The General Assembly First Committee,

Recognizing the urgency of eradicating chemical weapons from the modern global community as they are weapons which directly impact human rights and have dire impacts on victims of chemical attacks, and acknowledging the positive impact of organizations such as AKUT Search and Rescue Association, Doctors Without Borders, The Red Cross, the Red Crescent, the Syrian Civil Defense Forces, and EMERGENCY UK,

Acknowledging the relevance of pre-existing frameworks such as the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its mandate, as it encompasses existing regimes on mitigating the proliferation of chemical weapons,

Recognizing the primary purpose of the OPCW to fully eradicate the use, development, and manufacturing of chemical weapons; its role in implementing the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC); and the need for all Member States to sign and ratify the CWC,

Convinced that further measures are required to hold perpetrators of chemical weapon attacks accountable through the OPCW, and international and national laws, in particular by both state and non-state actors,

Fully aware of Article II of the CWC that currently defines chemical weapons to include all toxic chemicals and their precursors, except when used for purposes permitted by the convention, in quantities consistent with such a purpose,

Taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 71/220 (2017) that emphasizes the need for an economical and environmentally-friendly international disposal mechanism for the remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons,

Noting the need to monitor the proliferation of chemical materials due to the unsupervised nature of its transportation across national borders as well as discrepancies between declared and undeclared stockpiles,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 47/39 (1992) on the prohibition of the development, production, and use of chemical weapons and their destruction and considering General Assembly resolution 61/102 (2006) about the relationship between disarmament and development and about the observance of environmental norms in implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control,

Considering the high level of Member States participation to Australia Group Activities to promote negotiations in the conference on Disarmament in Geneva,

1. Recommends the expansion of the OPCW’s Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons in order to facilitate proper support of civilian non-combatants affected by chemical warfare by increasing the emphasis on medical care for victims through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which provide technical courses to volunteer groups involved in medical evacuation in danger areas, and urban search and rescue as well as establishing further contacts with the appropriate NGOs which provide the proper medical treatment of those who are victims of chemical warfare;

2. Supports the expansion of the CWC and OPCW’s shared information data bases with the task of tracking information regarding the export of dual use chemical materials consisting of the chemical make-up, mode of
transportation, and a declaration by State Parties to the CWC on the intended usage of chemical materials through suggested funding from OPCW or sovereign nations which will:

a. Monitor the buying and selling of large amounts of materials commonly used in chemical warfare;

b. Track the chemicals used in chemical attacks by various measures including but not limited to testing soil, air quality and victim accounts;

3. **Calls upon** Member States to implement OPCW regulations and provisions and relevant laws and agreements both within Member States and the international community and suggests enforcing financial sanctions already in place;

4. **Recommends** working with the OPCW and Member States to create international chemical weapon disposal mechanism by:

a. Reusing the components of chemical weapons for research and promoting the funding of laboratories, so chemical weapons stockpiles can be used by scientists for alternative purposes, as well as, neutralizing the remaining components;

b. Emphasizing a neutralization method followed by bio treatment as an environmentally friendly, relatively simple, and cost-effective method to dispose of chemical weapons;

c. Providing OPCW agents that will verify the destruction of chemical weapons, as well as, enter verification of the chemical weapon destruction into an international database;

d. Suggesting funding from Member States to be allocated towards the international chemical weapons disposal mechanism;

5. **Encourages** the elaboration of the current definition set forth by the CWC that currently includes toxic chemicals and their precursors, munitions, and devices by:

a. Expanding the materials list that can be used as chemical weapons to allow for the creation of a Schedule IV in coordination with the Annex on Chemicals which would be specifically directed towards dual-use chemicals, or any chemicals that, in addition to being used for consumer purposes, can also be used for developing a toxic chemical;

b. Recognizing the need to classify the insensitivity of every chemical attack and the damages of chemical materials in regards to their effects on the human body according to the severity of the attack and to impose an appropriate response with the potential of sanctions;

6. **Supporting** the Triple I mechanism, referring to international, impartial, and independent, which was established by the international Criminal Court to bring accountability to the users of chemical weapons;

7. **Fosters** the creation of additional OPCW verification laboratories as outlined by Article X of the CWC, through a collaboration with NGOs and national intelligence and an increased function of the OPCW, these laboratories would allow for an increased amount of research;

8. **Suggests** that the OPCW increases security through issuing inspection licenses to international inspectors prior to their arrival at their designated point of entry, ensuring the integrity of the process and ensure safety for those inspectors and by conducting two inspections per quarter, one in the beginning and one at the end to ensure frequent and adequate inspection results as compared to chemical weapon capabilities;

9. **Further recommends** a closer cooperation with the chemical industries which will be of use for conducting research and development on dual-use chemicals for the purposes of:
a. Efficient communication between Member States and chemical industries for effective dissemination of information new chemicals which can be used for beneficial and harmful purposes;

b. Sharing of information of effective ways of disposing chemicals that could prevent detrimental effects to the environment;

10. **Affirms** the importance to recycle the chemical substances originally created as weapons addressing these chemical materials for didactical, industrial, and research aims;

11. **Supports** the need to implement and strengthen volunteer export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group:

   a. By adopting a two-tier mechanism involving processing licenses for chemical weapons precursors through common control lists;

   b. By promoting transparency to prevent the acquisition of chemical weapons for military end-uses through the adoption of a dual-use item list.
The General Assembly First Committee,

