2010 GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FIRST COMMITTEE

28 March - 1 April 2010 - Sheraton
30 March - 3 April 2010 - Marriott

Director General: Michael Aguilar; Under-Secretary-General: Amanda D’Amico
Director: Nick Warino; Assistant Director: Charles Green
Message from the Director-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2010 NMUN-DC Conference

At the 2010 NMUN-DC Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs or judicial experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation’s policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country’s position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation’s position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are required for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must not exceed two single spaced pages (one double sided paper, if printed)
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at 1 inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page; the use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to dirgen.dc@nmun.org.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed **no later than October 15, 2010**.

**PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: SC_Central_University)**

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee’s mandate

Sincerely yours,

Michael Aguilar
Director-General
dirgen.dc@nmun.org
Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2010 National Model United Nations-DC Conference and the General Assembly First Committee (GA First). Your Director is Nicholas Warino and your Assistant Director is Charles Green. Your committee staff, and the rest of the NMUN-DC secretariat, has worked diligently throughout the year to prepare for this conference, and we sincerely hope that you will conclude the weekend at the conference with a greater appreciation for global politics.

In preparing for this conference, delegates should not only familiarize themselves with their own country but with the wider international system and all major issues outside the current topics in order to cultivate a broad understanding of the GA First and its mandate. Moreover, since the topics in this committee remain fluid, remember to periodically familiarize yourself with the Committee's current agenda. With a dedicated effort from all delegates, we are confident that this will lead to a successful simulation. This guide will aid you in developing a cursory understanding of the topics listed above and give you a starting point for future research.

We are privileged to play a role in your education experience here at NMUN-DC and look forward to working with all of you.

### History of the First Committee of the General Assembly

The United Nations (UN) Charter established the General Assembly (GA) in 1945 and divided it into six main committees, including the First Committee of the General Assembly, also known as the Disarmament and International Security Committee. As with all GA main committees, the GA First has 192 Member States that meet annually and create non-binding resolutions that serve as recommendations to Member States. In addition, each Member State within the GA First has one vote. According to the UN’s background on the General Assembly, “Votes taken on designated important issues, such as recommendations on peace and security and the election of Security Council members, require a two-thirds majority of Member States, but other questions are decided by simple majority.” Recently, the GA has made an effort to “achieve consensus on issues, rather than deciding by a formal vote, thus strengthening support for the Assembly’s decisions.”

The GA First had contributed many important international resolutions that have helped influence global action on the issues of disarmament and security. Some of the more notable instances include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1971), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1976), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996), and a portion of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000). Most recently, during the 64th session of the GA First, the Committee addressed a wide range of issues: effects of atomic radiation, international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, Palestinian refugees, Israel-Palestine, peacekeeping operations, and more.

### I. Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World

- Do acknowledged nuclear-weapon Member States have the moral authority to prevent other States from obtaining nuclear weapons? If they do, what is the basis for such a moral authority? If they do not, how can an existing nuclear weapon Member State argue against the creation of a new nuclear weapon State?
- What incentives does the international community have to offer prospective nuclear-weapon powers?
- How will peaceful uses of nuclear power fit into a nuclear weapons free world, considering the relative ease of switching from nuclear power to nuclear weapons?

During World War II, the United States (US) began its development on nuclear weapons and, in 1945, became the first and only country to use a nuclear weapon against another country by detonating two nuclear bombs in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. While traditional bombing attacks have caused more damage by some measures, the nuclear attacks have caused enormous moral contention and have shaped the world since. In attempts to counterbalance the US’s nuclear capabilities, the Soviet Union (USSR) developed its own nuclear weapons shortly thereafter. Soon, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and China joined the “nuclear club.” These five Nation States are the five official nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT, although they are not granted a right of perpetual ownership of nuclear weapons. Outside of this officially sanctioned club is India, Pakistan, and North Korea—all of whom have tested and possess nuclear weapons but remain non-signatories of the NPT. Furthermore, it is rumored that Israel possesses nuclear weapons as well and merely prefers to be an “undeclared” nuclear weapon state. According to the Arms Control Association’s Web site, “Israel has not publicly conducted a nuclear test, does not admit to or deny having nuclear weapons, and states that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Israel is universally believed to possess nuclear arms.” Furthermore, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there is “nuclear sharing,” where non-nuclear weapon Member States can store nuclear weapons. Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and formally Canada and Greece are part of this agreement. Similarly, the former USSR countries of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine stored and inherited nuclear weapons from the dissolved USSR. They have since transferred or disposed of all their nuclear weapon stockpiles. Additionally, South Africa developed six nuclear weapons in the 1980 but agreed to destroy them in the 1990s. The Arms Control Association considers Iran and Syria to be states of “immediate proliferation concern,” although there is no proof that either state possesses nuclear weapons. While there are now a handful of nuclear weapon states, nuclear weapons are still mostly concentrated in the US and present-day Russia. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, these two states possess over 20,000 total warheads (less than 10,000 active). In comparison, there are around 1,000 total warheads outside of the US and Russia, with some of these no longer active.

