The General Assembly First Committee,

Deeply conscious of the net negative impact easy-to-obtain small arms have on democracy, peace, sovereignty, and security of citizens on a regional and international level,

Alarmed by the fact that Small Arms Survey reports one billion arms are currently in circulation in the global community,

Seeking to secure the borders of Member States and reduce the illegal sales and production of small arms,

Recalling the shortcomings of current work to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, Artificial Intelligence (AI) weapons, conventional arms, and explosives,

Acknowledging General Assembly resolution 55/255 passed with the amount of unaccounted-for or illicit firearms in the global community,

Understanding that issues of political security and disarmament are heavily reliant on the economic standing of a Member State,

Keeping in Mind the goals and targets of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

Recognizing that individuals will take drastic measures such as the taking up of arms in order to protect loved ones from social, political, and economic duress,

Acknowledging that treaties and international law must be updated to accommodate evolving technologies in AI, cyberspace, and outer space technology,

1. Suggests Member States work with nonprofits and private enterprises through a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to create a bi-annual report on the dangers posed by conventional weapons as well as modern weapons in AI, cyberspace, outer space technology, performing any necessary treaty revisions in order to achieve SDG Target 11.5;

2. Requests for a permanent regulatory system from UNODC surrounding the sales and production of small arms that:
   a. Calls upon major importers and exporters to decrease incoming SALW over a 5 year period to reduce the number of small arms within countries and make regulation easier and aid in promoting peace in exchange for a more favorable trade policy regarding natural resources;
   b. Recommend the continued contribution of Security Council resources toward efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC);

3. Encourages that Member States prioritize SDG 3, “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being at all ages,” and SDG 16, “ensuring peace, justice, and strong institutions” to ensure individual members of each nation has its capabilities met by working with departments like United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) for guidance to find innovative solutions to increase the effectiveness of peace and security, humanitarian and development;
4. *Further recommends* Member States consider attending the multi-day annual Global Firearms Program forum event hosted by UNODC which promotes building adequate criminal justice systems and stopping illicit gun trade across international borders; Incentivizes Member States to attend through Foreign Direct Investment which could be funded by the World Trade Organization (WTO);

5. *Expresses its hope* for regional collaboration with commissions such as Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to create global standards that sustain non-proliferation treaties and develop implementation strategies for existing treaties;

6. *Supports* increased communication between Member states on sharing of information regarding arms control and measures used to prevent arms trafficking using the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA);

7. *Further requests* research be done by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to advance further this assembly's agenda of Strengthening and Developing the Systems of Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, to which the following research would include:

   a. Creating improved, inclusive global standards, including Western States, sustain non-proliferation and small arms control treaties already in existence and develop implementation strategies for existing treaties;

   b. Improved financial incentives such as health packages that prevent the spread of disease and educate people of basic health, and development packages that include telecommunication and infrastructure; these incentives will work to maintain the threshold of the sale of small arms and the elimination of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as the continued support and cooperation between Member States,

8. *Calls upon* the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to police and maintain the standard created by the UNDP in deciding what economic incentives discussed above will be beneficial regarding a nation's ability in meeting the standard;

9. *Calls for* United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to shepherd the economic mobilization of domestic industries and local workers to work towards peace and economic sovereignty utilizing:

   a. Save The Children programs to bolster education, female education, to stave off child recruitment and reduce incidences of gender-based violence empowered by small arms;

   b. Diversity training programmes for people in government, so that they properly address crimes against minority groups committed during armed conflict in which SALW were used;

10. *Strongly advises* the United Nations Institute for Disarmament (UNIDIR) to create a system to track SALW dedicated purely to developing nations;

11. *Recommends* providing rehabilitation through the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) to individuals engaged in illegal behaviors using:

   a. New, sustainable non-black market opportunities such as IT;

   b. An adaptation of current industries such as agriculture that are often corrupted by the black market for the purposes of transitioning a war-torn economy into a self-sustaining economy of peace;
12. **Recommends** the General Assembly review current regional groups’ (such as the African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and many more) performance in their efforts to share intelligence within and outside of their government, track illicit arms, and hold Member States accountable;

13. **Invites** UNODA and UNODC to recruit private companies to cooperate with international policing forces to collaborate with Member States to:

   a. Uphold the channel of communication and transparency between public national security groups through the tracking of arms shipments by barcodes, contracts, ownership contracts, background checks, and e-receipts;

   b. Provide regional groups with the necessary databases and tools to regulate and be informed of illicit arms trade and tracking of arms in each respective area.
The General Assembly First Committee,

Deeply concerned about the illicit trade, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), as well as its close link between terrorism, trafficking, and other socio-economic and humanitarian consequences,

Guided by the principles outlined in the Charter of the United Nations: Chapters V, VII, and XVII, namely the maintenance of international peace and security, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace,

Recognizing the need for the international community to strengthen international and regional institutions, ensuring their accountability for safeguarding human rights while guaranteeing the inclusivity and sustainable development of global commons,

Aware of the detrimental impact of the illicit small arms trade on democracy, peace, and security, and the relationship between the manufacturing and importing of legal light weapons and small arms and the size of the illicit weapons market,

Cognizant of the fact that SALW are easily accessible in conflict areas and are means of potential threats,

Recognizing the need to determine the allocation of financial and technical support, a method of determining unstable regions, and managing and processing the destruction of unnecessary arms,

Reaffirming the sovereign right of every State on regulating their national influx of conventional weapons, the imperative entry of force of the Arms Trade Treaty, and the necessity to expand the legal framework regarding the reporting of ammunition and raw materials for light weapons and small arms,

Seeking the need for information sharing in order to increase transparency as noted in Security Council Report S/2021/839 on SALW,

Expressing its appreciation for initiatives undertaken by Member States, including the UN, and of roles played by NGO and civil society, to enhance cooperation, improve information exchange, transparency and implement confidence building measures in the field of responsible arms trade,

Convinced of the need to proceed expeditiously with the elaboration of a convention against transnational organized crime pursuant to General Assembly resolution 55/25,

Emphasizing the importance of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which regulates the international trade of conventional arms and seeks to prevent illicit arms trading,

Noting with grave concern the increase in the magnitude of armed conflicts in countries of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, affected by the increase in the illegal traffic of light weapons,

Recognizing that the development of nuclear research and development programs outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is necessary for the technological and energy growth of developing countries,
Having examined that the parts, components and ammunition of small arms seized from organized criminal groups will be useful in preventing and combating Transnational Organized crimes,

Aware of the nexus dynamic between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change,

1. Recommends an amendment to the ATT regarding the international trade and transit of conventional weaponry on the following points:

   a. On Article 2, revise the probability of an expansion on the scope of the Treaty to include raw materials that could be used for the creation of new weaponry as charcoal, sulfur and potassium nitrate;

   b. On Article 13 (3), include on the mandate the necessity on the requirements for Annual Reports for the transit of ammunitions on States Party to the ATT as defined in Article 3 and raw materials as on the expansion recommended for Article 2;

2. Reiterates adherence and implementation of the framework provided by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA-SALW) especially at all levels to ensure national laws, regional protocols and international cooperation are focused on:

   a. Enhanced border control mechanisms to halt the illicit international trade and trafficking of SALW;

   b. Tracing, marking, stockpile management and security destruction of SALW;

   c. Annually reporting data on small arms to the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA) including but not limited to keep and actively update consolidated reports from Member States to provide access to information:

      i. The number of small arms produced;
      ii. The number of small arms imported and exported;
      iii. The destination or source of any imported or exported small arms;

