Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2024 National Model United Nations New York Conference (NMUN•NY)! We are pleased to introduce to you our committee, the Security Council (SC). Your committee’s work is facilitated by volunteer staffers. This year’s committee staff are: Director Aemin Becker (Session 1), and Director Pauline Bischoff (Session 2). Aemin holds a Master's degree in International Security from Sciences Po and two Bachelor’s degrees from the University of New Haven. She currently works in consulting at Booz Allen Hamilton. Pauline is currently pursuing a degree in Musical Theatre in Bavaria, Germany, and holds a B.A. in Social Sciences.

A portion of these materials was authored by Charlotte Gerdes, Director of Conference Management, and Shaun Martinez, Assistant Director of Conference Management. Charlotte Gerdes is currently pursuing her Master's degree in International Organizations and Crisis Management at FSU Jena after having completed her Bachelor's in Arabic Studies. Shaun Martinez has a background in Political Science and Advertising and is a freelance copywriter, photographer, and videographer who currently produces social media content and coaches students at his local boxing gym. The preparation of these materials was supported by Under-Secretaries-General Maike Weitzel (Session 1) and Martin Schunk (Session 2).

The topics on the agenda for this committee are:
1. The Situation in Sudan and South Sudan
2. Conflict and Food Security

This Background Guide serves as an introduction to the topics for this committee. However, it is not intended to replace individual research. We encourage you to explore your Member State’s policies in depth and use the bibliography to further your knowledge on these topics. In preparation for the conference, each delegation should submit a Position Paper by 11:59 p.m. ET on 1 March 2023 in accordance with the guidelines in the Position Paper Guide and the NMUN•NY Position Papers website.

Two resources, available to download from the NMUN website, serve as essential instruments in preparing for the Conference and as a reference during committee sessions:

- The NMUN Delegate Preparation Guide, which explains each step in the delegate process, from pre-conference research to the committee debate and resolution drafting processes. Please take note of the information on plagiarism, and the prohibition on pre-written working papers and resolutions.
- The NMUN Rules of Procedure, which includes the long and short form of the rules, as well as an explanatory narrative and example script of the flow of procedure.

In addition, please review the mandatory NMUN Conduct Expectations on the NMUN website. They include the conference dress code and other expectations of all attendees. We want to emphasize that any instances of sexual harassment or discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, age, or disability will not be tolerated. If you have any questions concerning your preparation for this committee, please contact the Deputy Secretaries-General at dsg.ny@nmun.org.

We wish you all the best in your preparations and look forward to seeing you at the Conference!

Aemin Becker, Director
Session 1

Pauline Bischoff, Director
Session 2
# Table of Contents

**United Nations System at NMUN-NY** ............................................................... 4

**Committee Overview** ........................................................................................................ 5
  - Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5
  - Mandate, Functions, and Powers ....................................................................................... 5
  - Governance, Structure, and Membership ......................................................................... 6

1. **The Situation in Sudan and South Sudan** ................................................................. 8
  - Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 8
  - International and Regional Framework ............................................................................ 9
  - Role of the International System ..................................................................................... 11
  - Combating Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan and South Sudan ....................... 13
  - The Humanitarian Situation in Sudan and South Sudan .................................................... 15
  - Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 17
  - Further Research ............................................................................................................ 17

2. **Conflict and Food Security** ....................................................................................... 24
  - Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 24
  - International and Regional Framework ............................................................................ 25
  - Role of the International System ..................................................................................... 26
  - The Impact of Armed Conflict on Food Security and Food Systems ............................... 27
  - Addressing Food Insecurity as a Driver of Conflict ......................................................... 29
  - Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 31
  - Further Research ............................................................................................................ 31
This diagram illustrates the United Nations system simulated at NMUN•NY. It shows where each committee “sits” within the system to demonstrate the reportage and relationships between entities. Examine the diagram alongside the Committee Overview to gain a clear picture of the committee’s position, purpose, and powers within the United Nations system.
Committee Overview

Introduction

The Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations defined by the Charter of the United Nations (Charter) (1945). The Security Council seeks to maintain international peace and security and oversees changes to the United Nations Charter. As the Security Council is the only United Nations body that can create legally-binding decisions for all Member States under Chapter VII of the Charter, it has a unique and impactful mandate to set norms and govern state actions. Traditionally, the Security Council discusses issues related to conflict, peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, the protection of human rights, disarmament, and humanitarian crises. With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) by the General Assembly in 2015, the Security Council has begun to increasingly focus on the intersection between sustainability, peace, and security.

Mandate, Functions, and Powers

The mandate of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security and to take action whenever peace and security are threatened. The council’s authority is particularly relevant with respect to the UN’s four primary purposes, as specified in the Charter of the United Nations: maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; cooperating in solving international problems; and promoting respect for human rights. The capabilities of the Security Council are highlighted in Chapters V-VIII of the Charter. Chapter V establishes the structure, membership, functions, and powers of the Security Council. Chapters VI and VII specifically address the range of actions that the Security Council can take when settling disputes. Chapter VI aims to settle disputes through peaceful means, such as negotiation and judicial settlement. Chapter VII explores further actions that can be taken regarding threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. This chapter also authorizes the Security Council to implement provisional measures aimed at de-escalating conflict situations, including the deployment of peacekeeping forces and sanctions. Chapter VIII allows the Security Council to call upon other regional agencies or arrangements to enforce appropriate operations and intervene if necessary.