Almost as soon as nuclear weapons were created, there were international responses to curb their growth and deployment. The first major attempt to do so was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, which limited all nuclear test detonations to underground facilities. Soon thereafter, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was drafted and came into force in 1970. The NPT is perhaps the most significant international attempt at nuclear weapons nonproliferation, as it is currently signed by 189 Member States. In 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed, which banned all nuclear explosions in all environments. However, despite 181 state signatures and 148 state ratifications, the treaty is not yet in force.

Due to the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons possessed by the US and the USSR/Russia, many of the key non-proliferation treaties were bilateral. During the 1970s and 1980s, the US and the USSR had several significant bilateral agreements limiting the use and development of nuclear weapons. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), were two treaties in the 1970s—SALT I and SALT II (SALT II superseding SALT I)—that limited both countries’ numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), heavy bombers, and multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In 1972, the US and the USSR also agreed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), which would limit the number and location of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US and Russia signed three Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) that would further limit each country’s nuclear weapons. However, only START I has been ratified. The US and Russia have also signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002 that attempted to reduce strategic nuclear warheads.

As can be seen, all of the major attempts at non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament have naturally been dealt with on a state-level. With the ever-present threat of international terrorism, however, the dangers of nuclear weapons are no longer confined to states. This creates several problems. First, terrorist organizations do not adhere to any of the international agreements and agencies that are in place to deal with non-proliferation and disarmament. Second, many of the inherent systemic constraints on the use of nuclear weapons—such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which is a contentious concept as is—rest on the assumption that both nuclear actors are also rational actors and have their own sovereign territory that they do not wish to see destroyed. Because many terrorist organizations are multi-national in composition which do not safeguard a territory or people, these rules do not apply. For example, if a terrorist organization that trained in one country and was composed of members from many different countries and had stations in many other different countries, where would an attacked country retaliate? Additionally, with the relative minute numbers of terrorists that make up any one organization and their more dispersed, transient nature, how effective could nuclear retaliation ever be? Because terrorist organization are likely aware of this logic, there is less of a natural deterrent in using nuclear weapons.
When states attempt to advance with a nuclear weapons program against the wishes of the international community, there are only a limited number of options that can be used to pressure these “rogue states” to drop their nuclear weapons programs. One option is militaristic; however, this presents many risks and in fact practical limits in effectiveness. First of all, the use of military force—whether it be limited to tactical strikes against nuclear facilities or a more expansive attack—can escalate into a regional conflict or war. Second, when sovereign states are attacked by outside powers, the result is often a strengthening of public support of the regime in question and their policies—including nuclear weapons programs. Third, military force may simply signal to the hopeful nuclear weapon state that they must, faster than ever, develop nuclear weapons to prevent another attack. Outside of military force, the other option that states have to prevent nuclear proliferation is the use of economic sanctions. The theory behind economic sanctions is that by constraining the state’s international economic activity, their internal economic growth would slow, making the option of pursuing nuclear weapons even more costly. Furthermore, the decline in international trade would result in increased unemployment and other economic calamities, which would then turn the public’s support against its regime. The problem with this tactic is that it relies on a unified international agreement of sanctions, because the country under economic sanctions could replace trade with one country with another, ameliorating many of the effects of the sanctions. The regime is also likely to have already priced-in these costs. Further complicating the issue is that even if the economic sanctions are successful in being costly to the state, there is no guarantee that the public will turn against their own regime. Even more, if the country is despotic in nature, they are unlikely to be responsive to internal public angst. Due to all of these variables, the task of preventing a new nuclear weapon state is difficult and complex.

