

10-14 April 2022

Documentation of the Work of the General Assembly First Committee (GA1) NMUN Simulation\*



## Conference B

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# General Assembly First Committee (GA1)

## Committee Staff

**Director**  
**Assistant Director**  
**Chair**

Adam Wolf  
Joli McSherry  
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## Agenda

- I. Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices
- II. Reducing Nuclear Danger

## Resolutions adopted by the Committee

CODE	TOPIC	VOTE (FOR-AGAINST-ABSTAIN)
GA1/1/1	Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices	Adopted without a vote
GA1/1/2	Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices	59-5-12

## Summary Report

The General Assembly First Committee held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

- I. Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices
- II. Reducing Nuclear Danger

The session was attended by representatives of 76 Member States. On Sunday, delegates began deliberating what topic to consider and ultimately adopted a topic order of 1-2, starting by addressing the subject of "Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices."

On Monday, the body began developing a range of working papers, ranging from establishing a definition of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), utilizing educational programs that focus on training and research, disrupting the supply chain and manufacturing tracking of IEDs, and partnering private entities and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Delegates were highly collaborative and respectful to each other in discussing the various considerations of their proposals. Delegates also discussed how they would merge their working papers.

On Tuesday, delegates continued their diligent work by revising the papers to better hone their ideas, once again discussing the possibility of merging between their working groups where their solutions aligned. During formal session, delegates continued to voice their concerns regarding the use of IEDs and lobbied their positions. As the day progressed, delegates primarily focused on refining their working papers and assessing where substance overlapped. Delegates worked diligently into the evening and further merged several working papers together, bringing the total number of working papers to four.

On Wednesday, delegates aimed to consolidate their work through final mergers. Ultimately, two final working papers were submitted and approved by the dais, both comprehensively covering a wide range of substantive issues related to the topic. The first draft resolution, 1/1, passed by consensus while the second drafted resolution, was amended with an additional operative clause, passed by a vote of 59 in favor, 5 against, and 12 abstentions.



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**Code:** GA1/1/1

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Noting* General Assembly Resolution 73/61 of 2018 on “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” and the need to further integrate mine risk education into national education strategies, alongside the work currently done by both the *United Nations Children’s Fund Education Strategy 2019-2030* and the United Nations Development Programme Educational Support Department with national education ministries,

*Bearing in mind* the encouragement of increased regional cooperation outlined in Security Council Resolution 2365 “Maintenance of International Peace” and the support the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Regional Peace Centers can offer in accomplishing regional cooperation,

*Remembering* General Assembly Resolution 72/75 on “Assistance in Mine Action” and the need to increase national border security to combat the smuggling of chemicals across Member States, exemplified by the International Criminal Police Organization’s (INTERPOL) Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement Programme (CHASE) and World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework’s goal of better training and equipping border security through a multi-agency approach,

*Emphasizing* the success of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in combating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in central Asia as seen in the 2020 Secretary General report on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (A/75/175),

*Having considered* the 2018 resolution 73/56 of the Secretary General on “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”, suggesting that information-sharing among Member States, international organizations and the private sector is central to effectively tackling the issue of improvised explosive devices,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 75/59 on “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosives devices” from 2020 which notes the increasing threat posed by IEDs and calling for increased support from all Member States,

*Guided by* a shared commitment to preserving civilian lives and human rights for all, which IEDs consistently erode,

*Affirming* the importance of proper education services and programs for civilians, military, and police in Counter-IED work, especially the success of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) IED Analysis Course,

*Noting the importance* of financial support for developing Member States or those involved in strenuous conflict in order to benefit from advanced Counter-IED technology,

*Noting the effectiveness* of trust funds such as the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action and the ANA Trust Fund in granting financial support to least developed and developing Member States,

*Noting the effectiveness* of national explosive training to special emergency forces and the success in disarming and seizing IEDs through an increase in surveillance and preemptive measures, as well as through increased partnership and cooperation with neighboring security and intelligence committees and organizations,

*Confident that* the root of IED manufacturing can be traced and tracked to some extent and the impact that data collection can have in tracking IED materials, known perpetrators, and support for Counter-IED operations,

*Calling attention* to the need for increasing availability of information in skill building abilities to combat IEDs,

*Noting* INTERPOL's Global Shield list of 14 Precursor Chemicals, Detonators, and Specific Transmitters, which can all be readily used in the crafting of IEDs and the need for additional oversight of these materials, as well as the recommendation from the 2017 General Assembly resolution 71/187 on "Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices" encouraging the support of the Global Shield Programme on monitoring of listed components,

*Guided by* the collaboration between Afghanistan, the United States, and Pakistan in the Tripartite Counter-IED Group's digitized Counter-IED database,

*Solemnly believing that* collaboration will help the countries affected by the problems of IEDs and that cooperation amongst the affected nations will mitigate the effects of the threats of IEDs to these nations,

*Bearing in mind* that artificial intelligence (AI) will help the effort of IED cleansing in the Middle East,

*Noting with regret* the continuous use and ease of manufacturing of IEDs utilized by insurgent groups in, for instance, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflict zones outside of the Middle East,

*Deeply conscious that* IED usage cannot be fully eliminated in the near future,

*Welcoming* continuous collaboration from Member States directly or indirectly in new and evolving technologies such as AI and smart robots to further limit casualties in disarming and detecting IEDs,

*Acknowledging* the general framework provided in the 1980 *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons* (CCW) which sets the groundwork for rules and regulations on IEDs with the pressing need for more specific frameworks,

*Noting the lack of* an information campaign that ensures all people regardless of education are taught how to identify explosives and explosive components,

*Being deeply disturbed by* the lack of specific solutions to the threat posed by IEDs and the lack of effective IED emergency response plans,

*Fulfilling* the United Nations (UN) system goal of properly equipping and protecting UN peacekeepers and the important role of UN peacekeepers in promoting peace and safety to citizens internationally, from all threats, including IEDs,

*Expressing concern* at the negative impact on civilian freedom of movement through the usage of IEDs on roads, bridges, and other transportation infrastructure expressed in General Assembly Resolution 73/67 on "Countering the Threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices",

*Approving* the contributions of the European Union - League of Arab States (EU-LAS) project to counter the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and the contribution of Project Masam in the sweeping of Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs) with their regional focus meeting the respective demands,

*Aware of* the necessity to build up state capacities to process reports on the whereabouts of IEDs,

*Recognizing* the success of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENFTATF) which fosters inter-regional collaboration to tackle the financial resources of non-state terrorist groups through an independent council,

*Understanding* that the definition of IEDs is a broad term that encompasses numerous types of explosive devices,

*Acknowledges* the safeguard guidelines and provisional IED definition established in 2011 by United Nations International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), focused on effective ammunition stockpile management, accounting and categorizing ammunition, surveillance, and physical security,