While the following list is not exhaustive, the mandate of the Security Council can be summarized as:

- The Security Council will generally: make policy recommendations that and conducize to the maintenance of international peace and security; call on Member States to apply economic sanctions and measures not involving the use of force; call for arms embargos, enforce disarmament, and call upon international judicial mechanisms to become active; use diplomatic tools to investigate situations that might lead to

---

2 Ibid.
8 Ibid. ch. V-VIII.
9 Ibid. ch. V.
10 Ibid. ch. VI-VII.
11 Ibid. ch. VI.
12 Ibid. ch. VII.
13 Ibid. ch. VII.
14 Ibid. ch. VIII.
aggression (between states, non-state groups, and within state territories); authorize
military action against states or entities threatening international peace and security.\textsuperscript{15}

- The Security Council \textbf{will not generally}: intervene in situations and enact enforcement
measures unless a threat to international peace and security can be determined;
encourage the use of force unless it considers that already taken non-military
measures have proven inadequate.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Governance, Structure, and Membership

The Security Council is the only United Nations body that has the power to adopt legally binding
resolutions, as article 25 of the Charter obligates Member States to accept and carry out the council's
decisions.\textsuperscript{17} The Security Council also has a variety of other tools to address issues on its agenda.\textsuperscript{18} For
example, the President of the Security Council may issue press statements or presidential statements to
communicate the council's position.\textsuperscript{19} Although not legally binding, such statements are used to bring
attention to important issues and to recommend solutions to ongoing conflicts.\textsuperscript{20}

The Security Council was initially composed of five permanent members and six non-permanent
members.\textsuperscript{21} In 1965, the number of non-permanent members was increased to 10.\textsuperscript{22} As the body's
structure has remained largely unchanged, debates over the Security Council's efficacy and authority as a
mediator on issues of international security continue.\textsuperscript{23} The five permanent members are China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, often colloquially referred to as the "P5."\textsuperscript{24}
Every year, the General Assembly elects five of the 10 non-permanent members for a two-year term.\textsuperscript{25}

Every Member State of the Security Council has one vote. Votes on all matters (substantive votes)
require affirmative votes of nine Member States rather than a simple majority.\textsuperscript{27} However, if one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council casts a negative vote on a matter of substance, such as a
draft resolution, it does not pass.\textsuperscript{28} This is known as a "veto."\textsuperscript{29} In the 1950s, Security Council Member
States made frequent use of their capacity to veto, but its usage declined in the 1960s, rising again in the
1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{30} In the last decades, the use of the veto power has been comparatively rare.\textsuperscript{31} In
recent years, the council has adopted many resolutions by consensus and is divided in relatively few
circumstances.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{16} United Nations, Security Council. \textit{Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
and Acts of Aggression}. N.d.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Global Policy Forum. \textit{Background on Security Council Reform}. 2021.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
Bibliography


1. The Situation in Sudan and South Sudan

Introduction

In April 2023, violence erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), leading to 1,265 deaths and 14,573 people injured as of 7 October 2023. This situation evolved from decades of instability resulting from two civil wars caused by ethnic and religious tensions, scarce resources, the marginalization of specific members of the population, and conflicting political and economic interests. From 1983 to 2005, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA or SPLM/A) fought the Second Sudanese Civil War. This war culminated in the independence of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011. Despite this, the countries remain linked both by regional proximity and through political and economic relationships.

The western Sudanese region of Darfur experienced war from 2003 to 2020. Non-Arab rebel groups, including the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), accused the government of oppressing Darfur’s non-Arab population. These groups fought the Sudanese military (SAF) and the government-backed Janjaweed militia, which evolved into the RSF and committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, including genocide and the use of chemical weapons. Hundreds of thousands died due to armed violence; even after the war’s official end, ethnic tensions and limited access to scarce resources, such as arable land for farming and safe drinking water, led to continued instability and deaths. In 2019, the Sudanese people protested their dire economic situation and demanded democracy and an end to President Al-Bashir’s rule. In a coup d’état, SAF and RSF jointly overthrew Al-Bashir. However, instead of transitioning to democracy and peace, a power struggle ensued between SAF leader Al-Burhan and RSF leader Hemedti. When SAF leader Al-Burhan promised to end the struggle if RSF assimilated into SAF under his leadership, Hemedti led the RSF in an armed uprising that led to the renewal of conflict in April 2023.

Concurrently, disagreements within the SPLM in 2013 led to the outbreak of a civil war in South Sudan until 2020, with a brief halt in the fighting from 2015 to 2016. In 2022, the South Sudanese government’s

34 Kurtz. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. The Spoilers of Darfur. Sudan’s protracted political crisis and the intensifying violence in Darfur are closely connected. 2022.
36 Ibid.
37 Kammel. The relationship between Sudan and South Sudan after independence - Interdependencies as key variables for sustainable peace. 2013.
41 Kurtz. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. The Spoilers of Darfur. Sudan’s protracted political crisis and the intensifying violence in Darfur are closely connected. 2022.
attacks on civilians, political violence, and counter-insurgency campaigns killed both livestock and civilians, causing a humanitarian crisis.47 Severe, prolonged flooding also affected more than one million South Sudanese in 2022, leading to further displacement.48 As of 2022, 9.4 million South Sudanese required humanitarian assistance and 7.8 million are acutely food insecure, with 16.3% of children under 5 years suffering from acute malnutrition and 38.2% from chronic malnutrition.49 Decreased harvests and the ripple effects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, including the expiration of the Black Sea Grain Initiative that ensured food and fertilizers could be supplied from Ukraine, reduced cereal and wheat availability and contributed to rising food prices alongside high inflation since 2022.50

Due to the South Sudanese civil war, localized violence, and resulting instability, more than 2.3 million people fled to other countries, including Sudan.51 In 2021, Sudan hosted more than 1.1 million refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan; as of 6 September 2023, more than 4 million in Sudan are internally displaced persons (IDPs), and over one million have fled or returned to neighboring countries, including South Sudan.52 The 2023 Fragile States Index named Sudan the seventh most fragile state in the world and South Sudan the third most fragile.53 The instability in both countries also contributes to frequent instances of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).54 The United Nations definition of CRSV includes rape, forced prostitution or marriage, sexual violence, and trafficking for the purposes of sexual violence or exploitation.55

