



Documentation of the Simulation of the

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)*



Conference A

6 - 10 April 2025

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The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Committee Staff

Director	Ashlee Ann Rolheiser
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Chair	Anabel Kummer

Agenda

1. Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors
2. Achieving Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Resolutions adopted by the Committee

Code	Topic	Vote (In favor - Against - Abstention)
OPCW/1/1	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	99 in favor, 36 against, 53 abstentions
OPCW/1/2	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	107 in favor, 35 against, 46 abstentions
OPCW/1/3	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	106 in favor, 27 against, 55 abstentions
OPCW/1/4	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	116 in favor, 20 against, 52 abstentions
OPCW/1/5	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	107 in favor, 22 against, 59 abstentions
OPCW/1/6	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	114 in favor, 25 against, 49 abstentions
OPCW/1/7	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	110 in favor, 22 against, 56 abstentions

OPCW/1/8	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	99 in favor, 32 against, 57 abstentions
OPCW/1/9	Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors	103 in favor, 25 against, 60 abstentions

Summary Report

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

1. Achieving Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention
2. Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The session was attended by representatives of 186 Member States and 2 Observers.

On Sunday, the committee adopted the agenda of topic 2, followed by topic 1, beginning discussion on the topic of “Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors.” By Tuesday, the Dais received a total of 19 proposals covering a wide range of sub-topics such as, establishing larger and far-reaching databases, enhancing multilateral information sharing, interregional cooperation, national law enforcement and border controls, capacity building, monitoring practices by employing blockchain technologies and artificial intelligence, expanding cooperation with other organizations, and addressing waste prevention as well as maritime security issues.

On Wednesday, 9 draft resolutions had been approved by the Dais, 1 of which had 4 friendly amendments. The committee adopted all 9 resolutions following voting procedure. The resolutions represented a wide range of issues, including establishing databases, using AI, supporting regional discussions and knowledge sharing, managing transportation, storage, and waste as well as maritime security. The atmosphere was productive and fruitful with engaged debates, during which the committee demonstrated strong cooperation and effective negotiation skills, reflecting their commitment to reaching common ground and appropriate solutions to the issue discussed.



Code: OPCW/1/1

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism overall, which includes preventing Non-State Actors (NSAs) from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons,

Taking into account the serious threat posed by the extensive usage of chemical weapons by NSAs, including terrorist organizations and rouge nations,

Acknowledging the utmost importance of the investigation done by the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to identify the perpetrators of specific chemical weapons used by non-state groups in the Syrian Civil War,

Noting further the implementation and existing use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in ethical matters,

Deeply alarmed by the Fourth Report of the IIT on the investigation conducted on the incident in Marea (Aleppo Governorate), the Syrian Arab Republic, on 1 September 2015 (S/2255/2024),

Urging to encourage all the countries to fully implement the Security Council resolution 1540,

Acknowledging the success of the Russian Federation and other Balkan and Eurasian Member States in combating terrorism through training and information sharing initiatives (2016),

Cognizant of the threat and danger that dual-use chemicals present to the security of countries as well as their population around the world such as chlorine that accounted for 48% of all chemical weapons attacks in the past 20 years,

Highlighting the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and partners in the Africa Programme and its ability to reaffirm commitment to the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC) (1992), demonstrating the effectiveness of regional collaboration,

Recognizing Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions),

Focusing on SDG target 16.7 ensuring responsive, participatory, and representative decision-making,

Guided by the adoption and implementation of regional-based partnerships,

Encouraged by the 193 Member States committed to the CWC, thus allowing 98% of the global population to live under the protection of it,

Remembering that over 7,000 people were harmed in attacks orchestrated by NSAs in over 1,000 attacks,

Viewing with appreciation the educational facilitation that the OPCW has allotted to the Republic of Serbia and other Member States within the Balkan region on June of 2019 focused on assistance and protection during times of chemical disaster,

Appreciating the importance of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in monitoring international security and stability,

Bearing in mind the continued threat posed by dual-use chemicals and the need for strengthened exports and border control systems,

Acknowledging that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated that in 2009 there were large-scale diversions of dual-use and precursor chemicals destined for Member States, presenting opportunities for NSAs and criminals to obtain them,

Conscious of the work on SDG 16 from the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the support of the disarmament measures by UNODA,

Emphasizing the development of a global tracking data base for the tracing of chemical substances financed by the World Bank (WB) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to foster the Anti Chem Alliance (ACA) Program proposed by Côte d'Ivoire,

Commending the role of UNCCT and its Border Security and Management (BSM) program in assisting Member States to strengthen cross-border chemical weapons detection and enforcement capacities,

Deeply convinced of the impact of creating an intelligence agency inspired by organizations like the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), and UNODC by focusing on monitoring chemical weapon movement across borders,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 2195 (2014) and 2349 (2017), which highlight the need to combat terrorism and transnational threats in the region,

Emphasizing the importance of monitoring the production and transportation of chemical weapons for national security,

Fully alarmed by the progressions of chemical weapons technology and the potential growing threat to the public,

Taking note of the need for cooperation between United Nations organs and national authorities in order to better coordinate their efforts to tackle acquisition and usage of chemical weapons by NSAs,

Referring to the importance of enhancing forensic research at border controls in high-risk areas,

Noting increased supply chain complexity and the associated dangers of chemical precursors being diverted for illicit purposes,

Reaffirming the importance of information-sharing channels between Member States in order to better coordinate chemical safety initiatives supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Doctors without Borders,

Welcoming the CWC of 1992, that became effective in 1997, with the goal of the complete eradication of chemical weapons,

Recognizing the threat coming from not monitoring the production and transportation of chemical weapons,

Seeking help from ECOWAS and customs authorities to tackle the monitoring of purchases of substances of chemical weapons funded by UNODA and WB,

Stressing the importance of increasing dialogues between Member States on how to respond to chemical weapons attacks,

1. *Calls* for the creation of a database for information sharing of crucial technologies for the use in tracking non-state activities by sharing available technologies to Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and developing countries to increase adherence to the CWC and tracking of NSA activities by:
 - a. Producing a blockchain-based database managed by the United Nations Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies to transparently and securely share the movement of dual-use chemicals with Member States and other relevant entities such as local authorities;
 - b. Implementing the database technology by:
 - i. Flagging and tracing illicit movement of dual-use chemicals;
 - ii. Using AI to create regional mapping to identify potential locations of NSAs;
 - c. Asking regional organizations to fund the database and disarmament activities through the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Activities by working through regional organizations like the African Union, Arab League, Pacific Island Forum, Balkans, and other organizations to enforce the database fund;
2. *Invites* regional organizations to train and educate officials regarding chemical weapons usage by:
 - a. Using regional organizations and United Nations affiliated training bodies such as UNODA;
 - b. Implementing yearly workshops and joint research projects through annual capacity-building workshops on chemical weapons identification, decontamination protocols, and emergency response technique;
 - c. Creating an annual Science and Technology Advisory Conference (STAC) to allow Member States to share expertise, best practices, and information on the threats and risks of emerging technologies, STAC would include industry and country experts and educators working to compose recommendations individualized to each Member State's needs with the inclusion of:
 - i. Biannual regional blocs summits with the OPCW to share national and regional concerns, effectiveness of operated programs, and development of consequent plans based on individual needs for the upcoming year through the implementation of OPCW;
 - ii. Funding by UNODA;

- d. Establishing Joint Regional Chemical weapons Research Hubs funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Activities to investigate detection and containment methods of chemical agents;
- 3. *Stresses* its desire to strengthen global intelligence by enhancing collaboration with INTERPOL, the United Nations, and national intelligence agencies to track and prevent the illicit use of chemical weapons;
- 4. *Proposes* the creation of an international dual-use chemical border communication forum (DCCF) with the implementation of the database between Member States managed by the OPCW Technical Secretariat including:
 - a. Flagging and tracing illicit movement of dual-use chemicals;
 - b. Calling Member States to enact stricter measures to regulate and monitor dual-use chemicals, including enhanced licensing systems, risk assessment, and real-time tracking mechanisms within supply chains to prevent their diversion for illicit purposes by NSAs;
 - c. Creating an alert system in cooperation with INTERPOL to ensure that suspicious movement of dual-use chemical products is treated accordingly;
 - d. Ensuring total access of local authorities to the forum;
 - e. Integrating AI-powered surveillance and detection systems at border control checkpoints, especially in high risk areas, in cooperation with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact;
 - f. Creating a UN-ChemTrackDatabase, a centralized and encrypted platform managed by UNODC to monitor, log, and analyze suspicious cross-border shipments;
 - g. Using AI to create regional mapping to identify potential locations of NSAs;
- 5. *Directs* OPCW to develop educational materials and region-specific training programs for law enforcement, military personnel, and chemical industry leaders on preventing the usage of chemical weapons by NSAs by:
 - a. Developing online and in-person training in multiple languages for different audiences to respond effectively to chemical attacks;
 - b. Sharing training materials that can be implemented and adapted by regional law enforcement cooperation agencies such as the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL);
 - c. Encouraging states and regions to utilize the existing Incident Response Team through INTERPOL partnered with AFRIPOL to assess and deploy teams of highly trained professionals to the requesting Member State within 12 to 24 hours of any incident, mitigating the damage of chemical weapon use by NSAs;
- 6. *Requests* Member States implement and enforce provisions of the CWC, particularly the clauses related to the proliferation of chemical weapons by NSAs by suggesting they:

- a. Establish task forces to monitor and enforce compliance with the CWC, including law enforcement and chemical companies;
 - b. Compile a report on random inspections of chemical facilities to share in an open forum at the biannual conference;
- 7. *Fosters* the cooperation between OPCW and Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) events, an educational and research platform that organizes events and disseminates information related to chemical weapons that:
 - a. Raises awareness about the dangerous consequences of chemical and biological weapons;
 - b. Offers a conscious and responsible debate between students;
- 8. *Urging* OPCW to form multilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNODA by:
 - a. Creating an algorithm that identifies common concerns between these agencies and determines the most pressing;
 - b. Hosting an annual meeting about the results of past initiatives, current common concerns and future action plans;
 - c. Organizing a joint team that assures the implementation of solutions;
- 9. *Encourages* the collaboration with the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) to conduct a study to find the impact of chemical weapon usage by NSAs on marginalized communities;
- 10. Encourages the creation of a voluntary regional forum which would meet annually in the capital of the Member States of OPCW to build up a better response capacity against chemical terrorism strengthening the cooperation between national personnel and the OPCW's Africa Programme personnel in:
 - a. Promoting joint training courses for human resources in their personal national frameworks and forcing exchanges between the staff of the willing states;
 - b. Cooperating for a complete adaptation of the national jurisdictions to the standards defined by article VII of the CWC;
 - c. Creating stable regional intervention forces which can provide the necessary help in case of chemical attacks in compliance with article X of CWC;
 - d. Building up a network of voluntary information sharing between bordering African states;
 - e. Promoting cooperation to improve the controls of chemical agents crossing at the checkpoints on the borders;
- 11. *Endorsing* educational and technical capacity building at different levels such as educational institutions and state officials through:
 - a. Facilitating the Chem4Good Fellowship which facilitates university students of Member States heavily affected by chemical weapons to study chemistry, the ethics behind

chemical usage, and eventually has a pathway to an internship or job position at OPCW in the Hague;

- b. Educating state officials of signatory and non-signatory states on the unfortunate deviant activities which take place while dual-use chemicals are in movement and get into the wrong hands, to further implore legislative changes regarding chemical weapons use;
 - c. Recommending the review and further development of existing legal frameworks and enforcement strategies with particular emphasis on regional coherence in order to combat chemical weapons proliferation;
 - d. Recommending to actively involve civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs in awareness campaigns and education initiatives, aimed at preventing chemical weapons proliferation;
 - e. Expressing the importance of education for all individuals and communities who may encounter or interact with chemicals attacks;
 - f. Encouraging the development of regional centers of excellence to train law enforcement and customs officials in identifying and mitigating chemical threats;
12. *Designates* a Voluntary Monetary Fund (VMF) to enable Member States to voluntarily commit funding as they deem necessary and sufficient to this program, noting the Balkan and Euro-Asian regions to be committed to committing funds to the VMF due to regional connection;
13. *Encourages* Member States to join in pledging support to this program through military training initiatives such as those proven effective in combating terrorism in partnership with the Libyan National Army (LNA) (2016) and financial support through the VMF;
14. *Encourages* Member States to stand in a strict zero-tolerance policy approach in regard of the deployment and possession of chemical weapons, especially by NSAs by:
- a. Inviting Member States to continue destroying existing chemical weapon supply to remove opportunities for NSAs to get chemical weapons;
 - b. Supporting the strengthening of national chemical intervention structures through fact-checking missions led by the OPCW Technical Secretariat;
15. *Recommends* the development of a comprehensive framework for public-private partnership between Member States, NGOs, and the chemical industry to ensure compliance with export controls and promote responsible practices in handling chemical precursors, where this framework should include regular information exchange mechanisms between governments and private stakeholders regarding best practices and risks related to chemical precursors, including:
- a. Joint training programs for industry and enforcement bodies on recognizing and reporting suspicious transactions;
 - b. A certification system for companies that comply with international standards on chemical precursor handling;
 - c. A monitoring and reporting system to track effectiveness and implemented practices and identify gaps;

16. *Encourages* the development of regional-based and sub-regional forums and partnerships focusing on capacity building that address the unique issues and dynamics within specific geographical areas;
17. *Focusing* on the integration and creation of the Sahel Counter-Chemical Trafficking Initiative (SCTI) under the OPCW by:
 - a. Designing an intelligence network that focuses on monitoring activity by NSAs concerning the distribution of chemical weapons;
 - b. Supporting the creation of a multi-source financing model, drawing from the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC) contribution for training programs;
 - c. Partnering with the UNCTC to fund the further expansion of forensic technology for tracking precursor chemicals and improving border security infrastructure;
 - d. Increasing forensic research collaborations with chemical security to develop more advanced detection methods for tracking illicit precursors;
 - e. Enhancing border security technology with the capability to detect chemical residue in imports as well as NSAs that attempt to cross borders with illicit chemicals;
18. *Encourages* the implementation of the Anti Chem Alliance (ACA) for monitoring and prevention of the purchase of chemical weapons by ensuring states perform stricter border controls by inspecting deliveries without slowing down transport times and registrations of the production and transportation of chemical weapons, in order to keep track of movement of substances used for the production of chemical weapons by:
 - a. Deploying more border patrols on critical areas to ensure faster and more searches;
 - b. Pursuing random controls of deliveries more often;
 - c. Implementing technologies to scan the load of every logistic transport vehicle leaving and entering the country;
19. *Calls upon* Member States to implement a comprehensive international support program to assist in strengthening chemical security by:
 - a. Establishing updated and unified regulations by providing unique tracking IDs and mandatory weighing and documentation at each checkpoint for the import of chemical weapon components, so that every potentially dangerous substance is to be listed in a data bank for the whole transportation process with every step recorded and weighed to avoid misplacement;
 - b. Strengthening national legal frameworks related to chemical weapon prevention, and the establishment of a station to safely dispose of unused or broken chemicals so that no embezzlement can take place;
 - c. Streamlining chemical monitoring and control systems at production processes to ensure strict regulation of chemical production, trade, and usage;

20. *Suggests* offering help to victims suffering from attacks with chemical weapons by offering reaction help and implementing damage limitations with the help from ECOWAS by:
- a. Developing emergency plans by experts and the World Health Organization and offering response teams which consist of doctors and chemical weapons experts and are always in stand-by in every country with Doctors Without Borders who help on site and train additional staff;
 - b. Building emergency medical and technical capacities to deal with chemical attacks consisting of container settlements for rapid construction;
 - c. Establishing opportunities to enable victims of chemical weapons to re-enter a fulfilling life through a job opportunity facility;
21. *Suggests* increased collaboration between Member States and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) through the strengthening of existing task forces, including the AFRIPOL and the Regional Counter-Terrorism Task Force (RCTF) under the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), dedicated to combating the proliferation of chemical weapons through improved intelligence sharing and coordinated enforcement actions to:
- a. Monitor and prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons across borders, especially in high-risk regions;
 - b. Facilitate structured and secure intelligence-sharing channels, including the establishment of regional intelligence databases accessible to verified national authorities;
 - c. Conduct joint training exercises for law enforcement, customs, and border control personnel to identify and intercept chemical precursors and related materials;
 - d. Coordinate cross-border investigations and enforcement operations targeting trafficking networks;
 - e. Investigate and secure both active and abandoned chemical production sites, and eliminate security threats therein;
22. *Calls upon* Member States to enhance information sharing and cooperation with the OPCW's Centre for Chemistry and Technology, particularly in the area of developing and deploying AI-based technologies for detecting and preventing the diversion of dual-use chemicals by NSAs through:
- a. Establishing national focal points to coordinate with the Centre for Chemistry and Technology and facilitating timely data exchange on suspicious transactions and trafficking patterns;
 - b. Participating in pilot programs and joint research initiatives hosted by the Centre for Chemistry and Technology to train national experts in AI-driven chemical monitoring and risk assessment;
 - c. Contributing anonymized data on chemical imports, exports, and usage patterns to support the development of predictive AI models;

- d. Supporting the creation of a secure, cloud-based platform for real-time threat detection, allowing authorized national agencies to access risk alerts generated by the AI systems;
- e. Organizing regional workshops in collaboration with the Centre for Chemistry and Technology to build capacity among law enforcement and chemical industry stakeholders in using AI-tools for chemical security.



