Security Council
Background Guide 2018

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2018 National Model United Nations Conference in Washington, D.C. (NMUN•DC)! We are pleased to introduce you to our committee, the Security Council. This year’s staff is composed of Director Adam Wolf and Assistant Director Dakota Foster. This is Adam’s third year with NMUN•DC and he also volunteers with NMUN•NY. He currently lives in Washington, D.C. where he works as the Membership and Outreach Manager with the Alliance for Peacebuilding. Dakota has been on staff for two years and this is his first time staffing at the DC conference. Dakota currently works as an executive legal assistant at a law firm in Dallas, Texas.

The topics under discussion for the Security Council are:

I. Countering the Evolving Global Threat Posed by Non-State Actors
II. Reviewing the Central African Republic Sanctions Regime

The Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations system and, under the Charter of the United Nations, is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Security Council can determine the existence of any threat to peace and act accordingly using sanctions or more assertive means to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council can also commission reports by the Secretary-General, authorize peacekeeping missions, and establish subsidiary organs. With many complex and multifaceted issues facing the world, the Security Council aims to act collaboratively to create new solutions and strengthen existing frameworks that uphold international peace and security.

We hope you will find this Background Guide useful as an introduction to the topics for this committee. However, it is not intended to replace individual research. We highly encourage you to explore your Member State’s policies in-depth, as well as use the Annotated Bibliography and Bibliography to further your knowledge on these topics. In preparation for the conference, each delegation will submit a position paper. Please take note of the NMUN Conduct Expectations on the website and in the Delegate Preparation Guide regarding plagiarism, codes of conduct, dress code, sexual harassment, and the awards philosophy and evaluation method. Adherence to these guidelines is mandatory.

The NMUN Rules of Procedure are available to download from the NMUN website. This document includes the long and short form of the rules, as well as an explanatory narrative and example script of the flow of procedure. It is thus an essential instrument in preparing for the conference, and a reference during committee.

If you have any questions concerning your preparation for the committee or the conference itself, feel free to contact the Under Secretary-General for the committee, Leah Schmidt; the Deputy Secretary-General, Chase Mitchell; or the Secretary-General for the conference, Angela Shively. You can contact them by email at: usgleah.dc@nmun.org, dsg.dc@nmun.org, or secgen.dc@nmun.org.

We wish you all the best in your preparations and look forward to seeing you at the conference!

Sincerely,

Adam Wolf, Director
Dakota Foster, Assistant Director

NMUN is a Non-Governmental Organization associated with the UN Department of Public Information, a United Nations Academic Impact Member, and a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization of the United States.
Committee Overview

Introduction

After the devastating effects of two world wars, the international community came together to establish the United Nations (UN) as an intergovernmental organization with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, creating conditions conducive to economic and social development, and advancing universal respect for human rights.1 The Security Council was established as one of its six principal organs and was given the primary responsibility of preserving international peace and security.2

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House in London.3 After its first meeting, the Council relocated to its permanent residence at the UN Headquarters in New York City.4 At that time, five permanent members (P5) and six non-permanent members comprised the membership of the Council.5 However, over subsequent years, discussions regarding the structure of the Council took place and, in 1965, the number of non-permanent members increased to ten.6 Although membership numbers have not changed since, discussions regarding a change in the Council’s structure take place frequently.7

During the Cold War, disagreements between the United States of America (USA) and the former-Soviet Union blocked the Council from being fully effective due to consistent use of the veto by the permanent members.8 However, despite criticism of the purported flaws of the Council, over the past two decades the Security Council has remained the leading international body on peace and security issues, particularly with the increase in peacekeeping missions since 1992.9 Additionally, traditional challenges to international peace and security have shifted, forcing the Council to adapt to new scenarios, such as the challenge of addressing multiple humanitarian crises simultaneously and respond to potential threats posed by emerging technologies and non-state actors.10 After the year 2000, the Security Council also started to examine at more thematic issues such as: terrorism; extremism; and women, peace, and security; in addition to continuing its traditional of addressing country-specific issues and establishing subsidiary bodies to address cross-cutting issues.11

Governance, Structure, and Membership

The Security Council is the only UN body that has the power to adopt legally binding resolutions.12 This means that when the Council adopts a resolution, Member States are obliged to accept and carry out its recommendations and decisions under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations (1945).13 The Security Council also has a variety of other tools to address issues on its agenda.14 For example, the President of the Security Council may issue press

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
statements or presidential statements to communicate the Council’s position. Although these are not legally binding, such statements are used to bring attention to important issues and to recommend solutions to conflicts.

Membership
The Security Council is comprised of five permanent members and 10 non-permanent members. The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Every year, the General Assembly elects five of the 10 non-permanent members for a two-year term. Elections for non-permanent seats on the Council can be extremely competitive, with countries expressing interest and campaigning years in advance. Countries elected to serve on the Security Council are expected to represent the interests of their region; they usually have an influence at the international level and demonstrate leadership in specific areas of interest to their foreign policy. Security Council elections are held in June, six months before the term starts. This change allows Member States ample time to prepare for their new role. The 10 non-permanent members represent countries from five groups: Africa, the Asia-Pacific Group, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Eastern European Group, and Western European and Other. Bolivia, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, and Sweden are the non-permanent members through the end of 2018.

Presidency
Each member of the Security Council holds the presidency of the Council for one month, rotating according to alphabetical order. Security Council meetings can be held at any time when convened by the President, and by the request of any Member State. Under Rule 1 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, the President shall call a meeting if a dispute or situation requires the Council’s attention.