**International and Regional Framework**

Signed in 2005 by the Sudanese government and SPLM/A, the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* ended the Second Sudanese Civil War.56 It also included a permanent ceasefire between the SAF and the SPLA, granted autonomy to South Sudan, and provided for South Sudanese representation and participation in the Sudanese government for a six-year interim period.57 After this, a successful referendum resulted in South Sudanese independence.58

When violence erupted in South Sudan in 2013, the first agreements between the government’s ruling party SPLM and the splinter group “SPLM - In Opposition” were the *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities* (2014) and the *Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan* (ARCSS)

---


58 Ibid.
The parties agreed to end military action and protect civilians, but violence did not stop due to distrust caused by deep-seated grievances and disagreement over the allocation of positions and responsibilities. In the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, the parties further agreed to refrain from any acts of sexual violence. In 2018, the parties signed the Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The agreement contained provisions on combating CRSV, decreased violent clashes between government and opposition forces, and led to the formation of a power-sharing transitional government with elections slated to occur in three years, which increased political stability. However, the transitional government has repeatedly postponed elections, most recently until the end of 2024, due to a lack of progress in installing a legal and institutional framework. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) expects this to increase political tensions. Concurrently, local human rights and peace activists expressed concerns about the country's readiness for “free, fair, and peaceful elections,” highlighting the lack of trust in election legitimacy and concerns about potential further violence.

The first major peace effort to end the war in Darfur (2003-2020), the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), was signed by the government and SLM representatives in 2006. The DPA aimed to resolve crucial issues of power- and resource-sharing, security, and displacement but failed to include all rebel groups, renewing violent conflict. The lessons from the DPA shaped the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) (2011), which included a broader coalition of rebel groups. The agreement centered on

68 Ibid.
establishing a ceasefire and power and wealth-sharing issues, but ultimately failed due to political differences and distrust in the lead negotiator, Qatar.\textsuperscript{70} The most recent peace agreement, the \textit{Juba Peace Agreement} (Juba Agreement) (2020), involved the Sudanese government and several Darfur rebel groups of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance.\textsuperscript{71} The agreement included provisions related to increased inclusivity, power-sharing, security arrangements, and transitional justice.\textsuperscript{72} While it effectively ended active fighting in Darfur, not all armed groups are signatories, resulting in ongoing violence between militias.\textsuperscript{73} Amidst the power struggle between SAF and RSF, Darfur remained largely neglected, leaving civilians targeted by militias without state protection.\textsuperscript{74}

In May 2023, the SAF and the RSF signed the \textit{Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan}, committing to respect international humanitarian and human rights law.\textsuperscript{75} Agreement provisions included protecting civilians’ lives, not hindering humanitarian operations, and refraining from torture and inhumane treatment, including sexual violence.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{Role of the International System}

The Security Council passed resolution 1556 (2004) on “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan” in response to the war in Darfur, which condemned human rights abuses and aimed to establish a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{77} The resolution threatened Al-Bashir’s government with economic sanctions should it not disarm the Janjaweed militia because of their mass killings and ethnic cleansing in Darfur and imposed an arms embargo on the Janjaweed and all non-governmental entities.\textsuperscript{78}

In 2004, the African Union (AU) deployed the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), mandated to monitor the implementation of a ceasefire between rebel groups and the Sudanese government.\textsuperscript{79} While initially successful, AMIS faced challenges due to limited funding and authority and was unable to effectively enforce the ceasefire amidst escalating conflict.\textsuperscript{80} Therefore, the Security Council adopted Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) on “Sudan,” which deployed the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in cooperation with the AU Peace and Security Council.\textsuperscript{81} Its mandate was to mediate between the government and armed movements, protect civilians, monitor human rights,


\textsuperscript{71} Chatham House. \textit{Sudan’s Juba Peace Agreement: Ensuring implementation and prospects for increasing inclusivity}. 2020.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{74} Salih. Al-Jazeera. \textit{20 years since war began in Sudan’s Darfur, suffering continues}. 2023; Al-Jazeera. ‘They killed everything’: Darfur survivor recounts deadly attack. 2022.

\textsuperscript{75} United States of America, Department of State. \textit{Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan}. 2023.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

facilitate humanitarian assistance, and support the mediation of inter-communal conflict.\textsuperscript{82} UNAMID lacked support from the Sudanese government; compounded with flaws in the DPA and DDPRD, the mission’s impact on the situation in Darfur was limited.\textsuperscript{83}

The Security Council phased out UNAMID with resolution 2524 (2020) on “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan” and transitioned its responsibilities to a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS).\textsuperscript{84} With President Al-Bashir’s ousting in 2019 and the end of the war in Darfur in 2020, UNITAMS’s mandate changed to assisting Sudan in its political transition by mediating among political actors, protecting human rights, and achieving democratic governance and sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{85} UNITAMS chairs the Permanent Ceasefire Committee for Darfur, ensuring compliance with the Juba Agreement and fostering collaboration among signatories.\textsuperscript{86} Security Council resolution 2685 (2023) on the “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (UNITAMS)” extended the mission’s mandate until 3 December 2023.\textsuperscript{87}

The Security Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with resolution 1996 (2011) on “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan” to protect civilians, create secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, support the peace process after independence and the implementation of the R-ARCSS, and monitor humanitarian and human rights law.\textsuperscript{88} All United Nations field missions are mandated to prevent and respond to CRSV, but UNMISS is one of only a few with a specific Security Council CRSV mandate.\textsuperscript{89} Security Council resolution 2677 (2023) on “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (UNMISS)” extended the mandate of UNMISS until March 2024 and called for progress in the implementation of the R-ARCSS.\textsuperscript{90}

Various United Nations agencies aid in humanitarian crises and human rights protection in Sudan and South Sudan.\textsuperscript{91} The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and OCHA help refugees and IDPs by establishing transit centers, providing food and healthcare, and facilitating onward transportation.\textsuperscript{92} UNHCR’s Khartoum office relocated to Port Sudan after the April 2023 renewal of conflict to ensure employees’ safety.\textsuperscript{93} OCHA works with the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to tackle malnutrition and diseases, and with the International Organization for Migration (IOM)...