II. The Development of Telecommunications and Science in the Context of International Security

- How can the United Nations (UN) and other Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) work to create effective methods to defeat cyber-terrorism and discourage cyber warfare between states?
- Can the UN effectively regulate cyber warfare at the state level without infringing upon state sovereignty? What limits should be put in place to prevent collateral damage to third-party states in the case of a cyber war?
- Should there be a legitimate, legal application for the use of cyber-warfare at the state level, for example, in order to prevent human rights violations or a greater breech of international law?

The increasing pace of technological development and modern advances in telecommunications has given States the ability to respond to security threats more rapidly than before, but the speed of innovation means that such threats are increasingly adaptive and destabilizing. This dichotomy between technology as a positive force and one that creates new and emerging challenges for a global security infrastructure necessitates an innovative and flexible policy on international cyber-security. When the UN was founded, the world relied on analog technology to communicate. Information was transmitted but not stored. In order to steal or spy upon information held by states, international actors had to either use code breaking tools or find physical copies of the information they wanted. Stealing such information was obviously dangerous and, just as importantly, was a criminal act under international law. Today, the world is a digital jungle of information. The internet allows anyone, but most importantly, international actors, to store information in a way that is easily accessible, either publicly or privately. The amount of interconnectedness has increased the opportunities for sabotage. John Chipman, the director-general of the London-based International Institute for Strategic studies, said in early 2010 that “We are now, in relation to the problem of cyber-warfare, at the same stage of intellectual development as we were in the 1950s in relation to possible nuclear war.” What Chipman meant is that while cyber warfare is acknowledged as a problem and has already been used by and against various states, the nature of the solution is not yet understood. The most direct attempt to answer that question was the Convention on Cybercrime, adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001. The convention highlights many of the issues that are part of regulating cybercrime. It defines five offenses considered criminal under international law: illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, and misuse of devices. This was one of the first documents to thoroughly address the legal and definitional issues of cybercrimes and cyber warfare, but the convention failed to address many more contentious issues such as national
Cyber warfare is the digital warfare against digital infrastructure. The likely targets are power-grids, communications networks, government Web sites and servers, and other high-value assets of a State. Actually attacking such targets, however, is extremely risky for a State, as there is no way to prevent retaliation. Michael Hayden, the former deputy director of national intelligence at the United States Department of Defense, said that “the inherent geography in [cyberspace] plays to the offense. There’s almost nothing inherent in the domain that plays to the defense.” When one country attacks, they immediately open themselves up to counter-attack. This new type of warfare has created an entirely new kind of relative power at the regional and global level. A joint US-NATO publication explains just how serious this new kind of war could be:

“An unrestricted cyber campaign would almost certainly be directed primarily against the target country's critical national infrastructure: energy, transportation, finance, water, communications, emergency services and the information infrastructure itself. It would likely cross boundaries between government and private sectors, and, if sophisticated and coordinated, would have both immediate impact and delayed consequences. Ultimately, an unrestricted cyber attack would likely result in significant loss of life, as well as economic and social degradation.”

This kind of cyber war could be initiated by a State, or by a non-State actor such a terrorist or criminal group. It could also be initiated by a terrorist or criminal group acting on behalf of a State, and for this reason it is important that the UN work to create an international legal code which regulates cyber-attacks but also prevents non-state actors from attacking state infrastructure. William Lynn, US deputy defense secretary characterized the situation in stark terms: “Once the province of nations, the ability to destroy via cyber now also rests in the hands of small groups and individuals: from terrorist groups to organized crime, hackers to industrial spies to foreign intelligence services….This is not some future threat. The cyber threat is here today, it is here now.” Recent events support Lynn’s conclusions; in early 2009, a wave of cyber attacks, which were presumed to be from North Korea, temporarily jammed South Korean and American government websites. At the same time, North Korea was testing multiple stage missiles and sanctions had been threatened by the U.S. and United Nations. Although the cyber attacks were not severe enough to cause military retaliation, there is no telling what level of disruption a State is willing to take before such retaliation is seen as an imperative to protect their security interests. Clearly, there is a need for a more stable security arrangement at the international level, and it is a telling sign of the times that some States have already begun to show willingness to concede some of their offensive abilities in order to protect themselves from the threat of cyber warfare; as early as July 2000, the Russian Federation submitted a draft resolution to the United Nations General Assembly, Principles of Information Security, that would prohibit the creation or use of tools for a cyber attack.

