates will find this report valuable when assessing challenges and reviewing the work of the PBC when starting their research on progress that should be made in 2018 session.

United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission. (2018). *Lessons Learned* [Website]. Retrieved 8 July 2018 from: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/policy-issues-and-partnerships/policy/lessons-learned>

This website provides information about how the PBC served in a coordinating capacity in various peacebuilding situations in the past. Topics cover security sector reform and peacebuilding; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; monitoring peace consolidation; and operationalizing national ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding. Delegates are encouraged to explore this webpage to gain knowledge regarding what PBC has done in the past as well as to understand remaining issues.

United Nations, Peacebuilding Support Office. (2010). *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation* [Report]. Retrieved 8 July 2018 from:

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf

This report, based on the Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict of June 2009, outlines the multifaceted characteristics of peacebuilding and the relevant UN and external entities that play a key role in global peacebuilding efforts. Recognizing that peacebuilding is a long-term process, this paper draws attention to the scope, resources, and evolution of peacebuilding. Delegates will find this paper useful for gaining an overview of peacebuilding around the world as well as the role of various UN entities in peacebuilding efforts.

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I. Partnerships for Sustainable Peace

“Efforts to build and sustain peace are necessary not only once conflict has broken out, but long beforehand through preventing conflict and addressing its root causes. We must work better together across the peace continuum, focusing on all dimensions of conflict.”⁵⁴

Introduction

“Sustainable peace” is defined by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as both the goal and the process of creating a holistic approach to lasting peace, restoration, and development in post-conflict societies.⁵⁵ As no organization is equipped to cope with this challenge on its own, achieving the goal of sustainable peace requires the involvement and cooperation of various entities involved at the domestic and regional level, with the support of the United Nations (UN).⁵⁶ In his official statement on the priorities of the work of the PBC in January 2018, the chair of the PBC highlighted announced the creation and intensification of partnerships for peace as his second most important task for 2018 in order to create sustainable peace.⁵⁷

In his 2018 report “Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace,” the UN Secretary-General stressed that in recent years, international efforts to create sustainable peace were often inconsistent and sometimes even competitive and conflicting.⁵⁸ This can lead to disjointed efforts that leave crucial gaps, or the misuse of resources through poor coordination and overlapping efforts. Partnerships can have a significant impact on the success or failure of a peace operation in a Member State, as cooperation can better address numerous causes for renewed escalations of conflict.⁵⁹ There have been successes in increasing cooperation in this area; one positive example for cooperation is The Gambia, where the PBC and the Security Council coordinated the contributions of UN agencies in support of the work of the Economic Community of West African States in efforts to resolve the electoral crisis in 2016.⁶⁰ However, despite individual successes such as these, the PBC still faces challenges in ensuring coherence of cooperation between different entities at the outset and throughout the implementation of such initiatives.⁶¹ Partnerships can be especially important in integrating vulnerable and underrepresented populations in peacebuilding activities, as well as in providing adequate and sustainable funding to support peacebuilding activities.⁶²

International and Regional Framework

Neither peacekeeping nor peacebuilding are explicitly mentioned in the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), but the respective Chapters VI, VII, and VIII are the legal basis for all peace missions of the UN.⁶³ Regarding partnerships, Chapter VIII of the Charter broadly encourages both Member States and the UN Security Council to form partnerships in order to create peace.⁶⁴

In 2014, the Security Council and the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General create the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) in order to review the UN peacebuilding architecture, which is the core

⁵⁴ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Report of the Secretary-General (A/72/707 – S/2018/43)*, 2018.

⁵⁵ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its tenth session (A/71/768)*, 2017, p. 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵⁷ UN PBC, *Peacebuilding Commission Formal Meeting – Statement of the Chair*, 2018.

⁵⁸ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Report of the Secretary-General (A/72/707 – S/2018/43)*, 2018.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² UN General Assembly, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*, 2015; UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its 11th session (A/72/721 – S/2018/83)*, 2018, p. 9.

⁶³ UN DPKO, *Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping*, 2016.

⁶⁴ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. VIII.

of peacebuilding its efforts.⁶⁵ The final report, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture* was published in 2015.⁶⁶ The report outlines the current challenges faced by the UN system regarding peacebuilding, and states that while peacebuilding is still generally considered to be an activity that takes place once a conflict has ended, in actuality these activities are often a prerequisite to peace talks and to lasting peace.⁶⁷ The AGE concludes that peacebuilding is a process that remains inconsistent and highly fragmented.⁶⁸ In a subsection specifically dedicated to the PBC's work with partners, the AGE report outlines that the division of tasks and resources, as well as the differing approaches between various actors, continue to be the greatest challenges for successful peacebuilding partnerships, and recommends closer coordination between the PBC and its partners.⁶⁹ Lastly, the report concludes that peacebuilding is still not being granted the focus it needs within the UN system and that many military missions sent out by the UN could be avoided through more extensive peacebuilding efforts.⁷⁰ The AGE recommends strengthening coherence on an intergovernmental level; extending and diversifying the work of the PBC; increasing the capacities of the UN for peacebuilding; intensifying the partnership between the World Bank and UN entities such as the Security Council and the PBC; making financing for peacebuilding more predictable; and redefining peacebuilding as more than a mere post-conflict task.⁷¹

Following the AGE report, the Security Council adopted resolution 2282 (2016), acknowledging the findings of the report and calling for reforms of peacebuilding activities.⁷² The resolution highlights the importance of the PBC and requests that it engage more closely with its partners, enhance the inclusivity and gender-responsiveness of its efforts, and better address cross-cutting and regional challenges in its activities.⁷³ The resolution further calls on an overall reform of peacekeeping in aspects such as fostering cooperation with stakeholders in affected regions, working closer together with the World Bank, increasing predictable financing, expanding efforts to involve women and youth, and strengthening UN country teams.⁷⁴ The UN General Assembly also responded to the report by adopting resolution 70/262 (2016), reiterating the need for reform of the peacebuilding architecture and adding this process to its agenda for the 74th session.⁷⁵ The General Assembly further recommends that the PBC should stress national ownership and inclusivity in its efforts to create sustainable peacebuilding efforts.⁷⁶

Efforts to enhance partnerships for peacebuilding are supported by the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, ratified by the General Assembly in 2015, and particularly Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17, "Partnerships for the Goals."⁷⁷ In relation to peacekeeping, SDG 17's targets 17.15, 17.16 and 17.17 are of special relevance, as they focus on national ownership, coordination in multi-stakeholder partnerships and enhancing public-private-civil society partnerships respectively.⁷⁸ These are some of main challenges identified by stakeholders, including the Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, as facing the peacebuilding framework today.⁷⁹ SDG 17's targets 15, 16 and 17 address problems specifically on the policy level, so that by implementing them, challenges pointed out by the AGE report can be broadly resolved.⁸⁰

⁶⁵ UN General Assembly, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*, 2015, p. 1.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁷² UN Security Council, *Post-conflict Peacebuilding (S/RES/2282 (2016))*, 2016.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ UN General Assembly, *Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (A/RES/70/262)*, 2016.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ UN ECOSOC, *Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (E/2017/66)*, 2016.

⁷⁸ UN DESA, Sustainable Development Goal 17, 2018.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Role of the International System

The main organ within the UN that brings together all actors in the sphere of peacebuilding is the PBC.⁸¹ It was founded to be a connecting institution between the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on peacebuilding activities.⁸² As the PBC acts as an advisory body to these three committees, the PBC is often requested to bring together all parties involved in peacebuilding to advise affected countries to create coherent approaches to peacebuilding, and to advocate in support of peacebuilding efforts.⁸³ In recent years, the sessions of the PBC have had an increased focus on diplomacy and political accompaniment (2016) and partnerships for financing for peace (2017).⁸⁴ Partnerships for sustainable peace continues to be a PBC priority as the PBC's thematic focus for 2018 is "peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel region."⁸⁵

During the 2017 session on partnerships for financing for peace, the PBC brought together international, regional, and public and private sector representatives from Member States, international financial institutions, and civil society in order to discuss best practices in sustainable financing of peacebuilding.⁸⁶ The participants of the PBC annual session 2017 agreed that peacebuilding is a long-term investment requiring short-term flexibility.⁸⁷ Member States agreed that close partnerships are the best solution to guarantee sustainable financing for sustainable peace.⁸⁸ A further outcome was an agreed shared goal to strengthen preventive measures in order to avoid the outbreak of violent conflicts.⁸⁹ There are two bodies tasked with the operational side of peacebuilding and supporting the work of the PBC: the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).⁹⁰ The PBSO is primarily in charge of the management of the PBF, but is also tasked to maintain and enhance partnerships with Member States and across the UN system.⁹¹ During the annual session of the PBC in 2017, the PBSO reiterated its goal to allocate 15% of the PBF budget toward gender-responsive peacebuilding activities.⁹² The PBF was created in order to fill funding gaps in a short amount of time in order to sustain peace projects by the PBC.⁹³ Its funds can be allocated to Member States, civil society organizations (CSOs), UN entities, regional organizations and financial mechanisms.⁹⁴ Since its foundation, the PBF has invested in more than 40 countries.⁹⁵

The General Assembly held a high-level dialogue on Building Sustainable Peace for All: Synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustaining Peace in January 2017.⁹⁶ The meeting included actors from within the UN such as the PBC, ECOSOC and the Security Council, as well as civil society actors.⁹⁷ The parties involved were asked to discuss the link between sustainable peace and sustainable development, and the opportunities that this connection provides for cooperation in the field of peacebuilding.⁹⁸ The final report of this high-level dialogue particularly highlights the importance of

⁸¹ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005, p. 2.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸³ UN Security Council, *Post-conflict peacebuilding (S/RES/2282 (2016))*, 2016.

⁸⁴ UN PBC, *PBC Annual Session 2017: Concept paper and programme*, 2017, p. 1.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁹⁰ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005, p. 5.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁹² UN PBC, *PBC Annual Session 2017: Concept paper and programme*, 2017, p. 3.