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. pp. 3-6.
\textsuperscript{86} United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan. \textit{The Permanent Ceasefire Committee (PCC)}. 2022.
\textsuperscript{87} United Nations, Security Council. \textit{Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (UNITAMS) (S/RES/2685 (2023))}. 2023.
\textsuperscript{90} United Nations, Security Council. \textit{Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (UNMISS) (S/RES/2677 (2023))}. 2023.
\textsuperscript{91} United Nations, Sudan Country Team. \textit{UN Entities in Sudan}. 2023.
\textsuperscript{93} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. \textit{Sudan}. 2023; Alamin et al. \textit{A Red Sea City Becomes a Haven for Refugees From Sudan’s Civil War}. 2023.
to track the number of IDPs and refugees. UNICEF invests in education, offers psychological support for conflict-affected children, and has improved access to clean, potable water reducing the risk of waterborne diseases as part of its Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene interventions. The Human Rights Council conducts the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, which reports on and preserves evidence of gross violations of human rights, allowing information to be collected to hold perpetrators accountable. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), mandated to promote gender equality worldwide, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which promotes sexual and reproductive health, both also operate within South Sudan to provide psychological support to CRSV survivors and raise awareness of CRSV.

Regionally, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an economic community of eight eastern African states, conducts numerous economic and development programs in Sudan and South Sudan, like the Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative. IGAD has been active in peace negotiations concerning Sudan and South Sudan for decades; however, the SAF rejected IGAD mediation efforts between the SAF and RSF in July 2023 due to perceptions of bias towards the RSF. Non-governmental advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International investigate and report on human rights violations in Sudan and South Sudan, such as the arbitrary violence of the Sudan security apparatus and the atrocities in Darfur. The South Sudan non-governmental organization (NGO) Forum, composed of 230 national and 114 international NGOs, aims to respond more effectively to humanitarian and development needs in South Sudan by deepening mutual and collective support and communication.

**Combating Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan and South Sudan**

Continued conflict instigates continued instances of CRSV in both Sudan and South Sudan. According to UNMISS, at least 52 CRSV cases affecting 103 individuals occurred in South Sudan in 2022. Sudan also experiences a high number of CRSV cases; the United Nations Human Rights Office in Sudan has received 21 reports of CRSV incidents impacting at least 57 individuals since the renewal of conflict in April 2023. Various entities within and outside of the United Nations system report that the number of

---

98 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, South Sudan Office. About the Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan. 2023; Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Sudan. 2023;
CRSV cases is likely to increase due to continued conflict.\textsuperscript{105} As of 11 July 2023, the Combating Violence Against Women Unit within Sudan’s Ministry of Social Development had received and verified reports of 97 CRSV cases, which is more than four times higher than the official number recorded and verified by the United Nations Human Rights Office in Sudan.\textsuperscript{106}

The Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reports that CRSV is not only widespread but systematic due to a lack of accountability and prevailing societal norms favoring males.\textsuperscript{107} For instance, a 2022 survey found that 82% of women and 81% of men in South Sudan believe that women should tolerate domestic violence to maintain the stability of their family units.\textsuperscript{108} The commission collaborates alongside UNMISS to combat CRSV through their reports, which increase awareness of CRSV and other human rights abuses within South Sudan and enable entities within and outside of the United Nations to hold perpetrators accountable, including by prosecuting them in courts of law.\textsuperscript{109} Raising awareness helps, as the number of CRSV cases in both countries is estimated as severely underreported due to social stigmas against CRSV victims and the fear of reprisal from perpetrators.\textsuperscript{110} Additionally, reporting, monitoring, and verifying CRSV incidents requires resources that receiving entities often lack.\textsuperscript{111} These challenges persist despite the Framework of Cooperation to Address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (2020), which aimed to address sexual violence, underreporting, and the lack of accountability for CRSV.\textsuperscript{112}

To combat CRSV within South Sudan, the United Nations established the Gender Task Force and Women’s Protection Advisors (WPAs) as part of UNMISS.\textsuperscript{113} The UNMISS Gender Task Force accounts for gender dynamics within conflict and mission analysis, implementation, and reporting, and specifically reports on preventing and protecting individuals from CRSV in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on “Women, Peace, and Security.”\textsuperscript{114} WPAs advise UNMISS on combating CRSV and engage with host country leadership and local organizations.\textsuperscript{115}

Within South Sudan, UN Women collaborates alongside UNFPA in a joint program providing psychological support to CRSV survivors.\textsuperscript{116} Within Sudan, the UN Women’s Peace for Sudan Platform consists of more than 50 Sudanese women-led initiatives and organizations focused on providing support to CRSV survivors.\textsuperscript{117} The platform was formed in response to the April 2023 outbreak in hostilities and

\footnotesize{
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Concern Worldwide. The South Sudan crisis, explained: 5 things you need to know in 2022. 2022.
\textsuperscript{110} Concern Worldwide. The South Sudan crisis, explained: 5 things you need to know in 2022. 2022; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs et al. Sudan: Top UN officials sound alarm at spike in violence against women and girls. 2023.
\textsuperscript{117} United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. In Sudan, women’s organizations fight back against sexual violence in conflict. 2023.
}
consists of organizations from across all regions of Sudan, which facilitates cross-country communication and advocacy and helps organizations access scarce resources and cooperate on specific initiatives, amplifying their effectiveness.\(^\text{118}\) UN Women also works with Sudanese humanitarian organizations to raise awareness, verify reports of CRSV, and refer survivors to support services.\(^\text{119}\) UN Women notes that a persistent difficulty is providing medical support to CRSV victims due to the destruction of medical facilities and critical infrastructure.\(^\text{120}\)

