



Documentation of the Simulation of the
Security Council (SC)*



Conference B

13 - 17 April 2025

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Security Council (SC)

Committee Staff

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Agenda

1. The Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh
2. Climate, Peace, and Security
3. The Situation in Yemen

Resolutions adopted by the Council

Code	Topic	Vote (In favor - Against - Abstention)
SC/PS/1/1	The Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh	Adopted without a vote
SC/2/1	Climate, Peace, and Security	10 in favor, 0 against, 4 abstentions
SC/2/2	Climate, Peace, and Security	Adopted without a vote
SC/PRST/3/1	The Situation in Yemen	Adopted without a vote

Summary Report

The Security Council held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

1. The The Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh
2. Climate, Peace, and Security
3. The Crisis in Yemen

The session was attended by representatives of 15 Member States.

On Sunday, the Council adopted its initial agenda, beginning discussion on the topic of “Climate, Peace, and Security.” On Monday, the Dais received three proposals for draft resolutions, and there were two developments concerning a crisis in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. On Tuesday, after significant development in the crisis, including speeches by representatives from Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Council amended the agenda and deemed the crisis urgent. The Council then prepared and adopted a Press Statement condemning violence in the region and encouraging diplomatic mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan without a recorded vote. Once the Press Statement was adopted, the Council resumed discussion on “Climate, Peace, and Security.”

On Wednesday morning, the Dais approved two more draft resolutions. On Wednesday morning, the Dais moved into voting procedure on all three draft resolutions. One draft resolution had one friendly amendment and was not adopted due to a veto by a member of the P5. The second draft resolution was adopted following a recorded vote, with 10 votes in favor and 4 abstentions. The third draft resolution was adopted without a recorded vote. The final resolutions addressed a wide range of topics, including the definition of climate change, proposals for a non-binding treaty on the climate-security nexus, and the reaffirmation of sovereignty for Member States.

Following the voting, the Council began discussion on “The Situation in Yemen.” The Council adopted a Presidential Statement on the topic without a vote, condemning the lack of diplomatic action and citing key points of action.



Code: SC/PS/1/1

Committee: Security Council

Topic: The Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh

The following Security Council press statement was issued today by the Security Council President:

The members of the Security Council are deeply concerned about the recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and their possible escalation, including the mobilization of troops, the closure of the Lachin corridor, and ongoing military exercises. The Members were honored to receive statements from the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations for Armenia regarding the situation, in which both expressed deep concern over the developing situation. As a result, the Members reaffirmed the territorial sovereignty of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The members of the Security Council called for the relevant authorities to protect all civilians in Armenia and Azerbaijan, regardless of their ethnicity. This is especially relevant due to the history of Armenian ethnic groups living in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani citizens having the inalienable right to return to their homes. The Members have also promoted the pursuit of peace in the face of escalating hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan starting April 8th, 2025, and called for an immediate halt to the hostilities mentioned above. The Members urged all States in the region to refrain from military intervention or hostility, as established in SC Resolution 884 "On the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh" of 12 November 1993, as it may exacerbate the tensions.

The Security Council members urged Armenia and Azerbaijan to collaborate in a diplomatic dialogue with the help of mediators from neutral Member States, as mentioned in the *United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation* (2012). The Members called for diplomatic negotiations facilitated by the Russian Federation and regional state actors, supplemented with support from key international organizations, particularly the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as NGOs such as the Red Cross, United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) that are actively working on the ground.



Code: SC/2/1

Committee: Security Council

Topic: Climate, Peace, and Security

The Security Council,

Acknowledges that Chapter 7 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) specifies that the Security Council shall define and respond to any threat of the peace or act of aggression in order to maintain international peace and security, with respect to Article 40 of the Charter which details that all actions of the Security Council must respect the rights, claims, or positions of all Member States,

Taking into account General Assembly resolution 64/350 on "Climate change and its possible security implications" (2009), which recognized five key aspects of how climate change impacts security, such as vulnerability, development, coping and security, statelessness, and international conflict,

Recalling the work of the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) of 1992 and their work on defining climate change as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods" as well as the previous commitments made by the Security Council under resolution 2349 (2017) on "Security, Protection of Civilians and Human Rights,"

Expressing its regret that there is currently no legal precedent which acknowledges climate change as an international threat and thus expresses its hope on creating a consensus perspective against climate change by all Member States,