Participation
Any Member State of the UN may attend the Council’s sessions if the body decides to extend an invitation. Member States are invited if the Security Council is discussing an issue that directly concerns the interests of the Member State. Invited Member States do not have the right to vote, but are allowed to submit proposals and draft resolutions. Furthermore, those Member States can inform the Council about a current crisis in their region. However, such proposals may only be put to a vote at the request of a member of the Council.

Subsidiary Organs
The Security Council has many subsidiary bodies, which are established under Article 29 of the Charter, including: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); sanctions committees; and standing and ad hoc committees, such as the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on

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16 Ibid. p. 15.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 UN DPI, Ahead of Security Council elections, General Assembly President explains how a country can get a non-permanent seat, 2016.
23 UN DPI, Ahead of Security Council elections, General Assembly President explains how a country can get a non-permanent seat, 2016.
24 UN General Assembly, Rules of procedure, 2017.
29 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is a body that reports jointly to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Additionally, Security Council Member States participate in various working groups, which discuss the topics of concern of the Security Council, such as the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. These working groups consist of some or all of the Security Council Member States and can focus on regional issues or improving the working methods of the Security Council itself. The Security Council is also responsible for determining if, when, and where a peacekeeping operation is needed. A peacekeeping operation is created through an adopted Security Council resolution, and the Council must monitor the operation through reports issued by the Secretary-General, as well as specific Security Council meetings.

Voting
Every Member State of the Security Council has one vote. Votes on all matters require an affirmative vote of nine Member States. However, if one of the five permanent members of the Security Council votes “no” on a matter of substance, such as a draft resolution, it does not pass. This is known as the “veto power.” In the 1950s, Security Council Member States, in particular the former Soviet Union, made frequent use of their veto power, but its usage declined in the 1960s, rising again in the 1970s and 1980s. In the last decades, the use of the veto power has been on a comparatively low level. In recent years, the Council has adopted many resolutions by consensus and has only been divided on a very limited number of issues, a prominent example being the case of Syria.

Mandate, Functions, and Powers
The mandate of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security, and to take action whenever peace and security is threatened. The Council’s authority is particularly relevant with respect to the UN’s four primary purposes as specified in the Charter of the United Nations: maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; cooperating in solving international problems; promoting respect for human rights, as well as being a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter specifically concern the Security Council and the range of actions that can be taken when settling disputes. Although the main goal is always to dissolve the disputes, Chapter VI aims to achieve this by peaceful means, whereas Chapter VII explores further actions that can be taken. As noted in Chapter VI, the role of the Security Council is to determine the severity of the dispute brought before the body and the impact of the dispute internationally. The Security Council is responsible for making recommendations to broker peace that take into consideration the previously attempted measures by the parties involved. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council has the authority to implement provisional measures aimed to de-escalate the situation.

35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
are ignored or are unsuccessful, the Security Council may decide to call upon military forces to act on behalf of the UN. The Charter provides the Security Council with several powers to guarantee international security:

- **Sanctions:** Pursuant to Article 41 in the Charter, the Council can call on its members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or end violence. These include economic sanctions, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, severance of diplomatic relations, and blockades. It may further mandate arms embargoes, enforce disarmament, or call upon international criminal mechanisms to become active.

- **Diplomatic Tools:** The Council is mandated to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to aggressions between states or other non-state groups or within states’ territories. To do so, it may “recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression, and recommend what action should be taken.”

- **Military Action:** Aside from diplomatic instruments, the Council may also take military action against a state or other entity threatening international peace and security and may further decide on the deployment of troops or observers. Article 39 of the Charter states that the Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” The Council may also decide upon the deployment of new UN peacekeeping operations to be led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as well as the extensions of their mandates and subsequent modification or drawdown of any troops.

- **Partnerships:** The Council also cooperates with a number of international and regional organizations as well as non-governmental organizations to implement its decisions. Cooperation between the Security Council and UN-related organizations, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, is significant, but partnerships with independent IOs, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU), are also of paramount importance for addressing a broad range of issues such as terrorism, disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and extreme violence from non-state actors.

**Recent Sessions and Current Priorities**

The topic of Africa occupied the Council during much of 2017, with 18 resolutions adopted focusing on the continent in the first half of the year. This included resolution 2359 on “Peace and Security in Africa,” which discussed the countries of the Sahel region, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The resolution commended the deployment of an AU force to the region. Further, the Security Council noted both the slow implementation of the 2015 peace accords and the spread of violence throughout Mali, where more than 100 peacekeepers from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in

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54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
2013 by the Council, have been killed.\textsuperscript{68} The Council requested that the force take “a more proactive and robust posture” in the resolution extending MINUSMA’s mandate through to 2018.\textsuperscript{69} The mission to provide peace and stability to the African continent is still ongoing for many Security Council missions in 2018.\textsuperscript{70} Throughout this year, the Security Council has adopted several resolutions addressing the concerns in Africa, including the renewal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).\textsuperscript{71} In March 2018, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2409 “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”\textsuperscript{72} Within the resolution, the Security Council strongly encourages the Congolese government and its stakeholders to quickly implement the provisions specified by the “Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement” of 31 December 2016 that would organize peaceful and honest elections.\textsuperscript{73}

In April 2018, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2413 on sustainable peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{74} Within the resolution, the Security Council took into consideration the recent recommendations of the Secretary-General, which ranged from increased financing of peacebuilding initiatives to building partnerships to promote peace and sustainability.\textsuperscript{75} The resolution further invited the Secretary-General to elaborate further on his initiatives and recommendations regarding peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{76} Also in April 2018, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) through October 2018.\textsuperscript{77} The extension calls upon the parties in the conflict to continue their negotiations with the Secretary-General’s oversight to reach a solution.\textsuperscript{78} It is the Security Council’s hope that extending the mandate will help the region develop a more practical and long-standing resolution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{79}