Raising awareness, enhancing prevention and protection, and resolving structural issues all stand as suggested areas to improve combating CRSV.\(^\text{121}\) Amnesty International notes that the 2021 Action Plan for the Armed Forces on Addressing CRSV in South Sudan was ineffective due to low accessibility and thereby low awareness.\(^\text{122}\) UNMISS noted that preventive and protective activities, such as escorting women and girls when entering potentially unsafe areas, have prevented CRSV cases, though these measures are resource-intensive and thus difficult to implement.\(^\text{123}\) Finally, structural challenges such as the inability to access a secure location to report incidents, especially in remote areas, prevent reporting and deny access to protective or medical services.\(^\text{124}\)

**The Humanitarian Situation in Sudan and South Sudan**

As of January 2023, 15.8 million people needed humanitarian assistance in Sudan; that number increased to 24.7 million by May 2023 - more than one-third of Sudan’s population.\(^\text{125}\) Children are among the most impacted, numbering 13.6 million.\(^\text{126}\) Additionally, 17.3 million people in Sudan do not have access to drinking water, and 24 million lack access to proper sanitation, such as bathroom facilities.\(^\text{127}\) Reflecting this, in June 2023 the Security Council called for quick, secure, and unimpeded access to humanitarian aid and expressed concern over the conflict’s impact on bordering countries, which are experiencing a high refugee influx.\(^\text{128}\)

In South Sudan, OCHA reports that levels of food insecurity and malnutrition are the highest since independence.\(^\text{129}\) OCHA’s 2023 South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan highlighted humanitarian access as a key challenge, with 450 humanitarian access incidents and nine humanitarian workers killed in 2022.\(^\text{130}\) In June 2023, 27 humanitarian access incidents occurred, of which 30% prevented operations from completion.\(^\text{131}\) The 2023 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan notes that human rights violations


\(^{120}\) Ibid.


\(^{126}\) Ibid.

\(^{127}\) Ibid.


\(^{129}\) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *South Sudan*. N.d.


have worsened Sudan’s humanitarian crisis and limited access to humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{132} Bureaucratic hurdles within Sudan and South Sudan also hinder the release of aid and limit humanitarian organizations’ operations.\textsuperscript{133} Other challenges include continuous conflict, ongoing violence against humanitarian personnel, and extensive damage to critical infrastructure, which all limit the availability of basic services and access to specific regions.\textsuperscript{134}

OCHA also works with the Humanitarian Coordinator in South Sudan and manages the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SSHF) to further its humanitarian response efforts.\textsuperscript{135} The Humanitarian Coordinator strategically coordinates the delivery of humanitarian aid and advocates for access to additional resources.\textsuperscript{136} The SSHF supports OCHA's Humanitarian Response Plans by making funds accessible to NGOs and United Nations agencies to support their humanitarian response efforts.\textsuperscript{137} The SSHF is funded through Country-Based Pooled Funds, composed of single, unearmarked funds from Member States and other organizations, and aims to provide additional resources for addressing severe humanitarian emergencies.\textsuperscript{138}

In light of the high number of IDPs and refugees in the region, OCHA also implements a tailored Refugee Response Plan for both Sudan and South Sudan, which strengthens protection, provides services, builds resilience between refugees and host communities, enhances humanitarian partnerships, and helps refugees continue to countries with better humanitarian situations.\textsuperscript{139} OCHA's and other entities’ work is challenged by frequent border closures and entry restrictions limiting refugees’ ability to apply for asylum.\textsuperscript{140} This limits refugees’ options to choosing between staying in a conflict-affected region or being stranded at another country’s border without access to basic resources.\textsuperscript{141} UNHCR and the World Health Organization (WHO) both actively work to alleviate the humanitarian situation in South Sudan and Sudan.\textsuperscript{142} UNHCR seeks to alleviate the situation of refugees in South Sudan, including Sudanese refugees, by collaborating with local humanitarian partners, international organizations, and other United Nations entities to integrate refugees into their host communities and enhance refugee protection.\textsuperscript{143} In pursuit of this goal, UNHCR launched the Flagship Survey Programme

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. \textit{South Sudan tops list of most dangerous countries for aid workers in the world, and the humanitarian crisis deepens amid mounting needs, access constraints, and lack of funding}. 2023.
\textsuperscript{135} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. \textit{South Sudan}. N.d.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. \textit{About the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund}. N.d.
\textsuperscript{138} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. \textit{Country-Based Pooled Funds}. N.d.
\textsuperscript{140} Amnesty International. \textit{Sudan: Neighbouring countries must provide safe passage to those fleeing conflict}. 2023.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
in 2023 to study the living conditions of refugees within South Sudan and identify data-driven areas to improve their services.\textsuperscript{144}

WHO works with the South Sudanese government to facilitate access to healthcare, including direct support to the Ministry of Health with vaccination campaigns that face numerous difficulties being conducted in remote or conflict-affected areas that are difficult to access safely.\textsuperscript{145} In Sudan, disease outbreaks including malaria, measles, acute watery diarrhea, and dengue fever were reported as of September 2023.\textsuperscript{146} These outbreaks further exacerbate Sudan’s fragile situation.\textsuperscript{147} WHO also reports increased attacks on and the occupation of healthcare facilities in Sudan since April 2023 and has verified a total of 56 attacks as of September 2023.\textsuperscript{148} These attacks further impede healthcare access, especially in more heavily conflict-affected zones.\textsuperscript{149} Nearly 65% of all political violence in Sudan since April 2023 has occurred in the state of Khartoum, but only 20% of Sudanese hospitals are located outside of this state, meaning most of Sudan’s hospitals are inaccessible.\textsuperscript{150}

