# NMUN•NY 2019



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Documentation of the Work of the General Assembly First Committee



Conference A

## **General Assembly First Committee (GA1)**

#### **Committee Staff**

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Chair	Jacob Trout
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#### Agenda

- I. Nuclear Disarmament and International Security
- II. Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security
- III. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

### **Resolutions adopted by the Committee**

Code	Topic	Vote
GA1/1/1	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	Adopted without a vote
GA1 /1/2	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	128 votes in favor, 3 votes against, and 8 abstentions
GA1/1/3	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	126 votes in favor, 4 votes against, and 9 abstentions
GA1/1/4	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	124 votes in favor, 4 votes against, and 11 abstentions
GA1/1/5	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	90 votes in favor, 20 votes against, and 29 abstentions
GA1/1/6	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	89 votes in favor, 31 votes against, and 19 abstentions
GA1/1/7	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	122 votes in favor, 4 votes against, and 13 abstentions
GA1/1/8	Nuclear Disarmament and International Security	122 votes in favor, 3 votes against, and 14 abstentions

#### **Summary Report**

The General Assembly First Committee held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

- I. Nuclear Disarmament and International Security
- II. Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security
- III. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

The session was attended by representatives of 140 Member States and 2 Observers. On Sunday, the committee adopted the agenda of I, II, III, beginning discussion on the topic of "Nuclear Disarmament and International Security."

By Tuesday, the Dais received a total of 16 proposals covering a wide range of sub-topics, including: nuclear energy and fissile materials, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, transparency, education programs, using social media to empower youth to advocate for disarmament, energy forums, and sustainable waste. As discussions progressed, delegates began to rework and merge their proposals for coherence and consistency. By Tuesday the delegates and working groups began to cooperate in order to merge their working papers into more cohesive ideas and to build consensus.

On Wednesday, eight draft resolutions had been approved by the Dais, three of which had amendments. The committee adopted eight resolutions, one of which received unanimous support by the body. The resolutions represented a wide range of issues, including: suggestions for a program agenda for the Conference on Disarmament, peaceful uses of nuclear technology, fissile materials, establishing new Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, transparency and confidence-building measures, the role of youth in disarmament, and goals for disarmament for the international community. The overall work of the body throughout the week was collaborative and all delegates worked as a cohesive body to build consensus and renewed momentum around nuclear disarmament.



**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

 *Emphasizing* the essential role stated in Article I of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) to "maintain international peace and security,"

Emphasizing further the right to national sovereignty stated in Article II of the Charter of the United Nations that, "the organization is based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all its Members,"

*Reflecting* upon General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975) which provides the definition for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ),

*Underlining* the need to preserve global commons as recognized by the Global Zero Initiative as a humanitarian means to nuclear disarmament,

Recognizing Article VII of the of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968), which affirms the right of countries to establish specified zones free of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming the definition and qualifications of a "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone" (NWFZ) set forth in General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975),

Viewing with appreciation the existing NWFZs established by the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1968), the *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1986), the *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (2009), and the *Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty* (2009),

*Viewing with appreciation* non-state NWFZ treaties like the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), the Antarctic Treaty (1961), the Moon Agreement (1984) and the Outer Space Treaty (1967),

Affirming the need for comprehensive oversight of commercial activities conducted in space in order to maintain outer space as a safe NWFZ as the rapidly growing commercial industry expands,

Concerned by the fact that Europe is one of the five regions in the world that does not have a declared nuclear weapon free zone and that three-fifths of the nuclear weapons states are in Europe,

Acknowledging the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005) to deter the illegal trafficking of nuclear weaponry by non-state actors,

Reaffirming the inalienable rights described in Article IV of the NPT of all states to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

*Recognizing* the importance of credible regional security, which can be established by a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Welcoming* all initiatives leading to an eventual general and complete disarmament, including in the European region, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

