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Documentation of the Simulation of the

## **General Assembly First Committee (GA1)\***

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**Conference B**

13 - 17 April 2025

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# General Assembly First Committee (GA1)

## Committee Staff

<b>Director</b>	Nicole Fett
<b>Assistant Director</b>	Shi Haoyu
<b>Chair</b>	Mariam Gad

## Agenda

1. Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security
2. Confidence-Building Measures in the Regional and Sub-Regional Context

## Resolutions adopted by the Committee

Code	Topic	Vote (In favor - Against - Abstention)
GA1/1/1	Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	88 in favor - 9 against - 26 abstention
GA1/1/2	Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	89 in favor - 6 against - 28 abstention
GA1/1/3	Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	91 in favor - 7 against - 25 abstention
GA1/1/4	Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	82 in favor - 15 against - 26 abstention
GA1/1/5	Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	92 in favor - 2 against - 29 abstention
GA1/1/6	Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	84 in favor - 16 against - 23 abstention

## **Summary Report**

The General Assembly First Committee held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

1. Confidence-Building Measures in the Regional and Sub-Regional Context
2. Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

On Sunday, the committee adopted the agenda in the order topic 2 followed by topic 1, beginning the discussion on “Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security.”

On Monday, the Dais received a total of 14 proposals covering a wide range of sub-topics, including nuclear transparency, nuclear education, monitoring and reporting, and enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The atmosphere of the committee was lively, as Member States were actively collaborating. By Tuesday, working groups merged along similar themes and sub-topics, which resulted in a total of 8 proposals.

On Wednesday, the Dais accepted 6 draft resolutions, one of which had amendments. The committee adopted 6 resolutions, all by recorded votes. These resolutions explored a range of topics concerning disarmament policies and agreements, regional mechanisms, and collaborative efforts aimed at advancing multilateral disarmament, and its effect on maintaining international peace and security. With a nearly fully attended committee, the body worked in the spirit of the United Nations in ensuring all Member States were able to discuss their ideas and objectives in a diplomatic and respectful manner.



**Code:** GA1/1/1

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Alarmed by* the threat to nuclear power plants during instances of armed conflict,

*Lamenting* the extreme and insurmountable loss of civilian life and environmental damage caused by nuclear attacks and disasters,

*Stressing* the importance of non-proliferation attempts in preserving the sanctity of human life,

*Emphasizing* the importance of nuclear safety and environmental protection,

*Emphasizing* the education of the population on the risks of nuclear armaments and weapons,

*Viewing with appreciation* the *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* (2005) (ICSANT) and the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (1979) (CPPNM),

*Realizing* that attacks by state and non-state actors on nuclear energy facilities could lead to immense human suffering and be considered a violation of international humanitarian law,

*Considering* the painful history of nuclear attacks and testing across the Asia-Pacific region, which has caused significant biological, cultural, and societal harm to millions, as well as the dangers presented by the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Disheartened by* the exclusion of Member States with exceptionally small areas, populations, and economic resources, as well as those without significant military capabilities and surrounded by larger, powerful Nations, from the conversation surrounding nuclear disarmament,

*Bearing in mind* the importance of peaceful nuclear energy as a sustainable source of power, as well as the need to encourage clean energy initiatives, and the use of nuclear energy in peaceful ways, like in the medical field or for research, and therefore supporting the expansion of nuclear infrastructure,

*Celebrating* the effectiveness of the *Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)* of 1972,

*Concerned by* the capacity for the misuse of technologies, including AI tools, and their utilization in nuclear security,

*Reiterating* the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) mission on transforming radioactive source into tools that accelerate the progress of sustainable development in medical study and monitoring system for environmental health,

*Recognizing* the importance of economic discretion as it pertains to the investment in and production of nuclear weapons programmes and actions,

*Deeply concerned about* the ongoing modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals by nuclear-weapon states,

*Appreciating* the urgent need for Negative Security Agreements for non-nuclear-weapon states that have voluntarily given up their nuclear weapons,

*Aware of* the excessive resources and monetary investment of maintaining and developing Nuclear weapons, highlights the need for a reallocation of resources to peaceful and sustainable development initiatives as laid out in the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons report *SURGE: 2023 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending*,

*Noting* the successful implementation of the No First Use policies (NFUs) of India and China,

*Affirming* that total nuclear disarmament cannot and will not happen overnight and without trust, accountability, security, and understanding of the culture and values of other Nations,

*Cognizant* of the vulnerability of all countries other than the pro-nuclear Nations under the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (1968) (NPT), as they are the only Nations allowed to have nuclear weapons under this treaty,

*Approving* of the signing and ratifying the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (2017) (TPNW),

*Acknowledging* the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) serve as ideal platforms for promoting disarmament, education, and community engagement on the risks of nuclear weapons, with even small states playing a crucial role in fostering peace and awareness, while reaffirming the importance of existing zones created through regional treaties, celebrating collaboration among entities like the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in non-proliferation efforts, such as the establishment of NWFZs under the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996) adopted by the AU,

*Noting* that a total of 4243 incidents of illegal or unauthorized activities involving nuclear or radioactive material have been reported since 1993, and that 52% of reported thefts of nuclear material occur during transport, according to the IAEA report *Incident and Trafficking Database* (2024),

*Reaffirming* the *Outer Space Treaty* (1964) mission to safeguard the exploration and use of outer space and the condemnation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner,

*Observing* the importance of every effort, no matter how small, to gradually but consistently reduce the number of nuclear weapons in circulation in an inclusive manner,

*Utilizing* foundations for multilateral nuclear arms control, such as South-South and Triangular Cooperation in nuclear technology and knowledge sharing,

*Acknowledging* the compliance of nuclear disarmament as overseen by the NPT and TPNW,

*Fully supporting* collaboration with IAEA and IPPAS with their mission in assisting Member States in planning and utilizing nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the importance of partnerships with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),

*Taking into consideration* the new *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* (2010) (New START) on nuclear arms reduction, aiming to limit the number of nuclear weapons held by the Member States hosting the most nuclear arsenal,

*Deeply disturbed by* the potential for escalation of regional tensions, thereby underscoring the persistent threat to international peace and security,

*Commending* the continent-wide nuclear weapons-free zone established under the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996) adopted by the AU,

*Applauding* Member States' collaborations with the Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project, which designs and implements secure systems for transporting nuclear materials by coordinating with law enforcement, transport authorities, and emergency response teams,

*Dismayed* by the continued existence of about 12,500 reportedly remaining nuclear weapons in the world, as outlined by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),

1. *Encourages* nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States to continue strengthening the ratification of the NPT in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and to take initiatives to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines by:
  - a. Urging Member States to take future policy actions that continue to recognize the importance of Article VII, which specifically establishes NWFZs;
  - b. Opening discussions with the United Nations Secretary General to create an International NWFZ but focusing first on decreasing regional tensions and push toward international peace;
2. *Recommends* the expansion of NWFZs to foster an environment of security and mutual confidence among Member States, taking inspiration from the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996), by:
  - a. Immediately identifying NWFZs and introducing the disarmament processes in regions presently strife with escalatory armed conflict;
  - b. Encouraging Member States to collaborate regionally to establish and implement treaties prohibiting the possession, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons;
  - c. Promoting international agreements and comprehensive inspections of nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons facilities;
  - d. Suggesting developing capacity-building initiatives to assist Member States in transitioning to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
3. *Proposes* that the UNODA facilitate dialogues and technical assistance to ensure the effective enforcement of the NWFZs covered by the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), the *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1985), the *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996), and the *Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia* (2006) by organizing:
  - a. The participation of Member States and UNODA experts in UNODA-organized workshops and seminars regarding NWFZs and the NPT;
  - b. Regional education hubs within NWFYs, where workshops, school programs, and public campaigns can raise awareness about disarmament and inspire youth-led peacebuilding initiatives;
4. *Calls upon* Member States, especially those in NWFZs, to collaborate with Member States with exceptionally small area, population, and economic resources, in creating accessible educational resources and regional programs that teach young people about nuclear risks and the importance of global disarmament;
5. *Calls upon* Member States, bodies such as UNODA and INTERPOL's Improving Counter-Terrorism Skills program, and other regional organizations to voluntarily participate in a program in order to decrease the

risk of nuclear-based terrorist attacks via a Disarmament Transparency and Reporting Mechanism (DTRM) database that:

- a. Compiles all relevant national statistics regarding nuclear stockpile sizes, active warheads, the transportation of enriched nuclear materials such as uranium within and across borders, and military expenditures regarding nuclear investment and illegal arms trafficking, dismantlement progress, verification measures, compliance procedures, and domestic steps toward disarmament;
  - b. Remains an accessible, reliable, open resource to guide the decisions of Member States' policies in disarmament, as the world works to reduce its nuclear stockpiles, as mandated by Sustainable Development Goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions);
  - c. Models itself after and reinforces the preexisting Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism measure designed to increase regional transparency and cooperation;
6. *Urges* the strengthening of cooperation between the IAEA and UNODA through technical exchanges, capacity-building workshops, and transparent data-sharing mechanisms to reinforce its monitoring and verification capabilities by:
  - a. Collaborating with UNODA to organize regional conferences and awareness campaigns that promote the NPT and support the implementation of disarmament education initiatives;
  - b. Urging the expansion of the IAEA nuclear security and safeguards programs to effectively prevent nuclear materials trafficking, unauthorized nuclear weapon developments, and enhance verification and compliance mechanisms;
7. *Recommends* that Member States, in collaboration with UNODA, the IAEA and regional blocks like the AU, ASEAN, EU, and others participate in best practice workshops, similar to those undertaken by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the BWC, to provide actionable ways for Member States to update national frameworks and regulations, including documents ensuring total nuclear disarmament, given the security threat posed by advancement of technologies;
8. *Recommends* that Member States collaborate with the IAEA's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), which facilitates the peaceful use of nuclear energy by providing a forum for city planners to collaborate with nuclear scientists to create a long-term plan for developing sustainable energy;
9. *Encourages* Member States to expand assistance and cooperation with the IAEA to:
  - a. Enhance capacity for verification and safeguards;
  - b. Provide financial and technical assistance to Member States without nuclear technology to achieve nuclear safety and non-proliferation practices;
10. *Encourages* the IAEA Technical Working Group for Nuclear Knowledge Management (TWG-NKM) to expand its scope by focusing on the inclusion of export regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and others, in the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology;
11. *Further recommends* the renewal of nuclear arms talks aimed at expanding implemented treaties such as the New START, the *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (1987) (INF), and the *Comprehensive*

*Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (1996) (CTBT) in order to further progress in nuclear disarmament and foster a greater sense of stability by:

- a. Disclosing regularly and voluntarily the total number of operationally deployed strategic warheads;
  - b. Cooperating on nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of a limited number of nuclear weapons with Nuclear-Armed Member States;
  - c. Aiming to continue the efforts of the treaty through continued good faith cooperation that also includes limits on nuclear warheads;
12. *Urges* all Member States, particularly those in regions with geopolitical tensions and nuclear-capable neighbors, to prioritize dialogue and diplomatic initiatives aimed at abolishing tensions and fostering trust;
13. *Urges* Parties to form regional blocs to cooperate in dialogues to end nuclear testing, aiming to build a safer future and stability in the African, Middle Eastern, American, and Southeast Asia-Pacific regions, which would:
  - a. Allow collaboration between Member States and the IPPAS to conduct more voluntary nuclear security reviews;
  - b. Allow Member States to strengthen national nuclear security regimes, systems, and measures;
14. *Invites* all Member States to sign and ratify the TPNW;
15. *Urges* Member States to establish No First Use (NFU) policies that will:
  - a. Establish trust and security that Member States will not utilize their Nuclear arsenal unless they are victims of a nuclear attack;
  - b. Discuss the possibility of NFUs as a first step towards partial or full nuclear disarmament in the future;
  - c. Intend to establish other, more peaceful frameworks for conflict resolution;
16. *Encourages* further research of emerging technological advancements and the human oversight of artificial intelligence (AI) in the context of its implantation in sensitive nuclear weapons databases:
  - a. To explore the benefits in United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Security and Technology programs which can enhance the monitoring and verification of disarmament agreements through data analysis;
  - b. Monitoring platform accessible to the UN as an Intelligence Sharing platform for nuclear weapons and their trafficking, utilizing AI to efficiently and consistently track nuclear weapons in transit and nuclear material;
  - c. Further AI under supervision and with full transparency from Member States;
17. *Recommends* partnerships and collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to advance the safety of nuclear materials being transferred in West Africa, recognizing the importance of improving technology and data sharing within Member States to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy;