3. Promotes a partnership with the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to increase transparency in armament and implement new approaches to disarmament verification;

4. Considers the development of an international weapons database, focusing on the creation of an international serial system program in conjunction with arms manufacturers, to foster the collection of information on weapons trading with a focus on advancing safe and effective arms dealing and containment that would:

   a. Establish an international communication system between arms manufacturers and nations to better keep track of weapons coming into and out of nations in legal trades;
b. Aim for specific shipment details, allowing for better location and trading to establish responsibility and strengthen security;

c. Create a stable foundation within arms companies and nations to assure all arms trades are legal around the globe;

5. *Suggests* the implementation of red-flag laws internationally within firearm certification services as a preventative measure in order to decrease the number of mass shootings and firearm related deaths;

6. *Further recommends* Member States to develop an improved system of background and health checks, inspired by the *Firearms Protocol (2001)* and aimed towards states that already have a background check system in place, so that:

   a. Law enforcement can be notified by family and friends with sufficient evidence can grant a called background check;

   b. Permits can be issued once again by the original certifying services after an X amount of years to be determined;

7. *Affirming* the efforts laid out during the agenda item list for the General Assembly A/C.1/75/L.64: “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements” that it is the responsibility and obligation of all Member States to ease international tension and refrain from negatively influencing international security in efforts to advance in complete disarmament and effective arms control by:

   a. Encouraging Member States that have the ability to, to provide and support the national and international implementation of arms control, disarmament and NPT and agreements;

   b. Understanding the UN role in which negotiations are fostered as well as transparency regarding arms control, disarmament and NPTs;

8. *Recommends* willing Member States contribute to a collective resource pool that will prioritize aid to Member States who are in conflict-prone geographic positions defined by cultural, linguistic, historical differences, and need for foreign assistance in weapons destruction;

9. *Encourages* the creation of a legal framework that allows the creation of databases on the trade in small arms in legal markets, as well as other weapons used in international conflicts;

10. *Urges* the creation of the *Wakanda Protocol*, which allows Member States to create nuclear research programs for the development of power plants, assuming the commitment to make use of these programs are only for research and energy purposes and not for the creation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), with the Program:
a. Having the objective of reviewing good practices in the development of nuclear projects in all those countries that have not originally been linked to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT);

b. Being a subsidiary protocol of the NPT in which all nations will be invited to ratify said protocol without necessarily being ratifiers of the NPT;

c. Being reviewed by the Security Council every 5 years and by the IAEA every 2 years through reports from expert groups;

d. Having its financing reviewed by the fifth committee of the General Assembly;

11. Further requests Member States to implement security protocols to combat Transnational Organized Crime, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/111, which strongly condemns the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms through:

a. Promoting, facilitating and strengthening cooperation among Member States in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition;

b. Monitoring and prosecuting the rising number of organized criminal groups and offenses that are transnational in nature;

12. **Encourages** the development of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), giving them the ability to provide recommendations on strengthening the implementation of refugee law when displacement occurs in context of nexus dynamics by:

a. Taking a ground up approach and augment previous research by contacting refugees, host communities, and individuals working in the field to better facilitate local and systemic change;

b. Utilizing technology to our advantage as tool to enable our advances in strengthening the implementation refugee law based international protection in the context of the adverse impact of climate change on SALW violence;

c. Creating legacy practices, procedures, and partners that are able to evolve and can be implemented on national, regional and international levels;

d. Ensuring that the OHCHR is able to offer practical and relevant solutions for persons displaced across borders in the context of nexus dynamics.
Decision: The General Assembly First Committee

Distressed over the impact of nuclear testing and warfare, such as that of the nuclear fallout and radioactive marine poisoning in the Indo-Pacific region, which caused insecurity on food, water, and culture through population displacement and tarnishing of land,

Alarmed and concerned about the release of highly enriched Uranium, Plutonium, and several other radioactive elements resulting from nuclear testing,

Recognizes the need for sustainable energy development globally in accordance with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7, highlighting the importance of equitable and environmentally friendly energy, which can be addressed by the current effort on proliferation being switched over to the use of nuclear fission energy,

Reaffirms General Assembly resolution 73/51 (2018) and its information on confidence building measures in the field of conventional arms, with the involvement of the main global tool Information Telecommunication Union (ITU) Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA),

Endorses both Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1984), which pertains to the rights of life and security in the aspect of the WMDs,

Expresses its grave concern of the damage done by Chemical Weapons but recalling the way it was addressed and wanting to use that foundation with Weapons of mass destruction,

Cognizant of the benefits of Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones (NWFZ) and positive effects of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which Member States are encouraged to sign and ratify,

Encourages Member States to serve as clean sources of energy and generate jobs to support regional economies,

Acknowledges the need for responsible innovation and application standards internationally in accordance to achieving SDG 7, such as the establishment of responsibly disposing of WMDs and the reduction of emissions that are released by the making of such weapons,

Encourages the prospect of economic and energy abundance associated with the development and use of sustainable development in programs,

1. Requests Member States to resolve the devastating impacts of radioactive elements on the environment, which has affected the security of Member States and its citizens through the confiscation of economic and social aspects, particularly pertaining to:
   a. the reduction of significant air quality, both breathable and expendable, which is often lost and turned rigid through the use of WMD and has been previously addressed after the banning of Chemical Warfare through the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
b. the need to reserve drinkable water due to the ramifications of Nuclear Warfare and testing, which results in contamination through ground water and food and further delays the reach of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) due to its high solubility in water, plaguing Member States and their people;

c. Requests for assistance in reestablishing and repairing damaged environment that have been devastated by nuclear testing, and asserts that new Nuclear-Free-Testing zones are to be established with the expectation of no further nuclear testing;

2. *Urges* nuclear Member States to further prioritize the production of sustainable energy and to take actions into consideration by 2030 through:

   a. denouncing global dependency on fossil fuels and instead encourages the augmentation of international nuclear energy programs, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Nuclear Energy Policy and Cooperation (INEPC), on a nondiscriminatory basis;

   b. Urging increased nuclear disarmament efforts, which will provide a secure and stable international community, are taken into account during future decision making;

   c. Requests for Member States with excessive nuclear arsenals develop a robust system of weapons grade uranium and plutonium trade, with the oversight of the IAEA, with Member States seeking to bolster their nuclear programs;

3. *Stresses its readiness* of Member States to actively attempt to understand one another’s differences for the safety of the of Global citizens and future generations, as well as collaborate on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), which have previously been used in non-military negotiations to initiate peace, to prevent lasting rivalries between Member States that involve conventional arms;

4. *Invites* Member States to commit to the reduction of greenhouse gases associated with the reuse of disarmed nuclear weapons, keeping responsible disposal of waste in mind with:

   a. the creation of an international task force to develop infrastructure for sustainable storage of nuclear waste;

   b. collaboration of between the private sector and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to implement these systems of storage;