Emphasizing Security Council resolution 2365 (2017) which states there is a global urgency to dismantle chemical weapons because of the high amounts of civilians killed or maimed by them since their emergence in World War One,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 72/43 (2017) which addresses the use of chemical weapons and successfully implemented the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that aims to eradicate chemical weapons by prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons; moreover, limiting the dissemination of chemical agents,

Recognizing the need to address chemical weapons use through technological measures which facilitate non-proliferation and strengthen trust building,

Appreciating the achievement of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in global chemical weapons elimination and calling attention to future accountability system and fully implementation of the CWC,

Recalling the OPCWs ability to discern parties involved in chemical warfare using its Inspectorate Division, a branch of the CWC that manages the inspections of both military and commercial facilities required by the CWC,

Emphasizing the research done by the United Nations Safeguard International Ammunition Technical Guidelines into the safe destruction of chemical stockpiles that acknowledges the need for further research into clean and affordable destruction methods,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 72/43 (2017) which invites Member States, Observer States, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to affirm commitment to the core values of the Nelson Mandela Peace Summit (2004) and the continuing dismantling of active chemical weapon stockpiles,

Highlights the steps already taken by the OPCW Advisory Board on Education and Outreach that specializes in multilateral chemical weapons disarmament issues,

Acknowledging the immense difficulties of tracing the manufacturing and distribution of chemical weapons,

Noting the significance of reviewing and implementing national policies which enforce regulations on all aspects of chemical weapon proliferation,

Acknowledging the success in collaborating with regional civilian NGOs that aim to respond immediately to chemical weapon attacks in conflict zones,

Further Acknowledging the African Union’s Agenda 2063 which enacts a bottom up approach in prioritizing domestic security through a concrete system of oversight and accountability measures,

Fully Aware of Member States retaining chemical weapons, specifically non-signers of the CWC, to join the aforementioned working group as established in General Assembly resolution 70/33 (2015), in order to foster dialogue between chemical and non-chemical states and find solutions bearing all states’ perspectives in mind,
Aware of emerging technologies in chemical fingerprinting and its possible applications for tracking the movement of chemical weapons,

Stressing its desire to further inform civil society and non-state parties of the dangers chemical weapons pose on the international community,

Recognizing the necessity of expanding global knowledge regarding the creation, distribution, neutralization, destruction, and disposal of weapons to enable every Member State to safely and effectively respond to these issues,

Realizing the need for the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons in states where they may be used by non-state actors.

Affirming the goal set by the OPCW and Human Rights Council standard by the United Nations (UN) though innovative uses of technology to help spread awareness about Chemical Weapons attacks,

Recognizing the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons and the voluntary trust fund to support chemical weapon attack victims,

Noting the International Symposium on Medical Treatment of Chemical Warfare Victims convened by the OPCW recently,

Noting the effectiveness of social media to spread valuable know-how and positive change,

Noting with deep concern the lack of transportation infrastructure in developing Member States and the impact disarmament methods of chemical weapons has on the environment,

Directs attention to the OPCW’s 2017 20th Anniversary Social Media Campaign,

1. Urges the OPCW to consider additional reforms to strengthen the credibility of the nonproliferation regime and invites mechanisms, such as an international database in partnership with the OPCW, to increase transparency within international communities;

2. Suggests reaching out to organizations, such as the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, which specializes in education regarding chemical weapons and that can offer valuable disarmament tactics through think tanks and conferences that highlights the need to dispose of chemical weapons and stockpiles that take into account environmental, social, and economic implications;

3. Invites the OPCW to broaden this definition of chemical weapons to include the hostile and illegitimate use of chemical weapons in the general purpose criterion;

4. Encourages the establishment of probationary periods for Member States that have used chemical weapons to re-accede to the CWC;

5. Further recommends filling technical gaps to ensure evidence is collected and preserved to OPCW standards;

6. Encourages the establishment of mock attack drills under the administration of the OPCW and the participation of Member States in those drills;

7. Expresses utmost efforts to engage, expand, and strengthen civil society to foster a community that calls for action in response to all violations surrounding chemical weapons usage;

8. Further recommends the establishment of an institutional mechanism to reduce vulnerability from political obstruction from other State parties;

9. Emphasizing the goal of Committee 1540 with UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to aid Member States in their efforts to fulfill their requirements of resolution 1540 and past instruments like the CWC;
10. Requests the needed amendments for domestic legal frameworks in place in order to see proper prosecution for the use of chemical weapons as an avenue for accountability;

11. Advocates for the safety of the people and protection of the environment during the destruction of the stockpiles through:
   a. Clean environmental means of disposal, including neutralization and incineration with the use of monoethanolamine, hydrolysis, and pyrolysis;
   b. Methods that comply with national and international safety and emission regulations;
   c. Further research funded by the OPCW towards affordable methods in the progression of destruction;
   d. The development mobile platforms in order to provide a global destruction facility;

12. Recommends partnerships with environmentally friendly NGOs such as Green Cross International that provides economic initiatives in order to safely, sustainably, and affordably dispose of chemical weapons through incineration or neutralization in ways that;

13. Discourages the reemergence of chemical weapon use by destroying chemical munitions in a timely manner to dissuade future use;

14. Strongly urges all Member States, Observer States, and NGO’s who are signatories of the OPCW to actively be a part of and contribute to all upcoming Nelson Mandela Peace Summits regarding the disposal of chemical weapon stockpiles in order to better assist in drafting of any legislation as well as contributing resources for any further resolutions;

