



Documentation of the Simulation of the

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)*



Conference B

13 - 17 April 2025

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Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Committee Staff

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Agenda

1. Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors
2. Achieving Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Resolutions adopted by the Committee

Code	Topic	Vote (In favor - Against - Abstention)
OPCW 1/1	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	83 in favor, 11 against, 26 abstentions
OPCW 1/2	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	81 in favor, 11 against, 28 abstentions
OPCW 1/3	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	92 in favor, 3 against, 25 abstentions
OPCW 1/4	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	88 in favor, 5 against, 27 abstentions
OPCW 1/5	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	81 in favor, 11 against, 28 abstentions
OPCW 1/6	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	81 in favor, 15 against, 24 abstentions
OPCW 1/7	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	87 in favor, 4 against, 29 abstentions
OPCW 1/8	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	74 in favor, 16 against, 30 abstentions

Summary Report

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

1. Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors
2. Achieving Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention

The session was attended by representatives of 120 Member States.

On Sunday, the committee adopted its initial agenda, beginning discussion on the topic of “Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors.” Delegates formed into multiple work groups on Monday, and by Tuesday, the Dais had received a total of 13 proposals covering a wide range of subtopics, including the use of technology, capacity building, border security, the role of artificial intelligence, and private-public partnerships. The atmosphere in the committee was one of collaboration, and by the end of the session on Tuesday evening, multiple working papers merged along complementary and similar themes.

On Wednesday, eight draft resolutions were approved by the Dais, one of which contained amendments. The committee adopted all 8 resolutions through a recorded vote. The resolutions represented a wide range of issues, including platforms for data sharing, educational training, research on the effects of chemical weapons used by non-state actors on wildlife, and the use of artificial intelligence. Cooperation, efficiency, and dedication were the tenets championed by the body in their approach to resolution writing and their commitment to preventing the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors.



Code: OPCW/1/1

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Guided by the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), and the steps necessary to accomplish the vision of a world free of these substances and their production,

Concerned that many conflict and trade zones remain unmonitored and could potentially aid in the transportation, proliferation, and misuse of chemical weapon precursors due to the lack of communication between global entities,

Reaffirming, in this context, the guidelines laid out for nation states in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in order to better prevent the acquisition of chemical weapons by non-state actors,

Recalling Article VII of the CWC, which obliges State Parties to enact domestic legislation to implement its provisions and to prevent the use of chemical weapons within their jurisdictions,

Acknowledging the crucial role of the Arms Control Association in promoting awareness of chemical weapons and covering the news efficiently and holistically regarding chemical weapons, while focusing on the hijacking by non-state actors,

Recognizing the progress and contributions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in fighting the illicit transfer of chemical weapons and related equipment, including rigorous screening of chemical exports and sharing information on suspicious transactions or movements,

Stressing the necessity of secure chemical storage and supply chain oversight as critical elements in preventing unauthorized access to toxic substances,

Emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation, public education, and emergency preparedness in reducing the risks posed by chemical weapons attacks,

Expecting that organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) will stand steadfast to their commitment for the Convention; working on Defence policies like NATO's policy to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the 2022 strategic concept to protect against CBRN threats,

Further reaffirming Article XI of the CWC that encourages the development and collaboration between Member States regarding the use of technology to prevent the proliferation of Chemical Weapons by non-state actors,

Reiterating the regional concerns of production and use of chemical weapons and demonstrating action addressed in Security Council resolution 1520 through monitoring international nations in possession of chemical weapons and/or Chemical Weapon Production Facilities,

Further acknowledging the role of international bodies such as INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Health Organisation (WHO) in combating transnational threats and protecting civilian populations,

Underlining the report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which reports that 60% of countries in conflict-prone regions lack adequate early warning systems (EWS) for chemical threats, leaving up to 1.2 billion people vulnerable to chemical weapons attacks,

Deeply concerned about the ability of non-state actors to acquire dual-use chemicals and weaponize them due to gaps in national security and international coordination,

Alarmed that over 20 chemical attacks in the past decades by non-state actors have occurred, 14 from Chlorine, 3 from Mustard Gas, and 3 from Sarin, spreading risk around the globe,

Draws attention to the importance of north-south collaboration in order to mitigate the lack of capacity-building resources experienced by some Member States,

Fully aware that the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) in the OPCW specializes in the development of effective training methodologies specific to chemical handling,

Noting the effects that chemical weapons have on biodiversity and wildlife, as seen in chemical weapon dumping as well as the lack of protection of global ecosystems,

Further underlining that, according to the OPCW Education and Outreach, the way to ensure a world free of chemical weapons is to have active engagement with key stakeholders to foster positive relationships,

Dismayed by the lack of controls present in the exportation of chemicals that have the potential to be utilized in chemical weapons,

Deeply concerned that more than 2,000 people were affected by the leaking of harmful chemicals in water, which eventually led to an insecure environment due to weak management of chemical industries,

Further recognizing the critical role of the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) in addressing the threat of chemical terrorism through dialogue, information sharing, and policy recommendations,

Encouraged by the Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT) support on combating terrorism at global, regional, and National levels, providing technical assistance to Member States and strengthening their coordination among United Nations entities,

Conscious of the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons (PAI) (2018), which mentions collecting and sharing information on those who use chemical weapons, supporting the implementation of sanctions, and denouncing and facilitating the prosecution of those involved in developing or using chemical weapons,

1. *Recommends* that all willing and able Member States work towards having or utilizing a framework to allow direct communication between suppliers of chemicals, Member States, and global justice resources, to:
 - a. Establish and strengthening frameworks to allow for chemical suppliers to track abnormal purchases of chemicals known to be utilized in chemical weaponry through technology that tracks and alerts Member States of dubious movement;
 - b. Report these sales and purchases to INTERPOL and other justice organisations to monitor;
2. *Suggests* that willing and able Member States and private companies provide further funding to go towards INTERPOL's Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Programme to further assist with the monitoring of purchases of chemicals used in chemical weapons;

3. *Encourages* the Executive Council of OPCW to work in collaboration with the Security Council to create a Global Civilian Protection Initiative (GCPI) to employ United Nations peace-keeping observers per the Member States' request into conflict and trade zones to ensure compliance of the CWC and prevent illicit trade of chemical weapon precursors through routine observations and assistance in promoting the peaceful use of dual-use chemicals;
4. *Exhorts* further expanding on the MoU to enhance border security, export control measures, and terms and conditions by:
 - a. Implementing a regular view of the terms and conditions of the MoU between the OPCW and the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and ensuring that it best fits the current circumstances in the regional and sub-regional context;
 - b. Establishing a system requiring both manufacturers of dual-use chemicals and companies that purchase them to report sales and transactions to their governments, then Member States relaying this information to the OPCW, which would create a comprehensive framework aligned with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) to strengthen both national and regional security;
 - c. Using advanced screening technologies and the enactment of border security-focused legislation, enforced by the World Customs Organisation (WCO) at national levels and in alignment with Article VII of the CWC;
5. *Endorses* Member States to collaborate with INTERPOL's Project Chase utilizing advanced security strategies, which reduces chemical explosive precursors smuggling by facilitating communication across shared databases among governments, chemical agencies, customs, and Law enforcement;
6. *Intends* to strengthen key intelligence cooperation with allies such as the EU, NATO, and the INTERPOL to:
 - a. Take INTERPOL's framework as an example for these objectives: information sharing, operational coordination, capacity building, partnerships;
 - b. Focus on detection and export control on chemical weapons, as well as the implementation of monitoring systems and advanced technology;
 - c. To maintain a control list over the exports, ensuring that chemical exports are not used to contribute to deadly weapon programs;
7. *Calls Upon* all willing and able Member States to establish and maintain artificial intelligence (AI)-driven systems, with the guidance and support of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, for the purpose of proactive detection of anomalies in trade, finance, and online activity indicating attempts by non-State Actors to acquire or develop chemical weapons, such as attempts to purchase chemical precursors and parts for chemical weapon delivery systems:
 - a. AI can analyze data from chemical sensors to identify the presence of chemical damage substances in a few minutes;
 - b. AI can distinguish between harmless substances and toxic agents;
8. *Welcomes* the formation and further collaboration of grassroots programs to endorse national and regional cooperation to coincide with OPCW objectives on a sectional basis by:

- a. Creating accessible educational courses on the nature and industry of chemical weapons;
 - b. Advocating for legal reforms specifying the abolishment of chemical weapon use & production by partnering with grassroots programs and regional organizations;
 - c. Recommending CWC procedures and goals to be implemented in sub-regional governments and organizations, establishing a stronger connection between neighboring countries;
9. *Propounds* that all states should employ effective and proper border monitoring measures and information sharing systems in order to prevent the cross-border transport of chemical weapons, and to this end shall:
- a. Develop, maintain, and disperse proper records of any non-state actor possession of chemical weapons or chemical weapons precursors, as defined by the OPCW, found or seized by the OPCW and other surrounding nations;
 - b. Collaborate with surrounding nations to ensure that proper regional border control measures are being properly implemented;
10. *Urges* willing and able Member States of the OPCW, in collaboration with the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), to organize more frequent workshops for first responders with a focus on the use of Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders (WISER) technology in regions that don't have annual training exercises to showcase best practices and enhance Emergency Preparedness Response (EPR);
11. *Asks* the United Nations University (UNU) for the creation of regional think-tanks aiming to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons by enhancing information sharing through AI and data-driven information, such as the transport of dual-use chemicals and safe inspection of chemical packages at borders;
12. *Considers* Member States to strengthen legal regulations at the national level in alignment with internationally accepted treaties to promote international collaboration on safe chemical handling and controlled chemical use;
13. *Advocates for* willing and able Member States to align themselves with the frameworks recommended by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) by engaging in north-south cooperation to review their internal frameworks and legislation, in order to prevent the acquisition of chemical weapons by non-state actors;
14. *Underlines* the necessity to produce additional protection policies for the environment through collaboration with wildlife programs by:
- a. Limiting and redirecting the transfer of dangerous chemicals through delicate ecosystems;
 - b. Restricting the disposal of chemical weapons into oceans and other environments;
 - c. Enforcing proper transfer of dangerous chemicals and disposal of chemical agents produced with the intent to harm;
 - d. During the elimination of chemical arsenals, standardized procedures must be followed for their correct disposal, avoiding contamination of all ecosystems and living beings;
15. *Advises* intensive training and education on chemical weapons handling from the ABEO for willing and able Member States, focusing on best practices and the safe transport of chemical weapons and chemical weapon precursors in order to maintain border security as well as regional stability;

16. *Promoting* industry-wide engagement by Member States of relevant stakeholders in the chemical industry, under the guidance of organisations such as the ICCA and IUPAC, on safeguarding human life while practicing safe chemistry;
17. *Implores* Member States to expand on North-South cooperation with the UNODC container control program, which offers training courses on inspecting dual-use chemicals to prevent Non-State Actors from exploiting security vulnerabilities in the chemical supply chain;
18. *Invites* all willing and able Member States to work to increase border controls and processing of potential chemical weapons exports in order to prevent proliferation and illegal transport by working with the WCO to have:
 - a. chemical weapon recognition training for border protection agencies;
 - b. chemical disposal training for law enforcement and border protection agencies;
19. *Expresses its hope* that Member States will work with relevant local stakeholders like the chemical industry, scientists, academia, civil society, and policy makers through National Authority capacity building programs to:
 - a. Bolster these relationships to promote information on chemical weapons and their effects;
 - b. Further the implementation of CWC frameworks into Member States by engaging with these stakeholders;
20. *Welcomes* consideration by Member States to deepen their engagement with OEWSG-T by regularly attending its substantive sessions, submitting national reports on chemical security challenges, and offering technical input on the use of AI-driven detection systems to advance collective understanding and enhance global preparedness against chemical terrorism;
21. *Further recommends* Member States to utilize Cosmic's CBRNE Detection in containers project, a tracking mechanism for high-risk cross-border containers and vehicles that minimizes the risk of terrorist threat towards transported precursor chemicals;
22. *Calls for* the nomination of Chemical Weapons Regional Coordinators (CWRCS) within the OPCW External Relations Division to ensure the effective dissemination of regionally specific information on the threat of chemical weapons use by non-state actors, regionally specific capacity-building opportunities, and targeted advice on the implementation of the CWC and chemical safety standards, in voluntary collaboration with regional bodies, such as the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), EU, African Union (AU), The Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (CELAC), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Organization of the American States (OAS), Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), and League of Arab State (LAS).



Code: OPCW/1/2

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Concerned by the risk of theft or misuse of chemicals and production equipment in domestic chemical production facilities by non-state actors,

Bearing in mind the rapid technological advancements and benefits in the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to help address the non-state actor chemical weapon threat,

Appreciating the achievements of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) regarding preventing non-state actors from acquiring chemical weapons,

Acknowledging the support from the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT), provision of leadership, coordination, and capacity building for Member States to prevent and counter terrorism through different activities, projects, and programmes,

Guided by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) requiring Member States to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,

Aware that the United States and other developed nations possess extensive chemical analysis expertise through established academic institutions and national laboratories that can strengthen global security when shared appropriately,

Having observed a gap in educational efforts in which an emphasis is placed on chemicals used by private sector companies with a focus on agriculture, sanitation, and waste management,

Considering the existing resource gap between developed and developing nations in the field of chemical research and the success of the Equipment Exchange Programme,

Mindful of the current programs for educating the military and hazardous prevention units in Latin American countries,

Recognizing the need for the OPCW Technical Secretariat to coordinate implementation with a particular focus on the Middle East, South East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, as these regions face an elevated risk of attacks by non-state actors,

Noting with concern the persistent challenges in coordinating timely information-sharing among Member States, which undermine efforts to monitor non-state actors' access to chemical agents, secure cross-border chemical trade, and prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapon attacks,

Further considering OPCW Report of the Temporary Working Group on Education and Outreach (2014) which highlighted the lack of proper education in developing nations on the recognition, storage, and disposal of chemicals following the guidance of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (CWC),

Recalling the OPCW Guidelines for the Safe Disposal of Chemicals Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Weapons by Non-State Actors,

Realizing that individual dual-use chemicals may not pose an immediate threat in isolation but can cause significant harm and endanger civilian populations when combined,

Taking into account the vast amount of dual-use chemicals used in everyday life, such as chlorine, ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, and phosphorus compounds,

Understanding the danger posed by dual-use chemicals in occupational supplies, thus creating workplace hazards, including but not limited to fertiliser, pesticides, and sanitisation supplies,

Appreciating the achievements of the OPCW and the World Customs Organisation's Memorandum of Understanding in enhancing the border control and export control measures,

Noting with concern the grave danger posed by old and abandoned chemical weapons and their potential use by non-state actors and commending the role of the OPCW's Verification Division's Chemical Demilitarization Branch in destroying and recycling chemical weapons,

Acknowledging that the OPCW Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has recently advocated for developing strategies to prevent non-state actors from acquiring chemical weapons,

Further acknowledging that borders are increasingly vulnerable to the smuggling and transportation of dual-use chemicals by non-state actors,

Recognizing the importance of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and its current ongoing SAB-OPCW AI Research Challenge for the research and recognition of the beneficial use of Artificial Intelligence,

Noting with approval the recommendations of the OPCW Report 29/4 (2024) on the "Implementation of the Convention on The Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction" for improved regional border-control cooperation and the importance of AI in smart scanning to detect the proliferation of chemical weapons, and of investing in research and awareness raising to mitigate the impacts of use of chemical weapons,

Guided by Article IX of the CWC which establishes fact finding missions (FFM) for the misuse of chemical weapons and close collaboration avoiding distortion of reality, omissions, inaccuracies and superficiality considering the FFM report developed in 2018 and Article XI which calls for international cooperation for the economic and technological development of Member States to the CWC,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 60/288 (2006), which establishes the *United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy* and calls for greater accountability for terrorist actors,

Identifying the need for modern analytical capacities globally, such as gas chromatography (GC), mass spectrometry (MS), and liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (LCMS), developed under the OPCW Laboratory Training Program for Analytical Chemists to address the chemical weapon non-state actor threat,

Commending the important work done by the Chemical Weapons No Impunity!, the CWC Coalition, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which operate as non-governmental organisations calling for the prevention of chemical weapon use and enhanced emergency response mechanisms,

Affirming the work of the Security Council through resolution 1373 (2001), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 2325 (2016), resolution 2527 (2021), and resolution 2663 (2022), which all call for counter-terrorism initiatives in relation to chemical weapons proliferation and use by non-state actors,

Emphasizing previous regional collaboration undertaken between Member States and state parties alike through cooperative groups such as the Australia Group, Pine Gap Facility, Five Eyes, International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODC) Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the South Asian Association on Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Group of African States,

Is fully conscious of the financing of OPCW initiatives by OPCW Trust Fund, the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities, the United Nations Office for Disarmament (UNODA), and contributions of private sector funding,

Recognizing the vital role of cultural differences in Member States and their ability to provide financial support, thereby fostering a global culture of chemical safety and resilience against non-state actor threats,

Calling attention to the four remaining actors who have not signed onto CWC to effectively prohibit the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons by state and non-state actors, realising the importance of the remaining four state actors who have not signed, chemical weapons must be stopped at the borders of all Member States,

Aware of the chemical production and trade by private corporations and their potential involvement with the illegal use of chemicals they produced, and State Parties' obligation to govern and penalize them under Article VII of the CWC,