*Taking note* of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism International Hub on Behavioral Insights, a program dedicated to using diverse disciplines such as psychology, behavioral economics, cognitive science, and social science to commission scientific research and understand the root causes of terrorism,

*Further supporting* the existence of the supplementary bodies within the United Nations specifically tasked with training and assessing risks related to IEDs, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Operations,

*Noting with approval* the success of various centers of excellence when it comes to sharing of emerging technological practices, best practices, and research in the disposal of IEDs, including the Countering IED Center of Excellence (C-IED CoE),

*Recognizing* the success of emerging technologies like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) UGO-1st program in disposing of IEDs,

*Acknowledging* the utmost importance of the International Humanitarian Law as presented by the 1949 *Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols*,

*Stressing* the importance of the *Fourth Geneva Convention* and the responsibility of the occupying power to ensure the safety of the civilian population,

*Reconfirming* the importance of international support for countries impacted by IEDs, especially countries under strenuous economic situations,

*Noting* the UN helps countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace, including by utilizing this aspect of United Nations operations, will help ensure the safety of civilians and restricting flow of IEDs,

*Expressing* concern over the increased usage of IEDs in conflict areas, and the lack of responsible protection of civilians due to explosive remnants in post-conflict areas,

*Referencing* the existing information sharing partnerships between Member States and international organizations such as Project Watchmaker and the need for new initiatives not duplicating existing efforts, *Reaffirming* the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in protecting the health and safety of victims of terrorist and IED attacks,

*Recognizing* that the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards (UNIEDD) defines IEDs as a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract,

*Noting* the definition of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXOs) as explosive ordnances that did not explode when they were employed and still pose a risk of detonation as defined in Protocol V, Article 2, of the CCW,

*Understanding* that the definition of landmine should be that of an explosive mine laid on or just under the surface of the ground as defined in Protocol II, Article 2, of the CCW,

*Affirming* that IEDs are predominantly used by Non-State Actors for the use of furthering extremist ideals,

*Calling attention to* the significant environmental impacts of IEDs, UXOs and land mines including soil degradation as a result of landmine and UXO fields being left untouched after the conclusion of conflicts,

*Emphasizing* soil degradation, the release of hazardous chemicals, pressures on natural resources, risk from forest fires, and risk to animals as the priority issues created by the environmental impacts of IEDs, UXOs and land mines,

*Encouraging* the creation of a recycling system that reduces, reuses, and recycles the debris and fallout from blast sites resulting from IEDs, UXOs, and landmines,

*Noting with deep appreciation* the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

*Taking note* of the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (UN VTF),

*Considering* the current lack of institutional knowledge regarding the environmental impact of IEDs on water supplies,

*Deploing* the unacceptable death toll that IEDs have claimed within the last decade which totals more than 350,000 as well as the 82 million victims displaced as a result of the war zones in which IEDS inhabit, as reported by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) Global Trends,

*Observing* the increasingly relevant General Assembly resolution 75/175 on “Human rights and extreme poverty” related to preventing Non-State Actors from obtaining the funds and materials for IED creation,

*Conscious that* international support for IED-affected Member States is crucial in promoting their ability to reduce the threat that such weapons pose, especially in light of the General Assembly’s 2006 resolution 60/288 the “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” and the 2017 General Assembly resolution 71/291 on “Strengthening the capability of the United Nations system to assist Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” which seeks to strengthen Member States ability to implement the Counter-Terrorism Strategy,

*Aware of* the increase in the stockpiling of ammunition by Member States and the insecurity of certain stocks leading to the risk of acquisition of IED components by Non-State Actors,

*Acknowledging* the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction of 1997* (Ottawa Treaty) and its following protocols,

*Affirming* the successful reduction of IEDs and similar ERW in light of treaties such as the 2014 *Arms Trade Treaty* (ATT), and the 2008 *Convention on Cluster Munitions* (CCM),

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 2370 “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” (2017) on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, which calls on states to eliminate the supply of weapons to those involved in terrorist attacks, including IED components,

*Acknowledging* the United Nations Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) importance in the dissemination of information with regards to disarmament, particularly the disparity of gender representation in reports,

*Having reviewed* the framework, definitions, and measures to be followed provided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) that address all UN activities related to mine action operations,

*Having considered further* the previously proposed working definition of an IED by the IATG,

*Distressed by* the limitations of existing definitions and lack of a universal definition as to what constitutes an IED,

*Expressing* the necessity of a realistic operational-focused training, such as systematic safety briefings, as established within the Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Safety Project (LSP) thus agreeing that every effort should be made to train personnel as they are intended to operate, while developing the team building and understanding and procedures that will be needed for success when deployed,

*Deeply conscious* of the need for information-sharing systems to be created and promoted with the goal of the removal of IED usage in Member States,

*Emphasizing* the importance of utilizing collected data to track the shipment of IEDs and IED components between Member States,

*Keeping in mind* the diligent work achieved by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to promote education-based solutions and fight adversity in its many sub-aspects, and expressing its appreciation in UNICEF’s efforts in using IED risk education to teach civilians on how to recognize, avoid, report threats of IEDs,

*Stressing once again* that international support for IED-affected Member States is crucial in promoting their ability to reduce the threat that such weapons pose,

*Expressing grave concern* over the increasing use of IEDs by illegally armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized bodies resulting in thousands of casualties both civilian and military,

*Underlining* the pressing need for universal tools to be available for all Member States to utilize in counter-IED efforts,

*Recognizing* the importance of the engagement of all Member States in multilateral training efforts for military personnel and soldiers on countering, disarming, and preventing IED explosions,

*Believing* that in relation to IEDs, counterterrorism is a fundamentally multilateral effort requiring universal tools as well as information and data sharing between Member States,

*Reiterating* the obligation of Member States to prevent the movement and supply of IED components and funds through effective border control and security, as emphasized by the United Nations IED Threat Mitigation in Mission Systems,

*Alarmed* with the increase in the stockpiling of ammunition on by Member States and the insecurity of certain stocks leading to the risk of acquisition of IED components by Non-State Actors,

*Taking notice of* the successful military working dog operations in various regions, particularly within European and Middle Eastern regions, in which canine units assist soldiers in IED prevention and avoidance tactics,

*Keeping in mind* the fact that the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Conventional Ammunition has stated that unsecured and poorly managed ammunition stockpiles have allowed for the illicit diversion of ammunition, potentially becoming a source for the construction of IEDs,

*Reaffirming* that there have been 357,619 civilian casualties caused by IEDs over the last decade according to the Action on Armed Violence's (AOAV) 2020 report, *A decade of global IED harm reviewed*,

*Taking into account* the importance of data protection in a digitized and globalized world, bearing in mind resolution 42/15 (2016) of the UNHRC on "The right to privacy in a digital age," Article 12 of the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and Article 17 of the 1966 *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*,

