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Security Council Background Guide 2026

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2026 National Model United Nations New York Conference (NMUN•NY)! We are pleased to introduce you to our committee, the Security Council (SC). Your committee's work is facilitated by volunteer staffers. This year's committee staff are: Director Matthias Burtscheidt and Assistant Director Hanzade Aslan (Conference A), and Director Eli La Ronde and Assistant Director Gabriel Wilson (Conference B). Matthias holds a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and Sociology and is currently finishing his Master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy at Trier University. Hanzade is currently pursuing a Master's in Human Factors Engineering at Wright State University and has a background in Industrial and Systems Engineering. Eli is a Master of Business Administration candidate at Duke University and has a background in people operations and project management. Gabriel is currently pursuing his B.S. of Political Science at Florida State University and will be graduating in May 2026. The preparation of these materials was supported by Under-Secretaries-General Alexandra Bogdasarow (Conference A) and Aemin Becker (Conference B).

The topics on the agenda for this committee are:

1. Strengthening Maritime Security through International Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea
2. The Role of Sanctions in Maintaining International Peace and Security

This Background Guide serves as an introduction to the topics for this committee. However, it is not intended to replace individual research. We encourage you to explore your Member State's policies in depth and use the bibliography to further your knowledge on these topics. In preparation for the conference, each delegation should submit a Position Paper by 11:59 PM ET on 1 March 2026 in accordance with the guidelines in the [Position Paper Guide](#) and the [NMUN•NY Position Papers website](#).

Two resources, available to download from the NMUN website, serve as essential instruments in preparing for the Conference and as a reference during committee sessions:

- The [NMUN Delegate Preparation Guide](#), which explains each step in the delegate process, from pre-conference research to the committee debate and resolution drafting processes. Please take note of the information on plagiarism, and the prohibition on pre-written working papers and resolutions.
- The [NMUN Rules of Procedure](#), which includes the long and short form of the rules, as well as an explanatory narrative and example script of the flow of procedure.

In addition, please review the mandatory [NMUN Conduct Expectations](#) on the NMUN website. They include the conference dress code and other expectations of all attendees. We want to emphasize that any instances of sexual harassment or discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, age, or disability will not be tolerated. If you have any questions concerning your preparation for this committee, please contact the Deputy Secretaries-General at dsg.ny@nmun.org.

We wish you all the best in your preparations and look forward to seeing you at the Conference!

Matthias Burtscheidt, Director
Hanzade Aslan, Assistant Director
Conference A

Eli La Ronde, Director
Gabriel Wilson, Assistant Director
Conference B




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United Nations System at NMUN•NY

This diagram illustrates the United Nations system simulated at NMUN•NY. It shows where each committee “sits” within the system to demonstrate the reportage and relationships between entities. Examine the diagram alongside the Committee Overview to gain a clear picture of the committee’s position, purpose, and powers within the United Nations system.





Committee Overview

Introduction

The Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations defined by the *Charter of the United Nations* (Charter) (1945).¹ The Security Council seeks to maintain international peace and security and oversees changes to the Charter.² As the Security Council is the only United Nations body that can create legally-binding decisions for all Member States under Chapter VII of the Charter, it has a unique and impactful mandate to set norms and govern state actions.³ Traditionally, the Security Council discusses issues related to conflict, peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, the protection of human rights, disarmament, and humanitarian crises.⁴ With the adoption of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (2030 Agenda) by the General Assembly in 2015, the Security Council has begun to increasingly focus on the intersection between sustainability, peace, and security.⁵

Mandate, Function, and Powers

The mandate of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security, and to take action whenever peace and security are threatened.⁶ The council's authority is particularly relevant with respect to the UN's four primary purposes, as specified in the Charter: maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; cooperating in solving international problems; and promoting respect for human rights.⁷ The capabilities of the Security Council are highlighted in Chapters V-VIII of the Charter.⁸ Chapter V establishes the structure, membership, functions, and powers of the Security Council.⁹ Chapters VI and VII specifically address the range of actions that the Security Council can take when settling disputes.¹⁰ Chapter VI aims to settle disputes through peaceful means, such as negotiation and judicial settlement.¹¹ Chapter VII explores further actions that can be taken regarding threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.¹² This chapter also authorizes the Security Council to implement provisional measures aimed at de-escalating conflict situations, including the deployment of peacekeeping forces and sanctions.¹³ Chapter VIII allows the Security Council to call upon other regional agencies or arrangements to enforce appropriate operations and intervene if necessary.¹⁴

While the following list is not exhaustive, the mandate of the Security Council can be summarized as:

¹ United Nations, Security Council. *What is the Security Council?* N.d.

² Ibid.

³ United Nations Conference on International Organization. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945. ch. VII.

⁴ Council on Foreign Relations. *The UN Security Council*. 2021; Encyclopedia Britannica. *United Nations Security Council*. 2023.

⁵ United Nations, General Assembly. *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*. 2015.

⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *What is the Security Council?* N.d.

⁷ United Nations Conference on International Organization. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945. art. 1.

⁸ Ibid. ch. V-VIII.

⁹ Ibid. ch. V.

¹⁰ Ibid. ch. VI-VII.

¹¹ Ibid. ch. VI.

¹² Ibid. ch. VII.

¹³ Ibid. ch. VII.

¹⁴ Ibid. ch. VIII.



- The Security Council **will generally**: make policy recommendations that are conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security; call on Member States to apply economic sanctions and measures not involving the use of force; call for arms embargos, enforce disarmament, and call upon international judicial mechanisms to become active; use diplomatic tools to investigate situations that might lead to aggression (between states, non-state groups, and within state territories); authorize military action against states or entities threatening international peace and security.¹⁵
- The Security Council **will not generally**: intervene in situations and enact enforcement measures unless a threat to international peace and security can be determined; encourage the use of force unless it considers that implemented non-military measures have proven inadequate.¹⁶

Governance, Funding, and Structure

The Security Council is the only United Nations body that has the power to adopt legally binding resolutions, as Article 25 of the Charter obligates Member States to accept and carry out the Council's decisions.¹⁷ The Security Council also has a variety of other tools to address issues on its agenda.¹⁸ For example, the President of the Security Council may issue press statements or presidential statements to communicate the council's position.¹⁹ Although not legally binding, such statements are used to bring attention to important issues and to recommend solutions to ongoing conflicts.²⁰

The Security Council was initially composed of five permanent members and six non-permanent members.²¹ In 1965, the number of non-permanent members was increased to 10.²² As the body's structure has remained largely unchanged, debates over the Security Council's efficacy and authority as a mediator on issues of international security continue.²³ The five permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, often colloquially referred to as the "P5".²⁴ Every year, the General Assembly elects five of the 10 non-permanent members for a two-year term.²⁵

Every Member State of the Security Council has one vote.²⁶ Votes on all matters (substantive votes) require affirmative votes of nine Member States rather than a simple majority.²⁷ However, if one of the five permanent members of the Security Council casts a negative vote on a matter of substance, such as a

¹⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Functions and Powers*. N.d.

¹⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*. N.d.

¹⁷ United Nations Conference on International Organization. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945. Art. 25; United Nations, Security Council. *What is the Security Council?* N.d.

¹⁸ Security Council Report. *The UN Security Council Handbook: A User's Guide to Practice and Procedure*. 2019. pp. 36-38.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ United Nations, Security Council. *Voting System*. N.d.

²² Global Policy Forum. *Background on Security Council Reform*. 2021.

²³ Council on Foreign Relations. *The UN Security Council*. 2021.

²⁴ United Nations, Security Council. *Current Members*. N.d.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ United Nations Conference on International Organization. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945. art. 27.

²⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *Voting System*. N.d.



draft resolution, it does not pass.²⁸ This is known as a “veto”.²⁹ In the 1950s, Security Council Member States made frequent use of their capacity to veto, but its usage declined in the 1960s, rising again in the 1970s and 1980s.³⁰ In the last decades, the use of the veto power has been comparatively rare.³¹ In recent years, the Security Council has adopted many resolutions by consensus and has been divided in relatively few circumstances.³²

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Security Council Report. *In Hindsight: The Veto*. 2013; Security Council Report. *The Permanent Members and the Use of the Veto: An Abridged History*. 2013.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.



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1. Strengthening Maritime Security through International Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea

Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea encompasses between 16 and 20 coastal and associated states, depending on geographic definitions, that rely heavily on maritime trade to transport over 5 million barrels of oil daily and sustain millions of livelihoods in fishing, offshore services, and shipping.³³ The region stretches approximately 6,000 kilometers along the Atlantic coast from Senegal to Angola.³⁴ It contains an estimated 4.5% of the world's proven oil reserves and 2.7% of global gas reserves, making it vital not only to global energy security but also to the coastal states bordering the Gulf of Guinea, where safe maritime routes are essential for importing and exporting goods, driving economic growth, and supporting broader socio-political stability.³⁵ Approximately 1,500 commercial and artisanal vessels operate in the Gulf of Guinea each day, reinforcing its strategic maritime importance.³⁶ According to the European Union (EU), maritime security encompasses the enforcement of international and national laws at sea, safeguarding freedom of navigation, defending citizens, infrastructure, the environment, and marine resources, as well as efforts to counter threats such as piracy, armed robbery, trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.³⁷ In the Gulf of Guinea, challenges to maritime security also intersect with unresolved maritime boundary disputes and overlapping jurisdiction claims, complicating surveillance efforts and cooperation among neighboring states.³⁸

The Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime regions in the world, accounting for the majority of global crew kidnappings and piracy incidents according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).³⁹ IMB reports that in 2020, the Gulf of Guinea accounted for 95% of all 135 global crew kidnappings and 81 piracy and armed robbery incidents.⁴⁰ Though piracy events in the Gulf of Guinea have decreased, dropping from 35 in 2021 to 18 in 2024, the region was responsible for all 12 global crew kidnappings and nearly 25% of seafarers held hostage worldwide.⁴¹

Although the frequency of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea has decreased, other forms of maritime crime remain persistent, imposing severe economic and political costs that undermine state authority and weaken long-term development.⁴² These crimes include IUU fishing, oil bunkering, and trafficking.⁴³ According to the EU Institute for Security Studies, IUU fishing accounts for 40 to 65% of total catch

³³ European Union Institute for Security Studies. *Deep Waters: The Maritime Security Landscape in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025. pp. 3-4.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 4.

³⁵ Atlantic Council. *Atlantic Piracy: Current Threats and Maritime Governance in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025. pp. 2-3.

³⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *UNODC Strategy 2021–2025*. 2021. p. 21.

³⁷ European Union. *EU Maritime Security Strategy*. 2023. p. 3.

³⁸ United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. *Maritime Boundary Delimitation in West Africa: A Case Study of Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria*. 2024. pp. 4-6.

³⁹ Inter Regional Coordination Centre International Maritime Bureau. *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*. 2024. pp. 5-6.

⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 7-9.

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 3-4.

⁴² United Nations, Security Council. *Situation of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its Underlying Causes (S/2022/818)*. 2022. pp. 2-3.

⁴³ Ibid. p. 5.



volume in some coastal countries, costing the region up to USD 10 billion annually in lost revenue.⁴⁴ Simultaneously, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and narcotics transit routes continue to exploit weak maritime surveillance and porous borders.⁴⁵ A 2022 Security Council report estimated that the direct and indirect costs of piracy total \$1.9 billion annually across affected countries.⁴⁶ These losses stem from elevated insurance premiums, rerouted shipping lanes, delayed cargo, and reduced investor confidence.⁴⁷ Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone, and other small coastal nations face disproportionately high maritime insurance rates (up to 40% higher than the global average) alongside already-strained public budgets due to persistent maritime insecurity.⁴⁸

Transnational maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea surpass the jurisdiction and enforcement capacity of individual states, requiring coordinated regional and international responses.⁴⁹ Criminal networks exploit weak naval capabilities, legal inconsistencies, and fragmented interagency coordination.⁵⁰ Overlapping mandates among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) further complicate unified efforts.⁵¹ Beyond undermining local economic growth and governance, persistent maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea also disrupts global supply chains and has become an international imperative that demands action.⁵²

International and Regional Framework

The *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS) (1982) defines the rights and responsibilities of Member States in regulating maritime zones, navigation, resource usage, and environmental protection.⁵³ UNCLOS establishes key maritime zones, including territorial seas, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones, within which states exercise sovereign rights to explore, exploit, and conserve natural resources in accordance with national law.⁵⁴ Beyond these limits, Article 86 defines the High Seas as open to use by all states, whether coastal or landlocked.⁵⁵ Under Article 92, ships operating on the High Seas are subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the state under whose flag they sail.⁵⁶ Article 94 further obliges the flag state to exercise effective jurisdiction and control

⁴⁴ European Union Institute for Security Studies. *Deep Waters: The Maritime Security Landscape in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025. p. 6.

⁴⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*. 2013. pp. 26-27.

⁴⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *Situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes (S/2022/818)*. 2022. p. 9.

⁴⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. *Review of Maritime Transport*. 2023. pp. 45-47

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 46.

⁴⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *UNODC Strategy 2021–2025*. 2021. pp. 18-19.

⁵⁰ United Nations, Security Council. *Peace and security in Africa (Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea) (S/RES/2634)*. 2022. p. 2.

⁵¹ International Maritime Organization. *Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa*. 2013. pp. 2-3.

⁵² Atlantic Council. *Atlantic Piracy: Current Threats and Maritime Governance in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025. pp. 2-3; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Report: Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States*. 2021.

⁵³ United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. *The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective)*. 2024.

⁵⁴ United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. 1982. p. 43.

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 57.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 58.



over its vessels.⁵⁷ Article 105 grants all states the universal right to seize or board pirate ships and to prosecute those found aboard, whether on the High Seas or “in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”⁵⁸

International frameworks emphasize that effective maritime security relies on multilateral cooperation, legal harmonization, and capacity-building among Member States.⁵⁹ The *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (2015) outlines 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).⁶⁰ SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) encourages international collaboration, including joint maritime surveillance, information sharing, and enforcement partnerships.⁶¹ The *Pact for the Future* (2024), adopted by General Assembly resolution 79/1 under the same title, addresses institutional governance gaps relevant to maritime security.⁶² The resolution aims to reinforce UNCLOS and address threats to maritime security through enhanced capacity-building and information-sharing mechanisms among states, as well as by focusing on root-causes related to a lack of development and peace in coastal countries which contribute to illicit activities.⁶³

Regionally, African Member States have adopted several frameworks to strengthen maritime security and governance.⁶⁴ In 2013, ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC adopted the *Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa* (Yaoundé Code of Conduct).⁶⁵ The Code establishes cooperative mechanisms to align maritime security policies with national laws and improve regional coordination.⁶⁶ Complementing this initiative, African Union Member States adopted the *African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa* (Lomé Charter) in 2016.⁶⁷ The Lomé Charter provides a legal and institutional framework to promote maritime safety, environmental protection, and sustainable economic development, including through enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA).⁶⁸ MDA is defined as the capability to detect and respond to criminal activity within national maritime jurisdictions.⁶⁹ The Lomé Charter outlines governance issues relevant to maritime cooperation, such as institutional and financial reform, sustainable development, and peace and security.⁷⁰ Implementation of these frameworks has been hindered by limited financial resources, capacity gaps, and legal inconsistencies among states.⁷¹

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 58.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 61.