18. *Urges* Member States to utilize already existing frameworks that utilize nuclear technologies for the benefit of society, including:
  - a. NGOs which emphasize the involvement of civil societies, youth, and academic institutions in disarmament negotiations;
  - b. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Atoms 4Food program;
  - c. peaceful use of nuclear technology to enhance food security by employing nuclear technology in agricultural systems;
  - d. The IAEA-WHO's joint Rays of Hope initiative, which enhances access of cancer patients in low-and-middle-income countries to nuclear imaging and radiation therapy;
19. *Suggests* Member States implement the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Nuclear Materials Security Program, which strengthens physical protection systems at nuclear facilities, as well as improves verification capabilities through the use of open-source data, satellite imagery, and social media analytics, and the use of multilateral programs to protect nuclear power plants;
20. *Encourages* increased participation by Member States in multilateral diplomacy in nuclear disarmament, including collaboration through the Conference on Disarmament, the General Assembly First Committee, and regional forums;
21. *Supporting* the creation of divestment plans for Member States that focus on building economic independence from nuclear development, while promoting economic stability, which would include:
  - a. Plans created at the discretion of each Member State, based on their divestment goals and capabilities;
  - b. Incremental programmes of action based on short and long-term divestment opportunities, including promoting a tax on corporations and individual investors that invest in nuclear weapons, materials, and testing that would serve as a monetary tool to promote other methods of disarmament;
22. *Recognizes* instances of attacks on nuclear power plants as violations of international humanitarian law by:
  - a. Drawing attention to the offenses of illicit trafficking and sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities under the ISCONT;
  - b. Designating the IAEA to investigate these offenses;
23. *Suggests* Member States coordinate with international observers as part of the physical protection for nuclear materials under the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (2005) CPPNM by:
  - a. Stationing these observers at nuclear power plants of Member States;
  - b. Inviting Member States to assist in the deployments of these international observers;
  - c. Advising Member States in conflict zones not to attack these international observers;

24. *Reinforcing* IAEA's effort on transforming radioactive waste into tools that support medical studies, environmental health, and education on proper dismantling of nuclear sources that create environmental contamination, such as creating technologies for assisting in:
- a. Implementing nuclear techniques to assist the needs for water sanitation and agricultural infrastructures;
  - b. Identifying reusable radioscopic waste to create necessary tools for improving climate change;
  - c. Regenerating remains into sustainable tools for the study of environmental health and marine ecosystems;
  - d. Recommending regional education for Nations on proper and safer ways to dispose of their nuclear weapons under existing IAEA frameworks;
25. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report on the implementation of these proposed amendments and recommendations, assessing their potential impact and feasibility, for submission to the next session of the General Assembly First Committee.



**Code:** GA1/1/2

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Acknowledging* dialogue and cooperation as elemental components of belligerence mitigation,

*Recognizing* the urgency of reaching consensus and fostering useful frameworks to promote nuclear disarmament,

*Declaring* the necessity to monitor the transportation of nuclear materials,

*Calling upon* the need to expand the abilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to better fulfill its purpose,

*Further recognizing* that all Member States are affected by nuclear proliferation, not only nuclear states,

*Aligning with* the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), as well as with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 11 (sustainable cities and communities), 13 (climate action), 16 (peace, partnership, and strong institutions), and 17 (partnership for the goals),

*Emphasizing* the importance of combating the threat of Nuclear Weapons as defined by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),

*Underlining* the imperative nature of realistic gradual steps towards disarmament,

*Taking into consideration* all international actors, including observers, non-de facto nuclear powers, and non-signatories to key treaties, as essential stakeholders in fostering a comprehensive and inclusive approach to nuclear disarmament and global security,

*Highlighting* the need to accord with and update existing international treaties and organizations such as the 1970 *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT), the 2017 *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW), and the 1996 *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (CTBT),

*Affirming* the need to incorporate the input of micro-States and small island nations into the conversation surrounding nuclear disarmament and nuclear waste disposal,

*Having recognized* the aforementioned nuclear materials coming into possession of non-state actors without knowledge of the member states as dangerous,

*Recommends* the cooperation between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the IAEA to hold sovereign states to gradual disarmament,

*Emphasizing* the importance of civil society work carried out by NGOs in nuclear-armed countries to shift public sentiment to oppose nuclear weapons,

*Affirming* the effectiveness of interorganizational and intergovernmental cooperation in promoting disarmament of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction,

*Cognizant of* the increased instability within the international system posed by armed conflicts and global shocks,

*Accounting for* the historic difficulty of ensuring that nations act in accordance with their promises of nuclear disarmament,

*Bearing in mind* the frameworks proposed by the NPT,

*Further acknowledging* the role of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security,

*Expressing concern* with the lack consensus-based reporting from nuclear weapon states in recent history,

*Emphasizing* transparency and cooperation as necessary for any long-term efforts in effective disarmament,

*Recognizing* the importance of IAEA's Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material in Transport (2024) and its implementation of regular joint exercises to test and improve international cooperation in responding to transport security incidents,

*Supporting efforts* by the IAEA to monitor the advancement of new technologies and the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) to encourage states to use nuclear technologies in a peaceful manner in accordance with the SDGs,

*Uplifting* the Integrated Civil Society Organizations System (ICSO) potential in connecting NGOs and the IAEA in communication,

1. *Implores* nations to acknowledge the necessity of disarmament in the context of nuclear weapons to fulfill the following goals in a structured and timely manner by:
  - a. The reduction in existing nuclear stockpiles around the globe;
  - b. Further cooperation with existing accords on nuclear treaties such as the NPT, TPNW, and CTBT;
  - c. The strengthening of existing oversight and monitoring efforts by the IAEA and similar agencies;
  - d. Addressing the root causes of nuclear escalation and establish a foundation of trust on which to facilitate nuclear disarmament;
2. *Urges* to strengthen Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) to increase international security via mitigating the risk of nuclear conflict by:
  - a. Limiting the possible provocative military activity that might undermine peace on a regional and subregional context;
  - b. Establishing United Nations moderated hotlines via already existing United Nations offices in high-tension regions to mediate conflicts and permeate peaceful, diplomatic relations in the subregional contexts;
  - c. Creating mechanisms that allow developing countries and communities to access information regarding military exercises globally;
3. *Encourages* local and regional actors to actively contribute to nuclear disarmament processes by:

- a. Participating in multilateral and regional dialogues aimed at designing and implementing CBMs that promote transparency, trust, and accountability among all stakeholders by:
    - i. Sharing best practices and security protocols through regional forums and institutional networks;
    - ii. Establishing inclusive platforms where civil society, academia, and subnational governments can engage in regular consultations;
  - b. Developing community-level peace initiatives and educational campaigns that foster public awareness and engagement on disarmament issues, thereby reinforcing a bottom-up approach to sustainable denuclearization by:
    - i. Encouraging disarmament education and youth programs in cooperation with local authorities and educators;
    - ii. Hosting public awareness events, such as exhibitions, workshops, and cultural forums to communicate the humanitarian and environmental risks of nuclear weapons;
4. *Urges* nuclear states to conduct comprehensive impact assessments of their nuclear activities by:
- a. Particularly analyzing the potential socio-economic, security, and environmental impacts of their policies and activities on non-nuclear states;
  - b. Requesting that nuclear states engage in transparent dialogue about impact assessment results with potentially affected states;
5. *Urges* the development of a task force under a panel of experts led by the IAEA to:
- a. Support Member States in preventing nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking;
  - b. Conduct training programs to prepare security personnel;
  - c. Carry out regular security assessments and joint exercises to identify any weaknesses and strengthen security;
  - d. Create advanced tracking system database shared between Member States to monitor all kinds of non-state actors that present a threat;
  - e. Use the data collected from the tracking systems to familiarize security with all procedures necessary designed for every potential breach of security;
6. *Calls upon* the support of NGOs and civil society groups to facilitate gradual disarmament initiatives with reverence to national sovereignty by:
- a. Encouraging the induction of NGOs into consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC);
  - b. Facilitating open dialogue between the IAEA and NGOs through direct communication lines within the United Nations Civil Society Participation (ICSO);
  - c. Training of NGOs and civil society groups led by the IAEA on lobbying, technical skills, information gathering, and legislative assistance;

7. *Recommends* a new iteration of the existing Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NDV) to track advanced methodologies and technologies for NDV by:
  - a. Including exploring the use of technological developments;
  - b. developments in the realm of communication technology;
  - c. Altering the GGE to elect member states bi-annually on a regional basis;
8. *Encourages* all Member States supporting NPT to create a task force to learn more about the global landscape while strengthening other nuclear treaties, and will be financed from donor Member States and any willing NGOs, and gaining the skills of:
  - a. Mastering the art of initiating and engaging in conversations with global team members;
  - b. Outreach turned into raised awareness of international security and what information could be obtained about the NPT treaty, nuclear treaties, and current and past resolutions made;
  - c. Sharing technological advancements with students to work with their Member State to promote transparency and increase education.



**Code:** GA1/1/3

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Underscoring* the importance of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (1968) (NPT), as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and a key instrument in facilitating access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology,

*Further recalling* Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions),

*Acknowledging* SDG 14 (life below water) which aims to conserve water and sustainably use oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development,

*Referring* to the Anti-Nuclear Treaties created for the sake of nuclear disarmament, such as NPT and the *Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty* (1996) (CTBT),

*Underlines* the importance of NPT, but also acknowledging the gaps on the basis of discrimination towards particular nuclear states,

*Underlining* the importance of General Assembly resolution 78/240 on “addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons” in advancing non-proliferation and promoting peaceful nuclear technology,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 49/75 on “general and complete disarmament” with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Reaffirming* the legitimate role of nuclear research and the use of nuclear technology for peaceful ends, as detailed in Article IV and Article V of the NPT,

*Reinforcing* the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) agenda on transforming nuclear weapons into technology to support sustainable developments in medical studies and monitoring tools for climate change and ecosystem,

*Recognizing* that IAEA and the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) are international frameworks that help control the development of nuclear energy,

*Noting with concern* the presence of approximately 13,000 nuclear warheads worldwide and the increasing number of operational warheads despite international disarmament initiatives,

*Emphasizing* the success of the nuclear conversion program called Megatons to Megawatts, between Russia and United States initiated in 1993 and completed in 2013 whereby Russia converted 500 metric tons of excess weapons-grade uranium enough for 20,000 warheads into 15,000 metric tons of low enriched uranium, which the USA purchased for use in its commercial nuclear power plant,

*Renewing* its appeal to all Member States to collaborate with the IAEA in its efforts towards nonproliferation and the provision of peaceful nuclear technology for agricultural purposes through radio-pesticide treatments,

*Reaffirming* the importance for all Member States to collaborate with Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations on all initiatives aiming to extend the NPT, on the use of nuclear technology for peaceful means in general, and radiotherapy technologies for medical use specifically,