*Further acknowledging* the previous efforts of the Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement Programme (CHASE) under INTERPOL on security and data protection,

*Cognizant of* the right of confidentiality of relevant information contributed, distributed, and withheld by participating Member States in order to uphold national sovereignty,

*Reconfirming* the *Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices* (1980) which clearly states in Article 2 that each Member State is responsible for all mines, booby-traps, and other devices being destroyed or removed from the respective Member State,

*Fully aware* the social causes of radicalization and the particular challenge regarding IEDs used by radicalized terrorist networks,

*Taking into consideration* that IEDs are predominantly used by Non-State Actors for the use of furthering extremist ideals and the rare occurrence of State actors supporting Non-State actors,

*Noting with concern* that the lack of a consistent definition and corresponding standards risks confusing the best response to addressing any given IED, and by extension could reinforce the dangers encountered by civilians living and working in areas with IEDs contamination,

*Noting* the increased usage of IEDs and the lack of protection of civilians that has led to the deaths of over 3,500 children in the last decade, especially populations in post conflict areas due to explosive remnants of war (ERW),

1. *Recommends* the use of the IATG as a foundation for a definition of IEDs implemented through the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) that would serve as a universal, evolving, baseline definition of IEDs with the following additions: self-made, modified, and/or repurposed explosive devices built, assembled, by - primarily - Non-State Actors or non-authorized personnel intended to cause public harm whilst:

- a. Seeking to recognize the usage of IEDs by State actors and further reminds States that such usage is prohibited by the *Geneva Conventions*;
  - b. Acknowledging the strong psychological harm IED detonation and threats inflict upon civilians, including the elderly, women, and children;
  - c. Strongly recommending that the UNODA and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) adopt this definition in addressing future issues concerning the usage of IEDs;
2. *Strongly recommends* UNODA to create a conference dedicated to expanding upon the new global standardized definition of an IEDs through:
- a. Establishing a specific date and time to discuss finding a definition using a development committee that holds session on the topic referred to as *The International Conference on Definition and Standardization*;
  - b. Meeting in session, allowing all Member-States who wish to participate to voice their nations concerns over the deliberation on a consensus of a definition;
  - c. Encouraging Member-States to cooperate in sharing crucial information and perspectives to identify all types of IEDs and the different ways in which they are used, while stressing the importance of UNODA to foster discussion on the wide variety of types of IEDs and IED-like weapons;
  - d. Providing Member States with the multilateral opportunity to freely discuss what their nations view as an IED by providing a space for all Member States' voices and perspectives to be heard which will aid the discussion on all aspects of IEDs, including their usage, development, and ease of availability;
  - e. Deliberating and ultimately agreeing on a universal standard definition of an IED as well as weapons which may share similar identifications;
3. *Encourages* new standards that recognize traditional methods, while also enforcing a broad definition that can encompass a wide range of potential IEDs including by providing guidelines dependent on how IEDs are triggered, transported, manufactured, materials being utilized, effect on the environment, and the context in which they are being used;
4. *Supports* an increase in domestic surveillance programs regarding the proliferation of IEDs on a case-by-case manner within Member States, the increased cooperation of security forces, and their ability to gain relevant technology by:
- a. Encouraging increased participation in multilateral security summits such as the Kazakhstan Security Exhibition and Conference, Munich Security Conference, Africa Security Symposium, and Kazakhstan Security Systems conference;
  - b. Working towards a general increase in the education of state and private security forces in combatting IEDs;
  - c. Petitioning nations with advanced anti-IED technology to attend security summits and share advancements and breakthrough in anti-IED technologies with other Member States;
5. *Calls upon* willing and able Member States to contribute and join the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, which would:

- a. Allow Member States in need of IED related aid to reap the benefits of advanced technology in the fight against IEDs such as IED jammers and anti-IED robots;
  - b. Be focused on granting aid to countries that are in need of support and are dealing with the consequences of strenuous conflict;
6. *Recommends* that the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT) Regional Programs in Central Asia, the Sahel, and South/Central America mirror the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force as well as the Counter Terrorism Financing Program in order to:
  - a. Counteract the financial resources of non-State terrorist groups that span multiple Member States;
  - b. Promote inter-regional accountability through the formation of independent regional councils with rotating chairs;
  - c. Standardize regulations between Member States surrounding financial tracking;
  - d. Engage in best-practice sharing about ways to track the finances of terrorist groups with other regional Member States;
  - e. Assist developing Member States that are struggling to tackle terrorism;
7. *Invites* Member States to contribute funds on a voluntary basis, based on their share of Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), to expand the International Hub on Behavioral Insights for the purpose of:
  - a. Commissioning a study on the prevention of radicalization, how terrorist groups approach vulnerable groups, and the psychological effects on victims of terrorism;
  - b. Providing mental health resources to survivors of IED terrorist attacks;
  - c. Creating clear and precise guidelines about the psychological factors involved with IEDs within the UN which will be shared to all Member State security departments or government offices;
  - d. Raising awareness through a public campaign about potential warning signs and behavior regarding IEDs and terrorism;
8. *Strongly urges* the need for the equitable delivery of humanitarian aid by Member States to fellow states severely affected by IEDs, including but not limited to financial, logistical, and medical supplies;
9. *Asks* Member States to address the short-term and long-term effects that IEDs have on states, which result in widespread damage to individuals, environments, agriculture, and infrastructure by:
  - a. Considering funding collaborative operations involving UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the HALO Trust (Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization), Legacies of War, UNODA, UNMAS, and UNOCT;
  - b. Stressing the responsibility of belligerent states to remove Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and UXO in post-conflict regions;
  - c. Supporting the comprehensive UNMAS efforts in coordinating victim assistance missions;