5. *Invites* Member states to repurpose Nuclear Weapons, with SDG 8 and 12, in mind to serve as clean sources of energy and create jobs to support regional economies by:

   a. Encouraging Member States to stimulate sustainable economic growth domestically, highlighting the important of sustainable development;

   b. Inviting Member States to redirect nuclear expenditures to benefit its citizens in a economical perspective by enhancing the availability of fission energy for their cities;

   c. Requesting the refurbishment of current WMDs to one of environmentally friendly end results such as fuel rods or titanium freezes;
6. *Further invites* the continuation of potential data sharing software using the ITU Global Security Agenda and universal tracing measures that implements various avenues such as NGOs by:

   a. Encouraging developed Member States to offer assistance to developing states with information sharing and capacity building in controlling the trade of illicit arms, expanding existing frameworks in the additional regions;

   b. Addressing the data sharing and tracing mechanisms can involve the use of cybersecurity in context of online security, both cognitive and distributed computing tools;

   c. Transmitting the discussions of the inclusion of non-state actors to model research in data mining, cyber-networks and cyber-security.
The General Assembly First Committee,

Acknowledging the work of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA-SALW) to work towards arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, while acknowledging that international efforts to reach these goals have stalled in recent years,

Cognizant of the importance of preventing nuclear war and completely removing the possibility of nuclear war,

Acknowledging the importance of new technologies and how they can help in the areas of supervising Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) and nuclear material smuggling,

Recalling United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, which is set to enforce the non-involvement of non-state actors in regard to providing, manufacturing, possessing, or transporting of any weapons that can be used by terrorist organizations, whereas human life and human rights would be regarded above profit,

Emphasizing the recognition of regions of high conflict and low arms control and how they are subject to internal displacement,

Recognizing the importance of further efforts by Member States to implement an international framework for cooperation on locating, and recovering stolen or smuggled arms, or nuclear material,

Confident in the continued cooperation between Member States in the matter of solving the issues of nuclear weapons and illicit firearms,

Concerned with the lack of participation from Member States regarding treaties and non-proliferation agreements,

Stressing the importance of a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons and any proliferation to meet the goal of a nuclear free world,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolutions 75/55 and 75/219, which acknowledge the the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons as something that is crucial to international security and well-being,

1. Recommends a forum on the Progress and Advancement of Weapons Security (PAWS) to address ideas for new directions in nuclear and conventional arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, which will:
   a. Invite all Member States, members of civil society, and other relevant stakeholders to provide input on future directions;
   b. Establish agreed upon norms and goals for Member States to work on in the topics that are named in following clauses;
c. Result in the adoption of a framework that will guide international efforts towards these goals through 2050;

2. **Calls for** all Member States to adopt policies to prevent nuclear war, including:

   a. Implementing a no-first-use policy in regards to nuclear weapons in order to put Member States at ease and open up the conversation surrounding disarmament, as well as to bring consensus around the idea of preventing nuclear war;

   b. Having Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) begin looking at methods of safe disposal for all existing nuclear weapons, to be carried out and completed by 2050, in line with the PAWS Convention and existing environmental and human rights standards;

3. **Urges** the implementation of new technologies in order to:

   a. Hold nations that deployed the LAWs out into the field accountable for the LAWs by creating artificial intelligence (AI) to supervise the LAWs through biometrics and to take control if needed, with at least one person supervising the LAWs while the AIs are being created;

   b. Emphasize the importance of tracking the displacement of nuclear material in the world by using AI to reduce nuclear smuggling and preventing terrorists from accessing these resources and emphasizing the inclusion of the 2005 Amendment to the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material*;

4. **Encourages** Member States to create a further framework that complies and supports United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, ensuring that further framework is created to hold non-state actors in accordance to resolution 1540;

5. **Reiterates** the imperative nature of discussing humanitarian issues in areas of high conflict and low arms control, especially considering the internal displacement of individuals;

6. **Calls upon** fellow Member States to support efforts to implement self-defense courses which will promote a sense of safety and security among Member States;

7. **Further** invites Member States to work multilaterally and provide necessary support towards an international system to locate and recover stolen or smuggled arms and nuclear weapons;

8. **Expresses** its hope that all Member States not yet party to existing frameworks surrounding disarmament and arms control will be encouraged to approve and participate in those agreements and treaties, stressing the particular importance of the ratification of the NPT, *Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW), and *Arms Trade Treaty* (ATT);

9. **Suggests** creating a working group to discuss a new legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons as a necessary contribution towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

10. **Endorses** the establishment and expansion of regional and sub-regional organizations based in communication and cooperation in order to hold accountable Member States who develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons which;
a. Allows Member States to build off of the existing work of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA);

b. Encourages cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), World Customs Organization (WCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) in order to maintain partnerships among Member States and key stakeholders.
The General Assembly First Committee,

Acknowledging that the United Nations (UN) General Assembly has hosted the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) in 1978, 1982, and 1988, and that the first session was successful in producing a final document regulating disarmament,

Appreciating the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its efforts to combat nuclear conflict and work towards non-proliferation,

Aware of the past efforts of Open Ended Working Groups (OEWG) to establish the agenda and objectives for the first three SSOD,

Recognizing the urgency for action regarding transparency and regulation of fissile materials specifically with the capability of development to nuclear weapons,

Underscoring the impact of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (1967), which established the world’s first Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), as well as the subsequent South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1985), Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (1995), African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (1996), and Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (2006), in creating zones that help to strengthen non-proliferation and consolidate global efforts in pursuit of peace and security,

Keeping in mind the sovereignty of Member States and the regulations of the Landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) regarding the creation of, and the transmission and trade of arms through legal means,

Expressing concern for global safety and peace, as agreements of proliferation and distribution of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) continue to progress,

Having considered that 191 Member States have joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), meaning that more Member States have ratified the NPT in comparison to any other disarmament and limitation agreement,

Emphasizing the development of new technologies and their importance in the contribution of strengthening the treaties and agreements regarding arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament,

Contemplating the security of small arms trade within Member States, specifically the control and information available to them after being sold,

Bearing in mind the existence of plans and policies similar to the Strategic Trade Management Act (STMA) in order to progressively and effectively prevent the production and sale of more small arms weapons,

1. **Urges** the hosting of a fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-IV) through the OEWG that would provide a new, necessary opportunity for all Member States to reconsider and discuss
nuclear arms, and set an agenda in order to:

a. Develop an international framework to eventually complete nuclear non-proliferation, using the individual autonomy of Member States to decommission their nuclear arsenals;

b. Provide a foundation in which transparency regarding Member States’ stance on their own nuclear powers and capabilities can be made public knowledge;

c. Work towards better understanding between Member States that both possess and do not possess nuclear arms with a goal to:
   i. Create the grounds for final documents or potential treaties, such as the final document produced at SSOD-I (1978), which calls for a decrease in nuclear threats and tensions;
   ii. Encourage the continued discussion of a preparatory committee to review yearly implementations and changes to treaties and documents;

d. Reassess the current global conditions regarding the threat of nuclear arms and continue the progress that has been made on already existing treaties due to the:
   i. Possession of nuclear arms held by prominent Member States;
   ii. Existing tensions in areas in which proliferation is a threat,