**Conclusion**

As the international community faces increasing asymmetrical threats from non-state actors and transnational organized crime, the Security Council’s role in maintaining international peace and security continues to evolve.\textsuperscript{80} The current situations in Somalia, Mali, Libya, the Korean peninsula, and the region of Western Sahara still cause divisions among Council members.\textsuperscript{81} As these conflicts prolong, the Council’s decision-making process, specifically the veto power of the five permanent members, remain controversial.\textsuperscript{82} However, as the Security Council is the only UN body with the power to adopt binding resolutions, it remains an important global entity for maintaining international peace and security.\textsuperscript{83}


\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} UN DPI, *Calling for Renewed Efforts to End Decades-old Western Sahara Conflict, Security Council Extends Mission, Adopting Resolution 2414 (2018)*, 2018.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{83} *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.
Annotated Bibliography


As the fundamental principles of the Security Council are established in the Charter, this document should be the first resource to consider. Article 23, which sets the membership structure for the Security Council and Articles 23 to 26, which discuss its basic functions and powers, are important for understanding both the structure and function of the Security Council. In addition, Articles 27 to 32 explain the Council’s voting procedure and its overall structure. Delegates will find Chapters VI and VII most helpful when researching the mandate, powers, and limitations of the Security Council, and while at the conference simulating the body.


The Council on Foreign Relations provides a comprehensive introduction into the structure and work of the Security Council and therefore constitutes a good starting point for more detailed research. The website discusses the Council’s powers and possibilities in taking coercive actions and addresses broadly discussed issues as criticism to the Security Council’s structure as well as possible reforms. In addition, the website contains links on further resources on the Security Council and recent international security issues as, for example, the Global Governance Monitor, which evaluates the international regime for armed conflict.


This volume provides readers with a detailed overview of the Security Council and its past and present challenges. This book touches upon many of the Council’s themes, institutions, and operations, explaining the Council’s structure in depth. As it discusses major operations on four continents, the document can be a useful tool for delegates’ understanding of detailed analysis on various international security crises.


In providing an overview of the history, structure, mandate, and perspective of the UN, this volume also includes a comprehensive section on the Security Council, as well as a separate chapter on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The book offers a succinct explanation of the Council’s political and operational constraints, including the veto power principle. It further provides delegates with a general overview of the importance of the Security Council for international security from its creation until now. Due to its comprehensive contents, this book may serve delegates as a good first starting point for further research on the Security Council as well as on international power relations.


This website gives an overview of the Security Council’s history, its mandate, and its basic functions and powers. It is a key resource and a solid foundation for delegates’ further research, as it provides detailed information on how the Security Council works in practice. The website contains the body’s provisional rules of procedure and a section on frequently asked questions. The latter is particularly useful when it comes to understanding the Council’s functions and powers. Delegates will find on this website detailed information about the Council’s recent sessions as well as other worth noting outputs.

Bibliography


I. Countering the Evolving Global Threat Posed by Non-State Actors

Introduction

“Non-state actor” (NSA) is a broad term referring to “persons or entities who are not acting on behalf of a state.” The term includes non-governmental organizations and civil society groups, but it also refers to violent NSAs, which encompasses transnational organized crime groups and terrorist organizations. In dealing with violent NSAs, the international community has focused on traditional security measures to suppress their activities and prevent them from acquiring weapons. That focus has expanded as non-state actors have leveraged emerging technology and financing methods that enable them to incite or inflict violence in innovative ways. These emerging threats include various uses of technology, including drones, 3D printing, the dark web, and using social media for activities such as recruiting foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and inciting violence. As violent NSAs have evolved, the international community aims to improve its efforts to address the global threat NSAs pose through increasing coordination and cooperation between Members States and the private sector, particularly the sharing of best practices and strategies for effectively combatting the exploitation of rapid technological advances.

International and Regional Framework

Since 1963, the international community has constructed 19 international legal instruments with the focus on creating a universal framework for preventing terrorist acts. These instruments, which include the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), were developed to address specific threats and emerging terrorist actions but also call for preventative measures and the prosecution or extradition of individuals and groups that partake in such actions. The international community has also addressed NSAs beyond defined acts of terrorism through conventions such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000). This convention serves as the main tool for addressing transnational organized crime and provides focus to specific areas of organized crime through three supplemental Protocols: “the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.”

In addition to the conventions and protocols, several UN Security Council resolutions address the topic of NSAs. Although addressing acts of terrorism had been on the UN agenda for decades, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States resulted in the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), which created the Counter-

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84 Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law, 2011, p. 10.
86 UN DPI, States Must Step Up Efforts to Check Spread of Deadly Weapons as Non-State Actors Exploit Rapid Technological Advances, Speakers Tell Security Council (SC/12888), 2017.
87 UN DPI, States Must Step Up Efforts to Check Spread of Deadly Weapons as Non-State Actors Exploit Rapid Technological Advances, Speakers Tell Security Council (SC/12888), 2017.
93 Ibid.
Terrorism Committee (CTC). Additionally, in 2004 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004), which declared that States should refrain from providing support to NSAs that intend to create or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Resolution 1540 (2004) also established the 1540 Committee to facilitate the implementation of the resolution’s binding requirements. Two years later, the General Assembly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, a strategic and evolving framework that enhances the international community’s counter-terrorism efforts through four pillars. These pillars address the conditions that foster the spread of terrorism, promote preventative and combative measures, call for counter-terrorism capacity-building among Member States, and support measures to ensure human rights and the rule of law are respected as the foundation for fighting terrorism. Finally, through the adoption of General Assembly resolution 71/291 (2017), the Office of Counter-Terrorism (OCT) was established with an aim to improve partnerships among the Security Council bodies and Member States as well as strengthen the capacity building of Member States to more effectively prevent and respond to acts of terrorism.