- d. Accommodating refugees and displaced persons through the use of:
        - i. UNHCR funding to construct and maintain temporary housing to welcome populations during the extraction of IEDs from their regions;
        - ii. WHO funding to provide healthcare and essential services to those displaced persons;
10. *Invites* UNODA, UNMAS, and UNOCT to support and enhance the capabilities of affected states, potentially making use of some of the funds Member States may elect to provide to these organizations in support of the collaborative initiative mentioned above, by providing expertise and assistance in emplacing relevant infrastructure to enable affected states to:
  - a. Develop a local capacity to conduct demining operations independent of outside support;
  - b. Enhance their capacity to restrict, within their borders, the trade of components critical to IEDs' manufacture, informed by the operational and bureaucratic experience of those three organizations;
11. *Calls for* the removal and reduction of any IEDs within Member States' territory to further reduce any threatening impact on citizens or the environment by:
  - a. Using innovative and advanced technology to find safe and sustainable ways in removing any explosive ordnance;
  - b. Locating and keeping track of all IEDs placed upon States to further recognize the amount of removal with the use of the aforementioned information hubs;
  - c. Properly disposing and dismembering of IEDs without threatening the environment;
  - d. Recognizing the environmental effects IEDs have on a State with an impact on potable water, soil, surface water and air, which presents a greater hazard to affected persons than the actual explosion caused by IEDs;
12. *Calls upon* Member States to comply with international humanitarian law and urges the international community to reconsider the funding of UNMAS by:
  - a. Imposing financial penalties on aggressors which initiate conflict to be used to fund UNMAS operations seeking to protect civilians from explosive remnants of war left in post-conflict areas;
  - b. Encouraging Member States to financially support UNMAS and IED affected countries in the work of disposal and clean up in regards to soil degradation and waterway pollution in areas affected;
  - c. Shifting the burden of IED disposal and cleanup away from the domestic resources of Member States who contribute financially to UNMAS;
13. *Encourages* UNICEF, along with UNDP, to collaborate to integrate mine risk education initiatives into national education strategies in the form of local community workshops and curriculum planning within countries most affected by IEDs to increase awareness and knowledge of all to better prevent unnecessary harm from IEDs;
14. *Suggests* Member States national police, customs, immigration, and border security agencies take part in training exercises through the International Police Organization's Project CHASE, along with other NGOs, in order to increase national investments in developing and utilizing detection technologies to

better protect Member States from international smuggling of chemicals across land borders in order to counter the proliferation of IEDs, including:

- a. Indicating and pinpointing potential stockpiles of IED related materials by working through NGOs, customs, and ports with support from border security agencies;
- b. Augmenting focus on stopping transportation of potential materials and inspect threats moving forward to prevent latent risks;

15. *Encourages* Member States to support the training and education of UN Peacekeeping Forces by providing technical, financial, and material assistance aimed at strengthening the capacity of peacekeeping missions that encounter IEDs by:

- a. Increasing the utilization of best practices and new technology in regards to increasing the safety of disposing explosive devices;
- b. Holding a one-time summit, *Experts on the Disposal of IEDs*, bringing together national experts on explosive devices, military leaders and safety experts providing an outcome document regarding:
  - i. Ensuring the safety of UN Peacekeepers during disposal missions by providing better coordination between local authorities and UN Peacekeeping Missions as well as within national security structures;
  - ii. Providing adequate equipment for disposal missions especially for the exposed teams and technical expertise on how to identify and safely detonate IEDs;
  - iii. Considering the prospects of the financing and development of technological possibilities benefiting disposal missions to provide safety for Peacekeepers onsite;
  - iv. Exchanging learnings between national and international excellence centers on IEDs as well as intelligence services;
  - v. Welcoming the establishment of a program similar to The Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) which has a mandate to provide access to IED education to increase the skill of peacekeepers and military personnel;

16. *Strongly recommends* UNODA to utilize its Disarmament Education program in order to properly educate willing Member States on the subject of IEDs by:

- a. Launching and maintaining a universal course for the education of IEDs disarmament accessible to all Member States emphasizing the troubling effects of IED attacks on vulnerable groups, notably women and children, in at-risk areas;
- b. Expanding the program to cater to each Member State and their respective political, geographical, and national security needs by sending in trained professionals from UNODA's Disarmament Education branch to educate each respective Member State on the disarmament and combating of IEDs;
- c. Educating local law enforcement, national militaries, and border controls as well as government officials of all Member States, on the recognition of IEDs and their key components;
- d. Encouraging NGOs and other civil society organizations with relevant expertise to participate in the development of these programs;

- e. Recommending that all willing Member States participating in this educational program to guarantee security against the growing threat of IEDs;
17. *Asks* for Member States to recognize programs that train individuals in the military profession on the dangers of IEDs using technology and experts by:
- a. Educating military personnel on how to use evolving methods and technologies of disposal of IEDs;
  - b. Encouraging the international community to implement their own canine training units to detect chemicals used in IEDs in order to increase troop level of detection, like the Bison Counter Program of 2013, which is the largest Counter-IED exercise in the EU;
  - c. Expanding training programs which offer immersive experiences through fake IEDs in virtual towns to emulate real-time decision-making experiences in low risk settings;
18. *Advises* the creation of voluntary counter-IED training initiatives available for all Member States through collaboration with national training programmes, including:
- a. Creating regional training centers under the auspices of UNODA and UNMAS;
  - b. Training personnel to return to their home states and further share their gained skills and knowledge in order to reduce costs and establish a snowball system and increasing the the number of trained personnel;
19. *Stresses the need* for UNMAS to create operational-focused training, focused on four broad areas, including:
- a. Creating appropriate training environments, with the idea that IED related training should be conducted in similar conditions to those expected on deployments, to reflect the environment's complexity, intensity, and challenges;
  - b. Centralizing the habitual association of personnel, conceding that operating as a team, interoperability and integration of capabilities are required starting at the lowest levels and therefore acknowledging that personnel who are to operate together in an IED threat environment, should be habitually associated from as early as possibly in their training;
  - c. Placing more emphasis on canine IED detection within UNMAS in order to train specialized mine-detecting dogs who have the ability to recover primary components of IEDs and to operate within hostile conditions that may be present in high-risk regions;
  - d. Considering the socioeconomic conditions and available equipment, training plan operations that may differ from one Member State to another;
20. *Recommends* that under the framework of a partnership between qualified non-governmental organizations and the UNODA all personnel working in environments with high concentrations of IEDs should receive basic IED awareness training which will:
- a. Consist of a comprehensive set of IED theory presentations and practical lessons which may include a written assessment or practical assessments with the intent to provide or increase recipients' knowledge in relation to IEDs, their threat, and basic threat mitigation measures;
  - b. Help mitigate the IED threat and the consequences of IED attacks by enhancing personnel safety and improving the survivability of personnel operating in IED threat environments;

21. *Calls upon* members of the international community to collectively achieve greater safety in IED affected communities through methods including, but not limited to:
  - a. The multilateral creation of regional expert knowledge hubs at the discretion of Member States, to be:
    - i. Sponsored by the UNOCT and Member States through both funding and practical leadership;
    - ii. Inspired by specialized organizations, such as the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory by the European Defence Agency (JDEAL) or NATO's C-IED CoE;
    - iii. Provided with the option of expanding on the already existing Ordnance School and UNOCT training grounds and Program Offices maintained by the UNOCT;
  - b. Investing in corporations and private sector partners that will use this knowledge base to further research the components and the construction of IEDs;
22. *Urges* Member States to initiate the establishment of similar programs to C-IED CoE in regions most affected by IED attacks by investing in infrastructure related to these specific programs, with the intention of:
  - a. Seeking an exchange of knowledge between experts within the organization's database;
  - b. Serving as an outlet for the sharing of best practices, including emerging technologies;
  - c. Operating as a collaborative means for coordinating training efforts for military and police forces;
23. *Further recommends* to establish research facilities in a safe, controlled environment to analyze battlefield evidence of IED composition in order to more accurately monitor commonly used materials in IEDs, detect evolutions in technology and utilize the experiments as a source of knowledge to counter possible future attacks;
24. *Recommends* the creation of the United Nation Explosives Components Database (UNECTD) under the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to better track the movement of potentially explosive chemicals at the discretion of participating nations within national borders based upon INTERPOL's Global Shield list of 14 precursor chemicals, detonators, and specific transmitters to combat the threat posed by IEDs and Counter-IED operational success by:
  - a. Allowing the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to use acquired data to produce quarter-quarter-yearly reports on themes, trends, and areas identified as potential supply chain of IEDs component and subsequently;
    - i. Enabling the international community to identify hotspots where smuggling and illicit shipment of goods is more common;
    - ii. Producing suggestions for Member States on how to address weak points in the security of the international shipping system;
  - b. Encouraging the sharing of national and private shipping logistic centers records of arrival and dispatch of large quantity of product containing listed components with national government to be then included in the UNECTD;