⁵⁹ International Maritime Organization. *Maritime Security in West and Central Africa*. N.d.

⁶⁰ United Nations, General Assembly. *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*. 2015.

⁶¹ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *Goal 17: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development*. N.d.

⁶² United Nations, General Assembly. *The Pact for the Future (A/RES/79/1)*. 2024. p. 17.

⁶³ Ibid. p. 17.

⁶⁴ International Maritime Organization. *Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa*. 2013.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ International Maritime Organization. *Maritime Security in West and Central Africa*. N.d.

⁶⁷ African Union. *African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter)*. 2016.

⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 14.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 14.

⁷⁰ United Nations, General Assembly. *The Pact for the Future (A/RES/79/1)*. 2024. p. 17.

⁷¹ ACCORD. *Cooperation as a Tool for Enhancing State Capacity to Fulfill Obligations of the Lomé Charter*. 2017.



Role of the International System

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Security Council coordinate international efforts to combat maritime crime in cooperation with Member States.⁷² IMO supports initiatives such as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct by strengthening port security capacity and advising Member States on revising national legislation to criminalize piracy, armed robbery at sea, and other illicit activities in the High Seas.⁷³ The Security Council has adopted several resolutions addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.⁷⁴ Security Council resolution 2018 (2011) on “Peace and security in Africa” recognizes piracy as a threat to international peace and security, and urges collective action to strengthen regional capacity and infrastructure.⁷⁵ Security Council resolution 2039 (2012) on “Peace consolidation in West Africa” welcomes the steps taken by ECOWAS and ECCAS to counter piracy while emphasizing the need for greater international assistance and addressing the underlying socioeconomic and governance factors contributing to maritime insecurity.⁷⁶ A decade later, Security Council resolution 2634 (2022) on “Peace and security in Africa (Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea)” reiterated the call for cooperation between Member States, and international and regional organizations to ensure adequate legal and operational support for building capacity, countering piracy and armed robbery, and prosecuting suspected pirates.⁷⁷

The EU supports coastal states in West and Central Africa through programs that enhance maritime governance, law enforcement capacity, and compliance with international security standards.⁷⁸ These efforts typically involve funding programs addressing port, cyber, and maritime security, criminal justice prosecution, and IUU fishing.⁷⁹ For instance, the Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network aims to improve MDA and inter-state communication among 19 countries.⁸⁰ The EU’s West and Central Africa Port Security program assists ports in meeting International Ship and Port Facility Security standards and strengthening preparedness for potential attacks or explosions.⁸¹ In addition, the Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security program received an initial allocation of EUR 28 million to reinforce regional law enforcement networks, improve evidence collection, and provide training for investigators, prosecutors, and judges.⁸²

ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC are central actors in advancing maritime security across the region.⁸³ Together, these organizations jointly oversee the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and its maritime security architecture.⁸⁴ This architecture is broken into two coordination centers, the West African Regional Maritime Security Centre and the Central African Regional Maritime Security Centre, which coordinate

⁷² International Maritime Organization. *Maritime Security and Piracy*. N.d.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ United Nations, Security Council. *Peace and security in Africa (Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea) (S/RES/2634)*. 2022.

⁷⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Peace and security in Africa (S/RES/2018)*. 2011.

⁷⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *Peace consolidation in West Africa (S/RES/2039)*. 2012.

⁷⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *Peace and security in Africa (Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea) (S/RES/2634)*. 2022. p. 3.

⁷⁸ European External Action Service. *EU Maritime Security Factsheet: Gulf of Guinea*. 2021.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security (SWAIMS)*. 2024.

⁸³ Inter Regional Coordination Centre. *Yaoundé Architecture*. 2025.

⁸⁴ Ibid.



with national maritime authorities to facilitate intelligence sharing and joint maritime operations.⁸⁵ The Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC) provides oversight and ensures cooperation between the two centers and among Member States.⁸⁶ GGC serves as a diplomatic forum that enables dialogue and coordination among coastal states on responses to maritime security challenges, such as piracy and other illicit activities.⁸⁷ Under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, ECCAS also supports joint operations and focuses on improving communication and information exchange between Member States to enhance collective responses to maritime crime.⁸⁸

Combating Incidents of Criminal Maritime Activity

Reporting and geographic patterns of crime have shifted, as incidents of piracy have decreased.⁸⁹ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) attributes part of this decline to higher rates of piracy convictions and increased naval patrols and law enforcement activity across the region.⁹⁰ The IMB's reporting also documents fewer successful hijackings and abductions in recent years while noting sustained levels of smaller-scale armed robbery and incidents that endanger seafarers.⁹¹ Implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct has also strengthened regional cooperation, information sharing, and coordinated naval responses among West and Central African States, contributing to improved interdiction and responses in several maritime corridors.⁹² In particular, Nigeria has increased its naval presence and patrols, corresponding with a displacement of some criminal activity to neighbouring waters.⁹³ Nevertheless, UNODC reporting indicates that a substantial share of reported incidents remains concentrated in Central African States belonging to ECCAS, representing a persistent regional vulnerability.⁹⁴ Furthermore, criminal maritime activities such as IUU fishing, drug and arms trafficking, migrant smuggling, and maritime environmental crimes remain prominent issues.⁹⁵

To improve national responses, Member States have established multi-agency task forces and technical working groups to design national maritime security frameworks.⁹⁶ Ghana's National Maritime Security Technical Working Group brought together government agencies and ministries to draft an integrated maritime security strategy.⁹⁷ The strategy's principles include national ownership, accountability, and stakeholder inclusion, and its objectives focus on legal reform, institutional coordination, and

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Member States of the Gulf of Guinea Commission to Deepen Collaboration*. 2024.

⁸⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *Ongoing Decline in Gulf of Guinea's Piracy, Armed Robbery Encouraging, But Support Needed to Fully Implement Yaoundé Architecture, Briefers Tell Security Council*. 2023.

⁸⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Explainer - What is Maritime Crime?*. 2025.

⁹⁰ Inter Regional Coordination Centre International Maritime Bureau. *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*. 2024. p. 18.

⁹¹ Ibid. p. 18.

⁹² United Nations, Security Council. *Situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes (S/2022/818)*. 2022. p. 12.

⁹³ Ibid. p. 3.

⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 3.

⁹⁵ European Union Institute for Security Studies. *Deep Waters: The Maritime Security Landscape in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025. p. 6.

⁹⁶ Ali et al. *Developing a Comprehensive National Integrated Maritime Strategy: The Case of Ghana*. 2022. p. 1.

⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 5.



capacity-building.⁹⁸ According to the Center for Maritime Law and Security Africa, Ghanaian authorities validated the importance of broad stakeholder inputs, including from civil society and the private sector, to ensure the strategy is implementable and adaptive to changing maritime threats.⁹⁹ At the regional level, ECOWAS Member States have participated in coordinated operations under the umbrella of “Operation Safe Domain,” employing aerial and naval surveillance, information sharing, and rapid interdiction to target maritime criminal networks.¹⁰⁰

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct is widely credited with improving cooperation and operational coordination in the Gulf of Guinea, but leaders and United Nations bodies note persistent obstacles to full operationalization.¹⁰¹ Fragmented national responses, limited harmonization of domestic legislation, and low investment in maritime security capacity slow implementation and reduce regional resilience against crimes such as IUU fishing.¹⁰² The EU Institute for Security Studies estimates that IUU fishing contributes to annual economic losses of \$10 billion in the region, a drain that undermines fisheries-based livelihoods and reduces state capacity to fund enforcement.¹⁰³ An ICC assessment similarly highlights corruption, logistical and operational shortcomings, and legal gaps as barriers that hinder prosecutions and reduce deterrence for maritime crimes.¹⁰⁴ The report outlines that these challenges, coupled with corruption, operational challenges, and legal gaps, create an unstable environment with no repercussions for committing crimes.¹⁰⁵ ICC further stresses that these structural challenges can aggravate coastal poverty and high youth unemployment, creating conditions in which criminal networks recruit young people and complicating how states treat and prosecute minors.¹⁰⁶

Child involvement in maritime crime raises legal and protection issues.¹⁰⁷ Unlike child soldiering, the legal status of child involvement in piracy and related offences is less explicitly codified, creating divergence in prosecution and protection practices among states.¹⁰⁸ Referring to the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (MACR) under national law and obligations under the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* (1989) (UNCRC), complications can arise when MACR-based prosecution practices conflict with UNCRC principles on welfare and rehabilitation.¹⁰⁹ Regional and international practitioners recommend clearer national legislation and increased capacity for child-sensitive investigations, diversion, and rehabilitation to avoid punitive outcomes that contravene child protection norms.¹¹⁰

⁹⁸ Ibid. pp. 5-6.

⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 9-10.

¹⁰⁰ Lionel. Military Africa. *ECOWAS Strengthens Maritime Security with Operation Safe Domain III*. 2024.

¹⁰¹ United Nations, Security Council. *9355th Meeting (S/PV.9355)*. 2022. p. 2.

¹⁰² Africa Centre of Excellence in Coastal Resilience, University of Cape Coast. *Addressing IUU Fishing in the Gulf of Guinea through Effective Training, Fisheries Management and Climate*. 2013.

¹⁰³ European Union Institute for Security Studies. *Deep Waters: The Maritime Security Landscape in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations, Department of Global Communications, *Piracy, Armed Robbery Declining in Gulf of Guinea, But Enhanced National, Regional Efforts Needed for Stable Maritime Security, Top Official Tells Security Council*. 2022.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Whitman et. al. *Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: Children and Youth in Marine Piracy - Causes, Consequences and the Way Forward*. 2012. p. 17.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 11.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 9.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 9.



The Security Council has addressed maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea through a series of resolutions and assessments that emphasize both repression and the need to address root causes.¹¹¹ Security Council resolution 2018 recognized piracy as a threat to peace and security in Africa and requested the Secretary-General to assess the state of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.¹¹² Addressing this, the United Nations Mission Assessment on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea identified underlying drivers of piracy in the region such as youth unemployment, income disparity, and corruption and supported addressing the root causes of these drivers to resolve these issues.¹¹³ Building on that assessment, Security Council resolution 2039 called for strengthened prosecution and repression measures and endorsed the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as an appropriate regional response.¹¹⁴ Security Council resolution 2634 urged Member States to harmonize domestic legal frameworks and enhance cooperation, shifting emphasis toward integrated responses that combine legal reform, capacity-building, and information-sharing.¹¹⁵

Threats to the Stability of Regional Supply Chains and Local Economies

The Gulf of Guinea serves as a major maritime corridor for the export of oil, gas, and agricultural products, connecting Africa to markets in Europe and the Americas.¹¹⁶ Its coastal economies depend heavily on seaborne trade, making them highly exposed to disruptions caused by maritime criminal activity.¹¹⁷ Crimes such as piracy, smuggling, and IUU fishing increase transport and insurance costs, discourage foreign direct investment (FDI), and reduce competitiveness across regional ports.¹¹⁸ Recent analysis by the Belgian Royal Higher Institute for Defence notes that persistent insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea has made it a focal point of maritime risk, prompting insurers to classify it as a high-risk area and influencing global shipping routes and costs.¹¹⁹ According to the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, vessels operating in Nigeria are burdened with war-risk insurance surcharges of approximately USD 445,000 per voyage for large crude oil tankers and USD 525,000 per voyage for a large container ship, despite significant decreases in regional piracy incidents.¹²⁰ According to UNODC, such costs directly burden regional supply chains that move crude oil, refined petroleum, and containerized goods, increasing prices for imported goods and reducing global competitiveness.¹²¹ UNODC further warns that diminished investment in logistics and port infrastructure constrains

¹¹¹ Boamah. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies. *The Role of the UN Security Council in the Fight Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2023.

¹¹² United Nations, Security Council. *Peace and security in Africa (S/RES/2018)*. 2011. p. 3; Boamah. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies. *The Role of the UN Security Council in the Fight Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2023.

¹¹³ Ibid; United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the United Nations assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (S/2012/45 (2012))*. 2012. p. 20.

¹¹⁴ Boamah. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies. *The Role of the UN Security Council in the Fight Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2023.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Internal Journal of Advanced Academic Research. *Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and the Quest for Security Intelligence Deployment in Combating the Menace*. 2020.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Matsunaga. Ships & Ports. *Gulf of Guinea Piracy Discouraging Trade, Foreign Investment — Envoy*. 2022.

¹¹⁹ Van Hövell. Royal Higher Institute for Defence. *The Gulf of Guinea at the Heart of an Unavoidable Maritime Trade Route*. 2025.

¹²⁰ Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency. *NIMASA's crusade to end war risk insurance premiums to save Nigeria over \$400 billion annually*. N.d.

¹²¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Report: Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea: A Cost Analysis for Coastal States*. 2021. p. 64.



employment creation and industrial diversification in coastal economies that already face high youth unemployment.¹²²

The cumulative economic effect of maritime insecurity across the Gulf of Guinea is significant.¹²³ UNODC estimates that forgone FDI and trade losses exceed USD 2 billion annually, while the Atlantic Council notes that sustained risk premiums have slowed port expansion and shipping-sector modernization.¹²⁴ For example, 80% of Benin's customs revenue is generated at the Port of Cotonou which represents about 40% of state revenue, though maritime security downgrades by insurers in 2013 led to a 28% loss in government revenue.¹²⁵ According to the Atlantic Council, ongoing maritime security risks, despite decreased regional criminal activity, have eroded investor confidence in regional Member States, including Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire.¹²⁶ Research from the International Journal of Strategic Research in Education, Technology, and Humanities identifies direct causal links between piracy and higher operating costs for energy and port services in southern Nigeria, which erodes fiscal space for essential public investment.¹²⁷ The Atlantic Council further stresses that the resulting uncertainty weakens Member States' ability to fund sectors such as oil and gas production and port rehabilitation, perpetuating dependence on commodity exports and external financing.¹²⁸ Analysts also highlight that supply chain fragility and high transport costs contribute to inflationary pressures in regional food and consumer markets, compounding social vulnerability.¹²⁹

Recognizing these economic repercussions, external partners such as the EU have expanded cooperation with regional organizations and national authorities, including IMO, ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC.¹³⁰ The EU's CRIMJUST program, implemented in partnership with UNODC, promotes cross-border cooperation against organized crime.¹³¹ In 2024, CRIMJUST assisted the Judicial Police of Guinea-Bissau in seizing 2.63 tonnes of cocaine.¹³² Later in 2024, CRIMJUST helped coordinate *Operation Gran Fénix 18 Bianga*, which dismantled a cocaine network linking Ecuador, Europe, and the Gambia and resulted in multiple arrests and the seizure of 3.1 tonnes of narcotics.¹³³ The European Commission expressed that these efforts illustrate how international partnerships can help stabilize trade routes, enhance the rule of law, and gradually restore investor confidence across the Gulf of Guinea.¹³⁴

¹²² Ibid. p. 26.