**Conclusion**

After decades of instability, more than one-third of the populations in Sudan and South Sudan require humanitarian assistance, which is why many United Nations agencies and NGOs are cooperating to ameliorate the humanitarian situation in accordance with the Security Council’s call for unimpeded humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{151} Ongoing conflict fed by continued high levels of mistrust between negotiating parties indicates that conflict, and therefore the number of CRSV cases and the dire humanitarian situation of both countries, will likely continue.\textsuperscript{152} Suggested areas for improvement in addressing these issues include raising awareness, enhancing prevention and protection, and resolving structural issues.\textsuperscript{153}

**Further Research**

Delegates should consider the following questions as they conduct further research: How can the Security Council improve Sudan’s and South Sudan’s adherence to international agreements and Security Council resolutions? How can the Security Council improve stability in these countries? How can the Security Council work with other entities to enhance existing efforts combating CRSV and address the worsening humanitarian situation in Sudan and South Sudan?

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
Bibliography


Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (In Opposition) (SPLM/A In Opposition). 2014. Retrieved 5 September 2023 from: https://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/250/cessation%20of%20hostilities.pdf


2. Conflict and Food Security

Introduction

Food security is achieved “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”\(^{154}\) As a concept, food security encompasses six dimensions: availability, access, utilization, stability, agency, and sustainability.\(^{155}\) These dimensions are all interlinked and a person is considered food insecure if just one of these dimensions is missing.\(^{156}\) Progress towards food security for all is usually measured through the prevalence of food insecurity.\(^{157}\) In humanitarian contexts, including in conflict situations, however, the concept of acute food insecurity is more suitable for assessing the urgency of responding to food crises.\(^{158}\) Acute food security is defined as “[f]ood insecurity found at a specific point in time and of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration.”\(^{159}\) The degrees of acute food insecurity are measured through the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification and Cadre Harmonisé (IPC/CH) with the levels of (1) minimal/none, (2) stressed, (3) crisis, (4) emergency, (5) catastrophe/famine, whereas IPC/CH Phase 3 or above is considered a high or acute level of food insecurity.\(^{160}\)

Conflict is the leading cause of acute food insecurity in nearly all food crises worldwide.\(^{161}\) In 2022, 117 million people were suffering from acute food insecurity due to conflict and violence, which is an increase of nearly 60% since 2018.\(^{162}\) With conflict as a primary cause of food insecurity, 42% of people in Sudan experience high levels of acute food insecurity, while in Yemen 34% of the population are acutely food insecure, as of 2023.\(^{163}\) Furthermore, conflict affects at least one of the six dimensions of food security.\(^{164}\) For example, while food might not become available because of the disruption of food production and agriculture during conflict, food could also become inaccessible either due to conflict-related income losses or supply chain disruptions.\(^{165}\) Thus, conflict is tied to varying degrees and levels of food insecurity.\(^{166}\)

---


\(^{155}\) Ibid.


\(^{157}\) United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture*. N.d.


\(^{163}\) Integrated Food Security Classification. *Sudan: Conflict, massive displacement and economic decline drive over 20 million people into high levels of acute food insecurity*. 2023; Integrated Food Security Classification. *Yemen: 3.9 million people likely to experience high levels of acute food insecurity, 456,000 children expected to be acutely malnourished*. 2023.


\(^{166}\) Ibid.
In conflict situations, ensuring food security is the responsibility of Member States, in particular in the context of the Protection of Civilians (PoC). In International humanitarian law (IHL), PoC applies to both international and non-international conflicts and remains a fundamental part of IHL. While the United Nations Security Council first addressed PoC as a standalone agenda item in 1999, it began considering food security as part of the PoC agenda item in 2017. Since then, the Security Council continues to address the interlinkages between conflict and food insecurity.

**International and Regional Framework**

Food is a fundamental human right. The right of individuals to a standard of living that includes access to and availability of adequate food is recognized in Article 25 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) and Article 11 of the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1966). Both also emphasize the responsibility of Member States to ensure the right to food. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), in its General Comment No. 12 on “The right to adequate food (art. 11)” further confirmed that Member States have an obligation to respect the right to food in other countries and to avoid the implementation of mechanisms and measures that jeopardize access to and the availability of food in other countries.

Food security is embedded into the concept of protecting civilians, which in turn is a pillar of IHL. In this context, IHL distinguishes civilians and civilian infrastructure from combatants and military objectives. IHL encompasses rules set forth by international customary law, treaties, and conventions, such as the four Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols. For example, the *Geneva Convention (III)* (1949) supported an early concept of food and water security as an individual right by codifying the basic provision of food and water to prisoners of war and detainees in Article 26 (III). By contrast, Article 55 (II) of the *Geneva Convention (IV)* (1949) expands this obligation of conflict parties to ensure the supply and access of food to civilians affected by the conflict. Article 70 of the *Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions* (1977) further clarifies that parties to the conflict are obligated to ensure the swift and uninhibited passage of relief supplies, equipment, and personnel, even if it is intended for the civilian population of their opponent.

---

173 Ibid.
Through its resolutions, the Security Council has also developed the global framework of the interconnectedness between conflict and food insecurity. Security Council resolution 2417 (2018) on the “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” calls on all parties involved in armed conflict to comply with IHL, while emphasizing the link between food insecurity and forced displacement, particularly in conflict zones. In its resolution 2573 on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict: indispensable civilian objects” (2021), the Security Council condemned any hostile action that threatened civilian food supply. This resolution categorized any attack on civilian food infrastructure as unacceptable and appealed for urgent action to curtail the increasing likelihood of a large-scale humanitarian disaster.

