The International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recognizing the relevance of nuclear safety protocols, and the importance of international support and adherence to the same set of standards such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

Observing that many Member States do not currently have nuclear power, but have the potential to develop facilities very soon,

Mindful of the increasing need for transparency in Member States’ programs to assure all states that nuclear weapons will not be used to further any Member State’s political agenda,

Affirming the paramount importance of all Member State’s adherence to the responsibilities delegated to them by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

Recognizing the importance of maintaining state sovereignty and peaceful resolutions to conflict should and must be achieved without resorting to nuclear threats, whether direct or indirect in nuclear energy matters and the priority of increasing Member States’ reactivity in preventing nuclear energy incidents in accordance with the IAEA Safety Standards, specifically The Safety Fundamentals (SF-1), the General Safety Requirements (GSR) in seven parts and the General Safety Guides (GSG),

1. Requests all Member States that have not yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to do so;

2. Invites Member States to adopt cohesive recommendations regarding nuclear safety infrastructure and decommissioning plans under Member State’s direct discretion; such recommendations can be strengthened by a certain State, for that State only, but cannot be decreased in order to meet the IAEA recommended level of safety;

3. Encourages various levels of communication between neighboring Member States regarding nuclear infrastructure and construction of nuclear energy facilities, while maintaining respect for Member State’s guaranteed sovereignty;

4. Strongly recommends Member States to increase facility inspections to a biannual basis and further submit detailed safety and technology advancement reports, based on the previous recommendations, and mandates suggested by the IAEA safeguard inspections, and suggests that these more frequent inspections and reports:

   a. For these inspections to be split and conducted by two different inspectors, with the first inspection conducted by the trained non-government World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) accompanied by IAEA inspectors. and the second bi-annual inspection of the Member States’ facilities be conducted by an operational domestic non-governmental organization of the Member State’s choice;

   b. Include Supplementary Documents on the Development, and implementations of State Level (GOV/2014/41) safeguard and security of Non Weaponized Nuclear Facilities, and waste management procedures to ensure the proper disposal and removal of all nuclear and radioactive waste within the Member-States’ borders;

5. Encourages Member States to develop and adjust domestic legislation on the Safeguards and Security Management of Nuclear facilities to be reviewed by the IAEA under strictly Member State discretion, and should further include:
a. Clear provisions for dealing with disagreements and with violations of regulations established by the IAEA Safety Standards, specifically The Safety Fundamentals (SF-1), the General Safety Requirements (GSR) in seven parts and the General Safety Guides (GSG);

b. Assurance that state implemented domestic legislation will clarify how the financial costs of the violations and requirements of the safety standards set by the IAEA Safeguard and inspection standards shall be met by third party owners of nuclear technology research and energy facilities (e.g. through general tax revenues, financial penalties, or domestic fees).
The International Atomic Energy Agency,

Remembering Section 2 Subsection B of The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which emphasizes how countries must communicate to reduce the risk of the dispersion of nuclear material,

Acknowledging the recent advancements of the scientific community which has proven that neutron/gamma Discrimination Detectors confirm the presence of nuclear materials through ray imaging, as supported by the National Science Foundation and reported in the Nature Journal Scientific Reports,

Taking note of the current structure of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) leadership which only allows ten Member States in its Board of Governors and inhibits diverse dialogue,

Observing the success of regional cooperation that allow Member States to improve their inter-state coordination,

Recognizing the importance of Information Control Technologies to closely monitor any situations involving the transfer of nuclear technology and their means of delivery and related material,

Recognizing that over 17 million shipping containers are sent worldwide between many ports; as disclosed by the Environmental Protection Agency, the detection of nuclear weapons in shipping containers is crucial to nuclear safety,

Fully aware of Article 2, Section 7 of the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 50/172 (1996), which both emphasize respecting the principles of national sovereignty and noninterference in other nations by Member States,

Recognizes Member States’ right to use nuclear resources for peaceful purposes and restates the General Assembly resolution 32/50 (1977), Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development, which advocates for the development of atomic energy technologies and for responsibility in their use,

1. Encourages the use of NUCLEUS information exchange mechanisms to be used at the discretion of each Member State by:

   a. Fostering and establishing cooperative International Community Policing by creating balanced initiatives and cooperation between neighboring nations; recommending the use of guidelines already set by the International Regulatory Review Service for all member states using nuclear energy; creating and developing comprehensive remote-border area surveillance programs which would improve ground security; providing timely information about unusual or suspicious incidents of interest to intra-agency law enforcement authorities; implementing border patrolling resources in remote areas that specifically pose a significant threat as they constitute; encouraging areas that are radioactive to form teams of experts to supervise expeditions to possible radioactive hotspot, at the discretion of each Member State; and maintaining regulatory agencies within each IAEA Member State that currently lacks routine inspection of nuclear technologies to ensure that all operators of nuclear facilities are following the procedures mandated by the United Nations and by the laws of the Member;

   b. Engaging in training and strategic workshops at the local levels with local officials and sharing information ad hoc, on request and periodic timelines between local officials by: conducting lessons for local officials on the technical aspects of guarding under the auspices of the UN Counter-Terrorism Security Initiative through providing public awareness sessions and advice on matters relating to...
security at the discretion of local governments, participating in and encouraging the development of consultative and cooperative arrangements;

c. U Urging Member States to follow the leadership of successful Member States by implementing a suggestive list of extensive safety tests before research facility operation commences, creating at least one recognized national radioactive waste site alongside each new research facility, maintaining integration of research facilities within the communities and local governments in which they are situated in;

2. Emphasizes the further development of best practices for state capacity building in nuclear safety and security through the:

a. Increased engagement of military and counterterrorism experts from relevant international organizations such as NATO and the EU Common Security Defense Policy to share their tactical and strategical knowledge through IAEA forums;

b. The design and development of an effective nuclear security detection architecture that; detects the amount of nuclear and radioactive material present in each state; informs whether there are unauthorized acts with the present nuclear and radioactive material beyond what is regulated;

c. The creation a framework for addressing and responding to threats and activities by these individuals and groups;