15. Supports dual-use technology by preserving and reusing the uncontaminated metals for benevolent purposes, utilizing Radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology throughout the entire manufacturing process to ensure no chemicals are lost during manufacturing, processing, or shipment;

16. Strongly suggests reaching out to organizations such as the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation who specialize in education regarding chemical weapons, and that can offer valuable disarmament tactics through think tanks and conferences that highlight the need to dispose of chemical weapons and malevolent stockpiles that takes into account environmental, social, and economic implications;

17. Stresses the importance of addressing the issue abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) in ways that encourages Member States to declare ACWs with OPCW, sees that the removal of ACWs left near waterways are prioritized, and recognizes that ACWs can be removed in concurrence with stockpiles;

18. Calls for the expansion of the investigative duties of the OPCW and its Inspectorate Division in order to further define the capabilities of the OPCW’s investigative stakeholders which may involve industrial inspections which focuses on investigating attacks perpetrated with chemical weapons and possession of such weapons of mass destruction, as well as transnational units for monitoring regions that have previously struggled with chemical warfare;

19. Advocates for the expansion of the goals of the OPCW through existing programs and the creation of new initiatives to include:
   a. Reaffirming the need for an educational framework by implementing a taskforce for education against chemical hazards initiative, which will effectively enable and train chemists on security measures and potential security risks such as the misuse of organophosphates through coordinated multinational research;
b. Encouraging research facilities to cooperate in developing safe methods of neutralization, destruction, and disposal of chemical weapons in controlled laboratory environments;

c. Requesting that countries in possession of nuclear weapons aid in the research by allowing portions of their stockpiles to be studied;

d. Promoting international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for more efficient methods of tracing the origins of chemical weapons attacks and working with organizations such as Intertek, MIT, and other cutting-edge research facilities to advance and implement chemical fingerprints;

e. Educating professionals in the field of chemistry on security measures in regards to organophosphates used in the manufacturing of chemical weapons;

f. Requiring chemists within the initiative to contribute and verify information about the monitoring of the productions and manufacturing of chemical weapons within a shared OPCW database, which will require:

i. The establishment of a committee comprised of experts in defense, chemistry, health, and environmental science meet annually to update a shared knowledge database of chemical weapons research and holdings to discuss new developments in the creation, neutralization, destruction, and disposal of chemical weapons;

ii. The creation of a secure database that allows for sharing the results of research between Member States in hopes of increasing awareness of safe and effective methods for responding to chemical weapons attacks;

iii. Member States to consider collaboration with organizations such as AKUT Search and Rescue Association which advance technical training courses to responders of chemical weapon attacks;

iv. High-level policy dialogue on advance science, technology, and innovation between regions such as the one existing between European Union and Africa;

v. The sharing of scientific knowledge that bears in mind Article XI of the CWC with the aim of promoting the use of chemical knowledge for peace;

vi. Hosting symposiums advances the understanding of chemistry and local connections between bodies working within the OPCW;

g. Encouraging the implementation of capacity-building tools, educational programs, training seminars and workshops jointly by the OPCW for Member States and societies that:

i. Incorporate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to educate populaces their nations’ chemical weapons policies, and their compliance with international treaties regarding chemical weapons usage and disarmament, to allow them to hold their Member States accountable for the production, use, and destruction of chemical weapons in a sustainable way;

ii. Encourage Member States to increase voluntary aid to these programs, which are the main components of progress on chemical weapons disarmament,

iii. Support the advocacy of analytical chemistry course hosted in critical languages to better the understanding of chemistry through the local professionals of affected areas, and better the relationship of the UN with local chemists, governments, and NGOs;

h. Further encouraging Member States to increase voluntary aid to these programs and recommends collaboration with the OPCW, UNODA, UNREC, and other research institutions such as the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VWERTIC), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), etc. to aid individual Member State’s voluntary contributions for funding purposes;
20. **Reiterates its call upon** Member States to comply with the OPCW by providing accurate self-reports of chemical weapons possessions and allowing the OPCW to conduct inspections of all relevant facilities;

21. **Supports** the advocacy of chemistry training courses hosted to better the understanding of chemistry through relevant agencies in affected areas and better the relationship and collaborative efforts of the UN agencies with local chemists, governments, and NGOs;

22. **Encourages** the implementation of capacity-building tools, educational programs, training seminars, and workshops jointly by the OPCW for Member States and societies;

23. **Further recommends** these programs to incorporate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to educate populations on chemical weapons usage to allow them to hold their Member States accountable for the production, use, and destruction of chemical weapons in a sustainable way,

24. **Further encourages** Member States to increase voluntary aid to these programs, which are the main components of progress on chemical weapons disarmament.