Role of the International System

In 2017, many members of the international community called for a shift in strategy beyond the scope of resolution 1540 (2004), with some highlighting the limits of the resolution in terms of effectively addressing the evolving threat of NSAs. Later in 2017, the Security Council adopted several resolutions with a wide range of responses to emerging issues. Among these were Security Council resolution 2370 (2017), which called for cooperation among Member States in preventing malicious NSAs from acquiring weapons and creating improvised explosive devices (IEDs), resolution 2388 (2017), which requests that Member States track and disrupt human trafficking linked to terrorist financing and recruitment, and resolution 2396 (2017), which addresses the issue of FTFs. Additionally, some recent reports from the Secretary-General to the Security Council described the threats posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and describe capture the evolving nature of NSAs, including their social media recruitment, FTFs, and new financing methods. The reports focus primarily on ISIL; however, the strategies used by ISIL are also being used by other violent NSAs.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is an overarching framework meant to capture the international community’s counter-terrorism priorities. The General Assembly reviews the strategy every two years to ensure that the counter-terrorism efforts adapt to the evolving landscape. Upon the adoption of the Global Strategy in 2006, the General Assembly additionally endorsed the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), which focuses on promoting coordination in the international community and providing assistance required for countering the evolving threats by NSAs. The CTITF and the UN Counter Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), established in 2011 to assist in carrying out the pillars of the Global Strategy through capacity-building, moved into

95 UN OCT, About, 2018.
97 UN 1540 Committee, Frequently Asked Questions on Resolution (1540).
98 UN OCT, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2018.
99 Ibid.
100 UN OCT, About, 2018.
101 UN DPI, States Must Step Up Efforts to Check Spread of Deadly Weapons as Non-State Actors Exploit Rapid Technological Advances, Speakers Tell Security Council (SC/12888), 2017.
102 UN Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2018, p. 5.
104 UN Security Council, Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2017, p. 3; UN Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2018, p. 5.
106 UN OCT, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2018.
107 Ibid.
the OCT in 2017. The OCT has prioritized coordination and coherence to create a “One United Nations” framework for countering violent extremism. At a regional level, the OCT has partnered with the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit to hold a capacity-building workshop focused on best practices for limiting new funding methods being used by NSAs. Additionally, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and the CTC have coordinated to perform an analysis of social media misuse by NSAs and how to disrupt the recruiting and financing strategies the violent NSAs have utilized through social media.

Furthermore, the International Criminal Police Organization and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime formed a strategic partnership in 2016 to enhance efforts on combatting transnational organized crime. The partnership includes the implementation of a Joint Action Plan that addresses common areas of organized crime that include: illicit trafficking, terrorism, and cybercrime. The partnership has also formed a framework for Project CRIMJUST, which promotes capacity building efforts for Member States to address organized crime through targeted training for law enforcement authorities, improved evidence collection for prosecutions, and the ability to conduct joint investigations at an interregional level.

**Funding Mechanisms Utilized by Violent Non-State Actors**

The globalized economy provides new avenues for violent NSAs to fund their illicit activities. As long as there is demand, transnational criminal organizations can continue to generate billions of dollars in funding through illicit activities, such as drug and human trafficking and illicit firearm trading. A large portion of the transactions for these activities take place on the dark web, “a section of the internet not accessible to the everyday user.” For example, up through 2017 a criminal organization under the pseudonyms ‘CherryFlavor’ and ‘WorldWide Arms’ used dark web markets to maintain anonymity and illicitly sell legally obtained weapons to customers all over the world.

Other funding mechanisms used by violent NSAs include kidnapping for ransom and looting and smuggling antiquities. Advancements in global logistics helps malicious NSAs to develop sophisticated trafficking methods, achieving significant revenues for their operations. The impact of such funding methods was illustrated in 2014 when the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, announced the selling of 200 kidnapped schoolgirls, one of the chief funding methods for Boko Haram. The smuggling and trafficking of people, primarily women and children, is a source of funding for numerous violent NSAs ranging from ISIL, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Middle East to the Zetas and Sinaloa cartels in Mexico.

109 Ibid.
111 UN Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2018, p. 10.
112 Ibid.
113 INTERPOL, INTERPOL and UNODC forge closer ties in combating transnational crime, 2016.
114 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
122 UN OSG, Chapter II: H. Drug control, crime prevention and combating international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 2018.
123 McCoy, This is how Boko Haram funds its evil, The Washington Post, 2014.
Some advanced organizations, like ISIL, have even been able to become financially self-sufficient organizations.\textsuperscript{124} The two chief financing methods for ISIL have historically been hydrocarbons and extortion/taxation.\textsuperscript{125} Hydrocarbons, by nature, have a large reliance on territory.\textsuperscript{126} When ISIL controlled a large amount of territory, their income was significant; however, this source of income declines as they continue to lose territory due to a United States-led NATO coalition.\textsuperscript{127} As the territory diminishes, ISIL and other NSAs look to further diversify income methods to become and remain financially independent.\textsuperscript{128} According to Member States, ISIL has shown an enhanced ability to adapt and evolve through strategic investments and has transferred funds to locations where NSAs are not yet present, so that they may continue their illicit activities elsewhere should they cease to exist in their current form.\textsuperscript{129} The financial innovations of ISIL provide a template for other NSAs to replicate and strengthen, potentially evolving as additional global threats.\textsuperscript{130} This hypothetical reality becomes more likely as ISIL affiliates are encouraged to become self-funded organizations separate from ISIL.\textsuperscript{131}