Code: OPCW/1/2

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Recalling the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC) (1993) and the mandate of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to eliminate chemical weapons and prevent their proliferation,

Acknowledging the work of the Temporary Working Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI) towards the integration of AI and machine learning technologies into the operations of the OPCW,

Further acknowledging the role that the CWC plays in preventing the use of chemical weapons and the acquisition of Non-State Actors (NSAs), as well as articles IX and XI that emphasize cooperation among States parties and technological development, respectively,

Affirming article VII, paragraph 4 of the CWC obligates states to nominate a National Authority as a central actor for effective communication within the organization,

Reaffirming under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) that Member States are prohibited from providing any form of support to NSAs attempting to develop, transfer, possess, or use chemical weapons, specifically for terrorist prevention,

Taking note of General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015) in its establishment of measures for international engagement for sustainable development,

Emphasizing the threat posed by chemical weapons, their precursors, and especially their use by NSAs, by also highlighting the connection of the illicit use of chemical substances and their harm to the environment, as specifically highlighted in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13 (climate action),

Appreciating General Assembly resolution 79/1 (2024) which recognizes the global rise of catastrophic and existential risks and the need to begin in multilateralism for a better future for our society,

Deeply concerned with the accumulation of chemical weapons stockpiles in unstable regions, particularly those affected by government turnover or recent political upheavals, where the risk of diversion to NSAs is significantly heightened,

Deeply concerned by the increasing use of widely available dual-use chemicals like chlorine in chemical attacks by NSAs and by the lack of clarity regarding action when NSAs use a chemical weapon,

Acknowledging the importance of collaboration between governments and the private sector,

Keeping in mind underlying international development frameworks, SDGs 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), and 17 (partnerships for the goals), as possible reference points for fostering cooperation, institutional resilience, and innovation in addressing shared challenges,

Recognizing regional approaches in normalizing rules and regulations addressed in the CWC, such as, the Basic Training Course on Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons for Arabic Speaking States parties (2016),

Recognizing the potential for fruitful collaboration between OPCW and non-government organizations (NGOs), such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in raising public awareness and engagement on the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons by NSAs, noting NTI's expertise in designing impactful communications campaigns and mobilizing a wide range of state and NSAs to build political will and foster systemic change in the field of weapons of mass destruction risk reduction,

Recalling the Scientific Advisory Board's (SAB) AI Research Project, which opened the door for researchers to help bolster OPCW's ability to respond to the re-emergence of chemical weapons,

Reaffirming Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) that impose on all Member States the prohibition of the use of chemicals by NSAs,

Aware of the grave threat posed by the potential misuse of chemical technology in the production, spread, and use of chemical weapons, and deeply concerned by the continuous increase in chemical attacks carried out by NSAs,

Recalling the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) and their provision of non-biased OPCW lead teams for the identification of the perpetrators of chemical weapon use in Syria,

Acknowledging the success of OPCW's Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS) as a secure platform that has enhanced transparency and accountability in the declaration processes under articles III and VI of the CWC,

Recognizing the necessity for continuous improvement of verification and monitoring mechanisms to prevent the diversion of chemicals for prohibited purposes,

Emphasising the need for Member States to enforce sanctions, government investigations, and national regulations against NSAs complicit in chemical weapons trafficking, in addition to international cooperation for prosecution through the International Criminal Court,

Reaffirming the commitment to the principles of humanitarianism and collective security in addressing the challenges posed by chemical weapons proliferation,

Recognizing the lack of training programs across all regions,

Recognizing the importance of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) related to training on disaster relief,

Recognizing the importance of the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations concerning training on disaster relief,

Recognizing the importance of the Organization for Defending Victims of Chemical Weapons in training on disaster relief,

Mindful of the positive impact of the Basic Training Course on Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons for Arabic-speaking States parties (2016),

Acknowledging the Conference of State Parties as the principal decision-making body of the OPCW,

1. *Urges* the expansion of the OPCW EDIS to include the cross-border movement of dual-use and precursor chemicals transnationally through:
 - a. Encouraging States parties to establish a tiered, permissioned-access system within the EDIS that grants designated bodies, specifically manufacturers of dual-use chemicals and operators of transportation networks, access to aggregate, non-sensitive data on dual-use chemical transfers to identify supply chain vulnerabilities, validate national reports, and further strengthen compliance and global security directly by:
 - i. Urging States parties to incorporate direct quantitative submissions through their National Authority established by article VII, paragraph IV of the CWC;
 - ii. Encouraging OPCW, in consultation with designated bodies, to develop standardized protocols and technical guidelines for the integration, verification, and validation of data provided by EDIS reporting;
 - iii. Suggesting for the tiered system to have the first tier destined to industry partners and reserved for submitting tracking data to EDIS, the intermediary tier of data about allowing data access from States parties to the data of their industries, and the third tier reserved for OPCW allowing access to all data present in EDIS;
 - b. Collaborating with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the World Customs Organization, the European Union's Database on Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals, and regional organizations for chemical disarmament;
 - c. Expanding the type of data collected to include:
 - i. Cross-border movement or exports of chemicals, especially high-value transactions;
 - ii. Individuals and organizations who partake in these transactions;
 - iii. Individuals and organizations involved in past violations;
 - d. Permitting States parties, with the approval of OPCW, to access relevant information when presenting substantiated concerns regarding potential chemical weapons threats, while ensuring safeguards are in place to prevent misuse of such information;
 - e. Deciding to review the data collected within EDIS on an annual basis, with a view to adjusting measures as needed to further strengthen compliance, accountability, and global security, where the review will be conducted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat and will aim to pinpoint security gaps and develop best practices;
2. *Requests* that capacity-building initiatives and technical assistance programs be expanded to ensure that both national authorities and designated industry partners are equipped with the necessary tools and expertise to implement and oversee this enhanced data-sharing mechanism under article III and article VII of the CWC, referring to General Assembly resolution 79/1 (2024);

3. *Requests* States parties to reevaluate and reinforce their individualized commitments to obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 by voluntarily sharing chemical weapon possessions and security regulations with an international database;
4. *Encourages* States parties to establish a Controlled Goods Act or equivalent regulatory framework that:
 - a. Ensures monitoring of the distribution of dual-use chemicals, thereby limiting their availability to NSAs through multiple methods, including but not limited to end-use verification, enhanced border control, and chemical tracing programs through unique chemical signatures;
 - b. Implements oversight mechanisms for the development, storage, and distribution of blueprints and technological inventions with potentially harmful applications;
5. *Urges* States parties to revisit the national authority of OPCW established in accordance with article VII of the CWC to ensure agreements with OPCW to consider and involve current difficulties facing the OPCW;
6. *Recommends* the Conference of States parties to establish Technology Research Challenges (TRC), echoing the OPCW 2024 AI Research Challenge, on relevant technologies decided during their Review Conferences every 5 years, to utilize the international community to enhance the OPCW's ability to respond by:
 - a. Creating outlines of technologies identified as capable of improving the OPCW's ability to respond to the emergence of chemical weapons;
 - b. Creating requirements for research proposals that fit the current needs of the OPCW;
 - c. Discussing incentives and their source, potentially including funding from States parties and the SAB;
7. *Recommends* the expansion of international funding mechanisms such as the International Cooperation and Assistance network to provide operative and technical assistance to developing states that lack resources to fully implement their non-proliferation obligations through the:
 - a. Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Prevention Fund to finance the development of national laws, enforcement mechanisms and institutional frameworks in developing states;
 - b. Incentivization of contributions by States parties that provide support to lower economically developed States parties;
8. *Calls upon* its States parties to facilitate verifications of dual-use chemicals and their declared end-users on a regular basis during OPCW inspections of relevant manufacturing facilities, while respecting confidentiality thresholds;
9. *Recommends* to continually review chemical substances that pose a considerable risk in their application as chemical weapons or their precursors in order to enhance stricter controls and supervision on the production and sale to prevent them from being accessed by unauthorized groups and individuals;

10. *Recommends* the further development of policies on safe storage and disposal measures for chemical weapons and chemical substances of high risk to establish international standards to minimize negative environmental impact while also preventing NSAs from accessing them by cooperating with specialized agencies to monitor and assess the environmental safety of disposal processes;
11. *Encourages* the expansion of the Conference of States parties in order for it to:
 - a. Exclusively focus on preventing and prosecuting non-state use of chemical weapons, similar to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
 - b. Mandate minimum legislative standards by including enforcement benchmarks to be met by all States parties;
 - c. Institutionalize cooperation between other United Nations bodies such as the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, INTERPOL Chemical Weapons threat units, and the World Customs Organization;
12. *Recommends* the establishment of regional workshops in the vernacular language of different regions, like the Basic Training Course on Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons for Arabic Speaking States parties (2016), in order to address the particular obstacles that NSAs possessing chemical weapons pose to national security;
13. *Implores* States parties to cooperate and act in accordance with OPCW and seek regional policy frameworks for cooperation and communication with NSAs, as well as newly formed states, to support the CWC in post-conflict measures on chemical disarmament and identification;
14. *Emphasizes* the need for fellow States parties to implement sanctions and government investigations against private sector companies that are complicit in the transaction of chemical materials that have been used for the manufacturing of Weapons of Mass Destruction;
15. *Recommends* all States parties to implement national regulations regarding the illicit trafficking of chemical weapons and sanctions for individuals, groups, or authorities associated with terrorism or chemical attacks by:
 - a. Requiring strengthening OPCW inspections and compliance mechanisms by increasing the frequency and number of border inspections of the distribution of chemical weapons;
 - b. Considering frameworks such as the European Union's common foreign and security policy, where all States parties from all around the world would impose travel bans and freeze assets on chemical weapons perpetrators;
16. *Recommends* that States parties strengthen partnerships with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL to work on capacity-building programs in areas of border control and illicit trafficking for preparedness and coordinated response;
17. *Strengthens* prosecution as well as investigation and legislative mechanisms to end the impunity of NSAs by:
 - a. Urging criminalizing and implementing harsher penalties on NSAs recognized under international law for the possession of illegal ingredients used to manufacture dual-use materials and chemical weapons;

- b. Encouraging States parties of international extradition of NSAs complicit in chemical weapons production and trade to the International Criminal Court to face prosecution under the Rome Statute or to face prosecution through national courts in cooperation with United Nations agencies;
 - c. Supporting the cooperation within the international community to help countries to integrate and strengthen their national legislative frameworks on the prosecution of NSAs;
- 18. *Establishes* the Salgado Regional Summit Program, working with regional and intra-governmental organizations to better educate government officials and company executives on the prevention of the use and creation of chemical weapons relevant to the specific region the summit is occurring in, specifically about NSAs by:
 - a. Serving as an extension of the Basic Training Course on Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons for Arabic-speaking States parties (2016), to address the particular obstacles that NSAs possessing chemical weapons pose to national security;
 - b. Meeting annually with sessions including, but not limited to:
 - i. Data-driven roundtable-style discussions between states to allow for collaboration on solutions to issues;
 - ii. Training from NGOs, such as the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations, the Organization for Defending Victims of Chemical Weapons, the ICRC, the Danish Demining Group, and experts on how to respond when or if a chemical weapon is used and on disaster relief programs;
 - iii. Discussion regarding the current standing of regional legal and ethical frameworks in the regions where frameworks exist and the creation of regional legal and ethical frameworks in regions where frameworks do not exist;
 - iv. Expert-led sessions on issues surrounding chemical weapons prevention that are relevant to the region, including but not limited to AI and its use in reference to chemical weapons;
 - c. Focusing on NSAs' use of chemical weapons and not States parties;
- 19. *Appeals* for the integration of AI and machine learning technologies into the operations of OPCW to provide a stronger ability to prevent the use of chemical weapons by NSAs through:
 - a. Asking the IIT to introduce legal and ethical frameworks with a better promotion of impartial investigations led by unbiased OPCW teams, using AI in coordination with agencies that are under the United Nations and establishing oversight and accountability mechanisms to allow for transparency surrounding any OPCW use of AI tools;
 - b. Fostering better cooperation and intelligence sharing with agencies such as the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to provide technical support and reinforce transparency in AI-assisted operations;

- c. Reinforcing a global safeguard system that integrates AI and machine learning that has the capability of detecting suspicious patterns and trends of chemical trafficking activities with a database that is able to monitor and track manufactures' transactions of chemicals;
- 20. *Requests* States parties to adopt ecologically innovative and energy efficient hardware in the operational practices that enable AI to be used in monitoring, tracking, and prevention by:
 - a. Ensuring nations that operate AI-related infrastructure to report their pollutant emissions related to AI usage;
 - b. Using the temporary working group on AI to perform research on the environmental impacts and optimization of the manipulation of AI technologies;
- 21. *Advises* establishing a permanent research institute, expanding on the work done by the temporary working group on AI under the supervision of the OPCW Centre of Technology that focuses on:
 - a. Implementation of data-driven AI solutions to analyze the trade of dual-use chemicals to improve the investigation ability into violations;
 - b. Looking into ethical frameworks and best practices to deal with the use of AI by NSAs to acquire chemical weapons;
 - c. Cooperation between the States parties and bodies of OPCW and relevantly approved academia to best address the emerging and evolving use of AI.



Code: OPCW/1/3

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Considering the commitments addressed by the States parties of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC)* (1992),

Reaffirming the concerns expressed in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and its subsequent resolutions 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011), and 2365 (2016) about the threat of non-state actors (NSAs) acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the prohibition of all state actors from providing any form of support to NSAs seeking to acquire WMD, related materials, or their means of delivery,

Bearing in mind the provisions enshrined in articles IX, X, XI, and XII of the CWC, which collectively emphasize the importance of verification, international cooperation, assistance and protection, and enforcement measures, particularly the destruction of chemical weapons and the consequences of non-compliance,

Recalling further the principles agreed with the World Customs Organization (WCO) on the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 13 January 2007, such as preventing the misuse of toxic chemicals, promoting the peaceful use of chemistry, and contributing to a safer world,

Deeply alarmed by the lack of coordinated regional efforts to bolster security and training measures,

Emphasizing the rising threat of NSAs seeking to obtain and use chemical weapons in civilian-targeted attacks,

Fully alarmed by the 383 terrorist chemical weapons attacks that have been committed by NSAs in the context of war in the past 50 years according to the Global Terrorism Database,

Cognizant of the sheer amount of dual-use chemicals on the market at the current time,

Viewing with apprehension the risks of unsecured borders,

Approving a multi-pronged approach focused on the budgetary, intelligence, and security aspects of preventing NSAs from gaining possession of chemical weapons,

Cognizant of increasing training measures similar to the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Initiative, which focused on helping identify and neutralize explosives, detecting illicit storage of chemical agents, and sharing surveillance of NSAs in possession of chemical weapons,

Recognizing the potential dangers that come with laboratories throughout the world selling dual-use chemical byproducts, often chemical weapon precursors, to governments and private entities,

Stressing the importance of promoting regional approaches to security mechanisms to better mitigate the issue of NSAs accessing chemical weapons,

Deeply concerned about the communication gaps and overall misalignment between states and NSAs, and the need to bridge political differences to ensure the protection of people across borders,

1. *Supports* the use of the newly developed Weapon Acquisition and Refraining from Seeing Acts of War (WARSAW) pact for funding grants to individual laboratories to:
 - a. Provide economic incentives for laboratories to dispose of precursor chemicals safely;
 - b. Provide safe procedures, the correct resources, and unique waste drop-off sites to aid in the process of disposal of dual-use chemicals commonly found in laboratories;
2. *Calls for* an increase in technical assistance for border officials and monitoring officials from all adhering States parties to the OPCW by 2030 through the implementation of workshops and training centers to further equip said officials by providing them with ways to enhance their capacity to effectively control the trans-border trade of strategic goods through:
 - a. Effective collaboration with the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC), OPCW, WCO, and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to ensure inter-agency cooperation, and further nurture a network of focal points within government structures and international organizations;
 - b. Regional implementation of said workshops, targeting local contexts to provide solutions adapted to existing issues;
 - c. The development of draft implementation roadmaps that specifically identify the ministries or agencies responsible for implementing certain obligations, as well as which international organizations or states may be able to provide further assistance;
 - d. The detailed review of the existing legislation prescribing different responsibilities of different authorities in States parties, enabling participants from different organizations to understand what other authorities do and to identify modalities of cooperation for achieving their common goals more effectively;
 - e. The deployment of OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) units to monitor sectors such as border control, military installations, chemical manufacturers, and arms licensing agencies;
 - f. The establishment of regional chemical security training centers, including proposed hubs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which will serve to train and certify experts in chemical weapons detection, forensic evidence, customs control, and emergency response capabilities, through collaboration with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to partner in these efforts by contributing to curriculum development, facilitating the deployment of qualified instructors or technical mentors, and assisting in the organization of multinational simulation exercises;
3. *Urges* every State party to enact and enforce domestic laws that govern the export of dual-use chemicals by article VII of the CWC, including:
 - a. Strengthening sanctions, trade restrictions, and criminal prosecutions on individuals or organizations found guilty of unlawfully exporting dual-use chemicals;