- 1. Recommends all implicated parties to consider taking necessary and sufficient steps required for the implementation and creation of the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe and the Arctic Circle, excluding areas of sovereign jurisdiction, such as:
  - a. Engaging in a report and review process in order to better understand Member States' stance on the NWFZ;
  - b. Combining the needs of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals with the needs of achieving a NWFZ;
  - c. Documenting all Member States' intended use of nuclear material within the proposed NWFZ, on a voluntary basis;
- 2. *Encourages* Member States to develop comprehensive legislation in accordance with IAEA frameworks and work to expand existing treaties to include activities conducted by public and private organizations for commercial use of global commons by:
  - a. Maintaining outer space as a NWFZ that is vital for the achievement of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;
  - b. Upholding Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 8, 9, and 16, strengthening institutions and holding them accountable for upholding human rights while ensuring the inclusivity and sustainable development of global commons as a NWFZ;
  - c. Preserving the unique and sensitive climate of the Arctic Circle, Excluding Sovereign Territory (EST) for the purpose of research and peaceful utilization of the region;
- 3. Stresses the importance of expansion of territory in collaboration with the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971) under the guidelines of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) such as the Arctic Circle above the 66th latitudinal line, EST, as the Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ) by:
  - a. Establishing the definition of a common good and the importance of identifying various regions as such;
  - b. Encouraging the participation of all Member States in order to unite the international community under a common good;
- 4. *Recommends* that international waters not under sovereign jurisdiction to not be utilized as areas for nuclear weapon proliferation by:
  - a. Recognizing the strategic importance of such areas for defense strategies to be gradually reduced:
    - i. With the understanding that some Member States lack the capacity to engage in import and export via the international waters without the use of nuclear materials;
    - ii. Maintaining a minimum level of nuclear armaments as a deterrent used for selfdefense purposes, subjective to national security policies and international law;
  - b. Ensuring that the zones covered are outside a Member State's territorial waters according to the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (1982);
  - c. Implementing these solutions in regard to Sustainable Development Goal 17 by strengthening partnership for dialogue on non-militarized and nuclear-free cooperation;

- 5. *Considers* the potential of nuclear weapons testing and retention in the Arctic Circle, ES T, and international waters, such as the prohibition of nuclear weapon use, testing, manufacturing, production, acquisition, installation, deployment, receipt, storage, and stationing;
  - 6. Calls for the gradual development of a European NWFZ (ENWFZ) to be developed in:

- a. All current members of the European Union, as well as candidate countries, and potential candidates with the acknowledgment of regions with special environmental needs;
- b. Regard to the example set forth by the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1968), The Treaty of Rarotonga (1986), The Treaty of Bangkok (1995), The Treaty of Pelindaba (2009), and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (2009);
- Concord with fellow Member States in order to establish a universal effort to establish a NWFZ in Europe;
- 7. Suggests that all Member States directly concerned consider taking the necessary, gradual, and sufficient steps, including to reduce or halt development, production, testing, or the procurement of nuclear weapons to implement the proposal to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe;
- 8. *Invites* Member States to enhance the guidelines provided in the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005), and improving the sanctity of policies by the IAEA to avoid clandestine import of nuclear based weapons in and/or from global commons by:
  - Encouraging public-private partnerships for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nonmilitarized scientific research within the Arctic Circle, excluding areas of sovereign jurisdiction for global commerce;
  - b. Differentiating the intentions of military research and non-military scientific research for promoting peaceful naval and transportation activities and situational awareness;
  - c. Encouraging Member States for mutual collaboration to recover stolen or smuggled nuclear weapons and/or weapons material by:
    - Identifying potentially dangerous non-state actors that are within close proximity of nuclear weapon stockpiles and/or are trafficking through international waters in accordance to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);
    - ii. Collaborating on a representative and international task force to identify unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons;
  - d. Responding effectively to violations within their own state through fair and leveled responses to violators:
- 9. Repeats the urgency of reducing European nuclear-weapon states' arsenals to diminish political tension between Member States in accordance with the goal of implementing a NWFZ and Global Zero Initiative for the benefit of all Member States with vested interests in Europe;
- 10. *Desires* all countries of the European region to adhere to and ratify the NPT (1970) and to agree to place all nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards;
- 11. *Endorses* that Member States work together toward a unified control and transparent approach toward the proliferation of nuclear material through programs akin to the Wassenaar Arrangement (1996) within Europe and the Arctic Circle, EST by:
  - a. Closely tracking nuclear materials entering or exiting state borders, with the understanding that:

- i. Wide open areas lacking well-defined boundaries are difficult to establish and enforce parameters;
- ii. Lack of supporting communication systems, secondary inspection, and temporary storage infrastructure can cause misunderstanding and lack of transparency concerning Member State's nuclear programs;
- iii. High diversity of criminal or intentional unauthorized acts are often detected during compressed timelines between detention and response;
- b. Combating the aforementioned issues through the incorporation of known non-military techniques and solutions such as:
  - i. neutron interrogation;
  - ii. advanced photo-fission techniques;
  - iii. evaporation based detection techniques;
  - iv. x-ray and gamma ray tracers;
- c. Sharing any knowledge gained from research in order to support a collaborative-based approach to nuclear energy utilization in contrast to nuclear weapons;
- d. Increasing knowledge about NWFZ towards the implementation of research and collaboration amongst European countries against military intent for nuclear matter;
- 12. *Requests* the Secretary-General pursue consultations with the states of the European region and other concerned states in order to move towards the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe;
- 13. Recommends the creation of an international summit by key stakeholders under the guidelines of the IAEA to promote epistemic communities regarding effective implementation of ANWFZ, the summit will:
  - a. Be co-hosted by the Kingdom of Denmark and the Swiss Confederation on a two-year basis;
  - b. Create a report for the forthcoming summit rendering the effectiveness of NWFZ in the Arctic Circle, EST, at the request of the secretariat;
  - c. Be jointly funded by the Arctic Council, Nordic Circle and the Balkan Peninsula countries and other interested Member States;
  - d. Prioritize the achievement of global peace by initiating a NWFZ in Europe due to:
    - i. The strategic placement of Europe and the Arctic Circle, EST, between Member States with conflicting interests;
    - ii. The need for Member States with existing NWFZ to act as precedent for negotiating and leading by example;
  - e. Facilitate dialogue between all Member States in order to learn from the challenges presented in previous the discussion of nuclear disarmament;
- 14. *Invites* nuclear-weapon states to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action, such as aggression via nuclear weaponry, deemed counteractive to the current resolution.



**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

Recognizing the need for a greater international security framework, committed to nuclear non-proliferation through the areas of nuclear testing, fissile material, irreversible disarmament, reporting and verification mechanisms, and future preventive measures, with strong methods of risk prevention and nuclear data sharing between Member States,

Bearing in mind the importance of increasing transparency of nuclear warhead and fissile materials Stocks as a step towards nuclear disarmament with emphasis on the current Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT),

Highlighting the importance of communications between all Member States to maintain a relation of trust and to have access of all the information needed,

Having devoted attention to the guidelines set forth in Article VI of the Charter of the United Nations (1945),

Bearing in mind that General Assembly resolution 1 (1946) was a response to nuclear weapons and the issues that arose from atomic energy, while acknowledging that the world continues to face international crises directly resulting from failed attempts of disarmament,

Recalling the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 in Geneva, underlining the importance of the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons technology, promoting cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy to achieve nuclear disarmament,

*Emphasizing* the importance of international transparency and communication and preventative efforts with regard to short and long-term missile technology, as well as the use of nuclear weapons undersea and in high altitudes,

Reaffirming the mission of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) of analyzing the technical basis of effective measures of reducing national storages of fissile materials,

*Fully aware* that social medias are a key to reach appeal, by their importance on international issues, their facility to reach out to people, their universality and their utility, the younger generation, which is a major player on future decisions, and concerned about their implication,

*Gravely concerned* by the numerous violations to the original NPT since its signing, which have brought about increased international tensions and threaten the effort towards peace established within the document,

*Expressing* appreciation for the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and its support of multilateral efforts aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of gradual disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming the 2015 United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/1 and the creation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a successful platform for international discussion, development, and partnership, and noting the positive contributions of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 9, 11, 16, and 17.

Recognizing the increasing role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and their work with UN Member States and partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear and energy technologies,

Stressing the importance of understanding the different capabilities of Member States in developing clean nuclear energy facilities, and encouraging Member States with more expertise to assist developing states in creating nuclear energy programs, following the example of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO),

*Noting with concern* that the continued production of fissile material could threaten all disarmament efforts, as stated in General Assembly resolution 48/75 on "General and Complete Disarmament and a Relationship between Disarmament and Development", for it highlights the need for accountability of fissile materials to ensure nuclear safety,

*Emphasizing* the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and monitoring the usage of said energy,

*Mindful that* nuclear technology will become even more sophisticated in future years, and that disarmament initiatives and goals must be both flexible, progressive, and universal in order to guarantee a nuclear weapon-free world,

Recalling the content of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 50/245 in September 1996, supported by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organizations (CTBTO), founded in 1996 in Geneva, which outlaws nuclear test explosions,

Acknowledging the International Youth Nuclear Congress (IYNC) as an important leader in the education of the younger generation on nuclear energy by its participation in the *Kyoto Protocol* of 1997 and the *Paris Agreement* 2015,

Noting with appreciation the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)'s "Nuclear Weapon Risk Reduction" project focused on developing practical ways to reduce the risk of nuclear building,

Bearing in mind the conclusion of the Vienna Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014) and Vienna (December 2014) about the humanitarian risk associated with nuclear weapons.