25. **Calls upon** Member States to adopt policies similar to Turkey’s Law Number 5564 which focuses solely on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and the use of chemical weapons;

26. **Urges** Member States to consider organizations such as AKUT Search and Rescue Association which advance technical training courses to responders of chemical weapon attacks;

27. **Promotes** expansion and replication in a chemical weapons context of the working group as established in General Assembly resolution 70/33 which discusses transparency measures which reduce the risk of accidental, mistaken, and unauthorized nuclear weapon detonations;

28. **Further promotes** the pursuit of multilateral regional solutions in order to better international peace and security while recognizing the sovereignty of each Member State in pursuing these ends;

29. **Affirms** the creation of recognized regional nonproliferation organizations that will aid in enforcing the CWC as well as all other related resolutions created within UN bodies;

30. **Recommends** the pursuit of multilateralism to achieve a just and equitable international order that is respectful of international law and the sovereign equality of all Member States, and recognizes the Member States role in promoting multilateralism for the benefits of the Union especially through their regional organizations;

31. **Recommends** a higher implication by Member States towards the OPCW Associate Programs by inviting the Nation’s respective academic experts to understand more effectively the OPCW current challenges;

32. **Encourages** the promotion of the Hague Ethical Guidelines in the existing meetings regarding the sharing of scientific knowledge;

33. **Noting with deep concern** the senseless and preventable loss of life that has resulted from chemical weapons not yet destroyed, as in 2018 the UN Independent International Commission of the Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic confirmed at least 34 chemical attacks since 2013;

34. **Suggests** that in the case of a chemical attack, citizens are recommended to be knowledgeable about how to respond and protect themselves and established toolkits that help bring attention to the victims of chemical warfare, assist investigators with establishing target areas and educate others in what to do in case of a chemical attack, which can be done through the spreading of know-how via:

   a. Social media, such as videos and posts, which can be used to disseminate UN sponsored post that include relevant medical techniques to make civilians under potential attack aware of the dangers of chemical weapons and how to best respond to them through proper self-care and maintenance after attack, through proper knowledge of where to acquire treatment for the effects of chemical
weapons, by understanding not all illnesses and long-term disabilities from chemical weapons are visual and to still find help if a victim seems unaffected;

b. The development and execution of chemical weapon attack drills, which may better civilian understanding of how to remain safe during a chemical weapons attack through response simulation of these attacks, better the understanding of first responders on how to adequately address the issue and remain safe during and after attack, and promote healthy tactics for local leaders on how to boost morale of citizens’ post attack, assess damage, and plan moving forward;

c. Incorporation into formal education, through specific-educational programs, the hazards of chemical weapons can be removed by encouraging Member States to incorporate the work of NGOs such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent into formal education;

35. Call upon Member States to look toward the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Agnostic Compact Demilitarization of Chemical Agents program as a model and the end result of stable alkali or alkaline earth metal salts to promote recyclable disarmament and aid in cutting down infrastructure costs for the construction of roads in developing Member States;

36. Encourages the OPCW to continue the collaboration and work with scientists, clinicians, experts, academia, and civil society representatives in order to explore emerging technologies and methods such as bio-surveillance that can be taken advantage of mass chemical casualties.
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Code: GA1/1/3
Committee: General Assembly First Committee
Topic: Addressing the Use of Chemical Weapons

The General Assembly First Committee,

Affirming the definition of chemical weapons as toxic chemicals and their precursors, munitions, devices, and equipment specifically intended to cause harm and death as outlined in Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),

Recognizing the urgency for standardized definitions in order to provide the international community with a common and universal understanding of terms related to chemical weapons to facilitate the global effort to eliminate the production of such weapons,

Recalling all chemical weapons strikes, injuries, and fatalities inflicted upon innocent civilians by malicious non-state actors, especially within the Middle East and Africa,

Affirming the purpose of the United Nations (UN) Office of Counter-Terrorism to address conditions conducive to terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building Member States’ capacity to combat terrorism, and to strengthen the role of the UN system,

Being aware that collaborative efforts between governments are crucial in deterring the use of chemical weapons by malicious non-state actors through shared information and intelligence,

Re-emphasizing commitment to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons and purports the need for an effective and efficient system allowing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to operate in its greatest functional capacity,

Acknowledging the African Union’s (AU) historical involvement with and support for the OPCW as established in UN General Assembly resolutions such as 71/250 (2017), the AU’s Agenda 2063 (2015), the CWC, and the Biennial Programme Plan as detailed in General Assembly resolution 71/6 (2016),

Reaffirming the importance of implementing and adhering to existing General Assembly resolutions, in particular, General Assembly resolution 72/43 (2017) on the production, proliferation, and distribution of chemical weapons,

Stressing UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which mandates Member States to create proactive legislation on the prohibition of the trafficking, production of chemical weapons and like technologies, and regulation of chemical substances,

Emphasizing the need for in-depth international training on and discussion regarding chemical terrorism to strengthen individual members of society and create an overall culture of preparedness in all Member States,

Acknowledging that engaging in cumulative denial against the capabilities of enablers limits the damage that can be inflicted upon society without allowing non-state actors retaliation or victory,

1. Defines malicious non-state actors as individuals or groups that are wholly independent of state governments and engage in the following terrorist activities against international, state, and/or civic, organizations;

2. Defines terrorism as actual unjustifiable use of force that is harmful, incapacitating, fatal, or destructive to non-combatant civilians, civilian infrastructure, cohesion, and social order on either domestic or foreign territory.
executed by groups with political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, or economic motivation to achieve socio-political change;

3. Defines chemical terrorism as use of toxic synthetic chemicals dispersed as a gas, liquid, aerosol, or agent absorbed through particles that may become powder in a terrorist attack;

4. Encourages Member States to condemn all activities involving the use of chemical weapons by malicious non-state actors through:
   a. Drawing attention to the threat of actors in the Middle East with access to chemical weapons;
   b. Emphasizing that the majority of non-state actors with chemical weapons are in the Middle Eastern region;
   c. Stressing the dangers of chemical weapons in the hands of non-state actors;
   d. Requesting the OPCW to focus on the Middle Eastern region and develop a regionally focused solution;
   e. Encouraging enforcement of verification and accountability measures via challenge inspections in crisis regions affected by malicious non-state actors;