¹²³ Amani Africa. *Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2022.

¹²⁴ Ibid; Atlantic Council. *Atlantic Piracy: Current Threats and Maritime Governance in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025.

¹²⁵ Ben-Ari. United Nations, Africa Renewal. *Piracy in West Africa: A Bumpy Road to Maritime Security*. 2013.

¹²⁶ Atlantic Council. *Atlantic Piracy: Current Threats and Maritime Governance in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025.

¹²⁷ Abimiku et al. *Effect of Piracy on Maritime Insecurity in South-South Nigeria*. 2023. p. 10.

¹²⁸ Atlantic Council. *Atlantic Piracy: Current Threats and Maritime Governance in the Gulf of Guinea*. 2025.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ European External Action Service. *EU Maritime Security Factsheet: Gulf of Guinea*. 2021.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² European Commission. *Global Collaboration Against Organised Crime Secures Major Wins*. 2024.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ European Commission. *Global Collaboration Against Organised Crime Secures Major Wins*. 2024.



Conclusion

Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, driven by piracy, armed robbery, trafficking, IUU fishing, and oil theft, continues to threaten peace, development, and lawful maritime order.¹³⁵ Although piracy incidents have declined since 2020, criminal activity has shifted in form rather than disappeared.¹³⁶ These threats impose significant costs on the region, including economic disruptions, weakened state authority, and reduced investment confidence.¹³⁷ International frameworks such as UNCLOS and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct provide essential legal and institutional structures for response.¹³⁸ Regional and international actors, including ECOWAS, ECCAS, IMO, and EU, contribute to regional capacity building, enforcement coordination, and legislative support.¹³⁹ However, structural challenges persist, including jurisdictional fragmentation, under-resourced navies, and enforcement gaps.¹⁴⁰ Recent initiatives, such as Security Council resolution 2634 and the *Pact for the Future*, emphasize the need for multilateral cooperation, regional ownership, and sustainable development approaches to maritime security.¹⁴¹

Further Research

As delegates conduct further research, they should consider: How is your Member State affected by threats to international security in the Gulf of Guinea? How has your Member State previously engaged with UNCLOS, and how does it interpret provisions related to jurisdiction and enforcement in international waters? How is your Member State affected by or contributes to issues like IUU fishing, oil theft, or maritime trafficking? How do unresolved maritime boundaries influence cooperation on shared security challenges in the region? What development or peacebuilding strategies could address the root causes of maritime crime, including poverty, unemployment, and limited access to services? How can national support for capacity building such as investment in training, surveillance, or port security, and partnerships with organizations like the EU, IMO, or African Union help contextualize a country's role in strengthening maritime governance?

¹³⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Situation of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its Underlying Causes (S/2022/818)*. 2022.

¹³⁶ Inter Regional Coordination Centre International Maritime Bureau. *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*. 2024.

¹³⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. *Maritime Policy*. 2014.

¹³⁸ International Maritime Organization. *Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa*. 2013; United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. 1982.

¹³⁹ European Union Institute for Security Studies. *Deep Waters*. 2025.

¹⁴⁰ United Nations, Security Council. *Peace and security in Africa (Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea) (S/RES/2634)*. 2022

¹⁴¹ United Nations, General Assembly. *The Pact for the Future (A/RES/79/1)*. 2024.



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2. The Role of Sanctions in Maintaining International Peace and Security

Introduction

With Article 41 of the *Charter of the United Nations* from 1945, the United Nations Security Council is authorized to decide on and employ measures not involving armed force against Member States or individuals after determining a threat to international peace and security.¹⁴² While the term “sanctions” is not explicitly mentioned, the article lays the foundation for international intervention by the Security Council or Member States to implement non-violent measures and thus prevent an escalation of conflict.¹⁴³ According to Article 41, examples of measures can include interrupting economic relations as well as various forms of travel and communication, or severing diplomatic relations.¹⁴⁴ All of these are specific examples of measures that fall under the concept of international sanctions.¹⁴⁵

Within the United Nations, sanctions are understood as measures encompassing a wide range of enforcement options not involving the use of armed force.¹⁴⁶ Sanctions constitute one of the most important tools for conflict prevention and management within the Security Council’s mandate.¹⁴⁷ In addition to those mentioned in Article 41, the most common measures of United Nations sanctions also include arms embargos, freezing of assets, or travel bans.¹⁴⁸ Sanctions of the Security Council can be categorized under five main principal objectives: conflict resolution, (nuclear) non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, protection of civilians (including human rights), and democratization.¹⁴⁹ Further, most sanctions regimes get special designation criteria established by the Security Council to categorize their measures.¹⁵⁰ These designation criteria include for example: threats to peace, security, or stability, obstruction of humanitarian aid, or violations of human rights.¹⁵¹

United Nations sanctions have been imposed within various regional contexts and conflicts over time.¹⁵² The Security Council first applied voluntary sanctions against the apartheid regimes of South Africa in 1963 and Southern Rhodesia in 1965, which were later transformed into mandatory sanctions.¹⁵³ The use of sanctions was limited during the Cold War era, but since the 1990s, sanctions have been imposed more frequently.¹⁵⁴ Also the scale and focus of sanctions have been changing in recent years, with all newly imposed sanctions since 2004 being targeted with a strategic focus on certain groups or

¹⁴² United Nations Conference on International Organization. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Sanctions*. N.d.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Huvé et al. United Nations University. *Enforcing UN Sanctions and Protecting Humanitarian Action. Towards a Coherent and Consistent Approach*. 2022. p. 8.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 4.

¹⁴⁹ Security Council Report. *UN Sanctions. Special Research Report*. 2013. pp. 3-5.

¹⁵⁰ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 5.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Security Council Report. *UN Sanctions. Special Research Report*. 2013. p. 3.

¹⁵³ United Nations, Security Council. *Question relating to the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa(S/RES/181 (1963))*. 1963; United Nations, Security Council. *Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia (S/RES/232 (1966))*. 1966; Security Council Report. *UN Sanctions. Special Research Report*. 2013. p. 3.

¹⁵⁴ Security Council Report. *UN Sanctions. Special Research Report*. 2013. p. 3.



individuals.¹⁵⁵ Further, in recent decades, Security Council sanctions have had a strong focus on measures of counter-terrorism.¹⁵⁶ This focus can be seen in the unanimous establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) with Security Council resolution 1373 on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” from 2001.¹⁵⁷ In total, the Security Council has established 31 sanction regimes, 14 of which are still present in 2025.¹⁵⁸ Currently, over 1,000 individuals and entities are listed on the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, the catalogue of persons who have been subject to individual sanctions by the council.¹⁵⁹

The sanctions imposed by the Security Council can have different strategies and work in different ways, depending on the individual context.¹⁶⁰ In general, there are three main categories of purposes for sanctions: Coerce, Constrain, and Signal.¹⁶¹ Coercive sanctions try to force a change of behavior through economic or political costs.¹⁶² Constraining sanctions limit the ability to engage in prohibited activities by limiting resource access.¹⁶³ Signaling sanctions try to signal international norms and stigmatize targets and actions of the sanctioned party.¹⁶⁴ Sanctions regimes can focus on one, two, or all three categories simultaneously.¹⁶⁵ Comparing the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions, the signaling function is usually the most successful one.¹⁶⁶ However, of all sanctions regimes since 1991, only 39% of measures have been considered effective.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, the United Nations is trying to increase the effectiveness of sanctions by applying them as part of a comprehensive peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategy.¹⁶⁸

International and Regional Framework

Drawn from the general prohibition of the use of violence under Article 2(4), Chapter VII of the *Charter of the United Nations* defines the Security Council's power to address threats to international peace and security including the ability to institute sanctions.¹⁶⁹ As a tool to ensure international peace and security, the Security Council has used sanctions to ensure compliance with several key documents of international law.¹⁷⁰ These include for example the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) and the *Geneva Conventions* (1949), which constitute the foundation of international human rights and the

¹⁵⁵ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 4.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*; United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373 (2001))*. 2001.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373 (2001))*. 2001.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. pp. 4-5; United Nations, Security Council. *Sanctions*. N.d.