Drawing inspiration from pioneering national frameworks such as Panama's Law 287 (2022) on the Rights of Nature and their work on legally binding nature, as well as the persecution for those actors who act against nature and therefore could produce climate-related security risks,

Recognizing the urgent need to safeguard ecosystems as a factor of maintaining global stability due to the impact that food and water insecurity has on worsening political and economic instability, as individuals become more desperate in the face of severe resource scarcity,

Aware of the detrimental activity of non-state actors concerning climate change, including pollution, unsustainable use of resources, and forced displacement due to the unsustainable use of resources,

Solemnly concerned about the overall burden placed on Member States to hold non-state actors accountable for their actions and how such actions affect Member States,

Aware of the consequences that the weaponization of natural resources by armed groups and non-state actors which have had the effect of prolonging conflicts, increasing resource scarcity, and contributing climate change as observed by the Security Council Arria-Formula meeting on "Water, Peace, and Security" (2018) which addressed the weaponization of water,

Noting with appreciation the work of the United Nations Climate Security Mechanism (UNCSM) and its relevance to preventive diplomacy,

Reaffirming the principle of non-intervention as enshrined in Article 2.7 of the *Charter of the United Nations*, and recognizing the sovereignty and national context of each Member State in developing climate-security strategies,

1. *Recommends* climate change to be defined by Member States as “a change in climate that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable periods of time” based on the UNFCCC and is conscious that climate change could play a role in driving conflict by exacerbating resource scarcity, displacement, and geopolitical tensions;
2. *Recommends* the incorporation of climate change as a scientific and humanitarian issue and a security threat by keeping in mind the various perspectives of climate change of different Member States, and with respect to their sovereignty, by:
 - a. Reiterating the importance of an adversary view towards climate change, in the hopes of creating effective group action against high pollution non-state actors;
 - b. Believing that a shift in perspective from viewing climate change as a humanitarian and scientific issue to an adversary perspective would benefit the citizens of the world by creating concrete action against major pollutant, non-state actors, thus improving everyday life by decreasing pollution and overexploitation in many areas internationally;
 - c. Allowing Member States to view, acknowledge, and define climate change as an adversary and take the respective appropriate action to eliminate the issue;
 - d. Identifying high polluters with operations in more than one country that become a problem of international security, and therefore can be legally persecuted by multiple Member States;
 - e. Providing an opportunity for non-state actors and sovereign countries to effect change through the donation and promotion of the creation of climate-friendly initiatives in the areas identified and recommended by the Security Council and the Climate Change Global Innovation Hub;
 - f. Preventing future conflict in conflict-ridden areas by uniting opposing factions in mitigating the effects of climate change, as some of this climate work might be done in border or high-conflict regions and could serve as a common goal;
3. *Expresses its support to* all Member States to develop and implement climate-security strategies that are tailored to their specific national contexts and priorities, in full respect of their sovereignty and in accordance with Article 2.7 of the *Charter of the United Nations*, while encouraging voluntary cooperation and knowledge-sharing frameworks that uphold the principle of non-intervention;
4. *Express hope that* the General Assembly will consider formally recognizing climate change as a transnational security threat under Chapter 7 of the *Charter of the United Nations* to support the Security Council’s response to climate-related security threats by appointing a dedicated climate-security envoy working with the United Nations Climate Envoy to create an annual report on specific climate-security risks around the world;
5. *Supports* the expertise on military instability to provide climate-focused rebuilding efforts to war-torn areas with the help of the Economic and Social **Council** (ECOSOC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) by:
 - a. Acknowledging that climate change initiatives could bring economic activity into countries recently affected by war, and therefore help Member States with climate-related conflicts;
 - b. Encouraging a joint group of the Security Council and the Climate Change Global Innovation Hub (CCGIH) to identify and target resolved conflicts that would benefit from creative climate-focused initiatives to be put in place in areas recently affected by conflict;