2. Calls for the establishment of a yearly Nuclear Energy Regulation Conference that will:

a. Be facilitated, organized, and maintained by IAEA;

b. Involve all Member States either interested in or already having acquired facilities capable of nuclear energy;

c. Promote the peaceful creation of nuclear energy for the advancement of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

d. Discuss the necessary framework to track the location of fissile materials that have potential to create nuclear weapons by:
   i. Within three years, striving to create international regulation infrastructure that is aware of the movement of fissile materials and will maintain compliance;
   ii. Creating a new platform to reach an agreement regarding such regulation and compliance each year after, if one is not made within the original three year goal;
   iii. Continuing the conference each year after an agreement is reached in order to review the year’s discussion and goals, and to consider any changes that may be necessary or desired by Member States;
3. **Calls upon** all regions of the world to support the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of NWFZs by adhering to the Secretary-General’s *Agenda for Disarmament*, which emphasizes essential measures for Member States to instate, including:

   a. Facilitating enhanced cooperation and consultation between existing NWFZs;

   b. Encouraging nuclear weapon states to adhere to the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing such zones;

   c. Supporting the further establishment of NWFZs through means such as:

      i. Successfully concluding a conference on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East at the upcoming 2021 NPT Review Conference;

      ii. Mainstreaming disarmament and non-proliferation education in line with the aims of SDG 4, target 7;

      iii. Enhancing civil society participation through systematizing NGO access in the primary disarmament organs;

4. **Stresses** the importance of each Member States’ right to own and deal small arms and light weapons “(SALW)” within the constraints of international law by:

   a. Maintaining the sovereignty of individual Member States to create, hold, and deal arms in order to respect the rights of individual Member States’ technologies and militaries and retain defensive and offensive capabilities for the protection of a Member State;

   b. Promoting transparency regarding the use of larger weapons without infringing on the rights of a Member State to create and sell weaponry;

   c. Aiding Member States in the prevention of the use of arms towards international and domestic terrorism and decrease the amount of terrorist attacks that employ the use of deadly arms;

   d. Protecting potential victims of international and domestic terrorism through the financial support of protection agencies and institutions that provide ground work to support victims of international and domestic terrorism;

   e. Preventing weapons from being procured by terrorist (non-state actors) organizations through:

      i. Encouraging Member States to increase transparency by maintaining all records in a secure database and by the introduction of The Bureau of Arms Monitoring (BAM), an independent organization;

      ii. Funding within the UN budget, as the purpose of this new organization would serve to track and monitor the distribution of small arms internationally and report these statistics;
iii. The use of Bureau of Arms Monitoring (BAM) to motivate an investigatory period of two days in the case that reports are not submitted by Member States;

iv. Supporting the inclusion of all Member State participation for international collectiveness, and especially welcomes participation of the global south;

v. Vitalizing transparency regarding the buying, selling, and trading of smaller arms through implementing regulations that ensure such transmission of weapons is done between entities and Member States that have the legal rights to do so;

5. **Recommends** that all Member States participate actively in the upcoming NPT Review Conference, addressing the issues that cause Member States to procure nuclear weapons or small arms, such as external threats or conflicts between Member States by establishing methods of de-escalation, deterring away from the use of nuclear power that:

   a. Set up good offices, which are friendly interventions from amoral authority or international body that is outside the dispute in question, as a modest diplomatic form of settling disputes/conflict between armend parties in conflict;

   b. Implement enquiry and arbitration;

   c. Exchange information on Member States arsenal of weapons/equipment, Including plans for deployment of weapons/equipment;

6. **Requests** the collaboration of Member States in the formation of a formal agenda that addresses nuclear arms control and nuclear energy parameters by:

   a. Setting an agenda for 2035 to consolidate regional frameworks that support nonproliferation such as Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ);

   b. Affirming the non-use of nuclear weapons, complete avoidance of nuclear conflict, and nuclear frameworks such as the NPT through:

      i. Frameworks and methods that respond to usage of WMDs;
      ii. Disarmament education among Member States;
      iii. Nuclear build programmes to mitigate nuclear energy insecurity;

   c. Encouraging the contribution of Member States towards the development of:

      i. Methods of nuclear energy regulation;
      ii. A proportional reduction of nuclear weapons based on a country’s existing amount of WMDs;
      iii. Support for resolutions that strive towards nuclear nonproliferation;

7. **Recommends** the creation of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) computer database to aid in the tracking of small arms imports and exports within Member States:

   a. Call on the International Tracing Instrument, in which Member States agreed to improve national small arms law and export and import control under the Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;

b. To encourage the application of biometrics, such as fingerprinting to help secure the security of AI;

c. Endorse the cooperation of all Member States in engaging in discussion towards the creation of internationally binding laws regarding the tracking of smaller arms in order to secure greater transparency, and safety

8. *Encourages* the international community to sponsor programs through the UN similar to the Strategic Trade Management Act (STMA), with the goal of lessening the dangerous trade of gun parts in developing Member States that:

   a. Aids in tracking the illicit trade of small arms in Member States, to crack down on illegal and lost weapons;

   b. Deescalates the trade of illegal arms by implementing specific frameworks that detail and record the journey sold arms;

   c. Allows for countries to decrease the size of illegal gun arsenals.
The General Assembly First Committee,

Affirming the need to support and strengthen protocols that are already in place to address the illicit manufacturing and transportation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), along with addressing the victims of violence that result from the illicit transportation of such weapons,

Recognizing that the rapidly changing global landscape of weapon proliferation and emerging technological advancements in weaponry requires multifaceted solutions addressing SALW, nuclear weapons, and artificial intelligence,

Recognizing the relationship between legal firearms production of the private sector and the subsequent distribution into the illicit sector, as well as the pre-existing structures in place to combat illegal trafficking,

Guided by the principles outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, namely the maintenance of international peace and security, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace,

Further recalling that an arms race is in process, with all the people of this world being affected, and with that, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) implement excess power and the halt of production for materials need to be established,

Reaffirms the barriers implemented around agreements on treaties between Member States, citizens, international, regional and subregional organizations including formal and informal diplomacy as stated in General Assembly resolution 73/127 and A/C.1/68/L.3,

Keeping in mind the lack of resources that small or developing nations affected by the violence stemming from black market SALW and trading that are so easily accessible, and are used as means of preventable threats,

Deeply cognizant of the detrimental impact of illicit SALW on the democracy, peace, and national and international security, and of the relationship between their manufacture and import and the extent of the illegal market for these weapons, both domestically and internationally, and of the necessity of increased transparency and collaboration between nations,

Acknowledging previous efforts by regional groups such as the African Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations to address the illicit trade of arms,

Understanding the importance of bringing the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) experts on women and children’s issues to the table during the legal process and in community development programs in the United Nations (UN),
Noting, with deep concern the severe lack of communication between Member States regarding arms control in the past and the need of increased communications between Member States on sharing of information regarding arms control and measures used to prevent arms trafficking between regional databases,

Recognizing discriminatory jury stacking in the International Criminal Court (ICC) prevents the punishment of crimes against war and humanity that occur every day due to the proliferation of SALW and light weapons,

Draws to attention the success that regional frameworks and agreements have worked in the past to not only help track illicit arms trade, but also foster avenues and methods of communication between Member States,

Deeply concerned over the illicit trade, transfer, and circulation of SALW and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world and the wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences as well as the close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals,

Deeply concerned by the amount of violence perpetuated by the illicit trafficking of SALW and the damage it causes to democracy, peace, and national and international security, particularly in developing nations, domestically and internationally,

Emphasizing the need for increased accountability and transparency in the production and distribution of arms between Member States,

Noting with deep concern that the risk of a nuclear weapon explosion is significantly greater than previously assumed and is increasing with proliferation, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/58 of 23 December 2016, the ongoing modernization of nuclear arsenals, and the role of nuclear weapons in the doctrine of Nuclear Weapon States,

Alarmed that since September 1992 there has not been a review conference of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) which facilitates cooperation related to the physical protection of nuclear material and legally binding criminalization of offences,