Welcomes all Member States to participate in the 2040 Action for Life Goals, modeled after the 2030
 Agenda for Sustainable Development and goals, in accordance with the 13 steps for Nuclear
 Disarmament outlined in the NPT, to:

 Act as a catalyst for educating, informing, and involving all civil society sectors in the progression of international security efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament;

 Act as a natural and long-term societal pressure and accountability measure for the aiding of governments in nuclear disarmament;

c. Focus campaign and program efforts in the following five focus goals which will be carried out by the year 2040, and which will include, but not be specifically limited to: universalizing structure for testing nuclear materials, addressing fissile material, creating irreversible disarmament, updating reporting and verification mechanisms, and looking to the future, prevention, and data sharing;

2. Encourages the Members States to ratify of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Ban-Treaty Annex,

- 3. *Invites* Member States to accept universalized structure for testing nuclear material as 2040 Action for Life Disarmament as goal one;
- 4. Calls upon the UNODA to create a platform where Member States are able to present a comprehensive report that identifies the following: risks, purposes, methods, location, expected outcomes, and deductions from all nuclear testing, while upholding the limitations of testing that are outlined in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) by:
  - a. Limiting civil and military testing to appropriate geographic locations that pose no threat to life, do not destabilize surrounding environment, and are at a considerable distance from the nearest living populous;
  - b. Ensuring that testing is not used for the purpose of enhancing a Member States arsenal, but rather for the use of safe practices concerning nuclear stockpiling and energy;
  - c. Considering the possible creation of a special UNODA investigation department or working group that sends independent observers to control more effectively nuclear infrastructures throughout countries;
- 5. Expresses the importance of the involvement of Member States and civil society organizations (CSOs) with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 64/35 "International Day Against Nuclear Tests," to develop strategic capacity building initiatives by:
  - Adhering to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO Preparatory Commission) for human resource development and knowledge networks of involved trained personnel;
  - b. Improving the verification data regime and mechanisms to avoid misinterpretation of those mining operations with radioactive nuclear activity, which are in accordance with the International Monitoring System (IMS), by evidence collection and record keeping;
- 6. *Invites* Member States to accept extrication and enrichment of fissile Material as the 2040 Action for Life Disarmament goal two;
- 7. Appeals to the UNODA to comprehensively adhere by the IAEA's Global Nuclear Safety Security Network framework, in order to expand both the existing human network and web platform to share known fissile material deposits to better ensure security of the extraction of fissile materials, that are purposed for both state and civil institutions to:
  - a. Encourage the use of other fissile materials such as thorium and unenriched uranium;
  - Increase accountability for desired use of all extracted fissile materials by further documentation;
  - c. Covert nuclear weaponry or converting them for civilian use at the grassroots level;
- 8. *Calls upon* the IPFM, in collaboration with the Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration, to develop an enhanced, accurate, up-to-date reporting system to promote transparency with substantive and comparable data that focused on:
  - a. Establishing a substantially agreed definition on fissile material in cohesion with the safeguard agreements established by the IAEA;
  - b. Reporting the reduction status of domestic highly enriched uranium and plutonium stockpiles;