*Confirming* that mutual trust between nuclear-weapon Member States and those developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is a fundamental pillar of international security and sustainable development,

*Disheartened by* the lack of inclusion and incorporation of micro-States lacking substantial military arsenal into the conversation surrounding nuclear disarmament,

*Recognizing* the existence and successes of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Africa,

*Acknowledging* the commitment of nations within NWFZs in supporting and promoting the NWFZ treaties, and their dedication to nuclear disarmament,

*Recognizing* the importance of nuclear deterrence as an expression of national sovereignty,

*Alarmed by* the lack of explicit guarantees of defensive action plans in the face of an attack and protection of non-nuclear states,

*Recognises* the success of existing communication frameworks, including multilateral agreements between nuclear powers, and the IAEA,

*Emphasizing* the critical importance of transparency and effective communication between nuclear-armed states in times of crisis, in order to prevent escalation and promote stability,

*Bearing in mind* that the lack of transparency in nuclear programs, including undeclared enrichment activities, inadequate reporting to international bodies, restricted access for inspectors, opaque management of fissile materials, and the absence of effective verification mechanisms, has perpetuated geopolitical tensions, heightened the risk of proliferation, and impeded global cooperation for the responsible use of nuclear technology,

*Noting* the crucial role non-state actors play in disarmament efforts, impacting Member States in both positive and negative ways,

Being *aware that* the prospect of nuclear escalation poses a great global threat in the face of offensive nuclear postures, especially with conflict zones spreading across the globe,

*Further noting* the unprecedented amount of armed conflicts across a plethora of regions, which exacerbate the risk of nuclear weapons use,

*Deeply concerned* by the 13% increase in global nuclear weapons spending, reaching a record \$91.4 billion by the end of 2023, according to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN),

*Concerned* about rising conflict, nuclear ambiguity, and the collapse of previously held agreements between nuclear armed powers, including the *Treaty on Measures to Further Reduce Strategic Offensive Arms* (2010) (New START) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) (JCPA),



*Recalling* that in 2024 alone, the IAEA recorded over 4,200 incidents of illegal or unauthorized nuclear and radioactive material activity, posing a growing threat to global security,

*Emphasizing* the IAEA's work concerning nuclear security activities on the need to secure nuclear materials during transport, prevent their acquisition by non-state actors, and strengthen global nuclear safety with enhanced cybersecurity measures,

*Applauds* the efforts of IAEA and IFNEC in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Cultivating* the mission of the United Nations Atomic Curriculum (UNAC) by interconnecting the professional community that is engaged in knowledge building of nuclear science and atomic safety,

*Encouraging* all Member States to build upon this resolution through international agreements or individual actions to further the progress of its objectives,

*Highlighting* the importance of states with cross-regional influence in advancing multilateral dialogue and fostering cooperative security frameworks, in line with the principles enshrined in the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945),

1. *Strongly recommends* all Member States to sign and ratify the NPT and CTBT by:
  - a. Further reminding the signatories of the NPT and the CTBT to ratify the said treaties to ensure its enactment within the Member States' borders;
  - b. Strongly advising all Member States to sign and eventually ratify the aforementioned treaties for the sake of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
2. *Advises* better communication about current nuclear weapons, radioactive materials for civilian use, and stronger communication between powers, including:
  - a. Expanding the preexisting IAEA framework to allow voluntary sharing of specific nuclear weapons data, including location of specific launch sites, number of launch sites, and warhead numbers at sites;
  - b. Calling for nuclear powers to communicate with their non-nuclear neighboring countries about the location of nuclear weapons;
  - c. Calling for nuclear powers to communicate with their geopolitical rivals about their location, type, size, and number of nuclear weapons;
  - d. Using Communicative Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), with the goal of avoiding accidents, miscalculation, miscommunication, and the outbreak of nuclear war;
  - e. The announcement of potential nuclear tests, or nuclear devices used in civilian construction, to the international community;
  - f. Increasing clarity between nuclear producing countries, with the goal of reducing the broken-arrow incidents, nuclear material robbery, and smuggling;
3. *Recommends* the expansion of the IAEA database for nuclear-related data and disarmament efforts, assisting Member States in accessing information from international disarmament forums, such as NPT, promoting transparency and trust by:

- a. Facilitating seamless communication between countries, advancing global disarmament goals without requiring frequent in-person meetings;
  - b. Enhancing rapid information sharing on nuclear safety and security, helping to prevent misunderstandings and build confidence;
  - c. Encouraging the incrementation of support for multilateral arms control frameworks, such as strengthening the NPT;
4. *Recommends* the establishment of a system to implement preventive measures tailored to different classifications of non-state actors, with particular emphasis on guerrilla warfare and terrorist groups by:
- a. Encouraging Member States to expand cooperation with the UN Office of Counter Terrorism, and expanding preventative measures focused on preventing international terrorism from accessing fissile material;
  - b. Urging Member States to adopt methods and negotiation approaches, including dialogue, mediation, and CBMs, when engaging with non-state actors on matters related to international security;
  - c. Promoting the development and implementation of comprehensive data analysis frameworks that allow for the timely identification of irregularities or suspicious activities related to nuclear materials;
  - d. Accommodating for the different security threats that arise involving different types of non-state actors through diverse methods of interaction and negotiation when addressing security issues involving non-state actors, ensuring a flexible and comprehensive approach to international security challenges;
5. *Strengthening* collaboration among Member States with IAEA and IFNEC to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and counter the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, and further:
- a. Urges all stakeholders to strengthen coordination with these organizations, ensuring that nuclear technology development complies with safety, security, and transparency standards;
  - b. Creating a pilot program, funded by the IAEA, focusing on how to eliminate and reduce nuclear waste, expanding resources focused on preserving and expanding natural resources, which align with SDG 14 (life below water) and 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) by highlighting that:
    - i. The commitment of all nations to funding nuclear waste research is paramount, whether a nuclear state or otherwise, in the hopes of solving this global issue, and;
    - ii. Inefficient management influences all nations in acts of nuclear terrorism, nuclear powers going against the mission of non-proliferation, and nations that were victims of or aggressed through nuclear actions, as research is the moral responsibility for all states, nuclear or not;
    - iii. Strengthening IAEA's enforcement and charter will allow for more independent study and investigation of nuclear waste-related assignments. A transparent outline of how the funds are distributed and used, and;

- iv. Encouraging any Member State that is planning to use nuclear material for non-military capacity to adopt IAEA safeguards, supporting Member States making individual agreements with the IAEA to further the ability of the agency to track fissionable material similar to INFCIRC/217 on “agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”;
- 6. *Strongly encourages* increased cooperation among UN agencies, regional organizations, and civil society to support disarmament-related initiatives through programs that address the long-term consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing, while promoting accountability and reinforcing the urgency of global disarmament efforts;
- 7. *Emphasizes* the integration of post-nuclear impact responses, such as environmental remediation, public health infrastructure development, and socioeconomic revitalization in affected areas, into broader disarmament strategies to demonstrate the tangible benefits of a nuclear-free world;
- 8. *Calls for* nuclear-armed states to commit to verifiable and irreversible disarmament pathways to serve as both a moral imperative and a strategic incentive;
- 9. *Encourages* participation in the Nuclear Energy Agency Global Forum on Nuclear Education, Nuclear Security Summit, and IAEA, including United Nations Disarmament Week, as a multilateral platform to facilitate open dialogue and progress checks among nuclear and non-nuclear states to:
  - a. Encourage the participation of all Member States, relevant international organizations, civil society actors, and independent experts to promote mutual understanding, reduce nuclear risk, and build confidence in disarmament processes;
  - b. Suggest that the GNTF be coordinated by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serving as the principal operational bodies for agenda-setting, logistical support, and knowledge-sharing;
  - c. Reinforces existing rotating host systems, prioritizing non-nuclear-weapon states and disarmament champions to promote neutrality, inclusiveness, and broader geographic representation;
- 10. *Reinforces* the IAEA's agenda on transforming nuclear weapons into technology to support sustainable developments in medical studies and monitoring tools for climate change and ecosystem;
- 11. *Encourages* close collaboration with the IAEA on transforming nuclear resources into sustainable developments, which include:
  - a. Incorporating IAEA's five-year plan, Coordinated Research Project (CRP), to use nuclear techniques to study artificial tissue and identify the tools necessary towards the transition to regenerative medicine;
  - b. Using nuclear science and technology to monitor emissions and environmental changes to the ocean and ecosystems;
  - c. Adapting to new climate realities, including food and water shortages and ecosystem losses;
- 12. *Urges* Member States to expand regional and global initiatives aimed at harnessing the power of nuclear energy in the transition to net-zero by:

- a. Collaborating closely with relevant UN bodies;
  - b. Considering the development of new nuclear power plants and the proper maintenance of existing ones to maximize their safety and efficiency;
  - c. Adopting best practices related to nuclear safety;
  - d. Drawing attention to the rights of indigenous people, and of those living in proximity to hazardous nuclear sites;
13. *Calls for* the prioritization of defensive over offensive nuclear postures, while encouraging comprehensive measures to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation and advance disarmament through:
- a. The provision of explicit guarantees for the protection of non-nuclear-weapon States in the event of armed conflict;
  - b. The continued advocacy and leadership of regional and international actors, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), and the New Agenda Coalition, in promoting the adoption of a No First Use (NFU) policy;
  - c. A call upon the five recognized nuclear-weapon States to engage in substantive negotiations with the aim of concluding a legally binding treaty on mutual NFU of nuclear weapons;
  - d. Encouragement for all Member States to consider extending the NFU principle to encompass all categories of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including chemical and biological weapons;
  - e. Increasing calls for the establishment and renewal of multilateral international treaties between nuclear powers with a high emphasis placed on non-proliferation or possibly, optional pathways towards nuclear disarmament, respecting Member States' self-determination as paramount;
14. *Invites* Member States to consider endorsing amendatory provisions to NPT with the aim of promoting a more inclusive and equitable global nuclear framework, through:
- a. The revision of Article 8 to facilitate the integration of currently excluded nuclear-armed States into the treaty, ensuring broader participation and shared accountability;
  - b. The recommendation that all nuclear-armed States, regardless of NPT membership status, be granted rights under the Treaty equivalent to those of existing signatories, in line with its peaceful objectives;
  - c. The proposal that any amendments reflect the principles of equality and non-discrimination among nuclear-weapon States, irrespective of their involvement in ongoing regional or international conflicts;
  - d. A recommendation that all proposed amendments be presented transparently before the full body of NPT signatories, with their implications clearly articulated and subject to open dialogue prior to adoption;
  - e. The revision of Article 9 to reconsider and modernize the definition of a nuclear-weapon State, ensuring it reflects current realities in the global security environment;