5. Encourages development of the Project on Ensuring Effective Inter-Agency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in Case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks within the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism to include the formation of a database consisting of voluntary intelligence regarding movement, capability, and so forth, of non-state actors in order to alert Member States of emerging threats and potential attacks, with the assistance of the UN Security Council;

6. Upholds collaboration between Member States, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and its associated programs by:
   a. Requesting that UN Member States join INTERPOL to engage in anti-chemical terrorism coalitions;
   b. Recommending that Project Watchmaker further develops its comprehensive regulatory program focused on targeting the production of and the individuals involved in manufacturing chemical weapons;

7. Calls upon Member States to leverage their capabilities to address threats posed by chemical terrorism and to promote the peaceful use of chemicals by:
   a. Increasing cooperation and responsibility of the chemical industry and national authorities through suggesting comprehensive dialogues regarding chemical substances, quantities, safeguarding measures, chain of custody, and so forth; in order to ensure accountability of materials;
   b. Promoting cross-border cooperation and collaboration of national authority agencies for the purposes of consensus building and collaboration directed at regional trade and accountability for materials so that they are not lost in route between borders;
   c. Encouraging coordination between national authorities and the OPCW through expanded dialogue and interaction;

8. Recommends that Member States monitor and limit production lines of chemicals by:
   a. Conducting extensive research on local production lines and identifying potential areas that can be compromised;
b. Requesting that INTERPOL broadens its Operative Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement Project to train Member States and international entities on preventing the smuggling of chemical substances and chemical and explosive terrorism;

c. Suggesting the updating and expanding the OPCW’s accords on dual-use chemicals;

d. Urging that the OPCW establish research into new technologies such as metal organic frameworks to mitigate the threat and severity of chemical weapons attacks within the international community and to ensure the safety of dual-purpose chemicals;

9. **Recommends** increased dialogue between national authorities, corporations, and international entities by:

   a. Establishing an annual summit overseen by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) comprising of scientists and industry professionals to investigate potential universal security flaws, risks, and solutions;

   b. Offering critical resources to communities under threat of chemical warfare attacks to minimize damage inflicted;

   c. Providing training to law enforcement officials through existing INTERPOL projects;

   d. Expanding the working group as established in General Assembly resolution 70/33 (2015) to offer avenues for dialogue between all Member States to find collaborative solutions;

10. **Further invites** all Member States to collaborate and offer extended solutions on international security and disarmament.
The General Assembly First Committee,

Assuring that all Member States’ sovereignty and legislation can peacefully coexist with the following resolution,

Recognizing the immense threat that chemical weaponry poses to international security,

Reaffirming the international community’s continued commitment to the creation of chemical warfare,

Expressing its concern for the serious humanitarian, environmental, and economic damage that a chemical accident or attack can incur not only on the targeted site but to the surrounding regions and persons as well,

Determined to foster strict respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations as avowed peace loving nations,

Further reaffirming the importance of providing monetary support from diverse sources while propagating support of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its mission by the incessant pursuit of our goals,

Emphasizing the importance of increased infrastructure security to ensure chemical weapons do not fall under the control of terrorist organizations or autocratic governments,

Acknowledging the grave concerns of the global community surrounding the issues of chemical weapons, and its use internationally,

Reaffirming the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1997), which bans chemical weapons and requires their destruction within a specified period of time,

Recognizing the devastation caused in the aftermath of chemical weapons attacks, particularly to innocent citizens,

Expressing deep concern for the needs of victims of chemical weapon attacks and providing the tools necessary to ensure their welfare,

Stresses its desire to have a treaty among Member States to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles within the OPCW,

Realizing the necessity of transparency in interactions between Member States and Mandated Investigative Organizations such as the Joint Investigative Method (JIM),

Emphasizing General Assembly resolution 72/43 (2017) and its recognition of improved security, specifically in developing Member States,

Understanding General Assembly resolution 68/45 (2014) for its recognition that the CWC does not hamper any economic growth to the regional and international countries continue which help fund the OPCW,
Noting with deep concern of fellow Member States that have not honored their commitments to the CWC Article IV and X while stressing Article X of the CWC and the need to make all resources from the CWC available to all Member States according to their capacities and assets,

Further reaffirming General Assembly resolution 71/250 (2016) which introduces the Declaration on the Occasion of the Centennial Commemoration of the First Large-Scale Use of Chemical Weapons at leper as well as extensive commitment and cooperation between Member States and the OPCW,

Further acknowledging the detrimental, physical, and psychological effects that chemical weapons cause first and second-generation victims who then often lack aid due to time constraints, limited funding, and international support,

Having considered current victim relief support systems and organizations such as the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons that allocate a limited, voluntary trust fund to victims,

Further recognizing the OPCW recognition and elegy of victims with the establishment of programs such as the annual day of remembrance held on November 30,

Recalling Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), which established a framework for the elimination of chemical weapon arsenals with sanctions of verification, removal and destruction,

Further recalling Youth 2030: The United Nations Youth Strategy, which calls upon Member States to highlight the role of the youth in international security, especially in regard to incorporating the youth in the discussion of chemical weapons,

Acknowledging the development of newer technologies and disposal methods in discarding chemical weapons,

Bearing in mind the principles and mission set forth by the 1925 Geneva Protocol in the abolishment of chemical weapons,