- c. Noting accurate quantitative information on previous fissile material stockpiles that nations hold;
- Recommends all Member States attend UN High-Level Conferences to participate in the open discussion fissile material reduction to:
  - a. Reaffirm the prohibition on the production of illicit fissile materials stockpiles;
  - b. Direct Member States to restrict the transport and trade of fissile materials with states who do not provide evidence for the peaceful use of such materials in their possession;
  - c. Gradually call for framework that bans the trade of fissile materials with countries that have not signed the Treaty on the NPT;
- 10. Invites Member States to synchronize and join their efforts in the inspection of warhead dismantlement, by using methods established through regional and state programs such as the UK-Norway research initiative while:
  - a. Using information barriers in place within the designed gamma radiation analysis system;
  - b. Complying with IAEA legal frameworks;
- 11. Supports Member States participating in an NPT RevCon to include the reaffirmation of the nuclear or non-nuclear power status for signatory states, and to update certain language in the articles of the NPT, such as:
  - a. Article 1 to introduce timelines, to encourage states which have acquired nuclear weapons after December 31, 1963 in violation of this article be subject to an alternative form of disarmament than what will be applied to previously extant nuclear states;
  - b. Article 2 to initiate a means of compensation for those states that are retroactively affected by the effects of article 1, with special provisions being made to ensure that weapons development facilities are effectively transformed into alternative facilities;
  - c. Article 3 to implement standards for safeguards in nuclear power sources akin to non-nuclear power sources;
  - d. Article 4 to set up stronger barriers to cooperation with those Member States;
  - e. Article 6 to replace phrasing "early date" with "2040," and implemented throughout document;
  - Article 10 to introduce accountability measures for those states that choose to remove their signatures, or otherwise violate their agreement by continuing to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons;
- 12. Advises all Member States to set up the maximum ratio for nuclear arsenals from conventional, medium to long range ballistic missile technology, partnered alongside the UNIDIR to limit and deter a Member State's dissuasive power by:
  - a. Incorporating the ratio as a number of nuclear armed warheads by the total missile arsenal (both nuclear and non-nuclear);
  - b. Making sure this ratio can be manipulated only by either decreasing the number of nuclear armed warheads or increasing the total missile arsenal, where:

- The number in the total missile arsenal cannot be increased by increasing the number of warheads;
- ii. Encouraging the decrease in the number of nuclear armed warheads;
- 13. *Invites* Member States to accept updating and expansion of reporting and verification mechanisms as the 2040 Action for Life Disarmament goal four;
- 14. *Invites* the IAEA and the MTCR to comprehensively monitor the Member States through measures such as but not limited to:
  - a. Comprehensive investigation programs sent to countries every 3 months with the suggested purpose of:
    - Accumulating detailed data on any and all nuclear experiments taking place in the international community;
    - ii. Increasing the efficiency of the watchdog system by verifying and differentiating nonweaponry experiments from weapon development experiments;
    - Noting all long-range missiles, especially ballistic and intercontinental ballistic missiles and ensuring all other forms of missiles do not have radioactive or nuclear payloads;
  - b. A reporting system of the Member States to the IAEA and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) when testing nuclear-related issues in order to keep precise documentation of nuclear experiments in the international community;
  - c. To verify and differentiate non-nuclear experiments from nuclear-related ones;
- 15. *Recommends* facilitating communication about nuclear weapons by the addition of a new platform on nuclear disarmament in order to inform the targeted audience about the consequences of nuclear weapons by:
  - a. Providing statistics and data of previous nuclear attack;
  - b. Showing concrete consequences of these attacks such as testimonies of survivors, photos and videos;
  - c. Explaining the progress made in the field of nuclear weapons and the effects they would have in case of use;
- 16. Proclaims that every Member State collaborate with the United Nation Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on the nuclear disarmament issue and on international security by introducing younger generations in:
  - a. their meetings with scholars, governments and student groups;
  - b. their annual training program of the United Nations Institutes for Training and Research (UNITAR) in Hiroshima in Japan;
- 17. Suggests Member States build up regional information sharing online platforms in the context of confidence-building measures in order to increase mutual trust, via ensuring the online platform is created in the context of sharing countries' research on nuclear technologies and the status of nuclear weapons, as well as transparency and accessibility, in regards to language, to all the members in the region;
- 18. *Urges* the establishment of an annual report formulated by the IAEA, by expanding their mandate in accordance with MTCR guidelines to ensure:

- a. The prohibition of adding any form of nuclear payload to missile stockpiles of Member States;
- b. That reporting is transparent to all Member States so that they verify compliance and take part in confidence-building measures;
- 19. Insists that Member States create regional programs in collaboration with MTCR which would:
  - a. Closely track the exchange of nuclear materials that enter and exit countries;
  - b. Identify and document the intended use of nuclear materials before a Member State receives any shipments;
  - c. Encourage the open communication amongst Member States concerning the trade and movement of nuclear export-controlled items;
- 20. *Directs* Member States to coordinate multilateral cooperation and dialogue on a regional, continental, and global scale through the involvement of the IAEA through promoting the principle of Sharing Applications and Information on Nuclear Technology and Science (SAINTS) by:
  - a. Doing research on non-weaponized nuclear avenues and nuclear safety in various areas, including scientific research, human health, the food industry, and agriculture;
  - b. Coordinating verification measures, radiation protection for human health and for the environment and nuclear transportation monitoring;
  - c. Sharing emergency and response measures;
  - d. Encouraging transparent dialogue of knowledge and expertise to take place among local community leaders, scientists, students, and professionals who are involved in nuclearrelated fields;
  - e. Organizing annual regional and international summits to coordinate and update information, that will:
    - i. Be hosted in cooperation with educational institutions in participating Member States:
    - ii. Be financed by a joint fund of IAEA and regional organizations;
    - iii. Result in annual reports discussing, assessing, and reevaluating the level of development of Member States on the issue of nuclear disarmament and possible future developments in reducing nuclear use, enabling the implementation of nuclear policies;
    - iv. Primarily focus on transparency and coordination in the fulfillment of the Action for Life Goal 4;
- 21. *Invites* Member States to accept looking to the future: prevention and data sharing as the 2040 Action for Life Disarmament goal five;
- 22. Encourages the UNIDIR to set up more research about disarmament, looking especially at the immediate and long-term consequences that humanity has to suffer, thus providing to the 2020 Vienna Conferences on the Humanitarian impact of a Nuclear comprehensive set of information about the impact on human life, environment, socio-economy and health out of transparency;
- 23. *Endorses* the establishment, by national governments, of Crisis Management Centers (CMC) in preparation for parallel negotiations across regional and state sectors by:

a. Establishing risk assessment units within the CMC, who conduct specialized research in nuclear risk; b. Establishing general knowledge sharing plans, based from the obtained CMC data, across regional CMC's, especially during and in preparation of emergency situations; Supporting the development of a unified risk assessment methodology across regional and communal sectors and possibly amongst Member States; 24. Emphasizes the importance of confidence-building measures as a means for the prevention of nuclear weapons in relation to guidance systems for ballistic missiles in high altitudes by: Enhancing the existing bilateral and multilateral Transparency and Confidence-building Measures (TCBMs) in relation to nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs);

- b. Monitoring any activity of nuclear weapons in high-altitudes, such as scheduled maneuvers, uncontrolled high-risk re-entries, emergency situations, intentional orbital breakups, in order to notify Member States;
- c. Conducting voluntary visits to launch sites and command and control centers, and demonstrations of high-altitude missile technology controls.



Committee: General Assembly First Committee

Topic: Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

Guided by Article I of the Charter of the United Nations (1945), which asserts the goal of maintaining international peace and security,

Keeping in mind the duty carried by Article XXIV, paragraph 1 of the Charter stating that "Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf,"

Fully aware of the detrimental effects of nuclear weapons on global citizens as well as the environment and noting the importance of taking all steps in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and maintaining the safety of citizens from the use of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind that international nuclear disarmament is integral to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 12 on Responsible Consumption and Production; SDG 14 on Life Below Water; SDG 15 on Life on Land; SDG 16 on Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions; and SDG 17 on Partnership for the Goals,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 70/10 for the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) work in "encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses" as well as the IAEA's work in countering the spread of the misuse of nuclear technology,

*Recognizing* the abundance of uranium in Earth's soil and water and the ease of acquiring materials to generate nuclear weapons,

*Fully aware* of the success of the nuclear *Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT) in their objective to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst Member States party to the treaty.

Taking note of the work that has been done by the IAEA such as the success of the IAEA's Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) as well as regional programs such as The Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (RASCA) to guarantee the peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibit its use for military purposes, while failing to prevent denuclearization and the fabrication of weapons of mass destruction,

Cognizant of the partnership between the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) with the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) with the goal of facilitating the sharing of knowledge and information for banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,

Acknowledging that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) constitute one of the most effective means for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and elimination of the danger of a nuclear holocaust, such as the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996), *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), and *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1985),

Recognizing the Nuclear Knowledge Management (NKM), a program overseen by the IAEA that supports the gathering and sharing of new knowledge and the updating of the existing knowledge base,

Stressing the importance of regional transparency and confidence building that aims to significantly strengthen cooperation and trust between Member States per General Assembly resolution 72/60,

Noting with regret the General Assembly resolution 2936/27, which addresses the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, adopted by the General Assembly although it failed to pass in the Security Council,