- b. The need for periodic review and updates of national control lists to reflect technological advancements and emerging risks;
- 4. *Implores* the establishment of a shared international chemical export watchlist to detect substances of concern and monitor questionable export patterns, which can be paired with a newly established single export license system that is available to the appropriate national authorities to maintain transparency and prevent document manipulation or forgery to:
 - a. Improve collaboration between national customs authorities using mechanisms for exchanging real-time information to identify and stop the export of chemicals that are either unlawful or suspect;
 - b. Use risk assessment algorithms in these systems to identify possible connections to suspect end users or non-state entities;
 - c. Compare export licenses to global watchlists of recognized terrorist groups and NSAs engaged in the trafficking of chemicals;
- 5. *Supports* the establishment of regional centers of excellence for chemical security, particularly in developing regions, to share best practices and technical assistance on export control enforcement to:
 - a. Encourage these regional centers of excellence to collaborate with international organizations, such as OPCW, to:
 - i. Facilitate training programs, joint research initiatives, and the development of standardized protocols to strengthen national chemical security frameworks;
 - ii. Carry out cooperative audits and inspections of chemical exporting firms to ensure adherence to export regulations and stop insider threats;
- 6. *Emphasizes* the significance of highlighting a balance between non-proliferation and peaceful use of chemicals, making sure that stricter export regulations don't obstruct the fields of science, industry, and medicine;
- 7. *Further encourages* all States parties to recognize the crucial need to reinforce their domestic legislation by paying attention to Security Council resolution 1540, including:
 - a. Adopting stricter, appropriate, and effective laws about controlling all activities related to the production, use, and distribution of dual-use chemicals;
 - b. Criminalizing the possession of these WMDs;
 - c. Using algorithms in tracking dual-use chemicals and persons of interest;
- 8. *Urges* the Director-General to promote the creation of a novel due-diligence guideline directed by OPCW to enhance the security mechanisms among transportation and the risks of transporting diversion and hijacking, which shall contain:
 - a. The adoption of the "Know Your Client" rule for the dual-use chemical producers to ensure the safe delivery of these hazardous chemicals;

- b. The strengthening of the responsibility scheme for the chemical producer, transporter, and final holder;
 - c. Building upon the framework laid out by the “Indicative Guidelines for Safe and Secure Transport of Hazardous Chemicals by Road;”
- 9. *Strongly encourages* the Director-General to promote the creation of a Safe-Transport Label (STL) for those companies that comply with the guideline promoted, recognizing, tracking, and verifying the safer industries to transport dual-use chemicals;
- 10. *Recommends* a rephrasing of Security Council resolution 1540 to expand the definition of chemical weapons use, including:
 - a. Modern, fast-growing technologies that may aid in the transportation and creation of chemical weapons;
 - b. An emphasis on adopting and enforcing laws that criminalize possession, acquisition, and transportation of chemical weapons by NSAs or actors not recognized by the United Nations and the state institutions funding these actors;
 - c. The condemnation of any States party enabling NSAs or actors not recognized by the United Nations to acquire or use chemical weapons through proxy by further noting instances in which logistical or tactical alignment between NSAs and States parties have emerged, and recommends enhanced oversight and investigation into such affiliations under the framework of the CWC;
 - d. Encouragement of multilateral dialogue to identify and monitor patterns of indirect support to NSAs in conflict zones;
- 11. *Advises* that all states adopt and enforce domestic controls over nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials to prevent their proliferation;
- 12. *Strongly advises* an algorithm and human personnel to check flagged individuals with the help of the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T), [International Criminal Police Organization](#) (INTERPOL), United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), and local intelligence networks, where the algorithm would ping people of interest and intelligence officers would look into these individuals or parties to see if they are actual threats through:
 - a. Encouraging cooperation on the creation of checkpoints and training of personnel with assistance by other States parties which would be strictly voluntary for States parties, but would allow states to help orchestrate training events that would educate on how to detect these transfers of hazardous materials through the use of the algorithm;
 - b. Requesting the use of blockchain to determine if there are questionable transactions taking place, specifically with the transportation of chemical materials and tracking of their locations;
- 13. *Emphasizes* the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of inspections at chemical weapons facilities to reduce the risk of these weapons being obtained by NSAs by:
 - a. Replacing permanent inspection teams with 100-day contract-based teams;

- b. Creating regional resource centers that will share best practices and spearhead innovations on local and regional detection and tracking efforts;
14. *Recommends* Technology Enhancement Grants to fund research into improved detection and tracking of dual-use chemicals by:
- a. Supporting the integration of AI algorithms or blockchain to enhance transparency and efficiency in chemical transactions;
 - b. Creating regional resource centers that will share best practices and spearhead innovations on local and regional detection and tracking efforts;
 - c. Creating capacity-building measures supported by the fund to strengthen confidence-building regimes in developing and vulnerable regions, and prevent access to chemical weapons through the:
 - i. Creation of a subsidiary body for managing the integration of AI algorithms or blockchain led by a board of 6 members from each continent (North America, South America, Asia, Africa, Oceania, Europe) that would be chosen by the Scientific Advisory Board within OPCW, trained by the Verification Research Training and Information Center, and enforced by INTERPOL;
 - ii. Implementation of current standards on the trade of chemical technology and materials by Member States with strong chemical research and technology industries;
 - iii. Promotion of measures to facilitate purchases for civilian purposes, assess potential risks, and build platforms to allow the sharing of information between private and public actors within a country to combat the trade of illicit chemical technology further;
 - iv. Adaptation of existing frameworks in organizations like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to support local needs and encourage border security practices to monitor trade across borders;
15. *Encourages* the chemical industry to support the joint work made by the States parties through multiple incentives, such as:
- a. A parallel Public-Private Partnership (PPP) dialogue forum regarding the requirement for private and public companies to list the comings and goings of these chemicals;
 - b. The promotion of open dialogue and transparency between large and small companies;
 - c. The promotion of an “OPCW Safe” recognition for those who address the initiatives, guidelines, principles, and security mechanisms promoted by the Conferences of the States Parties (CSP), such as the Safe-Transport Label (STP) promoted in clause no. 9;
16. *Encourages* collaboration with the United Nations Human Rights Council to conduct a study to find the impact of chemical weapon usage by NSAs on marginalized communities.



Code: OPCW/1/4

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Emphasizing the need for inclusive and transparent national security initiatives that address country-specific challenges while ensuring balanced gender participation in peace and security efforts, in line with international best practices and the spirit of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security,

Bearing in mind that, according to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), over one million people have suffered from chemical weapons since World War I, and acknowledging the special responsibility towards victim care,

Recalling the United Nations/Austria Symposium and the UNISPACE+50 Symposium, which facilitated information sharing between Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and Developed Nations,

Acknowledging the importance of the *Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare* (1925) (Geneva Protocol) which prohibits the use of chemical weapons in war, to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in relation to current international events, while also recognizing that the Geneva Protocol must be updated to further protect Member States from modern weapons and technology,

Noting the ongoing threat of non-state actors (NSAs) acquiring and using chemical weapons in at-risk areas and threatening international security worldwide, and the corresponding illicit trade networks that thwart international efforts of control and proliferate chemical weapons and precursors,

Reminding Member States of the difficult experience of SIDS and LDCs in securing their borders against chemical weapons trafficking due to limited resources and technical deficits,

Underlining the importance of international cooperation and information sharing on a global level in alignment with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) as established by General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015) in order to work towards a more sustainable and peaceful world,

Recognizing the current state of global distrust that stifles non-proliferation efforts and the repeated calls from the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) for solidarity and cooperative management of the global supply chain as the only way to prevent precursor and dual-use chemicals from getting into the wrong hands,

Noting also the consequent inefficiency of global trade data platforms – particularly in countries with a significant degree of instability – in managing scheduled dual-use chemicals and the critical need for a global ledger that delivers secure and timely information for the non-proliferation of chemical weapons across borders,

Taking into account statistics recorded by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, that multiple new chemical weapons are discovered every day, and the disproportionate capacity of SIDS and LDCs to address the danger of chemical weapons,

Reaffirming the importance of internationally-available systems in order to strengthen cooperation and to address security concerns in regards to chemical production, storage, and transportation by bringing together private industry, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and government representatives,

Acknowledging the potential of blockchain technology, though not yet widely utilized, to improve the tracking and monitoring of chemical weapons and precursors through secure and tamper-proof data recording, as exemplified by the active research of organizations such as the Stimson Center which have already produced working prototypes of blockchain platforms optimized for the tracking of dual-use chemicals,

Keeping in mind the purposes of the Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre) as an institution for collaborating with Member States, especially in the areas of knowledge sharing and technical collaboration,

Conscious of the significant work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in overseeing the carriage of dangerous goods but noting the restricted applicability of its mandate to the smuggling of chemical weapons and precursors,

Reiterating the capability and methodology of collaboration between international, state, and local law enforcement as well as international intelligence agencies to provide maximum intelligence sharing capability,

Reaffirming the importance of the steps already made in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) about preventing –through international and national controls – NSAs from attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes,

Calling to mind Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) which called for a Joint Investigative Mechanism designed to identify individuals, entities, groups, or governments responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war in order to emphasize the importance of the Syrian Arab Republic in fully participating in the regulations of the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC),

Mindful of the growing threat posed by the acquisition and misuse of chemicals by NSAs, in particular in areas of instability and conflict, and the urgent need for effective export control mechanisms in order to prevent the development of chemical weapons by NSAs,

Conscious of article V of the CWC, which highlights the necessity of the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities and stockpiles,

Recalling also the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* (UNTOC) (2000) and the *Hague Ethical Guidelines* (2005),

Believing in General Assembly resolution 70/1 which established the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to work towards a more sustainable and peaceful world, specifically SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions),

Taking into consideration the impressive and relevant work of the United Nations High-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence (HLABAI) and UNISPACE+50 Symposium,

Deeply alarmed by the rapidly increasing threat of NSAs acquiring and using chemical weapons through illicit channels and a rapid increasing number of chemical ingredient reserves transported across territorial boundaries by unidentified and unmonitored NSAs fueled by illicitly-obtained funds,

Acknowledging the importance of the *Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare* (1925) (Geneva Protocol) which prohibits the use of chemical weapons in war, to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW in relation to current international events, while also recognizing that the Geneva Protocol must be updated to further protect Member States from modern weapons and technology,

Observing the great challenge that border security organizations face in detecting the smuggling of precursors to chemical weapons, especially in regions where border security and customs is underdeveloped or absent,

Recalling devastating attacks by NSAs in the Middle Eastern and Asia resulting in loss of unnecessary life and damage to the environment,

Guided by the potential of regional cooperation to rapidly respond to potential threats,

Declaring an essentiality of regional cooperation with the Australia Group (AG), SIDS and Middle Eastern States,

Recognizing regionalistic approaches in normalizing rules and regulations addressed in the CWC, such as the OPCW collaborating within the region of the Middle East on the Basic Training Course on Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons for Arabic Speaking States Parties (2016) as an example of States Parties normalizing chemical weapon norms and regulations within regions affected by NSAs,

Taking note of the lacking discussion at international and regional conferences and fora surrounding non-State actor attacks, where these gatherings prioritize deliberation over governmental entities while leaving a void of restrictions and efforts pertaining to NSAs,

Emphasizing the need for greater international and regional organization cross-collaboration pursuant to SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) in order to curb the influence of NSAs and their access to chemical weapons,

Referring to the OPCW charter agreed on not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone, obligating Member States to cooperate with other States parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations,

Reiterating the purpose of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, which seeks to dismantle stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction within Middle Eastern countries with specific emphasis on chemical weapons,

Desiring to work with other international organizations such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNODA to encourage interagency cooperation:

1. *Recommends* that the international community enhance collaboration among international, national, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies by implementing regional chemical security training centers and capacity-building workshops, which will:

- a. Serve to train and certify experts in chemical weapons detection, forensic evidence, customs control, and emergency response capabilities;
 - b. Develop comprehensive methodologies and standardized procedures for intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination specifically related to chemical weapon threats posed by NSAs and enable Member States to detect, respond to, and mitigate incidents involving chemical weapons;
 - c. Establish detailed security protocols and best-practice guidelines for secure communication channels, effective response measures, and preventive security operations against the trafficking and illicit use of chemical substances;
2. *Requests* Member States to launch global campaigns to highlight the plight of chemical weapons victims, and to mobilize public and political support in collaboration with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to raise awareness of the risks of chemical weapons, particularly in vulnerable and conflict-affected regions which:
 - a. Propose the establishment of regional rehabilitation centers using existing healthcare infrastructure and emphasizes the importance of specialized training programs for healthcare professionals to equip them with the necessary skills to effectively treat chemical weapons victims;
 - b. Highlight the dangers of chemical weapons and their long term impact on the human body, in particular with regard to women and children;
 - c. Encourage Member States to broaden educational initiatives focused on the dangers of chemical weapons, particularly in vulnerable countries, integrating awareness programs into national curricula to inform youth about the ethical, legal, and humanitarian consequences of chemical weapons;
3. *Calls for* the creation of regional research initiatives and symposiums to alert and inform LDCs/SIDS nations on chemical weapons which:
 - a. Model themselves after the United Nations/Austria Symposium and the UNISPACE+50 Symposium;
 - b. Call upon established regional boards to send representative attendees from all capable Member States at annual international meetings based on the structure of the UNISPACE+50 symposium, which delves into technology and LDC involvement;
 - c. Advocate for private entities to also attend these symposiums and present their research to attending National Boards of advisors, allowing them to share any relevant research, if they wish to do so;
 - d. Understand the role of public-private partnership in regards to equitable development towards the fight against chemical weapons;
 - e. Disperse scientific knowledge that enhances the contributions of LDCs in Earth's greater mission of chemical peace and allows for equitable resource allocation amongst developed nations, developing nations, and relevant private entities;

4. *Urges* Member States to institutionalise OPCW Regional Training Hubs, focusing on capacity-building for LDCs by:
 - a. Expanding upon existing training systems or institutions including the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense School, ensuring cost efficiency and authenticity;
 - b. Delivering standardized curricula on chemical detection, protective gear use, and emergency decontamination;
5. *Suggests* the expansion of public information campaigns in regions vulnerable to extremism, with focuses placed on:
 - a. Discrediting extremist narratives that glorify the use of violence or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) promoting peaceful alternatives and resilience-building in affected youth populations;
 - b. Supporting international workshops and digital platforms that share best practices for preventing the spread of chemical weapon knowledge to NSAs;
 - c. Instructing civil society organizations, religious institutions, and local leaders to promote community-based education and counter-radicalization efforts;
6. *Supports* the enhancement of existing OPCW reporting and analysis capabilities by facilitating the structured integration of data from National Authorities, the Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM), and voluntary submissions under Security Council resolution 1540 into a centralized analytical function within the Technical Secretariat that would:
 - a. Collate trends in chemical weapon and precursor interceptions linked to NSAs;
 - b. Produce periodic assessments to support early warning, capacity-building, and risk-based resource allocation among Member States;
7. *Recommends* the expansion of information-sharing procedures within the OPCW's Knowledge Management System and capacity building initiatives, encouraging Member States to submit relevant open-source, intelligence-led, or case-based data on suspected non-state actors acquisition or use of chemical weapons and precursors which would support the development of a regularly updated threat picture, coordinated with the 1540 Committee and other relevant UN bodies, to better inform technical assistance efforts and targeted regional training programs;
8. *Calls for* Member States to use a system with automatized analysis and update tracking of new data of the data-base of arms control in accordance with the *Arms Trade Treaty* (ATT) to control an appearance of new chemical weapons or components for them and their proliferation;
9. *Supports* the implementation of existing prototype technologies developed by independently funded research NGOs that entail a digital network system built on blockchain technology or equally secure databases as an authoritative, distributed ledger for global trade data of schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals in order to enhance existing cooperation over supply chain security by:
 - a. Founding data sharing on dependable validation mechanisms unique to blockchain technology that will make data more usable for Member States and Interpol;

- b. Presenting a more attractive information sharing network for Member States on chemicals transported across borders by:
 - i. Establishing an encrypted platform for transparency that ensures both privacy and communication;
 - ii. Facilitating instantaneous communication and data-updates to the effect that suspect trade patterns can be flagged and the relevant parties informed before chemical attacks occur;
 - iii. Lightening Member States' load with a minimal cost of software and labor due to the inherent digitization and automation of a blockchain system;
 - c. Increase the incentive for countries not party to the CWC to sign and ratify in order to take advantage of this security resource;
- 10. Asks Member States to increase information sharing and intelligence cooperation on chemical weapons and precursor transit by:
 - a. Leveraging secure, real-time communication channels for intelligence sharing between Member States and interested international organizations, such as INTERPOL and the OPCW;
 - b. Increasing the function of international organizations, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in coordinating global intelligence-sharing platforms to meet the chemical weapons threat posed by NSAs;
- 11. *Emphasizes* the necessity for further technical support to the LDCs and SIDS in order to strengthen their ability to detect and fight the traffic of chemical weapons through:
 - a. OPCW providing financial and technical assistance to SIDS and LDCs in order to purchase modern detection devices and improve border security infrastructure;
 - b. Facilitating training courses to enhance the technical competence of customs inspectors and law enforcement personnel to identify chemical precursors;
- 12. *Suggests* that the international community expand the functions of the United Nations IMO to include the prevention of chemical weapons and trafficking by:
 - a. Providing affected Member States the proper training to effectively inspect for chemical weapons;
 - b. Offering security protocols to affected Member States to enhance security against chemical weapons;
- 13. *Calls on* all Member States to join the ATT to create a general data-base for providing an information about all types of weapons including chemical weapons to prevent their proliferation;
- 14. *Urges* Member States not to support terrorist organizations in accordance to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to refrain from providing support to those involved in them;