- c. Inviting non-governmental organizations, such as the Climate Change Network and Conservation International, and governments to accept recommendations from the SC x CCGIH joint group to invest in implementing lasting climate-friendly infrastructure to rebuild after a conflict;
 - d. Transforming a recently solved military conflict into a humanitarian and climate-friendly opportunity to benefit the affected areas in an attempt to both rebuild the country peacefully, create a foundation of focus on climate change, and provide economic relief to the country, as they could establish any fees or parameters they desire on the incoming initiatives;
- 6. *Suggests* the calling of a General Assembly meeting to discuss the potential creation of an international Climate Crime Treaty (CCT), joined voluntarily by Member States, to define the weaponization of land, water, and minerals as a crime against peace punishable under the International Criminal Court (ICC) by:
 - a. Collaborating with the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), and other internationally recognized organizations to develop and implement annual reports on environmental crimes that have been linked to conflicts around the world;
 - b. Suggesting Member States to strengthen their national laws against illegal mining, logging, and water control in conflict zones in order to provide a legal framework for the arrest and prosecution of individuals;
 - c. Encouraging Member States to participate in pre-existing regional coalitions that can assist fellow Member States in a multilateral coordinated action focused on environmental crimes that exist across national borders;
 - d. Recommending the ICC to engage in the prosecution of individuals and non-state actors accused of weaponizing or exploiting natural resources for personal gain;
- 7. *Encourages* the General Assembly Second Committee to call for a meeting to discuss the establishment of an international legal framework on the Rights of Nature, to ensure the legal connection between climate change and conflicts, with the following suggestions to be followed by the General Assembly:
 - a. Inviting the discussions on ecosystems as legal entities with enforceable rights to protection, restoration, and sustainable management;
 - b. With the assistance of the Special Advisory Group, appointing a Climate Change envoy who shall help with drafting model legislation, share best practices, and provide technical assistance to Member States adopting such laws;
 - c. Possible monitoring compliance through UNEP on the respect of the rights of nature through periodic reporting to the United Nations General Assembly or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on a yearly basis by monitoring:
 - i. Environmental Degradation and Violations, tracking large-scale ecological harm (deforestation, pollution, biodiversity loss) that violates recognized rights of nature principles;
 - ii. State and Corporate Compliance, assessing whether national laws and corporate practices align with international rights of nature standards;

- iii. Restoration Efforts, monitoring state-mandated ecological restoration projects and their effectiveness;
 - d. Possible escalation to the ICJ for systemic violations, with jurisdiction granted via optional protocol ratification;
- 8. *Recommends* the ICC to work closely with Member States to trial non-state actors who are involved in deteriorating climate change, and whose actions are possible initiators of conflict by:
 - a. Having the ICC start the persecution process based on the security implications that the damage could provoke;
 - b. Having a yearly meeting with Member States affected to discuss the possible non-state actors involved and the international persecution steps;
 - c. Recommending Member States possible consequences and actions that can prevent or remediate the damage caused by non-state actors within their State;
- 9. *Fully supports* the amendment of United Nations Peacekeeping mandates to include climate security measures that will allow for:
 - a. Specialized training in protecting water sources, preventing unauthorized land acquisitions, and resolving resource conflicts by:
 - i. Focusing on the protection of water sources, such as water filtration and storage infrastructures, as well as vital trade routes, from unlawful attacks by hostile actors through the use of enhanced security, surveillance, and rapid response teams to protect and monitor significant water sources and infrastructures during United Nations Peacekeeping missions;
 - ii. Prioritizing the prevention of unauthorized land acquisitions by non-state actors through engagement with said actors for diplomatic dialogues, providing technical support and capacity building measures for Member States, as well as protecting the civilians of Member States impacted by conflict;
 - iii. Aiming to resolve resource conflicts by fostering mediating dialogues between all involved parties, providing technical and capacity-building support for Member States, and implementing sustainable response measures in peacekeeping missions;
 - b. Utilization of annual reports from United Nations Peacekeeping missions to monitor ongoing climate security risks;
- 10. *Directs attention* to expand the mandate of the Climate Security Mechanism to anticipate, prevent, and respond to climate-fueled instability, with this initiative ensuring the rapid response to conflicts worsened by climate change through:
 - a. Cooperation among the existing United Nations bodies, such as the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), UNDP, UNEP, and DPO by inviting these bodies to meet three times a year for a week to discuss the information and possible responses by the CSM;