3. Encourages the update of regulations regarding the transportation of hazardous nuclear materials via maritime transport through collaboration with International Maritime Organization (IMO), including:

a. Analyzing and adopting current International Maritime Organization (IMO) by relevant IAEA recommendation and best practices documents;

b. Further collaboration between the IAEA and the IMO to further collaborate in the distribution of information as it relates to the transportation of shipping containers by confirming that the contents do not include nuclear material and that in the case of the discovery of any nuclear material we must, through collaboration, ensure the safe recovery of the nuclear substance;

c. The advancement of technological instruments used to detect radioactivity in shipping containers, such as Neutron/Gamma Discriminating Detectors;

4. Endorses an organizational reform of the IAEA Board of Governors to ensure that every nation has a chance of being equally represented in dialogue, and to increase diverse ideas for nuclear safety and management to be represented, through:

a. Expanding the IAEA Board of Governors to include more than 13 fixed Member States with 22 elected states per term, with a focus on meeting equal representation of developed and developing nations;

b. Amending the current Board of Governors election process which allows only members of the Board of Governors to select a Governor each to having the International Atomic Agency elect their Board per term.
International Atomic Energy Agency,

Reminding all Member States of their commitment to UN General Assembly Resolution 57/239 that recommends the “creation of a global culture of cyber security” and the UN consensus report A/70/172 that discourages the use of information and communications technologies to attack critical infrastructures,

Deeply concerned with the increased exposure to threats to nuclear infrastructure from hostile actors,

Stressing that a lack of cyber security presents a significant threat to nuclear reactors, and potentially dangerous radioactive materials,

Recalling that under General Assembly Resolution 64/211 (2009), creation of a global culture of cyber security and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures is imperative,

Recognizing the importance of responsibly spending funds allocated by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund,

Acknowledging that the threat of terrorism is the biggest threat to nuclear security,

Demonstrating the commitment to preventing, detecting, and responding to international nuclear terror threats as partners to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,

Calling upon action plans derived from the IAEA’s 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, which advocates for the IAEA to coordinate research and information exchange to promote resilience against cyber attacks, guidance for computer security regulations for the nuclear domain, and develop methods to foster and sustain computer expertise for nuclear security,

1. **Utilizes** superior international technology experts to train select candidates for intercontinental inspection:
   a. International nuclear technology experts will be nominated by member states of the IAEA;
   b. Nominees will be selected and confirmed by a selection committee that is composed of the IAEA Nuclear Information Section Head, the Nuclear Infrastructure Development Section Head, and the Nuclear Power Technology Head;

2. **Provides** thorough and extensive background checks on each applicant applying for the position;

3. **Implements** a regular biannual, offer for inspection of the technological efficiency of each nuclear facility. Although voluntary, the IAEA urges countries to participate fully for the safety of not only individual nations, but neighboring and oversea nations as well;

4. **Notes** that confidentiality of inspections is of utmost importance, and as such will be guarded in a series of protected archives, frequently tested for and with penetration tactics by assigned experts;

5. **Notes** also that the inspections will be reviewed between the country and the assigned experts; deciding whether or not to give certain information regarding the findings of the inspections;

6. **Establishes** a cyber security strength test, funded by the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, for nuclear facilities worldwide in an effort to map out potential vulnerabilities of these systems and improve upon them. The
strength test will pay special attention to the following factors as they relate to cyber security within the facilities:

a. Social testing to ensure that the internal staff and associates within the nuclear facilities are not mishandling sensitive information by examining the following factors:

i. Comprehensiveness of background investigations for individuals working within the nuclear facilities;

ii. Limitation of sensitive information accessibility by employees to special programs and systematic passwords within facilities;

iii. Human resource processes in places that promote incident reporting of employees who may be compromising systems in nuclear facilities;

iv. Surveillance capabilities in nuclear facilities to monitor employee data disposal and computer activity to ensure that this sensitive information is not getting into the heads of hostile actors;

v. Strengthening cyber security so it cannot not be infiltrated by terrorists or any hostile foes;

vi. Calls upon the strengthening of computer security as one of the important elements to nuclear security;

vii. Emphasizes the need to provide training courses in cyber safety programs;

viii. Increase the quality of cyber firewalls to better prevent a hacking of the system;

ix. Urges the installation of backup systems so that if a cyber system fails there can be one that will go on immediately and protect the facilities;

x. Strongly affirms that we need to raise awareness of the fact that cyber terrorist attacks pose a huge threat to nuclear security and we ask the Director General to submit an annual nuclear security report to the general conference;

Assigns a numerical rating on a scale of 0 to 100 that assesses the strength of information securities systems as they relate to nuclear facilities while further providing a detailed analysis of areas of vulnerability and the ability to respond to a cyber attack.
The International Atomic Energy Agency,

Emphasizing that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the primary international organization that promotes peaceful use of nuclear energy and ensures that Member States abide to international policies and regulations,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 32/50 (1997) and the promotion of nuclear energy through technical and economic cooperation in pursuit of social and economic development,

Viewing with appreciation the strides taken by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) to expand an international review program that provides beneficial recommendations to Member States’ nuclear programs in a strictly objective manner,

Recognizing that the IAEA’s digital monitoring and communication system has been described by this committee’s Department of Safeguards as inflexible and outdated with data spread across a patchwork of systems and realizing the security risk this entails,

Taking note of Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety (GC(46)/RES/9) (2002) and the importance of international cooperation to strengthen nuclear radiation and transport safety by modernizing the Incident and Trafficking Database,

Underlining IAEA’s International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale as a means of highlighting safety significance in events associated with the use, storage, and transport of radioactive material,

Understanding the need for a general plan for regulation of nuclear facilities during conflicts between Member States that both respects the Member States’ national nuclear policies and also properly oversees these nuclear facilities,

Further observing that Dual Purpose Casks are radiation proof safety cases designed to safely store and transport disused radioactive sources while blocking radiation and providing neutron shielding. Dual Purpose Casks have been tested to endure submersion, traumatic shock, and heat by the National Commission for Nuclear Energy of Brazil and according to studies performed by the German Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing Dual Purpose Casks are safe to transport for twenty years and are safe to store for forty years before the need to be replaced,

Acknowledging the workshops conducted by the Institute for Energy Technology and Nuclear Energy Agency that aims to present ideas on how to further improve nuclear facilities and contribute ideas based on proceedings and concluded projects,

Reminding less developed Member States of the IAEA designated International Centres based on Research Reactor (ICERR) program currently only being utilized by two nuclear facilities in France that designate nuclear programs in developed Member States to serve as an educational center for Member States that lack significant nuclear infrastructure,