15. *Encourages* all Member States to cooperate with the newly-formed HLABAI to further enhance an understanding of both creative and destructive potential of new technologies usage in the field of chemical weapons creation on a global level to prevent an emergence of new chemical weapons in the hands of NSAs;
16. *Calls on* Member States to use a system with automatized analysis and update tracking of new data of the data-base of arms control in accordance with the ATT to control an appearance of new chemical weapons or components for them and their proliferation;
17. *Calls on* Member States to prepare for any scenario attacks and enforce international standards to peace to achieve SDG goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) by:
 - a. Recommending field exercises on emergency services on scenarios might face if deployed in case of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) agents;
 - b. Asking to test and enhance the Member State's capacities to prevent and respond to a CBRN agents terrorism threat;
 - c. Demanding the surveillance and arrest of terrorists in possessions of CBRN agents;
 - d. Encouraging border crossing checkpoints for illicit trafficking of CBRN agents, in addition to the neutralisation of explosives;
18. *Encourages* all States party to the CWC to comply with the Australia Group (AG) guidelines which aim to:
 - a. Strengthen the non-proliferation of chemicals regulated in the CWC;
 - b. Enhance international cooperation in preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons;
 - c. Reduce the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons by NSAs;
 - d. Increase cooperation of NGOs and other international organizations with these guidelines to enhancing international cooperation in sharing good practices;
19. *Recommends* that Member States implementing the aforementioned guidelines submit an annual report on export control measures, which should include:
 - a. Chemicals specified in the OPCW Annex on chemicals;
 - b. The destination of such exports be detected and recorded by Member States to ensure these reagents are delivered to the proper territories like:
 - i. Chemicals specified in the AG guidelines;
 - ii. The destination of such exports;
 - iii. The quantities of such exports;
20. *Calls upon* the OPCW to increase transnational border monitoring networks with the capacity and expertise necessary to identify ingredient compounds involved in the production of chemical weapons while simultaneously by:

- a. Attributing each compound used in chemical weapon development to the respective technical practices of each identified NSA group;
 - b. Enhancing financial monitoring capacity to ensure restricted purchasing power for illicit utilized material ingredients;
- 21. *Emphasizes* that the creation and submission of reports will enable an objective assessment of the efforts by each Member State to strengthen export controls, thereby contributing to the development of more effective future non-proliferation strategies;
- 22. *Encourages* Member States to enhance current regional security cooperation to prevent chemical weapon and precursor smuggling through:
 - a. Establishing regional task forces specifically focused on detection and seizure of chemical weapon shipments, through the coordination of military, law enforcement, and customs agencies, while facilitating the construction of new Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (CWDFs) in high-risk chemical weapons proliferation areas;
 - b. Enabling joint regional exercises and capacity-building programs to build the combined capacity of states in at-risk regions to respond to chemical weapons threats by ensuring the destruction of chemical stockpiles within vulnerable areas on time;
- 23. *Recommends* the publishing of National Action Plans based on the OPCW National Implementation Framework process, which address the obstacles posed by NSAs, in line with Security Council resolution 1325;
- 24. *Calls upon* Member States to collaborate with local and regional academic institutions to conduct research on early warning indicators of chemical weapons radicalization among NSAs, and to develop culturally sensitive prevention strategies;
- 25. *Further recommends* regional chemical security training centers, which will serve to train and certify experts in chemical weapons detection, forensic evidence, customs control, and emergency response capabilities;
- 26. *Suggests* Member States host multilateral workshops bringing together leadership from both governments and private industries in order to address regional and domestic security measures concerning the illegal trafficking of precursor chemical agents;
- 27. *Recommends* the creation of a chemical threat map where states can upload and anonymize incident data to a live heat-mapped dashboard showing regions with rising CWC violations;
- 28. *Invites* Member States to adopt the Coordinated Operations for Multilateral Prosperity to Advance Sustainable Security (COMPASS) Initiative which is designed to:
 - a. Increase a rules-based order and strengthen confidence-building regimes;
 - a. Create an international registry to track the trade of dual-use chemicals across international borders;
 - b. Encourage the creation of checkpoints at borders to better track the transportation of chemical weapons;

29. *Calls upon* the UNODA to host a conference for states to express regional concerns pertaining to NSAs;
30. *Urges* the OPCW to form multilateral agreements with the IAEA and UNODA to:
- a. Organize regional partnerships aimed at enhancing information sharing, joint monitoring, and capacity-building among Member States to prevent the possession or use of chemical weapons by NSAs;
 - b. Facilitate regular regional forums for states to exchange intelligence and best practices on the secure storage, management, and destruction of dual-use chemicals;
 - c. Collaborate on strengthening safeguards of dual-use chemical, promote export control regimes, and ensure that all Member States implement rigorous legal frameworks that criminalize the transfer of chemical weapons to NSA;
 - d. Monitor and track illicit trafficking routes potentially exploited by NSAs to acquire chemical weapons, and support regional enforcement mechanisms to intercept and prevent such transfers;
31. *Encourages* collaboration between the OPCW, UNODA, and other relevant UN agencies to conduct a study assessing the impact of chemical weapon use by NSAs on marginalized communities;
32. *Encourages* all States party to the CWC to establish long-term strategies which prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, including:
- a. Abiding by the current annex list of chemical substances, that align with the OPCW which could result in the rise of chemical weapons;
 - b. Ensuring regulation of exports systems regarding chemical reagents and properties to monitor what territories they come from and ensure they align with domestic law;
 - c. Limiting access to such material by NSAs by allowing only those with proper credentials to maintain and operate for official purposes only;
 - d. Increasing collaboration with NGOs and other international organizations with these guidelines for the purposes in ensuring progress towards the affirmation;
33. *Supports* the Technical Secretariat to facilitate a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with a focus on chemical weapons, hereafter to be referred to as the Security of the Middle East Regional Framework (SMERF), with an annual summit held on a rotating basis between Member States where progress on disposing of chemical weapons shall be regularly reported and encouraged heavily;
34. *Calls upon* the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), in conjunction with Syrian authorities and neighboring states, in continuation of March 2025 efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), to:
- a. Identify and secure abandoned chemical weapon production sites and stockpiles in Syria;
 - b. Eliminate said sites and stockpiles to prevent abuse by NSAs;

- c. Request that all states with a direct presence in or allied to factions in Syria allow for investigators from the OPCW to identify and eliminate any possible chemical weapon depots;
- 35. *Recommends* the establishment of regional workshops in the vernacular language of different regions, like the Basic Training Course on Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons for Arabic Speaking States Parties (2016), which normalizes chemical weapon norms and regulations within different regions affected by NSAs in order to address gaps in current international frameworks that Non-State Actors possessing chemical weapons pose to national security of States parties tailored to regional experiences with NSAs;
- 36. *Urges* the creation of an OPCW joint training and capacity building programme for areas highly affected by terrorist action, and the formation of specific regional task forces to address local challenges related to the trafficking and misuse of chemicals by NSAs and by facilitating relationships between states in the Middle East and North Africa region and manufacturers protective wear;
- 37. *Urges* that the Conference of the States Parties defend the Geneva Protocol by reaffirming that:
 - a. Member States that align with the ideals and values of the OPCW have neglected the substances that are prohibited;
 - b. Reminding all Member States it is imperative to follow the Geneva Protocol as a required mandate under the OPCW.



Code: OPCW/1/5

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Acknowledging the necessity for enhanced border security to identify common strategies for smuggling chemical weapons, ingredient distribution, illicit financial funds critical for production, and information on criminal production networks necessary to eradicate the development of chemical weapons in all biological and radiological forms,

Bearing in mind that the evolving threat landscape requires broadening the scope of the definition of Non-State Actors (NSAs) under international chemical weapons frameworks, to address emerging risks and enforcement gaps,

Noting with deep concern the dangers of dual-use chemicals and the risk of cross-border movements,

Recalling that international cooperation and multilateralism are core goals of the United Nations and preventing the use of chemical weapons by NSAs is a shared responsibility,

Deeply conscious of the fact that effective border control is essential to the prevention of illegal shipment and unauthorized transportation of chemical weapons,

Noting with concern terrorist and criminal organizations that continue acquiring and using chemical weapons, which can lead to mass casualties and destabilization of international security, with possible conflicts and tension among states,

Aware of the prominent role peacekeeping plays in disarmament efforts, aiding the OPCW States parties with the Blue Helmets,

Recognizing the importance of controlling imports and exports of chemical weapons and their materials within OPCW States parties,

Highlighting Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), from General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015) in upholding peace and preventing danger at the hands of Chemical Weapon usage by NSAs,

Having recognized the positive nature of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which possesses the capacity to exponentially facilitate the advancement of destructive chemical weapons with a minimal paper trail while simultaneously serving as a powerful tool for advanced security measures and education,

Further underscoring that rapid technological advancement, such as AI, plays in the enhancement of chemical weapons exposure,

Taking into account the importance of civilian protection, especially in vulnerable States parties, against the threat of weapons of mass destruction, stresses increased international cooperation of border and police forces,

Noting the importance of emergency medical services in chemical weapons prevention,

Reaffirming SDG 3 (good health and well-being), incorporated from General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015), in the face of chemical weapons and their potential long-lasting health impacts on victims,

Guided by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015) SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals), particularly target 17.19, which highlights the importance of an international effort to develop accurate data and statistics, and conscious of the disproportionate burden developing States parties carry when developing an action plan to address NSAs,

Having considered the need for a controlled and shared communication system between the public and private sectors to avoid any mishandling of such sensitive and potentially dangerous materials, and information regarding them, both from a financial and management point of view,

Emphasizing the need for transparent lines of communication and an early warning system to detect the mobility of chemical development equipment, ingredient material, and their respective financial mechanisms and origins,

Stressing its desire to expand the responsibilities of the OPCW to include the regulation, monitoring of payment systems and banking transactions involving chemical weapons, ensuring that illicit settlements amongst non-trustworthy parties can be signaled and avoided,

Further underscoring the difficulty of coordinating States parties' efforts to monitor cross-border transactions of chemical substances that might be used in warfare,

Re-emphasizing the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and stressing the need to leverage SAB to be ahead of emerging developments,

Taking into consideration the benefit of information sharing between chemical companies and States parties,

Calling attention to communication corridors that enable real-time information sharing between States parties, security forces, and international bodies by improving tracking and interception of threats, integrating warning systems, and civilian technologies that can detect threats earlier,

Promoting the cooperation of OPCW and civil society organizations on the continent of Africa,

Highlighting the need for effective data analysis for the procurement of international law against NSAs,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which aims to prevent NSAs from acquiring and developing chemical weapons, in an effort to foster international dialogue,

1. *Further invites* States parties to incorporate a monitoring system to reflect the advancement of knowledge regarding various chemical reagents and their properties, tracking the flow of these substances through different territories by:
 - a. Establishing an effective regulatory process that corresponds to a modeled accepted list of chemical substances that are seen as harmful sources to the proliferation of chemical weapons, making them harmful if placed in the hands of NSAs;
 - b. Submitting an annual report to the OPCW, regarding which chemicals are exported, to what territory, and how such reagents are applied in domestic law;

- c. Calling for governmental funds to promote sovereign investment in border and export control to establish and design regional guidelines States parties set to monitor the usage of chemicals;
- 2. *Suggests* the OPCW body to increase and enhance customs and border security, including desolate areas, through the synchronization of common and demonstrably effective strategies to:
 - a. Ensure that local governments intercept illicitly obtained, utilized, and distributed laundered financial funds critical for production;
 - b. Share all information regarding criminal production networks necessary to eradicate the development of chemical weapons in all biological and radiological forms;
 - c. Implement a system that evaluates and monitors imports and exports of chemicals to ensure:
 - i. Dual-use chemicals are inspected thoroughly and tracked to their destination strictly for civilian use;
 - ii. Oversee background checks on supplier backgrounds and transporters;
 - iii. The recognition and capture of all smuggled chemical weapons and distributed ingredients;
- 3. *Further suggests* that recruiting specialized personnel, such as forensic analysts and cybersecurity experts, should be prioritized to:
 - a. Address complex situations that require professional expertise;
 - b. Create a research team dedicated to finding more efficient solutions to prevent chemical use by NSAs;
- 4. *Encourages* States parties, at their own discretion, to strengthen border and police forces by implementing programs to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illegal trafficking and brokering of chemical weapons through international cooperation, such as:
 - a. International border control operations and training led by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), specifically through:
 - i. Allocation of financial resources to developing countries;
 - ii. Insight on border control;
 - iii. Compliant transportation of chemical weapons;
 - iv. Expertise through training programs;
 - b. Bilateral collaboration between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and global surveillance organizations to strengthen response and preventive mechanisms;
- 5. *Introduces* an Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) observing future acquisitions or employments of chemical weapons by NSAs, through careful examinations into incidents including chemical assaults, recognizing sources and strategies utilized by perpetrators through:

- a. Coordinating with national authorities in post-incident zones to collect and preserve physical evidence, interview witnesses, and document patterns of use;
 - b. Producing standardized incident reports to be submitted to the OPCW for further action, including recommendations for international legal accountability;
- 6. *Encourages* the OPCW's Advisory Board on Education and Outreach to include initiatives and interactive workshops that educate States parties on specific ways NSAs weaponize AI and how to navigate AI without jeopardizing national security, including:
 - a. Custom training programs that equip officers with AI skills necessary to identify chemicals listed under the *Chemical Weapon Convention* (CWC);
 - b. Interactive Courses such as the International Telecommunication Union's "AI ethics for national legislators" course, which provide in-depth insights into AI's capabilities, ethical considerations, and security implications;
 - c. Scenario Based learning opportunities where States parties can simulate scenarios involving AI Developed Chemical Weapons and foster an international dialogue for how to tackle these challenges;
 - d. Cross Nation Workshops where experienced States parties share best practices and lessons learned in navigating AI while maintaining national security;
 - e. Suggests creating college internships in States parties to help states design and facilitate training of AI material;
- 7. *Recommends* expanding the functions of the Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS), by adjusting the organization and tracking of imports and exports of dangerous chemical materials through:
 - a. Securing and protecting through a cybersecurity program, with the best one being determined through rigorous research with the aid of States parties;
 - b. Bills of lading for chemical weapon materials will be a priority for the system and will be recorded within the system for all States parties to access and monitor, which will allow States parties to monitor what chemicals are being exported and imported in their state, and facilitate cooperation among States parties;
 - c. Reinforcing EDIS by the introduction of Control Exposure Development AI (CEDAI) that:
 - i. Operates to detect residue of materials utilized in the manufacturing of chemical weapons through the use of satellite imaging, drone shots, and inspection imaging by customs personnel using;
 - ii. Assists authorities in their investigations of chemical attacks by tracing the origin of the materials used;
 - iii. Using blockchain technology to ensure data authenticity and prevent tampering with evidence related to the use of chemical weapons;

- d. The expansion of financing for EDIS which will be sourced from voluntary contributions from Member States and the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships, building upon the efforts of NGOs in AI research, such as the Alan Turing Institute;
- 8. *Suggests* implementing external audits of AI systems, and the creation of safeguards flagging improper use of AI technology and access to sensitive information regarding chemicals and processes that have potential weaponized use by:
 - a. Installing AI systems with safeguards that process the input that they receive, in order to ensure that the information that the AI provides is not of a potentially dangerous or sensitive nature;
 - b. Holding organizations accountable for the information that their systems may reveal, and urging them to remove certain content that is used during the training of their systems;
- 9. *Recommends* the implementation of Peacekeeping Missions assigned to vulnerable areas determined by the Chemical Supply Chain Monitoring System, as reporting suspicious activity in regard to the import and export of Chemical Weapons and materials by:
 - a. Ensuring that the Peacekeeping Missions will be requested by a States party of the OPCW;
 - b. Removing military personnel upon completion of the missions' targets;
- 10. *Encourages* States parties to address the socio-economic root causes leading to the rise of violent NSAs to:
 - a. Prevent and resolve conflicts through peacebuilding missions in regions identified as high-risk for the mobilization and operation of violent NSAs, by implementing counter-extremism strategies and deradicalization initiatives, and by encouraging political engagement for marginalized communities and regions vulnerable to extremist recruitment;
 - b. Address socio-economic grievances by allocating adequate funding and investment in education, job creation, and poverty alleviation initiatives in regions at risk of emerging NSAs, and funding early warning systems to identify radicalization and extremist behavior;
- 11. *Pushes* for the establishment of civilian education programs with an emphasis on informing and raising awareness of chemical weapons when it comes to:
 - a. Recognizing chemical weapons and the proper procedures to report them, as determined by the state;
 - b. Medical knowledge on the effects of varying chemical weapons and how to safely deal with and prepare for them in the case of the use of a chemical weapon;
 - c. Discerning between the peaceful use of chemistry and chemical weapons and understanding chemical weapon precursors;
 - d. Strengthening the empowerment of women and local community leaders through targeted training programmes to support early diagnosis, raise awareness, and

strengthen cooperation with local authorities, particularly in rural or underserved areas, in collaboration with OPCW and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) frameworks, and further ensure that these trainer actors are integrated into the response system by:

- i. Establishing pre-arranged communication channels with national authorities;
- ii. Implementing community alert systems adapted to rural contexts;
- iii. Providential access to basic chemical safety equipment and first response kits;

12. *Recommends* that States parties update and review their current legislative frameworks regarding the use and manufacturing of chemical weapons and strengthen their current policies on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons by:

- a. Encouraging peer-to-peer consultations between States parties to share best practices on effective legal implementation and enforcement mechanisms;
- b. Translating and disseminating CWC-related legal resources in local languages to ensure wider accessibility and understanding of obligations;

13. *Promoting* the inclusion of civil society organizations in decision-making processes related to disarmament and chemical weapons prevention, ensuring that local communities' needs and perspectives are adequately represented and addressed;