*Understanding* that a greater use of thorium allows for a peaceful and more transparent alternative to uranium and recognizing that without an alternative for nuclear energy it is difficult to monitor how uranium is gathered and enriched,

*Noting* that nuclear energy allows for SDG 7 which requires energy to be produced cleanly and efficiently to be met and alternatives to uranium allows for nuclear energy to be harnessed without allowing for further proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Recognizing* the success achieved by the only country that has given up their nuclear weapons, South Africa, in 1989,

Deeply concerned with Member States that have imposed interest in the NPT although they have not dismantled their nuclear weapons,

*Alarmed* and concerned by the presence of 14,200 nuclear warheads, and the threat each and everyone of them poses to world stability,

*Taking into consideration* SDG 16, which emphasizes the importance of peace as the bedrock foundation for prosperity and SDG 17 which aims to promote multilateralism and partnerships between governments, private enterprises, and communities,

Recognizing the efforts made towards the implementation of the NPT, which operates as the foundation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by Member States, towards cementing the international peace and security of the world,

Acknowledging the current dysfunction and gridlocked status of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and concerned that the premiere conference and dialogue regarding nuclear disarmament only includes 65 Member States,

Referring to General Assembly resolution 71/28 adopted in 2016 emphasizing the priority to modernize Information and Communication Technology (ICT) protocols in assuring institutions against cyberthreats,

Acknowledging the work of the UN International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) in facilitating a multilateral cooperation between international and national institutions with security information and responses mechanisms,

*Underlining* that the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament in 1978 declared that "All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament",

Deeply concerned about the potential of malicious cyber threats on nuclear facilities, as seen by the development of malware such as TRITON (TRISIS) and Stuxnet which could lead to catastrophe, the loss of life, and incommensurable environmental damages,

Recalling paragraph 4 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, "we pledge that no one will be left behind towards a NFWZ future,"

Considering the relevance of technological support in nuclear issues for Developing Countries (DCs), as well as for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) through investing and infrastructure expansion,

Recalling the work of the United Nations Youth Assembly across the world involving youth in peace keeping efforts,

Acknowledging the target of SDG 4 in regard to education for sustainable development and global citizenship for future generations to come,

*Taking into consideration* the important role of young people in the implementation of SDG 17, particularly scientists for researches and innovation in medicine, industry, and other relevant fields,

Recognizing the work of the International Youth Nuclear Congress (IYNC) under its vision of transferring knowledge from the current generation of leading scientists to the next generation and across international boundaries,

1. Recommends a series of workshops on a regional level to enhance transparency for the effective means of nuclear verification modeled after the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, with an objective to share knowledge and enhance capacity for nuclear verification and to achieve the following:

a. The workshops will be organized by regional geography and all Member States of that region will be invited in an effort enhance safeguard verification measures for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

b. The conference hosting country will rotate every four years to ensure participation of all Member States within the region, with equal opportunity between developed and developing Member States:

 The UNODA will fund these workshops in order to see more participation of Member States and encourage Member States not party to the NPT to attend and view the benefits of working with the IAEA and NWS;

2. Promotes international collaboration for non-military nuclear research aiming to ensure that new nuclear initiatives set a positive global standard and create a national and/or regional system of security safeguards in an effort to monitor the exclusive civilian use of nuclear installations and nuclear materials;

3. Encourages transparency and accountability between parties when nuclear fissile materials are transported across borders and asks for Member States to provide detailed self-made reports: imported, and exported to be submitted in an annual report to the IAEA for accountability and record keeping purposes to increases Member State transparency to increase nuclear security;

4. Recommends the further discussion of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and collaboration with the IAEA to supervise all UN Member States on an international level and invites the IAEA to supervise all Member States of the UN, including all Nuclear Weapon States, especially those not party to the NPT;

5. Invites the creation of scholarship programs with the involvement of non-governmental organizations and philanthropic donors willing to fund nuclear research aiming to further discoveries on the alternative use of nuclear energy that would be granted to international research teams from all non-nuclear Member States and NWS, selected by an international jury appointed by the UNODA in order to expand knowledge, communication and cooperation amongst Member States to provide alternative resolutions to convert nuclear weapons into clean energy resources;