\section*{Technology Advancements}

Technological advancements, such as the use of social media, has allowed several violent extremist groups to reach a large audience through several languages and rapid dissemination of their messaging campaign.\textsuperscript{132} ISIL propaganda, for example, has been distributed through social media and is used to recruit fighters and promote and publicly display their violent acts.\textsuperscript{133} Sympathizers with NSAs can easily establish dialogue via social media and then use encryption technology to communicate anonymously.\textsuperscript{134} Such tactics make it difficult for Member States to monitor and investigate the communications between violent NSAs and their sympathizers.\textsuperscript{135} This issue is compounded when taking into account that the communications over social media, encryption applications, and the dark web are purported to guide followers in the building of IEDs and the conducting of terror attacks.\textsuperscript{136} The Manchester bomber in 2017, where 22 people were killed after an Ariana Grande concert, illustrates these methods as well as the FTF phenomenon.\textsuperscript{137} According to The Times, the Manchester bomber traveled to Libya and Syria where he was radicalized, and used YouTube videos and the dark web to craft the IED used for the bombing.\textsuperscript{138} While NSAs have learned to exploit the dark web to illicitly trade supplies such as ammunition and weapons, they have also identified legal supply chains for procuring commercially available parts to aid in the manufacturing of IEDs and WMDs.\textsuperscript{139} High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, declared that “many of the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{125} UN Security Council, \textit{Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat}, 2017, p. 3.
\bibitem{126} Ibid.
\bibitem{127} Ibid.
\bibitem{128} UN Security Council, \textit{Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat}, 2018, p. 4.
\bibitem{129} Ibid.
\bibitem{130} Knoll, \textit{How ISIS Endures by Innovating}, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 2016.
\bibitem{131} UN Security Council, \textit{Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat}, 2018, p. 4.
\bibitem{134} UN Security Council, \textit{Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat}, 2017, p. 2.
\bibitem{135} Ibid.
\bibitem{136} Ibid, p. 6.
\bibitem{137} Farand, Manchester bomber Salman Abedi learned how to make explosive device from YouTube videos, \textit{Independent}, 2017.
\bibitem{138} Hamilton, Manchester Arena killer Salman Abedi used YouTube to build bomb, \textit{The Times}, 2017; Evans, Everything we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi, \textit{The Telegraph}, 2017.
\end{thebibliography}
technologies, goods and raw materials required to produce WMDs and their delivery systems were available through legitimate producers.”

Similarly, NSAs have continued to innovate through the use of commercially available drones for propaganda, reconnaissance, and aerial attacks. Furthermore, technologies that have been democratized for benevolent civilian use can also be acquired by violent NSAs and adapted for harmful purposes. For example, the threat of misusing 3D printing for weapon creation or other advanced technologies for violent acts will continue to hinder the ability of the international community to effectively counter the threat of NSAs. As the technological landscape and the increasing plausibility of NSAs using cyberspace for furthering extremist acts grows, it will be crucial for the Security Council to work with the international community in strengthening frameworks to address these rising concerns.

Conclusion

The evolving global threat of NSAs requires a multifaceted and collective approach to effectively reduce the posed threat. The innovative uses of drones, social media, the dark web, and other advancing technologies has hindered the international community’s approach to these actors. Additionally, effective methods of dealing with violent NSAs will consider the evolving funding methodologies of NSAs and how such methods interact with human rights, historical preservation, and regional resources. Member States have stated that such issues can be addressed through the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its four pillars.

Further Research

There are many questions that delegates will need to address when considering the complicated evolving global threat of NSAs, such as: how can the Security Council help more Member States comply with the four pillars of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy? Do there need to be additional measures to address the rapidly changing technology and how it might be used for violent acts? What can the international community do to hinder the funding methods of NSAs? How are regional organizations, such as civil society groups and think tanks, working to address violent NSAs? How can inter-agency collaboration improve the Security Council’s approach to the evolving threat of NSAs?

140 UN DPI, States Must Step Up Efforts to Check Spread of Deadly Weapons as Non-State Actors Exploit Rapid Technological Advances, Speakers Tell Security Council (SC/12888), 2017.
141 UN Security Council, Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2017, p. 2.
142 UN OSG, Secretary-General’s remarks to Turtle Bay Security Roundtable: Managing the Frontiers of Technology [As delivered], 2018.
143 UN DPI, States Must Step Up Efforts to Check Spread of Deadly Weapons as Non-State Actors Exploit Rapid Technological Advances, Speakers Tell Security Council (SC/12888), 2017.
144 UN OSG, Secretary-General’s remarks to Turtle Bay Security Roundtable: Managing the Frontiers of Technology [As delivered], 2018.
145 UN OCT, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2018.
146 UN DPI, States Must Step Up Efforts to Check Spread of Deadly Weapons as Non-State Actors Exploit Rapid Technological Advances, Speakers Tell Security Council (SC/12888), 2017.
147 UN Security Council, Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 2017, p. 3.
Annotated Bibliography


This UN Meetings Coverage refers to a recent call for States to improve their efforts in addressing the threat of NSAs exploiting advancing technology. This coverage states that advancing technology such as drones, 3D printing, and the dark web could be used by violent NSAs as tools for further inciting violence. This is a valuable source as it is explicitly focused on the topic of how NSAs are evolving with the advancement of technology and exploiting for violent purposes. Furthermore, this source provides statements from speakers and representatives of several Member States, which is important to fully comprehend the positions of all involved Member States in delegate research.