- b. Local cooperation based on subregional areas that share specific climate-security-based characteristics based on geography, with the help of UNDP Climate Box's insight, the insights from the Climate Security Mechanism would:
 - i. Identify regional climate-security hotspots through key indicators such as rainfall variability, food insecurity, population displacement, and conflict activity;
 - ii. Provide a risk map and early warning section with geospatial overlays of climate hazards, including but not limited to drought, flooding, and desertification;
 - iii. Include a local intelligence and field feedback section composed of United Nations peace operations, regional partners, civil society organizations and environmental stressors for the next 5 years in order to include all parties that have similar climate-change related risks and promote communication between them for the duration of the process by assessing the climate-security specific aggravators that are present in their regions such as resource scarcity, displacement, food and water insecurity, and economic or political instability;
 - iv. Create a follow-up tracking system to review the implementation and effectiveness of actions taken in response to previous reports, with the aim of promoting accountability, transparency, and ongoing evaluation;
 - c. Fast deployment of security measures such as movement to safety areas, reconciliation between communities, and other explored measures by the CSM and their recommendations to ensure the protection of civilians;
11. *Invites* the Special Climate Envoy of the United Nations to work with Member States and ECOSOC representatives to annually provide reports focused on climate-security hotspots, based on subregions with shared ecosystems, where the report will:
- a. Track cross-fund impacts on the hotspots and their future impacts on the Member States' economy;
 - b. Work with Member States and the Climate Security Mechanism in order to provide specific recommendations in terms of future actions that prevent future conflict from erupting;
 - c. Provide the report to the General Assembly 2 to promote the multilateral and regional action and negotiation while considering other regions' possible actions;
12. *Requests* strengthened institutional coordination between the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) through:
- a. Joint programming mechanisms to finance integrated climate-security initiatives, prioritizing projects such as the CSRM, which:
 - i. Held a meeting to establish the percentage of funding that the established funds can provide for climate-security initiatives;
 - ii. Held meetings yearly with the CSRM to evaluate progress and usage of funding, including evaluation of hotspot needs and Member States' needs;

- b. Consideration of vulnerable States that are heavily impacted by climate change and in need of funding for climate-security related initiatives, and possible consideration of such Member States to get funding before more developed States due to their vulnerability to climate change security risks stated by the Climate Security Mechanism.



Code: SC/2/2

Committee: Security Council

Topic: Climate, Peace, and Security

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the principle of non-intervention as established in Article 2.7 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), and recognizing the sovereignty and national context of each Member State in developing climate-security strategies,

Recognizing the *Paris Agreement* (2015) as a legally binding international treaty on climate change, aiming to limit global warming to well below 2°C, ideally to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,

Emphasizing that the Green Climate Fund aims to mobilize funding for climate action in vulnerable regions, focusing on both mitigation and adaptation,

Acknowledging the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 13 (climate action) and 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions),

Strongly emphasizing the work achieved by the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),

Noting with regret that despite United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) data stating women's participation in climate adaptation reduces conflict relapse by 24%, this group remains underrepresented, as they comprise less than 20% of negotiators in climate-related conflicts,

Acknowledging the work done by the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) towards mitigation, adaptation, and financing climate risk mechanisms,

Recognizing the growing role climate change has in international peace and security, particularly for vulnerable and developing Member States,

Emphasizing the risk to security that environmental migration and displacement pose to Member States, with 7.7 million individuals being displaced in 2023,

Finding that climate disasters can destroy homes and make coastal residences uninhabitable, impact agricultural development, and impair access to clean water,

Deeply concerned that climate change could displace over 216 million people by 2050, according to the World Bank, intensifying insecurity in vulnerable regions,

Acknowledging that 80% of climate-displaced people are women according to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), heightening gender inequalities and exclusion from decision-making, which also increases gender-based violence, limiting women's access to economic and social opportunities,

Re-emphasizing the need for the UNFCCC to focus on mitigating the effects of climate change and promoting adaptive solutions for developing Member States experiencing adverse effects of climate change, which play a role in exacerbating conflict,

Recognizing the urgent need for a multilateral and holistic approach when tackling climate-related issues,