Emphasizing that the consequences of a potential nuclear weapon explosion and its associated risks raise profound moral and ethical questions that go beyond debates about the legality of nuclear weapons,

Taking into account that the risk of nuclear weapons use with their unacceptable consequences can only be avoided when all nuclear weapons have been eliminated,

Emphasizing that the consequences of a nuclear weapon explosion and the risks associated with nuclear weapons concern the security of all humanity and that all states share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons,

Reiterating conviction that WMDs - including nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical, and explosive weapons - pose a threat not just to individual states, but to the security and well-being of humanity,

Encouraged by the success and vitality of the Southeast Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, an accord that sought to ameliorate the catastrophic ramifications of nuclear weapon testing in the Global South,
Recognizing the risk of accumulating nuclear waste that is produced by nuclear power plants and processing facilities, some of which has been sitting in interim storage since the 1940s,

Acknowledging that nuclear proliferation threatens the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) of Peace Justice, and Strong Institutions (16) by 2030,

Acknowledges the work of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization as in General Assembly resolution 54/280 (2000) in upholding the accounts of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for all Member States that have ratified such treaty,

Noting with satisfaction the work and progress made by several UN related bodies such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), among many others, and their commitment to dialogue, multilateralism, and cooperation,

Affirming the use of nuclear technology through programs similar to those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the use of clean energy,

Observing the effects of technology in military warfare and its rapid development and adoption, with specific focus on fast-paced advancements in artificial intelligence,

Underscoring the existence of established precedents, such as the Geneva Convention, that provides a blueprint for warfare and human treatment, and that aspect fully applies to lethal autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and artificial intelligence,

Recalling further that an arms race is in process with all the people of this world being affected, with that, WMDs implement excess power and the halt of production for materials need to be established,

Reaffirming the Guiding Principles established by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGEs) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems that outline our beliefs that autonomous weapons systems need to be under human supervision and compliant with international humanitarian law,

Fully alarmed with the increasing possibility of biological and cyber-attacks in which technological advancements incorporate to methodologies of reaching targets without human contact addressed by the Charter of the United Nations and its fundamental essence of defending human security, accountability, and humanitarianism,

Bearing in mind the Martens Clause, established in the 1899 Hague Convention, and its principle of regulating military technology should it cause unnecessary suffering and pose a threat to international humanitarian law,

Acknowledging that technology is an implementational part of the military and daily annotations of life which is greatly being misguided upon technology biases and technology limitations,

1. Calls for the strengthening of the legally binding Firearm Protocol, and the expansion of the Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT) within the Peacebuilding Fund, which assists countries by addressing:
a. Practical issues such as weapons collection and destruction, proper stockpile management, weapons marking, record keeping and tracing, and data and evidence collection and analysis;

b. Legal and policy frameworks, such as education and awareness raising, increased capacity building, and the creation of humanitarian spaces;

2. Supports the expanded access to education, information, and professional programs to bring decision-making female and minority leaders into the war room:

a. Creating local forums for young leaders in Member States affected by SALW violence;

b. Implementing quotas to make national parliament seats and SALW reform committees at least 25% female;

c. Giving more gender, ethnic, and religious minorities judiciary and prosecutorial roles in the proceedings of international tribunals, such as the ICC, which frequently deliberate crimes committed against humanity using SALW;

3. Recommends that Member States actively report monthly data on SALW to the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA) that will be in updated compiled reports which would include but is not limited to:

a. The number of SALW produced;

b. The number of SALW imported and exported;

4. Proclaims the need for the international community to strengthen and comply with international regulatory bodies as a means of transparency, and to ensure the protection of the human rights of the vulnerable from the threats of small armaments;

5. Recommends for the ICC and other international tribunals to use hiring quotas to create "balanced benches" on weapons-bolstered crime to give legal positions of authority to women, ethnic minorities, and religious minorities;

6. Encourages Member State delegations within UNICEF, UNFPA, and UNHCR to mutually audit each other every 3 months or during another time frame recommended by the UNDP to ensure the just treatment of women and children in armed societies (using metrics such as the Gender Equality Index in a war and weapons context);

7. Reiterates its request to provide developing Member States with governmental security training and technological resources in order to prevent terrorist groups, carteles and guerillas from finding an untroubled path through SALW into underdeveloped countries;

8. Recommends directing attention to secondhand sellers and distributors, suggests the expansion and strengthening of current United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA-SALW) and UNODA that would directly tackle the issue of the illicit transportation of legally and illegally bought SALW across domestic and international borders;
9. **Suggest** the implementation of red-flag laws internationally to ensure thorough evaluations of persons diagnosed with mental and psychological disabilities prior to gaining access to arms in order to decrease the number of mass shootings and firearm related deaths;

10. **Recommends** directing attention to secondhand sellers and distributors, suggests the expansion and strengthening of current PoA-SALW and UNODA that would directly tackle the issue of the illicit transportation of legally and illegally bought SALW across domestic and international borders;

11. **Suggests** that current regional organizations, such as the African Union, ASEAN, and others, communicate more freely and share intelligence within one another formation of regional groups to review, hold accountable, and better track illicit arms trade in specific regions, with:
   
   a. Regional groups from each continent holding regular bi-annual council meetings revolving around the topic of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation to ensure communication of ideas and issues within regions;

   b. Communication between regions being streamlined to ensure transparency and with wholistic information;

12. **Encourages** the Security Council to increase the channel of communication and transparency of small and conventional arms shipments by barcodes, contracts, and e-receipts by means of private companies in cooperation with the International Police Criminal Organization (INTERPOL) to:

   a. Track types of AI weapons, conventional arms, SALW, explosives;

   b. Track influx of weapons by region/countries by arrests, weapons confiscation, and illegal shipments;

   c. Check of financial registrations, commissions, contracts, and legal paperwork;

   d. Those that are not of legal standards will be flagged and subject to inspection with consent of the host nation state;

13. **Reiterates its call upon** closer adherence and implementation of the framework provided by the PoA-SALW at the national, regional level, and international level as active international cooperation is needed to eradicate this illicit trade;

14. **Underlines** with concern that machine/algorithm bias is gravitational to conflict, the announcement of reaffirming imputed knowledge is skewed and should be reevaluated;

15. **Supports** the expansion of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (ABDM) to bring outside expertise to the issues of disarmament, and terrorist group operations, in collaboration with the Arms Control Association to increase understanding through press briefings, negotiations, and agreement by sharing critical information whereas:

   a. Each participating Member State provides 1-2 representatives;
b. The Advisory Board collaborates with domestic intelligence government agencies to strengthen its efforts;

c. Strictly maintains the confidentiality of countries by providing the option to not share domestic classified information with the international team in order to ensure a country’s sovereignty;

16. Stresses the importance of establishing legal obligation for parties regarding the physical protection of nuclear material through the CPPNM;

17. Calls upon all nuclear weapons possessor states to take concrete interim measures pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/41 (2016), to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon detonations through:

   a. Reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in tactical military doctrines and move nuclear weapons away from deployment into storage;

   b. Secure deep geological disposal of radioactive waste and ensure rapid reductions of all types of nuclear weapons;

18. Encourages all Member States to discontinue providing any kind of support to Non-State actors like terrorist groups that seek to obtain, make, own, supply, and transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear technology for terrorist activities;

19. Emphasizing the process of delegitimizing the use and proliferation of WMDs through the continued support of the treaties of Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), along with encouraging mutual, bilateral initiatives for transparency among WMD-possessing states, and to encourage reductions of nuclear weapons over a certain period of time;