- f. The inclusion of language in any future amendments that addresses the intersection of nuclear policy with environmental protection and the prevention of nuclear terrorism, recognizing their growing importance in international security discussions;
- 15. *Suggests* the support of all Member States to strengthen and advance the efforts of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and to encourage similar initiatives in other regions;
- 16. *Calls for* the expansion of NWFZ to include non-nuclear weapon states that currently lack such protections, by:
  - a. Strongly encouraging the adoption of existing NWFZ frameworks by countries that have not yet achieved this status, thereby extending the protections of these zones to a broader number of states;
  - b. Recommending countries that currently host nuclear weapons, as part of their deterrence strategies, to reconsider their role in further nuclear non-proliferation and consider aligning their doctrines with NWFZ frameworks;
  - c. Calling for countries that host foreign military bases where nuclear weapons are stationed to engage in discussions with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs on the potential establishment of NWFZs, in line with their commitments to global disarmament efforts and anti-nuclear weapons treaties;
  - d. Encouraging stronger diplomatic unity and advocacy in global forums to expand NWFZs and advance nuclear disarmament;
  - e. Encourages states with cross-regional influence to actively engage in the promotion and facilitation of NWFZs, particularly through confidence-building measures and regionally tailored disarmament initiatives;
- 17. *Strongly endorses* the collaboration with the IAEA to provide best practices and recommendations on nuclear detection and enforce their positioning on the borders of Member States willing to establish checkpoints, within their own jurisdiction, to combat nuclear trafficking;
- 18. *Strongly endorses* the expansion of the Nuclear Energy Policy Forum to include representatives from the 1540 committee and IAEA and the General Assembly to provide best practices on the transitioning of nuclear energy to peaceful use and development, and producing an annual report to be published publicly;
- 19. *Encourages* the continued expansion of the annual global nuclear transparency forum hosted by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, increasing the number of participating states, enhancing cooperation, and ensuring greater diversity of thought in the management and use of nuclear technologies;
- 20. *Suggests* the expansion of a comprehensive handbook entitled "Nuclear Security Nexus," which would serve as a detailed voluntary framework for countries to implement:
  - a. Safeguarding nuclear materials through robust protection mechanisms and secure storage protocols;

- b. Ensuring the safe transport of nuclear materials, incorporating advanced security measures during transit to prevent theft or diversion;
  - c. Preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials by implementing international cooperation, strict monitoring, and effective enforcement measures, to combat the illegal proliferation of nuclear substances globally;
21. *Endorses* the expansion of the IAEA's nuclear security plan to include a Nuclear Safeguard Development Initiative (NSDI) to assist Member States in preventing nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking through:
- a. Providing technical training to strengthen national capabilities in nuclear security;
  - b. Facilitating expert collaboration to share knowledge and best practices in safeguarding nuclear materials;
  - c. Conducting comprehensive security assessments to identify vulnerabilities and enhance nuclear protection measures;
  - d. Implementing advanced tracking systems to monitor and prevent the illegal movement of nuclear materials;
  - e. Recommending the IAEA to oversee the initiative and align it with the Nuclear Security Series;
22. *Reaffirms* the urgency of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in order to develop a nuclear conversion program that would benefit and involve all Member States and to this end decides to convene an open-ended working group to study the feasibility of a nuclear warhead conversion project (NCP) to be presented to the General Assembly, consisting of repurposing nuclear warhead fuel into fuel to be used in electro nuclear facilities for civilian use, detailing that:
- a. All States and NGOs are welcome to participate in the open-ended working group;
  - b. The open-ended working group shall submit a report on its substantive work and agreed recommendations to the Member States;
  - c. The program consists of transforming high enriched uranium used for decommissioned nuclear warheads to low-enriched uranium used for civilian nuclear power plants;
  - d. Recommending the creation of research centers, similar to the Norwegian Nuclear Research Center, within all Member States in need of renewable energy;
  - e. The economic proceeds derived from this transformation could benefit all countries involved and not involved in the project through an equitable division;
  - f. The Security Council and United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) are invited to oversee this project;
  - g. All Member States are invited to contribute financially to the implementation of the study;
23. *Calls for* the establishment of an international high-level conference aimed at promoting mutual No First Use (NFU) agreements among all nuclear armed states, and further:
- a. Encourages the participation of all recognized nuclear weapons states, as well as Member States with undeclared arsenals, to ensure comprehensive dialogue and transparency;

- b. Recommends that the conference be held in Geneva, Switzerland, a neutral and internationally respected venue for disarmament discussions;
  - c. Suggests that the UNODA organize the conference with the support of the IAEA and the Conference on Disarmament;
  - d. Proposes that it convene yearly to ensure regular updates to further the goal of transparency;
24. *Encourages* Member States to extend the no first use policy to include all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDS), with a high emphasis placed on the danger of chemical weapons;
25. *Recommends* ECOSOC to consider the implementation of a voluntary United Nations Atomic Curriculum, similar in framework to The American Nuclear Society (ANS) expansion of K-12 nuclear science and technology education curriculum, in collaboration with the IAEA;
26. *Recommends* the development and implementation of educational initiatives, public awareness campaigns, and diplomatic training programs in partnership with UNESCO and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to reinforce the norms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, particularly in developing and non-nuclear states;
27. *Strongly recommends* Emerging Markets Energy Services Company (EMESCO) to run and fund education summer programs for all Member States that are interested in education in atomic science by further:
- a. Explaining how uranium mining can contaminate land and water sources with radioactive waste, requiring extensive cleanup efforts;
  - b. Demonstrating how nuclear weapons production and testing, particularly atmospheric testing, have led to widespread radioactive fallout and environmental contamination;
28. *Encourages* Member States to increase the scope of existing youth and young adult participation in international disarmament by:
- a. Increasing accessibility of UN youth leadership programs such as the United Nations Young Leaders Training Programme, and the Young Leaders for the SDGs;
  - b. Raising awareness of international security, anti-nuclear weapons treaties, the effects of nuclear waste and radiation on the environment, and current and past UN resolutions on nuclear states;
  - a. Recommending the expansion of YouthForDisarmament, aimed to increase awareness of anti-nuclear weapons treaties, the effects of nuclear waste and radioactivity on the environment, and current and past resolutions made by the United Nations;
  - b. Discussing technological advancements with students to enhance the promotion of transparency and increase education within Member States;
  - c. Emphasizing the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons on human health, the environment, and long-term suffering;
29. *Urges* all Member States to ratify the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (1993) in an effort to expand the regulations to chemical weapons;
30. *Invites* Member States to draw funds used on nuclear weapons to the health care and education sectors;

31. *Calls upon* all Member States, especially nuclear-weapon states, to recommit their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.





**Code:** GA1/1/4

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Acknowledging* its resolution 79/55 on “Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources” which calls for measures to prevent terrorists from obtaining radioactive sources and the enhancement of the international framework for radioactive source security,

*Acknowledging* education and public awareness facilitated by United Nations body’s like the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) are essential to creating sentiments of peace and nonproliferation actions,

*Acknowledging* shifting funds from weapons to energy reduces nuclear risks and shows a strong commitment to disarmament,

*Acknowledging* the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in monitoring terroristic activities,

*Paying tribute* to the projects of International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO),

*Alarmed by* the lack of inclusion and incorporation of micro-States and small island nations into the conversation surrounding nuclear disarmament,

*Emphasizing* the need for international cooperation in long-term nuclear waste management in accordance with the *Seabed Arms Control Treaty* (1971),

*Alarmed by* the potential misuse of nuclear material by terrorists and non-state actors in insecure regions,

*Bearing in mind* the useful purpose of nuclear technology and its potential danger to humans,

*Affirming* that it is in the best interest of all Member States to prevent non-state actors from possessing nuclear material or technologies,

*Convinced* that redirecting nuclear weapons funding toward peaceful nuclear energy supports sustainability and reduces global security risks,

*Convinced* that nations that possess nuclear weapons should redirect nuclear weapons funding toward peaceful nuclear energy that supports sustainability and reduces global security risks,

*Desiring* that all nuclear energy facilities are protected from attack in times of war,

*Deeply conscious* about the threat posed by nuclear power proliferation and its consequences to international security,

*Emphasizing* the danger of unmonitored nuclear waste storage within unstable regions,

*Recalling* the previously created *Seabed Arms Control Treaty* (1971) drafted by the Government of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States about the prohibited acts of placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the Sea Bed, Ocean Floor, and in the Subsoil,

*Emphasizing* the need for proper security measures in maritime regions with regards to the *Seabed Arms Control Treaty* (1971) to ensure that previously disarmed nuclear weapon shells are not placed in oceanic regions,

*Recalling* the regulations implemented by the Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”,

*Seeking* the coverage of regional Nuclear-Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) initiatives by collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),

*Encouraged by* the IAEA’s development of the First School of Drafting Regulations on Radioactive Waste and Decommissioning Safety, which engaged with 27 partners to create safety requirements for waste management and decommissioning that can be deployed in their home nations,

*Emphasizing* the importance of a clean and secure environment while ensuring the right to a world without the threat of nuclear warfare,

*Emphasizing* the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences and multilateral cooperation in the safe uses of nuclear technology,

*Guided by* IAEA’s Technical Meeting on Artificial Intelligence for Nuclear Technology and Applications (2021) which provides an international forum to promote cooperation in the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) for safer nuclear use,

*Recognizing* the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on *Nuclear Disarmament Verification* (NDV) (2023) report providing suggestions for good governance, through increasing capacity building to enhance the use of technologies for NDV,

*Noting* the need for nuclear disarmament through education and safe waste management, acknowledging the misuse of terrorist and non-state actors in insecure regions, while having considered the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967) and seeking the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace justice, and strong institutions),

*Recognizing* the pre-existing systems of National Source Tracking System (NSTS) with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) that tracks high-risk radioactive sources from time of creation to time of disposal,

*Paying tribute* to the success of IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in improving nuclear security,

*Recognizing* that only 143 Member States participate in reporting incidents of illegal or unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material, and there were 146 incidents reported in 2022 alone, potentially leading to nuclear terrorism from non-state actors or the illegal selling of nuclear materials and technology,

*Aware* of the threat of improper nuclear armament and the lack of information on proper containment and seek to develop an information platform for nuclear deterrence and sustainable development,

*Recognizing* the need for nuclear disarmament through education and safe waste management,

*Recalling* the imperative educational impact of United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) initiatives that empower youth internationally,

*Reaffirming* that the relocation of resources from nuclear weaponry to peaceful uses, including agriculture and energy, not only reduces risks of proliferation and use, but also advances sustainability through low-carbon power and progress on SDG 7 (clean water and sanitation) and 13 (climate action),

*Seeking* the beginning of disarmament by the retirement of nuclear weapons that are aged and ineffective,

*Recognizing* that Articles I and II of the NPT are focused on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but is also focused on promoting the pacifist, which to promote peace and non-violence, usage of nuclear energy and disarmament,

*Declaring* the impact nuclear weapons have on the climate and encouraging other Member States to review the NPT, therefore enhancing transparency and accountability of their actions,

*Endorsing* the integration of seminars in university programs, educational programs through partnerships between experts and international organizations, as well as the IAEA regional education networks and the use of social media as tools to raise awareness about both the negative consequences of nuclear weapons and the importance of nuclear disarmament,

*Encouraging* the creation of a monitoring platform accessible to the United Nations as an Intelligence Sharing platform for Nuclear Weapons and their trafficking utilizing AI to efficiently and consistently track nuclear weapons and nuclear material,

*Emphasizing* the importance of security in nuclear energy facilities,

*Stressing* the restriction of high-readiness responses, such as hair-trigger alerts which keep nuclear weapons in a high state of preparedness, making them easy to launch in mere minutes and furthering the recommendations of relevant international bodies, as outlined in the 2024 Disarmament Orientation Programme documents by the UNIDIR, on training of professionals to prevent accidental launches,

*Emphasizing* the importance of compromise, global security, and clean energy over nuclear arms, aligned with SDG 11 (sustainable cities and development) by focusing on housing, infrastructure, and environmental impact, SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions) through establishing accessible institutions that provide justice and reduce violence to ensure peace, and SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) which strengthens the means of implementation of global partnerships for sustainable development,

*Recognizing* that nuclear disarmament inevitably generates persistent and hazardous nuclear waste, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, so necessitating complex, costly, and enduring solutions for its safe management, is emphasized by the crucial role of the UNODA in fostering international dialogue and the establishment of effective protocols, especially after incidents like the WIPP facility leak in the US and the environmental threats emanating from the management of Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines, highlighting the severe environmental, health, and security ramifications of inadequate handling,

*Aware* of the nuclear energy that can be created by dismantling nuclear weapons after disarmament and how this energy can be used for global benefits,