⁹³ UN PBC, *Peacebuilding Fund*, 2018.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ UN General Assembly, *High-Level Dialogue on 'Building Sustainable Peace for All: Synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustaining Peace' Summary of Key Messages and Observations*, 2017, p. 1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

inclusiveness.⁹⁹ It affirms that in order to prevent the outbreak of conflict, enhanced cooperation through partnerships is needed to implement core values of the international system on the ground, including human rights, the rule of law, and accountable institutions.¹⁰⁰

The Security Council, in cooperation with the General Assembly, also requested an independent study on youth, peace and security titled “The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth and peace and security.”¹⁰¹ The report was commissioned in response to Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) titled “Youth, Peace and Security,” in which the Security Council requested the involvement of youth in peacebuilding processes.¹⁰² The study found that the role of youth in peacebuilding is highly undervalued and underutilized.¹⁰³ The Security Council reacted to these findings by reaffirming its commitment to the inclusion of youth in peace processes around the world and called upon all stakeholders to do the same in the outcome document of the High-Level Dialogue on Building Sustainable Peace for All in 2017.¹⁰⁴

In terms of regional work, the partnership between the UN and the European Union (EU) is the most formalized and institutionalized partnerships in the UN peacebuilding architecture.¹⁰⁵ This is largely due to the amount of joint institutions between the two organizations and the extent of the legal framework created by the partnership.¹⁰⁶ In this capacity, the EU has also provided the UN with substantial financial, material, and regional-specific advisory expertise.¹⁰⁷ In 2018, the two organizations cooperated in missions in 170 countries and have extended their “Strategic Partnership on Crisis Management” until 2021 with an increased focus on women, conflict prevention and increasing cooperation in the field.¹⁰⁸ In recent years, the EU has also closely cooperated with UN peacekeeping missions in South Sudan, Libya, and the Sahel, among others.¹⁰⁹ However, even though there has been significant coordination in some areas, there are still opportunities to improve the nature of this engagement.¹¹⁰ The Security Council pointed out in its presidential statement 2014/4 of 2014 that the greatest remaining challenge is the separation of overlapping involvement, even between two strong partners such as the UN and the EU.¹¹¹

As the majority of the current missions for peacekeeping and peacebuilding are deployed on the African continent, the partnership between the UN and the African Union (AU) is of great importance to ensuring sustainable peace.¹¹² The cooperation between the two organizations began in 1990 through the opening of a UN liaison office at the AU, and has only intensified since this point.¹¹³ The AU and the UN undertake many joint projects such as the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur, supporting the G5 Sahel Joint Force and cooperating in formats such as the Libya Quartet with the EU.¹¹⁴ In April 2018, the AU and the UN signed a Joint AU-UN Framework for Enhancing Partnership in Peace and Security.¹¹⁵ Both parties

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰¹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth and peace and security (A/72/761 – S/2018/86)*, 2018.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ UN Security Council, *Maintenance of international peace and security (S/RES/2419 (2018))*, 2018, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ UN General Assembly, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*, 2015, p. 34.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁰⁷ UN Security Council, *Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (S/PRST/2014/4)*, 2014.

¹⁰⁸ EU External Action Service, *The EU-UN Partnership*, 2018.

¹⁰⁹ Pietz, *The European Union and UN Peacekeeping: Half-time for the EU's Action Plan*, 2013.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ UN Security Council, *Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (S/PRST/2014/4)*, 2014.

¹¹² AU, *United Nations Liaison and Representational Offices*, 2018.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ UN DPA, *United Nations – African Union Partnership in conflict prevention and mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, September 2017 – June 2018*, 2018.

¹¹⁵ AU, *AU-UN leaders sign Framework for Enhancing Partnership in Peace and Security and stress strengthening their partnership*, 2017.

agreed that national ownership is a core value of future cooperation and that common approaches are necessary for the facilitation of the partnership.¹¹⁶ From September 2017 to June 2018, the UN and the AU cooperated in 15 projects across the African continent, including the mitigation of tensions in Togo, fostering political dialogue in Burundi, and implementing a regional strategy for peace in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹¹⁷

CSOs also play a major role in creating sustainable peace, and thus organizations such as the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS) are of particular importance to connecting stakeholders and giving a voice to those affected by conflict throughout the peacebuilding process.¹¹⁸ The CSPPS was created in 2011 and aims to channel ideas and best practices from CSOs involved in peacebuilding to make peacebuilding efforts more efficient and to coordinate and improve their work in the field.¹¹⁹ Their main projects include the enhancement of capabilities, awareness-raising campaigns, and the inclusion of civil society in meetings between governments and other parties involved in peace and statebuilding.¹²⁰ Members of CSPPS are small local organizations and national, regional, and international organizations such as Oxfam or the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY).¹²¹

Reviewing the UN peacebuilding architecture, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict and the Quaker United Nations Office have published a report titled *Filling the Gap: How civil society engagement can help the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture meet its purpose* (2015) which shows that despite the existing engagements of CSOs, their coordination still remain tenuous.¹²² The report recommends the PBC increase transparency of its activities, form strategic partnerships with CSOs, bring stakeholders together more often, and create mechanisms for mutual accountability.¹²³

Building Inclusive Partnerships

In all operations to create sustainable peace, national ownership is regarded by the PBC as a key step to fully effective partnerships, as the affected state should be considered the most important partner for peacebuilding.¹²⁴ As stated by the AGE in its final report this means that “peace cannot be imposed from the outside, but must be genuinely and gradually built by a process of accommodation on the part of national stakeholders, public and private, who are best placed to understand the local dynamics that condition the attainment of peacebuilding goals.”¹²⁵ This recommendation highlights the importance of an inclusive approach to peacebuilding by including national actors, marginalized groups, and civil society in these processes.¹²⁶ CSOs often act as a bridge between the state and external parties by bringing the local impact of peacebuilding to high-level political attention, which is critical to realizing national ownership by local populations.¹²⁷ However, the difficulty in maintaining national ownership still lies in effectively coordinating the cooperation between the affected country and its partners, such as the UN or donor states.¹²⁸

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ UN DPA, *United Nations – African Union Partnership in conflict prevention and mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, September 2017 – June 2018*, 2018.

¹¹⁸ Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, *About*, 2013.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, *CSPPS members*, 2013.

¹²² Campisi & Pereira, *Filling the Gap: How civil society engagement can help the UN's peacebuilding architecture meet its purpose*, 2015.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ UN PBC, *From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalizing National Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, 2011, p. 1.

¹²⁵ UN General Assembly, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*, 2015, p. 17.

¹²⁶ UN PBC, *From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalizing National Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, 2011, p. 1.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 1.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

Youth Engagement

As the independent UN study on youth, peace and security titled *The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth and peace and security* from 2018, has shown, youth play an important role in creating sustainable peace through their involvement in CSOs, however their contribution to sustainable peace is still undervalued.¹²⁹ Involving youth in peacebuilding processes has been a priority for the PBC during its last session and continues to be a priority.¹³⁰ The independent study on youth, peace, and security recommends the foundation of partnerships between Member States, CSOs and youth organizations in order to foster inclusion.¹³¹ The work of young persons is especially important in developing their skills and knowledge to understand peacebuilding through participation in local CSOs.¹³² Moreover, the missing peace study further noted that youth often suffer short-term, mid-term and long-term effects of conflicts including victimization, social and economic exclusion, and traumatization, making them one of the most vulnerable groups in conflicts.¹³³ Thus it is vital to include youth in peacebuilding processes, as they could contribute actively to the prevention of conflict outbreak through their work in promoting peace and non-violence in their communities.¹³⁴ In order to achieve this, the Secretary-General and the PBF have created the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GPYI) that finances existing and new innovative projects that aim at including youth in peacebuilding processes.¹³⁵ A central aspect of GPYI is partnering with civil society, youth organizations, governments, UN agencies, and Member States to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 2250 (2015).¹³⁶

Partnerships to Support Women's Participation

A statistic from the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) showed that in peace processes between 1992 and 2011, only 2% of all mediators, 4% of witnesses and signatories, and 9% of negotiators were women.¹³⁷ This is despite evidence that including women in peace efforts increases the possibility of peace agreements lasting for two years by 20%, and lasting for 15 years by 35%.¹³⁸ The Secretary-General of the UN has highlighted in his report on women's participation in peacebuilding that women are key partners to achieving economic recovery, social cohesion and political legitimacy in post-conflict situations.¹³⁹ With the pivotal Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on "Women and Peace and Security," the process of including women in all levels of peacebuilding initiatives officially started.¹⁴⁰ The Report of the Secretary-General on "women's participation in peacebuilding" created an action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding with seven commitments was created.¹⁴¹ These commitments include: promoting women's engagement in conflict resolution; making post-conflict planning processes more gender-responsive; increasing funds for gender equality in peacebuilding; increasing the proportion of women civilians working post-conflict environments; increasing the proportion of women involved in post-conflict decision-making; support for the rule of law; and greater participation in the workforce for women in post-conflict societies.¹⁴² Ultimately, peacebuilding that is more inclusive, including women, youth, and national ownership in the

¹²⁹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth and peace and security (A/72/761 – S/2018/86)*, 2018, p. 9.

¹³⁰ UN Peacebuilding Commission, *Peacebuilding Commission Formal Meeting – Statement of the Chair*, 2018.

¹³¹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth and peace and security (A/72/761 – S/2018/86)*, 2018, p. 21.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹³⁵ UN PBF, *Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative*, 2018.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ UN-Women, *Facts and Figures*, 2018.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Women's participation in peacebuilding: Report by the Secretary-General (A/65/354 – S/2010/466)*, 2010, p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 8.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

processes, is also more effective.¹⁴³ It is key that a focus on inclusivity when structuring peacebuilding processes be considered by the UN and relevant stakeholders when building peacebuilding initiatives.¹⁴⁴

Financing Peacebuilding Operations

One of the greatest challenges still faced by peacebuilding operations is the lack of sustainable financing for the PBC, as discussed in its most recent report.¹⁴⁵ The financial commitment of Member States in 2017 was the highest yet with assured contributions of \$157,111,033.¹⁴⁶ Nonetheless, pledged funds do not necessarily equal the contributed amount as Member States do not always fulfill their financial commitments.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, even the pledged contributions were insufficient to fully meet the requirements of current and future peacebuilding operations.¹⁴⁸ A meeting was held by the PBC on this topic in October 2017 with the goal of finding innovative solutions for funding peacebuilding efforts.¹⁴⁹ The two main objectives of the meeting were to increase resources for the financial instruments of the organization and to collect funds from private sector resources.¹⁵⁰ In the past, the main source for funds has been donations from Member States, which have often failed to meet the amounts pledged.¹⁵¹ This is problematic, as funding in post-conflict situations can be pivotal to the success of the peacebuilding efforts, as efforts can only be completed to their full extent if fully financed.¹⁵²

In order to secure further funding from additional sources, the PBC formed a partnership with the World Bank in June 2017.¹⁵³ Both parties have agreed to help countries affected by conflict upon request, with a focus on ensuring national ownership; developing and sharing best practices in peacebuilding in order to create predictable and sustainable financing; and holding annual meetings in order to strengthen and enhance the partnership.¹⁵⁴ Another option for increased financing could come from partnerships with the private sector through foreign direct investments, which could be more stable.¹⁵⁵ In its last session, the PBC further discussed options of South-South and triangular cooperation, but concluded that a mix of various funding methods would be the best solution to make funding more diversified and reliable.¹⁵⁶

Conclusion

Even though the creation of partnerships has been a key recent priority of the PBC and other UN bodies, there is still much work to be done to create sustainable peace through partnerships.¹⁵⁷ The AGE report shows that peacebuilding efforts are still inconsistent and remain highly divided, leading to inefficiency and disjointed approaches.¹⁵⁸ Thus, partnering with marginalized groups such as youth and women and having a stronger focus on expanding existing regional approaches could be the key to developing

¹⁴³ UN General Assembly, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*, 2015, p. 17.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its 11th session (A/72/721 – S/2018/83)*, 2018, p. 9.