14. *Encourages* States parties with demonstrated expertise in preventing NSA's acquisition and use of chemical weapons to:

- a. Share technical resources and best practices with developing States parties through secure standardized platforms such as the International Criminal Police Organization's (INTERPOL) Global Chemical Congress Network, prioritizing intelligence-led strategies, dual-use chemical tracking, and incident response protocols;
- b. Mobilize financial and technical assistance through North-South and South-South cooperation frameworks to strengthen developing States parties' legislative and regulatory frameworks, particularly in aligning national policies with CWC obligations;
- c. Develop a centralized repository for anonymized case studies and declassified threat intelligence, accessible via OPCW-managed portals to enhance transparency while safeguarding operational security;

15. *Emphasizes* the importance of implementing transparent lines of communication and an early warning system, which will detect the mobility of chemical development equipment, ingredient material, and financial mechanisms;

16. *Urges* the development of a comprehensive framework within the OPCW to facilitate real-time information exchange between States parties regarding suspicious transactions involving chemical substances, emphasizing early detection mechanisms and coordinated responses to potential threats posed by NSAs;

17. *Strongly encourages* cooperation among CWC signatory states to harmonize their legislation when it comes to cross-border trade of chemicals, to prevent the use of such substances in warfare by NSAs, all while ensuring state sovereignty;
18. *Draws attention* to the importance of facilitating communication channels between neighbouring states or at a broader international scale by:
 - a. Creating specific divisions for chemical weapons prevention, supported by the use of AI and all the types of machinery able to detect emergencies, such as INTERPOL's department, to strengthen individual defense departments;
 - b. Establishing an interconnected early-warning system with the international community, specialized in helping rapidly with indirect or direct intervention;
 - c. Using tools as IBM's Watson for Emergency Management would provide real-time situational awareness;
19. *Urges* OPCW committee members to collaborate with international agencies, such as INTERPOL, that prioritize chemical surveillance and technical assistance to foster long-term security in communities susceptible to chemical weapons exposure;
20. *Requests* the international body to enhance protection for all facilities where basic chemical materials for the production of chemical weapons are processed and stored to:
 - a. Identify the relevant facilities to gain an overview of the extent of protection required;
 - b. Assess the current level of security in place at the identified facilities;
 - c. Decide on a comprehensive protection strategy, outlining the necessary measures and defining their global implementation;
21. *Further encourages* the collaboration between States parties and NGOs actively engaged in disarmament, humanitarian response, and chemical weapons prevention, with the purpose of:
 - a. Supporting the development of local early-warning systems and response mechanisms through NGO-led training and capacity-building programs;
 - b. Enhancing transparency and verification efforts by incorporating reliable NGO-sourced data into national and international monitoring frameworks, in accordance with existing confidentiality and verification protocols;
 - c. Promoting the inclusion of civil society organizations in decision-making processes related to disarmament and chemical weapons prevention, ensuring that local communities' needs and perspectives are adequately represented and addressed;
22. *Enhancing* transparency and verification efforts by incorporating reliable NGO-sourced data into national and international monitoring frameworks, following existing confidentiality and verification protocols;
23. *Emphasizing* the necessity of capacity-building for States parties suffering from NSAs using chemical weapons on their territory by:

- a. Calling for a limitation of unilateral impositions such as economic sanctions, military interventions or any other intervention affecting a States party's economy, which undermine state sovereignty and expedites NSA's abuse of chemical weapons;
 - b. Working on collaboration to help develop economic States parties work with other States parties with funding to build or improve infrastructures to comply with CWC legislation;
 - c. Ensuring that state sovereignty is well respected and that economic collaborations are not abused by more developed States parties;
24. *Encourages* the establishment of a triangular mechanism between the OPCW and the private-public sector to ensure accurate tracking and interception of chemicals potentially usable for chemical weapons, which will:
- a. Ensure that companies notify both the OPCW and national authorities when there are large shipments of chemicals;
 - b. Share details with OPCW that will include, but are not limited to, the shipment routes, the quantity of chemicals, and the details of the buyers of said chemicals;
 - c. Ensure that OPCW keeps a record of the suspicious shipments signaled more than 3 times;
 - d. Request for States parties to work closely with payments processing corporations to:
 - i. Prevent illegal activities throughout transactions of cross-border and industries that could spread chemical weapons among NSAs;
 - ii. Record any financial statement and, therefore, control all transactions involving chemical compounds, to avoid any kind of illicit transactions by cash;
 - e. Recommends States parties national authorities to intercept, verify, and declare any irregularities found in the interceptions of the suspicious shipments;
25. *Stresses* that no action mandated or encouraged by this resolution shall be interpreted as a political endorsement of any party involved in any conflict, and that the OPCW remains a neutral body focused solely on chemical weapons disarmament.



Code: OPCW/1/6

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Recalling the universal right to life, liberty, and security of person, as stated in article 3 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) (1948),

Reminding this committee of the importance of the *Rome Statute* (1998) and *Geneva Convention* (1949) to the OPCW's progress towards the eradication of chemical weapons and the inherent necessity to consider human rights laws while enforcing the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC) (1997) against all actors, both state and non-state,

Emphasizing Article 2(1)-(5) of Chapter 1 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), which stipulates that all Members are equal on the principle of sovereignty, and shall therefore refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which stipulates that all States parties shall refrain from providing any form of support to Non-State Actors (NSAs),

Also recalling Security Council resolution 2325 (2016), emphasizing the threat of NSAs acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),

Noting with deep concern the recent use of chemical weapons by NSAs,

Aware of the role drug trafficking has played in NSAs obtaining chemical precursors, chemical weapons, and funding used to create chemical weapons,

Recognizing regions with limited border control and chemical security infrastructure's vulnerability to the proliferation and misuse of chemical weapons by NSAs,

Considering the critical need to enhance the security of maritime transportation and to examine the role of ports in preventing the trade of chemical weapons and their precursors by NSAs,

Alarmed that the use of chemical weapons by NSAs poses a significant risk to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission and needs to be addressed,

Reaffirming commitment to communication among States parties that improves security throughout the global supply chain and increases monitoring for dual-use chemicals with specific respect to NSAs,

Agreeing upon the positive implications of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) on protecting all States parties from military actions taken by other state actors in response to the actions of external NSAs,

Reaffirming the importance of commercial chemical regulations as instructed by the CWC, as LDCs are increasingly engaging in the commercial chemical industry,

Deeply concerned with the improper disposal of substances that contribute to the manufacturing of chemical weapons,

Cognizant of the fact that chemical materials serve purposes beyond NSAs' malicious intents, dual-use and precursor chemicals are necessary for agricultural or medical purposes since they are commonly used in fertilizer and pharmaceuticals,

Recognizing the potential challenges faced by States parties with limited technical capacity in fulfilling their obligations under the CWC,

Reaffirming the OPCW's commitment to international cooperation, multilateralism, and solidarity in the global response to the use of chemical weapons, and that multilateralism is a necessity as we continue to build a more equal, more resilient, and more sustainable world, as mentioned in article IX (1) of the CWC,

Reaffirming the fact that all States parties have a duty under article I of the CWC to cooperate with other States parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations,

Urging States parties to meet their obligations according to their roles and responsibilities regarding the CWC, especially article VI (2),

Deeply appreciative that the Executive Council, during the 86th session in 2017, recognized the threat posed by NSAs that operate outside of international regulations and control mechanisms,

Reiterating its appreciation for the World Customs Organization (WCO) and its cooperation following its Memorandum of Understanding with OPCW,

Underlining OPCW's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism's (OEWG-T) progress towards implementing CBMs to encourage international safety and security in regards to chemical terrorism,

Further emphasizing the importance of expanding the OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board's research to adequately address the potential threats and benefits raised by changing Artificial Intelligence technologies,

Appreciative for the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) partnering with its Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) and the UNOCT's Countering Terrorist Travelling Program to prevent the movement of criminals,

Keeping in mind the need to establish regional hubs, particularly in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East, and the training of personnel,

Acknowledging the vital role played by regional organizations, such as the African Union and Nordic Council in developing cooperation among States parties,

Recognizing the limited resources available to Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to deal with the trafficking of chemical weapons through Pacific Islands, SIDS, and LDCs by NSAs,

Emphasizing the importance of partnerships between LDCs and More Developed Countries (MDCs) with the goal of sharing expertise regarding the production and usage of chemical substances,

Understanding the importance of research initiatives aimed at promoting knowledge sharing in LDCs and SIDS,

Reaffirming its commitment to General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015) on the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*,

Acknowledging the negative environmental impacts of chemical weapons on fragile climates, such as SIDS, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 13 (climate action), SDG 14 (life below water), and SDG 15 (life on land), that reaffirm the value of the environment,

Imploring States parties to adhere to SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) in order to reduce all forms of violence,

Deeply disturbed by the 965 fatalities and over 7,000 injuries involving chemical weapons between 1990 and 2020, according to the Violent NSAs Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Event Database,

Further recognizing that the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) have assisted States parties with detecting trafficking of dual-use chemicals,

Convinced that total proscription of chemical weapons will contribute to the strengthening of the security of all States parties, as stated in the Mendoza Agreement,

Bearing in mind that the Preparatory Commission for the OPCW recommended in paragraph 6.4. in its PC-VI/22 that laboratories should have an internationally recognised quality assurance system and accreditation by an internationally recognised accreditation body for tasks for which they are seeking designation,

Underscoring that the multi-million dollar illegal narcotic trafficking that is ongoing in the Caribbean region as per a 2020 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) report, and that drug trade routes are utilized to facilitate the movement of precursor chemicals, criminal personnel, and revenue involved in the independent development of chemical weapons,

1. *Commits* to uphold the CWC treaty without selectivity or different application of rules and/or standards to states with similar situations without a justifiable reason in regards to chemical warfare, by:
 - a. Ensuring that all alleged violations of the CWC are investigated and addressed through transparent and consistent mechanisms under the OPCW and appropriate UN bodies, emphasizing accountability for all actors;
 - b. Promoting the equal application of disarmament and non-proliferation obligations to all States parties without exception;
2. *Suggests* that States parties invest in peaceful-use infrastructure programs, such as the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ensuring the legitimate access to chemical materials for medical, agricultural, or educational purposes is protected, while simultaneously reinforcing safeguards that prevent their diversion and misuse by NSAs for hostile or weaponized purposes;
3. *Expands* the CWC to be directly applied and enforced against NSAs that intentionally use chemical weapons for the purpose of harming civilians or governmental processes through the following means:

- a. Recommending the Security Council expand the *Rome Statute* (1998) to apply to NSAs and individual instances that utilize chemical weaponry and their precursors as a crime against humanity and inherent violation of humanitarian law;
 - b. Encourages the Security Council to refer NSAs responsible for large-scale chemical weapon attacks to the International Criminal Court (ICC) pursuant to the *Rome Statute* (1998) and its key tenets;
 - c. Suggests to the General Assembly to create a mechanism under the guidance of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by which NSAs and their accomplices that have executed, funded, aided, or participated in coordinated chemical weapon attacks in regions affected by armed conflict can be held accountable by the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies once provided with evidence-based violations;
 - d. Suggests that the International Criminal Court (ICC) provide an advisory opinion on the legal responsibilities of States parties concerning the regulation and control of chemical precursors that may be diverted for the manufacture of synthetic drugs or potentially used by NSAs for hostile purposes;
4. *Recommends* the following criteria for the designation of laboratories by the OPCW, recognizing their critical role in preventing access to chemical weapons by NSAs, supporting evidence-based decision-making, and enabling timely responses through independent verification capacities through:
 - a. Designated laboratories shall contribute to the verification of alleged chemical weapon use, ensuring that any response by States parties is grounded in independently confirmed scientific evidence and not based on unverified claims;
 - b. Encouraging such laboratories' widespread establishment and geographic distribution to expand global verification capacity and ensure timely response capabilities in all regions;
 - c. Enhancing laboratory capacities in the region, notably by expanding existing laboratories for chemical analysis, and by creating regional laboratories capable of supporting chemical weapon use as well as civilian chemical incidents;
 - d. Establishing an internationally recognized quality assurance system in laboratories;
 - e. Encouraging laboratories to obtain accreditation by an internationally recognized accreditation body for the specific tasks for which designation is sought;
 - f. Allowing laboratories to regularly participate in and demonstrate successful performance in inter-laboratory proficiency testing programs;
 - g. Knowing that analytical laboratories shall be capable of producing reliable results when analysing control samples distributed by the OPCW;
5. *Calling on* the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) to create a report on the potential lasting negative impacts of chemical weapons on the environments of States parties, and how the deployment of chemical weapons by NSAs could damage those environments or their populations by:

- a. Investigating negative effects on social conditions caused by the illicit use of chemical materials, including impact on agriculture, tourism, and impoverished areas;
 - b. Providing technical support and facilitating dialogues between countries and NGO-OPCW networks to improve chemical management;
 - c. Advancing policy recommendations and plans of action to incorporate environmental protection into national legislation;
 - d. Integrating the considerations brought forth by the *Global Framework of Chemical Weapons* to ensure that ecological and legal international standards are recognized;
 - e. Creating facilities in each willing Member State explicitly utilized for the disposal of chemical weapon substances in a safe and environmentally conscious manner by:
 - i. Encouraging collaboration alongside UNEP through their *Global Framework on Chemicals*, adopted in September 2023, to achieve both the establishment of the facilities and the disposal efforts;
 - ii. Establishing rules and regulations in said facilities to ensure the safety of laboratory personnel and the environment around the facility areas, specifically implementing measures to prevent the accidental spillage of said substances;
6. *Requests* regional organizations, such as CARICOM and the African Union, which already foster more consistent and region-applicable responses and are best equipped to deal with the prevention and response to future or current proliferation of chemical weapons by NSAs in their region, to work towards mitigating that risk in their own regions by:
- a. Calling for the members of their regional coalition to cooperate and expand the sharing of information on the movement of possible chemical agents within their regions through the medium of regional bodies, regardless of the origination or destination of the agents;
 - b. Ensuring that LDCs, who have a lower capacity to secure or provide funding, are, to the greatest extent possible, being included in:
 - i. Discussions by these bodies on the prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons in their regions;
 - ii. Any capacity building by the bodies that focuses on the prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons;
 - c. Including all willing regional bodies in future OPCW discussions on the proliferation of chemical weapons by NSAs;
 - d. Enhancing relationships between LDCs and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) through the secretariat to facilitate resource sharing, transparency of funding opportunities, capacity building, and the enforcement of chemical safety initiatives;
7. *Recommends* the expansion of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) to include:

- a. Efforts to enhance detection and seizing protocols in Caribbean states regarding chemical weapons being transported by NSAs between CARICOM States parties by enhancing current security frameworks under CARICOM IMPACS and the associated Regional Security System (RSS) and its patrolling mechanisms;
 - b. Further expanding the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) under CARICOM IMPACS to create a reporting mechanism for the seizing of chemical weapons, instances of chemical weapon usage by NSAs, and research facilities that utilize chemical weapons or their precursors;
 - c. Encouraging NGOs, such as the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC), engaged in efforts to develop the capacity of CARICOM States parties to detect and seize chemical weapons in the Caribbean to assist in these efforts through knowledge sharing and the development of best practices with respect to the prevention of the transportation of chemical weapons and their precursors through Caribbean ports;
 - d. Utilizing the expansion of CARICOM IMPACS to establish best practices that can be applied to SIDS and LDCs globally with respect to regional patrolling mechanisms and the work of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL);
 - e. Increasing regional equipment exchange by creating a regional database of chemical research and attack response equipment, investing in equipment still missing in the Global South, and elaborating standardized exchange conditions providing safety and transparency in the equipment exchange for all States parties;
8. *Calls for* the expansion of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and CARICOM to promote capacity building and the individual capabilities of SIDS and LDCs to prevent NSAs from using chemical weapons by:
- a. Utilizing UNDP resources to prevent the illicit transit of chemical weapons by all forms of transport, with special attention to maritime transportation, to NSAs in SIDS and LDCs by enhancing training initiatives in CARICOM States parties related to detection;
 - b. Providing specialized guidelines to CARICOM States parties that integrate UNDP frameworks to allow for additional socioeconomic advancements in each States parties, such as the creation of government jobs related to detection and enforcement of the CWC against NSAs;
 - c. Encouraging Members of the CARICOM and the WCO to improve infrastructure that helps to create strong communication and investigation measures by increasing the development of port infrastructure and establishing direct hotlines that improve response times to incidents and misuse of dual-use chemicals;
9. *Further requests* that CARICOM IMPACS shares its APIS intelligence with the OPCW to:
- a. Prevent and track the movement of known or suspected NSAs linked to chemical precursors and weapons trafficking by sharing the data contained in the APIS system with international crime-based organizations, such as the UNODC and INTERPOL;
 - b. Collaborate on further developing border intelligence technologies and procedures;