1. *Highly encourages* the OPCW Technical Secretariat to establish the Chemical Tracking, Reporting and Compliance Enforcement (CHEMTRACE), a pioneering initiative under the OPCW Verification Division Declaration and Assessment Team, aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring dual-use chemicals;
2. *Suggests* the complete execution of CHEMTRACE with the creation and implementation of strategies that include:
 - a. The creation of a Global Chemical Monitoring Network (GCMN) under the OPCW Technical Secretariat, a decentralised blockchain-secured global database storing encrypted Digital Chemical Passports (DCPs) via a tamper-resistant digital ledger with monitoring data;
 - b. The development of the aforementioned DCPs, which are blockchain-based digital identifiers assigned to every shipment of dual-use chemicals, and will contain immutable, time-stamped records detailing the chemical's origin, composition, production batch, quantity, intended use, transit route, handling history, and final destination;
 - c. Setting of global standards for the DCPs with the help of the OPCW's Open-Ended Working Group for Terrorism (OEWG-T), along with national regulatory authorities, and with technical input from chemical safety engineers, blockchain developers, and supply chain specialists who would be engaged through public-private partnerships and exchange programmes with relevant industries and research institutions, such as but not limited to the chemical manufacturing sector, logistics companies, and digital infrastructure firms, and seeking representation from organisations such as the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC);
3. *Proposes* the enforcement of CHEMTRACE in three phases, with:

- a. The first phase beginning in 2025 and lasts for one year, focuses on the initial planning and the framework development of CHEMTRACE, and involves the establishment of the GCMN, creation of the DCPs, and initiation of research and development efforts for Internet of Things (IoT) -based tracking sensors and AI-based risk assessment and detection;
 - b. The second phase starting in 2026 and lasting for two years, focusing on the pilot testing and regional implementation of CHEMTRACE, and includes the execution of pilot programmes in high-risk regions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union (EU), real-time monitoring of chemical shipments using IoT devices transmitting data to the GCMN, capacity-building programmes and specialised training for customs officials, law enforcement and industry personnel, and evaluation of the pilot programmes, including feedback-driven system refinement;
 - c. The final phase, starting in 2028 and lasting for one year, focusing on the full-scale enforcement and standardisation of CHEMTRACE, and includes actions to integrate CHEMTRACE into national legal frameworks of all willing Member States and the use of DCPs and real-time tracking for all chemical shipments worldwide, conduction of periodic audits and submission of annual reports to assess compliance;
4. *Encourages* OPCW Member States to seek collaboration from the OPCW's Technical Secretariat, the Office of Strategy and Policy and the Implementation Support Branch to establish National Coordination Hubs (NCHs) in each Member State as a part of CHEMTRACE to serve as the bridge between the Member States and the GCMN, to oversee the domestic reporting, compliance and incident response and to serve as a training and information sharing centre for customs, security and environmental agencies;
5. *Recommends* prioritizing the geographical rollout of CHEMTRACE in areas affected by past chemical weapon use or ongoing conflict zones, high-volume industrial and transit regions to prevent illicit chemical trade and enhance data visibility, and customs control points and major ports and harbors to act as early enforcement nodes;
6. *Seeks* financial support and sustainability for CHEMTRACE from:
 - a. The United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities to finance the technological development and pilot programmes;
 - b. The OPCW Voluntary Trust Fund for training, compliance audits and technical assistance;
 - c. UNODA, in cooperation with all participating Member States, will provide adequate funding for all personnel responsible for the implementation of CHEMTRACE;
 - d. Private sector contributions from relevant stakeholders like chemical industries and technology firms to further support the development of the GCMN, the DCPs, the IoT-based tracking systems, and other software platforms associated with CHEMTRACE;
7. *Emphasizes* that all data collected within the CHEMTRACE initiative will be subject to zero-knowledge proof mechanisms to enable verification without revealing sensitive proprietary or security-related information, to ensure full confidentiality while allowing robust auditing and compliance enforcement;
8. *Insists* that the OPCW Technical Secretariat Inspectorate and Verification Division use the data collected from the Verification Annex Schedule VI, VII and VIII to flag potential anomalies and patterns in dual-use chemical purchases to Member States, through a report made by area quantity, previous purchases and

chemical activity history at the Member State level, to target potential non-state actor chemical weapon threats and take appropriate action;

9. *Requests* that the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board establish a temporary working group to generate an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Report that provides information on the threat of generative AI use by non-state actors for the creation of chemical weapons using dual-use chemicals and how to best address this threat through conducting research on the development and use of AI in the Chemical Industry and involving submissions from the SAB-OPCW AI Research Challenge;
10. *Urges* the OPCW ChemTech Centre Technology and Training Hub (ChemTech Centre) to collaborate with the OPCW International Cooperation and Assistance Division by incorporating research generated from the report from the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board to provide training to Member States to equip them with regulatory guidelines and tools to help states with AI development to identify vulnerabilities in chemical production facilities and coordinate emergency response in the event of an attack on a chemical production facility, while also prioritizing employment and regulation looking to prevent misuse resulting in chemical weapon production and identify risk areas for nations vulnerable to AI use by non-state actors for chemical weapon production;
11. *Proposes* that the Chemical Weapon Regional Coordinators be established within the OPCW External Relations Division to:
 - a. Collaborate and enhance collaboration between regional Member States to ensure the effective dissemination of targeted information on chemical weapon threats, emergency response mechanisms, capacity building opportunities, obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, peaceful uses of dual-use chemicals, and chemical safety standards relevant to Member States;
 - b. Collaborate with voluntary Member States and adherents of the Australia Group, Pine Gap Facility, Five Eyes, INTERPOL, ASEAN, EU, AU, CELAC, UNASUR, UNODA Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia to ensure that all Member States are provided with the necessary, adequate, and tailored information required for addressing the non-state actor chemical weapon threat;
12. *Further requests* Member States where they have not already due to limited technological capacity collaborate with the OPCW Operations and Technical Support Branch's Situation Centre to enhance their security systems such as chemical identification tracking systems which can track dual use chemicals, networked security systems and trade and customs border control in a way that is transparent and making use of the most technologically advanced systems to close the gap in enforcement, chemical agents training, and the rapid advancement of dual-use chemicals which continue to threaten global security;
13. *Invites* the expansion of the OPCW Equipment Exchange Programme to provide existing laboratories in developing nations with modern and advanced chemical technology for the research of harmful chemical agents, the development of chemistry for peaceful purposes, and general technological advancement;
14. *Further invites* the OPCW Technical Secretariat Verification Division to adopt and implement a Global Chemical Misuse Reporting Program for the purpose of documenting suspected misuse or theft of chemical agents to:

- a. Ensure states, chemical production corporations, and chemical production employees declare chemical misuse in chemical facilities officially declared by Member States under the CWC Verification Annex Schedules VI, VII, and VIII;
 - b. Be available as a low-resource digital reporting service provided to participating Member States;
 - c. Improve reporting capabilities of potential chemical misuse by non-state actors on the domestic, regional, and global levels;
15. *Proposes* that the OPCW International Cooperation and Assistance Division establish a Partner Laboratory Network (PLN) that:
- a. Creates partnerships between OPCW-designated laboratories and developing state parties through staff exchanges, leveraging the expertise of premier research institutions, universities, and state-operated laboratories;
 - b. Knowledge transfer programs designed to build sustainable local capabilities, specialised training programs for technicians from developing Member States on newly acquired scientific equipment to ensure effective implementation of the Equipment Exchange Programme;
 - c. Implement training protocols aligned with standards established by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and OPCW laboratories, and enhance method development and validation in laboratories by focusing on the development of standard operating procedures (SOP), quality control and quality assurance procedures, and validation of analytical methods;
 - d. Further enables collaborative research on detection methods and decontamination techniques through the OPCW ChemTech Centre and the OPCW SAB Reports;
 - e. Supports the exchange of personnel through the OPCW Research Project Support Program and OPCW National Authority Mentorship Partnership Program to help with containing and disposing of high-risk chemical substances to be located in major regional hubs;
16. *Commends* Member States with advanced chemical analysis capabilities, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States of America, to contribute technical expertise and resources to existing OPCW Programs such as the Fellowship and Associate Program and the OPCW International Cooperation and Assistance Program;
17. *Proclaims* all willing Member States to develop and implement information sharing by setting up a new global database and seeks to cooperate with INTERPOL's Watchmaker Program to raise our international data sharing experience to restrict the illicit transaction of chemical materials;
18. *Reinforces* the need for all States Parties to enact comprehensive domestic legislation aligned with the Article VII of the The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, explicitly criminalizing all prohibited activities under the Convention including but not limited to the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and deployment of chemical warfare agents, while simultaneously addressing emerging verification challenges through internationally coordinated frameworks and cooperative verification protocols;
19. *Expresses its hope that* all willing Member States implement a regulatory framework regarding private corporate production and trade of dual-use chemicals by:

- a. Establishing corporate accountability through submission requirements regarding the production and trade of dual-use chemicals to the Member States they are under their jurisdiction of;
 - b. Recommending the monitoring of the private trade of chemicals by Member States and the implementation of restrictions on the recipients of dual-use chemical trade through:
 - i. Support of the OPCW to make restrictions;
 - ii. Creating risk assessments collected by the Industry Verification branch and voluntary involvement from INTERPOL and other monitoring organisations;
 - c. Recommending that participating Member States hold corporations within their jurisdiction accountable for violating restrictions placed on dual-use chemical trade;
20. *Invites* all Member States to enact specific national legislation to target the non-state actor perpetrators of chemical attacks that kill or harm the health of others, such as through:
- a. Travel restrictions, capital restraints, and asset freezes against responsible non-state actors connected to chemical weapons attacks, which will be verified by voluntary involvement from INTERPOL;
 - b. Facilitating the arrest and prosecution of responsible non-state actors through appropriate legal channels to be implemented by Member States, potentially working in collaboration to decide the location of trials regarding factors including the criminal's country of origin and the country in which where the crime was committed;
 - c. Welcoming the extension of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Member States to the ICC when national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute non-state actors who use or are involved in the use of chemical weapons in accordance with Article 8 of the Rome Statute, with state permission;
21. *Calls for* the OPCW Technical Secretariat International Cooperation and Assistance Division to develop a comprehensive training program targeted at conflict-ridden states, crisis areas, and vulnerable populations, working with local grassroot organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to instill a sense of ownership in stakeholders, better prepare these areas to prevent the use of chemical weapons, and respond to attacks in emergency situations by:
- a. Modelling itself after the UNODC-World Customs Organisation's Container Control Program and the INTERPOL-UNODC Preventing and Responding to the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors for Terrorist Purposes Training Program;
 - b. Providing incentives for adherence, including targeted mechanisms to address security concerns in the most vulnerable areas and engagement with grassroots, public-private partnerships, and NGOs on the ground in these areas to better understand the situation, how to best target the issue, and existing best practices in these areas;
 - c. Ensuring the establishment of a secure environment before education initiatives begin;
22. *Supports* the establishment of a Tiered Intelligence-Sharing Framework under OPCW oversight as follows:
- a. Tier 1 being Non-sensitive information (e.g, general threats trend, public alerts, chemical signatures) to be shared with all OPCW Member States;

- b. Tier 2 being Moderately sensitive information (e.g, technical indicators, specific materials tracing) to be shared with select, vetted partner nations, and other qualified neutral states committed to chemical disarmament efforts;
 - c. Tier 3 being highly time-sensitive information related to imminent threats or active use of chemical weapons, to be disseminated rapidly via secure OPCW communication channel accessible to relevant nations and partners;
- 23. *Expresses its support for* diplomatic collaboration between Member States in order to further international intelligence sharing concerning chemical precursors and dual-use chemicals by creating an international forum to expand collaboration with INTERPOL CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives);
- 24. *Requests* the OPCW International Cooperation and Assistance Division to seek collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and INTERPOL to recommend law enforcement and border control agencies in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and low-resource states with the equipment and expertise to detect, prevent, and respond to chemical weapons threats due to SIDS remaining a main target for illicit activities by non-state actors and their developing nature with such cooperation would entail:
 - a. Specialised training modules developed by the OPCW ChemTech Centre and implemented by UNODC regional centres to increase the capabilities of customs officers, coast guards, and law enforcement officials to detect and address chemical threats at border crossings;
 - b. Technical assistance grants for setting up detection and monitoring equipment, including mobile chemical detection units in high-risk maritime and port regions;
 - c. An early warning system that will detect how chemical weapons are constructed in cooperation with INTERPOL to enable immediate sharing of data regarding suspicious chemical-related activities across borders, especially in vulnerable maritime regions;
 - d. Technical exchange conferences are held every year that would enable small states to share best practices, engage with big state experts, and enable joint solutions to meet CWC obligations;
 - e. Capacity-building missions, where experts visit the host country and conduct technical workshops, are specifically designed for SIDS to promote long-term self-sufficiency, such as but not limited to support for the preparation of legislation, national action plans, and enhanced inter-agency coordination;
- 25. *Calls upon* the OPCW to strengthen the already existing Open-ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) by:
 - a. Monitoring the activity of violent non-state actors regarding chemical weapons and their precursors;
 - b. Seeking to collaborate with global technological corporations and national intelligence services to track and report on the online dissemination of chemical weapons-related content, including, where possible, dark web transactions and AI-generated Large Language Model (LLM) Material;
- 26. *Proposes* the OPCW Annual Meeting of Representatives of the Chemical Industry and National Authorities collaborate with the OPCW's Executive Program on Integrated Chemicals Management to conduct an exhibition showcasing innovative technologies for detecting, destroying or neutralizing

chemical weapons including but not limited to mass spectrometers, ion exchange resins, reverse osmosis technology, LLM AI, liquid chromatography and electrochemical oxidation;

27. *Encourages* Member States to invest in and implement public information campaigns and specialised workforce training about proper recognition, storage, and disposal of chemical weapon precursors with a special focus on citizens working in the agricultural, chemical engineering, and sanitation sectors;
28. *Advocates for* willing and able Member States engage in north-south cooperation to review their internal frameworks and legislation to better align themselves with the frameworks recommended by UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), while mitigating resource differences, in order to prevent the acquisition of Chemical Weapons by non-state actors;
29. *Further recommends* expanding the OPCW and World Customs Organisation's Memorandum of Understanding that operates to prevent the misuse of toxic chemicals by seeking to apply AI where possible to further enhance the border security and export controls in the regional and sub-regional areas;
30. *Welcomes* global contribution towards expanding the capacity and training for the first responders program to the most targeted nations in order to save more lives, not only from the people affected by attacks from non-state actors, but also for the rescue units;
31. *Reiterates its request* that Member States work with the OPCW ChemTech Centre to establish education programs via:
 - a. Supporting local partnerships with NGOs, community educators, volunteers, and organisations, including the Panama Global Education Partnership;
 - b. Creating educational videos and material, social media pages, events, and posters about early warning systems, the dangers of chemical weapons, and their potential use by non-state actors;
 - c. Focusing on culturally adapting these materials and putting a specific focus on educating children about the dangers of chemical weapons and their potential use by non-state actors;
32. *Considers* Member States to cooperate in the establishment of robust border security infrastructure in an expansion upon Article VII of the CWC, in the form of:
 - a. Advanced screening technologies;
 - b. Border legislation regarding the movement of hazardous chemical substances across borders;
 - c. Cooperation with the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and its enforcement at the national level, in alignment with established treaties on the handling of chemical weapons;
33. *Asks* the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWC Coalition) to work with all willing and able Member States in high-risk areas to create educational public information campaigns aimed at civilian populations to further the work of EPR to local communities;
34. *Encourages* Member States to voluntarily deepen engagement with the OPCW Technical Secretariat's International Cooperation and Assistance Division to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons by strengthening information-sharing and collaboration with:
 - a. INTERPOL's Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit to establish secure channels for sharing real-time intelligence on non-state actors, enabling faster detection of chemical threats across borders;

- b. The World Customs Organisation's Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Programme to enhance training on auditing chemical trade flows, closing gaps in export-import monitoring;
- c. The OPCW's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) developing a voluntary reporting mechanism for Member States to share data on suspicious chemical procurement, bolstering global efforts to track and disrupt illicit activities.