¹⁴⁶ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Fund: Report of the Secretary-General (A/72/740)*, 2018.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its 11th session (A/72/721 – S/2018/83)*, 2018, p. 9.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁵³ UN PBC & World Bank, *Joint Statement of the Peacebuilding Commission and the World Bank*, 2017.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its 11th session (A/72/721 – S/2018/83)*, 2018, p. 9.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁵⁸ UN General Assembly, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*, 2015, p. 1.

practices which effectively create sustainable peace in the future.¹⁵⁹ All these efforts, however, should be coordinated with a strong sense of national ownership to make these efforts long-lasting and sustainable.¹⁶⁰ The execution of such efforts also relies on securing reliable financing options for all activities.¹⁶¹ In the upcoming session, delegates should strive to review the UN peacebuilding architecture and commit to strengthening policy-related engagements.¹⁶²

Further Research

In preparation for the conference, delegates should consider the following questions: How can the PBC create effective and sustainable partnerships for peacebuilding? How can the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in peacebuilding activities be improved? How can the PBC use these partnerships to sustain funding? What are ways to effectively increase the involvement of women, youth, and other marginalized groups in peacebuilding projects? In what way can the UN strengthen national ownership throughout the peacebuilding process? How can the action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding be implemented?

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This website provides an overview of the recent activities of the PBC and the expected work of the commission in the future. While current and past events are listed, the website also takes a look at upcoming events and possible debates in the near future. It is recommended that delegates review this website as it provides information on current debates in the Security Council, such as the state of partnerships with other organizations. It further contains updates on specific issues such as peace efforts, the situation of certain conflicts and the documents associated with them and it a useful platform to access current information on everything related to peace operations.

United Nations, Economic and Social Council. (2017). *Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: Report of the Secretary-General (E/2017/66)*. Retrieved 8 July 2018 from: <https://undocs.org/E/2017/66>

This is the latest report on the implementation of the SDGs. The report shows that the progress achieved between different goals is uneven and there remains much to be done in order to achieve the full targets. Of particular focus is the remaining levels of gender-based violence and violence against children, which shows that there is a strong need to focus more on them and their role in conflict and post-conflict situations. Additionally, for SDG 17 some progress in financing has been achieved, but significant work still remains in order to fully achieve this goal. In preparation for conference, delegates should be aware of the progress made with the SDGs and look out for the remaining challenges. This goal is the most relevant SDG for the present topic and thus delegates should strive to include its realization in their work.

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-ninth session. (2015). *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*. Retrieved 10 August 2018 from: <http://undocs.org/a/69/968>

¹⁵⁹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Women's participation in peacebuilding: Report by the Secretary-General (A/65/354 – S/2010/466)*, 2010, p. 3.

¹⁶⁰ UN General Assembly, *Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968)*, 2015, p. 17.

¹⁶¹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its 11th session (A/72/721 – S/2018/83)*, 2018, p. 9.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

This report provides an analysis of the issues facing modern peacebuilding and proposes recommendations for successful efforts. It outlines, for example, how local context is often ignored in designing peacebuilding initiatives and recommends focusing on national ownership and regional approaches. It also provides recommendations to assist in addressing the various challenges of peacebuilding, such as the implementation of financial partnerships to reduce risk and encourage donors to support peacebuilding activities. Delegates should use this document in their research as a useful in-depth analysis of the topic and utilize the recommendations provided as a starting point for their own efforts in strengthening partnerships and improving peacebuilding.

United Nations, General Assembly. (2017). *High-Level Dialogue on 'Building Sustainable Peace for All: Synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustaining Peace' Summary of Key Messages and Observations* [Report]. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from: <https://www.un.org/pga/71/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2015/08/Summary-of-the-High-level-Dialogue-on-Building-Sustainable-Peace-for-All.pdf>

This report summarizes the High-Level Dialogue on Building Sustainable Peace for All: Synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustaining Peace. The main results of the meeting are that sustainable peace and sustainable development are linked together and that both require national and inclusive ownership. The report emphasizes that when looking at a means to create sustainable peace, it is key to also look at the effects on sustainable development and how both can be achieved through partnerships. This is also relevant when forming new partnerships and delegates should consider this when preparing for conference.

United Nations General Assembly, Seventy-second session & United Nations Security Council, (2018). *The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth and peace and security (A/72/761 – S/2018/86)*. Retrieved 12 August 2018 from: <https://undocs.org/A/72/761>

This independent study requested by the Security Council and the General Assembly contains an overview of the involvement of youth in peacebuilding processes. It firstly stresses the extent to which youth is involved and affected by violent conflicts. Secondly, it addresses ways in which young persons are already getting involved, such as through youth organizations. Thirdly, the study shows that there are many more ways in which young persons can be empowered in order to foster sustainable peace. Overall, this is an excellent resource for delegates to understand the role of young persons and their relation to conflict prevention.

United Nations General Assembly, Seventy-second session & United Nations, Security Council. (2018). *Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Report of the Secretary-General (A/72/707 – S/2018/43)*. Retrieved 8 July 2018 from: <http://undocs.org/A/72/707>

This report by the Secretary-General reports on the progress of the process of creating sustainable peace. In this document, he highlights the current state of peacebuilding and recommends addressing the continued challenges in coordinating efforts between various stakeholders in regular regional meetings, in securing predictable finance, and a lack in close cooperation within partnerships. The document highlights the role of the PBC as the core institution of the peacebuilding architecture. Delegates should read this report in order to understand the current challenges faced by peacebuilding partnerships.

United Nations General Assembly, Seventy-second session & United Nations, Security Council (2018). *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its 11th session (A/72/721 – S/2018/83)*. Retrieved 8 July 2018 from: <http://undocs.org/A/72/721>

This is the latest report of the PBC, which addresses the current work of the PBC and its challenges such as the limits of financing, the need for regional approaches, and the involvement of women and youth. It also provides the readers with recommendations on what can be done to solve these challenges, such as improving and enhancing partnerships. Delegates should read this report in order to get an overview of the most recent work of the commission in specific regions and fields.

United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission (2017). *PBC Annual Session 2017: Concept paper and programme*. Retrieved 9 August 2018 from:

[https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_annual_session_2017 - concept note - final1.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_annual_session_2017_-_concept_note_-_final1.pdf)

The report on the annual session is a key document for insight into the actual work of the PBC. The focus of this particular session is 'Partnerships for Financing for Peace.' In the past year, the PBC has formed a very important partnership with the World Bank in order to secure more funding from non-Member State sources and therefore ensure that financing for peacebuilding operations is more predictable. This document gives an overview over the possibilities of financing from partnerships and delegates will find this useful when researching how to further these forms of collaboration between stakeholders and the PBC.

United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission. (2018). *Security Council Briefing on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace [Draft Statement]*. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from:

[https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sc_briefing_on_psp - statement by the pbc chair - final2.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sc_briefing_on_psp_-_statement_by_the_pbc_chair_-_final2.pdf)

This is a Draft Statement by the chair of the PBC for his briefing of the Security Council. He addresses the main challenges the PBC is facing in fulfilling its goal to achieve sustainable peace. He further highlights the main active peacebuilding operations the PBC is involved in, including in the Sahel region, The Gambia and Liberia. This document gives delegates insight into the successful partnership of the PBC with the Security Council within the UN system, but also stresses the need to also strengthen cooperation with entities outside the UN.

United Nations, Security Council. (2017). *Report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (S/2017/744)*. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from: <http://undocs.org/S/2017/744>

This is a recent report by the Secretary-General in regard to the UN-AU partnership for peace and security in Africa. It first highlights the institutions that have cooperated and their achievements such as the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. In the second section of the report, it further elaborates on the need for operational-level cooperation, including upholding the rule of law, financing projects, and cooperating with regional entities through the partnerships. The Secretary-General recommends that the UN should also increase its cooperation with regional entities in Africa in addition to furthering cooperation with the AU. Delegates should utilize this document in their research to gain a better overview of current cooperative arrangements and such initiatives.

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United Nations, General Assembly, Seventy-second session & United Nations, Security Council. (2018). *The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth and peace and security (A/72/761 – S/2018/86)*. Retrieved 12 August 2018 from: <http://undocs.org/A/72/761>

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II. Peacebuilding and Security Sector Reform

“At its heart, Security Sector Reform is about ensuring safety and enabling women, men, and children to live their lives free from fear, go to school, go to the market, and walk on the street at any time without having to worry about attacks, criminal assault, or other forms of violence.”¹⁶³

Introduction

Over the last 30 years, the number of interstate conflicts has decreased while the number of intrastate conflicts has increased.¹⁶⁴ Security forces, such as the military and police and justice institutions play an important role in the transition from violence to peace.¹⁶⁵ Successful security sector reform (SSR) is a critical long-term project for building trust and accountability in security forces, which in turn greatly improves the success of post-conflict peacebuilding.¹⁶⁶ The security sector represents the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for maintaining and developing strategies for security in a country.¹⁶⁷ This typically encompasses the military, law enforcement, intelligence organizations, and can sometimes also include legislative, judicial, and executive bodies, which play a role in creating and upholding security policy.¹⁶⁸

The Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) defines SSR as a “process of assessment, review, and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state.”¹⁶⁹ The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) regard SSR as a key element of post-conflict peacebuilding because it addresses some of the root causes of a conflict and develops the foundation for long-term peace.¹⁷⁰ A security sector that is ineffective or unaccountable poses a major threat to the economic, social, and peaceful development of a Member State.¹⁷¹ As such, successful SSR closely supports national goals for reconstruction.¹⁷² The PBC has participated in SSR activities in Sierra Leone and Burundi, in which they collaborated with the national governments and improved the administration and accountability of both the police and military, as well as helping to strengthen the rule of law.¹⁷³ Although there is no single universal implementation of SSR, the PBC provides best practices and helps coordinate SSR efforts among the different parts of the UN system involved in post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁷⁴

International and Regional Framework

While the UN's involvement in SSR has grown over the last 20 years, there are few frameworks that exist to guide it.¹⁷⁵ In a desire to establish a coherent system-wide approach for SSR, the Security Council called on the Secretary-General in 2007 to report on previous UN approaches to SSR and to provide

¹⁶³ Mohammed, *Speech by Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed at the UN HLPF on SSR and Sustaining Peace on 23 April 2018, in New York City*, 2018.

¹⁶⁴ UN DPI, *Peace and Security*, 2018.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ UN DPI, *Peace and Security*, 2018; UN University, *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 2.

¹⁶⁷ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659-S/2008/39)*, 2008, p. 5.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁷⁰ UN Peacekeeping, *Security Sector Reform*, 2018.

¹⁷¹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659-S/2008/39)*, 2008, p. 9.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁷³ UN Security Council, *Maintenance of international peace and security (S/PRST/2007/3 (2011))*, 2011.

¹⁷⁴ UN PBSO, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*, 2012, p. 13.