*Acknowledging* the previous efforts by Member States to attempt to create the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996) (CTBT),

1. *Recommends* a regional Radioactive Transport Emergency Response Units (RTERU), under the leadership of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), as a global contingency team dedicated to addressing security and safety incidents involving the transportation of radioactive materials;
2. *Encourages* collaboration with regional and international bodies, including UNODA, the 1540 Committee, and IAEA, to strengthen the monitoring and regulation of the transport of nuclear materials, ensuring that any transit within its jurisdiction complies with international nuclear safety;

3. *Encourages* all willing and able Member States to safely secure and protect nuclear materials during transportation by adhering to guidelines outlined in the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials* (1979) (CPPNM) in order to prevent the acquisition of these materials by non-state actors;
4. *Recommends* the structuring of NSTS to create secure transport for nuclear materials within and across member states in collaboration with the IAEA, including but not limited to:
  - a. An established and documented chain of custody throughout transport;
  - b. Adaptation by Member States for the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) to include radioactive waste and nuclear weapons, reducing the risk of nuclear materials and weapons falling into non-state actors;
5. *Recommends* that all Member States participate and advocate for the existing *Seabed Arms Control Treaty* (1971) to ensure that Member States are not affected by potential nuclear waste management strategies;
6. *Affirms* that the responsible management and disposal of nuclear waste, in full compliance with international standards and guidelines and that the protection of human health and the environment, will propel international goals like SDG 13 (climate action), 14 (life below water), and 15 (life on land);
7. *Encourages* all states that dispose of nuclear waste across international borders to evaluate risks associated with the waste disposal site, including regional stability, logistical limitations, and socio-ecological factors of the disposal state;
8. *Encouraging* Member states to conduct a comprehensive geopolitical risk analysis in cooperation with the IAEA and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) to ensure that storage sites are located in politically stable regions, including evaluating potential risks regarding to conflicts, terrorism, regime volatility, and cross-border tensions;
9. *Suggesting* that countries disposing waste internationally ensure the presence of adequate infrastructure and logistical systems required for the safe transport, monitoring, and maintenance of the nuclear waste storage facilities through the resources of the IAEA's *Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management* (1997) while including the availability of secure transport routes, emergency response mechanisms, and surveillance systems, while taking note of the INPRO to develop best practices on nuclear waste management;
10. *Urging* states that dispose of nuclear waste internationally to evaluate the environmental and social dimensions of nuclear waste storage sites, while assessing the environmental impact, including analysis of local biodiversity, water tables, and climate risks, while also engaging with local communities, particularly Indigenous and marginalized communities, to incorporate their input and ensure transparency and equity, incorporating the active use of SDG 4 (quality education), 5 (gender equality), 6 (clean water and sanitation), 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure), and 15 (life on land) and working together with the ECOSOC;
11. *Recommends* creating more infrastructure for monitoring possible misuses of nuclear waste, collaborating with the UNCCT, with special focus on possible terrorist movements within a region of nuclear waste locations;
12. *Recommends* that all Member States support or acknowledge the potential establishment of new Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NFWZ) to ensure that certain nations do not have to face the negative repercussions of radioactive nuclear waste and nuclear weapons testing in their respective regions by:

- a. Recognizing the efforts of countries within regions such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia in creating NWFZ;
  - b. Further recognizing the previously created NWFZ treaties in the regions of Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia is used as a potential basis for future frameworks;
  - c. Recognizing the successes of NWFZ treaties in upholding its provisions within the regions it is effective in;
  - d. Further inviting the expansion of currently existing NWFZ treaties;
13. *Requests* that Member States sign and ratify existing anti-nuclear weapon treaties such as the NPT and the CTBT;
14. *Suggests* that Member States ensure that proper security measures and personnel, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), along with the UNODA, are placed in the NWFZ regions to patrol and control the potential damage that is being done in the region;
15. *Recommends* that Member States participate in the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) to conduct voluntary nuclear security reviews, allowing Member States to strengthen their national security regimes, systems, and technology;
16. *Suggests* an expansion of scope among existing working groups such as the IAEA Technical Working Group for Nuclear Knowledge Management (TWG-NKM) to include best practices regarding export control regimes, such as the Missile MTCR or the IAEA Peaceful Uses Programme to promote the safe and peaceful technical research, sharing, and transport of nuclear technology;
17. *Stresses* the need for all Nuclear Energy Facilities to be safeguarded from theft and attack through:
  - a. A buffer zone of 5 miles being granted to all Nuclear Energy Facilities when considering use of military force in order to avoid nuclear disasters that would affect non combatant populations;
  - b. Additional funding towards nuclear energy facilities is spent on security;
18. *Invites* Member States to voluntarily explore the adoption of NWFZ frameworks through UNODA and IAEA facilitated regional dialogues in uncovered common areas to sign and ratify treaties, by:
  - a. Partnering with UNODA to work on forums between neighboring Member States for enhancing negotiations, offering diplomatic, logistical, and legal support to new adopted treaties by de-escalating tensions in the regional level, and assisting with mobilization towards international support, further assuring the political stability and sustainability of NWFZ;
  - b. Adopting NWFZ practices, including the banishment of testing, deployment, or transfer of nuclear weapons, and adopting reinforced verification protocols managed by partnering with IAEA;
  - c. Serving as the main body mediator, the IAEA will assist states in the process of adopting and implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol, for further verification of nuclear safeguards, extending aid to environmental sampling and satellite monitoring, providing consistent detection, and deterring violations;
19. *Endorses* the joint efforts of Member States to begin the disarmament of nuclear weapons with those manufactured before the year 2000, as the half-life of Plutonium, an element used in the design of nuclear

weapons is 12 years, Member States seeking to disarm older nuclear weapons should look to collaborate with neighboring Member States to safely and effectively disarm these nuclear weapons together;

20. *Calls for* a convening of a Special Session of the General Assembly dedicated to reviewing and strengthening the NPT by incorporating needed amendments, taking into consideration the views of all Member States, ensuring a balanced representation of nuclear and non-nuclear states;
21. *Suggests* that Member States make sure that proper security measures and personnel are placed in the region in order to control the damage that is being done in the region;
22. *Stresses* the need for all nuclear energy facilities to be safeguarded from theft and attack by:
  - a. Advising all Member States to ensure that a buffer zone of 5 miles is granted to all Nuclear Energy Facilities when considering use of military force;
  - b. Encouraging all Member States with Nuclear Energy Facilities to dedicate the necessary funding to ensure the security and safety thereof suggesting at least 10% of funding towards Nuclear Energy Facilities is spent on security;
23. *Recommends* the creation of an intersectional approach to monitor nuclear facilities;
24. *Stresses* the establishment of a standard communication system through the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and voluntarily participating Member States to establish immediate notification and transparency regarding the security of nuclear material between physically bordering and politically entwined Member States, regardless of diplomatic relations, that will:
  - a. Model the inter-Korean hotline and similar purpose-built de-escalation hotlines for the specific use of notifying neighboring States;
  - b. Be secured and encrypted using global best practices;
  - c. Allow each ratifying Member State to designate an individual or individuals to operate this line for its intended purposes, but encouraging access by heads of nuclear programs in respective Member States, such as a Minister of Energy or similar analogue;
25. *Encourages* all Member States to join the NPT, but also acknowledges the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear disarmament;
26. *Urges* to reach a pacifist consensus regarding the looming threat posed by nuclear weapons and their impact on global security by encouraging all nations to reaffirm, uphold, and strengthen existing international treaties related to nuclear disarmament, such as the NPT, while also engaging in diplomatic dialogue to prevent future proliferation and enhance collective safety;
27. *Suggests* the expansions of NWFZs in the Pacific Islander Region and other regions that want to voluntarily create their own NWFZs after being educated about the risks of nuclear testing in the region and the damages that radioactive nuclear waste causes in the region;
28. *Suggests* Member States to enhance education mechanisms surrounding transportation by utilizing the IAEA's Virtual School on Drafting Regulations on Transport Safety in order to increase awareness on issues that surround the transportation on nuclear materials;

29. *Suggests* the development of a toolkit by the IAEA detailing the advanced methodologies and applications of tracking systems for hazardous materials, including the use of satellite tracking and radio-frequency identification systems;
30. *Recommends* the creation of an Educational Program for the Positive Use of Nuclear Materials to heighten and reinforce technical knowledge on the safe and responsible use of nuclear materials in medicine and scientific research to achieve this purpose, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research will assist in developing the educational curriculum for doctors and engineers;
31. *Calls for* the development and global implementation of nuclear literacy and public education workshops between Member States and regions partnered with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to promote multilateral best practice sharing to implement nuclear energy research into education programs for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, especially for sustainable development, including programs such as:
- a. Scholarships and internships for scholarly populace similar to the global next generation fellowship program which aims to introduce education that covers nuclear energy, medicine, and construction;
  - b. Enhance localized stem programs to include nuclear energy topics, safe handling of nuclear waste, and sustainable development on nuclear energy;
  - c. Incorporating guidelines on how member states can use nuclear energy to advance the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (2015);
  - d. Making an event which diplomats from Member States can attend to discuss on these programs and outcomes of initiatives;
32. *Recommends* the development and implementation of educational initiatives, public awareness campaigns, and diplomatic training programs in partnership with United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to reinforce the norms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, particularly in developing and non-nuclear states;
33. *Encourages* the formation of a Scientific Advisory Board to explore the threats posed to nuclear proliferation and the illicit use of nuclear and hazardous materials by new and emerging threats including cybercrime and artificial intelligence;
34. *Calls upon* the integration of nuclear education and advocacy for peace policies, by:
- a. Aiming to raise awareness about nuclear threats and disarmament in public school and higher education curricula internationally;
  - b. Developing and coordinating through partnerships between educational institutions, nuclear security experts, and international organizations such as UNESCO and the Nuclear Threat Initiative;
  - c. Inviting states and international donors to contribute financial and technical support towards the development of these initiatives;
  - d. Collaborating with IAEA's regional networks for education in nuclear technology to establish the guidelines for nuclear trafficking and nuclear manufacturing and for public school funding;

- e. Adding non-compulsory classes in schools and colleges in order to raise awareness;
  - f. Giving voice to testimonies who suffered from the effects of nuclear weapons through social media platforms;
35. *Recommends* Member States to recognize cybersecurity as an essential tool to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts;
36. *Welcomes* policies aimed at establishing a fund dedicated to financing cybersecurity tools and technological advancements for countries lacking sufficient capabilities to prevent cybersecurity breaches, where Member States and relevant stakeholders should voluntarily develop and adopt cyber monitoring systems, particularly those tailored to the needs of smaller and developing nations to strengthen cyber defenses around nuclear infrastructure and sensitive materials, and establishing a fund will provide a starting point for cooperation and increased security of nuclear resources;
37. *Recommends* the implementation of an international code of conduct that outlines ethical practices in the development and use of emerging technologies in the context of international security that directs a dedicated working group under UNODA with accountability mechanisms to be reviewed by the General Assembly on a regular basis through reports submitted by Member States and relevant UN bodies;
38. *Calls upon* Member States that disarm nuclear weapons to use these materials for peaceful uses, such as agriculture to combat food scarcity, by:
- a. Utilizing monitoring measures to track uranium and plutonium gained from disarmament;
  - b. Establishing workshops that occur annually through UN collaboration with the IAEA and FAO to educate Member States on the peaceful uses of nuclear materials;
39. *Suggesting* that nuclear power states spend at least as much as they spend developing nuclear weapons on developing peaceful nuclear energy solutions, including safety, research, and clean energy access;
40. *Encourages* nations that possess nuclear weapons, to redirect funds from nuclear weapons programs toward the peaceful development of nuclear energy, including safety, research, and clean energy access;
41. *Calls for* a new iteration of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) to develop advanced methodologies and technologies for NDV, including exploring the use of technological developments such as information and communication technologies;
42. *Suggests* an expansion of scope among existing working groups such as the IAEA Technical Working Group for Nuclear Knowledge Management (TWG-NKM) to include best practices regarding export control regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the IAEA Peaceful Uses Programme to promote the safe and peaceful technical research, sharing, and transport of nuclear technology;
43. *Endorses* inclusivity and promoting equity within the NPT by reconsidering provisions regarding nuclear armed states and non-nuclear armed states to increase accountability and support international stability;
44. *Encourages* nuclear power states to spend at least as much as they spend developing nuclear weapons on developing peaceful nuclear energy solutions, including safety, research, and clean energy access.