Encourages Member States with experienced nuclear programs to participate in the IAEA designated ICERR and take the precedent set by General Assembly resolution 56/9 (2012) to promote the formation and training of national experts in countries which develop a civilian nuclear program,

1. Recommends that Member States utilize the vast benefits and resources of the IRRS to ensure the credibility of their domestic nuclear programs, including:
a. That IRRS reviews are done in an objective manner that prioritizes regulatory policies, such as
increasing from the average number of 24 reviewees such that more Member States can be represented
in the reviewing body that otherwise increases diversity within the IRRS, such that:

i. Additional reviewees are vetted, not only on their academic qualifications, but more importantly
on their capacity to be impartial to political interests while representing regional Member States
with a vested interest in ensuring the safety and security of nearby nuclear programs;

ii. Member States with larger and more predominant nuclear programs and Member States currently
developing nuclear programs should be allotted more of the additional reviewees;

b. Following a review, a Member State is given recommendations by the IRRS and are scheduled a
follow up meeting during a four year period to check upon a Member State’s progress, such that:

i. Member States should be encouraged to have continuous follow-up meetings to ensure that
recommendations set forth by the IRRS team have been taken into consideration;

ii. Member States to create regional and/or national institutions that would attend to nuclear incidents
and threats as follows and following along the guidelines of Emergency Response Network (ERNET);

c. These teams would be comprised of specialists from Member States who possess nuclear facilities and
Member States would be tasked of providing support and specialists as per ERNET standards;

d. These teams would provide nuclear or radiological emergency response and support functions under
each specialized team deemed as follows:

i. Radiological Advisory Team – provides search and detection capability in direct conjunction with
sovereign states task forces;

ii. Search Response Team – specializes in search capability for lost or stolen nuclear devices,
weapons and/or nuclear material;

iii. Joint Technical Operations Team – provides advanced technical capabilities to advise on rendering
safe operations and the movement of nuclear devices;

e. These teams will be mandated to respond to crises within seventy-two hours at maximum, depending
on the number of members sent to deal with said emergency;

2. Expresses its hope that in the event of ongoing regional conflict between Member States:

a. Regulation of the nuclear facilities in the active conflict zone will be regulated and overseen by the
IAEA at the voluntary request of either of the involved Member States:

i. Once a Member State has requested the initiation of oversight procedures, the IAEA’s Board of
Governors will convene to decide on a course of action in a timely manner;

ii. That the Member State that has physical control over the nuclear facilities has the ability to accept
or reject the requested IAEA regulatory oversight proceedings;

b. That the Member State being asked to comply will be asked to consider the well-being of all states
surrounding the conflict zone, even those not included in the conflict and to uphold the IAEA
regulations and put political and national views aside to prioritize the safety and security of the nuclear
facilities and nations in and around the conflict zone;

c. Regardless of which Member State requests oversight procedures to take place, all Member States
involved in the conflict will have the ability to provide technical expertise to IAEA;
d. During IAEA’s regulatory process, IAEA can request technical expertise from any involved persons as necessary, which entities providing technical expertise will have as full access to the most currently available non-confidential information regarding the nuclear facilities and may request physical access to the facilities to assist them in providing their expertise;

e. IAEA’s regulation of nuclear facilities in active conflict zones does not constitute international support of any Member State’s national interests; it is a neutral act, independent of conflict and/or tensions in the region;

3. **Further encourages** the transparency of Member States in order to hold accountability for the movement of nuclear sources both prior to use and disused by:

a. Calling upon the logistics set forth by the IAEA International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security:

i. Member States who are able to join in a coalition similar to the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators (ANNuR) or The Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA), hereby to be named The Database Cleanup Committee, to focus purely on improving the integrity and accuracy of the database which tracks the trade of reactive substances;

ii. The current database (The IAEA Incidents and Trafficking Database) should be both reformatted and enlarged to allow for quick and easy access to the positions of radioactive materials around the globe:

iii. Re-formatted in such a way so that the tracking sheets for different nuclear materials are accessible from one digital source;

iv. Enlarged in such a way so that not only is the shipment information available, but also the purpose of the shipment and actors participating in said transit;

v. Suggests upgrades to any outdated systems into an encrypted digital portal which integrates traditionally paper-based approaches to recordkeeping in order to allow states to quickly and securely communicate with IAEA officials and access critical information while also eliminating cyber-attack vulnerabilities present in the current system;

b. If the Security Council releases a resolution concerning a Member State who has had difficulties with illegal transfer of nuclear substances, a rules and regulations meeting shall be required within eight months of the Security Council’s resolution:

i. This meeting or conference shall be formatted and structured similarly to the Safeguards Implementation Workshop constructed and carried out by Finland:

ii. The purpose of this workshop would be to both ensure that the non-compliant Member State is aware of which specific clause they violated, to ensure that they carry out the proper steps to correct their infractions, and to allow other Member States to provide voluntary assistance to the Member States having difficulties;

iii. After attendance of said conference, this Member States would be required to check in with those who ran the workshop and provide qualitative evidence of improvement;

iv. Requests the assistance of Finland in the formation of such workshops to take the precedent set by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Helsinki;

4. **Further encourages** Member States to continue their collaboration through programs and projects focused on the specific shared needs of its members and to promote and coordinate cooperative research, development, and training projects in nuclear science and technology which would include:

a. Taking the framework set by European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) to further research in nuclear physics:
i. That CERN constitutes one of the largest and most respected scientific research facilities that puts forth an international forum for willing and interested states to expand their nuclear energy conceptions with respect to the strides taken by CERN under the guise of the IAEA;

ii. Supporting research and development on critical problems facing developing countries where nuclear technologies can make a difference in social and economic development;

b. Providing assistance to countries in order to plan energy needs, including nuclear electricity, which will meet the world’s rising energy demands:

i. Including cooperative projects in achieving tangible social and economic benefits for people in developing countries by partnerships that provide services, equipment, training, and other types of support;

5. Recommends that Member States utilize the combination of Dual Track Waste Management and Dual Purpose Casks to ensure the presence of a safety framework for regional nuclear storage and disposal facilities:

a. It is recommended that regional bodies such as the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, ANNuR, and ARASIA contribute research and technical assistance as well as security and safety advice to ensure that the joint Dual Track Waste Management and Dual Purpose Casks concept will meet current IAEA safety and security regulations;

b. Member States should partner with private sector companies for assistance in manufacturing and should access design information established by the IAEA International Workshop on the Development and Application of a Safety Case for Dual Purpose Casks for Spent Nuclear Fuel through collaboration with the UN Global Compact to ensure that new developments are coherent with international safety and security standards;