- c. Giving Member States the ability to identify unsecure supply chains that are shown to be linked to terror groups;
25. *Proposes* the inclusion of IED information sharing into ongoing international conferences, including:
- a. Expanding awareness of materials and components utilized in the structure of IEDs;
  - b. Developing knowledge of regional and international sources of such materials;
  - c. Highlighting regions that have military stockpiles and abandoned factories or warehouses which could contain explosive precursor chemicals;
  - d. Understanding the frequency of attacks exploiting IEDs and detailed accounts of such attacks;
26. *Calls upon* the UNOCT to expand The Global Programme on Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reignition (PRR) for educational programs that implement measures to stop the recruitment of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in engaging in the use of IEDs on behalf of NSAGs by:
- a. Creating more jobs for IED prevention efforts offering free or subsidized training programs for technical skills aimed at people who don't have many opportunities for education and jobs;
  - b. Exercising deradicalization and radicalization prevention efforts on a personal level, such as presence in online communities with anti-terrorist narratives in order to prevent IED attacks from their online source through the mitigation and reduction of terrorist group recruitment;
  - c. Imploring Member States to establish further national work building on existing international frameworks, such as INTERPOL Project Watchmaker, on monitoring existing radical terrorist networks as well as preventing radicalization of individuals and groups;
27. *Further suggests* collaboration between Member States, UNMAS and UNODA to build up capacities and infrastructure in information sharing to give civilians the opportunity to report findings of IEDs or landmines so that these can be swept by professional teams and make the sweeping efforts more effective;
28. *Suggests* the establishment of an IED risk reduction summit overseen by UNODA which must:
- a. Address and alter the international definition of IEDs as well as discuss educational measures and prevention actions;
  - b. Be held every 5 years;
  - c. Be initially held in Geneva, Switzerland, with the option to change at the discretion of the Secretary-General;
  - d. Assess all educational curriculums shared to Member States pertaining to IED training such as courses, simulations, and hands-on training;
  - e. Review the efficiency of the process every conference in order to confirm that Member States, especially developing Member States, are making progress with the education provided and are easily obtaining the necessary information and technologies and making sure the information is reported back to the secretariat of the General Assembly First Committee;

- f. Upholding the IATG guidelines and ensuring Member-States are educated on the specifics of the guidelines through:
    - i. Implementing a bi-annual forum whose sole purpose will be to discuss possible avenues and continue education on the subject;
    - ii. Outlining a set of universal goals, outlined by Member-States together at the aforementioned bi-annual forum, for Member-States to use to help ensure smooth implementation and continued adherence;
29. *Recommends* the creation of an information campaign that can be distributed by NGOs and local volunteers composed of:
- a. Simple designs that convey the signs of IED presence with little to no writing to ensure that undereducated populations can understand the created pamphlets by showing:
    - i. Sagging trucks or abandoned cars that could be a sign of a car bomb;
    - ii. Bulky clothing in an inappropriate climate that could conceal weapons or explosives;
    - iii. Wires protruding from letters or packages that could be a letter bomb or mailed explosive;
  - b. First-hand accounts from former soldiers and emergency responders to better understand what professionals look for in regard to IED threats as well as:
    - i. Instructing how to notify local authorities and peacekeeping forces about potential dangers;
    - ii. Training simple first-aid to local populations' civilian and police forces;
30. *Invites* the signatories of the *Ottawa Treaty* to ratify the terms of this agreement, as well as its additional protocols including:
- a. Prohibiting of the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APLs);
  - b. Mandating for states-parties to destroy their stockpiled APLs within four years and eliminate all APL holdings, including mines currently planted in the soil, within 10 years;
  - c. Annually reporting to the UN Secretary-General their total APL stockpiles, the technical characteristics of their APLs, the location of all mined areas, and the status of APL destruction programs;
31. *Further advises* Member States adopt legislation based on the Technical Guidelines to Facilitate the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 (2017), focused on monitoring and restricting precursor materials in order to greatly decrease the capacity of non-state armed groups to produce IEDs and materials related domestically by:
- a. Requiring licensing or permits in order to purchase explosive precursor chemicals commonly used in IED construction;
  - b. Tracking the purchase, movement, and storage of explosive chemicals used in IEDs within state borders;
  - c. Limiting the composition of chemical mixtures that contain explosive precursors, as laid out in the Chemical Facilities Anti Terrorism Standards (CFATS);

32. *Reiterates its request* to all participating actors take action against the transfer, construction, acquisition and use of IEDs by non-state armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients over the internet and black market;
33. *Asks* the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and other relevant stakeholders work with United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (UNRCPD) to promote research on a regional level regarding the production, trafficking, and usage of IEDs to better equip Member States with relevant research in order to combat IEDs from a life-cycle approach;
34. *Emphasizes* the need to utilize data gathered from Member States on IED materials, with the goal of the enhanced monitoring and restriction of such materials;
35. *Recommends* the creation of an UNODA initiative, titled the Safeguarding Ammunition and Other Materials Initiative (SAOMI), that would run adjacent to the UNODA SaferGuard Programme, in order to provide the accessible means to better protect ammunition stockpiles by:
  - a. Providing funding and key security field experts in order to give Member States the means to better protect ammunition and other key material stockpiles;
  - b. Inviting key field security experts across the globe to volunteer their time and guidance to Member States;
  - c. Employing the help of experts already within the UN, including UNODA and General Assembly First Committee security experts;
36. *Strongly encourages* the establishment of a refined centralized secure database regarding IEDs and ERW that is maintained by UNMAS, allowing for:
  - a. Transparent access to information from the international community in order to monitor and flag materials used to create or modify explosive devices in both transport and storage;
  - b. Discussions among Member States on the further strengthening of border control mechanisms to combat the international transportation of IEDs and IED components;
  - c. The monitoring of programs to flag potential concerns through the trade of IED materials, including but not limited to:
    - i. Improving regional information shared about IEDs to tackle explosion occurrences and geographical variation of IED creation methods in high-incidence regions;
    - ii. Flagging and identifying potential stockpiles of IED related goods and materials by working through NGOs, customs, and ports;
    - iii. Increased focus on stopping transportation of potential materials and investigating threats moving forward to prevent potential risks;
    - iv. Augmenting the cooperation across intelligence agencies on recent acquisition or attempted acquisition of weaponized materials with the goal of the enhanced monitoring and restrictions;
    - v. Identifying and tracking of known individuals formerly involved with the illegal production or distribution of explosive devices to non-state actors or non-authorized personnel;
    - vi. Increased efforts to measure data on how women and children are affected by IEDs;
    - vii. Transferring the data of the tracking of the IEDs to the UNODA and the UNHCR in order to organize the cleaning of the lands infected;