The ability to communicate and share information is not inherently a stabilizing influence on international security. While traditional military power is still an important factor in a State’s effect on international security, telecommunications and technological advances are forcing States to reevaluate traditional security paradigms. As civilian and military infrastructure become intertwined, it becomes easier to cripple a State’s infrastructure, and harder to prevent “collateral damage” to innocent civilians. Even if an attack was intended to be concentrated on a single target, be it a single piece of infrastructure or an entire state, the consequences of large-scale cyber warfare are still not understood—and just as with nuclear warfare, any large scale use of cyber warfare would surely be a lesson in unintended consequences. Although defining and regulating the use of telecommunications and technology is a difficult challenge, States are beginning to focus their resources on defensive measures meant to prevent cyber-attacks against their national interests. The United States is on the forefront of cyber defense, having established a Cyber Command in October 2010 in order to “establish a comprehensive approach to DoD [Department of Defense] cyberspace operations.” The Republic of Korea also created a cyber-command in 2010 to defend against alleged virus attacks by North Korea in July 2009. While such programs may provide States with a level of regional security in the short term, in order for the international community to find a solution to the problems specific to cyber warfare, and war in the modern age of rapid communication and information dissemination, the problem must first be analyzed and understood at the global level.
The rapidly changing nature of telecommunications and technology will require any codification of terms or legal documents to be flexible and innovative, much more so than previous arms-control agreements such as the Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has been successful in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, but relied on comparatively well understood scenarios, game-theory predictions, and mutually assured destruction as the “endgame” should it come to total war. Being unable to know or understand the cyber-warfare policies of States with the ability to commit acts of cyber-warfare is a destabilizing influence on global security. In order to prevent a “digital arms race” and ensure that global infrastructure remains intact, the international community will need to make a serious collaborative effort to understand the new realities of the digital age.

III. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

- Given the cost and time required to remove landmines using current methods, how can states comply with the Convention? What can the international community do to assist states that require financing, training, and logistical support?
- How can current methods for mine identification and removal be improved? What role can the United Nations play in researching such improvements?
- What more can International Govermental Organizations (IGO’s) do to assist the Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) sector?

Over the past 50 years, landmines are believed to have caused more casualties than nuclear and chemical weapons combined. In the 1980s, there were several international conflicts that ended, allowing indigenous populations to return to their previous farms and villages. As they returned to their land, the number of post-conflict civilian’s casualties from anti-personnel landmines quickly began to rise. In the late 1980s, the United Nations declared that the threat of landmines posed a major humanitarian crisis. The landmark publication that brought the issue international attention was the publication of a Human Rights Watch report entitled *The Coward’s War: Landmines in Cambodia*. This was the first detailed study of the actual usage and consequences of landmines. The UN began taking steps to eliminate landmines in the 1990s, which culminated in the adoption of the “Ottawa Treaty” in 1997. The treaty was described by Kofi Annan as being “a landmark step in the history of disarmament” and was the major turning point in the international effort to create a mine-free world. The purpose of this treaty was to put an end to the suffering and causalities caused by anti-personnel mines, to remove existing mines in the world, and to ensure their destruction.

By international standards, the Ottawa Treaty is an outstanding success. The treaty has achieved widespread implementation, and many States have embraced their responsibilities with unusual determination; despite the success of the Ottawa Treaty, there are still major roadblocks to its full implementation. As of July 2010, 37 Member States have still not signed the Ottawa Treaty and since 1999 only 11 States which were previously known to have mines have been declared “mine free.” That leaves an estimated 110 million landmines planted in more than 70 countries worldwide. It is not the level of success that concerns most inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), it is the pace of mine clearance and victim assistance. In 2004, the halfway point between the Ottawa Treaty’s establishment and its deadline, there were still millions of mines yet to be cleared, and some NGOs believed that the level of funding was nowhere near the amount required in order to meet the 2009 deadline. At the time, it was believed that the Nairobi Summit would help close the gap on the 2009 deadline. In 2004, the United Nations held the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-free world, which resulted in the *Nairobi Action Plan*. The purpose of the 70 point plan was to be a “spring board for action,” according to summit chair, Austrian Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch.