6. Imploring Member States to consider the goals of the ICERR program, the IAEA would like to add the following goals:

a. The creation of a mentorship program between developing countries participating in the ICERR program and underdeveloped nations desiring to create nuclear energy programs;

i. This partnership will allow for an open conversation in regards to borrowing technology and shared resources;

ii. For countries who offer their assistance, guidance and infrastructure to other states that is designed to guide developing states down the right path, there will be a reward such that states who volunteer as a mentor will receive priority when the IAEA considers designating funding to new sustainable projects;

b. Qualifying mentees will be Member States without any nuclear programs currently instated and qualifying mentors will be states who have had a successful and developed nuclear program for 10+ years:

i. The mentors and mentees will be paired up in accordance to both geographical location, regional bodies, and peaceful relations;

ii. The IAEA Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology Research Reactor Section, which oversees the ICERR initiative, will be tasked with both overseeing the progress of the mentees as well as the pairing of the states;

iii. The mentorship will focus primarily on providing catered and specific assistance to the mentees;

iv. Via nation specific requirements and recalling the options available to the Member State being mentored, the mentoring Member State will provide feasible recommendations to the mentees.
International Atomic Energy Agency,

Reminding all Member States of their commitment to United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 57/239 (31 January 2003) that recommends the “creation of a global culture of cyber security” and the UN consensus report A/70/172 (2015) that discourages the use of information and communications technologies to attack critical infrastructures,

Deeply concerned with the increased exposure to threats to nuclear infrastructure from hostile actors,

Stressing that a lack of cyber security presents a significant threat to nuclear reactors, and potentially dangerous radioactive materials,

Recalling that under General Assembly resolution 64/211 (21 December 2009), creation of a global culture of cyber security and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures is imperative,

Recognizing the importance of responsibly spending funds allocated by the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund,

Acknowledging that the threat of terrorism is the biggest threat to nuclear security,

Demonstrating the commitment to preventing, detecting, and responding to international nuclear terror threats as partners to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,

Calling upon action plans derived from the IAEA’s 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, which advocates for the IAEA to coordinate research and information exchange to promote resilience against cyber attacks, guidance for computer security regulations for the nuclear domain, and develop methods to foster and sustain computer expertise for nuclear security,

1. Utilize superior international technology experts to train select candidates for intercontinental inspection:
   a. International nuclear technology experts will be nominated by member states of the IAEA;
   b. Nominees will be selected and confirmed by a selection committee that is composed of the IAEA Nuclear Information Section Head, the Nuclear Infrastructure Development Section Head, and the Nuclear Power Technology Head;
   c. Provide thorough and extensive background checks on each applicant applying for the position;

2. Implement a biannual offer for inspection of the technological efficiency of each nuclear facility, although voluntary, the IAEA urges countries to participate fully for the safety of not only individual Member States, but neighboring and overseas Member States as well;

3. Notes that confidentiality of inspections is of utmost importance, and as such will be guarded in a series of protected archives, frequently tested for and with penetration tactics by assigned experts;

4. Instructs that the inspections be reviewed between the Member States and the assigned experts to give certain information regarding the findings of the inspections;

5. Establishes a cyber security strength test, funded by the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, for nuclear facilities worldwide in an effort to map potential vulnerabilities of these systems and improve upon them;
6. **Designates** the strength test will pay special attention to the following factors as they relate to cyber security within the facilities:
   
a. Social testing to ensure that the internal staff and associates within the nuclear facilities are not mishandling sensitive information by examining the following factors;
   
b. Comprehensiveness of background investigations for individuals working within the nuclear facilities;
   
c. Limitation of sensitive information accessibility by employees to special programs and systematic passwords within facilities;
   
d. Human resource processes in places that promote incident reporting of employees who may be compromising systems in nuclear facilities;
   
e. Surveillance capabilities in nuclear facilities to monitor employee data disposal and computer activity to ensure that this sensitive information is not getting into the heads of hostile actors;
   
f. Strengthening cyber security so it cannot not be infiltrated by terrorists or any hostile foes;

7. **Calls upon** the strengthening of computer security as one of the important elements to nuclear security through:
   
a. Training courses in cyber safety programs;
   
b. Increasing the quality of cyber firewalls to better prevent a hacking of the system;

8. **Urges** the installation of backup systems so that if a cyber system fails there can be one that will go on immediately and protect the facilities;

9. **Strongly affirms** the need to raise awareness of the fact that cyber terrorist attacks pose a huge threat to nuclear security and we ask the Director General to submit an annual nuclear security report to the general conference;

10. **Assigns** a numerical rating on a scale of 0 to 100 that assesses the strength of information securities systems as they relate to nuclear facilities while further providing a detailed analysis of areas of vulnerability and the ability to respond to a cyber attack.
The International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recalling the International Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which promotes the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy in medicine, technology, and industry,

Noting with deep regret the Fukushima Daiichi accident which has reminded the international community the threat of nuclear energy and led to the creation of 12-Point Action Plan,

Expresses its appreciation to the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators (ANNuR) and other regional bodies, and their efforts to stress cooperation and promotion of nuclear safety in their respective regions, to aid in growth, or establishment of nuclear programs,

Viewing with appreciation Nuclear Security (GC(59)/RES/10 (2015)), and the Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research Development Technology and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA), and their successful sharing of research and training among Member States in similar regions,

Alarmed by the need for regional and international cooperation with the growing recognition that the ability to prevent, detect, and respond to threats when nuclear materials are transported across frontiers is affected by the effectiveness of nuclear security measures established by Member States,

Fully aware of the prospect of cybersecurity attacks on nuclear plant databases posing an imminent threat to the global community,

1. **Urges** Member States to increase transparency and capacity building into existing nuclear programs and provide advice and proper training on improving security standards through technical experts and respond to the needs of other Member States through the authorization to regulate and provide guidance on the rules and procedures for the safe use of nuclear energy, transportation, and management:

   a. Requests Member States to act in sovereignty to be able to implement and efficiently put in use of:

      i. IAEA Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System, Incident and Emergency System and Incident and Emergency Centre to act in conformity against nuclear terrorism and unwanted incidents;

      ii. Promotes IAEA guidance documents to Member States, especially to those that have not received guidance from the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service, to protect themselves against nuclear terrorism and improve nuclear security activities;

      iii. Actively take part of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database in tracking nuclear smuggling and trafficking, including unauthorized disposal of all types of nuclear materials;