With the adoption of Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) in 2015, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set a global plan of action, which also addresses food insecurity and conflict. SDG 2 (zero hunger) aims to eliminate hunger, in particular for the poor and people in vulnerable conditions. The status of food security also impacts the success of every other SDG, like SDG 3 (good health and well-being) or SDG 10 (reduced inequalities). Likewise, SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) aims to substantially reduce violence and conflicts.

Role of the International System

The Security Council addresses the issue of conflict and food security under both the larger agenda item of "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the standalone item "protection of civilians in armed conflict," as well as in annual open debates. These annual debates are complemented by meetings on specific regions, such as the meeting on the "widespread food insecurity due to conflict and violence in northern Ethiopia, northeast Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen" held in September 2022. Most recently, the Security Council convened a "high-level open debate on famine and conflict-induced global food insecurity" in August 2023. Following the debate, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement on "Maintenance of international peace and security" (S/PRST/2023/4), outlining its commitment to tackle conflict-induced food insecurity and preventing famine. The Security Council also decides on all peacekeeping missions, which have the concept of PoC embedded into their mandates, including ensuring food security even during armed conflict.

---

184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
While the Security Council is the main organ of the United Nations to safeguard peace and security, humanitarian organizations respond to humanitarian crises that are affected by conflict and food insecurity.\(^{194}\) The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provides structured and coordinated efforts of humanitarian assistance and food aid.\(^{195}\) Its work is complemented by other United Nations entities and specialized agencies, including the World Food Programme, which focuses on food assistance to save lives.\(^{196}\) Funding for humanitarian assistance in emergencies is provided primarily by the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), as well as through the World Food Programme’s (WFP’s) Immediate Response Account (IRA), to ensure prompt action during a crisis.\(^{197}\) Both are financed through voluntary contributions from Member States, regional governments, corporations, foundations and individuals.\(^{198}\) In 2022, CERF provided $89.2 million to the sector of food security in conflict-related crises, whereas in 2023, IRA allocated $313.569.716 for general emergency relief.\(^{199}\)

As a result of conflict, farmers are often hindered from agricultural activities due to hazards or displacement.\(^{200}\) Thus, food security and conflict are addressed at the regional level by the African Union (AU) through its Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as well as through the European Commission with its Directorate General for International Partnerships.\(^{201}\) Likewise, coordinated efforts on the part of civil society and the private sector are also needed to strengthen local food production during and after conflict.\(^{202}\)

**The Impact of Armed Conflict on Food Security and Food Systems**

Armed conflict can lead to migration, forced displacement, and the interruption of the production and supply of water and food.\(^{203}\) The global effects of armed conflict may be represented in food shortages, undersupply of essential commodities, reduction of healthy diets due to minimized or discontinued production as well as trade blockages, price increases or inflation, and rising energy prices.\(^{204}\) This can lead to higher costs for agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, and an overall lack of access, causing higher food prices and, thus, a food availability crisis.\(^{205}\) Armed conflict also impacts food security, fuels famine, and results in food insecurity.

---

\(^{194}\) United Nations, Department of Global Communications. *Deliver Humanitarian Aid*. N.d.

\(^{195}\) United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *We coordinate*. N.d.


\(^{198}\) Ibid.


and leads to increases in starvation through the destruction of food systems.\textsuperscript{206} A food system comprises all actors or processes along the food supply chain from production to the consumption and disposal of food.\textsuperscript{207} In his 2022 report on “Conflict and the right to food” (A/HRC/52/40), the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri, highlights that while IHL provides some protection against the weaponization of food, it is not enough to fully protect people from hunger in conflict situations.\textsuperscript{208} For example, in armed conflict, hunger can be exploited by starvation as a means of warfare.\textsuperscript{209} While the Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions prohibits the use of starvation against civilians, it does not protect against the starvation of active combatants.\textsuperscript{210} As such, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food warns that blocking food supply chains to use starvation against combatants is problematic because the food supply chains for civilians are often the same as the ones for combatants.\textsuperscript{211}

A widespread example of the impact of armed conflict on food insecurity is the war in Ukraine, which has exacerbated food crises on both the regional and global scale.\textsuperscript{212} So far, Russian military attacks have damaged large portions of food production facilities, four million tons of grain and oilseeds have been destroyed or misappropriated, and storage for 9.4 million tons of agricultural products have been damaged.\textsuperscript{213} As of February 2023, 11 million people in Ukraine were food insecure.\textsuperscript{214} By contrast, the global consequences of this war include market volatility, trade drops, and highly increasing wheat prices.\textsuperscript{215} In 2021, Russia and Ukraine were two of the largest exporters of wheat, corn, rapeseed, sunflower seeds, and sunflower oil worldwide.\textsuperscript{216} As a result of the war, the unimpeded trade of these goods was no longer guaranteed, cutting off several countries from important food supplies and causing prices to rise rapidly.\textsuperscript{217} In response to this situation, the United Nations Secretary-General and Türkiye brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) together with Ukraine and the Russian Federation to resume grain exports through Ukraine’s Black Sea ports to help stabilize food prices and minimize factors of food insecurity and famine.\textsuperscript{218} Despite the positive effects of the BSGI, it ended in July 2023.\textsuperscript{219}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{208} United Nations, World Food Programme. Conflict and peace. n.d
\item \textsuperscript{210} Ibid. p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Welsh. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Russia, Ukraine, and Global Food Security: A One-Year Assessment. 2023.
\item \textsuperscript{216} United Nations, Joint Coordination Center. Beacon on the Black Sea. N.d.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Al Jazeera. Russia-Ukraine Black Sea grain deal: All you need to know. 2023.
\end{itemize}
Another recent example of the impact of armed conflict on food security is the war in Tigray, Ethiopia, between November 2020 and November 2022. As a result of the war between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, more than 15.1 million Ethiopians are currently dependent on food aid and 21% of the population was in acute food insecurity in 2022. This conflict led to a disruption of the agriculture and food system and the displacement of people, including farmers. In addition, the Tigray region has limited geographical accessibility, making it difficult to obtain food supplies. To address the situation, the Security Council convened several meetings “Peace and Security in Africa.” The Security Council condemned the violent acts in Tigray and urged all parties involved for PoC. Further, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted resolution S-33/1 (2021) and established the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) for one year. In its 2022 report, ICHREE accused the Ethiopian government of hindering humanitarian access and using starvation as warfare against civilians. While the ICHREE recommended that the Security Council address the situation in Ethiopia as a standalone agenda item to prevent further breaches of IHL, the Security Council has not yet adopted any resolutions on the Tigray conflict.