¹⁷⁵ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/67/970-S/2013/480)*, 2013, p. 2.

recommendations for improvement.¹⁷⁶ The subsequent 2008 report, “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” is the first collection of lessons learned from UN involvement in SSR.¹⁷⁷ It acknowledges that security is a “precondition for sustainable peace, development, and human rights” and that SSR is closely tied to national goals, making it an inherently political and collaborative process.¹⁷⁸ This report also identifies SSR as a way forward for developing gender-sensitive and non-discriminatory institutions that can adequately respond to the needs of diverse groups.¹⁷⁹

In response to the increasing discussions about SSR, Security Council adopted resolution 2151 (2014), which stresses the importance of national ownership of SSR to establish an inclusive national vision while ensuring the legitimacy of peacebuilding efforts.¹⁸⁰ Through improving partnerships and information sharing, best practices can be selected and embedded into a tailored approach for the state.¹⁸¹ The resolution also calls for increasing monitoring and accountability measures to evaluate security sector performance.¹⁸²

On 25 September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 70/1, the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, which is the primary UN framework for sustainable development.¹⁸³ SSR is incorporated into Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, which promotes the development of peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all, and the construction of effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions.¹⁸⁴ While there is no one model of SSR that can be applied to every situation, sharing of information on both successes and failures to improve the overall process of SSR is critical to success.¹⁸⁵ This is reinforced by SDG 17, which promotes partnerships among international organizations, national governments, private entities, and civil society organizations (CSOs).¹⁸⁶

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed an SSR handbook as an outcome of decades of policy work that focuses on best practices for achieving SSR.¹⁸⁷ Rather than promoting guidelines, the handbook instead identifies tools which lead to better SSR implementation.¹⁸⁸ The OECD also focuses on a long-term donor support model driven by national governments through emphasizing local ownership and active participation from domestic stakeholders.¹⁸⁹ This helps reinforce and legitimize SSR efforts, enabling legislative, executive, and judicial reforms to improve accountability and oversight.¹⁹⁰ This handbook was used to guide collaborative peacebuilding operations in the Central African Republic and in Guinea-Bissau to highlight gaps during the development of new national security policies and to ensure the inclusion of minority groups and women.¹⁹¹

¹⁷⁶ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/67/970-S/2013/480)*, 2013, p. 2; UN Security Council, *Maintenance of international peace and security (S/PRST/2007/3 (2011))*, 2007, p. 2.

¹⁷⁷ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659-S/2008/39)*, 2008, p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁸⁰ UN Security Council, *The maintenance of international peace and security: Security sector reform: challenges and opportunities (S/RES/2151 (2014))*, 2014, p. 3.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ UN General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*, 2015, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁸⁷ OECD, *Security System Reform: What Have We Learned? Results and Trends from the Publication and Dissemination of the OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform*, 2008, p. 3.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

Similarly, in 2013 the African Union (AU) developed the *AU SSR Policy Framework* in recognition that a large number of SSR processes take place in Africa, which lacks a comprehensive regional policy framework.¹⁹² The objective of this framework is to enable AU Member States to adequately plan, execute, and evaluate success of SSR operations while providing a platform for training and capacity-building.¹⁹³ Although many best practices are already established by the UN and related organizations, there is a stronger focus on context-specific policies to accommodate diverse situations, backgrounds, and cultures.¹⁹⁴ This can be accomplished through improved accountability and transparency under the rule of law, which also supports the legitimacy of the security sector and ensure lasting stability.¹⁹⁵ Lastly, the framework encourages its members to conduct a comprehensive review of its security sector every ten years to support improvements and accountability.¹⁹⁶

Role of the International System

While there was no defined, coordinated approach to peacebuilding and SSR prior to 2007, the UN system was still actively engaging and assisting national governments with aspects of both.¹⁹⁷ In 2008, the Secretary-General published a report that shifted the focus of UN SSR to a sector-wide approach, where SSR is conducted concurrently with developing a national framework to guide all security sector components.¹⁹⁸ In July 2011, the *Human Rights Due Diligence Policy* was adopted by the General Assembly to ensure both UN and non-UN security forces mainstream human rights in SSR efforts.¹⁹⁹ In 2012, these principles were applied in Tunisia where UN agencies successfully assisted the government in conducting a study; the outcome of the study led to recommendations and policies that improved the security sector to better protect the population and to ensure stronger accountability.²⁰⁰

The PBC is vital for streamlining the collaboration and coordination of SSR efforts.²⁰¹ Through SSR, the PBC guides the development of a professional, accountable, and effective security sector that promotes healing and reconciliation to build sustainable peace.²⁰² The PBC was key in advising the development of nationally owned SSR operations in Sierra Leone and Burundi, which reestablished accountability in the security sector while also improving the reliability of institutions.²⁰³ While the PBC is responsible for the execution of peacebuilding and SSR, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) provides experts to assist with the PBC's mission and also manages the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).²⁰⁴ The PBSO provides assessments of national capacities for peacebuilding and determines how the PBF can be best utilized to support missions.²⁰⁵

¹⁹² AU, *African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, 2013, p. 6.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁹⁷ UN General Assembly, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659-S/2008/39)*, 2008, p. 7; UN DPKO, *Sustainable Peace Through Justice and Security*, 2012, p. 17.

¹⁹⁸ UN DPKO, *Sustainable Peace Through Justice and Security*, 2012, p. 17; UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659-S/2008/39)*, 2008, p. 2.

¹⁹⁹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/67/970-S/2013/480)*, 2013, p. 9.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁰¹ UN PBSO, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*, 2012, p. 13.

²⁰² UN Security Council, *Post-conflict peacebuilding (S/RES/2282(2016))*, 2016, p. 5.

²⁰³ UN Security Council, *Maintenance of international peace and security (S/PRST/2007/3 (2011))*, 2011.

²⁰⁴ UN PBSO, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*, 2012, p. 5.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

The Security Council is heavily involved in determining the role of SSR in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and thus the role the UN plays in supporting SSR.²⁰⁶ The Security Council is responsible for establishing all peacekeeping mandates, and as such determines which missions should include SSR and to what extent.²⁰⁷ While the Security Council has addressed the importance of SSR only a handful of times in recent years, it plays a key role in setting normative expectations for the role of SSR in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.²⁰⁸ As the complexity of peacekeeping operations increases, the DPKO has become more involved in supporting SSR.²⁰⁹ SSR components are planned and managed by the DPKO SSR Unit.²¹⁰ The SSR Unit does this through the provision of sector specific guidance and technical advisers.²¹¹ Additionally, the SSR Unit serves as the secretariat for the Inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (IASSRTF), which is a multiagency collaboration to coordinate SSR.²¹² The IASSRTF is made up of 13 UN agencies, including PBSO.²¹³ While PBSO focuses on the high-level strategic vision, IASSRTF works to develop strategic national frameworks linking peacebuilding with SSR and good governance.²¹⁴

Other organizations, such as private sector actors and civil society organizations (CSOs) also play a role in supporting SSR. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one such actor; DCAF advises states, intergovernmental organizations, and other actors on policies and practices for optimal security sector governance and operation.²¹⁵ DCAF prioritizes national ownership and broad engagement with partners across sectors.²¹⁶

Accountability and Trust in the Security Sector

A credible security sector is crucial for establishing accountability and trust because of their responsibility for enforcing the law.²¹⁷ An accountable and trustworthy security sector is key to building a lasting peace, which is a core component of peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations.²¹⁸

While improving physical access to security services increases the likelihood that they will be used, public confidence will remain low if security forces are not supported with training to address corruption, legal awareness, and discrimination.²¹⁹ Additionally, police officers are more likely to embrace professional conduct reform if supported by credible and effective accountability mechanisms, such as well-defined rules around the use of force.²²⁰ Reform of a national police force is a significant time investment, as it goes well beyond just training and into capacity development, such as enabling disadvantaged groups to engage in the security as civilian leadership or police officers themselves.²²¹ SSR in Timor-Leste and Haiti used specialized teams to improve the inclusion of minority groups in police training.²²² This level of

²⁰⁶ UN Peacekeeping, *Security Sector Reform*, 2018.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ UN DPKO, *Sustainable Peace Through Justice and Security*, 2012, p. 16.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²¹⁴ UN PBSO, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*, 2012, p. 12.

²¹⁵ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *About us*.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership, and people: Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446)*, 2015, p. 54; UN DPKO, *Police Capacity-Building and Development*, 2015, p. 3.

²¹⁸ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership, and people: Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446)*, 2015, p. 13.

²¹⁹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Annual Report 2017*, 2017, p. 21.

²²⁰ UN DPKO, *Police Capacity-Building and Development*, 2015, p. 4.

²²¹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership, and people: Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446)*, 2015, p. 54.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 55.

inclusion was successful in improving local trust in the police forces, which is critical for sustaining peace especially in a divided society.²²³

A component of SSR which is often forgotten is the judicial system of a country, which is responsible for handling criminal cases, including those of security sector abuses.²²⁴ More than 50% of SSR mandates include some focus on developing fair judicial systems because unreliable judicial systems negatively impact trust and undermine accountability.²²⁵ By ensuring that the judicial system will hold the security sector accountable, civilians will trust that both the security sector and the judicial system will act in their best interests.²²⁶ For example, SSR funded police training in Liberia was supported in tandem with information technology systems and training.²²⁷ Through this approach, both judicial record keeping and storage of evidence were improved, thus contributing to a stronger justice system.²²⁸

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is the process of rehabilitating former combatants back into civilian life and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).²²⁹ DDR can help ensure the long-term success of SSR through the integration of former combatants into civilian roles, while SSR ensures the long-term success of DDR through the development of programs which discourage former combatants from returning to violence.²³⁰ As such, the mutually reinforcing relationship between SSR and DDR can contribute to the success of long-term peace.²³¹

In order for SALWs reduction to be successful, civilians must be able to trust that the security sector can provide adequate protection.²³² It is important for SALW reduction to begin as early in the peacebuilding process as possible, so that trust and reliability in police forces can be built up while reducing the likelihood individuals maintain SALW to protect themselves.²³³ Disarmament can sometimes be mistakenly understood as a short-term security measure, when in fact it also involves a long-term process of developing state regulations and controlling the proliferation of SALW.²³⁴ In Comoros, the PBC and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) collaborated to establish a plan for controlling SALW through workshops and specialized training for legislators and police, which were successful in reducing community violence and improved the overall the success of additional local SALW initiatives.²³⁵

When former combatants are reintegrated, many join police or military forces due to their experience as combatants.²³⁶ This can also help provide stability by reducing the size of the military through their

²²³ Ibid., p. 55.

²²⁴ UN PBSO, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*, 2012, p. 15.

²²⁵ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Annual Report 2017*, 2017, p. 20.

²²⁶ UN PBSO, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*, 2012, p. 24.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

²²⁹ US Institute for Peace, *Special Report: The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict-Affected Countries*, 2010, p. 1.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

²³¹ Ibid., p. 1.

²³² Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Linkage between DDR and SSR - Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa*, 2007, p. 12.

²³³ UN IAWG on DDR, *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards - DDR and Security Sector Reform*, 2009, p. 6.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

²³⁵ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/67/970-S/2013/480)*, 2013, p. 10.