¹⁵⁹ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. pp. 4-5.

¹⁶⁰ United Nations, Department of Global Communications. *Core elements*. 2023.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ United Nations, Department of Global Communications. *Effectiveness*. 2023.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *Sanctions*. N.d.

¹⁶⁹ United Nations Conference on International Organization. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*



principles of humanitarian law.¹⁷¹ Further, the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) from 1968 and the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* from 1992 forbid the production and use of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷² In 1994, the General Assembly adopted the *Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*, a landmark consensus in which Member States condemned all acts of terrorism as unjustifiable and committed to combating and preventing terrorism through international cooperation.¹⁷³ All of these foundational documents lay the groundwork of international and human rights law, and the Security Council can impose measures on Member States that fail to comply with the obligations of international treaties.¹⁷⁴

With Security Council resolution 253 (1966) on the “Question concerning the Situation in Southern Rhodesia,” the Council imposed its first mandatory sanctions in response to the apartheid regime in Rhodesia, marking a significant precedent of targeting a specific Member State.¹⁷⁵ Further, the Security Council has promoted international peace and security through ensuring non-proliferation, with sanctions regimes established by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) on “Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea” and 1737 (2006) on “Non-proliferation” which addressed the Islamic Republic of Iran.¹⁷⁶ The dire humanitarian conditions exacerbated by the sanctions regime on Iraq established by Security Council resolution 661 (1990) on “The situation between Iraq and Kuwait”, along with a 1995 letter from the five permanent members to the president of the Security Council addressing the unintended humanitarian impact of sanctions contributed to the transition from comprehensive sanctions to targeted sanctions in the 2000s.¹⁷⁷ After the subsequent resolution 1483 (2003) lifted the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq in favor of targeted sanctions, all following United Nations sanctions regimes have utilized targeted sanctions.¹⁷⁸ General Assembly resolution 60/1 on “2005 World Summit Outcome” called on the Security Council to improve implementation of sanctions regimes and effectively monitor them to ensure they achieve their goals of maintaining international peace and security.¹⁷⁹ Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) on “General issues relating to sanctions” created the first universal humanitarian exemption to asset freezes.¹⁸⁰ In its 57th Session in 2024, the Human Rights Council pointed out a potential need for additional frameworks regarding unilateral sanctions implemented

¹⁷¹ United Nations, General Assembly. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (A/RES/217 (III) (1948)). 1948; *Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field*. 1949.

¹⁷² United Nations, General Assembly. *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (A/RES/2373 (XXII)). 1968; United Nations, Conference on Disarmament. *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (A/47/27). 1992.

¹⁷³ United Nations, General Assembly. *Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism* (A/RES/49/60 (1994)). 1994.

¹⁷⁴ United Nations, Security Council. *Sanctions*. N.d.

¹⁷⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Question concerning the Situation in Southern Rhodesia* (S/RES/253 (1966)). 1966.

¹⁷⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *Non-proliferation / Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (S/RES/1718(2006)). 2006. p. 1; United Nations, Security Council. *The Situation Concerning Iran* (S/RES/1737(2006)). 2006.

¹⁷⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *The situation between Iraq and Kuwait* (S/RES/661 (1990)). 1990.

¹⁷⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *The situation between Iraq and Kuwait* (S/RES/1483 (2003)). 2003.

¹⁷⁹ United Nations, General Assembly. *2005 World Summit Outcome* (A/RES/60/1 (2005)). 2005.

¹⁸⁰ United Nations, Security Council. *General issues relating to sanctions* (S/RES/2664 (2022)). 2022.



by regional bodies or individual Member States outside of current Security Council frameworks.¹⁸¹ Currently, the United Nations only addresses one instance of unilateral sanctions, the United States' embargo on Cuba, which the General Assembly has voted to end each year since 1992.¹⁸²

Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts" marked a key step as the focus of United Nations sanctions was shifting towards counter-terrorism.¹⁸³ The resolution attempted to clarify the fragmented understanding of terrorism through the promotion of an international definition.¹⁸⁴ Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Security Council established the CTC through the subsequent resolution 1373 to aid Member States in the fight against terrorism through international cooperation.¹⁸⁵ This resolution also signified a shift in the Security Council's behavior against terrorism from reactive to proactive governance by imposing internationally binding obligations.¹⁸⁶ Security Council resolution 1636 (2005) on "The situation in the Middle East" established targeted sanctions in Lebanon in response to the 2005 Beirut bombing that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister.¹⁸⁷ The Security Council has also established targeted sanctions against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and ISIL.¹⁸⁸

Role of the International System

The most important actor dealing with sanctions within the United Nations system is the Security Council, as it decides and imposes sanctions on states, groups and individuals, and others.¹⁸⁹ The Security Council establishes Sanctions Committees for each sanction regime to manage and implement the sanctions as reaffirmed in resolution 1276 (1999) on "The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait," which highlights the role of the committees overseeing targeted sanctions regimes.¹⁹⁰ Currently, there are 14 sanctions committees existing.¹⁹¹ The Security Council established the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions (IWG) in 2000 which provided a framework to monitor the implementation, effectiveness, and impact of sanctions regimes to assess and improve the implementation of sanctions

¹⁸¹ United Nations, Human Rights Council. *57th Session of the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/2024 (2024))*. 2024.

¹⁸² United Nations, General Assembly. *Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/RES/79/7 (2024))*. 2024.

¹⁸³ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373 (2001))*. 2001.

¹⁸⁴ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1566 (2004))*. 2004. p. 2.

¹⁸⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373 (2001))*. 2001.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *The situation in the Middle East (S/RES/1636 (2005))*. 2005

¹⁸⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1988 (2011))*. 2011; United Nations, Security Council. *The situation in the Middle East (S/RES/1636 (2005))*. 2005; United Nations, Security Council. *The situation in Afghanistan (S/RES/1267 (1999))*. 1999; United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1989 (2011))*. 2011.

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 4.

¹⁹⁰ United Nations, Security Council. *The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait (S/RES/1276 (1999))*. 1999.

¹⁹¹ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 4.



regimes that remained active until the end of its mandate in 2006.¹⁹² After IWG's mandate ended, its mechanisms were used in the succeeding sanctions regimes through the creation of expert groups and panels.¹⁹³ These expert groups support the work of the Sanctions Committees by investigating violations and reporting regularly on the implementation and impact of sanctions to their respective Sanctions Committees, who then report to the Security Council.¹⁹⁴ The members of these expert groups are independent specialists, recruited and managed by the Security Council Affairs Division.¹⁹⁵ In 2024, Security Council resolution 2744 on "General issues relating to sanctions" re-established the IWG.¹⁹⁶

The CTC monitors the sanctions implementation by Member States, these sanctions include criminalizing the financing of terrorism, freezing terrorist assets, denying terrorist safe havens, and cooperating by sharing information.¹⁹⁷ Security Council resolution 1535 (2004) on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts" reformed the CTC through the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which assesses the Member States' counter-terrorism capabilities and how they can increase their likelihood of success in the fight against terrorism.¹⁹⁸ CTC and CTED foster international collaboration through communication, support Member States through shared resources, and address new and emerging threats.¹⁹⁹ CTED also enhanced counter-terrorism monitoring across the United Nations by adopting more technical methodologies and shifting the approach from political to methodological.²⁰⁰ As part of the counter-terrorism struggle, Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) made a significant effort to create an international definition of actions that are considered as terrorism.²⁰¹ The Security Council defined actions that are classified under terrorism as criminal acts intended to cause serious injury or death or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.²⁰² Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, the Security Council's modern technique in counter-terrorism is one of a rule-based, technical, international response, which is aided by this international understanding.²⁰³

Other international institutions and specialized agencies are also responsible for implementing and overseeing the Security Council sanction regimes.²⁰⁴ The International Criminal Police Organization

¹⁹² United Nations, Security Council. *Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2000/319 (2000))*. 2000. p. 1.