2. **Encourages** all Member States who have nuclear energy to recognize the hazard that radiation poses on all living beings, especially laborers who work in this area, to establish strict regulations on nuclear facilities, specifically in:

   a. Stressing for more states to adopt a local agency or program to focus in to enhance and supervise technical capacititation of personnel on nuclear safety facilities;

   b. Provide proper training to nuclear facilities to monitor the proper management of nuclear material and prevent nuclear incidents;
c. Abide by the 2006 Environmental Protection Law No. 52 stating a mandatory Environmental Assessment of nuclear power plants in addition to complying with IAEA requirements when considering construction of nuclear facilities near shared bodies of water as:

i. The risk that nuclear accidents could potentially pose transnational and safety risks to neighboring States;

3. Suggests Member States cooperate with neighboring states, to form regional bodies, similar to the European Atomic Energy Agency, Arab Atomic Energy Agency, ANNuR, and ARASIA, to:

a. More efficiently train emergency preparedness and response (EPR), that respond to all potential nuclear disasters within the body;

b. Allow for better localized support for developing states, who are pursuing to expand, or begin a nuclear energy program;

4. Suggests Member States who wish to establish or improve nuclear programs request, safety, security, and environmental impact surveys from not only international bodies such as the IAEA, but also in regional bodies such as ANNuR:

a. To establish and support regulatory bodies in states wishing to construct their first nuclear reactor;

b. Member states accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere;

c. Under these agreements, the IAEA will ensure that safeguards are applied on all such nuclear materials for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

5. Further requests the IAEA to amend IAEA Safety Standards in the 12-Point Plan. Amendments include:

a. Endorses the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) to also encompass cybersecurity by:

ii. Preventing non-state actors and terrorist organizations in engaging in the act of cyberterrorism in the means of attacking a state’s crucial infrastructure by establishing a state-of-the-art computer security system;

iii. Further recommends the legislative body of the respective state to review and update their security measures constantly in an effort to deter new and emerging methods of infiltration and other potential threats to security of the data servers;

b. Expanding the IAEA education and training, covering new areas to the IT sector and encourages all nuclear power plant to employee IT experts at the site;

6. Expresses its hope for a collaboration with the World Nuclear University (WNU), an IAEA-sponsored course that offers education and training programs regarding nuclear activities by:

a. Encouraging states, who are pursuing to build or expand nuclear energy facilities, to send and support students to the WNU;

b. Cooperation and collaboration between regional bodies such as the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators:

i. Endorses the dissemination of nuclear training and education through regional bodies hosting small conferences at a regional level;
c. Inviting WNU trainees, with high aptitude and qualities of leadership, to become interns at the IAEA:
   i. Depending on their performance, outstanding interns will be provided professional staff positions within the IAEA;

d. Encourages the Member States of the IAEA to provide opportunities to the trainees to become prospective Resident Ambassadors to the IAEA or potential volunteers at RANET;

e. Requests to include the *IAEA Strategic Approach to Education and Training in Nuclear Safety 2013-2020* and cybersecurity curriculum to train more full-fledged and experienced trainees;

f. Supports the development of a scholarship for the WNU;

7. Further recommends the supranational organizations and other regional bodies to utilize the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group’s stress test because:
   g. The stress tests transcend the current standards for licensing and periodic nuclear testing;
   h. The European Union’s stress test is the paragon of nuclear benchmarks, due to its rigorous examination process, which has led to the advancement of improving nuclear safety.
The International Atomic Energy Agency,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Commending with appreciation the efforts of this committee in promoting public awareness,

Whereas nuclear safety is defined as the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, and the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks,

Whereas nuclear security is defined as the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities,

Encouraging transparency of all Member States in regards to nuclear proliferation, disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear technology,

Reaffirming that peaceful use of nuclear technology and the goals of disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation are compatible, and that nonproliferation does not mean a lack of empowerment, but global improvement regarding peace security,

Always considering the ever present need for full consideration, approval, and adhesion to all guidelines and strategies deemed beneficial to all Member States by all Member States, where in guaranteeing the effectiveness of the recommendations developed by this body and for this body,

Further acknowledging on a secure and cohesive method of addressing any noncompliant Member States and the supporters thereof, acting with malicious intent against the esteemed member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while ensuring the safe and secure transfer and housing of radioactive material,

Referencing the order from the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its suppression of aggression in previously rogue member states,

Recalling previous legislation that takes into consideration the necessity for the non-proliferation of nuclear weaponry and seizure of nuclear wastes and other materials, and the obligations of all Member States to prevent the development and acquisition of nuclear materials for the purpose of malice and aggression, such as Security Council resolution S/RES/1540,

Alarmed by the need for regional and international cooperation with the growing recognition that the ability to prevent, detect, and respond to threats is affected by the effectiveness of the nuclear security measure taken by other States, especially when nuclear materials are transported across frontiers,

Endorsing General Assembly resolution 70/23, which recognized the Treaty of Pelindaba, creating the African nuclear-weapon-free-zone and establishing standards of safety and security for a peaceful use of nuclear energy, General Assembly resolution 68/220 of 2013 and General Assembly resolution 70/73 of 7 December 2015,

Regarding the General Assembly resolution 68/32 on the central role of United Nations (UN) in disarmament and also underlining the relevance of multilateral disarmament machinery as mandated by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament and of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1995),

Endorses the initiatives of Member States having nuclear research programs, such as the Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Research to ensure nuclear safety,
Recognizing that a clear communication strategy can play a crucial role in promoting nuclear safety and security among International Community,

Pointing out the growing importance that the private sector has in the nuclear energy and its derivatives, such as in the medical and agricultural sector,

Recalling IAEA resolution GC(59)/RES/13 that calls upon all Member States to give their full and continuing support to the IAEA in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities,

Expressing its appreciation for all nations to uphold the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, working towards making Africa and other regions a nuclear weapon free zone,

Taking note of the thirty-four international monitoring systems (IMS) within twenty-two African countries,

Recognizing the efficacy of the International Nuclear Information System, which promotes transparency while utilizing nuclear weaponry and facilities,