²³⁶ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Linkage between DDR and SSR - Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa*, 2007, p. 14.

integration into civilian police forces.²³⁷ In 2009, DPKO-coordinated DDR led to the downsizing of Guinea-Bissau's military by providing a socio-economic opportunities and incentives for integrating into the police force.²³⁸ As a result, the number of former military personnel in the police went from 300 to 3,600 across the country.²³⁹ This initiative owes its success to the extensive screening provided to prevent particularly violent members of the military from joining civilian police forces.²⁴⁰ However, there remains the risk that violent former combatants may join police forces.²⁴¹ When violent former combatants are mistakenly reintegrated into security forces, it can have the opposite effect by eroding confidence and encouraging civilians to turn to alternative methods for protection such as acquiring SALW.²⁴² Even former combatants who do not remain violent after going through DDR processes may erode civilian trust by their very presence.²⁴³ For victims of violence, having former attackers or enemy combatants act as police or military may create discomfort and distrust in the security sectors.²⁴⁴ Efforts to make the DDR and SSR process transparent to the general public and to have clear accountability mechanisms in place can alleviate some of these concerns and among local populations.²⁴⁵

Gender Mainstreaming in Security Sector Reform

Although the security sector is traditionally dominated by men, gender mainstreaming is important to the development of an inclusive, responsible, and non-discriminatory security sector.²⁴⁶ Gender mainstreaming requires that policymakers and leaders consider the positive and negative implications of proposed actions on different genders is considered and used to guide balanced and fair decision-making.²⁴⁷ Gender discrimination complicates SSR by limiting participation in the security sector and directly or indirectly limiting access to available resources, such as legal assistance.²⁴⁸ Additionally, gender plays a role in determining what kind of experience an individual has with the security sector.²⁴⁹ The lack of representation of women in the security sector and peacebuilding planning represents a missed opportunity to integrate different skill sets and perspectives.²⁵⁰

Due to a lack of inclusiveness and transparency, the likelihood that women report crimes or take cases beyond initial reports is low, especially when there are only men working in the security sector.²⁵¹ Ensuring SSR initiatives and policies are people-centered, implemented at the national level, and are responsive to needs regardless of gender or age is critical to their success in serving local populations.²⁵² In 2016, the PBC adopted a gender strategy which promotes inclusiveness and gender-responsive engagement at all levels.²⁵³ The PBC stresses that SSR initiatives should prioritize the inclusion of women throughout the entire process, from discussion to implementation, in order to develop policies that

²³⁷ UN IAWG on DDR, *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards - DDR and Security Sector Reform*, 2009, p. 5-6.

²³⁸ UN DPKO, *Sustainable Peace Through Justice and Security*, 2012, p. 31.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁴¹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Linkage between DDR and SSR - Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa*, 2007, p. 14.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁴⁶ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659-S/2008/39)*, 2008, p. 11.

²⁴⁷ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform and Governance*, 2017, p. 4.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁵⁰ UN IAWG on DDR, *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards - DDR and Security Sector Reform*, 2009, p. 12.

²⁵¹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Annual Report 2017*, 2017, p. 21.

²⁵² NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, *Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council: 2017*, 2008, p. 38.

²⁵³ UN PBC, *Peacebuilding Commission's Gender Strategy*, 2016, p. 2.

take into account their particular needs.²⁵⁴ An inclusive and diverse security sector is key to making improvements in oversight and accountability, as well as in ensuring local ownership of SSR processes.²⁵⁵

Special consideration of individuals with diverse sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC) is not always present in discussions and resolutions on peace and security or SSR.²⁵⁶ This results in their exclusion from the planning and execution of peacebuilding initiatives, which often results in biases and discrimination against this population.²⁵⁷ Comprehensive consideration of SOGIESC individuals in national policies leads to a more effective and accountable security sector and improves the legitimacy of the government through demonstrating its commitment to the equality of its people.²⁵⁸ During peacebuilding in South Africa, it was reported that prison wardens actively discriminated against SOGIESC individuals, reducing overall confidence in the security sector's ability to protect incarcerated individuals.²⁵⁹

Conclusion

SSR is considered by the PBC to be a core part of a transitional justice approach to preventing further conflict, but implementing SSR is complicated by the specific needs of each security sector and the particular post-conflict situation.²⁶⁰ As such, strong national engagement and long-term commitment is critical to developing strong, accountable, and sustainable security sectors in post-conflict countries.²⁶¹ The development of an accountable and trustworthy security sector is essential for civilians to feel confident that the system can protect their interests and facilitate conflict resolution and justice.²⁶² Post-conflict situations also require that the SSR process reestablish public trust in these institutions in order for them to operate successfully.²⁶³ While there have been few explicit UN resolutions that directly link peacebuilding and SSR, the PBC as a coordinator and an advisory body to Member States has the potential to guide innovation in and implementation of SSR in peacebuilding.²⁶⁴

Further Research

Delegates should consider the following questions when researching the topic: How can the PBC work to reduce gaps in implementation and reporting during SSR? What can the PBC do to scale the coordination of SSR with other UN agencies and regional bodies? How can the UN better prioritize and integrate national ownership at the outset of the SSR process? How can the PBC prioritize SSR when there are many additional considerations during peacebuilding? While national contexts make it difficult to establish a single successful model of SSR, can the PBC still develop universal learnings and how should it apply those to future peacebuilding operations?

²⁵⁴ UN PBC, *Peacebuilding Commission's Gender Strategy*, 2016, p. 8.

²⁵⁵ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground*, 2011, p. 2.

²⁵⁶ UN PBSO, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*, 2012, p. 26.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁵⁸ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform and Governance*, 2017, pp. 16-17.

²⁵⁹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground*, 2011, p. 49.

²⁶⁰ UN Security Council, *Post-conflict peacebuilding (S/RES/2282(2016))*, 2016, p. 5.

²⁶¹ UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Challenge of sustaining peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490)*, 2015, p. 45.

²⁶² UN General Assembly & UN Security Council, *Uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership, and people: Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446)*, 2015, p. 13.

²⁶³ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Linkage between DDR and SSR - Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa*, 2007, p. 14.

²⁶⁴ UN DPKO, *Sustainable Peace Through Justice and Security*, 2012, p. 49.

Annotated Bibliography

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. (2011). *Gender and Security Sector Reform: Examples from the Ground*. Retrieved 12 August 2018 from: <http://www.poa-iss.org/kit/Gender-SSR-E.pdf>

The Geneva Centre for DCAF is a leading organization in DDR as well as SSR. This source highlights the importance of tailored gender-sensitive responses by analyzing and comparing peacebuilding operations in Africa. Some examples include the recruitment of women in armed forces in Hungary and Liberia and gender-sensitive reforms to laws in South Africa and Indonesia. Delegates can use this source to better understand the different approaches that can be taken and to develop their own ideas of best practices and areas for improvement regarding gender in SSR.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. (2017). *Annual Report 2017*. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from: https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/129803/2657379/ISSAT_Annual_Report_2017_web.pdf

This source provides the most recent statistics and best practices with regards to SSR. Additionally, it discusses how a number of CSOs engage with the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) and UN entities to accomplish reform. Although not directly affiliated with the UN, the ISSAT aids the development of technical best practices around the world through the provision of on the ground assistance. Delegates can use this source to gain a broad understanding of how international organizations support SSR in several capacities, ranging from knowledge management to strategic engagement.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. (2017). *Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform and Governance*. Retrieved 20 September 2018 from:

<https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/SSRG-West-Africa-Toolkit-Tool-8-EN.pdf>

This toolkit is used to support the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) implementation of security sector reform. It identifies how each branch of government can support SSR and establishes common benchmarks of success in mainstreaming gender from West Africa, such as the integration of women into the national police in Liberia. This source also identifies how national governments and UN agencies can collaborate on legislation to mainstream gender in SSR. Despite being focused on West Africa, delegates can still use this source to understand the role that mainstreaming gender plays in SSR and peacebuilding.

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. (2017). *Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council: 2017*. Retrieved 12 August 2018 from:

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NGOWG-Mapping-WPS-in-UNSC-2017.pdf>

The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security is a collaboration of 18 non-governmental organizations. This source establishes the inclusion of women as critical to peacebuilding, due to the vital roles they play and unique perspectives they bring. It additionally assesses the success of women's rights policies in peace and security in specific areas, including Liberia and Sierra Leone. In these countries, women were encouraged to join elements of SSR during the peacebuilding process, bringing about greater inclusion in the security sector and improved reporting of gender-based violence. Delegates can use this source to understand the broader impact of gender mainstreaming in SSR and can identify areas for improvement, such as the better inclusion of SOGIESC individuals and women earlier throughout the peacebuilding process.

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Security Sector Reform Unit. (2012). *Sustainable Peace Through Justice and Security* [Report]. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from:

https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ssr_perspective_2012.pdf

This source is best used to understand the collaborative UN approach to SSR integrated with peacekeeping operations. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Affairs published this magazine to explain how SSR operations work and are coordinated across multiple agencies. Delegates can use this source to gain an understanding the complexity of peacebuilding operations with the number of organizations involved. Additionally,

delegates should use this source to consider different case studies where SSR has been successful and how it can be improved upon.

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2015). *Police Capacity-Building and Development* [Report]. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from: https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/sgf-guidelines_police_cbd-2015.pdf

This source is used by UN Police to provide guidelines for managing and interacting with police during peacekeeping operations. This highlights that post-conflict security sector management is often neglected, especially with regards to reform of police forces. It describes the best practices around police training and procedure, which helps with police capacity-building at all levels of reform, from local to national. Delegates can use this handbook to understand the best practices for SSR with regards to police training and management.

United Nations, General Assembly, Seventy-second session & United Nations, Security Council. (2018). *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Eleventh session (A/72/721-S/2018/83)*. Retrieved 12 August 2018 from: <http://undocs.org/A/72/721>

This report of the PBC to the General Assembly and the Security Council is the most recent compilation of actions taken by the PBC through 2017. It also highlights thematic issues, such as the need for national ownership of SSR, mainstreaming gender, and financing. This report identifies case studies, such as Burundi, where the PBC successfully encouraged dialogue for implementing a plan for national peacebuilding. Delegates can use this report to better understand current peacebuilding and SSR operations and evaluate their effectiveness.

United Nations, Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. (2009). *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards - DDR and Security Sector Reform* [Report]. Retrieved 12 August 2018 from:

<http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%206.10%20DDR%20and%20SSR.pdf>

The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR was established to increase the cohesiveness of UN DDR operations across multiple agencies. This document outlines the importance of DDR and SSR dynamics while also informing the reader about known best practices, such as improved border controls to prevent proliferation of SALW and the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Delegates can use this document to better understand the interaction between DDR and SSR while also developing ideas on how to improve on existing DDR and SSR initiatives.

United Nations, Peacebuilding Support Office. (2012). *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic review of security sector reform (SSR) to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund*. Retrieved 8 August 2018 from:

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ssr2_web.pdf

The UN PBF is part of the peacebuilding apparatus, which also encompasses the PBC. Although this source deals primarily with how peacebuilding is funded, it takes into consideration how to improve and streamline peacebuilding operations to make the most use of limited funding. The PBF provides financial support for SSR operations conducted by the PBC. This source is important for delegates to understand funding of SSR and highlights potential sources for additional funding.