The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is the current global framework for addressing the evolving threat of violent NSAs, particularly terrorist organizations. The Strategy is made up of four pillars that indicate overarching strategies for Member States to counter the spread of terrorism, build capacity for further prevention, and ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law. This source is important because it provides the primary strategy for addressing violent NSAs, and is reviewed every two years to keep the strategy relevant, which is a major factor in effectively addressing the evolving threat posed by NSAs. This Strategy will serve as a strong foundation for delegates when suggesting improved or innovative methods of addressing violent NSAs.


This report outlines concerns regarding Al-Qaida and related entities by discussing the overarching threat, the sources of weapons and how the weapons being used are evolving, the sources of funding, and recruitment in Al-Qaida and other NSAs. This is an important report in viewing how social media was beginning to be exploited in 2014 for recruiting by NSAs, and how far violent non-state groups can reach through the internet. Delegates can use this resource to understand how NSAs have evolved their methods over a short period of time and have increased their presence through social media and the dark web.


This report provides a comprehensive view of the strategies of ISIL and important background knowledge for addressing the evolving situation. The report discusses how ISIL functions through evolving approaches to finances and weapons. This report is valuable for seeing how ISIL and related NSAs have adapted their funding mechanisms and online recruiting methods in the face of new technology. Delegates can compare this report with past reports from the Secretary General to see how ISIL has diminished in their loss of territory but remains a threat through their growing technological influence.


This report is similar to the previous fifth report of the Secretary-General, but provides a more updated outlook. However, where the fifth report provides a focus on ISIL finances, and foreign terrorist fighters, the sixth report provides a focus on regional trends. Both reports give updates to the evolving threat of ISIS – which is valuable for seeing how NSAs can adapt over short periods of time. Having this report coupled with the fifth report is necessary for understanding the reality
by which ISIL and other NSAs are currently operating. This foundation will help delegates see where the gaps are in the international community’s current efforts and where work can be done.

Bibliography


II. Reviewing the Central African Republic Sanctions Regime

Introduction

The Central African Republic (CAR) is a country that has been politically unstable since its independence from France in 1960.\(^{140}\) The first two decades of CAR’s independence saw three military coups and several bids for power to control the country through direct rule or single party political systems.\(^{150}\) The country has been a consistent agenda item on the Security Council’s Programme of Work since 1998, and it continues to face escalating civil conflict and the increasing presence of numerous armed militias.\(^{151}\) More recently, unrest has left over 680,000 persons internally displaced and 2.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.\(^{152}\) CAR has also struggled with a long series of violent clashes between armed groups, with the most recent involving the rise of the Séléka rebels in 2012 and subsequent collapse of the government in 2013.\(^{153}\) While there have been multiple international efforts to stabilize the country, the violence in 2013 prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 2134 in 2014 which added targeted sanctions measures that were intended to help build and sustain peace within CAR.\(^{154}\) Given that the most recent report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic highlights a continued deterioration of peace and security in the country, the Security Council must carefully assess how to use its current instruments, such as the sanctions regime, to help stabilize and build peace and security within the CAR.\(^{155}\)

International and Regional Framework

Using a variety of peace and security enforcement actions that do not involve the use of armed force, such as sanctions, is a power granted to the Security Council under the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.\(^{156}\) Article 41 specifically states that “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.”\(^{157}\) Generally, the goal of enacting sanctions is to support peaceful transitions, deter non-constitutional changes of power, constrain terrorism, protect human rights and promote non-proliferation.\(^{158}\) While sanctions measures may vary, there are five principal types of sanctions the Security Council typically enacts: diplomatic; asset freezes; travel bans; arms embargoes, and commodity interdiction.\(^{159}\) Additionally, there are currently 14 sanctions regimes enacted with 10 monitoring groups, teams, and panels currently supporting 11 of these regimes.\(^{160}\) The first time the Security Council enacted sanctions was in 1968, when it passed resolution 253 and placed several economic and travel sanctions against the apartheid regime of Southern Rhodesia.\(^{161}\) Though intended to help support international peace and security, the Security Council recognized in 1995 that sanctions may have adverse economic and humanitarian impacts on civilians.\(^{162}\) In a letter to the President of the Security Council entitled S/300/1995, the permanent five members moved for the Security Council to also consider how to reduce the negative side effects of sanctions on vulnerable populations.\(^{163}\)

When examining the sanctions regime in CAR, it is necessary to understand the series of peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities applied by the Security Council, beginning with the creation of the UN Integrated

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\(^{150}\) Conciliation-Resources, History: Central African Republic conflict.

\(^{151}\) Human Rights Watch, Central African Republic, 2018


\(^{153}\) Conciliation-Resources, History: Central African Republic conflict.


\(^{156}\) Charter of the United Nations, 1945.


\(^{159}\) Ibid.


\(^{161}\) UN Security Council, Question Concerning the Situation in Southern Rhodesia (S/RES/253), 1968.


\(^{163}\) Ibid.
Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA) in 2010. While BINUCA saw several achievements, a lack of funding and resources hampered efforts to reform an ailing security sector, and led to the rise of the Séléka rebels, who then captured the capital of Bangui and ousted then President François Bozizé. In response to the forcible takeover of Bangui and the resulting instability, the Security Council adopted resolution 2134 in 2014, which added targeted sanctions measures and established a standing committee on sanctions implementation. Soon after, resolution 2149 was adopted in 2014 and authorized the now on-going United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), subsuming BINUCA and taking over any remaining regional peace operations from the African Union.