Recognizing the efforts made by the African Union and other regional organizations which promote regional chemical weapon disarmament frameworks,

Keeping in mind General Assembly resolution 377A (1950), Uniting for Peace, which gives authority to the General Assembly in holding emergency special sessions in dealing with issues whereby the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Fully aware of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which requires all states to implement and enforce laws that act as effective measures to preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons by non-state actors,

Noting the potential advancement gained from the collaboration amongst developing and developed Member States;

1. Proposes the adoption of a charter broken into three categories, namely prevention, enforcement, and neutralization, which is supported by documents and treaties such as the Geneva Protocol and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction;

2. Draws attention to Member States that have utilized chemical weapons and substances in the past but have chosen to find an alternative route to addressing public concerns by forgoing their usage of harmful chemicals;

3. Establishes a three-month reporting period on the current OPCW Scheduled Chemical Database, which incorporates all Member States that have massive stockpiles of dangerous chemicals that can or have been used against their civilians, in order to hold Member States accountable for their chemical capacity;
4. **Call upon** the United Nations (UN) to expand the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone and establish weapons of mass destruction free zones in order to establish chemical free hotspots in contested regions;

5. **Urges** other Member States to create an international chemicals reductions treaty modeled after the **New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty**, which would contain:
   a. Designated reduction goals for chemical warheads and/or conversion into more efficient sources of energy;
   b. A time period for implementing these reduction goals;
   c. The duration for which this treaty would be effective;
   d. A strong verification system to ensure the elimination or conversion of the designated items;
   e. Notification guidelines for the time period that other parties must be notified before certain actions, particularly withdrawal from the treaty;
   f. Other confidence building measures, including use of the OPCW database between consenting Member States, which would include a unique identifier of each weapon, location of these weapons, aggregate numbers of deployed or non-deployed weapons, and number/type of production, conversion, and elimination facilities;
   g. Work towards the Global Zero framework, leading to a chemical weapon free world;

6. **Further urges** the UN to hold a review conference to amend the 1972 **Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)** and the CWC to:
   a. Focus the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons;
   b. Continue with the reduction of chemical stockpiles in Member States possessing them with a designated time frame, possibly 30 percent every five years;
   c. Ensure that Member States send annual reports to the BWC so it can serve as a verification system for all Member States;
   d. Push Member States to work towards the destruction of all chemical weapons currently existing in the international community, as is mandated by Article I and III of the CWC;
   e. Generally push the ratification and implementation of the CWC;

7. **Recognizes** the international credibility and backing behind operatives carrying out the mandates of the UN and facilitating their effectiveness through:
   a. Recognizing the legitimacy and integrity of said organizations to conduct their investigations;
   b. Requesting the extension of mandates once final conclusion reports are published and;
   c. Designating Security Council resolution 2235 and 2286 as guidelines for investigations;

8. **Draws attention** to the issue of unilateral action, in which one Member States takes it upon themselves to address chemical weapons abusers and instead, calls upon unilateral solutions such as recommending international sanctions to the UN Security Council on chemical weapons users, global cooperation, and changes in diplomatic staff;
9. **Recommends** improved regional cooperation amongst Members States that will allow for major strides in disarming chemical weapons, including through effective methods such as:

   a. Regional states helping to fund chemical disarming facilities that various states of the region are able to access in order for more effective disarmament;

   b. Increasing regional cooperation outlined by the CWC;

10. **Encourages** Member States to implement initiatives through funding from the OPCW through multilateral cooperation through:

   a. Improving education on the disposal of chemical weapons through domestic policy based on Member State;

   b. Incentivizing an increased percentage of funding to those who comply and show progress, such as evidence of a dismantlement of chemical weapons;

11. **Strongly urges** the creation of a subsidiary organization that directly deals with any past, present, and future victims of chemical warfare attacks as supported by Article X of the CWC, Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons;

12. **Requests** a psychological and financial support system for the progeny of the victims the States Parties in position to take a leading role to help fund programs through voluntary monetary contributions by Member States;

13. **Recommends** the inclusion of preventative measures against upcoming chemical warfare technologies including, but not limited to, drones, autonomous weapons systems, space mechanisms, and cybersecurity, while not infringing upon the economic growth of Member States, as supported by voluntary Member States;

14. **Further invites** Member States to continue sharing technological developments in science for disarmament-related purposes and to make these technologies available to interested states;

15. **Requests** that the procedures for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles as defined by the OPCW to be amended to allow Member States to both offer and receive assistance in destroying current stockpiles to facilitate bilateral cooperation;

16. **Further requests** new technologies to aid in transportation and security of chemical weapons such as the Metal Organic Frameworks and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Agnostic Compact Demilitarization of Chemical Agents program;

17. **Promotes** the further creation of anti-chemical regional frameworks which will provide security and support to the abiding members of the OPCW, and also recommends:

   a. Mutual trade agreements;

   b. Economic incentives such as reduction of tariffs, subsidizing exports, foreign aid;

   c. The encouragement of stronger diplomatic relations;

18. **Decides accordingly** that the Security Council should expand the context of General Assembly resolution 377A (1950), the Uniting for Peace Resolution, under chemical weaponry, including operative clause one, which grants authority to the General Assembly to discuss violations of international peace and security in the event of a security crisis;