Code: OPCW/1/3

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Recognizing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), which aims to prohibit the stockpiling, production and use of Chemical Weapons,

Reaffirming the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's definition of terrorism involving criminal acts mainly against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 60/288 (2006), which established the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, comprising of four pillars: addressing conditions conducive to terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building state capacity, and ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law in counter-terrorism efforts,

Recognising also General Assembly resolution 55/283 (2001), which affirms Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and Decision 5 of the Sixth Session of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties (2001),

Expressing its appreciation for the financing of initiatives by the United National Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities from the United Nations Office for Disarmament (UNODA) and the contribution of private sector stakeholders interested in disarmament efforts,

Alarmed that non-state actors (NSA) pose a serious threat to the security of precursor chemicals through the theft of materials, especially during transportation,

Noting with approval Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which calls upon Member States to implement necessary domestic legislation to combat the risk of NSA of obtaining chemical weapons,

Approving the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Expert Network on the Governance of Chemical and Biological Weapons considering their expertise in regards to currently existing networks of chemical weapons,

Guided by the work of the OPCW and the Scientific Advisory Board's (SAB) Artificial Intelligence (AI) Challenge which has worked to identify the capabilities and current and future challenges posed by AI,

Noting with concern the persistent challenges in coordinating timely information-sharing among Member States, which undermine efforts to monitor NSA's access to chemical agents, secure cross-border chemical trade, and prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapon attacks,

Deeply concerned by the absence of a coordinated global intelligence platform within the framework of the OPCW to monitor the international transportation of dual-use chemicals,

Further affirms the OPCW ChemTech Centre Technology and Training Hub's initiative to advance the technological capabilities of defining and regulating harmful chemical substances,

Alarmed by the trauma a civilian may experience after a chemical weapon attack, the research paper World Health Organization: Mental Health of Populations Exposed to Biological and Chemical Weapons details that, providing a mental health officer is present at all hospitals after a chemical weapon attack,

Fully aware of the need for establishing a List of Probable Threat Parties (LPTP) as to provide a clear warning system and methodology for recognizing when a given NSAs may attempt to pursue chemical weapons,

Having considered further paragraph E (43) of the OPCW's Verification Annex, emphasizing the protection of controlled environments within chemical production facilities to ensure safety and security,

Appealing to the goals of the OPCW's Technical Secretariat's Chemical Safety and Security Management Development Programme to strengthen national capacities dealing with chemical safety and security,

Expressing satisfaction with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), establishing the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its ability to appoint a commission or committee to address problem areas,

Stressing the importance of Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and the sanctions they impose on NSAs and terrorists, with special emphasis on the Taliban,

Guided also by OPCW's Executive Council's decision EC-86/DEC9, which highlights the importance of continuous and mutual support among Member States,

Taking note also of the key role of secure and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems in achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly in addressing global environmental challenges, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 78/265 (2024),

Stressing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 4 (quality education) and 12 (responsible consumption and production) to ensure sustainable consumption and education of AI algorithms, considering the lack of knowledge from citizens and first-responders on chemical awareness,

Cognizant of fulfilling the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially target 12.4 of SDG 12 (responsible production and consumption),

Noting that NSA interference with chemical supply chains obstructs SDG 12 (responsible production and consumption) focused on responsible consumption and production,

Considering the nature of new technology, like Artificial Intelligence (AI), having both benefits in terms of research advancements, but also the potential for synthesizing chemical pathogens alike,

Re-emphasizing that all Member States must ensure transparency, accountability, and above all, the safeguarding of human dignity in every step we take especially when dealing with chemical weapons,

Cognizant of the international legislation including the Security Council Office of Counter-Terrorism and national legislation from Member States, in attempting to combat terrorist organizations using chemical weapons,

Firmly convinced of the importance of strengthening international and regional surveillance methods to enhance the efficiency of rapid response to potential chemical attacks,

Alarmed by the far reaching consequences of the use and transference of schedule 1 chemicals by NSAs contributing to the threat of civilian safety,

Reconfirming the importance of public and specialised education on the effects and treatments for chemical weapons,

Supporting fully the need for regional cooperation to keep chemical weapons (CWs) away from NSAs,

Noting further the importance of intelligence sharing amongst the international community to prevent WMD threats, aligning with Security Council resolution 2325 (2016),

Taking into account the need for educational information to be available in all languages to aid inhabitants of Member States of understanding precursor chemicals and chemical weapons implications,

Referring Member States to General Assembly resolution 78/29 (2023), "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," which emphasizes that international collaboration is necessary to reach the elimination of the use of chemical weapons,

Reiterating with concern, that many of the Member States that are most threatened by chemical weapons use do not currently have the resources and knowledge necessary to address the problem,

Reiterating its dismay at the 65,000 civilian deaths caused by Improvised Explosive Devices utilized by NSAs,

Further believing the importance of the declarations of chemical weapons for the operation of the OPCW and the preventing of the acquisition of chemical weapons by NSAs, and OPCW's provision of the Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS) in order to help Member State parties meet their Convention obligations in the most efficient, effective and secure way possible, as stated by the OPCW's Director of Verification,

Noting with concern the potential inaccessibility of chemical safety training initiatives between global regions due to language barriers and cultural differences,

Convinced of the effectiveness of AI for self monitoring security systems and encryption and its precision on identifying vulnerabilities in data systems,

Highlighting the lack of a cohesive system between modes of crossing borders, resulting in the unknown smuggling of chemicals,

Observing the lack of dialogue between Member States and the limited cooperation with established identification teams for sharing information,

Calling attention to programs such as the Countering Terrorist Travel Programme (CTTP) or Airport Communication Programme (AIRCOP),

Recognizing that the Universality of the CWC is one of the most important steps to preventing the acquisition of chemical weapons by NSAs as stated in the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Joint Statement: Preventing Acquisition of Chemical Weapons by NSAs by Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition and ArgIQ – Argentina Information Quality, Argentina and the NGO Joint Statement: Preventing Acquisition of Chemical Weapons by NSAs prepared by the African Center for Science and International Security (AFRICISIS) and the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition,

Acknowledging also the necessity of monitoring and securing high-traffic maritime shipping routes in high-conflict areas such as the Suez and Panama Canals to combat the illicit trafficking of dual-use chemicals to NSAs,

Taking note of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization's (WCO) Container Control Program,

Bearing in mind that the OPCW's Annex on Chemicals and Scheduled Chemical Database differs from other dual-use and precursor chemical databases and lists such as the EU's Dual-Use Exports Control List's Annex of Chemicals,

Supporting fully the newly passed EU Artificial Intelligence Act which may be utilized by the OPCW to address the use of AI by NSAs,

Noting the success of General Assembly and Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013), which established the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to verify compliance with the CWC in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Recalling the 86th Session of the Executive Council's request for the Secretariat to enhance its capacity-building programmes that facilitate the sharing of security best practices to help counter the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons by NSAs,

Reiterating its dismay that the use of chemical weapons in at-risk regions poses an existential threat to neighboring nations and endangers vulnerable groups,

Noting the need to expand OPCW's existing Specialised Training Programmes,

Concerned also by the continued existence of unreported legacy stockpiles of chemical weapons as mentioned within the OPCW 2023 Report of the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and the ease in which they can be exploited by NSAs,

Recalling Article XII of the CWC titled Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions, and drawing upon the precedence of the OPCW's Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, the OPCW has the ability to recommend actions be taken by the Security Council or General Assembly in cases of particular gravity,

Recognizing with gratitude the work of WCO, under the Container Control Program,

Appreciating the work done at CHEMEX, a 2023 conference where a series of workshops trained first responders in 32 African nations in identifying and treating victims of chemical weapon use,

Expressing its satisfaction with the work done by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which carries out investigations to determine whether CWs were involved in an area of alleged deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Recognizing the international legislation, including the Security Council Office of Counter-Terrorism and national legislation from Member States in attempting to combat terrorist organizations using chemical weapons,

Expressing its gratitude for the financing of initiatives by the United National Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities from the United Nations Office for Disarmament (UNODA) and the contribution of private sector stakeholders interested in,

Noting with concern the lack of a cohesive system between modes of crossing borders, resulting in the unknown smuggling of chemicals,

Cognizant that borders need stricter measures to prevent the illicit trafficking of chemicals specifically regarding transportation between and within states that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons,

Noting with gratitude the work of the OPCW's International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons and its work regarding victims of chemical attacks carried out by NSAs,

Recognizing how marginalized groups, like women and children, are disproportionately affected by the chemical weapons attacks by NSAs,

1. *Implores* the strengthening of international legislation and regulation of response tactics used to organize against the insurgency of NSAs on a government institution by:
 - a. Working closely with the Security Council Office of Counter-Terrorism on efforts to ensure that communication for deploying defenses against chemical attacks is rapid and efficient;
 - b. Incorporating the United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel ('CT Travel') Programme into the framework of the OPCW to strengthen the monitoring and surveillance of terrorist groups and detect the emergence of potential chemical attacks;
 - c. Urging the OPCW to work with the United Nations to ensure the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) chemical classifications are updated with present chemical threats by changing the two year timeframe for updating chemical classifications to update annually;
 - d. Expressing hope *for* Member States to model after EU Chemical CBRN Risk Mitigation Centers to closely monitor the risks associated with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials;
2. *Urges* the implementation of the United Nations Executive Council's decision EC-86/DEC9 - which addresses the threat posed by chemical weapons in the hands of NSAs, and the measures State-Parties must take regarding this issue - in the investigation and prosecution of NSAs who violate the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC) while considering any recommendations, proposed by sponsoring Member States, that are compatible and fall into their legal framework;
3. *Directs* OPCW SAB to establish a Temporary Working Group to compile an Analysis of Artificial Intelligence Report by conducting comprehensive research on the development and use of AI in the chemical industry by incorporating submissions from the SAB-OPCW Artificial Intelligence Challenge and specifically analysing the threat of AI use by NSAs, including the access to readily available online content related to chemical weapons, and methods of effectively responding to this threat;
4. *Strongly Urges* training to be provided by the OPCW ChemTech Centre Technology and Training Hub, in collaboration with the OPCW international cooperation and assistance division by incorporating research from the SAB to equip Member States with the knowledge and involving tools necessary to regulate AI development and its use by NSAs in responding to potential chemical weapons threats;
5. *Intends* for the OPCW to establish a permanent Working Group in the OPCW's SAB focused on the investigation of newly emerging chemicals used by NSAs, by expanding the mandate of the OPCW's SAB to include a temporary working group focused on new emerging chemicals and dual-use technology, which will subsequently be added to the OPCW's Scheduled Chemicals Database and Annex of Chemicals. This temporary working group could be renewed after its period of validity;
6. *Ensures* that the OPCW SAB works in tandem with the EU Scientific Panel of Independent Experts as laid out in the EU Artificial Intelligence Act in Article 68 once it goes into force on 2 August, 2025, and invite them to the annual meeting of the SAB to consult the board on the issue of NSAs utilizing AI to proliferate chemical weapons;

7. *Proposes* the establishment of the System for Chemical Exposure by Non-State Threats (SCENT), an intelligence-tracking AI-based database under the supervision of the OPCW to monitor NSAs and their use of chemical weapons by:
 - a. Gathering real-time data from open-source platforms, such as governmental or scientific databases including but not limited to those focused on chemistry, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Health Observatory and UNData;
 - b. Utilizing AI algorithms and machine learning models to analyse patterns and identify emerging threats related to the use and purchasing of chemical weapons by NSAs;
 - c. Integrating modern ways of tracking included but not limited to geo-fencing tools and biometrics tests to monitor the use of chemical weapons in the hands of NSAs;
 - d. Incorporating a cross-network communications system in the SCENT database with security agencies such as INTERPOL, terrorism databases such as the Global Terrorism Database and chemical weapons experts;
8. *Endorses* Member States to incorporate legislative implementations requiring companies utilizing AI to avoid using or revealing hazardous material information in regards to the manufacturing of chemical weapons while training their AI models, as this will proactively prevent this information from being within the AI system early on, further preventing non-state actors from accessing this information;
9. *Suggests* the use of a decentralized blockchain-secured global database storing encrypted Digital Chemical Passports (DCPs) and monitoring data for the real time monitoring of dual-use chemicals to enhance transparency and accountability on their production, transportation and storage;
10. *Encourages also* Member States to strengthen the regulation of trade between Member States and NSAs by partnering with the United Nations Trade and Development in order to prevent the spread of chemical weapons on a regional basis through:
 - a. Monitoring trade of chemical weapons between Member States to enforce regulatory measures:
 - i. Including that the partnership will include a specific task force in collaboration with the United Nations Internal Task Force that will hold Member States accountable for their trade;
 - ii. Monitoring the declaration of transferred chemical weapons and dangerous chemicals between States that are categorized in the Schedule 1 category as stated by the OPCW;
 - iii. Encouraging the opportunity for the creation of regional state groups to create specific tactics and policies for the trade of chemical weapons so that they are specific to their regional concerns;
 - iv. Suggesting Member States work in collaboration with the OPCW SAB and the External Relations Division to submit updated voluntary reports on dual-use chemical seizures, unusual purchases, and suspicious diversions in a structured format;
 - b. Restricting trade of chemical weapons between NSAs by:
 - i. Utilizing advanced encryption technology as seen in the Pacific Transnational Crime Network from the Pacific Island Forum and information sharing focusing on specific transactions and illicit movement;

- ii. Restrictions will be on a regional basis determined by the threat of chemical weapons and trade patterns;
 - iii. UNODA will enforce trade restrictions based on regional requirements;
- 11. *Further recommends* the establishment of a List of Probable Threat Parties (LPTP), entailing the codeification of clear components that denote if a given NSA is likely to pursue or develop chemical weapons, including ideology, proximity, access to materials, financial means, rhetoric, revenue stream, intention and conflict exposed to, with logistical caveats including:
 - a. Administration of the LPTP by a OPCW Working Group for Identification (WGI), to serve directly under the OPCW Executive Council, comprised of 20 members;
 - b. Expansion or reduction of the WGI's staff to be made by the Executive Council and Budget Committee;
 - c. Classification of NSAs into four categories of escalating risk, including negligible, concerning, alarming and imminent;
 - d. Production of annual reports, including which NSAs are a probable threat, beginning on April 17th, 2026;
 - e. Funding for both the WGI and LPTP to be allocated in the OPCW annual budget as determined by the OPCW Budget Committee, under the operational process of prevention;
 - f. Bridging information gaps between INTERPOL non-compliant or non-cooperative Member States, as to ensure that essential warning-systems are supported despite political disputes some Member States may have with INTERPOL and international law enforcement;
 - g. Desiring to partner with the UNODA and their United Nations-system-wide Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to build upon their existing database and guidelines for preventing NSA's gaining weapons of mass destruction;
- 12. *Requests* Member States to voluntarily deepen engagement with the OPCW Technical Secretariat's International Cooperation and Assistance Division to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons by strengthening information-sharing and collaboration with:
 - a. INTERPOL's terrorism incident database Project Watchmaker;
 - b. INTERPOL's Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit to establish secure channels for sharing real-time intelligence on NSAs, enabling faster detection of chemical threats across borders;
 - c. INTERPOL's Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement (CHASE) network to integrate law implementation data on chemical trafficking to ensure real-time flagging;
 - d. The WCO Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Programme to enhance training on auditing chemical trade flows, closing gaps in export-import monitoring;
 - e. The OPCW's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) to develop a voluntary reporting mechanism in cooperation with public-private partnerships for Member States to share data on suspicious chemical procurement, bolstering global efforts to track and disrupt illicit activities;

13. *Invites* Member States to explore the implementation of national legal frameworks for chemical security to develop a compilation of laws, regulations or their equivalents to secure toxic chemicals transportation across borders through the implementation and expansion of:
 - a. Stricter auditing guidelines for chemical weapons destruction and more frequent inspections;
 - b. The Manual on Implementing National Legislation of the CWC to adequately address and support national measures;
14. *Further invites* WHO and the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) to collaborate through a joint operation in public health preparedness and emergency response to chemical attacks by providing:
 - a. Necessary personal protective equipment (PPE) such as HAZMAT (Hazardous materials) suits and full-face respirator masks;
 - b. High-volume, low-pressure decontamination showers that are essential for wet decontamination of emergency responders after high level HAZMAT incidents;
15. *Requests the consideration of* the adoption of remote monitoring technology including temporary closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras and thermal imaging within the OPCW Verification Regime in order to redistribute inspector resources to monitor smaller and high-risk chemical facilities which are more easily able to divert to chemical weapons development and are more vulnerable to manipulation by NSAs;
16. *Asks that* the General Assembly expand the mandate of the DAT to offer its services voluntarily to all Member States in order to prevent the illicit transfer of precursor and dual-use chemicals to NSAs by engaging in verification initiatives such as:
 - a. Assessing the activities of the private sector in collaboration with Member State governments by conducting frequent and sudden challenge inspections;
 - b. Collecting verification documents confirming the successful implementation of OPCW guidelines;
 - c. Guaranteeing the confidentiality of communication and data-sharing networks using the OPCW's Verification Division's Security Critical Network computer system;
 - d. Aims to work with the United Nations Office of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to share best practices to provide security and auditing expertise;
17. *Recommends* Member States to deploy of mobile destruction units for abandoned chemical weapons, under the supervision of the OPCW, containing detonation chambers, static kiln detonation furnaces and chemical neutralization systems enabling verifiable on-site destruction while ensuring compliance with safety and verification protocols and real-time tracking preventing proliferation risks;
18. *Further recommends* Member States increased participation programs from the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) or UNODC, such as the CCTP or the AIRCOP program to obtain a more cohesive strategy between modes of crossing borders resulting in increased surveillance for dual-use chemicals and chemical weapons;
19. *Encourages* Member States to collaborate in order to share resources and promote technical assistance, utilizing the WCO Container Control Program (UNODC-WCO CCP), a container technology and logistics system, which creates and enables Port Control Units and Air Cargo Control Units to efficiently identify

and inspect high-risk air, land, and maritime shipments at checkpoints for dual-use and chemical precursor materials to prevent interference from non-state actors, including:

- a. Collaborating with WCO to monitor and control the movement of high-risk dual-use chemicals, such as chlorine and hydrogen cyanide, at key ports and shipping hubs;
 - b. Utilizing risk-based profiling, cargo scanning technology, and international data-sharing platforms to identify and intercept shipments specifically containing dual-use chemicals that may be diverted for malicious use by non-state actors;
20. *Proposes* collaboration on improved border control mechanisms to reduce the cross-border flow of chemical weapons specifically with Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional partners;
21. *Solemnly affirms* that Member States implement a program similar to the European Union Community Research and Development Information Service *CHEMSNIFF*, a portable tool that analyzes air samples to detect CBRN materials;
22. *Further recommends* an expansion to the existing CHEMEX program to conduct more workshops in other areas at risk of chemical weapon use by NSAs;
23. *Expresses* its hope for larger restitution and stricter punishment within Member States for violations committed by NSAs utilizing chemical weapons on civilian populations, suggesting Member States compensate civilians and public health;
24. *Welcomes* the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters to consider the creation of a special OPCW Trust Fund supported with voluntary financial contributions of each Member State, to finance;
25. *Direct attention to* Member States' ability to utilize the EDIS, supported by OPCW and provided free of charge, in order to streamline and make more ecologically sustainable the process of chemical weapon declaration;
26. *Calls for* the nomination of Chemical Weapons Regional Coordinators (CWRCS) within the OPCW external relations division to ensure the effective dissemination of targeted information on chemical weapon threats, capacity-building opportunities, and obligations under CWC and chemical safety standards;
27. *Emphasizes* the importance of CWRCS seeking to involve other divisions of the technical secretariat relevant regional bodies, such as the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Organization of the American States (OAS), and League of Arab State (LAS);
28. *Calls upon* the Director General of the OPCW, to revise the SAB bylaws and expand its elected members of the OPCW's SAB from its current 25 members to 30 members;
29. *Asks for* a temporary technical working group in the OPCW's SAB focused on the investigation of newly emerging chemicals used by NSAs, by expanding the mandate of the OPCW's SAB to include a temporary working group focused on new emerging chemicals and dual-use technology, this temporary working group could be renewed after its period of validity;
30. *Recommends* the creation of an intelligence sharing platform to ensure all components of chemical weapons are accounted for by assisting Member States in cataloging entities which produce and sell

precursor chemicals, then forwarding said information to their respective Member States' OPCW representatives for tracking and storage;

31. *Proposes* that, if there is evidence that a state is violating Article I.1.(d) of the CWC by knowingly and willingly arming NSAs with chemical weapons, the OPCW should formally request sanctions against that state by the United Nations Security Council and encourage Member States to enact individual sanctions against Member States found to be engaging in such actions;
32. *Reiterates its demand* that the General Assembly consider expanding the mandate of the DAT to offer its services voluntarily to all Member States in order to prevent the illicit transfer of precursor and dual-use chemicals to NSAs by engaging in verification initiatives such as:
 - a. Assessing the activities of the private sector in collaboration with Member State governments by conducting frequent and sudden challenge inspections;
 - b. Collecting verification documents confirming the successful implementation of OPCW guidelines;
 - c. Guaranteeing the confidentiality of communication and data-sharing networks using the OPCW's Verification Division's Security Critical Network computer system;
 - d. Partnering with the UN Office of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to share best practices to provide security and auditing expertise;
33. *Designates* the improvement of the OPCW Scheduled Chemicals Database and Annex of Chemicals, by expanding and consolidating identification controls through a comprehensive list of the dual-use and precursor chemical exports through:
 - a. Collaboration with the Australian Group, the European Union, and INTERPOL to strengthen intelligence cooperation and create a shared database including dual-use chemicals;
 - b. Encouraging each Member State to declare its exports and imports of chemical of dual-use in accordance with an updated OPCW list of dual-use and precursor chemicals;
 - c. Utilizing the EU's Dual-Use Exports Control List's Annex of Chemicals to expand upon the CWC Annex of recognized chemicals under schedules 1-3;
 - d. Continuously updating the CWC annex of chemicals having the SAB regularly review the EU Dual-Use Exports Control List and presenting this updated list to the body of OPCW to be voted upon whether it should be incorporated into the annex of chemicals of the CWC or not;
 - e. Working with INTERPOL's Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit to establish secure channels for sharing-real time intelligence on NGAs, enabling faster detection of chemical threats across borders;
 - f. Partnering with the WCO Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Programme to enhance training on auditing chemical trade flows, closing gaps in export-import monitoring;
 - g. Collaborating with the OPCW's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) to develop a voluntarily reporting mechanism for Member State to share data on suspicious chemical procurement, bolstering global efforts to track and disrupt illicit activities;
34. *Strongly advises* Member States to expand their educational resources to focus on regional concerns of dual-use chemicals and precursor chemicals including by:

- a. Providing training on specific threats in each Member State's region to increase preparation with specific incorporation of the EU Non-Proliferation eLearning Course and the OPCW's e-learning modules;
 - b. Recommending the implementation of virtual trainings of precursor chemical identification from the International Cooperation and Assistance Division and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach initially listing specific dual-use chemicals flagged within regions then creating updatable replayable videos specific regarding each region;
 - c. Encouraging the translation of important educational materials pertaining to chemical weapons and dual use chemicals, so that they are accessible to all;
 - d. Conducting comprehensive research on the development and use of AI in the chemical industry, incorporating submissions from the SAB-OPCW Temporary Working Group on Artificial Intelligence;
 - e. Asking for an increase in the number, variety, and frequency of United Nations regional workshops on chemical weapons nonproliferation and response to chemical attacks in collaboration with global UNRCPD locations;
 - f. Inviting global collaboration and contribution for instructing the research and results gathered from the simulations and practical uses of AI to "The United Nations Institute for Training and Research" (UNITAR);
35. *Strongly encourages* OPCW to expand its joint "Training of Trainers Programme" with WCO to include monitoring and data collection on Member States' implementation and execution of the best practices provided through the program, in an effort to:
- a. Refine the "Training of Trainers Programme" by:
 - i. Monitoring the effectiveness of best practices and technical assistance related to risk assessments, trans-shipments of chemical material, and software used by customs officials;
 - ii. Identifying the best practices that are most efficacious to enhancing the inspections of imports and exports of toxic chemicals;
 - b. Initiate a research pilot program in which a specific Member States' customs officials will monitor and collect data on the implementation of the Training of Trainers Programme in their respective Member State to identify which best practices have been most effective;
36. *Supports* an expansion of the existing "Specialised Training Programmes" to include a program for United Nations Peacekeepers and local first responders that will provide best practices and training courses to enhance their capacity to coordinate and respond to chemical weapons attacks and reported threats by NSAs, including through:
- a. Partnership training with emergency management personnel and social institutions to leverage their knowledge and identify potential threats posed by NSAs that use chemical weapons;
 - b. Coordination training to identify, handle, and dispose of dual-use and overall chemical weapon substances in austere environments;

- c. Mental health training focused on addressing the acute and chronic psychological effects associated with chemical weapons attacks, utilizing coping strategies and therapeutic practices for victims and first responders following NSA chemical weapons attacks;
37. *Invites* to partner with NGOs such as Green Cross International and United Nations bodies such as UNODC to promote education and technology-focused capacity-building workshops, modeling the initiatives of the Afghan Red Crescent Society to address the misuse of dual-use chemicals by NSAs by:
- a. Partnering with stakeholders in the private sector to promote the use of artificial intelligence and existing database programs to reduce the risk of dangerous NSAs acquiring dual-use chemicals;
 - b. Collaborating with institutional bodies in civil society, such as universities to promote internship opportunities in collaboration with the OPCW SAB to address challenges with emerging technologies such as AI, blockchains, and virtual protection networks (VPNs);
 - c. Utilizing the OPCW workshop Chemical Weapons Convention and Peaceful Uses of Chemistry to work with Member State governments, educate legislators and state officials in avenues to address the use of chemical weapons by NSAs by training stakeholder representatives on non-proliferation of chemical weaponry and precursor materials in peaceful uses of chemistry;
 - d. Expanding OPCW National Implementation Support Programs (NISP) to work with newcomers in Member State governments in adapting legislation to incorporate addressing the misuse of dual-use chemicals by NSAs through stockpile and manufacturing prevention initiatives;
38. *Suggests* to partner with NGOs including UNODA to potentially engage in dialogue between the OPCW, Member States, and other relevant stakeholders through various initiatives including:
- a. Modeling the traditional Vanua system to take a community-based approach to engage in dialogue educate civil-society actors on methods to report and identify suspicious activity in local governments;
 - b. Expanding the Education Through Immersion Program to the OPCW's "Hazardous Capacity Training Program" which would enable the survivors of chemical weapons attacks to share their experiences not only in global conferences but also in the regional and sub-regional areas to be able to promote dialogue between Member States and relevant stakeholders;
 - c. Utilizing existing educational materials in collaboration with NGOs such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) to raise public awareness through about the misuse of chemical weapons by NSAs by incorporating dialogue between Member State governments and actors in civil society by:
 - i. Advocating for the safe use of dual-use chemicals in civil society;
 - ii. Raising awareness by utilizing informational campaigns leveraging social media platforms such as United Nations Radio and the United Nations Department for Global Communications;
39. *Expresses its hope* for Member States to work with the OPCW's Technical Secretariat's International Cooperation and Assistance Division to further integrate the Chemical Safety and Security Management Tools Development Programme through incorporating:
- a. AI-driven predictive analytics to identify vulnerabilities in chemical production facilities for Member States;

- b. AI-driven risk modeling and scenario analysis to support real-time decision-making and coordinated emergency response in the event of an attack by NSA on a chemical production facility;
- 40. *Invites* the OPCW's International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons to interview victims of chemical weapon attacks carried out by NSAs and publishing these stories in an annual journal in order to raise visibility and awareness on the authentic effect these weapons and attacks have on civilians and infrastructure;
- 41. *Fully supports* an investigation, conducted by the OPCW's International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons, into the effects NSA chemical weapons attacks have on marginalized communities worldwide, which will then be published in a report to be presented to the General Assembly to further hold accountable NSAs that are responsible for these attacks;
- 42. *Requests* the implementation of WHO principles throughout the entire timeline of a chemical weapons attack with implementation from NGOs such as, *The Red Cross & Doctors Without Borders* to collaborate with temporary psychiatric and neurological professionals in Member States by providing:
 - a. Available mental health officials can be rerouted to an area following a chemical weapons attack;
 - b. Aid for affected civilians on handling a mental health crisis after an NSA chemical weapons attack, referring to mental health experts who have dual experience with training or certification in mental health and chemical weapons attacks.



Code: OPCW/1/4

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Appreciating General Assembly resolution 60/288 and its establishment of the *United Nations Global Terrorism Strategy*,

Recalling provisions outlined in the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (CWC), which bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons,

Acknowledging the importance of regional cooperation among Member States in the prohibition of chemical weapons, as a means to strengthen disarmament efforts, enhance mutual trust, and ensure compliance with international legal frameworks such as the CWC,

Recalling the Verification Annex (Parts VI, VII, and VIII) and the requirement for the states to declare relevant information to the OPCW to ensure informed and effective regulation of chemical weapons use by state and non-state actors,

Promoting coordination among regional Member States to enhance collective responses to global challenges and foster sustainable cooperation across political, economic, and security dimensions,

Deeply conscious of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 and 2325, which can assist Member States in developing and enforcing effective laws, establishing domestic controls, including physical protection measures, border controls, and law enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and combat the misuse of chemical weapons,

Encouraging Member States to critically evaluate and consider the accountability mechanisms embedded within the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) National Implementation Framework, promoting transparency, inclusiveness, and alignment with international norms and obligations,

Calling attention to Member States that acquire or manufacture dual-use chemical agents and have insurgent groups utilize technology for violent purposes,

Stressing the need for stronger border regulation and oversight of chemical weapons in line with General Assembly resolution 65/99, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery,

Emphasizing OPCW Executive Council decision EC-86/DEC.9, which states that each State Party must ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are used only for lawful purposes under the CWC, extending the security of the chemical life cycle management,

Highlighting the safeguards provided by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), which aid in guiding the safe and ethical use of new technologies in chemical weaponry verification and detection sectors,

Believing in strong adherence to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the General Assembly in 2015, and designed to achieve sustainability by 2030 in five pillars: people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnerships,

Taking into account SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong Institutions), which aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels,

Deeply concerned by the absence of a coordinated global intelligence platform within the framework of the OPCW to monitor the international transportation of dual-use chemicals,

Stressing the importance of strengthening communication channels and promoting comprehensive information sharing between Member States of transfer, including imports and exports of chemicals,

Reconfirming Member States shall respond accordingly to those who are intentionally misinterpreting the laws set forth by the State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, and the CWC,

Aware of the need for stricter rules and regulations internationally, as well as in a regional and national context, on the purchase and distribution of chemical weapons and their precursors,

Alarmed by the inconsistencies and disparities present in the current regulatory and licensure processes of Member States and the resulting cross-border gaps in security,

Noting the historical collaboration between the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) and OPCW in addressing the private sector's role in managing dual-use chemicals,

Emphasizing the necessity of reform to national legislation in order to strengthen effective border control,

Further recalling General Assembly resolution 79/138 on "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel," which describes measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMD, and emphasizes the strengthening of national measures in areas such as export controls, border security, and illicit trafficking prevention,

Bearing in mind the reality of limited funds establishes the need for proper allocation as well as diversification of those designated funds,

Recalling the importance of sustained financial and logistical support to ensure timely and thorough investigations, victim support, and deterrence of future chemical attacks,

Guided by the OPCW Advisory Board on Education and Outreach, accurate advice on strategies, key points, and partnership in terms of the education sector,

Noting with concern the persistent challenges in coordinating timely information-sharing among Member States, which undermine efforts to monitor non-state actors' access to chemical agents, secure cross-border chemical trade, and prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapon attacks,

1. *Invites* Member States to deepen engagement with the OPCW Technical Secretariat's International Cooperation and Assistance Division by collaborating with the International Criminal Police Organization's (INTERPOL) Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit, utilizing the International Cooperation and Assistance Division's (ICAD) technical assistance to develop secure protocols for sharing real-time intelligence on non-state actors, thereby enhancing the detection of chemical threats across borders;

2. *Requests* Member States to engage with the OPCW Technical Secretariat's ICAD in partnership with the World Customs Organization's (WCO) Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Programme, drawing on the ICAD's capacity-building expertise to strengthen training programs for auditing chemical trade flows, thereby improving export-import monitoring to prevent illicit transfers;
3. *Recommends* Member States to collaborate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat's ICAD to support the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) in establishing a voluntary reporting mechanism for sharing data on suspicious chemical procurement, with the ICAD providing technical expertise to enhance global efforts to track and disrupt illicit activities;
4. *Encourages* regional cooperation and regional/international institutions to implement tracking systems of toxic chemical imports and exports to halt insurgent groups from gaining access, supplemented by:
 - a. Training and educating customs officers of Member States to detect and manage hazardous chemical materials;
 - b. Providing support for schools and institutions aimed at cultivating skilled professionals in chemical safety, regulation, and enforcement;
5. *Calls upon* the Member States, relevant regional unions and organizations, as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts to enhance capacity-building measures aimed at preventing the acquisition, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons by non-state actors through:
 - a. Comprehensive and sustained training programmes for law enforcement, chemical crisis response forces, and border control authorities, in order to effectively identify dual-use chemicals crossing borders between Member States for further investigation and screening;
 - b. The introduction of specialized simulation training for customs and border officials to effectively intercept the illegal transportation of dual-use chemicals;
6. *Calls upon* Member States to implement national legislation following the CWC in order to strengthen border controls and security:
 - a. By supporting Member States with insufficient legal frameworks with various incentives and resources through the OPCW:
 - i. By monetary incentives like funding;
 - ii. Through increased training and the addition of more workforces;
 - b. Also intends to enforce various consequences on Member States that have not implemented sufficient legislation and, through negligence, have allowed weapons-grade chemical agents through their borders;
7. *Recommends* amending the Verification Annex (Parts VI, VII and VIII) to require the inclusion of information relating to the safety of dual-use chemical manufacturing in State declarations submitted to the OPCW Verification division's Industry Verification Branch, including the safety protocols, emergency preparedness, and response protocols of plant sites producing, processing, or consuming Scheduled Chemicals, and the steps being taken to minimise Chemical Weapon acquisition by non-state actors;
8. *Proposes* the creation and implementation of a voluntary OPCW-supported licensing system in partnership with the ICCA to provide a comprehensive framework for domestic licensing authorities,

standardizing global licensing procedures to enhance security and accountability in the production and trade of dual-use chemicals, including key components such as:

- a. Stringent background verification for dual-use chemical producers that requires producers to demonstrate adherence to best industry practices and operational transparency;
 - b. Assessments of physical security measures, production processes, and employee training programs;
 - c. Conduction of regular, unannounced audits by domestic oversight authorities of production sites, ensuring a sufficiently robust security and oversight apparatus is in place;
 - d. Continuous monitoring to ensure compliance and report any changes in ownership or operational practices;
 - e. Comprehensive verification of chemical purchases through periodic site inspections and continued authentication of their legitimate commercial purposes;
 - f. A robust tracking system to ensure transparency and to identify anomalous purchasing behaviors;
9. *Stresses its desire* to Member States for the creation of educational programs, around disarmament, non-proliferation, and first aid response to state and non-state actors' chemical weapons attacks, including:
 - a. Strengthening education on chemical weapons and their danger to people and the environment on the national and international levels, and engaging in the importance of partnership and strategies to achieve the goal of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as recommended by the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach, by:
 - i. Developing a collaboration with the chemical industry and the scientific community to raise awareness of the characteristics, dangers, and effects of chemical weapons in all languages necessary for the understanding of all populations likely to be affected by attacks;
 - ii. Integrating a culture of responsible conduct towards chemical products, especially in specific areas at risk of chemical attacks, such as conflict zones;
 - iii. Promoting the expansion and sharing of knowledge around how to rehabilitate areas affected by chemical weapons;
 - b. Creating education programs around responding to chemical attacks, including familiarity with the detection processes, warning signs, and post-chemical warfare implications;
10. *Suggests* to consider translation of documents and information relating to chemical weapons, dual-use chemicals, and chemical preparedness into the languages of all OPCW Member States upon request, and further recommends working with international translation organizations that are willing such as Translators Without Borders and Eriksen Translations to work in collaboration with the Language Services Branch to translate these documents and make them readily available on the OPCW website;
11. *Further requests* the allocation of adequate resources to support developing Member States, through the Research Progress Support Programme and the OPCW Voluntary Trust Funds, as well as through bilateral cooperative regional agreements, such as the establishment and strengthening of specialized

chemical prevention and crisis response facilities and programs in order to mitigate chemical disaster effects, through:

- a. The promotion of partnerships with international entities such as the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, as well as with academic and research institutions, to fund education opportunities locally for contributing states, focusing these targeted studies and scholarships to engage in the field of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security;
 - b. Strengthening bilateral, as well as OPCW cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) agencies to support regional disarmament centres and capacity-building in chemical weapons threat reduction;
12. *Encourages* Member States to increase voluntary financial contributions to the OPCW Trust Fund for Syria Missions and other regions strongly affected by the threat of chemical weapons by non-state actors in order to:
 - a. Enhance investigation capacity, victim assistance, and operational aid reach;
 - b. Coordinate funding efforts through the European External Action Service to ensure strategic allocation of resources for OPCW field operations with a focus on conflict zones and areas at high risk of chemical weapons use;
13. *Strongly encourages* providing annual reports from all Member States submitting action plans to the OPCW addressing their implementation of the CWC in monitoring chemical weapons and their agents:
 - a. Stresses the necessity of increased, detailed reports from Member States facing chemical attacks at the hands of non-state actors;
 - b. Recommends that specific Member States in dangerous regions submit additional reports based on the findings from the OPCW's fact-finding missions;
14. *Calls* for the establishment of joint OPCW working groups with board regional areas tasked with identifying specific mission needs, financial gaps, and areas where regional support could significantly improve the OPCW's effectiveness:
 - a. Endorses the creation of a joint OPCW working group that could offer significant guidance and funding:
 - i. Within and outside of the European Union (EU);
 - ii. Within the African Union;
 - iii. Within the Middle East and North Africa region;
 - b. By supporting the allocation of EU development and security aid toward programs that align with OPCW activities, including local capacity building, chemical safety infrastructure, and emergency response capabilities in affected regions;
 - c. Through providing aid to fill the financial gaps of developing Member States to further strengthen their independent monetary systems and to establish robust regional capabilities;

15. *Further recommends* OPCW State Parties to adjust their national security budget to ensure adequate funding for:
 - a. Prompt chemical weapon detection and prevention technologies;
 - b. Ensuring appropriate medical countermeasures and decontamination protocols are in place to mitigate the impact of these incidents;
 - c. Enabling rapid response capabilities to counteract the short-term effects of chemical weapon attacks;
16. *Further recommends* the creation of a global intelligence-sharing network, connecting private actors directly with port and relevant governmental authorities that would be similar to INTERPOL but solely for the monitoring of dual-use chemicals:
 - a. The main mechanism of this system would be private companies submitting a report covering the sales/transactions of dual-use chemicals to their Member States, in turn reporting that data to the OPCW for tracking, storage, and management;
 - b. This network would require that private companies include biographical information of the buyer as well as the purpose for which they are purchasing the dual-use chemicals;
 - c. Establishing a dialogue forum that allows private participants an avenue to contribute opinions of the proficiency of global intelligence-sharing network mechanisms, allowing for continual tailored improvement of the network;
17. *Recommends* that Member States, in alignment with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, strengthen their national capacities through engaging in capacity-building programs led by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) for strategic coordination and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for border security and counter terrorism with financing for both in partnership with INTERPOL, and focusing on threats related to border security, cyber-security, and WMD;
18. *Suggests* an OPCW scope expansion of Security Council resolution 2325 and Security Council resolution 1540 in order to hold Member States accountable for the actions of non-state actors within their borders by:
 - a. Regarding Member States who neglect to address the actions of the non-Member State actors within their domain as compliant with these non-members' proliferation of chemical weapons;
 - b. Incentivizing the sharing of knowledge to educate governments on how they can best prevent non-state actors from accessing, creating, and carrying out chemical weapon attacks, further incentivizing the adoption of universality in the future;
19. *Welcomes* a collaboration between the International Court of Justice and the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism that allows Member States to contact international experts and utilize their expertise and craft new legislation that will be adopted by Member States to standardize chemical import/export procedures to prevent interception;
20. *Invites* Member States to designate national programs in accordance with Article X and XI of Chemical Weapons Convention, to train first responders, emergency workers, and other hospital staff about crisis response after chemical attacks and the proper use of chemical protection gear, especially in vulnerable areas with high risk of exposure to attacks by non-state actors;

21. *Recommends* that the Director-General create a joint mission under the control of the OPCW technical secretariat as an investigative body on the usage of chemical weapons for a period of 20 years, with express responsibility of:
 - a. Investigation into alleged chemical weapon incidents upon notification and allowance by OPCW;
 - b. Providing a report to the OPCW, excluding recommendation of action, and with the possibility of no verdict within two years, including perpetrators, chemicals used, form of dispersal, and chemical sourcing;
22. *Encourages* the OPCW, in further partnership with the ICCA, to expand their collaboration to establish a standardized international licensing model for dual-use chemical producers and traders, wherein:
 - a. Company registration and identity verification through the ICCA coordinated platform;
 - b. Submission of operational and security protocols for peer-reviewed validation;
 - c. Routine inspection data to be logged within the shared ICCA-OPCW monitoring database;
 - d. Verification of end-user legitimacy and commercial intent prior to shipment;
 - e. Real-time integration of tracking data with customs authorities and relevant private-sector stakeholders to direct deviations or red flags;
23. *Encourages* strengthened collaboration between the WCO and national law enforcement agencies, focusing on sharing intelligence through:
 - a. Developing secure platforms for sharing intelligence related to chemical weapons and dual-use chemicals, following OPCW's information sharing protocols;
 - b. Encouraging Member States to prioritize training regional law enforcement staff in collaboration with the WCO, aiming to enhance their ability to recognize threats early;
 - c. Establish regional intelligence hubs to centralize and coordinate intelligence sharing among Member States, leveraging the WCO's Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices network;
 - d. Coordinate collaborative risk assessment frameworks to align the risk management strategies of the WCO and national law enforcement agencies;
24. *Endorses the call* for more cohesive and impactful South-South-Cooperations to further enhance regional readiness, framework collaboration, and interdependent regional affiliation in order to best possibly prevent and mitigate possible future chemical attacks and threats by non-state actors, through:
 - a. Taking the Chemex-Africa 2023 project, a regional cooperative South-South effort of 23 African countries and the first ever OPCW large-scale chemical emergency response exercise for African countries, as a prime example for future cooperative endeavors;
 - b. Strengthening regional cooperation efforts and the sharing of best practices by emphasizing and building upon existing global exchange and collaboration platforms, like the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) and OPCW programs for South-South engagement, in order to reinforce the emergence and consolidation of cooperation and regional alliances to effectively combat the threat of chemical weapons in the hands of non-state-actors;

25. *Affirms* the support of the OPCW in cooperation with law enforcement and customs authorities to prevent the unauthorized transportation and development of chemical weapons of mass destruction:

- a. Encourages enforcing chemical weapons embargoes, and exporting control regimes in order to regulate the distribution, transportation, and manufacturing of chemical weapons;
- b. Requires strict surveying measures to keep track of the movement and distribution of weapon-grade chemicals with thorough reports to the Security Council;
- c. Denounces the illicit trafficking of chemical weapons by enforcing chemical disarmament verification, securing fissile materials, and promoting broad participation.



Code: OPCW/1/5

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Recognizing the dire need to educate civilians of the impending threat of chemical weapons in the case of an attack by non-state actors as noted by the 86th Session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in which chemical weapon usage by non-state actors was recognized as a growing and urgent threat,

Guided by the principles of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (CWC), Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) in pursuit of peace, a chemical weapons-free globe, and to prohibit the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors,

Aware of the General Assembly resolution 60/288 on “The United Nations Counter Terrorism Strategy” and its semi-annual review on terrorism, which was created to unite the world in its fight against terrorism through providing training, leadership, and communication to achieve that goal,

Deeply conscious of the more than one million lives lost and impacted by the use of chemical weapons since their initial widespread use in the First World War, per the United Nations (UN) Office for Disarmament Affairs, as well as the extreme threat posed to the international community by non-state actors acquiring these weapons of mass destruction,

Alarmed by the lack of accessibility to chemical protective gear, chemical detection devices, and education on their usage,

Taking into consideration that the role of non-state actors has significantly expanded since the end of the Cold War in 1991 due to increased levels of globalization, the growing influence of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the declining leverage of individual state sovereignty from intra-state conflicts,

Profoundly concerned about the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, including ISIS, ISIL, Al-Qaeda, and more, despite the efforts of the OPCW to reduce their use in recent years,

Troubled by the potential of non-state actors to utilize chemical weapons without consequence to conduct attacks on a massive scale, which would pose a significant risk to human security across the globe, particularly for citizens living in fragile or conflict-ridden Member States,

Applauding the commendable efforts previously undertaken by the international community, including organizations such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and various non-governmental organizations, to provide critical resources, humanitarian aid, and educational tools to civilians, these initiatives have played a crucial role in reducing the number of casualties and injuries sustained during times of conflict and disaster by improving emergency preparedness, facilitating access to medical care, and distributing life-saving information to vulnerable populations,

Taking into consideration the importance of international and domestic organizations and Member States in eliminating the use of chemical weapons, to better facilitate accurate information regarding border security, chemical storage, and inventory,

Acknowledging regional instability as a catalyst for chemical weapons acquisition, and the importance of regional cooperation to see the implementation of the CWC,

Deeply concerned by the growing threat of chemical weapons in regions marked by instability and terrorist activity, particularly the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, while recognizing the vital role of OPCW-led training in strengthening the preparedness and resilience of vulnerable Member States,

Recalling Article 10 of the CWC, which emphasizes the importance of assistance and protection, as well as affirms the need for sustained technical and financial support to help developing countries implement robust chemical safety frameworks,

Emphasizing the importance of effective border management in preventing the transnational movement of chemical precursors while acknowledging the role of regional cooperation in addressing shared chemical security risks through harmonized procedures and shared intelligence,

Alarmed by the ease with which dual-use chemicals may be diverted for malicious purposes,

Recalling the obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors,

Recognizing that inconsistent national regulations can create legal loopholes exploited by illicit networks and calling for greater harmonization of chemical safety laws across regions to strengthen enforcement and international coordination,

Welcoming increased collaboration between intelligence services, law enforcement bodies, and the OPCW in tracking chemical precursor movements,

Having examined the effectiveness of the Training for Trainers Programme in preventing the prevalence of chemical weapons in accordance with the CWC,

Recognizing the crucial role of regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in supporting the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention through coordination, information-sharing, and region-specific guidance,

1. *Advocates for* Member States to expand on educational programs that are inspired by the United Nations' #helloglobalgoals framework in hopes to train populations on the misuse of chemicals in a more approachable manner, especially for younger audiences, by inviting Member States to voluntarily provide the following chemical weapons educational initiatives to any group that Member States deem is vulnerable to chemical weapons attacks by nonstate actors and requires increased knowledge on this subject, and suggests:
 - a. The Kindness in Togetherness To Treasure Youth (K.I.T.T.Y.) Initiative, which aims to educate youth on protecting themselves when exposed to chemical weapons of non-state actors and the misuse of chemicals, resulting in reduced engagement between youth and non-state actors, mitigating injuries caused by chemical weapons, and decreased aid required following chemical weapons attacks, by:

- i. Educating children about the usage of chemical protective gear and abuse of chemicals by using approachable figures, under the guidance of relevant domestic authorities, and respectful of national pedagogical traditions and cultural norms, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the program so that the information is retained by the viewers;
 - ii. Proposing to have interactive lessons that use real and safe chemical equipment for hands-on experience to teach the proper wear of gear;
 - iii. Encouraging experts on chemical weapons from the United Nations University and #youth4disarmament to build a website and videos tailored specifically towards the K.I.T.T.Y Initiative and create engaging games or backgrounds to provide resources for chemical weapon assistance and education;
 - iv. Proposing Member States engage with the K.I.T.T.Y Initiative to collaborate with the programs to fund and provide protective wear in order to both educate and protect the public and provide the public with better accessibility to safety measures;
 - b. Policies within Member State public school systems that educate youth on chemical weapons, focused on the history, risks, and consequences of chemical weapons use by:
 - i. Inviting engaging guest speakers to speak about chemical safety and disarmament, to share information on the proper handling of household chemicals and the dangers of their misuse;
 - ii. Proposing that Member States voluntarily integrate national annual educational programs;
2. *Requests* the voluntary creation of transnational checks and balances partnerships by willing Member States and relevant regional bodies, in which neighboring Member States may collaborate to:
- a. Check and confirm that their neighboring Member States are appropriately eliminating stockpiles to reduce access to chemical weapons by non-state actors nearby that can potentially access these stockpiles;
 - b. Prevent the unauthorized exportation, trafficking, or transportation of chemical weapons and their precursors across borders;
 - c. Note that while the OPCW currently conducts inspections and monitors compliance under the CWC, this proposed system would complement OPCW efforts by encouraging regional collaboration and peer accountability, and would be done on a voluntary basis to respect national sovereignty;
 - d. Shift the current framework, wherein chemical weapons compliance and monitoring are managed largely through domestic National Authorities responsible for national implementation of the CWC, towards a more collaborative regional model that allows neighboring Member States to voluntarily support and verify each other's efforts, share updates on stockpile destruction, and maintain open communication channels to promote transparency, consistency, and accurate information across borders;
3. *Encourages* parties to the CWC to voluntarily form transnational partnerships that facilitate the rapid deployment of resources, both educational and humanitarian aid, to neighboring Member States affected by chemical attacks by individuals, non-state actors, or otherwise, including:

- a. Accessible language translation services and culturally sensitive materials to ensure accessibility and effectiveness for impacted civilians;
 - b. A shared pool of educational resources, including online digestible texts and teaching aids, to facilitate rapid distribution to affected regions;
 - c. The establishment of a special Emergency Response Team comprised of educators, psychologists, and counselors from multiple nations within the region, which:
 - i. Develops clear protocols for the swift deployment of response teams across borders, ensuring teams can access impacted areas without unnecessary delays;
 - ii. Creates clear communication channels between response teams and local authorities to coordinate efforts effectively during emergencies;
4. *Encourages* Member States to collaborate with OPCW experts, NGOs, and partnering Member States to provide more accessible forms of education to the public sector including:
- a. Providing further context on the mission of transnational partnerships in order to further inform the public sector and prevent the emergence of possible non-state actors' pursuit of achieving chemical weapons;
 - b. Establishing a novel standard of education aligning with Article II of the OPCW about chemical weapons, which would encompass:
 - i. What defines chemical weapons and toxic chemicals;
 - ii. What forms of chemical agents are not classified as chemical weapons;
 - iii. The proper authority to appeal if chemical weapons were to be found;
5. *Recommends* the creation of an international support and monitoring framework that will operate as part of the OPCW committee, inspired by the 1540 Committee under the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly resolution 60/288, known as the Coordinating Unit Combating Terrorist Chemical Weapons Use (C.U.C.T.C.W.U.), which includes:
- a. The creation of an international roundtable, created by the OPCW Executive Council in cooperation with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which will be conducted semi-annually in alternation with the Office of Counter-Terrorism meeting, and the composition will be open to deliberation upon request of one or more Member States, with the goal of:
 - i. Integrating the work of experts and specialists to oversee the implementation of educational initiatives, with the aim of preventing the development or use of chemical weapon devices by non-state actors;
 - ii. Ensuring that Member States know how to best adhere to OPCW and international standards;
 - iii. Spreading awareness of non-state chemical weapons development and strategies to deter and react to their employment;
 - iv. Creating and implementing this program by 2028;