Facing a deteriorating security situation with over 2.5 million civilians at risk of violence, the CAR Sanctions Committee helps to determine which parties will be targeted by sanctions and also reviews sanction implementation. In addition to this committee, the Security Council also has a panel of experts that are country-based and assist the committee in analyzing the sanctions, their implementation, and effectiveness. Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) first established an arms embargo as the only sanction to be enacted in an effort to reduce the illicit flow of weapons to parties that would use them to carry out human rights abuses. The following year, the Security Council expanded the list of sanctions by passing resolution 2134 (2014), which installed measures to freeze the assets and prevent the movement of individuals and entities list by the regime. The Security Council further renewed the sanctions regime and MINUSCA through adopting resolution 2339 (2017) and resolution (2399) in 2018. The most recent sanctions renewal was Security Council resolution 2399 (2018), which introduced collaborative framework to combat weapons trafficking meant to circumvent the arms embargo, such as MINUSCA’s arms embargo working group.

In a regional context, frameworks such as the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair or Assembly (2010), also known as the Kinshasa Convention, and sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of Central African States, play a crucial role in reinforcing the sanctions regime through institutionalizing legal frameworks that support sanctions activities, particularly the arms embargo.

**Role of the International System**

As the international body within the UN system that enacts sanction measures, the Security Council has been the primary actor in deciding which sanctions are put into place in CAR and how they should be implemented. This process has been largely supported by the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2127 Concerning the Central African Republic, also known as the CAR Sanctions Committee. The CAR Sanctions Committee is comprised of all 15 Security Council members and decisions are made by consensus. This body is mandated to monitor and review the progress of implementing the sanctions measures within CAR and report on their findings.

The work of the CAR Sanctions Committee is primarily supported by the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic. The Panel of Experts was first created in 2013 under resolution 2127 and is currently mandated by

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164 UN DPA, BINUCA – Background, 2018.
167 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
resolution 2399 (2018). It serves to gather and analyze information surrounding the sanctions measures in CAR, particularly in cases of non-compliance. It communicates much of its work through the publication of an interim report in July and a final report in December, with the most recent final report being S/2017/1023. It also assists the CAR Sanctions Committee in maintaining and refining a list of individuals and entities that have been found to have committed actions that are outlined in paragraphs 20 and 21 of Resolution 2399, and are to be sanctioned, such as the former CAR President François Bozizé. Both of these bodies lead to the gathering and analysis of information that pertains to implementing sanctions within CAR.

The CAR Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts collaborate with other UN and international entities to help pool information, capacities, and resources that aim to improve the implementation of sanctions in CAR. For example, the Security Council has requested that the Secretariat assist with various aspects of the sanctions regime, including setting benchmarks for the arms embargoes and have key representatives, such as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, brief the committee on relevant information. In a broader international context, several UN bodies and agencies also provide complimentary non-security support to CAR, such as the World Food Programme (WFP), which conducts work in mapping the conflict dynamics and humanitarian needs. These collaborations also help provide useful resources and information, such as the flow of internally displaced persons, for the CAR Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts in developing their reports. Additionally, MINUSCA conducts activities, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, to reinforce sanctions, particularly the arms embargo. This is done through its activities in supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia fighters, as well as training security forces how to properly manage stockpiles.

State of Current Measures

The Arms Embargo

The Arms Embargo was the first sanction to be enacted within CAR in 2013 under Resolution 2127. Under this provision, all Member States are required to take measures to prevent weapons and their related parts and components from entering into CAR from their territory unless it was an authorized and verified transfer to an exempt party. Exemptions were granted to a core group of entities that eventually evolved into a list of approved international actors that were committed to keeping peace and security in the state, such as MINUSCA and CAR security forces participating in the security sector reform process. This exemption list largely remains unchanged in the latest 2017 mandate renewal. In its current state, the arms embargo has faced many challenges due to illicit arms trafficking. This situation has been exacerbated by CAR’s porous borders, which are shared with other fragile states, such as South Sudan, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and allow for militias to connect with transnational criminal groups to deliver weapons in return for payment. Training and posting

188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
security personal in the more remote areas of the country to address this problem has been an ongoing technical and logistical problem.\textsuperscript{197}

\textit{The Travel Ban and Asset Freeze}

The travel ban and asset freeze were introduced in 2014 as more targeted measures were applied to specifically listed individuals and entities.\textsuperscript{198} The travel ban dictated that Member States should prevent anyone that was listed in the sanctions regime to travel within their borders.\textsuperscript{199} The asset freeze stated that Member States should take action to freeze the funds and resources that belonged to listed individuals and hosted or controlled by within their territory.\textsuperscript{200} This included financial resources that were managed by a third party.\textsuperscript{201} The 2016 and 2017 reports of the Panel of Experts showed extensive documented details of how the travel ban and asset freeze have been circumvented, poorly implemented, and in some cases ignored outright.\textsuperscript{202} For example, Bozizé, despite being a sanction-listed individual, has reportedly been able to circumvent his travel ban and has made trips to numerous countries, either through the compliance of national governments or the use of falsified documentation.\textsuperscript{203}