Bearing in mind that the 2003 Radioactive Waste Management Glossary defines cleanup as any measures that may be carried out to reduce the radiation exposure from existing contamination through actions applied to the contamination itself or to the exposure pathways to humans and that in a radioactive waste management context, cleanup has essentially the same meaning as rehabilitation, remediation and restoration,

1. Establishes an Information Sharing Network and Aid fund focused on research and technology and therefore:
   a. Calls upon Member States for the creation and implementation of all-encompassing monetary and knowledge networks focused on fulfilling the dual mandate of the IAEA;
   b. Specifically suggests the development of multilateral aid funds focused on the continued advancement and research of nuclear technologies, especially those technologies focused on electricity and power generation;
   c. Highly recommends Member States to use nuclear technologies to contribute to the development of the research in peaceful means, such as the development of drought tolerant and disease resistant materials to aid developing nations to combat potential degradation of nuclear facilities which results in incidents such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima;
   d. Suggests that such a fund be housed and operated within the existing IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme which provides for sources of funding from projects related to the development of nuclear and atomic energy technologies. Such a fund will be supported through voluntary donations of willing member states and participation from qualified research institutions and non-governmental organizations;
   e. Requests an increase in IAEA funding dedicated toward the cause of promoting nuclear safety and security;

2. Further recommends the expansion and refinement of current information sharing systems for the widespread transparent distribution of policies, techniques, and information regarding the management and operation of nuclear facilities and prevention of global thermonuclear incidents, such as:
   a. Nuclear reactor construction protocols/practices;
   b. Nuclear management protocols/practices;
   c. Nuclear emergency systems;
d. Nuclear waste systems;
e. Non-nuclear weapons, current research concerning nuclear energy;
f. Compilation of past mistakes and subsequent fixes of specific member states;

3. **Encourages** the establishment of regional peer review through the existing framework of Self-Assessment of Regulatory Infrastructure for Safety:

a. Asserting that regional collaboration on nuclear policies and development is the most effective way to ensure multilateral support, policy coordination, and safety;

4. **Calls upon** member states to set up additional sound nuclear emergency preparedness programs with systems that include but are not limited to:

a. Regular nuclear accident simulation exercises, involving large-scale population action and simulated media pressure;

b. Providing an additional layer of protection by specifying response actions that may be taken in the event of a serious accident or event;

5. **Establishes** a conference to be hosted by the IAEA in 2017 and every year thereafter with the focus of creating and implementing a set of standardized guidelines for the management of nuclear energy facilities as well as emergency response guidelines and will:

a. Allow Member States a forum to share effective policies and procedures concerning nuclear energy that are in operation across the world;

b. Allow for multilateral efforts to promote nuclear safety and security for all Member States;

c. Allow for humanitarian aid organizations to provide response training and the familiarization of operating procedures in case of meltdown;

d. Be hosted in Vienna, Austria at the headquarters of the IAEA;

6. **Encouraging** full adherence to the IAEA’s Systematic Assessment of Regulatory Competence Needs to strengthen the efforts of building local/domestic capacities while complying/adhering to commonly shared tools and with:

a. The goal is to promote education and training programs that integrate overall strategies to both build and maintain capacity, are supported by governments and provide technical, human support for management of competencies of specific importance in the field of nuclear development;

b. The intent is to further maximize the practice of technology and resource sharing among regional and international partners;

7. **Proposing** the establishment of Non-Proliferation Documentation Against Noncompliant Member States and those Member States that support them and is additionally:

a. Recommending consideration by the Security Council to address the need for enforcement of nonproliferation documentation against noncompliant Member States who are suspected by the UN of malicious intent using nuclear materials;

b. Expanding these regulations and guidelines to the actions of those member states who provide fiscal and political support of noncompliant Member States;
c. Establishing mandates and comprehensive documentation of all Member States that incorporates and encourages noncompliant member states to cease aggressive and malicious activities in favor of diplomacy and peace;

d. Reinforcing previous regulations such as Security Council resolution 1737 and Security Council resolution 1540 developed for the purpose of suppression against anti-terrorism efforts and the acquisition of nuclear material by noncompliant Member States;

e. Believing that further advisory legislation must be developed to fortify all supporting Member States against aggressive development of nuclear technology with malicious intent, following precedent set by the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;

8. Recommends that Member States begin allocating Research and Development funds in the style of the Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories project, for the purposes of safe and secure nuclear development which has the purpose of:

a. Implementing of a nuclear management fund regarding maritime robotics to support initiatives such as SEA-VAX, in the style of the Renovation of Nuclear Applications Laboratories Project, throughout regions highly susceptible to radioactive waste and with seafloor depositories of nuclear materials, such as the Pacific region;

b. Encouraging of new methods of the promotion of nuclear safety and security in an ever-changing technological world;

c. Supporting that the IAEA regulate the peaceful implementation and monitor the location of these robotics in order to mitigate the potential threat of territorial disputes by member states;

d. Encouraging funding for the maritime robotics nuclear management fund be provided by voluntary contributions from member states, as well as from regional organizations. If voluntary contributions are not met, a reassessment of the IAEA budget from the Office of Procurement Services will be used in order to call for a minimum funding of the project;

9. Establishes an independent agency reporting directly to the IAEA, starting its sessions in 2017 and every year thereafter with the focus of promoting training and supporting those countries which are developing atomic energy and will:

a. Set a calendar of meetings in order to suggest new safe strategies and technologies of sound development;

b. Encourage multilateral efforts to discuss reports on data about the ongoing improvement of newcomers to nuclear power, respecting the standards of nuclear safety and security;

c. Closely cooperate with the IAEA, empowering training and the familiarization of operating procedures in case of meltdown;

d. Have its legal seat in Vienna, Austria where is also the headquarters of the IAEA; The agency shall be named International Agency for Nuclear Safety and Security (IANSS) and comprise all those Member States that have already collected a deep experience in threat characterization due to their history as leading heads and examples for countries in developing process;

e. Allow each leading Member State to support newcomers to be included in the agency by considering several criteria based on the level of development of nuclear facilities of the country itself;

f. Assign the level of nuclear facilities development is at the discretion of the IANSS, with an annual technical revision;
10. **Recommends** the creation of a completely transparent regulatory commission to ensure the proper disposal of high-level primary waste, in an effort to safeguard against environmental harm and in fulfillment of IAEA standards for waste disposal and:

   a. This commission will be entirely under the control of the IAEA exclusively located at the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory;

   b. Calls for strengthening and enhancing IAEA international standards for Asserts that all member states act accordingly to the principle of sovereignty, and fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by them in accordance with the statute of the IAEA;

   c. Establishes that all states will retain their state sovereignty in respect to all facets Urges member states, which have not done so to sign all treaties and international legislation pertaining to nuclear safety and security, of this resolution the construction and building of new Atomic Centrals;