- b. The creation of panels or roundtables overseen by the C.U.C.T.C.W.U. to assist Member States in implementing or improving their domestic 1540 plans, ensuring that they are in full cooperation with the CWC and its goals to prevent non-state actors from using chemical weapons, thereby:
 - i. Facilitating the mobilization of resources, expertise, and funds from the international community to support the continuity of education in affected areas;
 - ii. Allowing Member States to learn from the mistakes and/or processes of other Member States, to know how to best implement their domestic 1540 legislation;
- 6. *Calls for* Member States to work alongside NGOs, such as Doctors Without Borders and local Red Cross organizations, utilize surplus military and humanitarian donations, allocate donations to provide chemical protective gear and chemical weapons detection devices to individuals, citizens, organizations, and secure government facilities for use in case of a chemical weapons usage, known as the Managing Assistance to prevent Scandalous Killings Plan (M.A.S.K. Plan) by encouraging the following:
 - a. Member States aid the international community through law enforcement, local government entities, and regional organs, by providing chemical protective gear and chemical weapons detection devices to people, especially those in high-risk chemical exposure zones, this will limit the potential civilian casualties from a possibly chemical attack, and ensure that there is a faster reaction time to assist those affected;
 - b. Member States provide chemical protective gear and chemical weapons detection devices of their choice to any group or nation that they deem vulnerable and require protection for the following reasons:
 - i. Once chemical detection devices are installed, the public can be informed when chemical weapons are deployed and be able to take immediate action to protect themselves from harmful results;
 - ii. If the public has chemical protective gear and can utilize these when chemical weapons are deployed in the vicinity, it will mitigate the number of injuries and, thus, decrease the amount of national and international aid required afterward;
 - c. Member States partner with the K.I.T.T.Y. Initiative to educate the public on proper usage of chemical protective gear and chemical weapon detection devices;
- 7. *Encourages* Member States to partner with NGOs and research institutions to research the production of affordable and accessible chemical protective gear and affordable chemical detection devices by:
 - a. Urging collaboration and international trade between Member States in order to reduce the costs of producing chemical protection gear and detection devices by utilizing comparative advantage in producing goods;
 - b. Inviting Member States to share research on discovered materials, methods, and other knowledge that could be helpful in producing and reducing the cost of protective gear;
 - c. Requesting that Member States reduce tariffs on materials being imported to be used to produce chemical protection gear and detection devices to provide to groups vulnerable to chemical attacks;

8. *Welcomes* Member States to further efforts to facilitate transnational dialogue through regular regional summits to be voluntarily hosted by Member States or NGOs on the following topics:
 - a. The importance of understanding and implementing the CWC to combat the use of chemical weapons;
 - b. Guidance for Member States responding to chemical weapons incidents;
 - c. Directions on the inspection of chemical weapons for Member State officials responsible for chemical weapons management;
9. *Fully aware* of the interaction between governments and private sectors to supervise the trading of chemical substances, regulations on chemical production, trade, and storage are encouraged by:
 - a. Highlighting the importance of checking licenses and conducting inspections to allow private companies to share information about potential risks and strengthen chemical safety;
 - b. Encouraging technical and contractual documentation protocols such as safety data sheets, barcode mechanisms, and GS1 standards to provide traceability and transparency over the handling of dual-use chemicals strictly aligned with their declared purposes;
10. *Reiterates its desire* to expand training programs for strengthening detection and response capacities, by:
 - a. Emphasizing the importance of rapid emergency response domestic policies in order to contain and neutralize chemical spills and promote a non-proliferation culture by establishing national emergency response plans to define procedures for handling chemical incidents, to coordinate civil defense, public health, and military;
 - b. Recognizing the urgency of technical assistance as personal protective equipment, specific antidotes, and medications for Member States with limited control capabilities to prepare for real scenarios by providing guidelines adapted to the local context and simulation exercises;
 - c. Reaffirming its awareness and training programs for industrial personnel on the risks of proliferation by educating on national protocols focusing on national export control laws and recognizing dual-use risks delivered through targeted workshops to ensure compliance and early threat detection;
11. *Calls upon* Member States to regulate their production of chemical substances within the private sector to prevent unequipped peoples from managing hazardous materials by:
 - a. Urging industries involved in handling hazardous chemicals to implement more rigorous security protocols and build partnerships with industries within trade associations to share information on potential threats or suspicious transactions;
 - b. Emphasizing that any licensing or authorization measures are to be tailored to national contexts, and not impose undue burdens on domestic industries engaged in lawful dual-use chemical activities in accordance with Article XI of the CWC;
 - c. Recommending the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, which mandates states to adopt measures to prevent non-state actors from misuse of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons through increased security of dual-use chemicals and training on how to properly store, transport, and develop dual-use chemicals;

- d. Suggesting the establishment of mandatory registers of chemical substances potentially dangerous for civilians, and the implementation of alarm systems to prevent and detect theft or tampering;
 - e. Encouraging the development of licenses and authorizations for the production, possession, of use of chemical products with both civilian and military applications;
 - f. Strongly emphasizing supporting scholarships on topics related to disarmament and chemical safety, including training or workshops to further educate the public;
 - g. Encouraging exchange programs for young researchers with laboratories affiliated with the OPCW, and annual review of programmes with the support of OPCW experts and regional agencies;
 - h. Recommending reinforced border security to limit smuggling and introducing stricter controls over the chemical trade to mitigate the risk of proliferation;
 - i. Enhancing the implementation of rapid notification mechanisms between Member States in case of detecting, trafficking, or illicit use by providing national and international databases for monitoring chemical substances;
12. *Encourages* the expansion of the OPCW's existing training and capacity-building initiatives, such as the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa and the Training of Trainers Programme in high-risk regions, including the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, in order to enhance Member States' ability to prevent and respond to chemical threats by:
- a. Conducting regular technical workshops on chemical safety, legal implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and emergency response protocols, coordinated by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, in collaboration with regional stakeholders;
 - b. Ensuring that training programs are context-specific through partnerships with regional organizations such as the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to reflect the legal, linguistic, and logistical needs of participating Member States;
 - c. Providing targeted support to countries with limited resources, including through the OPCW Africa Programme and voluntary contributions to relevant OPCW Trust Funds, in order to cover training materials, expert deployment, and logistical assistance;
13. *Asks* for the establishment of an OPCW Capacity-Building Fund, financed through voluntary contributions from Member States, international partners, and private-sector stakeholders, while maintaining principles of transparency and neutrality towards the OPCW agenda, with the aim of supporting developing countries in strengthening their chemical security frameworks, by:
- a. Providing legal and technical assistance for the drafting, harmonization, and enforcement of national chemical safety laws, including the implementation of obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, in line with the OPCW's National Implementation Programmes;
 - b. Organizing specialized training programs for customs officers, border patrol units, and law enforcement personnel to enhance their capacity to identify, monitor, and intercept the illicit trafficking of toxic chemicals and dual-use substances, coordinated by the OPCW Technical Secretariat in collaboration with regional organizations;

- c. Enhancing national emergency response systems by funding the acquisition of protective equipment, detection technologies, and medical preparedness tools, as well as by supporting simulation exercises for first responders in high-risk regions, in accordance with Article 10 of the CWC;
 - d. Ensuring transparency and accountability in the use of the fund through annual reporting, needs-based allocation mechanisms, and partnerships with regional organizations, for effective project implementation;
14. *Encourages* the development of regional cooperation frameworks among Member States, particularly in areas vulnerable to chemical terrorism, with the support of the OPCW and relevant international organizations such as INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in order to strengthen border control capacities by:
- a. Establishing a voluntary, inclusive forum for neighboring states, regardless of differences in neighboring states' abilities to enforce national security measures, to engage in collaborative border security operations, in order to monitor and intercept the illicit transport of chemical precursors and dual-use substances;
 - b. Creating shared, secure watchlists and chemical trafficking databases, managed in coordination with the OPCW, to facilitate real-time exchange of information regarding suspicious individuals, organizations, or cargo movements;
 - c. Standardizing customs and inspection procedures among regional partners to ensure consistent enforcement of chemical safety regulations and to prevent regulatory loopholes;
 - d. Organizing annual regional forums for border security agencies to provide technical assistance and funding to low-capacity states through an OPCW-administered mechanism to support training, whilst also exchanging practices, conducting scenario-based simulations, and coordinating their chemical counter-terrorism strategies;
15. *Promotes* the adoption of chemical tracking and tagging technologies to improve the global monitoring of dual-use chemicals and prevent their diversion for malicious purposes, and further recommends the establishment of a centralized tracking database, based on the voluntary participation of Member States, under the supervision of the OPCW, by:
- a. Ensuring that each Member State's key information is preserved, conditional on their wishes;
 - b. Encouraging Member States and private-sector chemical producers to implement tagging systems such as barcodes, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips, or blockchain-based solutions to trace the movement of hazardous substances throughout the supply chain;
 - c. Developing an international database managed by the OPCW to record and monitor the cross-border movement of high-risk chemical shipments, with secure access granted to verified national authorities;
 - d. Promoting data-sharing agreements between Member States to enable real-time alerts in case of suspicious or unauthorized chemical transfers;
 - e. Supporting the technical and financial inclusion of developing countries in these systems by offering training and infrastructure support through existing OPCW capacity-building programs;

16. *Calls upon* all Member States to adopt and implement comprehensive national legislation aimed at preventing the misuse of toxic chemicals by non-state actors, by:
- a. Developing and enforcing legal and regulatory measures to prohibit the unauthorised acquisition, possession, manufacture, transfer, or use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, in accordance with national legal systems and the CWC;
 - b. Establishing clear penalties and legal frameworks for prosecution and extradition, in accordance with national and international law;
 - c. Strengthening regulatory control over facilities and supply chains that produce, store, or distribute toxic chemicals, particularly dual-use chemicals that may be repurposed for malicious purposes;
 - d. Mandating the registration and licensing of chemical handlers, producers, and distributors to ensure traceability and accountability;
 - e. Enhancing cooperation with international organisations to receive technical assistance, capacity-building, and legislative guidance;
 - f. Promoting inter-agency coordination between customs, law enforcement, intelligence services, and chemical safety authorities to detect and respond to potential threats involving toxic chemicals;
 - g. Encouraging the reporting and sharing of information on suspicious activities related to chemical substances through secure and standardised channels;
17. *Proposes* the voluntary establishment of a Chemical Threat Exchange Unit (C.T.I.E.U.) within the OPCW, aimed at enhancing real-time intelligence sharing to prevent the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, and recommends that this unit work in coordination with a Temporary Working Group on Artificial Intelligence, to be monitored and convened by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), with the mandate to:
- a. Facilitate secure and timely exchange of intelligence among Member States through encrypted channels, customs authorities, and international law enforcement agencies regarding trafficking networks, suspicious chemical transactions, and dual-use chemical threats;
 - b. Analyze global procurement patterns of chemical substances, including through AI-assisted tools, and identify high-risk activities by non-state actors, particularly in regions with weak regulatory enforcement;
 - c. Coordinate closely with INTERPOL and UNODC to identify trafficking routes and enhance joint operations in high-risk regions, particularly in the Sahel, North Africa, and the Middle East;
 - d. Support capacity-building efforts in Member States with limited intelligence or analytical capabilities through training, technical guidance, and regional cooperation frameworks;
 - e. Conduct in-depth research on the development and misuse of AI in the chemical industry, incorporating findings from the SAB-OPCW Artificial Intelligence Research Challenge, with special focus on its potential exploitation by non-state actors;
 - f. Recommend safeguards and policy tools for mitigating AI-driven risks in the chemical domain, including early warning systems, automated detection of suspicious activities, and responsible innovation frameworks;

- g. Seek funding through the OPCW capacity-building fund mentioned in clause 2, voluntary contributions, and partnerships with international organizations;
18. *Supports* the further expansion and broader implementation of the Training of Trainers Programme, with the objective of enhancing the ability of border security personnel to detect, identify, and prevent the movement of chemical weapons and related materials by:
- a. Developing standardized training modules tailored to the needs of border security agencies, with a focus on the identification of toxic chemicals, precursors, and dual-use items;
 - b. Distributing technical manuals and digital tools to assist in the on-site recognition and safe handling of suspect chemical materials;
 - c. Organizing regional workshops and simulations in collaboration with the OPCW and relevant international stakeholders to ensure practical preparedness;
 - d. Promoting the exchange of best practices between participating Member States to improve frontline response and risk assessment at international borders;
 - e. Encouraging the participation of developing countries, particularly in Africa and other under-resourced regions, by providing financial and logistical support for their inclusion in the programme;
 - f. Ensuring follow-up evaluations and assessments to measure the effectiveness of training and identify areas for improvement;
19. *Directs* the OPCW to establish and nominate Chemical Weapons Regional Coordinators (CWRCs) within the External Relations division of the OPCW, tasked with strengthening communication and coordination between the OPCW and Member States on matters related to chemical weapons threats, capacity-building opportunities, and implementation of obligations under the CWC, and further mandates that these Coordinators:
- a. Support the regional implementation of OPCW training and capacity-building initiatives, including legal assistance, technical workshops, and emergency preparedness programs, in cooperation with national authorities and relevant regional organizations;
 - b. Facilitate the dissemination of best practices and training materials developed under OPCW programs, in cooperation with national authorities and relevant regional organizations;
 - c. Assist in identifying funding and partnership opportunities for chemical security-related projects, including engagement with voluntary donors, the private sector, and development agencies;
 - d. Coordinate efforts to strengthen regional cooperation in areas such as border control, information-sharing, and joint security operations to prevent the trafficking and misuse of chemical substances;
20. *Encourages* the CWRCs to engage with regional bodies including the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), the AU, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the United Nations office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean to assist in the collation and dissemination of the relevant information to the relevant Member States;

21. *Recommends* the development and implementation of voluntary national plans to detect, investigate, and respond to emergencies that involve the use of chemical weapons through:

- a. The establishment of dedicated response teams;
- b. The provision of training and equipment for first-time responders and medical personnel by:
 - i. Deploying additional specialized forensic and hazmat units trained to secure, assess, and decontaminate affected areas in collaboration with unmanned satellites;
 - ii. Encouraging the use of drones to detect unusual and suspicious activity in high-risk zones.



Code: OPCW/1/6

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Acknowledging the importance of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction*, also known as the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC), as the primary legal framework for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons worldwide,

Being cognizant of the information that the Central Analytical Database (OCAD) has provided, which allows for relevant information about chemical weapons and permits the identification and verification of chemical substances,

Recognizing the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons (ISNVCW), which was established in 2011 in the hopes of raising awareness and providing resources for victims of chemical weapons, which has also been noted for working closely with victims' associations,

Acknowledging the Global Federation of Animal Sanctuaries (GFAS) for its promotion of sanctuaries and rescue centers for their contributions to wildlife recovery and rehabilitation,

Showing awareness of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which investigates alleged incidents of chemical weapons use, gathering and analyzing evidence, including information such as medical records and autopsy reports, all to determine if the cause of death was a chemical weapon,

Understanding the scientific background and field training needed to properly address chemical environmental contamination in animal ecosystems,

Expressing deep concern about the lack of data analytics focusing on the effects of chemical weapons on animals around the globe,

Recognizing Vets Beyond Borders, which provides veterinary care to animals in need due to environmental or manmade circumstances,

Strongly emphasizing that chemical weapons and industrial chemical misuse do not just harm humans, but also affect all sorts of living organisms,

Recognizing the Chemical Agents and Ecosystem Consequences Observatory (CHEM-ECO),

Stressing the profound and often irreversible ecological consequences of chemical weapons use, particularly by non-state actors, whose actions frequently target or inadvertently impact vulnerable environments,

Highlighting that chemical agents, once deployed, contaminate soil and are absorbed by native vegetation, infiltrate groundwater and freshwater sources, and eventually reach aquatic systems, damaging riverine ecosystems, estuaries, and coral reefs, with cascading effects on biodiversity, food chains, and local communities reliant on these natural resources,

Noting with concern the multitude of crops and agricultural products that have been interfered with by non-state actors through the use of chemicals such as glyphosate and cosmo flux,

1. *Requests that* the CWC emphasize a separate division dedicated to documenting and analyzing the effects of chemical weapons on wildlife, such as animals, and the ecosystem;
2. *Recommends* the establishment of partnerships with conservation societies, such as Friends of the Desert Mountains, GFAS, and the World Animal Society to initiate comprehensive studies aimed at documenting and analyzing the ecological impact of chemical weapons, particularly those deployed by non-state actors, with a focus on the acute and chronic effects on wildlife populations, biodiversity, habitat degradation, and the bioaccumulation of toxic substances within animal life cycles;
3. *Calls for* Chemical Weapons Regional Coordinators (CWRCs) to be appointed within the OPCW's External Relations division to facilitate region specific information sharing regarding regional risk, capacity building needs, safety requirements and cwc obligations in order to strengthen communication between OPCW and regional bodies such as the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Organization of the American States (OAS), and League of Arab State (LAS);
4. *Encourages* the expansion of the CHEM-ECO (Chemical Agents and Ecosystem Consequences Observatory) research program under the OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board for the purpose of understanding the acute and long-term impacts of chemical weapon use by non-state actors on flora and fauna in the strike area by:
 - a. Strongly advising collaborating with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to assist in research and data collection on environmental impacts;
 - b. Suggesting an alliance with the World Wildlife Fund in order to gather data and develop sustainable solutions;
 - c. Encouraging Member States to openly use these groups to support the recovery of affected ecosystems and strengthen the efforts in future prevention of chemical weapons attacks by non-state actors, allowing for data collection, a crucial step for developing early detection systems, improving response mechanisms, and implementing policies that protect both human and wildlife populations from the devastating effects of chemical warfare;
 - d. Conducting a research program that works on the effects on animals and floral life in order to start understanding the risks and develop countermeasures against them;
 - e. Suggesting the improvement of veterinary care by offering antidotes and developed methods to cure animals exposed to chemical weapons;
5. *Encourages* Member States to investigate the rehabilitation of animals that have been affected by residual chemical weapons in areas affected by conflict with non-state actors by:
 - a. Inviting research groups like the National Audubon Society and the Society for Conservation Biology to provide expertise and equipment for measuring the prevalence of birth defects and habitat loss for affected non-human life;
 - b. Further inviting the same groups to investigate the effects on the reproductive habits of affected non-human life;
 - c. Asking Member States to maintain humanitarian corridors to allow for research in affected areas;

6. *Encourages* the development and expansion of specialized OPCW training seminars to explore the environmental consequences of chemical weapons use, particularly in instances involving non-state actors, for the purpose of:
 - a. Focusing on advanced chemical detection and environmental sampling techniques, including soil, water, and air analysis in ecosystems negatively impacted by chemical agents, with case studies drawn from real-world incidents involving non-state actor use of chemical weapons;
 - b. Providing first-hand knowledge to Member State representatives and environmental authorities regarding the impact of chemical agents on native plant and animal life;
 - c. Illuminating the process of environmental remediation and restoration in contaminated areas, incorporating best practices and lessons learned from past OPCW missions or analogous international environmental recovery efforts;
7. *Recommends* the development and implementation of training programs for veterinarians and animal handlers on recognizing and responding to chemical exposure to animals;
8. *Calls for* the development of a multi-tiered environmental surveillance mechanism under OPCW oversight to monitor chemical residue movement from terrestrial to marine environments and to identify early signs of ecological collapse linked to toxic exposure;
9. *Urges* Member States to support the expansion of programs like CHEM-ECO to include targeted environmental intelligence efforts that track, document, and share data on chemical weapons usage patterns by non-state actors, with the goal of disrupting supply chains, detecting illegal stockpiles, and anticipating potential ecological targets;
10. *Further encourages* the integration of environmental impact assessments into counter-proliferation strategies, ensuring that the prevention of chemical weapons use by non-state actors includes an ecological lens—one that safeguards the health of the planet as well as its people;
11. *Encouraging* Member States to increase precautionary legislation regarding the prevention of large-scale crop sabotage.