10. *Directs* this body to facilitate the establishment of regional OPCW hubs for Africa, the Caribbean, the Global South, and the Middle East, and the training of its personnel which would:
 - a. Implement capacity building measures aimed at equipping vulnerable regions with the ability to detect, surveil, mitigate, and respond to chemical weapons and their precursors;
 - b. Aid in the formation of regional and domestic legislations that would speak to the tightening of regulatory frameworks, strengthen the control over dual-use chemicals, and establish and enforce the criminalization of chemical weapons possession;
 - c. Reinforce the establishment of legal frameworks supporting the implementation of state-specific allocations for the importation and exportation of chemicals, as well as increasing surveillance on imported chemicals;
11. *Advocates* for inclusive multilateral dialogue where all voices, especially from the Global South, are treated with equal legitimacy to address the imbalance in the enforcement of interpretation by:
 - a. Rejecting the weaponization of the CWC for political purposes or unilateral interests, defending politically and economically vulnerable States parties against unfair use of legal norms;
 - b. Being wary of political bias in the discussions pertaining to chemical weapons and warfare in international security where Global South States parties are concerned;
 - c. Including NGOs, International Organizations, and observer States parties in discussions which directly concern them about matters that directly affect them;
12. *Advocates* for training specialized personnel in the field of chemical engineering, hazardous material response, and chemical agent identification within LDCs, so as to have local specialized personnel available in the event of NSAs utilizing chemical weapons, or a further need for these personnel by:
 - a. Increasing OPCW-led training workshops in LDCs;
 - b. Recommending the construction of educational institutions for the fields of chemistry, law enforcement, and public health;
 - c. Creating job opportunities within LDCs;
 - d. Enhancing laboratory capacities in the region, notably by expanding existing laboratories for chemical analysis, and by creating regional laboratories capable of supporting chemical weapon use as well as civilian chemical incidents;
13. *Urges* a further collaboration between the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), UNODC, and OPCW members to develop enhanced training and guidelines by leveraging article VII of the CWC to implement national measures to assist members in monitoring the trade of dual-use chemicals that are used by NSAs, so as to:
 - a. Develop a unified database to track transactions involving chemical weapons precursors;
 - b. Facilitate training programs for border security personnel to improve the detection of chemical weapon-related materials;

- c. Use resources from these agencies to build institutions pertaining to further education in the fields of chemistry, law enforcement, and public health;
 - d. Tighten border controls on dual-use chemicals by enacting legal frameworks supporting implementation regulations on the importation and exportation of chemicals, increasing surveillance on imported chemicals to identify and address legal loopholes, leakage, and theft, and collaborating with neighboring States parties and sharing intelligence networks to facilitate real-time tracking of dual-use chemicals;
14. *Encouraging* the incorporation of awareness and educational programs into national curriculum of States parties to inform their youth regarding the ethical, legal, and humanitarian implications of the use of chemical weapons by:
- a. Partnering with civil society organizations, NGOs, and local leaders to promote community-based education and counter-radicalization efforts;
 - b. Supporting international workshops and digital platforms that share best practices on preventing the spread of chemical weapon precursors and knowledge to NSAs;
 - c. Recommending the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) collaborate with regional partners in areas affected by active armed conflict - such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and CARICOM - to promote early intervention programs - such as after school programs and vocational development programs - for youths at-risk of joining terrorist organizations or acting alongside NSAs;
 - d. Making available special trainings for smaller and developing countries by offering scholarships in chemical weapons defense and emergency response training programs for chemical industry, healthcare, and emergency services professionals, and by urging the OPCW, in partnership with UNODC to help provide technical support and assistance to developing nations that focus on training law enforcement officers, customs officers, and regulatory bodies;
15. *Urges* States parties' action to continue border-security intelligence as it pertains to NSAs and enhance maritime surveillance to strengthen collective efforts in preventing the use of proliferation of chemical weapons by NSAs transported via bodies of water by:
- a. Collaborating with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) Programme on Preventing and Responding to WMD/CBRN Terrorism;
 - b. Further collaborating with the UNCCT Border Security and Management Programme (BSM), as this program addresses broader issues such as drug and small arms trafficking, which are potential indicators of chemical terror attacks;
 - c. Strengthening pre-existing global trade platforms such as the United Nations Comtrade Database to ensure a reliable and secure import and export tracking system;
 - d. Increasing control of suspicious activity through law enforcement education and national policies on dual-use chemicals;
 - e. Expanding the OPCW's OEWG-T to provide a platform for communication between states and international experts;

16. *Expands* the OEWG-T to specifically address NSAs and the acts of chemical terrorism carried out by individuals and groups through the following actions by:

- a. Expanding upon the MoU between the OPCW and the WCO with respect to the detection and tracking of chemical weapons by conducting OPCW-led trainings for port and harbor-based authorities that would develop the capacity of States parties to prevent the trade of chemical weapons by NSAs;
- b. Further collaborating with INTERPOL to seize chemical weapons transported by NSAs and calling upon the General Assembly to allocate further resources to INTERPOL in regions prone to chemical weapons attacks by NSAs;
- c. Addressing the need for further CBMs in regions experiencing terrorism by NSAs and allowing the OEWG-T to be a forum for these states to enhance regional protection through increased military communications and joint operations against NSAs;

17. *Calls for* the establishment of a Chemical Substance Tracking Agency through article VIII of the CWC, which would track the distribution and use of substances that could be utilized to manufacture chemical weapons by:

- a. Suggesting the General Assembly to provide funding and support for the operational sustainability of this new agency;
- b. Encouraging NGOs, such as, but not limited to, CWC Coalition and WCO, to support the efforts of the Chemical Substance Protection Agency and increase international collaboration;
- c. Encouraging the establishment of a system of structured bilateral and multilateral cooperation between national law enforcement agencies, INTERPOL, and the UNODC, aimed at improving the monitoring and control of the chemical supply chain, by:
 - i. Identifying and maintaining updated registries of companies involved in the export of chemical precursors commonly used in the illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs, in cooperation with relevant authorities, and referencing operative clause 14.d;
 - ii. Monitoring companies importing such chemical substances, including dual-use chemicals, through enhanced customs and trade transparency mechanisms, as also referenced in operative clause 14.d;
 - iii. Sharing relevant intelligence through secure communication channels, under the supervision of INTERPOL and UNODC, in order to improve early warning systems and detect suspicious trade patterns;
 - iv. Considering the implementation of international sanctions or regulatory restrictions against companies repeatedly involved in unregulated or illicit trade of high-risk precursor substances, in line with national and international legal frameworks;

18. *Requests* the Security Council to pass a resolution which focuses on NSAs' ability to obtain funding and chemical precursors required to make chemical weapons through drug trafficking by:

- a. Disrupting Illicit financial networks that enable NSAs to acquire dual-use chemical materials by supporting the States parties' national capacities to monitor and regulate chemical compounds linked to narcotic production distribution;
- b. Reinforcing cross-border cooperation on intelligence of export/imports of chemical precursor and law enforcement mechanisms regarding drug trafficking routes and areas controlled by NSAs;
- c. Recommending that the UNODC, in collaboration with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), assess the inclusion of emerging synthetic drug precursors in the list of internationally controlled substances, reflecting current developments in illicit drug production and trafficking;
- d. Updating national chemical control lists to include not only currently known high-risk precursor substances used in the synthesis of dangerous synthetic drugs, but also structurally similar or functionally equivalent compounds that may emerge as substitutes in response to regulatory controls to:
 - i. Contribute to the development of a coordinated Global Precursor Watchlist, in collaboration with the UNODC;
 - ii. Support scientific research initiatives focused on the identification of novel precursors and synthetic analogues, in order to anticipate evolving manufacturing trends and strengthen existing regulatory and enforcement frameworks;
- e. Protecting the youth from the potential usage of drugs which secures the strength of future generations.



Code: OPCW/1/7

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Remembering the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) Chapter VII, which emphasizes that the proliferation and use of chemical weapons by any actors represents a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 77/320 (2023) on the impact of rapid technological change on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and targets, resolution 78/160 (2023) on science, technology, and innovation for sustainable development, resolution 78/213 (2023) on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of digital technologies, and resolution 78/49 (2023) on the importance of steering Artificial Intelligence (AI) towards global good, and the faster realization of sustainable development,

Mindful of the decision made during the 86th session of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council (2017), which located the issue of chemical weapon use by Non-State Actors (NSAs) within OPCW's mandate,

Noticing the success of European Union (EU) Testing and Experimentation Facilities (TEF), and its real-world application in conjunction with original research,

Reaffirming the goal of completely eradicating chemical weapons of all kinds from the world as stated in the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC) (1992),

Reiterating articles IV, V, and VI of the CWC, requiring all States parties to be compliant with declarations and permissions of inspections at facilities handling Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals, including dual-use items,

Bearing in mind article XI of the CWC, which aims at centering international cooperation on promoting the economic and technological development of States parties,

Deeply alarmed that individuals often use coded language to disguise references to these chemical compounds on the dark web, raising the complexity of navigating the new age of chemical warfare,

Concerned by the weaknesses in the supply chain that facilitate the acquisition of dangerous and dual-use chemicals by NSAs,

Recognizing the need for innovation and new strategies regarding supply chain management to enhance security,

Cognizant of the benefits of working with the private sector insofar as it encompasses the backbone of the global chemical supply chain,

Emphasizing that the creation and submission of reports will enable an objective assessment of the efforts by each States party to strengthen export controls, thereby contributing to the development of more effective future non-proliferation strategies,

Firmly convinced of the benefits brought on by the development of an international certification regime for companies that manufacture and handle Schedule 1, 2, and 3, as specified in the OPCW's Annex on Chemicals, and dual-use chemicals,

Having considered the limited capabilities of some States parties in gathering intelligence on NSAs,

Taking note of the growing threat of the misuse of dual-use chemicals in conflicts,

Acknowledging the role of the Australia Group (AG) and its successful export controls on numerous chemical weapons precursors and dual-use materials,

Deeply convinced of the importance of the Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS) in monitoring dual-use chemicals and their precursors for effective compliance with international chemical weapons regulations,

Having regarded the role of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the OPCW Technical Secretariat in strengthening state capacity through regional training programs for law enforcement,

Draws attention to the efforts by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) and their efforts in Syria since 2018, while also noting the underutilization of their expertise,

Observing the need for developing nations to have the capabilities to identify chemical weapons and components with the use of OPCW-approved laboratories and an investigation framework,

Expressing appreciation for the work done by Dialogue on Underwater Munitions and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) addressing the 1.6 million tonnes of chemical weapons improperly disposed of in the ocean and the threat that their reacquisition by NSAs poses, while acknowledging this number is 50-60% higher due lack of transparency concluding that up to 3 million tons of chemical munitions may be lying on the ocean floor,

Having studied the recommendations of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) on how emerging forensic technologies and chemical testing can become more accessible and efficient if laboratory centers were increased,

Recalling the Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) obligating all States parties to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,

Expressing concern over the lack of rapid response and recovery capabilities in developing nations where chemical contingencies may occur, and recalling General Assembly resolution 46/182 (1991), which established the foundation for international emergency response coordination,

Expressing satisfaction with the establishment of the OPCW Africa Programme and General Assembly resolution 40/151 (1986), which expanded existing UNODA resources to various regions, created regional UNODA offices, which advanced capacity-building efforts,

Acknowledging the importance of the *Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the CWC* held in Rabat in October 2024, which recognized the threats and the challenges caused by the misuse of AI and its detrimental effect on the purpose of the CWC,

Deeply conscious of the duality of AI, which can be used as a tool to fight against the use of chemical weapons by NSAs actors, but can also be used as a tool for NSAs actors to create enduring problems,

Cognizant that the rise of AI in the modern digital age has significantly changed the dynamics of chemical weapons proliferation, as it contains the potential to catalyze chemical weapon development, can quickly and efficiently create tens of thousands of chemical weapons compounds that can be used as chemical weapons, and currently lacks policy framework and mechanisms to prevent its misuse,

Observing the EU AI Act for its innovative approach to regulating the dangers of artificial intelligence, specifically by establishing obligations for providers and users depending on the level of risk of the AI,

Recognizing that NSAs often utilize AI to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer, or use deadly chemical weapons, expresses its serious concern that these weapons will only become more sophisticated and widely used over time due to how easily such technology proliferates,

Concerned that without sufficient transparency and ethical oversight, AI-driven systems may amplify the ability of NSAs to avoid detection and international regulation,

1. *Strongly condemns* chemical weapons use, noting that usage of chemical weapons at any place or any time constitutes a violation of international laws and norms and serves as a crime against humanity;
2. *Urges* States parties to enact further, as required by article VI, paragraph 2 of the CWC, comprehensive legislation to “ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used” for purposes not restricted by the CWC;
3. *Insists* States parties further “take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation” of chemical weapons and their means of delivery as obligated under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);
4. *Recommends* the use of blockchain or equally secure technology for logistics worldwide in the chemical industry, providing a transparent and unalterable record, ensuring accurate tracking, enhancing security, and overall making sure supply chains are better monitored and secure from the threat of NSAs;
5. *Establishes* the Enhanced Dual-Use Monitoring Mechanism Certificate (EDUM), issued by the Technical Secretariat of OPCW, that companies can apply for if they implement the following measures to secure their supply chain, ultimately hindering ill-intended NSA activity without impeding international commerce by:
 - a. Suggesting the use of blockchain or equally secure technology for documentation of logistics, which is appropriately protected against modification according to current industry standards;
 - b. Sharing the documentation of their supply chain and logistics with the OPCW, securely and in full accordance with OPCW’s established protocols for confidentiality and data protection;
 - c. Ensuring safe transportation and preventing interception from NSAs by other means, such as, but not limited to:
 - i. Regular training for transportation personnel on safe transportation;
 - ii. Live tracking of vehicles and ships;

- iii. Safe production and waste-management protocols;
 - iv. Implementing successful guidelines from the AG;
6. *Further expands* the inspections by the Technical Secretariat to include annual inspections of the EDUM requirements, or upon request by a third party with a credible accusation of violations, revoking the certificate in case of:
- a. Failure to fulfill the requirements, though allowing for application in the following year;
 - b. Fraud, which will result in the exclusion from the certificate for 5 years or longer, depending on the severity and frequency of violations;
 - c. Refusal to be inspected upon a third-party request;
7. *Expresses its hope* that States parties allow EDUM certificate holders to enjoy incentives, specified in their national legislation, such as expedited travel through customs, a label to enable the recognition of chemicals handled safely, and further benefits at the discretion of States parties, to ensure that the required standards do not hinder economic activity but rather make their acquisition more lucrative;
8. *Encourages* the strengthening of monitoring systems for both airborne and maritime transportation of chemicals;
9. *Resolves* to expand the IIT's mandate, utilizing their expertise to investigate chemical weapons usage worldwide and create a larger operational capacity, including:
- a. Investigation of instances of chemical weapon usage where the responsible party has not been identified and other potentially harmful usage of chemical components;
 - b. Collaboration with other relevant international bodies, including the United Nations and other regional organizations, ensuring effective attribution and drafting non-prosecutorial, yearly public reports to increase transparency on the following:
 - i. Methodology, including how investigations were conducted;
 - ii. Factual findings including timeline, details, types of agent, methods of delivery, casualty information, and how much of the chemical was detected;
 - iii. Attribution analysis, including assessment of involvement by specific actors;
 - c. Providing technical assistance to States parties lacking the capacity to conduct national investigations and help implement the newly developed OPCW capacity multiplier mobile chemical testing lab;
10. *Further proclaims* the establishment of OPCW Mobile Analytical Labs that are deployable mobile chemical labs with technical experts that can be expeditiously deployed globally, furthering IIT abilities and creating a capacity-building multiplier to any country by:
- a. Helping conduct onsite analysis of chemical weapon attacks, including the identification of potential chemical weapon attack precursors, including dual-use chemicals;

- b. Training national experts and local teams in sampling techniques, detection methods, and evidence preservation;
 - c. Fostering regional capacity building with rotating deployments and supporting the development of national verification infrastructure and emergency response systems;
- 11. *Expresses support* for cooperation with NGOs and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Maritime Security Sub-Directive in removing improperly disposed chemical weapons from the ocean, especially in regions with limited maritime surveillance capabilities such as the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and other developing nations, supporting SDG 14, whilst prohibiting NSAs from acquiring chemical munitions with new submersible technology;
- 12. *Supports* the creation of OPCW regional offices in high-necessity areas, such as the Middle East, Africa, and Asia-Pacific to facilitate the expedited deployment of advisors and scientists through the:
 - a. Utilization of UNODA security experts to determine the best placement for these offices, taking into account the region's susceptibility to chemical attacks, as well as a state's willingness to host an office;
 - b. Collaboration with the United Nations Fellowships Programme on Disarmament in the establishment of regional offices and substantive support for targeted capacity building and technical assistance support;
- 14. *Calls for* enhanced collaboration with the OPCW Group of Governmental Experts and the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology to research and develop new forensic technologies and improve chemical detection methods while simultaneously calling for all States parties to share relevant information on the development of new chemical weaponry and scientific discoveries to ensure this information is accessible to all States parties;
- 15. *Further requests* the continued development and utilization of the EDIS to enhance transparency, accuracy, and timeliness in the reporting and monitoring of dual-use chemicals and their precursors, following the obligations set forth by the CWC;
- 16. *Endorses* the enhanced collaboration between the OPCW, Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the EDUM certification program to restrict the acquisition or transportation of dual-use materials by NSAs by:
 - a. Organizing regional training programs focused on educating local law enforcement and customs officials on identifying and recording dual-use chemical shipments in collaboration with UNODA and the OPCW Technical Secretariat;
 - b. Expanding the OPCW Chemical Safety and Security Management Programme to assist States parties with capacity-building to enhance border security measures regarding chemical trade by allowing more access to increased training sessions from field experts;
- 17. *Suggests* States parties provide technical and financial assistance to nations in need, to further develop States parties' capacity to respond to chemical weapons incidents, through the following measures, including, but not limited to:
 - a. Institutionalizing mandatory training programs for first responders and chemical weapons experts, modeled after successful programs such as those provided by several

institutions, including Switzerland's Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence School, to build national capacity for detection, response, and decontamination;

- b. Providing support to assist states facing challenges in implementing the CWC teachings, particularly those lacking the necessary infrastructure, expertise, and resources.