11. **Prevents** any intromission in the nuclear weapons’ operative system by terroristic groups and draws the attention to the fact that new threats are posed everyday to the safety of nuclear transportation and encourages joint actions in order to prevent terrorist attacks;

12. Calls upon the need for more International Monitoring Systems to locate and alert nations of where and when any nuclear tests that have taken place:

   a. Further invites Member States to incorporate and properly utilize the IMS for the use of Nuclear Disaster prevention including:

      i. Tracking and sharing information;

      ii. Awareness of nuclear testing;

      iii. Safeguarding other nations via alerts;

13. **Calls upon** an update to the 2003 Radioactive Waste Management Glossary by defining the term rehabilitation and:

   a. Recognizing in order to implement rehabilitation in post disaster zones the term must be clearly defined;

   b. Acknowledging that cleanup and rehabilitation are different terms and should be defined differently;

   c. Calling for the definition to be, “ensuring through different means, including medicine and psychological assistance, that people affected by nuclear disasters are treated until their lives are restored to their prior status before the disaster occurred”;

   d. Responding to UN Documents calling for rehabilitation like resolution A/70/L.27;

   e. Also urging Member States to work and update on other existing legal framework and improve a common pattern to follow, this supporting international cooperation efficiency;

14. **Establishes** a department that shall:

   a. Be staffed and managed by the IAEA;

   b. Be equipped and funded by volunteering Member States;

   c. Dedicated to providing rehabilitation services and suggested programs to nations affected by any nuclear-related emergency, with the expressed consent of the affected nation(s);
d. Shall conduct research and develop extensive plans of action for various nuclear disasters and emergencies.
International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), pertaining to the responsibilities Member States have to refrain from supporting the use and/or development of waste nuclear materials by non-state actors,

Further recalling the significance of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) concerning the close connection between terrorism and organized crime and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials,

Reaffirming the responsibilities, the IAEA has under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the key role nuclear disarmament plays in increasing Member States’ nuclear safety and security as outlined in General Assembly resolution 59/9 of the 22 of October 2004, General Assembly resolution 59/10 of the 22 of October 2004, and General Assembly resolution 59/13 of the 29 of October 2004,

Affirming and re-emphasizing the importance of all Member States’ adherence to the NPT in order to encourage non-members to sign the NPT,

Noting with delight the progress some Member States, such as Ukraine, have made towards converting their stored of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) into Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) in joint efforts with other Member States,

1. Suggests the Member States still utilizing highly enriched uranium for fuel research, isotope-production, naval reactors and medical radioisotope production begin the transition to low enriched uranium by:
   a. Developing national programs dedicated to developing LEU fuel and converting research reactors from HEU to LEU;
   b. Encouraging the sharing of information through the IAEA technical cooperation program;
   c. Utilizing the support of other Member States and international organizations to facilitate this process, in a similar fashion as Ukraine;

2. Recommends that a Nuclear Disarmament Summit be set up, meeting annually on years during which no NPT review conference is held, hosted by rotating volunteer Member States, to assist Member States’ in various ways:
   a. Member States will have the ability to provide progress reports and express any concerns with the ongoing disarmament process, receiving voluntary advice and aid from other Member States;
   b. This annual forum will assist in ensuring the consistent progress of the long-term process of nuclear disarmament by participating Member States and ensure international cooperation;

3. Proposes that, at the next Nuclear Disarmament Summit, Member States set concrete goals for a timescale for complete nuclear disarmament, including goals for phasing out nuclear weapons, and repurposing nuclear material such as HEU and plutonium to materials used only for peaceful purposes;

4. Suggests Member States repurpose fuel removed from nuclear arms and reserve stockpiles of unused radioactive material, such that:
   a. The removed nuclear fuel will be used for the continued development of nuclear infrastructure in any Member State that has nuclear capabilities and the expansion of nuclear energy in those countries that have not yet developed nuclear technology;
b. This fuel will be repurposed for use in nuclear research and power reactors, maritime vessels, and production of medical isotopes;

c. Member States who have excess nuclear material from repurposed nuclear arms or reserve stockpiles are encouraged to negotiate the safe transfer of said materials to Member States who lack nuclear fuel resources and who are party to the NPT.
The International Atomic Energy Agency,

Affirming the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Integrated Regulatory Review Service,

Recognizing the danger of complacency in the development of nuclear power technology between Member States with new nuclear programs and Member States with historically more developed nuclear programs,

Noting further the need for increased border transparency and the further development of capacity building measures into Member States’ nuclear programs to improve security standards,

Alarmed by the unregulated radioactive material movement across state borders in direct opposition to the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1, and as it relates to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (GC(47)/RES/7) and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources(GC(48)/RES/10),

Affirming Member States’ rights to pursue peaceful nuclear energy development guided by the IAEA Safety Standards: Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2012 Edition) which emphasizes the need for regulation to protect both the people and the environment,

Aware of the need to provide capacity building in order to promote the nuclear energy programs of Member States in compliance with the International Physical Protection Advisory Services (IPPAS), a program provided by Norway and the IAEA,

Emphasizing GC(57)/RES/11, which strengthens technical cooperation activities between Member States, and GC(57)/RES/12, which stresses the importance of further research to strengthen nuclear science and technology for its use in nuclear power facilities,

Recognizing the United Nation’s Sustainable Energy for All program and other comparable programs, in their mission towards increasing communication of sustainable energy practices on a regional basis in order to address regionally specific concerns in the area of nuclear energy,

Noting With Satisfaction both Norway’s emergency planning agreement on early warning and information exchange, wherein Member States must provide a forewarning of vessels containing radioactive materials that traverse the Norwegian borders, a model for bilateral communication and respect in the transport and usage of nuclear material, and the recent Climate Risk Early Warning System (CREWS), born out of the Conference of the Parties (COP21), which provides a workable model for funding and implementing warning systems in LDCs and SIDs,