¹⁹³ Security Council Report. *UN Sanctions. Special Research Report*. 2013. pp. 6-7

¹⁹⁴ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 4.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *General issues related to sanctions (S/RES/2744 (2024))*. 2024.

¹⁹⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373 (2001))*. 2001.

¹⁹⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1535 (2004))*. 2004.

¹⁹⁹ United Nations, Security Council, Counter-Terrorism Committee. *About Us*. N.d.

²⁰⁰ United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1535 (2004))*. 2004.

²⁰¹ Ibid. p. 2.

²⁰² United Nations, Security Council. *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1566 (2004))*. 2004.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 4.



supports cooperation and information sharing amongst law enforcement to track terrorists.²⁰⁵ Financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Society of Worldwide Financial Telecommunication assist in enforcing financial sanctions globally.²⁰⁶ The World Customs Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and International Maritime Organization help implement travel bans and monitor international transportation.²⁰⁷ The Inter-Agency Working Group on United Nations Sanctions aids implementation of sanctions by coordinating efforts across United Nations bodies and other agencies to improve effectiveness, address any challenges of implementation as well as any new challenges.²⁰⁸ When applicable, United Nations related agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons oversee sanctions related to weapons of mass destruction, focusing on nuclear and chemical weapons.²⁰⁹ Regional organizations, such as the African Union and European Union, also cooperate to support the Security Council's sanctions regimes.²¹⁰

Effectiveness of Sanctions in Maintaining Peace

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations defines the Security Council's mandate to maintain international peace and security through peace enforcement mechanisms.²¹¹ The Security Council views sanctions as an effective alternative to peacekeeping missions when implemented diligently and supported thoroughly by Member States.²¹² To ensure the success of sanctions, they need to be established following clear objectives and they should not be tools of punishment.²¹³ The effectiveness of sanctions in maintaining international peace and security relies heavily on continuous monitoring, auditing, and enforcement methods to ensure achievement of their objectives, as well as ensuring they don't cause unintended harm.²¹⁴ To this end, Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) on "The Situation in Afghanistan" was a milestone that established a system to track sanction violations and report them to the appropriate sanctions committee through the use of monitoring groups and information sharing.²¹⁵ Security Council resolution 1587 (2005) on "The Situation in Côte d'Ivoire" reinforced the monitoring of arms embargos to prevent a flow of weapons in conflict areas.²¹⁶ Security Council resolution 1854 (2008) on "The Situation in Liberia" emphasized the importance of monitoring the effectiveness of sanctions by monitoring Member States' implementation of the sanctions as well as the activities of sanctioned

²⁰⁵ International Criminal Police Organization. *Terrorism*. 2025.

²⁰⁶ Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. *Swift and Sanctions*. 2025; International Monetary Fund. *The IMF and The Fight Against Illicit Financial Flows*. 2023; World Bank Group. *Office of Suspension and Debarment*. 2025.

²⁰⁷ International Maritime Organization. *ICAO, IMO, and WCO chiefs strengthen ties in promoting global supply chain security*. 2013.

²⁰⁸ IDN-InDepthNews. *Security Council Debates Effectiveness of UN Sanctions*. 2017.

²⁰⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency. *Basics of IAEA Safeguards*. 2025; United Nations, Conference on Disarmament. *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (A/47/27)*. 1992. pp. 147-148.

²¹⁰ African Union. *Press Release. AUC Chairperson's statement in support of End of Sanctions against the Republic of Zimbabwe*. 2024.

²¹¹ United Nations Conference on International Organization. *Charter of the United Nations*. 1945.

²¹² United Nations, Department of Global Communications. *Full Support of Member States Key to Effective Sanctions Regimes, Assistant Secretary-General Tells Security Council*. 2017.

²¹³ *Ibid*.

²¹⁴ United Nations, Security Council. *The Situation in Afghanistan (S/RES/1363 (2001))*. 2001.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*.

²¹⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *The Situation in Côte d'Ivoire (S/RES/1587 (2005))*. 2005.



entities.²¹⁷ Current sanctions monitoring and enforcement mechanisms can still be improved, as seen by the monitoring team established for the sanctions on Al-Qaeda and ISIL pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015) on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”²¹⁸ Despite asset freezes and travel bans, members of terrorist groups successfully find ways to travel and finance their operations.²¹⁹

The Security Council has effectively used sanctions to foster peace in many situations, including preventing the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.²²⁰ In response to the advancement of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the Security Council implemented targeted sanctions through Security Council resolution 1737.²²¹ The Security Council sanctions regarding nuclear development, financial trade, and transportation of goods against Iran eventually became a key factor in negotiations between Iran and other states, which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.²²² The JCPOA ensured Iran’s compliance with the NPT and cooperation with the IAEA, and resulted in the Security Council removing sanctions on Iran through Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) after the implementation of JCPOA.²²³ In contrast to the success of the Iran sanctions regime, the strict arms, goods, and travel sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) established by Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) have been unsuccessful in preventing the advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, according to the Panel of Experts.²²⁴ Sanctions on the DPRK began to unravel in 2022 when the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China vetoed new Security Council sanctions in response to the continued advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear program.²²⁵ Additionally, the Russian Federation vetoed the 2024 Security Council resolution extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts for the 1718 sanctions committee, ending official monitoring of DPRK sanctions implementation.²²⁶

The Humanitarian Concerns of Sanctions Regimes

Article 25 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.”²²⁷ The Security Council first recognized the hardships faced by Member States because of comprehensive sanctions regimes with Security Council resolution 327 (1973) on “The situation in Southern Rhodesia” in the

²¹⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *The Situation in Liberia (S/RES/1854 (2008))*. 2008.

²¹⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *Note by the President of Security Council (S/2025/482 (2025))*. 2025. pp. 1, 19-20.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, *Security Council Briefing on the Evolution of United Nations Sanctions, Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman*. 2014.

²²¹ United Nations, Security Council. *Non-proliferation (S/RES/1737 (2006))*. 2006.

²²² United Nations, Security Council. *Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) (S/2015/401 (2015))*. 2015.

²²³ United Nations, Security Council. *Non-proliferation (S/RES/2231 (2015))*. 2015.

²²⁴ United Nations, Security Council. *Note by the President of Security Council (S/2024/215 (2024))*. 2024. p. 4.

²²⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea draft resolution (S/2022/431 (2022))*. 2022.

²²⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (S/2024/255 (2024))*. 2024.