- d. The implementation of a multi-layered and well-structured data encryption and protection infrastructure to prevent unauthorized access to or exploitation of the database, as well as information leaks;
37. *Supports* increased information sharing on a regional level, data which concerns information, potential risks concerning IED materials and individuals or groups constructing them, to create a multinational approach to mitigating and reducing the risk of explosive disasters occurring by:
- a. Bringing attention to unusual movements of stockpile materials with international NGOs such as the European Defense Agency (EDA);
  - b. Creating data sharing policies with states to allow more flexible monitoring of online movements;
38. *Encourages* an independent joint organization for the publishing of information-sharing between all Member States in order to bolster security, allowing them to increase awareness on methods being used by Non-State Actor groups through:
- a. The introduction of an independent intergovernmental data-collection agency allowing the supplemental groups discussed above to share information on a confidential website to protect the sanctity of peace and security when working toward combating IED usage internationally;
  - b. The collation of a plethora of exact methods contributing to the adequate dismantlement of the multitude of different types of IEDs, thus contributing to the decline in casualties internationally;
39. *Strongly encourages* all Member States to work towards the establishment of an independent international organization that is designed to supervise some of the most prominent terrorist groups' activities included within the distribution of IEDs including:
- a. The primary chemicals necessary for the manufacturing of IEDs subsequently to find the necessary trails in international countries that they are apparent in;
  - b. The tracking of large purchases regarding IED related materials to identify potential terrorist threats;
  - c. The trading or selling of this supplementary device which identifies the frequent locations of the transportation routes used by terrorist groups;
40. *Encourages* the mainstreaming of Artificial Intelligence in national and regional detection and removal efforts by:
- a. Employing state-of-the-art-robots AI technology for IED identification and removal;
  - b. Using neural networks trained in identifying IEDs in conjunction with aerial drones;
  - c. Employing remote-operated bomb-defusing robots to reduce human casualties from IED removal;
41. *Encourages* collaborative research efforts to strengthen the sharing of best practices and emerging technologies in the disposal of IEDs, including radar technology, exoskeletons or counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device warfare (CREW);
42. *Recommends* Member States focus on the tracking of IED circuit boards for passive infrared sensor detonators to maximize the likelihood of partially hindering IED manufacturing, through overseeing

circuit board manufacturers implementing stronger measures for ease of tracking of their product portfolio suitable for passive infrared sensors;

43. *Recommends* the creation of a platform to identify the vulnerable factories and warehouses in collaboration with national police agencies that may be holding the materials that are likely to be used in the manufacturing of IEDs, through:
  - a. Coordinating with the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), who will be aided by NGOs and UN Peacekeepers in the location of the factories or warehouses in control of the IED components;
  - b. Reporting the location of the factory and warehouse to UNDC and local law enforcement;
44. *Proposes* to establish regional offices under the authority of the UNMAS and the UNODA in cooperation with local organizations providing basic training for security personnel in regional training centers on matters of:
  - a. Verifying and sweeping of ERWs, similar to Project Masam;
  - b. Monitoring ammunition stockpiles and trade to identify patterns of illicit trade similar to EU-LAS, but focused on proliferation of ammunition;
45. *Encourages* Member States and private actors to cooperate with UNMAS on:
  - a. Collecting reports on the whereabouts of IEDs, ERWs with national centralized institutions to be established by the Member States to coordinate the sweeping process;
  - b. Reporting the loss of certain precursor materials listed by UNMAS to the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List to better allow regional Member States knowledge on the potential acquisition of materials by non-state actors;
46. *Invites* the UNHCR and the WHO to collaborate with UNMAS during demining operations in order to guarantee the safety of the population living in this area by setting up camps, with the objective of welcoming people displaced because of the insecurity of their lands around their home due to the presence of IEDs;
47. *Requests* that the Secretary-General assure the establishment of the Council of Environmental Ordnance (CEO) in order to ensure the environmental friendly disposal of IEDs, UXOs, and landmines whereas:
  - a. The CEO is established as an additional council to UNMAS in order to assure environmentally friendly ordnance disposal practices;
  - b. The CEO is responsible for the oversight of:
    - i. Research on the environmental impacts of IEDs, UXOs, and landmines;
    - ii. Best practices for the environmentally friendly disposal of IEDs and UXOs;
    - iii. Best practices for the proper placement, maintenance, and disposal of landmines in regards to protecting the environment from conflict areas;
    - iv. Education and training for member states, NGOs, and IGOs on best practices or all environmental ordnance issues;
48. *Requests* the Secretary-General to allow the CEO to work with agencies such as the Geneva UN Charter Centres of Excellence to establish universal guidelines for environmentally friendly cleanup and disposal of IEDs, and the UNEA to rehabilitate areas of environmental destruction as a result of IEDs, UXOs and land mines;

49. *Further requests* the CEO to be an organization open to all Member States who want to combat environmental destruction brought on by IEDs, UXOs and land mines and membership shall open to all member states who wish to be a part of CEO;
50. *Suggests* the United Nations Environment Programme to conduct a study finding what risks IEDs pose to waterways with an emphasis on drinking water supply;
51. *Calls upon* Member States to eradicate the use of IEDs by Non-State organizations within their own borders by utilizing the UN VTF resources, actively taking measures to deny accessibility to NSAGs, and exercising improved oversight of surplus ammunition stockpiles and their transfer;
52. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-seventh session under the item “Disarmament affairs” subtopic “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices” in order to further advance the conversation on countering the threat of IEDs.