1. Ensures that the nuclear programs of Member States are evolving at a rate equal or greater to the current international standards as defined by resolution GC(47)/RES/7, the IAEA recommends that:

   a. Large members states develop established nuclear energy programs at a rate acceptable to maintain their compliance with the evolving definitions of global Nuclear Facility standards;

   b. This ensures that Member States do not maintain aforementioned energy sites that are at an increased risk for accidents or malfunctions;

2. Draws attention to the lack of cooperation between Member States in the regards of transparent information sharing between Member States and strongly urges each Member State to increase collaboration in member
state transparency to allow for an influx in capacity building measures, communication, and increased security when transporting nuclear equipment between Member States:

a. Recommends that Member States to ensure that unregulated movements of radioactive materials do not occur:
   i. The unregulated movements of radioactive material can be monitored with implementation of Geiger counters and other radio-isotope detecting devices along regional borders;
   ii. Radioactive materials are defined as, but not limited to: Radioactive scrap materials, medical radioisotopes, waste from nuclear facilities, and other Beta and Gamma emitting materials;

b. We recognizing that transparency is a pillar of interstate and intrastate development, and is necessary for the successful relations between Member States;

3. Recommends that Member States implement the transparency, accountability, and construction oversight program, or TAC, with a focus on developing nuclear powers:

a. Noting the importance of transparency between the scientific community and the general public in dissemination of information regarding safety of nuclear technology works as a strong confidence building measure;

b. Suggesting a focus on educating regulatory authorities, elaborating upon programs similar to that initiated by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), which will establish accountability systems for the staff of each nuclear facility:
   i. By ensuring that all employees working at operational or decommissioned nuclear facilities are knowledgeable and well-equipped to handle their duties, any potential human errors that could lead to nuclear disasters can be mitigated;
   ii. Making this information on nuclear safety available to the public allows Member States to promote a nuclear safety culture that can subsequently work to prevent civilian panic in the face of potential crises and place public pressure on national governments to adhere to international safety standards;

c. With geographically diverse Member States, the design of new nuclear facilities should include measures that account for any potential natural disasters unique to each region, as well as upholding current structural and redundancy standards such as:
   i. Designing and building nuclear reactors that can withstand any potentially destructive natural disasters like earthquakes, droughts, and tsunamis that could adversely disrupt the functionality and safety of a nuclear facility;

4. Calls upon every Member State to fully adopt and enforce the Code of Conduct on the Safety, CPPNM, and Security of Radioactive Sources and Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources:

a. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources is a core document of the IAEA that is essential to ensuring that all countries dealing with radioactive materials follow this code of conduct to ensure standardized safety;

b. We request that Member States comply with all articles of the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) as a legally binding article of the IAEA:
   i. Instructs that intensive full-scale simulation training should be required for prospective employees in order to protect nuclear facilities in the case of unforeseen attack or disaster;
   ii. We recognize the amendment for physical protection under the CPPNM as a legally binding necessary instrument under the auspices of IAEA;
5. **Urges** that the classification system of the IAEA Guidelines For State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials be updated to include interstate cooperation regionally, as a nuclear accident does not just apply to a particular nation, but affects the international community economically, politically and socially:

   a. Particularly in the government and legal framework which deals with government responsibility and provides concrete governmental guidelines with data provided by the IAEA, such as Radiological Assessment Reports, the International Nuclear Safety Group’s INSAG Reports, Technical Reports, and TECDOCs;

   b. Additionally, the responsibilities of the regulatory body do not provide a step by step process in the way of how the IAEA would deal with such matters, and should:

      i. include a streamlined reporting process that is tailored to individual nation’s linguistic capability;

      ii. keep in mind that any step-by-step processes must factor in a state’s development level and their ability to maintain and protect nuclear facilities;

6. **Calls for** Member States that choose to participate in the Voluntary Information Sharing Program be required to comply with the IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, Operative clause 7 expands on the Voluntary Information Sharing Program:

   a. Transparency and oversight is necessary to ensure that Member States do not misuse the information provided to them as well as showing that the states with well developed nuclear programs are sharing factual and helpful information;

   b. The IAEA would immediately reject any Member State to be found using information shared in the purpose of benevolence from the Voluntary Information Sharing Program:

      i. The IAEA would also make allowances under their current powers to recommend sanctions on Membr States that violate the terms of their agreement and entrance into the Voluntary Information Sharing Program(VISP);

      ii. Violation includes but is not limited to misuse, trade, movement, or dissemination of informational resources provided by the Voluntary Information Sharing Program(VISP);

7. **Endorses** the creation of a secure and voluntary forum for information sharing between Member States with established Nuclear energy programs and developing Member States:

   a. Participation in this forum requires much stricter stipulations on the transparency and effects of nuclear power within voluntary states;

   b. Requires that participating in the Voluntary Information Sharing Program comes with the legally binding stipulations defined in the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials;

8. Defines capacity building in agreeance the IAEA meeting document titled Capacity Building: Concept, Definition, and Methodology for Self Assessment:

   a. Places full time IAEA administrative officials into newly created generation sites;

   b. Provides for annual inspections and for training workshops of all workers, such as the IAEA Training Workshop: Systemic Approach to Safety – Pragmatic Solutions, to ensure that nuclear energy sites meet the structural and redundancy regulations as provided by the IAEA including:

      i. Full-scale simulations in accordance with the IAEA International Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) framework, provided in public spaces and households by the IAEA;

      ii. And these actions shall be implemented by the Member States’ government, supervised by the IAEA’s Department of Nuclear Safety and Security;
iii. The Division of Nuclear Installation Safety (NSNI) within the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, which assists Member States with administering safety reviews, provides an international system for research reactors, and works with Member States in choosing suitable sites for nuclear reactor construction;

c. Suggests the IAEA provide funding and resources to Member States deciding to implement nuclear energy programs in their regions:

i. Funding should be provided to Member States that wish to develop nuclear programs in accordance with the IAEA regulations and the legally binding CPPNM;

ii. Funding should also be provided to Member States that wish to update reactors that are generally accepted by the IAEA to be out of date, or reactors at a significant risk for failure;

9. Aspires for the expansion of “Sustainable Energy for All” by the Secretary General worldwide in order to increase regional cooperation in the area of nuclear safety and security so that Member States who have experienced success in their programs can provide valuable advice to those still working to increase the safety of their programs.