19. **Recommends** that Member States need to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to ensure that chemical weapons do not fall into the hands of malicious terrorist organization such as, including by:
a. Establishing an effective chemical security infrastructure requiring a multidisciplinary approach by:

i. Training forces in the regions including basic training from the design basis threat workshops and more training from state systems for accounting for nuclear materials training courses;

ii. Establishing appropriate systems to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts involving chemical material, which will prevent terrorists from being able to escape with the weapons should they be able to acquire them;

iii. Establishing appropriate systems to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts involving chemical material, which will alert other countries in the region of the actions taken by these terrorists, and of their potential threat;

iv. Specifying threat levels and increasing the amount of over watch as well as available intel relevant to chemical weapons;

v. Establishing security protocol and measures in compliance with international legal framework like OPCW guidelines;

vi. Taking recommendations from OPCW inspectors in regard to how secure the facilities are;

vii. Increased security of chemical facilities through background checks on facility workers, and ensuring that entrance be granted to only approved workers;

b. Including legal and regulatory infrastructures with clearly defined responsibilities among different organizations and operators that will:

i. Encourage human resource development;

ii. Provide technical support for national infrastructures, recognizing that chemical security arrangements within chemical facilities/locations are different from those to be applied outside such facilities/locations;

c. Protecting civil society and viewing them as a priority by:

i. Educating the population against the threats of gassing and radiation including the method in which it enables whole areas uninhabitable for decades;

ii. Educating the population against the threats of gassing including the increased risk of cancer that comes about as a consequence of exposure to radiation;

iii. Harnessing the media to warn the population should a chemical weapon be stolen;

iv. Making the population aware of threat of chemical;

v. Creating fallout shelters;

20. Urges the development of a phased adaptive approach defense systems to be installed regionally work in coordination with the Global Zero Framework;

21. Approves the use of the Verification, Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) and the Technical Cooperation Program of the OPCW, which:

a. Complete research into the potential benefits and drawbacks of the development of high temperature destruction technologies like plasma pyrolysis, incineration and explosion chambers;

b. Research into the development of low-temperature destruction technologies like neutralization with the aid of neutralizing agents or a decontamination solution such as monoethanolamide, RD-4M or aqueous NaOH;

c. Spread awareness on any new technologies and methods that are developed;

d. Encourage funding for additional research and non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
22. Encourages Member States that will voluntarily provide monetary support to a fund middle and lower income Member States to build infrastructure that will give them the ability to break down chemical weapons within their own borders;

23. Authorizes specific Member States that are willing to contribute radar technology for the purposes of early weapon detection in all vulnerable Member States which will help the population to avoid or survive these vigorous chemical attacks;

24. Authorizes elected Member States to be a principal overseeing agent in the building of chemical weapons disposal agencies in the African Continent, South American continent, Central American region, the European and Asian continents;

25. Reiterates its call for a protocol if a Member State fails to declare any chemical weapons stockpiles within the OPCW, initiating immediate action for evacuation and protection of citizens;

26. Intends to encourage sanctions upon Member States with unauthorized possession of chemical weapons, including by:
   a. Educating and alerting citizens about how to protect themselves from chemical weapons attacks;
   b. Furthering military action and deploring blue helmet UN peacekeepers;
   c. Investigating any Member States that breaks the treaty and imposing economic sanctions;

27. Insists on increased transparency through reports generated by the OPCW on each Member State’s chemical status with increased investing from regional NGO’s for the purpose of confidence building amongst Member State enclaves;

28. Suggests that the OPCW increases the tactics of condemning Member States that violate the provisions as mandated by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the CWC;

29. Expresses its readiness for an empowering legislation to protect lower income Member States and donating funds to Member States who apply for the funds;

30. Requests the creation of regional forums which will be utilized to:
   a. Develop reports on chemical activities to be submitted to the BWC;
   b. Discuss any new information discovered by VERTIC or other relevant bodies;
   c. Define operational measures to be taken at the governmental level to reduce chemical stockpiles of Member States that possess such weapons and foster relations directly between Member States and the OPCW and CWC Safeguards;

31. Further urges the expansion of educational programs under UN committees, such as the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Health Organization, in Member States that are deemed chemically unsafe locations and seeks to:
   a. Train individuals to recognize symptoms of chemical warfare;
   b. Provide them with medicinal and homeopathic instruction to successfully taking care of those affected by chemical weapons;
   c. Create a trainee hotline that links them to certified identification help internationally to assist in the process and documenting forms of chemical attacks;
d. Certify all individuals that pass this educational program and all examinations part of it and allow them to be supplementary aid when attacks occur;

32. **Urges** that a new CWC conference be held to rework its direction and re-found the OPCW with the aim of working for the reestablishment of the investigatory process for the OPCW in order to provide for a process that is both more detailed and respectful to the sovereignty of Member states including a convention that:

   a. Replaces the routine investigations currently in place with more frequent randomized investigations as a means of more tightly policing the issue;

   b. Eliminates self-reporting as the official means of determining stockpile size and replaces it with an official permanent Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) report to determine the true size of existing stockpiles;

   c. Eliminates time limits attached to investigations of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals;

   d. Removes the challenge investigation mechanism from the investigatory process in place of a mandatory reporting provision triggered by the aforementioned JIM report that:

      i. Would be headed by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW;

      ii. Will still invoke the Security Council, but will remove the ability of Member States to use this process as a means of harassment;

   e. Reinvents the 75% challenge veto as a 90% veto meant as a last resort if the reports of the JIM report are universally found to be erroneous or malicious;

   f. Introduces a special procedure for unilateral Security Council initiated challenge investigations in obvious extreme circumstances;

   g. Guarantees the support of at least one Security Council member for the safety of the JIM mechanism if the body is required to conduct investigations in areas of danger;