20. Affirming the efforts laid out by the General Assembly A/C.1/75/L.64: “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements” that it is the responsibility and obligation of all Member States to ease international tension and refrain from negatively influencing international security in efforts to advance in complete disarmament and effective arms control by:

   a. Encouraging States that have the ability to, to provide and support the national and international implementation of arms control, disarmament and NPT and agreements;

   b. Understanding the United Nations role in which negotiations are fostered as well as transparency regarding arms control, disarmament and NPTs;

21. Strongly advises all signatories of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment to participate in the regular review every 5 years of the CPPNM permitted by Article 16.2 to begin in 2022 in order to review the adequacy of the CPPNM
and maintain effective worldwide physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities used for peaceful purposes in line with SDG 16 by:

a. Continuing the meetings of legal and technical experts and a preparatory committee (PrepCom) of Member States, whether virtually or in-person, to set the thematic and procedural matters for the Conference to include strengthening state and international standards for the transportation of nuclear material and the protection of facilities;

b. Identifying the 2022 host nation as the United Kingdom;

c. Dedicating funding from voluntary Member States and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund to the implementation of this review conference;

22. Calls upon developed and developing nuclear energy Member States to continue pursuing the achievement of SDG 7 and 13 to achieve affordable and clean energy and combat climate change through nuclear energy and coordination with the IAEA's Department of Technical Cooperation, Department of Nuclear Energy and Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications to facilitate the growth of nuclear energy in all Member States who wish to pursue peaceful nuclear energy;

23. Seeks assistance from Nuclear Weapon States who have performed nuclear experiments in developing countries to aid in revitalising damaged ecosystems disrupted due to the testing, specifically finishing economies and agricultural communities that have been catastrophically damaged by the testing of nuclear weapons;

24. Further requests Members States to secure substantive progress of proper disposal through:

a. Establishing disposal of high level waste at preferred geological repository sites;

b. Allocating technological resources towards excavation of a deep underground repositories by using standard mining or civil engineering technology;

c. Working towards permanently vitrifying high level nuclear waste;

25. Requests for collaboration with the IAEA to facilitate the passing of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in order for Member States to work collaboratively towards the uses of nuclear technologies for peaceful and safe purposes;

26. Supports the expansion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to include a monitoring system that for all States that participate and assist in the monitoring process of nuclear testing:

a. Allow participating States to request a higher monitoring presence in their geographic region;

b. Create an official forum that discusses States that are testing nuclear weapons and in what regions;

c. Encourage participating States to perform national security audits on one another every financial quarter;
27. **Further requests** Nuclear Weapon States maintain peaceful relations and work towards eliminating nuclear testing sites in Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

28. **Emphasizes** the use of the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Training (INIT) programme for developing countries to receive training and expertise from developed nuclear energy Member States;

29. **Emphasizing** the need to create transparency of technological and nuclear energy developments through the creation of an international summit, the Technological Development Summit, to bring Member States together to discuss the creation of new AI technology and to report on the advancements of AI in autonomous, weaponization systems, and nuclear weapon systems:
   
   a. The Technological Development Summit will meet bi-annually with the attendance of Member States, AI innovators, and technology experts to discuss new technological advancements in AI;

   b. To be taken apart through UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR);

   c. Reports will be taken by the Technological Development Summit;

30. **Emphasizing** the need for an international definition on the levels of AWS, including:
   
   a. Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems (Off the Loop), whereas AI weapons systems that do not have any human interaction and are fully autonomous over the tracking, pursuit, and identification of a target, and over the attack (automatic in using force, neutralization, and object destruction;

   b. Semi-Autonomous Weapons Systems, whereas AI weapons systems that have a limited amount of human interaction;

31. **Recommends** creating the REBAW (Rules of Engagement on the Battlefield for AI Weaponry) adding to the already existing battlefield rules of engagement outlined by the Geneva Convention and creating rules of engagement for AI conventional weaponry on the battlefield through including human operation to start and abort missions, selecting targets, making the distinction between potential targets and bystanders, deciding on degrees of force, and identifying surrender, to minimize collateral damage and to prevent the killing of noncombatants on the battlefield;

32. Underlines with concern that machine/algorithm bias is gravitational to conflict, the announcement of reaffirming imputed knowledge is skewed and should be reevaluated, including the:
   
   a. Reevaluation of what information is inputted within the AI systems;

   b. Database information collection for analyzation and reworking sections that show skewness and bias upon technology and AI;

   c. Establishment of more data to include in AI systems for less biases platonically within all fields of technology;
33. *Further recommends* the enhancement and the improvement of the international tracing of AWS to keep up with the ever-changing technology advancements by using the ITI to easily trace the AWS back to the country and human operator who is responsible for physical and electronic markings on the AWS able to be traced back to the human operator and country by using the international tracing instrument;

34. *Requests* the review of the use of Artificial Intelligence in the decision-making process of nuclear warheads as it removes all human rational decision making:

   a. Recognizes the potential increase of cyber insecurities with the introduction of AI protection systems;

   b. Establishing a database that traces the creation of nuclear warheads and detects their international use.
The General Assembly First Committee,

Reaffirming the commitment of the Member States to peace through international treaties such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), as well as the Statute of the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),

Noting with satisfaction the work done by the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) to provide assistance such as tracing illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and law enforcement cooperation to stop the trafficking of illicit arms,

Noting with deep concern the agile and borderless nature of illicit transnational organizations in the trafficking of SALW leading to the exacerbation of civil conflicts within the international community,

Elucidating the correlation between Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, which is a vision in developing peace and security for all Member States and overall disarmament in the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies at all levels,

Appalled by the sponsorship of the defense weapons industry in the practice of destruction for profit,

Alarmed by the rate at which SALW is currently being illegally traded in developed countries despite international collaborative efforts,

Recognizing “Air” guns as valid and lethal weapons systems that employ the explosive qualities of alcohol as a firing mechanism,

Convinced by studies that show a substantial increase in the trafficking of conventional and non-conventional firearms on a global scale,

Taking into account an increase in homemade ballistic weaponry being more accessible in developing countries,

Concerned by the lack of attention given to ensuring developing nations have sufficient resources and knowledge to protect their borders from not just illicit gun trade but also homemade guns so, in turn, these nations will be able to provide a safe environment for their citizens,

Taking into account the difficulty of tracking homemade weaponry due to their unconventional nature compared to standard firearms,

1. Encourages Member States to expand upon the use of the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) and increase cooperation with international organizations such as the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) and
international firearm databases such as Interpol’s Illicit Arms Record and Tracing Management System (iARMS) to deter malicious actors from acquiring firearms through:

a. Supporting the workings of International Tracing Instrument (ITI), adopted by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA-SALW), in widening the database to be more inclusive and transparent;

b. Expressing its hope that Member States use MOSAIC and are transparent with information concerning the flow of illicit SALW;

c. Reminding Member States that local law enforcement can better deter the trafficking of arms if there is collective involvement;

2. Requests that a greater emphasis is placed on the importance of providing resources and knowledge for developing Member States to tackle the issue of SALW smuggling:

a. Implementation of a multinational initiative similar to the Arms Trade Treaty in Asia, Africa, and South American states that have not already shown support in the matter;

b. Recommending current Member States to allow for further education and training on the matter as new methods and data are brought forth into the public domain;