United Nations University. (2005). *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding*. A. Schnabel, H.G. Ehrhart (Ed.), JP: United Nations University Press. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from:

<https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2552/pdf9280811096.pdf>

This source introduces the concepts of SSR and peacebuilding and how they interact with and support each other. It provides a comprehensive list of challenges and case studies, such as challenges faced reintegrating African armed forces and ways to approach SSR with multiple armed ethnic groups. Additionally, these case studies can be used to highlight areas of success and failure. Delegates can use this source to understand how SSR and peacebuilding were coordinated in the past.

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III. Implementing the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS)

Introduction

The Sahel is a large, semi-arid region of sub-Saharan Africa that stretches between the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea in the east.²⁶⁵ Geographically, it is the continent's transitional region that separates the Sahara Desert to the north from the tropical climates of to the south.²⁶⁶ There are ten states—Burkina Faso, Cameroon, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad—which lie partially or fully within the Sahel region and are currently facing a similar set of shared economic, environmental, and developmental challenges.²⁶⁷ The United Nations (UN) has designated the term the “Sahel” to indicate these countries specifically, and has sought to establish development and peacebuilding approaches targeted toward the needs of this specific region.²⁶⁸

The Sahel region is faced with a number of interconnected humanitarian, environmental, and security crises, all of which are currently being addressed in some capacity by the UN.²⁶⁹ Food shortages in the region resulting from decades of drought and deforestation have left over 30 million people in a state of food insecurity, with more than 10 million being classified by the UN as severely food insecure.²⁷⁰ The migration of shepherds and farmers in search of arable land has also led to a rise in conflict within the region.²⁷¹ These land disputes coincide with larger power struggles in Member States such as Mali, where an estimated 5.1 million people live in areas currently affected by conflict.²⁷² The state of insecurity in the Sahel, specifically in Mali and the Lake Chad Basin, has also opened the door for non-state actors such as Boko Haram to use violence to seize control of territories.²⁷³ To address these compounding factors and implement a comprehensive strategy to promote peace and development within the region, the UN Security Council adopted the *United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS)* in 2013.²⁷⁴

There are several factors preventing the states of the Sahel region from achieving the goals of the UNISS over the last five years, and the international system is working to recognize and overcome these roadblocks in order to bring sustainable peace to the region.²⁷⁵ The porous borders within the Sahel region, which are primarily the result of a lack of government capacity and infrastructure, have contributed to the instability of the region, with conflicts, terrorist groups, and international organized crime syndicates spilling over into neighboring countries and creating conflict.²⁷⁶ Increasing regional cooperation between the Member States of the Sahel, as well as the support of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs), will be an important part of implementing UNISS, particularly to prevent conflict and address the humanitarian crisis in the region.²⁷⁷

International and Regional Framework

The framework for peace and development in the Sahel stems from a long legacy of overarching international treaties, resolutions, and agreements.²⁷⁸ The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)* (1948) set an international standard for the rights of all individuals, including the right to life,

²⁶⁵ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 5.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁶⁷ UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, p. 3.

²⁶⁸ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 5.

²⁶⁹ Essoungou, *The Sahel: One Region, Many Crises, Africa Renewal*, 2013.

²⁷⁰ UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, p. 3.

²⁷¹ FAO et al., *Sahel: Early Action and Scale-Up of Emergency Response 2018*, 2018, pp. 2-3.

²⁷² UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, p. 3.

²⁷³ UN DPI, *Lake Chad Basin: Areas reclaimed from Boko Haram must be stabilized, Security Council told*, 2018.

²⁷⁴ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*, 2013, p. 14.

²⁷⁵ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, pp. 5-10.

²⁷⁶ Essoungou, *The Sahel: One Region, Many Crises, Africa Renewal*, 2013.

²⁷⁷ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 12.

²⁷⁸ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*, 2013, pp. 4-7.

security, movement, and an adequate standard of living, all of which are currently threatened by the situation in the Sahel.²⁷⁹ The assurance of these human rights in the Sahel is directly related to the capacity to address climate change, as the effects of climate change have greatly contributed to the current instability in the region.²⁸⁰ The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) outlined in General Assembly resolution 70/1 of 2015, known as the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, emphasize the connection between sustainability and development.²⁸¹ The needs of the Sahel are represented throughout the 2030 Agenda, specifically in SDG 16, which calls for peace, justice, and strong institutions.²⁸² Also adopted in 2015, the *Paris Agreement* is a climate change framework that promotes renewable energy sources in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.²⁸³ Given the interrelation between access to energy, development, and sustainable peace, the *Paris Agreement* will play a critical role in resolving the Sahel crisis.²⁸⁴

United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel

The primary framework regarding peace and security in the Sahel is the UNISS, which was drafted in 2013 following a series of correspondences between the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General.²⁸⁵ The UNISS was drafted as an annex to the 2013 Secretary-General report on “The situation in the Sahel region.”²⁸⁶ This report provides the context in which the strategy was developed, noting several challenges affecting the region, including barriers to effective governance and security; cross-border criminal activity; an inability to provide basic services to the people; and development and humanitarian challenges, including land degradation and food insecurity.²⁸⁷

The UNISS itself is comprised of three overarching strategic goals, which are interconnected and interdependent.²⁸⁸ Each of the three strategic goals is further divided into objectives.²⁸⁹ The document also includes specific actions that includes a list of all relevant UN organizations and subsidiary bodies suited to assist in the implementation of each task.²⁹⁰ For strategic goal one, objectives include increasing democratic practices; ensuring the availability of public services; promoting regional economic mechanisms and justice institutions to combat corruption; strengthening early warning systems to combat challenges to governance; and increasing social cohesion within nations.²⁹¹ These objectives serve to establish strong, inclusive national governments capable of administering public services to its citizens while simultaneously combating corruption.²⁹²

Strategic goal two focuses on the creation of national security infrastructure to combat the proliferation of international organized crime and terrorism, as well the establishment of secure borders for Sahelian countries.²⁹³ Objectives include strengthening UN security and updating existing systems to monitor movement of weapons and persons; developing the capacity to combat terrorism and organized crime at the national and regional level; and enhancing regional cooperative efforts to eliminate the trafficking of weapons and drugs.²⁹⁴ Goal two tasks the international community with providing the support necessary

²⁷⁹ UN General Assembly, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (A/RES/217 A (III))*, 1948.

²⁸⁰ Essoungou, *The Sahel: One Region, Many Crises, Africa Renewal*, 2013.

²⁸¹ UN General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*, 2015.

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ COP 21, *Paris Agreement*, 2015.

²⁸⁴ Essoungou, *The Sahel: One Region, Many Crises, Africa Renewal*, 2013.

²⁸⁵ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*, 2013, pp. 1-4.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-4.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

²⁸⁸ UN PBC, *Informal Meeting on the Situation in the Sahel*, 2017, p. 1.

²⁸⁹ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*, 2013, pp. 14-25.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-25.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-17.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 14-17.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-22.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-22.

for Sahelian nations to address these issues within their own government and security systems by providing information sharing and assistance from sources such as the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force.²⁹⁵

The third and final UNISS strategic goal aims to better address the humanitarian needs of the region in order to build long-term resiliency.²⁹⁶ Its objectives include better tracking of vulnerable households; promoting social services and social protection mechanisms; developing risk management capacity and sustainable livelihood; and implementing resource management mechanisms, especially for water.²⁹⁷ Since its creation in 2013, the UNISS has been recalibrated to align its goals with several more recent international frameworks, including both the SDGs and the *Paris Agreement*, as outlined in the 2018 UN Office of West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) report titled *UN Support Plan for the Sahel*.²⁹⁸ This support plan emphasizes the role of addressing climate change to create stability, the need to empower women, and promoting access to renewable energy resources.²⁹⁹ Supporting sustainable resource management and seeking to mitigate the already-devastating effects of climate change in the Sahel also adhere to the principles of the SDGs and the *Paris Agreement*.³⁰⁰

Apart from UNISS and the international frameworks that have shaped its strategies, there are a number of regional agreements that have been enacted to address the situation in the Sahel.³⁰¹ While these frameworks are not directly related to UNISS, they do affect the implementation of the UN's strategies in the region.³⁰² One such agreement is the *African Union Strategy for the Sahel Region* (2014), which is similar to UNISS in terms of goals, but differs in strategy.³⁰³ The African Union (AU) strategy is broken down into the same three pillars as the UNISS: governance, security, and development, but the objectives seek to utilize national and local-level institutions to achieve these goals, as well as remaining mostly separate from the work of the UN.³⁰⁴ Another example is the European Union's *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel* (2011), which includes country-specific goals and assessments.³⁰⁵

Role of the International System

The urgency of securing sustainable peace and stability in the Sahel has never been more apparent than it currently is, as the UN intensifies its efforts to secure prosperity and peace in Africa.³⁰⁶ The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is one of several UN bodies currently working to resolve the situation in the Sahel.³⁰⁷ With the wide variety of state actors, CSOs, and IGOs also involved in the region, the PBC has the responsibility of bringing together the relevant entities to increase cooperation, reduce redundancies, and advise the work of various UN institutions in order to create sustainable peace in the Sahel, as per its foundational mandate.³⁰⁸ To accomplish this task, the PBC plays an active role in organizing meetings to connect members of the peace, development, and capacity-building processes, as well as supervising the progress of UN-mandated work in the region.³⁰⁹ In 2017, the PBC and the UN

²⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 17-22.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 22-25.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-25.

²⁹⁸ UNOWAS, *United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel: the UN Strengthens its Commitments*, 2017.

²⁹⁹ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, pp. 14-15.

³⁰⁰ COP 21, *Paris Agreement*, 2015; UN General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*, 2015.

³⁰¹ Helly et al., *Sahel Strategies: why coordination is important*, 2015, p. 3.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 9.

³⁰³ AU, *The African Union Strategy for the Sahel Region*, 2014, pp. 2-6.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 6-20.

³⁰⁵ European Union External Action Service, *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*, 2011.

³⁰⁶ UN DPI, *Africa's Sahel must be a top priority for UN peacebuilding efforts, says commission*, 2018.

³⁰⁷ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354 (2013))*, 2013, pp. 14-25.

³⁰⁸ UN General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180)*, 2005.

³⁰⁹ UN DPI, *Africa's Sahel must be a top priority for UN peacebuilding efforts, says commission*, 2018.