Clearing mines is the responsibility of the United Nations Mine Action Team (UNMAT), which is made up of more than 14 UN departments, agencies, programs, and funds. The UNMAT is currently providing services to more than 30 countries. Even with such a focused and large-scale effort, the number of landmines planted around the world continues to rise. Clearing mines is a dangerous, expensive, and extremely time consuming process. The current methods for clearing mines are the roadblock to achieving timely results; these methods are the most immediate roadblock to full implementation and the most difficult issue to solve. Although the UN can, and has, provided funding to assist states in clearing mines, the main source of funding for mine clearance lies within the states themselves. The problem is that many states are far more willing to invest money in weaponry than in its removal.
While 100,000 landmines were cleared last year, more than 2 million were planted. While many countries officially recognize the importance of demining, it is largely a financial and logistical issue. The cost to produce a landmine is as little as $3, but the cost to remove that mine once it is planted is at least $1,000. According to the 2009 Landmine Monitor Report it would cost roughly $33 billion and 1,100 years to achieve a mine-free world at the current rate of clearance.

The Korean peninsula is one of the principle case studies in landmine use, clearance, and effect. During the Korean War, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) laid millions of mines throughout the Korean peninsula. After the war, low-income farmers began moving into areas with known mines and clearing them with metal detectors; meanwhile, both sides have stockpiled mines and have continued to plant them along the Demilitarized Zone and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) in the ROK. While the ROK claims that data on landmine casualties is unavailable for the 40 year period immediately after the Korean War, between 1992 and 1999 there were an acknowledged 34 civilian and 91 total landmine casualties in the ROK. Since 1999, the ROK has undertaken limited demining efforts in areas surrounding military bases, spurred by concerns that flooding was washing mines into civilian populated areas. The removal projects have involved tens of thousands of ROK military personnel in several specific campaigns since 2000 and have succeeded in removing well over 10,000 mines, but that number represents barely a fraction of the number of mines still present in the ROK and ignores the heavily mined DMZ and CCZ.

The ROK has expressed reticence to engage in demining efforts in the DMZ and CCZ for strategic reasons. Noting the large DPRK military presence at its northern border the ROK has both continued to abstain from participation in the international Mine Ban Treaty and maintained stockpiling large quantities of antipersonnel landmines (407,800). This highlights one of the primary obstacles universal implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty faces: the perception among military strategists that landmines are an integral and necessary component to security infrastructure. As long as this military paradigm remains dominant in a few key security circles mines will continue to be stockpiled and linger ready for deployment, and demining efforts will remain insufficient.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the First Committee of the General Assembly

United Nations (n.d.). United Nations General Assembly: 64th Session Agenda. Retrieved July 17, 2010, from http://www.un.org/ga/64/agenda/A-peace.shtml. This Web portal gives links to all the official documentation of the UN General Assembly’s most recent ordinary session. This will help delegates get a full understanding of what the UN GA, including the GA First, works on and how they produce their work. Delegates should incorporate this understanding in their own work in the GA First simulation.


United Nations (n.d.). United Nations General Assembly: Main Committees. Retrieved July 17, 2010, from http://www.un.org/ga/maincommittees.shtml. This Web page, delegates will see a brief description of all six main committees of the GA. Included are links to each main committee, which includes further information and links. Delegates should internalize the specifics of the GA First in order to best work within its purview.

I. Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World

At this Web site, delegates will fine a detailed breakdown of the distribution of nuclear weapons in the international system. Obviously, it is of paramount importance for delegates to fully understand what the nuclear capabilities of all countries. Furthermore, the Arms Control website has a wider collection of resources that will be helpful.


This column takes a look at the negotiations between the US and Russia during the “new START” talks. Not only does this column offer details on the new START treaty, but it also provides a valuable look into the difficult and complex nature of these negotiations. Delegates should use this article to gain a greater understanding of how nuclear negotiations take place in a practical sense.


This is an enormously helpful Web site for understanding nonproliferation. Within this site is a wide array of resources that can be used. Included are articles and fact sheets on recent attempts at nuclear nonproliferation.


Within this document is an expansive look at nuclear proliferation and terrorism. This document provides a helpful history of nuclear proliferation, a contemporary look at the issue, and other valuable information. Delegates should familiarize themselves with its contents.


This is simply the entire text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Despite not being in effect as of now, the CTBT is a significant treaty in the quest for a nuclear free world. Delegates should know the details of this treaty in order to advance on the issue.


This article critiques the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD is a significant theory in how one perceives the scope of the problem with nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, delegates should fully understand the theory in order to use it or to argue against it.