**Code:** GA1/1/5

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Recalling* its resolution 68/46 and 69/41 on “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, and resolution 78/26 and 79/46 on “Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation” on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons,

*Recognizing* the importance of transparency in nuclear activities to build mutual trust, supports the development of multilateral frameworks that promote open sharing of information regarding nuclear arsenals and related activities,

*Considering* the sensitive geopolitical position of many non-nuclear weapon states and their commitment to enhance trust and foster international security to create good faith and trustworthy disarmament efforts in the long term,

*Stressing* the importance of a gradual and verifiable reduction of nuclear weapon capabilities, such as the encouragement of non-nuclear states to declare themselves nuclear weapon-free zones, and support of those declarations,

*Recognizing* the difficulty of immediate nuclear disarmament and supporting gradual steps on nuclear disarmament,

*Reaffirming* the efforts behind the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (1968) (NPT) through transparency in an effort to build unity on a global scale,

*Acknowledging* the detrimental effects of nuclear weapon use and testing on the global environment and population,

*Recognizing* the importance of nuclear disarmament as well as the security concerns of nuclear states,

*Calling attention* to the necessity of utilizing confidence-building measures concerning nuclear weapons to facilitate communication between Member States on promoting nuclear disarmament,

*Emphasizing* Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institution) to strengthen institutions through global cooperation and inclusive dialogue amongst countries while developing effective, transparent, and accountable institutions,

*Recalling* the outcomes of the 2023 First session of the preparatory Committee Review Conference of the NPT, which identified specific transparency deficiencies in reporting mechanisms on nuclear stockpiles,

*Recognizing* the indispensability of the effect of the NPT on international nuclear non-proliferation through its dedication to facilitating interstate cooperation and transparency, as well as the efforts of all the State Parties of the NPT in the latest Conferences (2020) and the potential outcome working plan that will be produced in the upcoming NPT Review Conference in 2026,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the NPT, acknowledging its vital role in promoting international security and nuclear disarmament,

*Recognizing* that, despite the successes of the NPT, significant challenges remain in achieving comprehensive nuclear disarmament and ensuring security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states,

*Establishing* commitment from Member States bound by NPT to stronger consensus-based reporting efforts,

*Reaffirming* the *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (1996) (CTBT), which prohibits nuclear explosions of any kind, both military and peaceful,

*Affirming* Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, and NPT to mitigate nuclear weapon risks and increase international security,

*Recognizing* that non-strategic nuclear weapons pose a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and are currently underregulated by the provisions of international treaties such as the NPT,

*Stressing* the paramount nature of the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (1979) (CPPNM) to advance the peaceful use of nuclear materials and transparency,

*Acknowledging* the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NDV) (2023) report, which provides suggestions for good governance, aiming to implement capacity building to enhance the use of technologies,

*Underscoring* the necessity for research sharing initiatives related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

*Understanding* the necessity of constant awareness of location, ownership, and use of fissile material to prevent the loss and/or theft of nuclear materials,

*Acknowledging* the pivotal role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and preventing proliferation, supporting measures to reinforce the IAEA's mandate, resources, and verification capabilities,

*Emphasizing* the need for transparency and peaceful use of nuclear technology via the IAEA,

*Reaffirming* the importance of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA to increase the oversight ability required greater verification of uranium deals to understand where the product is going,

*Understanding* the ever-present value provided by the IAEA, including but not limited to The Incident Tracking Database (ITDB), inspections of nuclear facilities, and resources to ensure security of nuclear material and facilities,

*Expressing* grave concern about the rise in nuclear material trafficking incidents reported to the IAEA's ITDB alongside the fact that nearly 40% of Member States with nuclear facilities have not yet implemented the IAEA's *Additional Protocol for the verifications of nuclear safeguards* (2023) (Additional Protocol) as of March 2025, creating dangerous verification gaps that compromise global nuclear security efforts,

*Recognizing* the need for all Member States to ratify the Additional Protocol in order to ensure its ability to verify the peaceful usage of nuclear materials in states in pursuit of transparency for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Recalling* the IAEA's General Conference resolution GC(49)/10 on "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat" to focus on the terrorist threat that is exacerbated by nuclear capabilities, particularly in the Middle East region, which is threatened by belligerent groups near countries engaging in nuclear enrichment,

*Recognizing* the threat mining of radioactive elements brings in global trade along with the risk associated with emerging technologies,

*Recognizing* the *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* (2005) (ICSANT) to address access to nuclear and radioactive materials by non-state actors for the development and use of nuclear weapons and the convention that criminalizes acts of nuclear terrorism and to promote police and judicial cooperation to prevent, investigate and punish those acts,

*Recognizing* the threat mining of radioactive elements brings in global trade along with the risk associated with emerging technologies,

*Encouraging* the development of the International Criminal Police Organization's (INTERPOL) Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism unit to emphasize counter-terrorism initiatives and international cooperation, which are key to ensuring that fissile materials remain secured from illicit acquisition,

*Upholding* the recommendations of the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) of 2006 by means of joint military operations amongst Member States and information sharing,

*Emphasizing* the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, and the need advocates for enhanced international cooperation to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear materials, including through information sharing and joint security initiatives,

*Deeply concerned* that nuclear plants and reactors under construction were targeted in 15% and 8% incidents respectively, according to a review of incidents in the global terrorism database,

*Disheartened* by the lack of inclusion and incorporation of microstates, small island nations and Member States lacking substantial military arsenals into the conversation surrounding nuclear disarmament,

1. *Recommends* Member States form collaborative technical partnerships to enhance support for verification, control, and training capacities in the field of peaceful nuclear technology;
2. *Suggests* the modelling of joint training initiatives inspired by successful bilateral and multilateral military cooperation efforts that foster transparency and mutual understanding such as the France-Italy Joint Amphibious Training (2007), which fosters a more cooperative and transparent framework to:
  - a. Provide a platform to test verification procedures, command, and control protocols related to nuclear disarmament;
  - b. Promote new technologies beneficial for nuclear material tracking, arms reduction verification, satellite monitoring, and secure communications;
2. *Recommends* regional partnerships, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Coalition (APEC) and the EU, develop toolkits detailing the advanced methodologies and applications of tracking systems for hazardous materials, which would use technologies like satellite tracking and radio-frequency identification systems to track any hazardous materials transported;
3. *Urges* Member States to enhance cooperation and transparency regarding the monitoring of terrorist groups, identified by the IAEA, and their capability to target nuclear programs;

4. *Encourages* all Member States to ratify the existing frameworks NPT and the CTBT to encourage disarmament and build confidence;
5. *Recommends* the NPT Review Conference of 2026 investigate means to establish clear and effective negative security assurances, ensuring protection against the threat or use of nuclear weapons for all non-nuclear-weapon states that formally renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons and remain in compliance with their non-proliferation commitments;
6. *Suggests* the upcoming NPT Review Conference in 2026 focus on provisions relevant to enhancing transparency, nuclear counter-terrorism, empowerment of the IAEA, and facilitation of international cooperation and formulate an action plan as a guideline for all Member States;
7. *Encourages* organizations of states or Member States that share nuclear weapons with non-nuclear armed states to begin the process of returning their nuclear arsenals to the states from which they are loaned, to align with the first pillar of the NPT more closely;
8. *Invites* nuclear weapon states to undertake measures to further the goals of the NPT, such as the support of Member States without nuclear weapons through the development of non-weaponized nuclear technologies;
9. *Encourages* the creation of regional workshops held by the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), consisting of young leaders of all Member States supporting the NPT to learn more about the global landscape while strengthening other nuclear treaties by:
  - a. Mastering the art of initiating and engaging in conversations with global team members;
  - b. Raising awareness of international security and what information could be obtained about the NPT, nuclear treaties, and current and past resolutions made;
  - c. Share technological advancements with students to work with their Member States to promote transparency and increase education;
10. *Calls upon* nuclear-armed states to formally commit to respecting the nuclear-weapon-free status of self-declared zones, in line with the principles of the NPT and existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) by:
  - a. Refraining from the deployment, transport, or stationing of nuclear weapons within or through these zones;
  - b. Limiting the presence of such weapons strictly to their own recognized sovereign territory, excluding overseas bases;
11. *Recommends* that Member States and relevant UN bodies provide technical assistance, development aid, and diplomatic support to Member States that declare themselves nuclear-weapon-free zones, including preferential access to international peace and security programs, capacity-building through the UNODA, voluntary reporting mechanisms, and recognition of global non-proliferation efforts;
12. *Recommends* expanding the responsibilities of the IAEA to effectively mitigate risks associated with nuclear material by:
  - a. Increasing the scope of the IAEA's inspection capabilities to now include unannounced inspections to civilian facilities as outlined in IAEA-SM-367/12/03 of 29 October 2001;

- b. Further tracking fissile material from mine to reactor to ensure accountability and increase accuracy in finding where and when material was lost or stolen;
  - c. Encouraging existing regional partnerships, such as the European Union (EU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to work closer with the IAEA to ensure accountability at the more regional level and multilateral collaboration on security and tracking of nuclear material;
  - d. Calling upon Member States to create and adopt nuclear-focused Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) with the assistance of and monitoring of the IAEA;
  - e. Suggesting the IAEA be trusted to ensure the integrity of NWFZs;
  - f. Encouraging the IAEA to develop clear and reliable mechanisms to monitor the mining, trade, and use of radioactive materials, making sure every step is transparent and safe;
13. *Urges* Member States to explore NWFZ frameworks in regional and subregional dialogues on the implementation and ratification of treaties by:
- a. Collaborating with UNODA to work on forums with surrounding Member States to enhance diplomacy and negotiations;
  - b. Assuring the political sustainability of NWFZ by de-escalating tensions at the regional and subregional level as well as mobilizing political support;
  - c. Inviting the IAEA to act as the main body mediator in adopting and reinforcing Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements such as extending aid, satellite and environmental monitoring, consistent detection, and other deterring violations;
14. *Encourages* the continued development of INTERPOL's Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism unit in order to emphasize counter-terrorism initiatives and international cooperation as key measures to ensure that fissile materials remain secured from illicit acquisition;
15. *Encourages* Member States to recognize and invest in the potential of nuclear research such as enhancing agricultural productivity and sustainability, through collaboration with initiatives namely the IAEA's Atoms4Food and NUTEC Plastics programs;
16. *Proposes* regional partnerships to collaboratively engage in the creation of a joint research initiative to enhance nuclear security measures and protocols, aiming to prevent future misuse and mishandling of nuclear energy and weapons;
17. *Reinforces* the ICSANT to address access to nuclear and radioactive materials by non-state actors for the development and use of nuclear weapons.