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) held a joint meeting in order to bridge the gap between peace and development challenges by utilizing an integrated approach to solving regional crises.³¹⁰ The PBC has held five Sahel-specific meetings in 2018, as well as other meetings devoted to responding to issues on the African continent.³¹¹ In 2018, the PBC Chair also conducted meetings with Permanent Representatives of the Sahel states in order to better gauge how the PBC can be of use during the peacebuilding process in the region.³¹²

In an effort to better organize the various actors working toward peace and stability in the Sahel, the Ministerial Coordination Platform for the Sahel was established following a high-level meeting between the UN Secretary-General and regional leaders in 2013.³¹³ The platform is comprised of four thematic working groups, in line with the pillars of the UNISS, which work to ensure that the various initiatives and strategies for the Sahel are being implemented coherently, and to increase efficiency by enhancing coordination and synergy between actors.³¹⁴ Similarly, the Steering Committee of the UNISS also serves to provide strategic guidance for the various national, regional, and international actors involved in the implementation of the UNISS.³¹⁵ The UN Security Council, in its supervisory role overseeing the implementation of the UNISS, actively monitors the situation in the Sahel and works to adapt strategies to the changing needs of the Member States and organizations at work.³¹⁶ The Security Council therefore calls for progress reports, such as those submitted by the UN Secretariat, and approves operationalization of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding forces.³¹⁷

An important directive put forth by the Security Council is the approval and operationalization of the Joint Force of the G5 for the Sahel (FC-G5S), a peacekeeping force operated by five of the most conflict-burdened nations in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.³¹⁸ The G5 for the Sahel was created in 2014 in Nouakchott, Mauritania as an institution to promote regional cooperation across the five Member States, with the responsibility of guaranteeing conditions for security and development by establishing infrastructure and building resilient communities.³¹⁹ FC-G5S is the security force component of the G5, and while the force will be a key factor in combating violence and affirming state authority, it will also play an important role in facilitating humanitarian assistance and development.³²⁰ There is an important distinction between peacekeeping efforts, which utilize military personnel to promote state authority and rule of law, and peacebuilding initiatives, which seek to promote sustainable peace through the development of institutions to prevent conflict in the future.³²¹ The Security Council's decision to work cooperatively with regional actors such as the G5 Sahel reflects the multifaceted aims of the UN's integrative strategy.³²² Another example of this integrated approach is the work of United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), which is currently working on an initiative that utilizes smart agriculture technology to build the resilience of female farmers in the Sahel, making them less vulnerable to climate shock.³²³

³¹⁰ UN ECOSOC & UN PBC, *The Situation in the Sahel*, 2017, p. 1.

³¹¹ UN PBC, *Provisional Workplan 2018*, 2018, p. 1.

³¹² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³¹³ UNOWAS, *Supporting the Implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel*, 2018.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

³¹⁶ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (S/2018/649)*, 2018, pp. 1-7.

³¹⁷ UN Security Council, *Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/432)*, 2018, pp. 8-10.

³¹⁸ UN Security Council, *Peace and Security in Africa (S/RES/2359 (2017))*, 2017.

³¹⁹ Permanent Secretary of the G5 Sahel, *The G5 Sahel*, 2018.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ UN DPKO, *Terminology*, 2018.

³²² UN Security Council, *Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/432)*, 2018, pp. 8-10.

³²³ UN-Women, *UN Initiative to Boost Resilience of Women and Youth in the Sahel Through Climate-Smart Agriculture Launched at One Planet Summit*, 2017.

Regional actors also play an important role in the peacebuilding process in the Sahel.³²⁴ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Sahel strategy is comprised of 31 proposed projects to be completed at a cost of over \$4 billion.³²⁵ Regional development banks, such as the African Development Bank, have also initiated strategies in the region and invested funds toward various operations geared toward improving governance, security, development, and education.³²⁶ Nationally-focused peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) or the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel, play an important role in establishing safe environments in which other actors can work to maintain sustainable peace.³²⁷ However, violence and instability still continue to spill over beyond national borders, and thus beyond the reach of national initiatives such as MINUSMA.³²⁸

Roadblocks to Sustainable Peace in the Sahel

Despite progress in some areas, the Sahel still faces a number of unresolved issues, such as limited access to social services, poor public-sector performance, the rise of violent extremism, and the absence of rule of law.³²⁹ These problems are present in the region largely because of the inability of state governments to establish authority, fulfill administrative capacities, and provide public services.³³⁰ These failures are the result of continuing conflict, which destabilizes governments and limits development capacities.³³¹ Additionally, the lack of cooperation between state actors has proven to be a major barrier to progress, with law enforcement efforts being restricted by borders.³³² Without social services readily available to citizens, poverty and food insecurity remain and continue to foster the continued rise of violent extremism, which further destabilizes governmental authority and perpetuates the cycle of violence.³³³ The persistence of these issues five years after the adoption of UNISS only reinforces the need for more coordination between all actors in the Sahel.³³⁴ However, the UNOWAS Support Plan outlines a series of new directions which can help facilitate the achievement of the UNISS goals by combating the issues which have slowed down effective implementation up to this point.³³⁵ This includes cooperation between UN and regional peacekeeping operations such as MINUSMA and FC-G5S, which are currently working to address barriers preventing Member States of the Sahel from developing national capacities.³³⁶

Apart from the issues outlined in the original strategies, the recalibrated UNISS support plan also notes a number of new problems standing in the way of achieving these goals.³³⁷ Gender-based violence and discrimination have been shown to greatly hinder the contributions of women in the region; these actions often exclude women from contributing to development and peacebuilding processes, out of fear that they will face harassment or discrimination.³³⁸ There also exist significant cultural and institutional barriers to the broad participation of women in such initiatives.³³⁹ Nine of the 17 West African states lack any legislation regarding sexual harassment, and of the eight that do, the protections for women are limited in scope.³⁴⁰ West African women, on average, make up over 40% of the agricultural workforce, yet

³²⁴ ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Calls for Collective Ownership of Sahel Strategies*, 2015.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

³²⁶ Helly et al., *Sahel Strategies: why coordination is important*, 2015, p. 9.

³²⁷ UN Security Council, *Peace and Security in Africa (S/RES/2056(2012))*, 2012.

³²⁸ UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, p. 5.

³²⁹ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, pp. 8-9.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

³³¹ UN Security Council, *Peace and Security in Africa (S/RES/2056(2012))*, 2012.

³³² UN ECOSOC & UN PBC, *The Situation in the Sahel*, 2017, p. 2-3.

³³³ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, pp. 8-9.

³³⁴ UNOWAS, *United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel: the UN Strengthens its Commitments*, 2017.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ UN Security Council, *Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/432)*, 2018, pp. 1-10.

³³⁷ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 9.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁴⁰ OECD, *Gender Inequality in West African Social Institutions*, *West African Papers No. 13*, 2018, p. 14.

constitute only 8% of agricultural land owners, cutting women out of important decision-making processes regarding land-use and sustainability.³⁴¹ To address these issues of harassment and inclusion, the goals of the new strategy include provisions for the inclusion of women in leadership roles, as well as promoting legislative action to ensure equal property and financial rights for women.³⁴² This change was made in response to the adoption of the SDGs, specifically goal 5 (gender equality), and the system-wide effort to streamline all UN initiatives toward their completion by 2030.³⁴³

Another issue addressed within the recalibrated support plan is the role of climate change in fueling conflict in the region.³⁴⁴ The support plan report highlights the fact that the effects of climate change, including desertification, drought, and subsequent food insecurity as a result of crop shortages, are driving factors for many of the other problems in the region including conflict, migratory issues, and poverty.³⁴⁵ Pastoralist communities, which make up approximately 30% of the Sahel's population, have had to begin their seasonal migrations earlier as a result of changes in the climate pattern, and the increased toll on pastoral land resources may lead to an increase in intercommunal violence.³⁴⁶ The Sahel is also experiencing an energy deficit, despite its remarkable capacity for renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power, severely limiting its development capacity.³⁴⁷ Improving the Sahel's renewable energy infrastructure would greatly improve the available energy supply, and it would allow reliable access to energy and promote economic growth in the region.³⁴⁸ To address these problems, the revamped UNISS strategies incorporate the SDGs (specifically goals 2, 7, 9, 11, and 13) and the commitments made in the *Paris Agreement* into their goals for promoting peace.³⁴⁹

Engaging a Regional Approach to Peacebuilding

Given the size of the Sahel and the cross-border nature of the issues in the region, any effort that focuses only on a single country is likely to fall short of creating sustainable peace in the region as a whole.³⁵⁰ A regional approach is the most effective way of creating peace and fostering development in the Sahel, and the UNISS aims to harness potential synergies while avoiding issues of redundancy, competition for resources, and conflicts between frameworks.³⁵¹ This means that all organizational actors, including the PBC, must work to find a balance between engaging with the diverse agendas of regional actors, such as development banks, IGOs, and security forces, and avoiding redundancy and inefficiency.³⁵² Partnerships between governments, especially those who share borders, have become increasingly vital to the peacebuilding process as a result of the increase in international crime and violent extremism in the region.³⁵³

While it is valuable to have regional strategies with goals that align with UNISS, it can also become an impediment to achieving progress in the region.³⁵⁴ Authors of these strategies range from regional IGOs such as the AU or European Union (EU), international development banks such as the World Bank or the Islamic Development Bank, and other bodies within the UN system.³⁵⁵ There are currently 19 separate

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁴² UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 15.

³⁴³ UN General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*, 2015.

³⁴⁴ UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, p. 3.

³⁴⁵ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, pp. 8-9.

³⁴⁶ UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, p. 6.

³⁴⁷ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 7.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

³⁴⁹ COP 21, *Paris Agreement*, 2015; UN General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*, 2015; UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, pp. 8-9.

³⁵⁰ Helly et al., *Sahel Strategies: why coordination is important*, 2015, pp. 8-10.

³⁵¹ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 9.

³⁵² UN ECOSOC & UN PBC, *The Situation in the Sahel*, 2017, p. 2.

³⁵³ UN DPI, *Peace and security challenges in Africa's Sahel region require 'holistic approach,' says UN official*, 2017.

³⁵⁴ Lebovic, G5 Sahel: Much Done, More to Do, *European Council on Foreign Affairs*, 2018.

³⁵⁵ Helly et al., *Sahel Strategies: why coordination is important*, 2015, p. 2.

regional frameworks or strategies in place in the Sahel region, each with its own funding, objectives, and geographical scope, making it difficult to coordinate efforts, avoid overlapping responsibilities, and monitor overall progress.³⁵⁶ Calls for collective ownership of such strategies can be heard from organizations such as the ECOWAS, an IGO that initiated its own Sahel strategy in 2013, however most non-UN plans are unable to effectively coordinate their efforts with that of other initiatives due to insufficient communication between programs.³⁵⁷ This is the result of a lack of meaningful coordination between actors, as well as differing geographic scope of individual strategies.³⁵⁸ Plans initiated by regional organizations or CSOs (such as ECOWAS or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) are often seen as more legitimate, but they lack the funding and capacity of larger entities such as the UN.³⁵⁹ Given these difficulties, it is imperative that the PBC fulfill its mandated role as intermediary between all relevant actors in order to support the implementation of UNISS.³⁶⁰

Additionally, the cross-border trafficking of small arms and light weapons, drugs, and humans by organized crime syndicates in the region is both cause and effect of the breakdown of the rule of law, at both the national and regional levels.³⁶¹ Given the limited border management capacities of individual Sahel Member States, as well as a lack of information sharing between those states, this trafficking has been allowed to proliferate in the region.³⁶² Cooperation between national governments, regional actors, and international organizations is the first step in preventing the spread of violent extremism.³⁶³ Information and technology sharing, as well as partnerships between law enforcement agencies, will create the capacity to combat the organized crime and weapons trafficking tactics used by extremist groups.³⁶⁴

The UN is also tasked, per UNISS strategic goal number one, to increase its capacity to monitor cross-border threats in the region and assist national institutions as they address those threats.³⁶⁵ UNOWAS has arranged meetings with relevant leaders within affected Member States to promote security sector reform as a means of securing borders and countering cross-border threats, resulting in fruitful negotiations in Burkina Faso and The Gambia.³⁶⁶ However, such reforms would likely be more effective if reached in concert with neighboring Member States, ensuring coordination on both sides of national borders being affected by such activity.³⁶⁷ When regional cooperation is achieved and maintained, cross-border violence and trafficking will be reduced and improved governance can take effect to address the issue.³⁶⁸

Conclusion

The UNISS has been active for the past six years, and while progress has certainly been made toward achieving peace in the region, there is still much work to be done.³⁶⁹ Violence from non-state actors and extremist groups continues to undermine the authority of national governments, and forced migrations resulting from climate change have led to intercommunal violence.³⁷⁰ Women continue to face violence,

³⁵⁶ UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 9.