Within this Web portal are a bevy of links to different resources on arms control and disarmament. Included are dozens of articles on US policy, US-Russia efforts, and key treaties. Additionally, there is a look at international and regional organizations and their role in nuclear disarmament.


This Web site is a detailed look at the issue of nuclear terrorism. There are several articles and links that discuss the issue at several levels. Nuclear terrorism is what most people in the security community fear the most, so it is of utmost importance for delegates to study the issue thoroughly.

Quite simply, this is the direct text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is the signature international attempt at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, delegates must have a full understanding of the treaty.

II. The Development of Telecommunications and Science in the Context of International Security


This is the news story detailing the creation of South Korea’s Cyber Command. It is an interesting look at the practical issues that states run into when dealing with unilateral security threats and provides a good example of the different attitudes and opinions involving responding to security threats.


This article is an editorial peace from The Economist which argues that the emerging power of the internet over military and civilian infrastructure requires the immediate attention of the international community. It goes on to say that the internet should have arms-control treaties in the same form as conventional weapons. Delegates should be aware of the contents of this article.


Stuart’s paper is excellent editorial piece detailing the specific problems preventing an international legal framework for deterring or preventing cybercrime. It also reviews some of the history of cybercrime in significant detail. Delegates should be familiar with both the opinions and history within this document in order to understand one of the main attitudes towards the regulation of cybercrime.


This journal article argues that defense planning must include cyber warfare in order to prevent real physical consequences. The article is at times highly technical but for that very reason is a valuable resource. It provides an excellent introduction to the issue of cyber-security in the 21st century. Although this article is extremely well written and presents multiple viewpoints on the issue, remember to view all sources with an eye towards possible bias.


This is a short but notable news article on a speech given by Estonia’s President in front of the General Assembly in 2007. The speech included many of the points now being made by other world leaders, such as the call for a comprehensive set of laws governing cyberspace and the need for collaboration within the United Nations. This speech is also notable because it is illustrative of the views and concerns of smaller states in dealing with cyber-attacks.


Project Grey Goose is an Open Source Intelligence initiative launched on August 22, 2008 to examine how the Russian cyber war was conducted against Georgian Web sites and determine if the Russian government was involved or if it was entirely a grass roots movement by patriotic Russian hackers. The report is a fascinating examination of cyber-warfare and international security and also serves as an excellent case-study in the effect of combining cyber-warfare and conventional weapons on the battlefield.

This article is an excellent explanation of cyber-warfare in relation to conventional warfare and a good piece about the current abilities of states to defend against such attacks. It includes research from multiple studies and publications and gives an excellent analysis from an international relations viewpoint.


This document authorized the creation of a U.S. Military structure to counter cyber threats. The US began developing strategies and military units designed to adapt to the threats of cyber terrorism and cyber warfare after 9/11, and has been at the forefront of cyber defense in the past decade. This document may foreshadow a trend among larger states in the near future.

III. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction


The Landmine Monitor Report is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty. It monitors and reports on State Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the treaty and is a veritable encyclopedia of all mine-related statistics and news over a yearly period.


This report is a historical study of the campaign to ban landmines, starting well before the Ottawa Treaty. It contains all kinds of information on the issue from the early 1990’s until immediately prior to the Nairobi Summit in 2004, and is a much more extensive review of the topic as a whole than any other publication.


The Ploughshares Monitor is a published by Project Ploughshares, a member of the Cluster Munitions Coalition. This journal reviews the Ottawa treaty and has especially interesting analysis of why the Ottawa treaty has achieved so much relative to previous efforts. It is an excellent piece for background information on the Ottawa treaty and arms control.


Jody Williams shared the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. She wrote this article as a recap of the fight to first bring international attention to the issue of landmines and then to ban them. Ms. Williams spends a significant amount of time on the role that NGO’s played in her campaign and this is an excellent source of historical information on NGO’s and the history of landmines.


The full text of the Convention can be accessed here. Delegates should be very familiar with the language of this treaty. This document provides essential knowledge for discussion of this topic.


The Nairobi Action Plan was a major step in the continuing work of the international community to achieve the goals of the Ottawa Treaty. Seventy different actions were decided upon and agreed to by states parties to the convention. This document is the equivalent of a protocol or update to a major UN Resolution and delegates should know and understand the points of the plan.