18. *Recommends* the establishment of the Chemical Security and Artificial Intelligence Framework (CSAIF) as detailed in the following operative clauses, to harness the potential of AI while addressing the challenges it poses, thus strengthening the prevention of the use of chemical weapons by NSAs by:

- a. Resolving to bridge AI and digital divides between and within States parties by fostering global cooperation, harmonizing ethical and technical standards, and ensuring equitable access to AI and data governance frameworks;
- b. Proposing the creation or utilization of artificial intelligence systems to counter chemical weapon proliferation by:
 - i. Developing an United Nations initiative that would pool an international database and integrate AI software, combining historical case evidence for analyzing all aspects of illicit proliferation networks, to enhance OPCW enforcement capabilities;
 - ii. Collaborating with existing apparatuses such as Foxhunt, which use the rapid processing power of AI to track chemical purchases and help to connect scattered purchases by sophisticated terrorist networks;
- c. Further inviting States parties to deploy artificial intelligence tools such as Natural Language Processing (NLP) on Dark Web marketplaces, encrypted communications applications, or forums, in order to enhance the detection and the monitoring of transactions potentially involving dual-chemicals substances by:
 - i. Using NLP-driven algorithms to uncover covert advertisements containing dual-use chemicals within public or semi-public digital ecosystems by scanning platforms on the World Wide Web for specific content that indirectly relates to chemical compounds, including niche terminologies, coded-language, slang, euphemistic expressions, or nicknames;
 - ii. Utilizing NLP-driven algorithms to cross-reference information potentially related to the sale of dual-use chemicals with user metadata to trace recurring transactional patterns and high-risk entities;
 - iii. Employing programs such as neural machine translation (NMT) to support the real-time monitoring of multilingual communications across platforms in order to enhance the ability of States parties to detect suspicious transactions and thus ensure that threat detection is not limited by linguistic barriers;
- d. Recommending the development of specialized large-scale reference sites to encourage technology providers to test and experiment at scale with the state of AI solutions, which is a toolbox tailored for stakeholders taking notes of TEF by:

- i. Including support for integration, testing, and experimentation of the latest AI-based technologies to solve issues in the dual-use chemical;
 - ii. Offering physical and virtual facilities to allow innovators and researchers to carry out tests and experiments of their AI solutions;
- e. Further recommending the Technical Secretariat to publish an AI-chemical security initiative and handbook in cooperation with the Temporary Working Group on Artificial Intelligence (TWGAI) and the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) to provide long-term coverage of AI and chemical security by:
 - i. Providing guidelines for national legislation on regulating chemical related AI-usage by NSAs, including:
 - 1. Accountability mechanisms for providers of dual-use AI drug creation models;
 - 2. Educational material for regular mandatory training for chemical synthesizing companies on the risks of AI-usage by NSAs;
 - 3. Regulating toxicity data bank access for NSAs;
 - ii. Safeguarding sensitive information and ensuring that the use of AI tools remains strictly controlled and confined to activities within the mandate of this body, and accessible only to States parties in full compliance with the CWC;
- f. Encouraging States parties and United Nations Regional Groups to develop training courses to add a better acknowledgment of how to use AI in order to combat the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, taking existing training programs as a model to emulate, such as:
 - i. General Training Course on the *Chemical Weapons Convention* for the personnel of National Authorities and relevant stakeholders, which was offered by the Dominican Republic to Group of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC);
 - ii. General Aspects on Chemical Safety and Security in Laboratories, which was offered by Italy to Western Europe and other States parties;
 - iii. A Chemical Safety and Security Management Seminar in cooperation with the OPCW Chemical Safety and Security Program, which was offered by Croatia to Eastern Europe;
 - iv. Seoul Workshop on the peaceful development and use of chemistry for States parties to the OPCW, which was offered by the Republic of Korea for the Asian region;
- g. Recommending the OPCW, in the face of the ever-developing nature of AI, to establish an annual review process of CSAIF to remain adaptable to the latest trends, by:
 - i. Proposing annual recommendations of the TWGAI until the expiration of their mandate;

- ii. Establishing annual OPCW conferences on AI under the leadership of the TWGAI to take over the review process from the TWGAI after the expiration of their mandate;
- h. Encouraging voluntary financial contributions from States parties to support expert review of AI algorithms and data analysis methodologies, as well as to fund annual conference activities and the maintenance of secure network infrastructures



Code: OPCW/1/8

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Recognizing the necessity for a comprehensive framework to ensure the secure management of chemical weapons to prevent a lack of oversight, which results in easy access to such substances by non-state actors (NSAs),

Deeply concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that NSAs may acquire, develop, and traffic in both chemical weapons and their means of delivery, as well as dual-use chemicals and riot control agents, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons,

Bearing in mind many States parties' advancement of peaceful chemical technology and the positive impacts on many economic and social sectors,

Alarmed by the increasing risk posed by dual-use chemicals and chemical precursors falling into the hands of terrorist organizations and other unauthorized non-governmental groups, particularly in conflict-prone and unstable regions, and with emphasis added on the ability of NSAs to obtain such materials through unregulated or poorly monitored supply chains,

Recognising the danger of lacking proper disposal of hazardous substances and the risks they come with, like NSAs being able to use chemical waste to their advantage,

Noting the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism's (OEWG-T) concern over the special threat artificial intelligence poses concerning chemical weapons, and acknowledging Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM),

Aware of International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) report stating that Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems could potentially instruct NSAs on how to create tens of thousands of chemical compounds, which can then become chemical weapons within a six-hour period,

Guided by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and recalling the OPCW National Implementation Framework (2019),

Deeply concerned with the exploitation of chemical material transportation within the regional setting due to insecurities through States parties borders,

Observing the potentials of regional cooperation to rapidly respond to potential threats, and trusting that through global cooperation chemical weapon use by NSAs can be prevented or stopped entirely,

Mindful of the presence of chemical precursors and the ease at which NSAs can obtain precursors to chemical weapons as well as dual-use chemicals, and welcoming the creation and collaboration of regional organizations in countering the proliferation of dangerous chemicals,

Noting the need for funding for the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) called for by the General Assembly resolution 61/275 (2007),

Recognizing the need to accurately identify and control the transportation of dual-use chemicals in order to ensure chemical compounds are not obtained by NSAs and used to fabricate chemical weaponry,

Seeking further research in the Monitoring and Tracking Chemicals (MATCH) prototype to establish a more secure method of tracking chemical transfers,

Highlighting the importance of expanding and continuing the work done by the Investigation and Identification (IIT), as well as the Fact Finding Missions (FFM) to enable further protection from chemical weapon development,

1. *Invites* States parties to adopt the Coordinated Operations for Multilateral Prosperity to Advance Sustainable Security (COMPASS) initiative designed to standardize efforts among States parties;
2. *Endorses* strengthening confidence-building measures within States parties to the CWC, through:
 - a. Adopting robust monitoring practices and enforcement of chemical trade and supply chains;
 - b. Strongly encouraging all States parties to increase their oversight capacity by bringing chemical production, transportation, and supply chain processes under their purview;
 - c. Encouraging efforts to identify and monitor illicit trafficking routes potentially exploited by NSAs to acquire chemical weapons;
3. *Calls upon* all States parties to engage in joint mechanisms for monitoring suspicious off-shore bank accounts that could be used for financing NSAs alongside chemical shipments, including maritime, terrestrial, and aerial transportation;
4. *Recommends* the adoption of an *OPCW Border Security Protocol*, which would encourage States parties to align their border control measures, improve chemical cargo tracking, and share intelligence by:
 - a. Advocating that border agencies receive specialized training in detecting and preventing the smuggling of hazardous substances;
 - b. Requesting that States parties establish trilateral agreements on border control protocols to ensure the prevention of chemical weapon smuggling and the third party involved should be an inspection mission of the OPCW, in accordance with its mandate, which would assist in border control verification;
 - c. Supporting regional enforcement mechanisms to intercept and prevent transfers of chemical weapons to NSAs;
5. *Welcomes* cooperation among States parties to address the usage of chemical weapons by NSAs by using regional approaches, such as:
 - a. Calling upon the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to host a conference for States parties to express regional concerns pertaining to NSAs;
 - b. Fully supporting the organization of regional partnerships aimed at enhancing information sharing, joint monitoring, and capacity-building among States parties to prevent the possession or use of chemical weapons by NSAs;

- c. Further requesting all States parties comply with OPCW mandates of international information sharing regarding the movement of chemical weapons and their precursors by NSAs across borders;
 - d. Promoting the formation of specific regional task forces to address local challenges related to the trafficking and misuse of chemicals by NSAs;
 - e. Facilitating regular regional forums for States parties to exchange intelligence and best practices on the secure storage, management, and destruction of dual-use chemicals;
- 6. *Expresses its support* for non-government organizations (NGOs) and other private entities to assist in these efforts by:
 - a. Encouraging studies assessing the impact of chemical weapons use by NSAs on marginalized communities;
 - b. Advocating for investment in chemical security infrastructure through public-private partnerships, and coordinated responses to illicit dual-chemical transfer, working in tandem with any approach attempting to hinder NSAs acquisition of chemical weapons;
 - c. Urging companies that deal with dual-use chemicals to improve compliance with the monitoring obligations established at the regional, national and international levels including the management of imports and exports within and across countries, as sensitive points often targeted by paramilitary groups for the procurement of chemical weapons;
- 7. *Encourages* greater funding to the UNODA in light of the struggle that developing countries experience in enforcing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) by:
 - a. Encouraging United Nations Member States and NGOs to increase their voluntary donations to UNODA;
 - b. Recommending an appropriate increase in funding to UNODA from the United Nations Regular Budget;
- 8. *Suggests* that all CWC States parties enact and strictly enforce national laws regulating precursor and dual-use chemicals, criminalizing chemical weapon-related activities by NSAs and imposing severe penalties on perpetrators and suppliers by:
 - a. Cooperating with the World Customs Organization's Memorandum of Understanding to improve monitoring of the trade of dual-use chemicals;
 - b. Recommending strengthening States parties' domestic regulatory frameworks to ensure that dual-use chemical producers have proper monitoring systems in place to report to the OPCW;
 - c. Modifying inspection protocols to allow more frequent and unexpected visits to already disarmed States parties;
- 9. *Recommends* that UNODA establishes an International Task Force for Eliminating Chemical Weapon Threats (ITFECT) meant to prepare and respond to potential chemical weapon threats by:

- a. Requesting regional task forces be established as branches of the greater task force to strengthen response in greater international regions;
 - b. Encouraging collaboration between these regional task forces to reinforce preparedness, response, and development;
 - c. Seeking collaboration between regional task forces in the form of training, education, and information sharing to strengthen response to potential chemical weapons threats worldwide;
 - d. Collaborating with OPCW IIT and FFM to ensure local authorities are prepared in event of chemical attack;
 - e. Hoping that special attention be paid to non-compliant States parties due to the higher risk of chemical weapons proliferation to NSAs;
 - f. Encouraging the establishment of a specialized investigatory mission under ITFECT aiming at identifying the procurement methods and supply chains of NSAs following a chemical weapons incident;
10. *Further suggests* States parties and the IIT acknowledge the research done thus far by the MATCH project, and consider implementing its findings in the IIT to adequately track the presence of chemical precursors and dual-use chemicals by:
 - a. Tracking the mass, density, and chemical composition of notable dual-use and precursor chemicals before and after transit;
 - b. Enhancing the OPCW's ability to inspect chemical storage facilities with specific analysis of dangerous dual-use chemicals and chemical weapon precursors;
 - c. Approving notifications of chemical transport to ensure chemical precursors and dual-use chemicals reach their intended destination;
11. *Calls upon* all States parties to adopt rules and regulations, where it has not been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the CWC and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);
12. *Further requests* all States parties enhance dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, as well as address the threat posed by the potential use of dual-use chemical and riot control agents by NSAs;
13. *Trusts* all States parties to support the strengthening and cooperation with the chemical industry to enforce best practices in chemical management, to promote the *Hague Ethical Guidelines* (2015), and to implement effective export and transport controls;
14. *Calls upon* all States parties to increase communication by advocating for increased and stronger communication with INTERPOL, other relevant international agencies and existing frameworks for communication between States parties to track and disrupt illegal trafficking of dangerous chemicals;
15. *Encourages* all States parties to increase media exposure by supporting the engagement of NGOs and media to denounce governments that do not protect their citizens;

16. *Proposes* the conversion of illicit former production sites, which were confiscated by the national authorities, into facilities for alternative uses by:
 - a. Recommending remodelling infrastructures for pharmaceutical, sustainable agriculture and educational purposes, which further:
 - i. Expresses its hope to overhaul these facilities into buildings at the disposal of every citizen;
 - ii. Desires to liaise with international organizations, including United Nations International Schools (UNIS), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Build Health International (BHI), and Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO);
 - iii. Suggests the establishment of a specialised database to provide accessible information in regards to each facility's current state and compliance with their safety standards;
 - b. Encouraging specifically for those facilities to be employed for storage of chemical weapons, using special crafted sealed containers and separation of types of chemicals, as well as monitoring these storage rooms;
17. *Encourages* the establishment of OPCW regional offices in States parties and high-risk areas to facilitate expedited deployment of experts, under OPCW guidance, including:
 - a. Coordinating regional policies regarding the security of dual-use chemical stockpiles;
 - b. Establishing joint training programs for regional police and intelligence agencies in chemical detection, regulation, and response;
18. *Recognizes* regional and international export control agreements, including but not limited to the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, which have accomplished the:
 - a. Enhancement of regional and international security and stability;
 - b. Promotion of transparency in transfers of dual-use goods categorizing chemicals;
 - c. Strengthening of export control systems for the global proliferation of chemical weapons;
 - d. Supporting the purpose and objectives of the CWC;
 - e. Preventing of the acquisition of chemical weapons by NSAs;
19. *Supports* the enhancement of regional cooperation to increase the barrier to chemical weapons production and their waste for NSAs through the creation of the Regional Green Security Initiative (RGCSI), which focuses on tightening trade regulations and enhancing intelligence-sharing on chemical threats by:
 - a. Encouraging the controlled, monitored, and eco-friendly disposal of hazardous substances to prevent acquisition and reuse by NSAs by implementing green disposal techniques across States parties like biomedical and hazardous waste incineration funded by the OPCW Trust Fund;

- b. Supporting the creation of guidelines for waste prevention and management regulation, including controlled exports of hazardous waste, proper segregation and pre-treatment of waste, and monitoring of companies to ensure detailed records of waste management activities;
 - c. Supporting agencies to create public awareness initiatives to enhance knowledge on disposal of chemical waste;
- 20. *Encourages* the establishment of a secure global Data-Sharing Platform managed by the OPCW to facilitate international cooperation in monitoring, detecting, and preventing the use or transportation of chemical weapons and dual-usage chemicals by NSAs by:
 - a. Facilitating real-time intelligence and data sharing between States parties, regional bodies, and relevant international organizations on suspicious chemical weapons-related activities;
 - b. Ensuring that all data-sharing complies with international legal standards on privacy, sovereignty, and security;
 - c. Proposing the development and use of artificial intelligence-based analytic methods to assist in gathering actionable intelligence;
 - d. Proposing the development and implementation of blockchain technology to facilitate real-time data sharing among all States parties;
- 21. *Requests* the establishment of regional training centers under the OPCW's guidance, which shall focus on:
 - a. Enhancing the capacity of national authorities, customs officers, and law enforcement agencies to detect and prevent the illegal use and trafficking of chemicals;
 - b. Expanding workshops and seminars in order to instruct the public and better inform policy makers as well as the scientific community on legal and environmental issues that arise from the use of chemical weapons;
 - c. Expanding the online publishing of materials and reports on chemical weapons, so they are readily available to the public;
 - d. Enhancing periodic and updated training sessions for firms that sell and buy chemical weapons, in order to raise awareness on the physical and psychological impact of chemical substances on the human body;
- 22. *Calls upon* States parties to take initiative for swift actions to recuperate in the short and long-term following chemical weapons attacks by:
 - a. Encouraging the expansion of the OPCW's rapid response team to mitigate the damage done in the aftermath of a chemical weapons attack by NSAs, urging the expansion of the RRAM to more reliably react to incidents as they occur;
 - b. Providing further support to the World Health Organization (WHO) to assure long term assistance to those affected by chemical weapons;

23. *Urges* the establishment of an international legal framework to regulate the role of AI in chemical security by:

- a. Developing clear standards requiring mandatory compliance from research institutions and tech companies;
- b. Advocating for a global monitoring system to detect and regulate illicit AI applications in chemical weapons proliferation;
- c. Encouraging the use of AI to detect chemical materials that are held in packages and other forms of containers.