**National Model United Nations • NY**

**Code:** GA1/1/2

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices

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*The General Assembly First Committee,*

*Emphasizing* the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) that have defined IEDs and desiring an improved universal definition of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to be adopted by the United Nations in order to develop effective guidelines to counter the usage of IEDs,

*Taking note* of the lack of information and frameworks regarding IEDs and the need to develop essential technology to better track, monitor, and counter IEDs and explosive material in order to build a more secure and peaceful international system,

*Reaffirming* the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (2015) and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 4 which aims at ensuring inclusive education and opportunities, and target 4.1 of the SDGs that aims at ensuring gender equality throughout education,

*Noting that extending* the effort of the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund (UNVTF) is crucial to enable worldwide assistance of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in order to support a coherent multilateral humanitarian response to risks posed by mines and explosive remnants of war as well as strengthening coordination on their removal and as well as the funding for training and facilitation of counter-IED (C-IED) teams and efforts,

*Acknowledging* Article 6 on International Cooperation and Assistance of the 1997 *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, also known as the *Ottawa Convention*, which ensures a right to international assistance for all states who are taking part in the destruction of anti-personnel mines and recognizes need to locate Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO),

*Stresses* the importance of the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War* of 1949, more particularly Article 60, Part III, Section III, on the Responsibility of the Occupying Power to ensure the safety of the civilian population, and the perception of current world conflicts as well as the process it takes to safely operate with respect to Member States' national sovereignty and borders,

*Affirming* the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which calls for international cooperation in countering recruitment of fighters and procurement of weapons and explosives, and the International Narcotics Control Board which recognizes chemicals used in manufacturing IEDs and works to combat the trade of precursor chemicals used in the creation of illicit drug trade,

*Viewing with appreciation* the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) which focuses on the capacity of governments to take a whole-of-government approach on a national level, the United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS) which works on device threat mitigation and awareness, risk education, disposal, and more, and the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which works to reduce the effect that IEDs have on humanitarian issues including impact on civilians, political process, military, police, and UN peacekeepers,

*Reaffirming* General Assembly Resolution 75/59 (2020) on "Countering the threat posed by IEDs," that acknowledges the increased usage of IEDs by terrorists and other Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) infringing on the security of Member States, making it necessary to establish sufficient and transparent frameworks, and an all-encompassing database to monitor when, where and why IEDs were used,

*Recognizing* the work done by the UN SaferGuard Programme, the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), and specific Non-governmental organizations including the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) which have made strides in countering use of IEDs by NSAGs,

*Affirming* Report A/75/175 (2020) of the Secretary General, which addresses the use of IEDs in conflict zones and emphasizes the importance of the UN to take a “whole of system approach,” and UN Counter-Terrorism Centre’s (UNCCT) and Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) work towards a constructive counter-terrorism agenda on a global, regional, and national level,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 60/288 (2006) on “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” that enhances counter-terrorism efforts and General Assembly resolution 71/291 (2017), establishing the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office (UNOCT), and UNODC work on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) with both documents further expressing the need for combating terrorism,

*Affirming* the ongoing efforts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in their efforts to attain sustainable financial growth and prosperity in order to support Member States with establishing an environment of security and civilian trust to combat terrorism and the use of IEDs by terrorist groups and NSAGs,

*Emphasizing* UN Secretary-General report A/72/226 on Assistance in Mine Action (2017), which stressed the need to improve research and training to help combat counter IEDs, and World Customs Organization (WCO) National Customs Enforcement Network (nCEN) that assists in exchanging information on regional and national levels,

*Highlighting* the critical role that education plays in IED safety and preventing civilian casualties, for instance Secretary-General Report S/2020/366 (2020) on “the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, and the work done by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that responds to IED disasters,

*Recognizing* the work done by nongovernmental organizations like the HALO Trust through their IED disposal standard operating procedures, and the difficulties of developing techniques in finding and safely disposing of explosive devices, as well as the progress made by the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

*Drawing attention* to project Invisible Shield, a defense and security competition in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that seeks proposals to rapidly accelerate electronic capabilities to counter IEDs and noting the limited effectiveness of the single-country approach of this program,

*Affirming* the work done by the Office of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in creating a safer and sustainable future through innovative technology and recognizing the need to adopt a collaborative framework through technology for managing the threat of IEDs as outlined in General Assembly resolution 72/36 (2017) on “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”,

*Concerned* with the practice of supplying NSAGs with military ordnance and munitions that are capable of being converted into IEDs, and regarding previously,

*Bearing in mind* the statements made by the president of the Security Council in statement S/PRST/2021/8 (2021) and recognizing that there is still room to improve and expand in these initiatives,

*Deeply convinced* of the immovable respect for the paramount principle of the right to national sovereignty and the inherent right to self-defense of all Member States as declared in Chapter I Article 2 and Chapter VII Article 51 of the *Charter of the United Nations* respectively,

1. *Takes note* of the ever evolving nature of IEDs, strongly recommending that Member States consider the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) definition of an IED as the universal definition for IEDs, which states that an IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials, or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract, or harass, and that they may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components;
2. *Encourages* Member States to strengthen the security of stockpile ammunition to counteract the threat of IEDs, address the importance of international collaboration through the spread of information, strengthen existing collaborative frameworks for the prevention of arms proliferation, and reaffirm their prior commitments to building peace;

3. *Encourages* Member States to expand existing domestic educational programs, in order to address the illicit trade, construction, and effects of IEDs and their uses by Non-State Actors by:
  - a. Providing access to education for all, notably by enforcing policies in line with SDG 17, on gender equality and SDG 4, on the universal right to education;
  - b. Ensuring a safe environment for school and protecting students in and on their way to school and university;
  - c. Including deradicalization education in primary, secondary and higher education, and also education on the means used by terrorists groups in their propaganda and recruitment schemes, especially in areas most concerned by the use of IEDs;
  - d. Furthering risk awareness for civilians and professionals on the dangers of IEDs, as well as how to identify and avoid IED threats;
  - e. Strengthening collaboration between neighboring Member States in the proposed educational initiatives;
4. *Further reminds* Member States and organizations to contribute funds according to their ability to the UNVTF in order to:
  - a. Financially assist least developed Member States who aim to resolve issues concerning IEDs:
    - i. Including funding humanitarian responses and adequate optimization of research, development, and maintenance of C-IED teams as well as C-IED equipment by UNMAS in least developed Member States;
    - ii. While sharing military, scientific and technical training for C-IED teams, as mentioned by the UN Secretary-General in the report Assistance in Mine Action A/72/226 (2017);
  - b. Fulfill their commitments to Article 6 of the *Ottawa Convention* (1997) that each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible;
  - c. Present Member States and other organizations with an opportunity to contribute to the removal of IEDs caused by those Member States in foreign armed conflicts and military operations;
5. *Recommends* that willing and able Member States provide financial assistance, technical assistance, and information on locations of UXO and AXO in the dealing with IEDs in a manner that is consistent with the obligations in Article 6 of the *Ottawa Convention*;
6. *Calls upon* Member States to comply with their commitment to the International Humanitarian Laws and responsibilities set out by the *Geneva Convention (IV)* of 1949;
7. *Urges* the international community to continue to further fund UNMAS and thereby:
  - a. Placing financial responsibilities on aggressors that initiated the conflict in the task of protecting civilians from the explosive remnants of post-conflict areas;
  - b. Encourages Member States to financially support UNMAS and IED affected countries in the work of disposal;
  - c. Shifting the burden of IED disposal and cleanup away from the domestic resources of Member States who contribute financially to UNMAS;
  - d. Drawing attention to the right to exercise self-defense of Member States' territory and national sovereignty;