Code: OPCW/1/7

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Reaffirming the importance of the *Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (CWC) as the primary legal framework for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons worldwide,

Taking into account the sovereignty of each Member State's education system,

Taking into consideration Article II.1.b of the CWC, Chemical Weapons are defined as munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals,

Recalling Article 2.2 of the CWC defining Toxic Chemicals as any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals, including all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere,

Noting Article 2.3 of the CWC, which defines Precursor Materials as any chemical reaction that takes place at any stage in the production by any method of a toxic chemical, this includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system,

Further noting the chemicals listed in the annex of the CWC,

Recognize the essential role of private sector actors in the production, storage, and transportation of chemicals used for industrial purposes, and the need to ensure their awareness and compliance with the CWC,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 1540, defining a non-state actor as an individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities,

Recognizing the lack of a standardized set of definitions relating to the issue of non-state actors' (NSA) acquisition and manufacturing of chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),

Bearing in mind the Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)'s Scientific Advisory Board at its 38th Session (SAB-38/1), highlighting the need for accessibility of information on the use of chemical weapons,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 79/56 on the "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the fields of chemical activities,

Guided by Chemical Emergency Response Capacity-Building Exercise for the Africa Region (CHEMEX Africa), the first pan-African chemical response capacity-building exercise was conducted in the context of the CWC,

Taking into account the 2024 OPCW and the CWC National Authority of China training course on Medical Aspects of Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons,

Acknowledging the collaboration between national and private sectors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors, to ensure the secure management of chemicals in industrial settings,

Recognizing the urgent need for proper training and education of border officials surrounding chemical transfers in high-risk transfer zones,

Bearing in mind the OPCW Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security, the strengthening of border security, and intelligence sharing between Member States,

Noting the importance of upholding the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

Guided by the calls for the integration of chemical security measures into SDG 16 to strengthen institutions in the fight against chemical weapon proliferation,

Emphasizing the duties adopted under Part II, A, to the CWC, committing to voluntary inspection by the United Nations inspection teams in relation to chemical manufacturing and logistics facilities across the state,

Further, nothing with concern the rapid advancement in chemical technology, which, while beneficial for industrial and health purposes, also increases the risk of misuse by non-state actors,

Recalling the obligations of States Parties under the CWC to monitor and control the production, transfer, and use of dual-use chemicals and chemical weapon precursors,

Acknowledging the need for enhanced integrity and traceability of international chemical shipments through a decentralized and tamper-resistant design,

Acknowledging the work of the Organization of American States (OAS) and its Committee on Hemispheric Security in promoting weapon disarmament and chemical non-proliferation efforts within the Latin American and Caribbean region,

Supporting the OPCW Chemical Emergencies Training Program (CETP) that was provided for the Latin American and Caribbean regions,

Recalling the work of organizations such as the White Helmets in the Middle East, guided by the training provided by Turkey, and organizations such as Pesticide Action Network Africa (PANAF), acting as first responders in vulnerable areas,

Underscoring the need to strengthen national capacities to prevent, detect, investigate, and respond to the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, including through the provision of technical and financial assistance to developing countries and the enhancement of regional and international cooperation mechanisms,

Emphasizing the importance of regional and international cooperation in strengthening chemical security, monitoring potential threats, and ensuring enforcement measures against non-state actors,

Alarmed by the lack of a permanent regional consultation forum addressing the evolving security concerns pertaining to the proliferation of chemical weapons by non-state actors,

Recognizing the importance of Security Council resolution 2518 (2020) in its incorporation of intelligence sharing mechanisms, establishing preventive measures for NSAs obtaining chemical weapons in conflict zones,

Conscious of the consistent collaboration between agencies such as the OPCW, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and United Nations Interregional

Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in combating possession of chemical weapons by non-state actors,

Cognizant of INTERPOL's Watchmaker database, which contains profiles of over 4,600 people and 38,750 entities associated with illicit activities involving chemical, biological, and IED-type weapons,

Mindful of the assistance the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) has provided to Member States regarding the combating of chemical terrorism through simulations and working group exercises,

Believing that active and coordinated intelligence-sharing frameworks are essential to intercept the illicit acquisition of dual-use chemical materials and disrupt the planning and execution of chemical attacks by malicious actors,

Reconfirming the model of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission under Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) for addressing public health issues about chemicals in the Syrian Arab Republic for other states,

Desiring the formalization, streamlining, and universality of existing, informal chemical export controls under the guidance of the OPCW,

Encouraging all Member States to recognise the importance of existing capacity-building research programmes that teach states about the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes,

1. *Recommends* the expansion of stricter border security measures, joint agency cooperation projects, specialised training programs, and voluntary intelligence-sharing between Member States to prevent the trafficking of chemical weapons and their precursors by:
 - a. Encouraging each Member State to take action, according to their abilities, in relation to border security measures;
 - b. Encouraging OPCW collaboration with INTERPOL to enhance counter-terrorism efforts specifically regarding chemical trafficking, including:
 - i. Potential expansion of INTERPOL's Project TRACE to equip Member States' intelligence agencies with the training necessary to identify and intercept the illegal movement of CWC annex-listed chemicals through the dark web;
 - ii. Widespread Member State participation in INTERPOL's Project Sharaka to train customs agents in identifying illegal chemical transfers passing through airports and border checkpoints;
 - c. Expanding cooperation with agencies such as the OPCW OEWG-T, INTERPOL, UNODC, UNICRI, regional security organizations, and local law enforcement to facilitate real-time data exchange, joint threat assessments, and collaborative investigation:
 - i. Building on INTERPOL's terrorism incident database Project Watchmaker, the UNODC's SHERLOC database, among others, to provide local law enforcement and military personnel of Member States with information and profiles of non-state actors and groups listed on these databases who have previously made use of chemical weapons and CWC Annex-listed chemicals;
 - ii. Partnering with INTERPOL's Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement (CHASE) network to integrate law enforcement data on chemical trafficking to ensure real-time flagging;

- d. Expanding joint projects and specialised training programs led by the OPCW, such as CHEMEX Africa of the OPCW Africa Programme, to educate local law enforcement, military personnel, and customs officers on how to prevent, detect, and respond to the acquisition, development, and use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, which may include:
 - i. Simulated chemical attacks and emergencies to test law enforcement response effectiveness, like what was seen during the “Preventing and Responding to the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors for Terrorist Purposes in Indonesia” program in Indonesia;
 - ii. Providing training on the proper usage and implementation of Hazardous Materials (HazMat) safety equipment and detection systems, such as LCD 3.3 detectors, which are advanced warning devices that alert users to gas and vapours that could be signs of toxic chemicals, in the event of a possible chemical attack by a non-state actor;
 - e. Implementing advanced tracking and monitoring systems for the production, storage, and transportation of high-risk chemical substances, with an emphasis on digital traceability and standardized reporting practices that:
 - i. Creates a voluntary linked database across organizations through cross-border info-sharing via the Global Chemical Security Network;
 - ii. Creates a voluntary global registry of chemical stockpiles under the OPCW, providing live-tracking capabilities, with information-sharing mechanisms established in coordination with INTERPOL where appropriate, particularly in regions with a high risk of illicit chemical trafficking;
 - iii. Mobilizes immediate responses in any case of stockpiles;
 - iv. Expands INTERPOL’s Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit by incorporating the Chemical Transportation Emergency Team (CTET);
 - v. Responds to threats of hijack for the transportation of dual-use chemicals;
 - vi. Trains community educators and volunteers to serve as early warning points and spread awareness about the manipulation of chemical substances by non-state actors;
 - f. Strengthening customs protocols and voluntary regulatory oversight at all points of entry, including seaports, airports, and land borders through improved inspection technologies, staff training programs, and risk-based cargo training;
 - g. Advocates for the establishment of dedicated response teams and the provision of training and equipment for first responders, medical, and customs personnel;
 - h. Suggesting that the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT) increase to yearly meetings with the General Assembly;
2. *Suggests* the General Assembly convene for the creation of an open-ended forum of experts to assess the evolving threat of chemical weapons used by non-state actors, develop recommendations for strengthening international cooperation, and explore the feasibility of establishing a global mechanism for early warning of suspected chemical weapon use;

3. *Encourages* Member States to develop and implement decentralized blockchain-based tracking systems through technical assistance provided by the technical secretariat of the OPCW, enhancing the integrity, transparency, and traceability of international chemical transfers, particularly for dual-use chemicals, including precursor substances by:
 - a. Creating an immutable and tamper-resistant digital ledger that records all cross-border movements of relevant chemical materials in real time via voluntary contribution from Member States;
 - b. Minimizing the risk of data manipulation by integrating digital verification protocols such as cryptographic timestamps and third-party notarization at the point of entry, ensuring that once submitted, no single state or actor can alter or revise chemical shipment data, thereby protecting against corruption and diversion;
 - c. Granting tiered, role-based access to verified shipment records, where:
 - i. Designated national authorities may audit chemical transfer data related to their jurisdiction, in accordance with national compliance mechanisms;
 - ii. The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW is granted supervisory authority for the sole purpose of verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention, without authority to alter data, ensuring both transparency and respect towards sovereignty;
4. *Encourages* Member States in collaboration with industry experts and OPCW facilitators to establish a biannual voluntary education program hosted on a rotational basis by CWC signatory Member States who are willing and able, on the safe transportation and disposal of chemical weapons, along with healthcare concerns and survivors of chemical weapons attacks raising awareness, and further:
 - a. To be carried out through in-person workshops and technical training sessions tailored to regional needs, with materials made accessible in multiple languages and formats;
 - b. Recommends that the first conference, hosted in the winter season, focuses on sharing innovations within chemical weapon proliferation prevention, focused on the strengths of the hosting nation;
 - c. Appeals for a second conference, hosted in the fall, focused on the assistance and healthcare for victims of chemical weapons attacks, as well as providing a platform for survivors of chemical weapons attacks to share their experiences and life after the attacks;
5. *Encourages* all Member States to use pre-existing frameworks, of state or regional origin, as a basis to create new and efficient frameworks to address healthcare issues caused as a consequence of chemical weapon usage, among the existing frameworks:
 - a. Using the OPCW's Technical Secretariat's 2024 "Call for Nominations for a Preparedness Course for States Parties from Africa" as a model for other regions on how to educate states on public health issues about chemicals for hospitals;
 - b. Expands the OPCW's Public Affairs Branch's outreach events to work with existing frameworks of state or regional origin, specifically through the OPCW's Group Visits Programme that takes place in the OPCW's Main Building;

6. *Calls upon* Member States to grant access, in respect to their sovereignty, of collected information, such as fabrication, storage, and disposal of chemicals, to other Member States by:
 - a. Being willing to cooperate with all nations globally, regardless of continent or any cyber threats, and monitoring suspicious movement or transactions of high-risk chemicals that could negatively affect the interests of any Member State;
 - b. Recommending the creation of interoperable multilayered digital monitoring systems between Member States and international agencies to track dual-use chemical substances and precursors, while respecting national data sharing agreements;
 - c. Supporting the establishment of National Chemical Inventory Systems to track the cycle of dual-use chemicals from production to disposal, to ensure greater transparency, accountability, and early detection of diversion risk;
 - d. Promoting security audits and inspections of high-risk facilities, in partnership with the OPCW and different technical bodies;
7. *Calls for* the development of educational seminars and outreach programs for the purpose of raising awareness on safeguarding chemicals for industrial purposes, forestalling non-state actors from gaining access to chemical weapons by:
 - a. Educating chemical producers and transporters on the risk of diversion to non-state actors:
 - i. Supports training international customs officials to recognize and respond to the illicit transfer of chemicals in high-risk border zones;
 - ii. Raise public awareness on the dangers of chemical weapon proliferation and how to report suspicious activity through social media and the distribution of educational material;
 - iii. Encourages national governments to reinforce education about the detrimental consequences of chemical weapons by partnering with #youth4disarmament, engaging youth in chemical disarmament and non-proliferation efforts by fostering educational programs, workshops, and competitions to raise awareness about the CWC;
 - iv. Invites to adapt and expand this “Chemical Emergencies Training Program” to the Global South, provided by national organizations such as emergency responders, with the purpose of saving the lives of the affected and the first responders;
 - b. Recommending Member States to allocate funding and resources within respective public departments to further educate citizens on the dangers of CWs and chemical agents, such as:
 - i. Working with the OPCW to develop the Limiting the Use of Chemicals Killing Youth (L.U.C.K.Y) programs, which would focus on educating children in public schools about the danger of CWs as well as providing them with general knowledge on their use;
 - ii. Partnering with OPCW experts and NGOs to host informative sessions on local levels that provide the public sectors with information on dual-use chemicals, chemical weapons dangers, and the mission of the OPCW;

- c. Recommending Member States to establish community-based education and outreach programs, such as the Panama Educational Program (PEP), particularly in regions at high risk of illicit chemical trafficking, by:
 - i. Supporting local partnerships between governments and community leaders to deliver public seminars and workshops about the risks associated with chemical weapons;
 - ii. Disseminating culturally adapted educational materials in vulnerable or rural communities, using tools such as social media, posters, and local events;
 - iii. Training community educators and volunteers to serve as early warning points and spread awareness about the manipulation of chemical substances by non-state actors;
- 8. *Encourages* Member States to explore legislation within agricultural departments to further regulate the handling and transportation of dual-use chemicals by:
 - a. Implementing accurate labeling systems of dual-use chemicals within agricultural markets, such as Ammonium Nitrate, which is found in many fertilizers, to better inform agricultural workers;
 - b. Allocating existing federal agricultural funding to reinforce the transit of dual-use chemicals and maintain their security from outside interference during transportation;
- 9. *Urges* all Member States to increase both financial and technical support for developing nations with the aim of strengthening their national chemical security frameworks and response capacities, particularly in regions most vulnerable to chemical threats by:
 - a. Establishing international funding mechanisms and public-private partnerships dedicated to enhancing chemical safety infrastructure, including the construction and modernization of secure storage facilities by:
 - i. Encouraging each Member State to provide voluntary funding within their capacity;
 - ii. Using international funding, including IGOs such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Customs Organization (WCO), INTERPOL, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
 - iii. Utilizing funding through organizations such as the BRICS Development Bank for projects relating to increasing the security of chemical disposal for nations increasing their manufacturing capacity;
 - iv. Explore partnerships with research institutions in Global South countries to expand joint training, chemical safety workshops, and the promotion of chemical disarmament principles;
 - b. Providing targeted technical assistance, specialized training, and equipment for the detection, containment, and decontamination of hazardous chemical materials by:
 - i. Strengthening and expanding existing mechanisms for investigation and monitoring, like the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team (IIT);