\textit{Improving the Arms Embargo and the Reporting of Violations}

The arms embargo in CAR has faced criticism from local governing bodies in the CAR at failing to prevent the trafficking of small arms and light weapons.\textsuperscript{204} However, in its latest report, the Panel of Experts recognized that growing inter-agency collaboration between MINUSCA, the CAR government, and regional entities may work to improve their coordination and the effectiveness of the embargo.\textsuperscript{205} One such example was the recommendation of an Arms Embargo Working Group between MINUSCA and government stakeholders.\textsuperscript{206} The Secretary-General also noted that this Working Group could be instrumental in coordinating responsibilities and actions, collecting and managing information, reporting, and providing training for national authorities.\textsuperscript{207} While these recommendations are enacted, much of this group’s time currently has been on processing requests to exempt certain government entities from the arms embargo.\textsuperscript{208} This has limited its work on verifying entities as legitimate governmental actors, granting the exceptions from the embargo, and allowing actors to acquire limited weaponry for security purposes.\textsuperscript{209} The Panel of Experts noted that further dialogue on identifying and countering trafficking networks needs to take place in order to coordinate swifter actions against these activities.\textsuperscript{210}

The Security Council has also sought methods to help monitor and evaluate the progress of the arms embargo in conjunction with improving it.\textsuperscript{211} In following up to the Security Council’s request, in a 10 July 2017 letter the Secretary-General outlined several methods to set benchmarks for the arms embargo, citing past examples from

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[198]{UN Security Council, \textit{The Situation in the Central African Republic (S/RES/2134)}, 2014.}
\footnotetext[199]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[200]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[201]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[203]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[206]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[209]{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
sanctions regimes in Somalia, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. These options included a headquarters-based desk review with remote consultations from the field, and a headquarters-based desk review with remote field consultations. The letter noted that these options would help provide viable benchmarks needed to measure the progress of the embargo.

In a regional context, the African Union developed its leading peace and security framework, the Africa Peace and Security Architecture 2016-2020. The framework highlights five priorities to prevent and reduce conflict and increase security. Part of this framework emphasizes coordination to ensure the effective implementation of sanctions, while also offering priorities for the Security Council to consider when determining future security measures. This includes the arms embargoes and offering advice on how to promote effective cooperation on a sub-regional level, which was noted as needing to be strengthened in the recent Panel of Experts Report.

Conclusion

Though noted as imperfect, the sanctions regime is generally recognized as an important framework to prevent the escalation of violence and hold those who undermine security accountable. Still, a lack of capacity by the national government and MINUSCA to effectively implement these measures persists. In order to improve the sanctions regime, the Panel of Experts and the Secretariat have highlighted a number of potential solutions, including setting benchmarks for the arms embargo and improving measures to report and document violations. Moving forward, it will be critical for the Security Council to work with the international community to find innovative methods to implement the proposed solutions.

Further Research

In further researching this topic, delegates should consider the history behind the recent violence, which will be instrumental in formulating policy and actions on this matter. Some focus questions to consider include: What additional actors can be guided to help support the existing sanctions regime in CAR? How can existing security frameworks within the African region help improve existing sanctions regimes? What other sanctions regimes currently exist and how are they being implemented? Are there applicable success stories to previous sanctions regimes that can be applicable to the CAR? How have different regions responded to the sanctions, and have regional frameworks been helpful in increasing sanction effectiveness?

213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
Annotated Bibliography


Security Council Resolution 2399 was the first resolution passed by the Security Council on the CAR in 2018. This document will be particularly important for delegate research for several reasons, the first of which is that it renews the arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze until January 31, 2019. This resolution therefore serves as the most recent document to renew the sanctions regime in the CAR. Furthermore, it provides the latest details regarding exceptions to certain sanctions, as well as how it may apply to various parties that may not necessarily be directly involved in the domestic conflict. Lastly, the resolution offers insights to the latest actions to be taken up or soon considered by the sanctions committee and the Panel of Experts on CAR.


This report is the most recent document outlining the current situation within the CAR, including coverage of the current status of the sanctions regime. It contains details about the effectiveness of sanctions and cites the number of reported instances when a sanction, particularly the arms embargo, was violated. It reports on the progress of particular agreements between groups, and reported travel violations of sanctioned individuals. It also comprehensively covers the progress of the implementation of an asset freeze by the national authorities in the CAR, and highlights the progress in freezing the assets that are contained in neighboring countries, such as Chad. Overall, this report will serve as a rich resource for delegates in providing practical details of how the situation in the CAR is developing.


This letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council provides a detailed report on several ongoing plans and initiatives to assess the implementation of the Arms Embargo in the CAR, which will be key to guiding delegate research. The proposals revolved around potentially setting up a working group in coordination with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to better review lessons learned and share best practices between stakeholders. This document provides two key takeaways: first, it showcases the potential solutions that the UN and the Security Council are currently weighing. Second, it outlines the process behind implementing several potential solutions on assessing the CAR arms embargo from the prospective of the UN Secretariat and how these solutions would facilitate interaction between stakeholders.


This resource provides a comprehensive and cohesive overview of the UN Sanctions Committee for the CAR. The fact sheet itself condenses some of the complicated pieces of the mandate and functions given to the Sanctions Committee into an easily understandable format. This is an excellent resource for delegates to use in quickly understanding the full mandate and functioning of the Sanctions Committee as it relates to each aspect of the topic. Most of all, it highlights the types of sanctions in place, how each one functions, and the categories of groups and entities that are placed under each regime. It also provides additional information, such as who are the current members of the panel of experts and recent activities taken up by the committee.

It will be important for delegates to know which individuals and entities are specifically listed by the Sanctions Committee. This can help delegates best understand the individuals and entities that current face targeted sanctions, but also understand what those listed did specifically to be targeted. More importantly, delegates can draw parallels between listed individuals and their roles in the history and conflict within CAR, giving an opportunity to better frame a dynamic and complicated situation. This list can also help delegates understand how these individuals were targeted through the extensive information and it provides additional links that provide more information from other sources, such as Interpol. Ultimately, this source can be very useful to frame and understand the operational aspects that the Security Council employs to enforce its sanctions.

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