As of October 2023, the number of conflicts remains high, with approximately 32 countries being involved in conflict situations. This will likely cause more people to drift into acute food insecurity. The flagship report on the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023, led by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO), projects that 119 million fewer people would have suffered from hunger had the war in Ukraine not happened. Thus, in order to achieve SDG 2 (zero hunger) and achieve food security and nutrition for all, OCHA warns that it is necessary to address conflicts and their humanitarian impacts while protecting civilians in conflict situations.

Addressing Food Insecurity as a Driver of Conflict

While conflict can increase hunger and malnutrition, food insecurity can function as a driver of conflict. Food insecurity can also increase internal displacement and multiply threats, worsening conditions that criminal organizations can exploit. Thus, conflict is a typical outcome resulting from the threat of food insecurity. Moreover, food insecurity can be a tool for criminal organizations to destabilize societies and to increase their access to power and resources.

---

225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
228 Ibid. p. 19.
shortages, and the resulting conflicts may vary in intensity depending on the type of civilization from which food instability emanates, such as riots and protests in urban cities or terrorism and war typically emanating from rural towns.\textsuperscript{235} Food insecurity is often used by extremist organizations such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and Hezbollah as a recruitment tactic for those affected, promoting violent extremism.\textsuperscript{236} Typically, extremist or insurgent groups exploit the desperation of people from food-insecure regions in the Middle East, Africa, and South America and offer food as a form of compensation, meaning that agricultural development can serve as a deterrent for recruiting into violent extremism.\textsuperscript{237}

While food insecurity is not the sole cause of conflicts, it is an important puzzle piece in understanding the multidimensional aspects of conflict.\textsuperscript{238} This highlights the need to address conflict through the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, also referred to as the triple nexus.\textsuperscript{239} The HDP nexus refers to approaches that aim to promote robust collaboration, cooperation, and coordination among humanitarian, developmental, and peacebuilding initiatives.\textsuperscript{240} As such, the HDP nexus combines the work of humanitarian organizations, such as OCHA or WFP, with development actors, such as FAO or UNICEF, and peace operations, including United Nations peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{241} The Security Council has already mainstreamed multidimensional nexus approaches into the mandates of its peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{242} In its resolution 2282 (2016) on “Post-conflict peacebuilding,” the Security Council further emphasized the interlinkages between development, peace, and human rights, including humanitarian action.\textsuperscript{243} Similarly, in its resolution 2349 (2017) on “Peace and security in Africa,” the Security Council urged for better collaboration between development and humanitarian actors to improve food security and living conditions.\textsuperscript{244}

Overall, humanitarian solutions, including emergency food assistance and safety net systems, serve to curb potential outbreaks of food insecurity, and prevent the recruitment into violent extremism and increase conflict.\textsuperscript{245} Development-focused solutions include bolstering agricultural capabilities in food-insecure regions that can insulate a population against threats to imported food supplies.\textsuperscript{246} By contrast, peacebuilding activities are generally focused more on governance, yet provide a space to explore the complex relationship between conflict and food systems, in particular at a local level.\textsuperscript{247} However, while there is increasing evidence that links food insecurity to an increase in conflicts and violence, more data and research are needed.\textsuperscript{248} Meanwhile, the concept of addressing food insecurity as a driver of conflict remains part of the sustaining peace agenda of the Security Council, requiring a continued focus on multidimensional approaches.\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{235} World Food Program USA. \textit{Dangerously Hungry: The Link Between Food Insecurity and Conflict}. 2023. p.4.
\textsuperscript{236} World Food Program USA. \textit{Winning the Peace: Hunger and Instability}. 2017. pp. 6-7, 32.
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid. pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{245} World Food Program USA. \textit{Winning the Peace: Hunger and Instability}. 2017. pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid.


**Conclusion**

Conflict and food security are interlinked. Conflict is indeed the primary driver of acute food insecurity, but food insecurity can similarly also function as a driver of conflict. Food, however, is a human right, and ensuring access to food is a fundamental part of PoC and IHL. In this context, the Security Council regularly considers food security and conflict as part of thematic and regional agenda items. In order to achieve SDG 2 (zero hunger), for example, the Security Council addresses the linkages between conflict and food insecurity under the concept of PoC. Likewise, in order to consider food insecurity as a driver of conflict, peace operations, and by extension also the Security Council, are required to take multidimensional approaches to conflict within the HDP nexus.

**Further Research**

As delegates further research this topic, they may consider: How can the Security Council introduce more accountability in terms of PoC in armed conflicts to prevent the use of starvation as warfare? Keeping in mind its mandate, which types of measures can be taken by the Security Council, as well as the international community, to prevent acute food insecurity, leading to famine? What type of actions can be aligned to combat the root causes of armed conflict? How can international collaboration preventing food insecurity during armed conflict be strengthened? What are other conflicts where food insecurity is severely impacted? How can the Security Council address these conflicts?

---

251 Ibid.


United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. N.d. Retrieved 30 October 2023 from: https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal2#targets_and_indicators


United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *We coordinate.* N.d. Retrieved 15 September 2023 from: [https://www.unocha.org/we-coordinate](https://www.unocha.org/we-coordinate)