3. Strongly encourages Member States to continue to consider the importance of SDG 16 in promoting peace and tranquility and further asserts that by providing resources to new programs focused on tracking the illegal smuggling of homemade weaponry, crime rates will subsequently decrease;

4. Emphasizes the need to explore deterrence measures to prevent the act or desire to engage in SALW smuggling to protect the security interests of the people;

5. Strongly condemns any public, or private, sponsorship, of any nature, of defense companies profiting from destruction by emphasizing the effect SALW manufacturers have in developing countries, including civil wars and domestic conflicts;
The General Assembly First Committee,

Determined to address the issues of disarmament, arms control, nuclear information security, and non-proliferation treaties and agreements in a facilitative and internationally beneficial manner,

Viewing with appreciation previous agreements regarding nuclear weapons such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), having examined the work of non-proliferation treaties and promoting the need to strengthen the clauses, regulations, and customs within to keep up with the current global climate,

Expressing the crucial need for non-nuclear states to be protected from and deter nuclear attacks by developing conventional military tactics and weaponry,

Aware of gender-based bias and civil rights violations that exist within the conversation regarding nuclear disarmament and how promoting diverse leadership within such safety organizations, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), can have a greater effect on its outcome,

Keeping in mind that according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, international discourse is imperative to address the rising number in reports to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database in regard to unauthorized possession of nuclear materials and small and light weapons,

Recognizing the need for knowledge about nuclear energy, especially in developing nations, and the need for Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) to advise those nations looking to not only establish power plants but also continually work to keep power plants maintained and updated, while upholding and ensuring the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals Seven and Thirteen,

Noting with deep concern the rate at which nuclear information regarding weapons, technology, and energy shared at academic and other institutions and understanding the new risks posed by these technologies regarding the access of information to potentially irresponsible parties,

Taking note also of the increased availability of nuclear material to hostile non-state actors, due to multiple factors, an increase in the quantity and quality of nuclear material being used for both military and civilian purposes, increased vulnerabilities in global bulk supply chains of raw materials due to infrastructure concerns and the increase in quantity, an increase in the building capacity and organization of non-state actors around the world thanks to increased training and information available, the lack of a dedicated GGEs to identify and recommend norms, practices and progress in regards to the maintenance, storage, management and non-proliferation of raw and enriched nuclear material,

Considering Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 in which inclusive and quality education is ensured to encourage civil society participation through systematizing non-governmental organization access in the primary disarmament organs and mainstreaming disarmament education,
Understanding ideas established in the NPT in partnership with the IAEA, be utilized in the future to help establish safeguards among non-member and member nations alike in the purpose of safety, and recognizing the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification that provides services to participating States in regards to verifying the disarmament of active nuclear warheads, upholding the account of the Non Proliferation Treaty in emphasizing the need for nuclear energy to be used for peaceful purposes,

Convinced that all Member States and observers realize the value and importance of a nuclear drawdown, meaning that they acknowledge the necessity to reduce their nuclear arsenal or cease non-peaceful nuclear programs,

Acknowledges that there are legitimate reasons for Member States to harbor nuclear weapons and notes the need to address underlying conflicts and tensions in order to achieve successful disarmament,

Bearing in mind the potential threat untraced SALW and anti-personnel mines and similar technology,

Further emphasizing the existential threat of mutually assured destruction that the continued proliferation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons poses to all Member States,

Regretting the unfortunate incidence of terrorism that plagues the respective region of Kashmir caused by the illegal trading of SALW leading to violence by extremist groups,

Recognizing the dire need to hold accountable piracy and terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, along with combating corruption within the organizations that are meant to uphold established regulations,

Confirms the framework of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA-SALW), the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), in its efforts of increasing transparency and shared communication in Member States SALW data,

Welcoming international cooperation with the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme (DDR), Interpol’s Electronic Weapons Tracing System (IWeTS), and with in dismantling and identifying the possession of SALW from irresponsible non-state actors,

Noticing the need for international accessible information for nations to take into consideration for domestic and global cooperation and usage with United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA),

1. *Requests* periodic review and potential renewal to non-proliferation treaties in order to ensure that all relevant non-proliferation treaties remain effective and relevant moving into the future and keep up with the current international non-proliferation climate:

   a. *Further reminds* the importance of reviewing and renewing, the NPT in particular, by section as follows; Non-Proliferation, Disarmament, and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy;

   b. *Emphasizes* the importance of an in-depth analysis of sectionary divisions of each prominent arms treaty to ensure up-to-date regulations and information based on current international happenings;
c. Recommends the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty by all Member States, but understands and respects the decision of dissenting Member States to remain persistent objectors;

2. Encourages the proposal of non-nuclear state regional defense alliances and resource pools to deter nuclear weapon attacks and unsafe testing, in order to:
   a. Protect the interests and safety of non-nuclear states, especially those in close geographic proximity;
   b. Create an inclusive and collaborative geopolitical atmosphere where the interests of all states and nations are realized and recognized;

3. Calls upon Member States to effectively combat gender-based bias and civil rights exploitation in nuclear non-proliferation agreements by:
   a. Sending delegations reflecting not only gender equality but also peoples of all nationalities, specifically within the IAEA, to these agreement discussions;
   b. Considering placing quotas on the number of women required for seats in educational and government forums on nuclear nonproliferation;
   c. Forming a program modeled after the EU-Non Proliferation and Disarmament’ Young Women and Next Generation Initiative (YWNGI) through UN-Women, in order to educate women on disarmament and arms control initiatives;

4. Welcomes the participation of all Member States in the formation of a working group to increase international collaboration and the creation of a task force designed to identify and respond to Non-State Actors against NSAs who seek to escalate conflict through arms or nuclear proliferation by:
   a. Encouraging the formation of an ad hoc working group under the topic of “Protecting Against Illegal Arms Control and Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation” where all Member States are able to participate;
   b. Endorsing the creation of the “NSA De-Escalation Task Force” with the purpose to research and advise Member States on how to address SALW trends using geospatial intelligence by:
      i. including identifying the emergence of new weapons technologies obtained by NSAs;
      ii. prioritizing where to send humanitarian or medical aid, within vulnerable areas of armed conflict;

5. Encourages further implementation of clean energy and safety measures within the realm of nuclear energy, as well as the consistent maintenance and upkeep of nuclear energy facilities such as that of nuclear power plants that provide sources of clean energy, safety measures must be implemented in order to continue uses of Nuclear energy and to ensure the future of peaceful Nuclear power within Member States, by SDGs 7 and 13 by:
a. Providing and maintaining a sufficient budget for the facilities in order to continue and expand the mission of safety and security for all in accordance with IAEA through:

- i. Continuing to work within IAEA frameworks to share nuclear technology and infrastructure;
- ii. Encouraging developed nations to help developing countries by sharing knowledge about how to safely install nuclear power plants and infrastructure;
- iii. Continuing to safely and carefully share uranium and other radioactive elements;

b. Ensuring proper training for nuclear energy upkeep;

c. Aiding in the development of nuclear facilities for developing countries;

d. Focusing nuclear efforts away from weaponry and towards sustainable development;

6. **Strongly advises** research into new risks posed by innovative technologies regarding the access of vital nuclear arms information to potentially irresponsible parties, such as non-state actors through the:

   a. initiation of an investigative committee to project the effects that new technology could potentially have on the ability of irresponsible non-state parties to wrongfully possess nuclear arms and nuclear arms information;

   b. Invitation of an evaluative party within each nation possessing nuclear power to address these risks based on the individual concerns within every country;

   c. Recommendation that states with nuclear information sharing programs, such as Norway’s Export License, are updated with stricter guidelines to prevent the spread of information on nuclear technology being used in non-peaceful ways;