³⁵⁷ ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Calls for Collective Ownership of Sahel Strategies*, 2015.

³⁵⁸ Helly et al., *Sahel Strategies: why coordination is important*, 2015, pp. 3-10.

³⁵⁹ Helly et al., *Sahel Strategies: why coordination is important*, 2015, p. 9.

³⁶⁰ UN DPI, *Africa's Sahel must be a top priority for UN peacebuilding efforts, says commission*, 2019.

³⁶¹ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*, 2013, p. 8.

³⁶² UNOWAS, *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel*, 2018, p. 14.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁶⁵ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*, 2013, p. 18.

³⁶⁶ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (S/2018/649)*, 2018, pp. 10-13.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁶⁸ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*, 2013.

³⁶⁹ Helly et al., *Sahel Strategies: why coordination is important*, 2015, p. 10.

³⁷⁰ UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, pp. 3-5.

harassment, and discriminatory treatment, which reduces their ability to contribute positively toward implementing the UNISS.³⁷¹ Recent experience from UN efforts in nations such as Liberia and Burundi has shown that an effective way to effect change in the region is by supporting governments in addressing the root causes of conflict, as well acknowledging the multi-dimensional nature of the crisis at hand.³⁷² Building capacity for development efforts target those needs, and the PBC is in a position to facilitate such improvements.³⁷³ However, the root causes of conflict are also spurred on by the effects of climate change, which have greatly impacted food security and economic livelihoods for millions in the region, reaffirming the need for regional sustainability.³⁷⁴ The interconnected nature of these issues makes it all the more difficult to eliminate any one problem, meaning that a multidimensional and multi-stakeholder approach to implementing UNISS will be required.³⁷⁵

Further Research

When beginning their research into the issues affecting the Sahel region, delegates should consider: Who are the relevant stakeholders and actors concerned with the UNISS strategic goals, specifically the new directives outlined in the *UN Support Plan for the Sahel*? How can the PBC work to ensure that an integrated regional approach is prioritized in the implementation of UNISS? Given the commonalities that exist between the goals of the UNISS and the SDGs, how can all relevant actors support these frameworks? How can the PBC harness those interactions and coordinate the utilization of resources made available as a result of the SDGs? How can the PBC improve already-existing oversight mechanisms, such as the Steering Committee and the Ministerial Coordination Platform, to address possible issues of redundancy and inefficiency among the various regional and international strategies in the Sahel?

Annotated Bibliography

Helly, D. et al. (2015). Sahel strategies: why coordination is imperative. *European Center for Development Policy Management*. Retrieved 4 August 2018 from: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190285/PolBrief76Eng.pdf>

This peer-reviewed policy brief is an informative study of the international response to the situation in the Sahel. It features the results of a comparative study of several strategies for the Sahel, indicating the possible benefits and dangers of implementing multiple plans of action at once. One of the key factors in the implementation of the UNISS, as noted in the UN Support Plan for the Sahel, is avoiding inefficiency as a result of too many actors attempting to solve the same issues without coordinating their efforts. Delegates should read this brief as a primer for their research on regional partnerships and cooperation, as it provides valuable insight into the issues surrounding UNISS implementation.

Permanent Secretary of the G5 Sahel. (2018). *The G5 Sahel* [Website]. Retrieved 12 September 2018 from: <http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/qui-sommes-nous/le-g5-sahel>

This website is a useful source of information on the G5 Sahel, offering information on the organization's activities, goals, and mandate. Since its founding, the G5 for the Sahel has become an influential actor in the region. With the creation of its joint security force (FC-G5S), the G5 Sahel has taken an even more pivotal role in peacekeeping operations, and has been recognized and operationalized by the UN Security Council. This website contains all necessary information on the functions and aims of the G5

³⁷¹ OECD, Gender Inequality in West African Social Institutions, *West African Papers No. 13*, 2018, pp. 14-17.

³⁷² UNOWAS, *United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel: the UN Strengthens its Commitments*, 2017; UN DPI, *Africa's Sahel must be a top priority for UN peacebuilding efforts, says commission*, 2019.

³⁷³ UN DPI, *Ending Vicious Cycle of Sahel Terrorism, Crisis Hinges on Mobilizing Joint Action, Resources, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Peacebuilding Commission*, 2017.

³⁷⁴ UN OCHA, *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements*, 2018, p. 3.

³⁷⁵ UN DPI, *Ending Vicious Cycle of Sahel Terrorism, Crisis Hinges on Mobilizing Joint Action, Resources, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Peacebuilding Commission*, 2017.

Sahel, and delegates should familiarize themselves with this IGO and its connections to the UN when looking to engage a regional approach to implementing the UNISS.

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2017, December 13). *Ending Vicious Cycle of Sahel Terrorism, Crisis Hinges on Mobilizing Joint Action, Resources, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Peacebuilding Commission (DSG/SM/1121-PBC/125)* [Meetings Coverage]. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/dsgsm1121.doc.htm>

This meeting coverage bulletin features a statement given by UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed when she spoke before the PBC on the topic of the Sahel. This statement coincides with the release of the UN Support Plan for the Sahel, the updated addendum to the UNISS which outlines the mission's most recent objectives. Her statement succinctly explains the shift in focus from the mission's original goals and offers information regarding prospective partnerships between the UN, IGOs, CSOs, and development banks. Delegates should understand the shift toward the inclusion of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement in UNISS, and these remarks provide a thorough explanation of this development.

United Nations, General Assembly, Seventieth Session. (2015). *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)* [Resolution]. Retrieved 25 July 2018 from: <https://undocs.org/A/RES/70/1>

The SDGs should be the starting point of any research on the implementation of UN peacebuilding strategies. These 17 goals are the focal point of the UN system's current work, especially with the increasing prominence of system-wide implementation strategies. In regards to the UNISS, the strategic goals of the Sahel mission have been reassessed and recalibrated to align more seamlessly with the SDGs wherever applicable. Delegates should be familiar with SDGs which apply to the new UN Support Plan for the Sahel, specifically goals 2, 5, 7, 13, and 16, as these goal influence the aims of the PBC in their planning for UNISS.

United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018). *Sahel 2018: Overview of Humanitarian Needs and Requirements* [Report]. Retrieved 2 August 2018 from: <https://rowca.egnyte.com/dl/fSQ0TrN4BF>

This report released by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provides an assessment of the humanitarian situation on the ground in the Sahel. While the strategic goals of the UNISS may be more rooted in governance and security, the real impact of the situation in the Sahel is the humanitarian crisis that has resulted. This report provides key statistics regarding the needs of the people of the Sahel, from food insecurity information to informed estimates of the fund required to address this insecurity. Delegates should be mindful of the humanitarian issue at hand, as well as the need for peace and security that is explored in this document.

United Nations, Office for West Africa and the Sahel. (2018). *UN Support Plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel* [Report]. Retrieved 9 July 2018 from: https://unowas.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_summary_report_0.pdf

This report summary was presented at the thirty-first summit of the African Union in June of 2018. The support plan was drafted by the UNOWAS in order to highlight key focus areas for prosperity in the region. These include increasing cross-border cooperation, preventing conflict, creating inclusive growth, addressing climate change, promoting renewable energy, and empowering women and youth. This report highlights the most recent strategies for creating resilience and stability in the region, looking beyond peacekeeping operations and including implementation of the SDGs. Delegates will need to have a thorough understanding of this recalibrated set of goals in order to begin their research on implementing the UNISS.

United Nations, Security Council, 6952nd Meeting. (2013). *Mali (S/RES/2100 (2013))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 7 July 2018 from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2100\(2013\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2100(2013))

This document established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which subsumed the former United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM). MINUSMA was tasked with discharging the tasks of UNOM, as well as the conditions of its own mandate. This document lists that mandate in full by outlining the specific goals and expected outcomes of MINUSMA going forward, which include stabilizing key population centers, establishing and promoting state authority, protecting civilian and UN personnel, and supporting humanitarian assistance. Given the newly forged partnership between the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and MINUSMA, delegates will benefit from a thorough understanding of MINUSMA and its mandate.

United Nations, Security Council. (2013). *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)*. Retrieved 7 July 2018 from: <https://undocs.org/S/2013/354>

During the aftermath of the 2012 outbreak of the conflict in Mali, this Report of the Secretary-General was drafted upon the request of the Security Council in order to implement an integrated strategy for the Sahel region, encompassing the issues of security, governance, development, and human rights. The resulting UNISS, which is an annex to this resolution, outlines three overarching goals that address inclusive and effective governance, security mechanisms to address cross-border threats, and the integration of humanitarian and development plans to build resilience. Delegates should familiarize themselves with these three “pillars” of the UNISS as they begin to consider how to implement the strategies.

United Nations, Security Council, 7979th Meeting. (2017). *Peace and security in Africa (S/RES/2359 (2017))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 7 July 2018 from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2359\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2359(2017))

This Security Council resolution formally welcomes the deployment of the Joint Force of the G5 for the Sahel (FC-G5S), a major development in the peacekeeping process in the region. This document officially establishes the Security Council’s support for the FC-G5S and outlines its desire to support cooperation with UN operations in the region, including MINUSMA and UNOWAS. Delegates should utilize this document as an example of the way in which UN entities can partner with regional authorities in a fruitful manner, mitigating redundancies and overlap in responsibility by coordinating efforts.

United Nations, Security Council. (2018). *Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (S/2018/649)*. Retrieved 7 July 2018 from: <https://undocs.org/S/2018/649>

This is the most recent Secretary-General report regarding the Sahel, and it includes a wide array of information regarding events in specific Member States, the actions of non-state actors such as Boko Haram, and a section on the implementation of UNISS. Given that the UNOWAS is predominantly concerned with topics related to peacebuilding and development in the region, any and all reports on the office’s activities should prove beneficial when determining what has been done and what still needs to be accomplished. The section regarding the implementation of UNISS will be particularly useful to delegates, as it is the most recent UN documented update on the topic.

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