**Code:** GA1/1/6

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Affirms* that, under Article 21 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), the General Assembly holds the right to adopt its own rules and procedures,

Advocating for the effectiveness of diplomacy when all Member States engage on a foundation of fairness and equality, and that is best accomplished by recognizing the reality of the global nuclear situation,

*Guided by* Article 33 of the *Charter of the United Nations* calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes, Article 3 of the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) recognising the “right to life, liberty and security of persons”, and Article 21 of the *Charter of the United Nations* that the General Assembly holds the right to adopt its own rules and procedures,

*Reiterating* Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), particularly SDG 16.4, (combating illicit arms flows), as well as nuclear disarmament’s inherent linkage to SDG 1 (zero hunger), SDG 3 (good health and wellbeing), SDG 4 (quality education), and SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy),

*Concerned by* the 2024 *Sustainable Development Goals Report* conveying only 17% of SDGs to be on track, with one-third of Goals stalling or regressing,

*Acknowledging* the ability of the General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs under Article 22 of the *Charter of the United Nations*,

*Acknowledging* the successes of existing nuclear disarmament treaties, including but not limited to, the 1968 *Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT) catalyzing disarmament, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, encouraging peaceful nuclear technology, and the 2017 *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW), aiming to prevent development and production of nuclear weapons,

*Reiterating* the paramount importance of nuclear non-proliferation agreements in international tension de-escalation efforts to meet the objective of the TPNW for a strictly monotonic decrease in global nuclear stockpiles,|

*Deeply concerned with* the dangers that nuclear warheads pose to humanity and the environment, including the immense loss of life, long-term health effects from radiation exposure, destruction of ecosystems, particularly regarding the threat of aging nuclear weapons,

*Highlighting* the 1963 *Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty* (PTBT), which banned nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, as well as its successor, the 1996 *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (CTBT), working to close gaps within the former PTBT, preventing all nuclear testing by Member States while recognizing the existence of unrecognized nuclear states,

*Commending* all existing treaties that contribute to the reduction of the likelihood of nuclear escalation, reducing the active international nuclear warhead stockpile, and lay the groundwork for nuclear disarmament and international peace, these major denuclearization frameworks have served a great purpose in this world,

*Recognizing* the current UN definition of a Nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), established in its resolution 3472 (XXX) (1976) on “Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects”, which calls for the complete absence of nuclear weapons in an internationally recognised zone and is considered a highly effective method for nuclear disarmament, and the benefits of Nuclear De-Escalation Zones (NDZ),

*Noting with appreciation* existing international treaties, such as the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1986), *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1995), and the *Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia* (2014), which established Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) in regional areas around the world, creating security benefits for all Member States in the affected regions and the broader international community,

*Recognizing* the success and diplomatic significance of the advancement in nuclear arms reduction of the *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* (1991) and the *Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty* (2003),

*Keeping in mind* General Assembly resolutions 3261 (XXIX) (1974) on “general and complete disarmament”, which established the possibility of Single-State Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (SS-NWFZ), General Assembly resolution 53/77 D on “Mongolia: nuclear-weapon-free status & security”, causing the implementation of the first and only existing SS-NWFZ in Mongolia to prevent the transportation and holding of nuclear weapons, components, and waste through its territory, and General Assembly resolution 73/71 on the “Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2020”, which convened the Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia to coordinate and strengthen NWFZ efforts,

*Expressing satisfaction with* the diplomatic progress that the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has made to educate member states on the world's most detrimental topics,

*Recognizing* consistent efforts within the Conference on Disarmament in facilitating regional and international dialogue for Member States seeking to strengthen multilateral transparency and communication,

*Mindful* of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), which works closely with Member States towards innovative solutions to reduce global dangers, specifically towards nuclear disarmament,

*Expressing appreciation* for the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF), which funds projects that help prevent conflict, strengthen multilateralism, and promote peacebuilding efforts,

*Appreciating* the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which supports nuclear disarmament between Member States through the promotion of trust-building dialogue and upholding commitment to the NPT,

*Having devoted attention* to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is an independent international organization that works closely with the UN by helping countries develop their civilian nuclear science, technology use, and monitoring compliance, particularly its safeguards, which ensure that nuclear facilities and materials are used solely for peaceful purposes,

*Noting with zest* the IAEA's continued efforts to bolster nuclear disarmament through Compliance Safeguards Agreements (CSA), as well as their Milestones Approach, ensuring Member States' adherence to thorough nuclear material safe handling practices given that one-third of the world's nuclear facilities have no regulatory requirements in place during a natural or man-made disaster,

*Appreciating* the efforts of the joint Food Agriculture Organization (FAO)/IAEA programmes in fostering the development of peaceful nuclear technologies through food irradiation and exportation practices,

*Noting further* the International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd), which was adopted at the Transforming Education Summit in 2022 by the UN, it is a powerful financing engine for global education to tackle the education crisis in lower-middle-income countries,

*Strongly emphasizes* supporting the implementation of the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is a station promoted by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) capable of detecting nuclear tests and explosions in the region,

*Observing* the successful efforts of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and their 2024 research report, *Nuclear Risks: Perceptions and Pathways*, which provides data and guides conversations surrounding nuclear disarmament,

*Recalling* the critical role robust cybersecurity frameworks serve in protecting nuclear facilities, as the 2024 Nuclear Security Index identified at least 18 states with nuclear materials lacking adequate digital safeguards,

*Having considered* the Pakistan-India Bilateral Moratorium on Nuclear Testing, renewed in 2016, where each party refrains from the destruction and damage of nuclear facilities in each country through annual exchanges of information,

*Disheartened* by the lack of inclusion and incorporation of micro-States, smaller nations, and Member States lacking a substantial military arsenal in the conversation surrounding nuclear disarmament,

*Referring* to Multi-Track Diplomacy tools such as the Diplomatic Dialogue Tracks 1.5 and 2, which respectively initiate dialogues between governmental officials and non-governmental experts, as well as unofficial dialogue channels between non-governmental experts,

*Recognizing* the impact of military expenditures on global peace efforts and the need to redirect funds towards sustainable development and nuclear disarmament,

*Acknowledging* the successful impact of the *United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement* (1993), which converted excess highly enriched weapons-grade material from former nuclear weapons into low enriched material for civilian energy production,

*Cognizant* of the pathways machine learning and other neural network technologies, collectively Artificial Intelligence (AI), open in the field of data categorization and pattern inference,

*Recognizing* the importance of transparency, trust-building, and cooperation in advancing nuclear disarmament, the Principality of Andorra proposes a joint training initiative, modeled after the 2007 France-Italy Joint Amphibious Training, to support verification, capacity-building, and technological innovation in a multilateral setting,

*Deeply concerned* by the significant 43% rise in nuclear material trafficking incidents, particularly in regions characterized by porous borders and insufficient regulatory oversight, as documented by the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database between 2022 and 2024,

*Deeply alarmed* by the escalation of military tensions resulting in catastrophic losses of life and destruction of infrastructure in the Middle East in recent years,

*Further recognizing* the existence of approximately 12,500 recognized nuclear arms and around 2,000 historic nuclear tests, according to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs,

1. *Strongly advises* Member States to recommit to dialogues carried out in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons to appease tensions in the region;



2. Proposes the implementation of the Strengthening Engagement and Cooperation for Unifying Regional Efforts (SECURE) plan, which, from 2030 onward, would focus on step-by-step measures to achieve gradual nuclear disarmament in the Middle East by:
  - a. Encouraging collaboration with the IFFEd to raise awareness through education by:
    - i. Joining efforts with UNODA's Information and Outreach Branch to modify Disarmament Education, within existing resources, develop reports and other e-resources explaining the processes and differing stages of development and collaboration by Member States towards a Middle Eastern NWFZ;
    - ii. Partnering with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in promoting civic engagement;
    - iii. Integrating educative programs on the history of nuclear weapons and their potential impacts into school curricula within the Middle East and beyond, developed through partnerships between regional educational institutions, the NTI, UNESCO, and Nuclear Security experts;
  - b. Promoting Diplomatic Dialogues between Middle-Eastern Member States using Dialogue Tracks 1.5 and 2 to promote trust and cooperation between key regional actors;
  - c. Implementing joint training initiatives to foster a more transparent and cooperative global framework for nuclear disarmament, modeled after the France-Italy Joint Amphibious Training (2007), piloted by the Principality of Andorra, where the micro-State would:
    - i. Provide a platform to test verification procedures, command, and control protocols related to nuclear disarmament;
    - ii. Enable the development of necessary skills for national and international disarmament operations;
    - iii. Promote new technologies beneficial for nuclear material tracking, arms reduction verification, satellite monitoring, and secure communications;
    - iv. Work to enhance the ability of Member States to collaborate effectively in high-stakes, high-security environments;
  - d. Suggesting the creation of a voluntary agreement to develop trust and transparency within nations, further to start the process of nuclear disarmament by:
    - i. Providing safety protocols for storing, transporting, and handling nuclear materials to secure channels to promote transparency;
    - ii. Using IAEA safeguard measures and advisory services to establish standard verification protocols;
    - iii. Suggesting the use of the IMS to detect any illegal nuclear tests or activities in regions;
    - iv. Recommending the establishment of a regional security hotline platform using the Moscow-Washington Hotline system as a reference and the support of UNODA to help states in disclosing and reporting to each other the use of nuclear devices that are not in compliance with IAEA guidelines;

- v. Encouraging the promotion of disarmament efforts that include AI as a monitoring tool;
  - e. Promoting the safe and sustainable use of nuclear technologies by working with the IAEA to organize regional scientific and technical forums and conferences;
  - f. Encouraging the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF) to fund the project;
- 3. *Invites* Member States to create a forum financed by willing Member States and NGOs, consisting of young adults from 15 to 25 years old from any Member State that supports the NPT, to strengthen community support for other nuclear treaties by:
  - a. Educating members about global nuclear power dynamics;
  - b. Engaging in conversations with global team members;
  - c. Raising awareness of international security and obtaining information about the NPT, nuclear treaties, and current and past resolutions made;
  - d. Sharing technological advancements with students to work with their Member State to promote transparency and increase education;
  - e. Creating an online space to share knowledge and educational tools for future generations to learn and build from;
- 4. *Encourages* Member States not in possession of nuclear weapons and not already members of existing NWFZs to consider pursuing recognition for an official SS-NWFZ, by:
  - a. Recommending that the future conventions of the Conference of NWFZs and Mongolia gather together a panel of experts on the establishment of NWFZs and SS-NWFZs;
  - b. Suggesting that the UN University launches a study on the establishment and effectiveness of SS-NWFZs, and submit its findings to the aforementioned panel of the Conference of NWFZs and Mongolia;
  - c. Urging the Information and Outreach Branch of the UNODA to work with the aforementioned panel of the Conference of NWFZs and Mongolia to pool information about establishing NWFZs and SS-NWFZs into official publications and disseminate that information to relevant Member States;
  - d. Proposing that all Member States not in possession of nuclear weapons consider sending representatives to attend the next convention of the Conference of NWFZs and Mongolia to consult with the aforementioned panel of experts to review the practicality and capability of becoming a SS-NWFZ;
  - e. Committing to seriously consider supporting and recognizing all nuclear-weapon-free Member States that attempt to become official SS-NWFZs;
- 5. *Recommends* the establishment of NDZs, allowing states to establish regional treaties and define themselves as an NDZ by:
  - a. Submitting plans to decrease nuclear weapon testing, manufacturing, deployment, and other prohibitions of TPNW;