1. *Requests* Member States to create the Climate Security Adaptation Treaty (CSAT) as a legally binding agreement for Member States willing to sign it to address climate change as a security problem by:
 - a. Defining the following proposals as the Climate Security Adaptation Treaty;
 - b. Emphasizing that only Member States that sign the treaty will be legally bound;
2. *Calls upon* all Member States who are voluntarily signing the treaty to gradually adapt to its primary goal, which encompasses:
 - a. Supporting signing Member States in situations of Climate risk crisis in the case of water scarcity, extreme weather events, land degradation, sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion, resource-based conflicts, and climate-driven displacement of population, threatening international peace and global security;
 - b. Urgent actions and an integrated approach that combines climate resilience with peacebuilding efforts through regional cooperation; multi-actor collaboration with Member States, local governments, and United Nations agencies;
 - c. Updating climate-related policies into national climate risk policies of the participating Member States to enhance global efforts by:
 - i. Promoting rapid and optimized responses adapted to each Member State with the implementation of a Climate Security Impact Assessment conducted under a joint technical team composed of UNDP, UNEP, CSM experts, national agencies, and civil representation;
 - ii. Identifying policies that are not as efficient as expected, needing adjustment, not to impact the competence of the Member States' agenda by comparing the data of the originally implemented policy with the current impact of Climate change on a region's security;
 - iii. Implementing a progressive transition timeline to help Member States adapt to the new policies according to each Member State's capacity, as well as a minimum 18-month adaptation status within the treaty;
 - iv. Sharing knowledge and information between Member States to implement the climate security policies efficiently;
 - d. Recommending policies including, but not limited to, Early Warning Systems and Evacuation Protocols, Displacement and Migration Policies, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Plans, Inter-Ministerial Coordination Mechanisms, National Climate Security Strategies, Conflict-Sensitive Climate Adaptation Plans, and Gender Inclusive Policies to aid vulnerable populations such as women, children, youth, and displaced people in conflict areas impacted by climate;

3. *Directs* the Security Council President to release a statement emphasising the need to collaborate with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) and the UNDP to establish a framework for integrating women-led climate solutions into national security strategies, which would include:
 - a. Grants from the United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women;
 - b. Member States adopting quotas ensuring that women make up at least 30% of climate-security decision-makers, which would be enforced through a requested annual report to UN Women on women's participation in climate security policies;
4. *Urges* Member States to implement governmental training programs for women in climate leadership, including:
 - a. A "Women for Climate Security Network" that is modeled after the Global Network of Data Officers and Statisticians to provide women with a global professional space regarding climate change and how it uniquely affects this population;
 - b. Collaboration with the UNDP, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), and UN Women to create a holistic training program, consisting of:
 - i. Annual global forums, where women and top researchers across the globe may meet and discuss scientific findings;
 - ii. Meetings with local officials and leaders to provide insight on the significant role women play in climate negotiations while soliciting an open discussion;
5. *Suggests* to the Director-General of the International Organization on Migration (IOM) to create an additional office titled the Environmental Migration Monitoring Office (EMMO) in order to study the effects that Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, and migrants have on the environment within certain regions, particularly the Mediterranean and the Middle East with the intention of:
 - a. Creating annual reports to examine how Member States have responded to the ecological effects of mass migration and how effective these responses were;
 - b. Holding land surveys on common migration routes every five years to study the effect mass migration has on land over time;
6. *Encourages* the aforementioned treaty to create regional platforms, modeling after the Mano River Union (MRU) and the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (TAC), for more vulnerable areas such as the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), the Horn of Africa, and South America to aim for a more fair distribution of resources in these regions by:
 - a. Partnering with Member States' governments and the UNDP to launch the "Green Infrastructure for Peace" initiative to design climate-resilient housing, water systems, and roads in conflict-prone regions by:
 - i. Applying for grants from the World Bank's Climate Investment Funds through the Dedicated Grant Mechanism (DGM), encouraging public-private partnerships, and recommend Member States to, when possible, adopt the European Union's (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM);