- ii. Incorporating policy-based frameworks that ensure systematic data collection, timely reporting, and geographic prioritisation, particularly in high-risk zones where the use of chemical weapons is deemed probable;
 - iii. Collaborating with regional frameworks such as the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) Council of Ministers of Defense to assist in the monitoring of existing chemical weapons and their eventual disposal in line with OPCW guidelines, especially in war-torn areas in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where such weapons have been deployed in recent conflicts;
 - c. Supporting regional and national research initiatives focused on innovative security technologies, including real-time threat detection;
10. *Implores* Member States to establish, through the Conference of the State Parties (CSA), a regional consultation mechanism to address security concerns pertaining to the proliferation of chemical weapons by non-state actors for all major regions:
- a. According to Article VIII, paragraph 20 of the CWC, the CSP can adopt decisions and recommend on implementing the CWC, including a permanent or semi-formal body;
 - b. Requests that these are to be called the "Asia-Pacific Chemical Security Forum," "European Chemical Security Forum," "North American Chemical Security Forum," "South American Chemical Security Forum," and the "African Chemical Security Forum," respectively;
 - c. This is to operate under the technical jurisdiction and oversight of the OPCW Technical Secretariat;
 - d. To serve as regional platforms for annual consultations among Member States on threats, challenges, and asymmetric security risks relating to chemical weapons proliferation by non-state actors:
 - i. To host regional capacity-building initiatives, technical exchanges, and assistance coordination upon the request of Member States to mitigate either internal or transboundary threats;
 - ii. Allowing for targeted regional diplomacy, in coordination with already existing, established, and well-entrenched multilateral groupings such as BRICs, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Commonwealth of Independent States, or the European Union;
11. *Strongly advises* the creation of the Chemical Intelligence Platform for Hazard Evaluation and Response (CIPHER) to aid in the prevention of non-state proliferation of chemical WMDs by:
- a. Making this a voluntary collaboration, in which a shared intelligence channel is made in coordination with INTERPOL, its regional branches, and the OPCW;
 - b. Monitoring and providing surveillance over international smuggling efforts of chemical agents;
 - c. Tracking suspicious dual-use chemicals purchased and notifying respective and relevant state parties of any threats accordingly and expeditiously;
 - d. Archiving data on other presumed proliferation attempts at non-state chemical weapons with an expiration date of 10 years, subject to change and circumstance;

- e. Providing stringent data protection protocols, in which states can request the removal or confidentiality of any sources and methods of intelligence provided to this framework;
12. *Calls* all voluntary Member States, in collaboration with the Technical Secretariat, to establish and compile an international guidebook on stringent border control measures for dual-use chemicals based on existing informal groups, such as the Australia Group, implemented into the OPCW by:
- a. Recommending legal frameworks and recognition towards multilateral platforms like the Australia Group, which involves an association of countries that jointly control and significantly monitor the export and import of dual-use chemicals to ensure they aren't used to undermine national security;
 - b. Strongly recommending the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Board Temporary Working Group on AI to produce an *Analysis of Artificial Intelligence Report*, which comprehensively investigates the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the chemical industry and the threat of AI use by non-state actors, drawing on the submissions of the SAB-OPCW Artificial Intelligence Research Challenge;
13. *Encourages* widespread use of the Nonproliferation Cheminformatics Compliance Tool (NCCT) developed by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP) to:
- a. Help customs agents who lack training in chemical literacy to easily identify whether a chemical is listed in the CWC Annex;
 - b. Prevent illicit chemicals from being imported without the permission and regulation of the governments of participating Member States;
14. *Encourages* widespread use of the Nonproliferation Cheminformatics Compliance Tool (NCCT) developed by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP) to:
- a. Help customs agents who lack training in chemical literacy to easily identify whether a chemical is listed in the CWC Annex;
 - b. Prevent illicit chemicals from being imported without the permission and regulation of the governments of participating Member States;
15. *Suggests* the General Assembly convene for the creation of an open-ended forum of experts to assess the evolving threat of chemical weapons used by non-state actors, develop recommendations for strengthening international cooperation, and explore the feasibility of establishing a global mechanism for early warning of suspected chemical weapon use;
16. *Looks favourably* towards the creation of an accession protocol to encourage more Member States to participate in export controls by:
- a. Providing a structured, inclusive, and non-binding pathway for state parties to the CWC to engage with and adopt best practices in export controls for dual-use chemicals, in which:
 - i. The protocol shall not compromise national sovereignty in legal or enforcement matters and is to be framed as an instrument to aid in implementing Article VI and Article VIII of the CWC;
 - ii. Any state party to the CWC may choose to accede to the protocol, and endorsements of the guidebook may be expressed through an official note to the Director-General;

b. Envisaging a tiered participation model, to which:

- i. Observer Status will refer to states that receive technical documents, attend workshops, and access best practices with regard to maintaining a robust infrastructural framework for chemical export controls;
- ii. Technical Alignment will refer to states that adopt minimum standards for chemical screening, licensing systems, and inter-agency coordinating;
- iii. Cooperative Enforcement refers to states that participate in joint exercises, data sharing, and voluntary alignment with international export regimes related to chemical materials.



Code: OPCW/1/8

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Emphasizing the fact that dual-use chemicals can be abused by non-state actors (NSAs) to create weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),

Highlighting the importance of securing borders when transporting dual-use chemicals to prevent the smuggling of such chemicals for the subsequent development of chemical weapons,

Recognizing the lack of a standardized set of definitions relating to the issue of NSA's acquisition of chemical weapons,

Echoing Security Council resolution 1540's call to prevent the spread of chemical WMDs to NSAs,

Acknowledging the importance of utilizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to detect and track the use of weapons across the border and manage what states are partaking in the use of weapons,

Recognising that novel technologies may facilitate the proliferation of chemical weapons and the role of the OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in doing that,

Highlighting the use of technological devices for research purposes by NSAs and attacks that use chemical weapons,

Alarmed by the constant danger of transporting chemical materials between Member States,

Recognising the need for stronger international cooperation to prevent access to chemical weapons by NSAs,

Acknowledging the progress and significance of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) in enhancing the border controls and export regulations to prevent the illicit transfer of chemicals, such as the MoU between the OPCW and the World Customs Organization (WCO),

Acknowledging the importance of information-sharing efficiency in international cooperation in controlling chemical weapons,

Calling attention to assisting developing countries, marginalized groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in allocating resources for monitoring NSA activities,

Emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation regarding information sharing and chemical tracking capabilities,

Recognizing the utility of algorithmic models in determining what NSAs are procuring dual-use chemical compounds,

Aware of the importance of public awareness and education in the prevention of chemical weapons use, affirmed by the shared responsibility of all Member States,

Recalling the importance of international cooperation and trust in combating the current chemical weapons onslaught,

Noting with concern the persistent challenges in coordinating timely information-sharing among Member States, which undermine efforts to monitor non-state actors' access to chemical agents, secure cross-border chemical trade, and prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapon attacks,

Reiterating the importance of the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN) defense COE to continue educating and training personnel in the fight against chemical weapons,

Affirming the OPCW's Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) and its goal to advance understanding of chemical weapon issues for students, educators, civil society, and policymakers,

Recognizing the important role youth leaders play in educating and representing the policies and decision-making processes that affect their peers who are vulnerable to the influence of NSAs,

Appreciating the progress of the OPCW "Hazardous Capacity Building Training Program" in Latin America and the Caribbean region, which is held on sporadic occasions concerning vital information,

Concerned by the accessibility of the training programs, such as "Hazardous Capacity Building Training," being only available online, which would limit access to regions that have limited internet connection,

Reiterating Article X of the *Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (CWC), "Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons" and the right of each Member State to participate in the sharing of information for the protection against chemical weapons,

Fully aware of OPCW's "specialized training programs that equip individuals with skills to protect against chemical weapons and train against contamination to reach progress in border regions and capacity building,

Cognizant of the Report of the Seventeenth Session of the ABEO stating that translation creates a barrier to populations in accessing OPCW tools and materials,

Affirming the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong Institutions), target 16.a and the need to strengthen the relevant national institutions on the global awareness of CWs used by NSAs and their impact on Member States,

Guided by the work of the OPCW and the SABs AI Challenge, which has worked to identify the capabilities and current and future challenges posed by AI as it pertains to the threat of CW used by NSAs,

1. *Appeals* to all willing and able Member States to review sections one, two, and three of the Security Council resolution 1540 and to align their national frameworks with these sections to better combat NSA's attempts at securing chemical weapons and their precursors;
2. *Strongly encourages* the creation of educational programs by the OPCW's SAB to aid the internal and local law enforcement of Member States to combat the use of chemical weapons by NSAs through more enhanced knowledge of what chemical weapons are and how they are acquired, which would be established in the following way:
 - a. The establishment of a common training doctrine for local law enforcement that focuses on the mechanisms of location and disarmament of chemical weapons of NSAs;

- b. The creation of educational programs that would include workshops that will encompass an explanation of what chemical weapons are, an analysis of existing mechanisms to detect chemical threats, and a structured worksheet with chemicals that may be used for the manufacturing of chemical weapons;
3. *Proposes* the training of a more developed research team by the OPCW that utilizes updated technologies, such as cyber technology, to gather information on chemical weapons and track data on active NSAs, such as what weapons they are using, where they are being used, and who is being targeted by them;
4. *Requests* that Internet of Things (IoT) sensors be installed on chemical containers to monitor location and environmental conditions, and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-driven technologies to enhance traceability on chemical transportation and storage, and to analyze shipment data to detect irregularities and flag suspicious activity;
5. *Requests* the establishment of the Chemical Tracking, Reporting and Compliance Enforcement (CHEMTRACE), an initiative to prevent non-state actors from acquiring dual-use chemicals;
6. *Invites* global collaboration and participation in the instruction of the research and results gathered from new technologies and AI to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR);
7. *Calls upon* all willing and able Member States to consider the dangers of chemical weapon proliferation through the web mechanisms and to do the following to prevent the acquisition of chemical weapons, their precursors, and the information on creating them by NSA:
 - a. Monitoring dark web marketplaces specifically for chemical weapon precursors and chemical weapons;
 - b. Increasing the powers and mandate of each Member State's national authorities regarding chemical weapons to include monitoring chemical law transgressions online;
 - c. To consider taking measures to prevent the widespread dissemination of dangerous information about the creation of or acquiring the materials to produce chemical weapons;
8. *Declares* the adoption of several definitions for various AI technologies relating to chemical production, including but not limited to:
 - a. UNESCAP's definition of AI is "the ability of machines and systems to acquire and apply knowledge, and to carry out intelligent behaviour," encompassing tasks like sensing, language processing, reasoning, learning, and decision-making";
 - b. Generative Molecular Design:
 - i. Originally developed for drug discovery, these generative AI models are used to design novel chemical compounds;
 - ii. These models have the potential to be repurposed to generate toxic agents, as demonstrated by findings in the OPCW's SAB, which suggested that AI systems could produce 40,000 potentially lethal molecules;
 - c. Predictive Toxicology Models:

- i. Machine training models trained on toxicological data can predict the toxicity of untested compounds;
 - ii. These can be used to either identify or design harmful chemical agents;
 - d. Dual-use AI technologies, such as AI technologies developed for beneficial purposes that can be repurposed for malicious means;
9. *Implores* the OPCW's SAB to add three (3) ex-officio non-voting members with a background and expertise in AI to meet the needs of non-state proliferation:
- a. Under the jurisdiction of the OPCW Technical Secretariat as a consultative body tasked with:
 - i. Monitoring emerging technologies;
 - ii. Assessing their dual-use potential;
 - iii. Providing non-binding technical guidance and best practices to state parties, industries, and academic institutions on mitigating risks;
 - b. Participation would be strictly voluntary, with no need for intrusive verification or data-sharing mandates;
 - c. Recommendations would remain non-prescriptive, recognizing that states need to tailor implementation strategies to their national contexts and interests;
 - d. The composition of these advisors would be diverse and highly informed:
 - i. Technical experts from OPCW-designated laboratories and academic researchers in prestigious institutions like King's College London's Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS);
 - ii. Tech Industry advisors and NGO observers, such as the International Council of Chemical Associations and OpenAI's Preparedness Team;
 - iii. Regional state representation, such as India's Defence Research and Development Organisations (DRDO), to ensure equitable participation and universal representation;
10. *Calls upon* the establishment of institutionalized guidelines by the OPCW for ethical use of AI in drug development at the university level, with the support from the International Association of Universities (IAU), affiliated with UNESCO, including the following measures:
- a. Academic institutions must implement mandatory dual training for chemistry and computer science programs, aimed at raising awareness at the potential misuse of scientific research;
 - b. Research involving molecular generation tools capable of producing hazardous compounds should go through a review process by interdisciplinary ethics committees composed of experts;
 - c. Scientific publishers should implement publication safeguards for high dual-risk AI chemical compounds, especially the ones susceptible to being easily synthesized by non-state actors;
11. *Strongly recommends* OPCW's SAB to establish a Temporary Working Group on AI to produce an Analysis of Artificial Intelligence Report following the completion of comprehensive research into the role

and development of AI in the Chemical Industry, incorporating submissions from the SAB-OPCW Artificial Intelligence Challenge and specifically analysing the threat of AI use by NSAs;

12. *Urges* training to be provided by the OPCW ChemTech Centre Technology and Training Hub, in collaboration with the OPCW international cooperation and assistance division, to ensure that Member States are adequately equipped with the knowledge and tools to equip Member States with the knowledge and involving tools necessary to regulate AI development and its use by NSAs in responding to potential chemical weapons threats;
13. *Directs* the OPCW to establish Chemical Weapons Regional Coordinators (CWRCs) to be nominated within the International Cooperation Division to enable more specific and targeted information sharing between the OPCW and relevant regions, including the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), The Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (CELAC), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Organization of the American States (OAS), and League of Arab State (LAS), particularly as it concerns Capacity Building opportunities, Chemical Weapons threat, and CWC obligations;
14. *Encourages* regional information sharing for Virtual Protection Networks (VPNs) servers cross-nationally, utilizing INTERPOL's Artificial Intelligence Toolkit:
 - a. INTERPOL's Implementation of intelligence sharing;
 - b. Collaborating with advertisers and private companies to monitor online traffic via INTERPOL's AI toolkit by tracking third-party cookies;
 - c. INTERPOL must integrate cookies and algorithmic metadata to fingerprint non-state actors digitally;
 - d. Extending network jurisdiction beyond individual Member States' borders, subjecting non-state offenders to legal extradition;
 - e. Require that individual Member States enact laws to mitigate online privacy;
15. *Highly encourages* communication with INTERPOL, especially for the construction of Chemical Materials Tracking Database (CMTD), to effectively restrict rapid and illicit tracking of chemical substances;
16. *Invites* all willing and able Member States to create public-private partnerships with the oversight of the WCO to develop bilateral educational campaigns for the importance of chemical proliferation during transfer to all citizens;
17. *Calls upon* expanding training courses into more Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) countries that are being directly targeted by the misuse of chemical weapons and suggesting to enhance by:
 - a. Encouraging the expansion of OPCW's "Hazardous Capacity Training Program" to be presented in the MENA region to improve the civil defence, capacitate the fire and rescue services, police department, and medical responders with their appropriate translations, and educate in person, not only through online or media;
 - b. Establishing an Education Through immersion Program which would perpetually provide seminars, workshops, and emergency preparedness by touching upon the identification of toxic industrial chemicals and chemical weapon agents, incident commands, as well as allowing the victims of chemical weapons to share their experiences;

18. *Suggests* applying the NGOs and Education Through Immersion Program to the OPCW “Specialized Training Programmes” to promote inclusivity and enhance public awareness through the experiences of the victims of chemical weapons attacks by NSAs in the global conferences;
19. *Recommends* the collaboration between NGOs and the Education Through Immersion Program to the OPCW “Specialized Training Programmes” to promote inclusivity and enhance public awareness through the experiences of former and current victims of chemical weapons attacks by NSAs by:
 - a. Calling all Member States to voluntarily provide the data on casualties created in the event of NSAs using chemical weapons;
 - b. Organizing an annual workshop at the institution focusing on educating and raising global youth awareness on the consequences of NSAs abusing chemical weapons, holding NSAs accountable;
20. *Strongly encourages* the ABEO to improve the development and expansion of engaging, youth-targeted multimedia content to raise public awareness about the dangers of chemical weapons through engagement and collaboration with international governmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, and civil society to prevent the recruitment of youth by NSAs;
21. *Calls* on the OPCW to identify webinars, technical guidelines, and learning modules on chemical weapons for translation to enhance accessibility, promote capacity-building, and ensure all State Parties have equal opportunities to address chemical weapon threats by NSAs;
22. *Urges* all willing Member States to implement regional programmes focused on the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) with the guidance of the OPCW’s National Authority to provide a workspace focused on the secure transfers of dual-use chemicals;
23. *Endorsing* the need to increase youth representation in policy and decision-making processes through the utilization of civil society, IGOs, and local NGOs, with the oversight of the OPCW’s ABEO programme to combine the changing technological environment;
24. *Asks* the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWC Coalition) to work with all willing and able Member States in high-risk regions susceptible to attacks from NSAs to create educational public information campaigns aimed at civilian populations to further the work of EPR to local communities;
25. *Urges* all willing and able Member States to train police forces responsible for monitoring international borders and equip them adequately to detect and control the illegal passage of raw materials used for the creation of chemical weapons to protect local communities and prevent the proliferation of chemicals during transfer;
26. *Encourages* Member States to voluntarily deepen engagement with the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s International Cooperation and Assistance Division to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons used by NGAs by strengthening information-sharing and collaboration through Member States to voluntarily deepen engagement with the OPCW Technical:
 - a. Working with INTERPOL’s Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention Unit to establish secure channels for sharing real-time intelligence on non-state actors, enabling faster detection of chemical threats across borders;
 - b. Partnering with WCO’s Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Programme to enhance training on auditing chemical trade flows, closing gaps in export-import monitoring;

- c. Collaborating with the OPCW's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) to develop a voluntary reporting mechanism for Member States to share data on suspicious chemical procurement, bolstering global efforts to track and disrupt illicit activities.