²²⁷ United Nations, General Assembly. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (A/RES/217A (III) (1948))*. 1948.



context of Zambia's struggle to comply with the sanctions on their trading partner, Southern Rhodesia.²²⁸ Further, Security Council resolution 661 (1990) and the comprehensive sanctions regime against Iraq in response to their 1990 invasion of Kuwait resulted in dire humanitarian conditions for the Iraqi people.²²⁹ Therefore, the Security Council would permanently shift away from comprehensive sanctions, such as the full economic embargo placed on Iraq, to targeted sanctions in the 2000s.²³⁰ The sanctions on Iraq created a humanitarian crisis that saw Iraq's GDP fall by nearly two thirds from their implementation to 1999.²³¹ From 1989 to 1997, the maternal mortality rate in Iraq more than doubled, and the mortality rate of children under five more than tripled.²³² According to the World Health Organization, the available kilocalories of food per person decreased by 65% after the implementation of the sanctions on Iraq.²³³ The situation in Iraq in the 1990s also raised many concerns from humanitarian aid organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the dire effects of economic restrictions on the civilian population.²³⁴ The Security Council attempted to address the humanitarian consequences associated with the Iraqi sanctions regime through the "oil for food" program established by resolution 986 (1995) on "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait," which created a humanitarian relief program financed by allowing Member States to import limited amounts of oil from Iraq.²³⁵ The cap on allowed oil imports from Iraq was removed by the Security Council in 1999.²³⁶ The "oil for food" program helped to prevent the worsening of the humanitarian situation in Iraq.²³⁷ After the Security Council removed the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq, the Security Council exclusively shifted its focus to targeted sanctions regimes.²³⁸

Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) attempted to further reform United Nations sanctions by allowing humanitarian exemptions to asset freezes applying to all 14 active sanctions regimes, but several other factors still contribute to the increasing humanitarian concerns associated with sanctions.²³⁹ Sanctions that target important sectors of a Member State's economy, such as a central bank, can have a comprehensive effect by harming the Member State's economy as a whole.²⁴⁰ Similarly, overcompliance further blurs the line between comprehensive and targeted sanctions when a private entity chooses to avoid business with a sanctioned Member State, eliminating the risk of accidental non-compliance by

²²⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *The situation in Southern Rhodesia (S/RES/327 (1973))*. 1973.

²²⁹ United Nations, Security Council. *The situation between Iraq and Kuwait (S/RES/661 (1990))*. 1990; United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) (S/2023/658 (2023))*. 2023. p. 2.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 1227 (1999) (S/1999/356 (1999))*. 1999. p. 35.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Popal. Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal. *Impact of Sanctions on the Population of Iraq*. 2000. p. 3.

²³⁴ Al Samaraie. International Review of the Red Cross. *Humanitarian implications of the wars in Iraq*. 2007. pp. 5, 11.

²³⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *The situation between Iraq and Kuwait (S/RES/986 (1995))*. 1995.

²³⁶ United Nations, Security Council. *The situation between Iraq and Kuwait (S/RES/1284 (1999))*. 1999.

²³⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 1227 (1999) (S/1999/356 (1999))*. 1999. p. 39.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ United Nations, Security Council. *General issues relating to sanctions Maintenance of International Peace and Security (S/RES/2664 (2022))*. 2022.

²⁴⁰ United Nations Children's Fund. The Office of Global Insight and Policy. *Sanctions and Their Impact on Children*. 2022. p. 10.



treating the targeted sanctions as comprehensive.²⁴¹ Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization advocating for human rights, echoed these concerns in Iran and Syria, where broad sanctions and overcompliance impacted people's rights to goods and services as well as post-conflict development.²⁴² Lastly, the aggregate effect of unilateral sanctions in combination with each other or with United Nations sanctions can have a comprehensive effect, as seen in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where inflation jumped by over 30% from 2018, when the United States of America pulled out of the JCPOA in favor of additional unilateral sanctions, to 2021.²⁴³ Currently, United Nations monitoring of the impact of unilateral sanctions is nearly non-existent.²⁴⁴

Targeted sanctions, or the threat thereof, have effectively promoted better humanitarian conditions in several cases since their adoption.²⁴⁵ The threat of United Nations sanctions has resulted in the release of children by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.²⁴⁶ Additionally, Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) on "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan" addressed human rights abuses in Darfur, Sudan by implementing an arms embargo that remains active to this day.²⁴⁷ However, targeted sanctions still carry the risk of worsening humanitarian situations.²⁴⁸ According to the 2023 Global Humanitarian Overview, over one third of the 339 million people in need of humanitarian assistance live in sanctioned countries.²⁴⁹ In the DPRK, according to the panel of experts established by Security Council resolution 1718, United Nations sanctions have played a role in the worsening humanitarian conditions, a fact cited by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation in defense of their vetoes on tightening sanctions on the DPRK in 2022.²⁵⁰

Conclusion

Sanctions can be one of the most powerful instruments of the United Nations Security Council.²⁵¹ If applied within a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy, they can be a crucial tool for conflict management and prevention of further escalation.²⁵² However, this efficiency of measures is often lacking,

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Human Rights Watch. *US, EU, UK: Lift Syria Sanctions Hindering Recovery*. 2025; Human Rights Watch. *"Maximum Pressure". US Economic Sanctions Harm Iranians' Right to Health*. 2019.

²⁴³ United Nations Children's Fund. The Office of Global Insight and Policy. *Sanctions and Their Impact on Children*. 2022. p. 10.

²⁴⁴ United Nations, Human Rights Council. *Monitoring and assessment of the impact of unilateral sanctions and overcompliance on human rights (A/HRC/57/55 (2024))*. 2024.

²⁴⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) (S/2023/658 (2023))*. 2023. p. 3.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ United Nations, Security Council. *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/RES/1591 (2005))*. 2005.

²⁴⁸ United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) (S/2023/658 (2023))*. 2023. p. 2.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ United Nations, Security Council. *Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2022/668 (2022))*. 2022. p. 79; United Nations, Department of Global Communications. *General Assembly Holds Landmark Debate on Security Council's Veto of Draft Test Aimed at Tightening Sanctions Against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*. 2022.

²⁵¹ Huvé et al. United Nations University. *Enforcing UN Sanctions and Protecting Humanitarian Action. Towards a Coherent and Consistent Approach*. 2022. p. 8.

²⁵² Ibid.



demonstrating the importance of using sanctions as part of a comprehensive strategy.²⁵³ As part of such a strategy, sanctions can support peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations and contribute to preventing further violence, for example by limiting access to resources.²⁵⁴ However, it is also evident that sanctions can have unintended humanitarian impacts on the population of sanctioned countries.²⁵⁵ Therefore, the Security Council shifted the focus of sanctions regimes in the past decades towards a strategic targeted approach.²⁵⁶ Making sure sanctions work effectively and without negative humanitarian effects is the main challenge the United Nations has to face.²⁵⁷ This will be necessary to keep sanctions an effective peacebuilding tool supporting the maintenance of international peace and security.²⁵⁸

Further Research

As delegates conduct further research and consider how to address this topic, they should consider: In what scenarios can sanctions be a reasonable measure? How can sanctions be applied to work more efficiently? What circumstances and context-specific characteristics must be taken into account? What institutional or practical barriers obstruct and hinder the impacts of sanctions? How can existing processes in the Security Council be improved to make sanctions more efficient? How can sanctions support peacekeeping efforts? Are sanctions a sustainable peacebuilding tool? How can the Security Council ensure that sanctions do not have negative humanitarian effects? How can the effectiveness and side effects of sanctions be measured?

²⁵³ United Nations, Department of Global Communications. *Effectiveness*. 2023; United Nations, Security Council. *Sanctions*. N.d.

²⁵⁴ United Nations, Department of Global Communications. *Full Support of Member States Key to Effective Sanctions Regimes, Assistant Secretary-General Tells Security Council*. 2017.

²⁵⁵ United Nations, Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) (S/2023/658 (2023))*. 2023. p. 2.

²⁵⁶ United Nations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council, Fact Sheets*. 2023. p. 4.

²⁵⁷ Huvé et al. United Nations University. *Enforcing UN Sanctions and Protecting Humanitarian Action. Towards a Coherent and Consistent Approach*. 2022. p. 8.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.



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