7. **Suggests** for the incorporation of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) by the Secretary-General, to prepare reports for the General Assembly in regards to norms, practices and recommendations involving nuclear disarmament and proliferation, as well as progress made and progress that needs to be made towards a defined disarmament goal, and to provide oversight on the development of weapons and the sales and shipments of nuclear materials as well as nuclear testing sites, for military and civilian use alike, as to prevent non-state actors from obtaining it by creating an administrative body to protect the development and sales of weapon and an administrative body to protect testing sites;

8. **Introduces** the need for all Member States to continue to allocate resources towards the education of handmade arms in developing communities affected by instability through the PoA-SALW;

9. **Recommends** that a multinational forum be established to connect the NPT as well as IAEA, in order to provide all states with already ensured safety measures created by the IAEA agency alongside the establishment of a multinational committee, hereby referred to as the Council on Sovereignty and Nuclear Security (CSN), open to all Member States and observer entities with the provisions of:
a. Asking IAEA allow increased inclusion non-Member States to engage current safety standards and practices regardless of membership status to the agency;

b. Emphasizing that the forum will be compliant with principles, provisions, and stipulations contained within the ideas of the NPT and the IAEA for the purpose of CSN being able to:

i. Slowly and gradually implementing an equal and fair disarmament of nuclear weapons in all nuclear weapons states (NWS);

ii. Advance regional stability and cooperation in areas with complex security environments;

iii. Design a further strict timetable consisting of an interval of no fewer than 5 years, at which nations will dispose of a set number of nuclear warheads until a suitably low number has been reached by implementing a target by which all Member States will have reached an equivalent, reduced number of nuclear warheads (on or off of missile bodies), a total of no more than 125 nuclear warheads;

iv. Inspect, Pursuant to IAEA stipulations, NWS and Member States suspected of nuclear capabilities in order to ensure compliance with the drawdown, as to implement a set process for verifying the successful disarmament of nuclear warheads that:

a. All Member States can access how the physical dismantlement process works and can be implemented on a global scale;

b. Create a review of the process meeting every 5 years to discuss the progress in verifying dismantlement with nuclear arms-bearing states;

c. Creating a double verification process in which an independent committee is formed, returning to state efforts and verifying that they have reached desired goals;

v. Help ensure that new nuclear energy sites are safe and do not pose a threat to the Member State in which they reside so as to ensure personnel training and site safety, CSN also work to make nuclear energy sites more resistant to natural disasters to avoid tragedy like the Fukushima disaster of 2011;

vi. Provide training and educational services on the process of converting to peaceful use of nuclear energy, as such services also include ways nuclear energy can be beneficial even for non-nuclear bearing Member States;

vii. Reemphasize that all nuclear weapon Member States have already promised to reduce their nuclear weapon stockpile by 10% over the next five years and in five year increments;

viii. Allow each Member State reserves the right to formally withdraw from CSN and stipulated provisions at any time and the right to review compliance in any other Member State per formal request issued to CSN;

10. Recommends the creation of a multilateral joint task force under the jurisdiction of CSN for counterterrorism in the regions of Kashmir that:

a. Creates a multilateral task force that will include security communication and recommendations from India and Pakistan;
b. Produces a report of joint security efforts in the region for the UN every 3 years;

c. Provides a framework for joint and merging efforts between Pakistan and Indian security forces;

d. Works toward an end-goal of complete Pakistani-Indian security collaboration in the region;

e. Respects the right of every state involved militarily in the region to have control over their security efforts and allow a review of the task force’s objectives, compliance, or pull-out at any time;

f. Works with non-nuclear weapon states within IPNDV to ensure that security efforts are accurate at the mark of the 3 year period;

11. Establishes a separate task force under CSN’s jurisdiction that is compliant with the regulations of and in cooperation with the IAEA that will, inter alia, contrive a long-term investment plan that:

   a. Provides mass training programs for Member States who request assistance from the task force where training programs will be carried out in collaboration with the IAEA;

   b. Provides storage of nuclear fissile material where none of the nuclear fissile material obtained by the task force will be from mining;

   c. Encourages and aids in the disassembly and de-enrichment of nuclear warheads and their payloads to salvage their nuclear fissile material, where the task force will accept nuclear warheads from Member States under a simple disassembly program based on rules that:

      i. Member States and the task force split the disassembly costs;

      ii. Member States receives 60% of salvaged nuclear fissile material;

      iii. The task force keeps 40% of salvaged nuclear fissile material;

   d. The task force will take additional guidance from the Security Council and will be staffed by no fewer than 5 representatives from Member States elected by the General Assembly every 5 years;

   e. Designates the Member States of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers;

12. Further recommends that CSN create and oversee a database to track and log records of the transportation of merchant ships globally which will:

   a. Collaborate with all volunteering Member States and those participating in CSN, the World Trade Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and other similar bodies relevant to economic trade to gather intelligence on the movements of merchant ships for the database;

   b. Track imports and exports to limit lost SALW, ammunition, and illegal trade and:
i. Allow the ability to retrace where the weapons are to hold accountability for countries promoting violence and corruption;

ii. Expand upon the UN Register for Conventional Arms and including the framework of The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction and including such systems into the database;

13. **Requests** the Security Council to exercise their powers in a more concerted and robust manner by imposing stricter punishments on those that are confirmed to have violated customary or otherwise binding international law:

   a. Punishments should derive legitimacy and be consistent with erga omnes obligations;

   b. Validation for such measures may and in many cases should be derived from advisory opinions requested of the International Court of Justice;

14. **Encourages** multilateral tracing efforts of illicit SALW with United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT), UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime;

15. **Encourages** Member States to strengthen the implementation of the PoA-SALW ITI through:

   a. Encouraging Member States to submit an annual review to UN Institute for Disarmament Research;

   b. Recommending Signatory and observing Member States attend an annual conference for the discussion on strategies to improve the PoA SALW ITI;

16. **Notes with concern** the lack of security surrounding international weapon storage of SALW and suggests:

   a. Looking to create an international standard for the storage of small and light weapons as well as proper training of personnel guarding firearm storage facilities to avoid the potential distribution of these arms;

   b. Member States aim to create a task force and education program dealing with the protection of weapon storage and ensuring a secure facility;

17. **Supports** cooperation with the DDR along with the separate IWeTS following:

   a. Including the International Centre For Counter-Terrorism alongside UNOCT that identifies SALWs held by non-state actors that violate international law, this center should continue to specialize in non-state actor interactions and involvement and create recommendations for a dismantling procedure for firearms and explosive recycling and dismantling;
18. **Recommends** that Member States annually report data on SALW to the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN CASA) including but not limited to keep and actively update compiled reports from Member States to provide easy access information, as:

a. Member States should prioritize the collection of the following information:

   i. The number of SALW produced;
   ii. The number of SALW imported and exported;
   iii. The destination or source of any imported or exported SALW;

b. Member States should work in tandem with the UN CASA to verify the integrity of report data;

c. Member States may form regional commissions if they please, and it is the recommendation of the complete body that data should be freely and completely shared among Member States;

d. It is recommended for Member States to participate in the program to improve tracing but not required of Member States.