- b. Establishing mechanisms for dialogue that hold regular sessions to discuss the progress in disarmament;
  - c. Promoting the adoption of a “no first strike” policy to minimize the likelihood of nuclear engagement under the supervision of the IAEA;
  - d. Ensuring nuclear waste's safe and sustainable disposal to protect our planet and uphold our responsibility to future generations;
  - e. Committing to the goal of becoming an NWFZ through an established timeline adopted through the treaty;
6. *Supports* Member States involved in the manufacturing, possession, and sharing of nuclear weapons in establishing and expanding NDZs in order to promote regional and trans-regional safety, security, and transparency, including countries unable to complete the nuclear disarmament prohibitions stated in the TPNW and join a NWFZ;
  7. *Reiterates* that Member States should review and consider reinvesting funds set aside for the development, testing, and use of nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure towards civilian projects, like education, healthcare, and welfare projects;
  8. *Strongly recommends* Member States to support initiatives to convert weapons-grade material towards peaceful civilian use in nuclear energy production and other societal enrichment fields in the agriculture, educational, and biomedical sectors, through promoting future High Enriched Uranium deals between Nuclear Weapon States based on the framework of the *United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement* (1993);
  9. *Calls upon* all concerned Member States that have not yet done so, pending the establishment of the aforementioned Middle Eastern NWFZ, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA nuclear activity safeguards to ensure their peaceful use;
  10. *Urges* for the modernization of nuclear facilities in all Member States and the promotion of safe and sustainable use of nuclear technologies through regional, scientific, and technical forums to encourage peaceful and transparent use of non-violent nuclear innovations for the benefit of said States, based on the IAEA Milestones Approach;
  11. *Supports* the establishment of an annual rotating conference of inter-military communication between Member States who wish to participate to promote accountability;
  12. *Requests* the United Nations Secretary-General to establish a special conference with the agenda of working towards the potential establishment of an NWFZ in the North Pacific, including but not limited to the Korean Peninsula;
  13. *Further recommends* that all willing and able Member States to sign and ratify the NPT, CTBT, and TPNW, as well as any other applicable treaties that promote measures for nuclear safety, to contribute to the fulfillment compilation of the Agenda 2030, including, but not limited to, SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions), and to achieve the universality of those treaties, delivering on the goal of a strictly monotonic decrease in global nuclear stockpiles;
  14. *Endorses* the creation of a Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit on a national level by Member States, which shall:

- a. Identify and monitor the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials;
  - b. Provide training to law enforcement agencies;
  - c. Detect and respond to nuclear material trafficking, working under the CITE Framework;
15. *Further urges* willing and able Member States in partnership with the IAEA to strengthen regionally led nuclear verification mechanisms by implementing the recommendations of the IAEA, such as Compliance Safety Agreements (CSA) and the IMS;
16. *Encourages* the launch of the Global Nuclear and Development Campaign, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme, which will:
- a. Be modeled after existing Campaigns that are currently in partnership with the UN through organizing a traveling “Peace and Progress Festival” featuring music, art, and storytelling to engage global citizens and being hosted within the Caribbean, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Africa, and more;
  - b. Promote an inclusive online forum to discuss redirecting military funds to sustainable development and nuclear disarmament;
  - c. Cooperate with International NGOs to collect funds through percentages of tickets, beverages, and food sold at the event;
  - d. Implement social media campaigns and digital ads to raise awareness and build momentum for nuclear disarmament advocacy and transparency;
17. *Advises* Member States to adopt the Cooperation Investment Transparency and Enforcement Framework (CITE) to encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology by:
- a. Encouraging cooperation among Member States across national borders through:
    - i. Increasing military joint readiness and transparency;
    - ii. Bolstering police cooperation in border regions;
    - iii. The creation of multilateral dialogues by regional organizations;
  - b. Investing in nuclear power and methods to protect radiological materials, in addition to buying back nuclear weapons for recycling into fuel for nuclear reactors;
  - c. Implementing regional monitoring treaties and regional aid agreements, thereby safeguarding nuclear security;
  - d. Creating and maintaining transnational frameworks for justice regarding the illicit procurement and possession of radiological and nuclear materials;
18. *Suggests* all willing and able Member States to adopt a gradual and collaborative approach to global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation by:
- a. Taking initial steps to build trust with the nine recognized nuclear-armed states to foster mutual trust and reduce the risks of nuclear conflict;

- b. Advocating for open collaboration among all states to ensure responsible management of nuclear materials and technology;
19. *Strongly supports* the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime to promote CBM based upon balance and communication in the region to de-escalate tensions by:
- a. Reiterating the importance of compliance from Member States;
  - b. Encouraging Member States to participate in IAEA nuclear technology training and capacity-building programmes such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) School on Strategic Planning for Sustainable Nuclear Energy to ensure that states are safely handling nuclear materials to prevent diversion to non-state actors;
  - c. Calling upon all countries to increase cooperation with the IAEA in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology;
  - d. Establishing and improving upon intelligence sharing and communication channels regarding the use of nuclear technology;
  - e. Opening up channels of communication and self-reporting of current nuclear armaments;
  - f. Providing routine opportunities for IAEA observer groups to monitor the use of nuclear energy;
  - g. Favoring the implementation of UNODA traceability guidelines stemming from regional case studies;
  - h. Creating UN regional hotlines that nurture peace and diplomacy, especially for key affected regions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia;
20. *Recommends* the IAEA to develop a report on recommendations and the provision of international standards for digital security at nuclear facilities, addressing the possible implementation of:
- a. A global rapid response protocol in case of suspected cyber breaches;
  - b. Capacity building recommendations for Least Developed Countries to help provide cyber protection at nuclear facilities;
  - c. Public awareness protocols for Member States who face incidents at nuclear facilities;
  - d. Analog computers in nuclear facilities in increasing data security;
21. *Decides* to convene a special conference with the agenda of Law Enforcement and Methods to Address Nuclear Terrorism in the city of Seoul in 2026 in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency, UN Police Services, facilitated by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, regarding the nature, handling, and patterns of nuclear incidents;
22. *Further encourages* Member States to agree to implement an agreement to end nuclear testing in the Asia-Pacific region, to promote long-term stability in the area and strengthen friendship and trust among Member States;
23. *Requests* the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Reductions (UNSCAR) to seek cooperation with the IAEA to invest in nuclear disarmament and transitioning nuclear technology from military into civilian applications according to regional circumstances, including nuclear waste

management, recycling, agriculture, and water treatment, to reduce military expenditure and the increase of voluntary funding towards UNSCAR Fund;

24. *Calls upon* able and willing Member States to assist the IAEA by supporting an increase in their voluntary funding, encouraging transparent and appropriate monitoring of nuclear materials in partnership with observers, and seeking regional assistance to promote transparency in nuclear material management;
25. *Recommends* the Conference on Disarmament to welcome the expansion of membership to include new Member States, micro-States that lack a substantial military arsenal, civil society groups, and NGOs to diversify representation and accommodate more equitable solutions;
26. *Welcomes* the expansion of IAEA-led peaceful nuclear technology programs such as the Atoms 4Food initiative, which supports Member States utilisation of nuclear irradiation sciences to advance agricultural productivity, as well as other programs under the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) which mobilize responsive extrabudgetary contributions to support other IAEA programs in the area of peaceful nuclear technologies, and working with the FAO to establish guidelines on effectively using nuclear byproducts to maximize agricultural and water production and development;
27. *Promotes* signatories of the NPT to initiate the NPT-specified amendment process, by engaging in the NPT amendment process as specified in Article VIII of the NPT, with the goal of amending the subsequent propositions into a new clause within the NPT, further detailed by:
  - a. Signatories to the NPT recognizing a new category designated as “Post-1967 Nuclear Weapon Member States,” (P67);
  - b. P-67 holding voting rights as regular signatories of the NPT, but their support of a resolution shall not be required for passing amendments to the NPT;
  - c. States parties to the NPT observing that the P-67 differ, in their legal standing, from the NWS, referred to within the NPT in its current form;
28. *Suggests* that the amendment to the NPT, upon the completion of the amendment process that incorporates the ideas elucidated in clause one, should specify that any state that has openly detonated a nuclear weapon between January 1, 1967, and January 1, 2025, shall be eligible to receive and maintain status as a P-67 state so long as they, the designated P-67 state, fulfil the requirements and duties included within the amended NPT, with the understanding the revocation of the P-67 status can be initiated if:
  - a. A P-67 state is considered in breach of its obligations to sign, ratify, and adhere to the CTBT and the *Outer Space Treaty* (OST);
  - b. A P-67 state is considered in breach of its obligations to accept and engage with the continued efforts and support for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections as stipulated in Article Three, Section Four of the NPT;
  - c. A P-67 state is considered in breach of its obligations to recognize and pledge to honor existing NWFZs as of January 1st 2025;
  - d. A P-67 state is considered in breach of its obligations to enunciate and Adopt a “No-First-Use” Policy, meaning, that they agree to never be the first Member State in a conflict to use a nuclear weapon;

- e. A P-67 state is considered in breach of its obligations to disavow the idea of threatening nuclear strikes or any atomic first strikes;
  - f. A P-67 state is considered in breach of its obligations to continue to align with the principle in *Security Council Resolution 1540* (2004) on “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” that nuclear-armed states shall not provide nuclear weapons to non-state actors or assist non-state actors in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons;
  - g. A P-67 state is considered in breach of its obligations to commit to and implement total nuclear military disarmament over a 25 year period starting from the date of the Amendment’s passage, where, if this is not accomplished, the status of the P-67 states return to status prior to passage;
  - h. With the recommendation that the P-67 status of a state can be revoked through a simple majority vote unless the recognised P5 member states collectively vote against revocation in which case a two-thirds majority is required to overturn the veto;
29. *Further recommends* that, upon compliance with the aforementioned conditions, the United Nations Security Council shall conduct annual assessments of each P-67 state's disarmament progress, with the aim of proportionally reducing existing sanctions in accordance with verified disarmament benchmarks, thereby incentivizing sustained commitment and transparency;
30. *Recommends* the creation of a Conference of Atomic States which includes both the NWS and the “P-67” on pursuing gradual nuclear disarmament; who, meet every three years in a willing non-nuclear Weapon State's homeland that is a sponsor or signatory to this document, to include, the expectations that this Conference shall adhere to the following negotiation framework:
- a. Discussions of all Member States to implement plans and processes to decrease their number of nuclear arms with differing obligations depending on the size of nuclear arsenals with the goal of first reaching weapon parity and then total disarmament;
  - b. These meetings shall include perspectives from civil society organizations that focus on nuclear weapons disarmament;
  - c. The organizers of these meetings shall commit to upholding the Sustainable Development Goals when planning tri-yearly meetings by mitigating the negative impact of travel to host countries on the social, political, and natural environments of these countries, particularly by consulting the SDGs in all aspects of planning the logistics of the conference;
  - d. All NWS and P-67 states shall adopt an agenda to agree to the formal universal adoption of a “No-First-Use” policy, as defined as the agreement to never be the first state in a given conflict to use a nuclear weapon;
31. *Creates* a subsidiary committee of the General Assembly, titled the “International Committee on Nuclear Weapons Law,” hereafter abbreviated as the ICNWL, to engage in conversation to strengthen understanding of international law as it connects to nuclear weapons, with this Committee:
- a. Comprising of two delegates from each of the nuclear weapon States, who are recognized by the NPT, along with two delegates from each of the P-67 states, totaling eighteen delegates, hereafter referred to as state-based delegates;

- b. Comprising additionally of eighteen legal scholars, with expertise, to be selected by eighteen civil society organizations and academic institutions, with each civil society organization or academic institution appointing one legal scholar to this committee;
- c. Adopting the procedure of the eighteen state-based delegates selecting, by simple majority, the civil society organizations and academic institutions that shall appoint members to the ICNWL;
- d. Mandating that the legal scholars appointed by civil society organizations and academic institutions be nationals of Member States who do not possess nuclear weapons;
- e. Utilizing UNODA, as a resource to on information about disarmament;
- f. Aiming to develop conclusions on what additional treaties the General Assembly may adopt in order to materially further advancement of nuclear disarmament and abolition, in line with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.