Code: OPCW/1/9

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Preventing the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Reaffirming Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the “Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for Maritime Safety and Security,” utilizing information sharing to strengthen border control against the transportation of chemical weapons between neighboring countries,

Recognizing Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) which froze trade engagements with violent organizations,

Alarmed by a report by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2021 that over 1,000 attacks by non-state actors (NSAs) harmed more than 1,750 in over 40 States parties,

Fully alarmed by the 2017 assassination in Malaysia using VX nerve agent, which exposed fatal shortcomings in the global chemical detection framework,

Realizing the importance of international cooperation and intelligence sharing between States parties to prevent the transfer of chemical weapons and their precursors demonstrated by the fact that 55% of chemical weapons seized globally between 2010 and 2020 were the direct result of collaborative intelligence efforts,

Noting with regret the risk posed to achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 12 (responsible consumption and production) by the evolving threat of NSAs,

Stressing the urgent need for equitable access to advanced detection technology and training across all States parties,

Deeply appreciative of the foundation the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC) has provided,

Acknowledging SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) in strengthening national institutions through international cooperation for capacity building,

Encouraging the adoption and implementation of regional-based partnerships in promoting SDG target 16.7 (ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all level),

Keeping in mind the joint non-governmental organization (NGO) statement Preventing the Acquisition of Chemical Weapons by NSAs,

Affirming that the threat of illicit chemical weapon trade can be region-specific and requires cooperation,

Guided by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria and its role in detecting the use of chemical weapons,

Acknowledging the March 2025 collaboration between the Syrian Government and the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) on fulfilling its obligations under the CWC,

Emphasizing the importance of strategic trade control enforcement through information sharing,

Noting that Secretary-General António Guterres signed the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact in 2018,

Fully alarmed by the increase of chemical attacks during the past few years,

Affirming the importance of state sovereignty while also urging States parties to recognize the importance of information sharing when it comes to monitoring and controlling the trade of chemicals utilized in chemical weaponry,

Acknowledging the danger and potential global hazards caused by chemical weapons in the hands of NSAs,

Recalling OPCW Decision C-16/DEC.10 (2011), which emphasizes the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of article XI of the CWC, particularly regarding international cooperation and assistance in the field of chemical activities not prohibited under the CWC,

Recognizing the significance of the OPCW Decision C-16/DEC.10 (2011) in promoting the full implementation of article XI of the CWC, which underscores the importance of international cooperation and assistance,

Noting with concern the challenges posed by the production and trade of dual-use chemicals, which can be diverted for unauthorized purposes, and the need for robust international monitoring mechanisms to prevent such occurrences,

Emphasizing the importance of collaborative efforts between governments and the private sector, particularly within the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, to establish clear guidelines on the handling and sale of precursor chemicals, in alignment with General Assembly resolution 67/51 (2012) on combating the illicit trade in chemical precursors,

Acknowledging the Chemical Security Analysis Center disparities in state capacity to monitor and identify chemical weapons threats,

Underlining the need for training programs in order to ensure efficient treatment of illicit non-state activities,

Recognizing the importance of border security in the illicit trade of dual-use chemicals and the useful regional treaties like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for security,

Recalling article V of the CWC, which highlights the necessity of the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities, including chemical materials,

Fully aware of the great steps in the fight against chemical weapons taken through the adoption of the Hague Ethical Guidelines,

Aware of the difficulties faced by organizations, such as the Five Eyes Alliance and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, regarding confronting the threat of chemical weapons,

Alarmed by the amount of chemicals used in the making of chemical weapons by transnational terrorist organizations, from business and research facilities,

Fully alarmed by the re-emergence of chemical weapons by NSAs through the un-checked spread of dual-use materials and technology,

Recognizing the Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) sensing: an overview of the technologies report (2005) by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), concerning the use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups and implementation of solution,

Emphasizing General Assembly resolution 70/1 (2015) on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015), particularly SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) and stressing the importance of sustainable long term solutions including a framework for international cooperation and collaboration,

Taking into account that free international trade must be counterbalanced by verification measures to ensure no loopholes exist within trade networks,

Noting with appreciation the progress made through the OPCW Schedule of Chemicals and export notification systems, but recognizing the need for stricter and more unified enforcement mechanisms,

Supporting the precedent set by the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases & Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925) in prohibiting the use of chemical weapons,

Affirming the continued coordination between States parties and international organizations within the United Nations in enforcing global counter-terrorism via General Assembly resolution 60/288 (2006),

Recognizing the importance of Project TERMINUS in extending 24/7 access to international communications and intelligence,

1. *Urges* the establishment of regional databases that track chemical trade and emerging threats, which are:
 - a. Accessible to relevant and authorized agencies of States parties to create uniform risk detection and enforcement practices;
 - b. Created by a protocol for the facilitation of seamless information-sharing between states thereby enabling the early detection of suspicious activities and potential threats;
 - c. Partnerships with United Nations bodies such as the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to enhance threat detection and intelligence-sharing initiatives;
 - d. Integrated chemical workshops and enforcement standards, working in collaboration with GRULAC to mitigate regional risks;
 - e. Advocacy efforts for the monitoring of chemical imports and exports via Artificial Intelligence (AI) powered surveillance in accordance with the function of the International Maritime Organization;
2. *Requesting* States parties to engage in international cooperation and assistance by:
 - a. Participating in international chemical weapon prevention exercises and simulations;
 - b. Developing an upgraded early warning system, rapid response capabilities and international assistance programs for investigating chemical weapons;

3. *Calls upon* States parties to allow open communication between their states and others to facilitate the effective monitoring of chemicals and preventing the possession of chemical weapons by NSAs through the:
 - a. Creation and utilization of an information sharing system to monitor chemicals in movement;
 - b. Implementation of a database to track nations possession of chemicals that could be utilized in chemical weaponry;
 - c. Addition of further safeguards to internally protect nations stores of chemicals and chemical weaponry;
4. *Calls for* enhanced international monitoring of dual-use chemical production and trade, proposing the creation of an international tracking system under the OPCW and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to monitor the movement of high-risk substances and prevent their diversion by:
 - a. Calling to establish systematic inspections and audits of companies;
 - b. Encouraging research institutions, and industrial facilities managing dual-use chemicals in order to prevent their diversion for nefarious purposes;
5. *Stresses* the importance of public awareness campaigns and multi-sectoral education programs to inform industries, research institutions, and the general population about the risks of chemical proliferation and the need for vigilant reporting of suspicious activities;
6. *Recommends* the implementation of stronger inventory practices along international trade lines;
7. *Encourages* the development of an OPCW Micro-Quantity Chemical Detection Initiative to improve international detection and prevention of micro-quantity chemical agent trafficking by:
 - a. Requesting that OPCW initiate Micro-Detection Training and Capacity-Building programs to train customs, security, and law enforcement officers in identifying micro-trace levels of chemical agents;
 - b. Creating an Annual Micro-Detection Audit and Verification program within the OPCW to conduct random inspections of member state border facilities;
8. *Calls upon* the creation of an NSA Chemical Weapon Assessment and Tracking Hub (NSA-WATCH) to support communication networks and cooperation among States parties on dual-use chemicals and traditional chemical weapon threats through the:
 - a. Implementation by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC), with potential funding from the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament;
 - b. Creation of regional chemical trade and threat databases linked to authorized agencies and sponsored by United Nations bodies such as the UNCTC and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL);

- c. Establishment of workshops and enforcement standards in collaboration with the Group of Latin America the Caribbean (GRULAC) and existing regional commissions to address local risks;
 - d. Establishment of strengthened systems to prevent non-state actor access to dual-use chemicals, including uniform training standards, improved security, faster response time, and theft risk management;
- 9. *Requests* that OPCW continues to provide technical assistance and capacity building programs for States parties, especially for those with limited resources, to enhance their ability to detect and prevent chemical weapons threats posed by NSAs by:
 - a. Recommending States parties implement regional and subregional forums and workshops in alignment with the Conference on Disarmament and the OPCW's Outreach Advisory Board;
 - b. Endorsing the adoption of integrated border systems projects such as the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security;
- 10. *Establishes* the Global Detection Technology Fund under the OPCW to finance the development and implementation of advanced security systems to detect chemical weapons in under-resourced States parties;
- 11. *Invites* voluntary contributions from States parties, NGOs, and private-sector partners to support border security measures;
- 12. *Welcomes* the creation of the Global Security Intelligence Exchange (GSIX) under the OPCW for the purpose of safeguarding communications and facilitating the exchange of intelligence by sharing with all States parties the current whereabouts of dual-use chemicals in the supply chain and information on known NSAs through:
 - a. The OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) would get involved as soon as any of the dual-use chemicals be reported missing;
 - b. Promoting transparency by inviting the remaining four non-ratifying States parties of the CWC so as to share this initiative with them and build trust;
- 13. *Emphasizes* the need to update provisions within the CWC so they directly address NSAs and their connection to dual-use chemicals by:
 - a. Facilitating coordination between every OPCW Member State and the IIT in an indefinite joint-partnership so they can take proactive measures that combat NSAs;
 - b. Redefining what qualifies as a chemical weapon and broadening the scope of restricted substances to help mitigate the misuse of dual-use chemicals;
 - c. Requiring State parties to adopt specific legislative measures that criminalize the acquisition of and use of controlled chemicals by NSAs;
 - d. Encouraging technical assistance programs targeted at State parties' national capacities for monitoring and detecting dual-use chemicals;

14. *Calls* on fellow States parties for international cooperation with INTERPOL and relevant agencies for the implementation of Project TERMINUS and the adoption of the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database and workshop to enhance data sharing and tracking by:
 - a. Endorsing the use of I-Checkit technology that allows partners to screen documents against the SLTD database;
 - b. Assisting in the prevention NSAs from accessing sensitive documents related to chemical weapons;
15. *Calls upon* all States parties to establish a standardized screening procedure on a regional level based on the following criteria, such as:
 - a. Classifying chemicals in alignment with the three OPCW schedules;
 - b. Verifying export documents;
 - c. Assessing the legitimacy of the end-use of said chemicals;
 - d. Evaluating the receiving facility's capabilities;
 - e. Ensuring compliance with international regulations;
16. *Suggests* that OPCW partner with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and chemical weapons experts to create tailored reports for the General Assembly specific to each States parties to:
 - a. Highlight potential weak points in States parties supply chains and infrastructure that NSAs may take advantage of to acquire chemical weapons;
 - b. Be funded by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT);
17. *Urges* States parties to monitor domestic and international terrorist organizations operating within their territory to prevent further attacks and prosecute possible perpetrators;
18. *Calls on* strengthening regulations on the sale, storage, and transportation of precursor chemicals, ensuring that only verified and authorized entities have access to such materials;
19. *Encourages* the expansion of the FFM in Syria into a global FFM, capable of detecting all perpetrators of chemical weapons internationally, and analyze chemical production factories within territories;
20. *Suggests* the renewal of the Joint Identification Mission (JIM) by the Security Council to establish the JIM as an OPCW mission, responsible for the identification of chemical weapon use internationally;
21. *Proposes* that State parties implement programs similar to the Red Sea Security Initiative (RSSI), under the jurisdiction of the OPCW, to combat terrorism by strengthening public-private partnership for strengthened maritime safety and security;
22. *Encourages* States parties to partner with the IMO to implement increased safety measures and inspections, ensuring safe passage for asylum-seekers and refugees;

23. *Advocates* for the specialization of marine as well as land border workers by:
- a. Training voluntary border control workers, specifically in the detection of chemical weapons, under the supervision of the Technical Secretariat;
 - b. Opening a technical program for future border control workers that can graduate as specialists in chemical monitoring;
24. *Proposes* the creation of the Chemical Safety and Non-State Actor Prevention program (CSNAP), a collaborative task force designed to tackle the threat of NSAs through:
- a. Collaborating with INTERPOL to coordinate investigation and enforcement operations against NSAs suspected of possessing chemical weapons, including:
 - i. The implementation of joint training sessions between the OPCW and INTERPOL in order to ensure best practices and optimal efficiency in the seizure of illicit chemical weapons;
 - ii. Establishing routine procedures for chemical agent storage and disposal after seizure;
 - b. Encouraging information sharing between OPCW States parties through secure channels in existing international law enforcement agencies;
 - c. Funding from the Global Framework on Chemicals Fund in accordance with its mission statement;
25. *Calls upon* the OPCW Live Agent Training personnel to focus the training of first responders, police forces, and border patrol officials, prioritizing areas highly affected by NSA's activities, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by:
- a. Strengthening capacities of local authorities in detecting illicit activities related to chemical weapon use;
 - b. Urging new developments in smuggling and chemical weapon use by NSAs as well as in enhance law enforcement methods as chemical threat detection, forensic analysis, and response coordination to detect chemical weapon production and use;
26. *Recognizes* the need for enhanced regional cooperation in preventing illicit chemical weapons activities by:
- a. Ensuring the establishment of specialized Regional Defense Coordination Centers with participation from neighboring countries by:
 - i. Monitoring suspicious chemical transfer activities across national borders, including precursor and dual-use chemicals;
 - ii. Encouraging regular assessments of chemical security threats in the region, particularly along known smuggling routes;
 - iii. Emphasizing reporting directly to the OPCW Technical Secretariat;

- b. Recommending all States parties to cooperate fully with the Regional Defense Coordination Centers and to implement their recommendations, including through:
 - i. Dedicated international technical assistance programs focused on chemical security;
 - ii. Voluntary contributions from States parties and international partners;
27. *Recommends* the implementation of detection mechanisms within civil and commercial customs administrators, such as the Autonomous Pathogen Detection (APDS) systems, detectors that can detect small doses of pathogens, and Biological Identification Systems that can prevent the diffusion of chemical gas within locations, by:
- a. Implementing the recommended number of 10 APDS detectors and 5 biological identification systems to each custom checkpoints;
 - b. Creating a global fund for the implementation of the mechanism in States parties custom administration through:
 - i. Contributions by international organisations, such as the OPCW ChemTech Centre fund;
 - ii. Voluntary donation by States parties and private sectors;
 - c. Establishing initiatives in States parties, where such initiatives are not present;
 - d. Suggesting the deployment of “Honeytrap Chemical Batches” which are identifiable chemical tracers, to:
 - i. Trace illegal trade routes and identify actors within the chemical supply chain;
 - ii. Enable early intervention before chemicals are weaponized;
 - iii. Collaborate with international laboratories and research institutes to ensure the safe deployment of such batches;
28. *Calls for* existing regional bodies to bolster their borders by implementing communication with neighboring countries similar to the CSTO, by:
- a. Aiming to maneuver immediate threats;
 - b. Providing partnerships that discuss border strengthening tactics that are pertinent to the region’s geography;
 - c. Ensuring cooperative communication while maintaining national security, further:
 - i. Operating under the OPCW’s guidelines and limitations;
 - ii. Strengthening existing means to combat NSAs from obtaining and using chemical weapons;

29. *Strongly urges* States parties to recognize the necessity of transparency with an intergovernmental networking platform to promote regional and international interceptions of hijacked or illegally acquired chemical weapons and precursors, which would:
- a. Provide governmental communication in matters of terrorist operations involving chemical weapons making threats internationally accessible;
 - b. Facilitate reports and published information regarding international safety concerns to ensure transparency, worldwide collaboration and provide education on NSA actions and issues related to their monitoring;
30. *Suggests* that OPCW expand and therefore enhance regional cooperation to increase the barrier to chemical weapons productions and their waste for NSAs, through the creation of the RCSI by:
- a. Encouraging the controlled, monitored and sustainable disposal of hazardous substances through an elimination mechanism of chemical weapons to prevent acquisition and reuse by NSAs by implementing efficient disposable techniques across States parties;
 - b. Suggesting guidelines for waste prevention and management regulation, including:
 - i. Controlled export of hazardous waste;
 - ii. Proper segregation and pre-treatment;
 - iii. Monitoring of companies to ensure detailed records of waste management activities;
 - c. Supporting agencies to develop and implement waste management plans as well as including public awareness initiatives to enhance knowledge on disposal of chemical waste;
31. *Further requests* the continuation of the OPCW Instructor Development and Exchange Programme to:
- a. Promote and teach skills needed by nurses and doctors to tend to victims of chemical weapons, which would provide each OPCW Member State with the capacity to train first responders to respond and aid in the event of chemical terrorism adequately;
 - b. Work extensively with the World Health Organization (WHO) to further globalize this initiative, which would further strengthen the globalization efforts and make the international application of chemical agent treatment more straightforward;
 - c. Provide training to military medics who attend a Member State's military school to:
 - i. Further aid in the development of these treatments in warfare or combat against NSAs, if military personnel or civilians are injured with said chemical agent;
 - ii. Include chemical agent treatment education/training for all military personnel as a part of each state's basic training for their respective military;
 - d. Ensure that chemical terrorism and warfare are ineffective and therefore not an optimal means of violence by:

- i. Ensuring that states have the full capacity to respond to these attacks, making the use of chemical weapons an outdated means;
 - ii. Consequently, disincentivizing transnational terrorist organizations from using said chemical weapons;
- 32. *Recommends* the expansion of OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board underneath the OPCW's Director-General to include a specialized panel which would work to identify new and potentially threatening technologies related to the use of chemical weapons in academic or defense-based research, consisting of:
 - a. An expanded number of regional and international experts qualified to advise the OPCW on the subject of chemical security;
 - b. Meetings on an ad-hoc basis whenever new literature is introduced into the public fora which introduce the potential to significantly alter the chemical weapons landscape;
- 33. *Calls upon* the IIT, in conjunction with Syrian authorities, to investigate abandoned chemical production sites in Syria, securing said chemical production sites to prevent abuse by NSAs, and work to eliminate any highlighted weak points in continuation of March 2025 efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT);
- 34. *Recommends* that individual States parties adjust their border security policy to strengthen the interception of illegal chemical materials by:
 - a. Securing any identifiably porous sections of the border that provide proven or theoretical opportunity for abuse by NSAs through:
 - i. Allocating adequate human resources for proper coverage;
 - ii. Installing necessary technological infrastructure for visual monitoring;
 - b. Implementing extensive background checks on individuals seeking to enter the territory of States parties for any connection related to violent NSAs;
 - c. Prosecuting any individuals caught attempting to illegally enter the territory of a Member State while in the possession of illicit chemical materials or weapons and report any further leads that arise from these individuals regarding potential connections to other NSAs or organizations.