33. **Urges** that a new CWC conference be held to rework its direction and re-found the OPCW with the aim of revising current definitions and standards to adjust to the modern status of chemical weapons, including:

   a. Eliminating the distinction between schedule 1 and schedule 2 chemicals in order to advance the time frame for the destruction of these chemicals;

   b. Eliminating the provisions that allow for the conversion of weapons facilities into non-prohibited production centers;

   c. Further restricting the acceptable levels of non-military schedule 3 stockpiles by establishing quotas on a per-organization basis;

   d. Further restricting schedule 3 cross-state transportation to smaller quantities;

   e. Eliminating the clauses of the present CWC that legitimize the use of certain schedule 3 weapons in defensive or policing action;

   f. Ceasing the practice of granting extensions on weapon destruction to those states that do not seek assistance under the provisions of this resolution in eliminating their stockpiles;

34. **Recommends** the use of the following types of incentives to discourage Member States from developing chemical technologies relating to cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, amongst others, including:
a. Economic incentives, such as market access agreements, access to capital from private corporations and international institutions loans, World Bank and International Monetary Fund grants, chemical related trade agreements;

b. Diplomatic incentives, such as establishing liaison offices for diplomatic contacts, bilateral visits, summit meetings;

c. Confidence building measures, such as bilateral inspection agreements, exchange of lists about the location of chemical sites, provision of chemical safety training, research exchanges, equipment monitoring, creation of regional chemical safety organizations;

d. Humanitarian incentives, such as food aid, medicine, infrastructure development, funding for education from NGOs like the International Peace Institute (IPI), And member countries;

35. **Encourages** increased funding from Member States, regional and international bodies, nongovernmental organizations and hopes that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to coordinate their efforts in regards to chemical development initiatives;

36. **Reaffirms** the need of the international community to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of detrimental chemical weapons and technology when appropriate by calling upon states to fulfill their obligations from Article IV of the CWC which includes the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their chemical arsenals;

37. **Recommends** that before a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle east is created, the international community should:

   a. Establish a Middle East no first use of weapons of mass destruction agreement which should be considered and explored;

   b. Work to promote parallel peace negotiations and wider disarmament talks;

   c. Establish comprehensive negative security assurances, backed by states pertaining to the Middle East;

   d. Freeze sensitive chemical activities leading to the establishment of a fuel cycle free zone as a short-term measure;

   e. Work towards regional enrichment and reprocessing activities as a long-term measure;

38. **Supports** the official adoption of the WMD-free Middle East proposal to officially establishment of a chemical-weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly through:

   a. UN Monitoring and the Verification and Inspection Commission, which would work in conjunction with the OPCW by using:

      i. Subdivisions on energy monitoring like the creation of staff with experts on chemical power technology, shift from military reactions to peaceful power reactors, and improvement of the energy infrastructure of states;

      ii. Transparency and security measures to ensure chemical energy usage exclusively for peaceful purposes;

      iii. Transparency and security measures to ensure prohibition and prevention in their respective territories of testing or manufacturing of weapons, production or acquisition of weapons storage, installation, and deployment of any chemical transparency;

      iv. Transparency and security measures to ensure secure transport for non-military chemical material;
v. Transparency and security measures to ensure proper understanding between the international community and Middle Eastern countries pursuing chemical energy policies;

b. A graduated program for independence in regards to chemical energy use of Middle Eastern Member States through:

i. Responsible, clean energy plants that operate according to the UNEP;

ii. Proper chemical waste disposal as outlines by the CWC and OPCW;

c. A Treaty that will provide for incentives for Member States to adopt the chemical weapons provisions of the WMD-Free Middle East in the Middle East, including:

i. Access to the latest chemical technology provided by the UND;

ii. Summits which emphasize the collective security aspect as a WMD-Free Middle East;

iii. Removal of sanctions by the UN from countries currently worked under them;

iv. Access to the aforementioned energy committee;

v. Means to renew a Member State’s energy infrastructure;

d. Punitive measures for violators of treaty terms including targeted sanctions and levied sanctions on the exports of that Member State, relating to an immediate embargo on that Member State’s chemical material importation;

39. Emphasizes the role of education as a long-term solution in slowing the spread of chemical weapons, and ultimately ending the creation of these weapons in cooperation with the chemical and chemistry education as a bridge for peace, by:

a. Educating communities and possibly villages of the history of chemical weapons which would include mustard gas during the First World War and the carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide and Zyklen-B attacks of WWII;

b. Making people aware of the current status of chemical warfare, and how chemical weapons are:

i. Still a major concern to the international community because of their increased strength of up to 20 times more powerful than the first bombs;

ii. Still a major concern to the international community because of their staggering quantities in different Member States, which could destroy the world many times over;

iii. Still a major concern to the international community because of their aftereffects, in which the radiation can enable entire territories uninhabitable for decades to come;

iv. Still being created despite concerns from the international community in Member States that act in a controversial manner;

c. Using existing NGOs and the UN Children’s Fund to create curricula and spread information in developing Member States;

d. Promoting media campaigns that can spread awareness and draw attention to the problem of chemical warfare throughout a Member State using television, radio, newspapers, pamphlets, brochures, and by hosting internet websites.