- ii. Endorsing governments to work with engineers and urban planners to build flood-resistant homes, drought-proof agriculture, and clean energy grids;
 - iii. Monitoring progress through independent audits, completed by the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) or the UN Office for Sustainable Development (UNOSD);
 - b. Promoting collaboration between the IPCC as well as the World Climate Data and Monitoring Programme (WCDMP) to have reports made by a group of experts chosen by the aforementioned new EMMO that focuses on the effects of conflict and mass displacement on climate in hopes of proactively finding more sustainable and transparent practices by initiating the work required for the reports within a two-year time frame, and every six months to submit current data;
7. *Supports* the implementation of a Climate Security Response Mechanism (CSRM) to promote:
- a. Installation of early warning systems (EWS), rapid response coordination, securing critical resources, and analysing climate-related instability with the expertise of the Climate Security Mechanism;
 - b. Coordination with the participation of UNFCCC, IPCC, and UNEP to focus on risk assessment, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and conflict mediation efforts;
 - c. Organization of funding through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the World Bank Group (WBG), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
 - d. A case-by-case basis on the situation of a Member State, to ensure tailored and context-sensitive implementation of the mechanism;
8. *Intends* to appoint a United Nations Climate Security Rapporteur to oversee and coordinate the inclusivity of all Member States in need of assistance when requested;
9. *Foresees* the integration of climate-related security risks into peacekeeping and conflict prevention mandates when unanimously deemed necessary by the IPCC;
10. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



Code: SC/PRST/3/1

Committee: Security Council

Topic: The Situation in Yemen

At the meeting of the Security Council, held on 19 April 2025, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The Situation in Yemen," the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The members of the Security Council are deeply concerned about the ongoing conflict and security crisis in Yemen, including the mobilization of troops, degradation of the environment, and closure of economic trade routes in the Red Sea and the blockade of humanitarian aid corridors present primarily in the cities of Sanaa and Aden.

"The members of the Security Council support an immediate ceasefire and the launch of an inclusive political dialogue aimed at resolving the military-political crisis in Yemen by uniting all relevant regional factions in diplomatic, fair, and equitable dialogue in order to call for a comprehensive approach focused on long-term peace, humanitarian relief, and the protection of civilians in Yemen to ensure an enduring peace.

"The Security Council recommends cooperation on humanitarian aid being sent to Yemen by focusing on humanitarian assistance for civilians, such as food security and medical supplies. This will be achieved through assessed and voluntary contributions, prioritized by developed Member States along with NGOs, such as the Red Cross, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and UN Women to target specific needs to vulnerable populations.

"The Security Council expresses grave concern regarding the deteriorating security conditions in the Red Sea, which continue to obstruct the flow of humanitarian and commercial aid to Yemen. The Security Council underscores the urgent need to safeguard maritime routes and welcomes regional and international efforts to ensure safe passage. In this regard, the Security Council proposes the Red Sea Maritime Protection Initiative (RS-MPI), aimed at strengthening cooperation between regional naval forces and the International Maritime Organization to facilitate secure humanitarian access.

"The Security Council calls for an end to piracy in the Red Sea, and calls for a multipolar coalition to work towards the securing of trade routes in the Red Sea for merchant, commercial, and civilian ships to ensure the safe passage along a vital avenue of global trade.

The Security Council is deeply concerned with the recent rise in recruitment of child soldiers; This council draws attention back to Resolution 44/45 "Convention on the Rights of the Child" (1991) and Resolution 1386 "Declaration of the Rights of the Child" (1959), The Geneva Convention, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as reference on the human rights violated by the usage of child soldiers.

"The Security Council drawing on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2006 that supported the demobilization of child soldiers post civil war, the Security Council calls upon UNICEF, the Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict, and the Secretary General for Children and Armed in Conflict to assist the Yemeni government in funding the demobilization of child soldiers by ensuring psychosocial support, family reunification, and preservation of their dignity for the child soldiers in Yemen regardless of their affiliation.

“The Security Council recognizes the efforts of Member States for the establishment of a neutral economic rebuilding platform through the implementation of an Economic Stabilization and Climate Resilience Framework (ESCRF) to introduce joint projects between different relevant parties to reactivate Yemen’s economy.

“The Security Council recalls this week’s recently adopted resolution 2/2 (2025) of 16 April 2025, operative clause 5 about the Security Council’s expertise in war-torn areas and possible usage of such expertise in combination with the ECOSOC and UNDP to assist in Yemeni areas that need economic assistance and promotion of economic activity.

“The Security Council is mindful of resolution 2/3 (2025) of 16 April 2025, operative clause 6, subclause A, which suggests that the Yemeni government consider implementing the “Green Infrastructure for Peace” initiative to protect their vital water infrastructure by building climate-resilient housing, water systems, as well as roads.

“The Security Council remains dedicated to finding fair and equitable resolutions to the ongoing conflict and is committed to continuing to work on providing peace during this crisis.”