8. *Endorses* the creation of a Pre-Export Notification system similar to the UNODC International Narcotics Control Board standard for precursor chemicals used in the creation of IEDs and existing collaborative frameworks for the prevention of arms proliferation by tracking the export of dual use chemicals, to limit the creation of IEDs;
9. *Suggests* that UNODA, UNMAS, and UNIDIR help Member States by establishing technical cooperation and implementing capacity building measures to create a national database for tracking IED material stockpiles of military grade ordnance and munitions, in order to:
  - a. Help track current IEDs and explosive materials;
  - b. Work with the Multinational Explosive Ordnance Device Coordination Cell (MN EOD CC) and National Point of Contact EOD (NPOC EOD) of Peacekeeping, Observing, or Training-Mission Contingents, working for removal through:
    - i. Identifying the threats using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for instructions of possible threats;
    - ii. Implementing funding by Member State for proper training, appropriate equipment, and up-to-date information;
  - c. Alert authorities if items are stolen by NSAGs in order to prevent the manufacturing of IEDs;
  - d. Track IEDs attacks in Member States, what specific groups used IEDs and targeted bodies of peoples based on gender, political affiliation, religious groupings, etc., and what materials were used to manufacture IEDs and the source of these materials;
10. *Requests* UNODA through its UN Safer Guard Programme to host a workshop for Member States and expert NGOs such as Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and Action on Armed Violence (AOVA) to discuss the current trends of IED manufacturing and create a comprehensive outcome document of the discussions, allowing participatory and absent Member States to gain extensive knowledge in order to be able to implement national strategies to combat production methods of IEDs;
11. *Implores* Member States to strengthen financial and preventative capabilities to enhance the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by creating and expanding existing UNOCT and IMF structures and programs, including:
  - a. Investigating malicious use of financial resources, focusing on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) efforts, relating to the purchases of materials related to the manufacturing of IEDs;
  - b. Strengthening existing training centers of the UNOCT to include comprehensive and current expertise on the threat of IEDs from Non-State Actors;
  - c. Incorporating UNCCT in counter-terrorism strategies in protecting human rights and global citizens' livelihoods from the dangers of IEDs;
  - d. Promoting pre-developed disarming techniques and technologies developed by the HALO Trust to Member States in need of such strategies;
12. *Calls once more upon* the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) to fund programs that implement measures to stop the recruitment of Non-State Actors in engaging in the use of IEDs on behalf of Non-State Armed groups, by:
  - a. Requesting that the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly allocate funds to UNOCT programs that implement measures to stop the recruitment of Non-State Actors who engage in

the use of IEDs on behalf of Non-State Armed groups, for example, increasing employment opportunities and implementing education;

- b. Encouraging Member States to offer free or subsidized training programs in order to boost technical skills in C-IED efforts aimed at people who do not have many opportunities for education and jobs;
  - c. Increasing UNOCT programs for deradicalization centers in regions where Non-State Armed groups are most active;
13. *Urges* Member States to participate in the WCO's National Customs Enforcement Network (nCEN) to increase the sharing of information and to develop guidelines for border control, monitoring, and countering transportation of IEDs and materials/chemicals that are used to construct IEDs;
14. *Encourages* the collaboration between UNMAS, OCHA, and with the discretion of the Security Council to conduct humanitarian operations acting as a quick action response force, an IED response team, and mobile IED disposal teams/units to assist with existing peacekeepers in areas inflicted with IEDs:
  - a. Train local police and military forces in at risk regions on how to assess IEDs;
  - b. Engage directly with at-risk communities who may gravitate to swing towards extremist views;
  - c. Equipped with modern military explosive disposal training and cutting edge equipment;
15. *Suggests* the introduction and further research of alternative methods to locate and disarm IEDs by:
  - a. Recognizing the diligent work of nongovernmental organizations like the HALO Trust to effectively and safely dispose of IEDs through the Standard Operating Procedures;
  - b. Developing a program that trains artificial intelligent robots to reduce casualties in combative fields as well as making being more effective at disarming and locating IEDs;
  - c. Introducing local Rattus species to locate IEDs, seeing as it is one of the most cost-efficient and accurate detection methods;
  - d. Implementing funding for further research on robotic intelligence as well as Rattus in combat fields and their ability to locate or disarm IEDs;
16. *Emphasizes* the need for the creation of a global body, under the purview of UNMAS, to sponsor the development of novel technologies for the disarmament of IEDs by:
  - a. Requesting award grants from the global body to provide funding for projects dedicated to disarming and defusing IEDs in novel manners and:
    - i. Having three qualifications to qualify for the project, including capturing and analyzing radio frequency signals, neutralizing targets timely and effectively, and utilizing novel hardware and ancillary components;
    - ii. Stressing ingenuity in hardware and software for these projects to allow forever evolving solutions to threats posed by IEDs;
  - b. Encouraging the UNVTF or interested Member States to fund or contribute to this project;
17. *Encourages* Member States to reach out to rural communities through ICTs by:

- a. Working through NGOs to establish ICT infrastructure in rural communities to better connect rural communities to IED educational awareness;
  - b. Investing in education web seminars aimed to better reach first responders, law enforcement, and government officials in rural regions of all Member States to better equip them with knowledge of IED mitigation and risk deduction;
  - c. Establish virtual community liaison teams to connect rural communities to local resources on IED education through Member States national disaster relief programs;
18. *Suggests* the Security Council address the concern of Member States distributing military grade ordnance and munitions to NSAGs capable of the production and deployment of IEDs by assessing the efficacy of embargoes as it relates to ordnance and improve them, and:
- a. Further recommends members of the international community to reaffirm their prior commitments to building and maintaining peace;
  - b. Stresses the urgency with which members of the international community should strengthen existing collaborative frameworks for the prevention of illicit arms proliferation by recommitting themselves to adopted resolutions;
19. *Encourages* the UNHCR and the WHO to collaborate with UNMAS during C-IED operations in order to guarantee the safety of the local populations by setting up refugee camps:
- a. With the purpose to aid those displaced by the presence of IEDs;
  - b. The WHO and the UNHCR would be encouraged to work in coordination with the UNMAS depending on their needs on the displacement of population:
    - i. The UNHCR will be trained in helping refugees to manage the camps with more efficiency and diligence with the WHO managing those displaced but still remaining in their home nation;
    - ii. This Program would be recommended to the General Assembly 5th committee for financing.