6. *Endorses* the gradual transition from highly enriched uranium to the usage of thorium for fissure processes in order to eliminate the possibilities of weaponized fissile materials, while still maintaining the capability for nuclear energy by:

a. Calling for the creation of a twenty-year transition program in each Member State;

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b. Requesting aid from the World Bank, able and willing states, and non-governmental organizations to assist developing states whose economy is reliant on mining uranium;

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c. Disclosing any current information on nuclear technological materials that are imported and/or exported prior to the production of any potential weapons of mass destruction and/or that assist in fabricating of said weapons;

- d. Encouraging the submission of an annual report to the United Nations General Assembly from Member States that use uranium, detailing the exact amount which is mined, enriched, stored, imported, and exported;
- 7. Encourages all Member States, who have not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to implement concrete actions in order to support the main ideas of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as appropriate, including, but not limited to:
  - a. The installation of facilities by Member States for the purpose of collecting and transmitting data to the International Data Center in Vienna, Austria;
  - b. Allowing access for UN-inspectors in order to verify Member State compliance to the NPT;
- 8. *Recommends* the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) establish and finance a 'Middle East Reconciliation Conference,' which shall:
  - a. Consist of all UN Member/Observer States located in the Middle Eastern region, as geographically defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
  - b. Serve as a forum to restart or create new instances of respectful and direct dialogue between all respective states;
  - c. Work towards achieving an agreement, signed by all present states containing mutual recognition and an assurance that nuclear weapons shall not be further developed;
  - d. Be the foundation and precondition for further negotiations concerning a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East:
  - e. Take place in 2019 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, given Turkmenistan's official status as an United Nations permanent neutral Member State;
- 9. Encourages Member States with nuclear security conflicts to diffuse or overcome those by agreeing on a neutral mediator such as another Member State or an UN body (Security Council or Secretary General), and should the Security Council not act as a mediator it is invited to assist in that process as well;
- 10. *Invites* the United Nations Disarmament Commission to create an annual conference focused on analyzing potential escalation risks in relation to nuclear weapons, called 'For a World Without Nuclear Weapons,' for every region that has adopted NWFZ(s) which:
  - a. Will be under the purview of the UNODA;
  - b. Will be hosted by members of each existing NWFZ allowing each Member State to feel included and involved;

214 c. Will be in cooperation with the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) which
 215 will assert the legal nuclear liability of each Member States of a NWFZ in light of the new
 216 legal standards each NWFZ will have chosen;

- 11. Recommends the Conference on Disarmament to consider increasing its membership, from the current 65 Member States, to include any and all Members States interested in participating in the international dialogue for nuclear disarmament, with the intention and purpose to overcome the conference's current dysfunctionality;
- 12. *Invites* the Conference on Disarmament to consider the agenda items regarding nuclear disarmament, such as Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Fissile Material and Nuclear Deterrence, and to summarize the conference's findings and progress on nuclear disarmament in a public report;
- 13. *Encourages* Member States to enhance their internal early warning and detection systems for nuclear activities committed by other states in an effort to stop undeclared and unsanctioned nuclear usages by:
  - a. Requesting Member States and Permanent Observer States increase their respective national budgets into space programs to develop satellite imagery, remote sensing and other technical measures for undeclared and new nuclear detection;
  - Recommending Member States to post their findings on monitoring to International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC) periodically and officially;
  - c. Encouraging Member States to increase information sharing to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society to make more estimates about national nuclear activities and create a basis for public discussion, generating pressure on national policies;
- 14. *Stressing* the need to adapt and improve the NPT by 2020 by incorporating a report with common guidelines in which two-thirds majority of Member States agree on and split into three sections:
  - a. Including a record of NPT implementations to date, and defining common guidelines and definitions;
  - Accurately summarize discussions and review current international and technological developments:
  - c. Integrate recommendations to strengthen the NPT and nuclear weapon non-proliferation;
- Calls upon Member States to cooperate with the Office of Information and Communications
  Technology (OICT) in form of an annual strategic report to ease responses to issues relating to
  cybersecurity risk;
- 16. Suggest the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cooperate with the IAEA to renew the "Enhancing Cybersecurity for Least Developed Countries" consider creating a program plan which will make a special training for cyber defense personnel (judicial, administrative, digital forensics) with the aim to create basic defenses for nuclear energy and nuclear armament cyber infrastructures for all countries especially the ones lacking in the field of cyber defense;
- 17. Encourages Member States to be involved with deterrence efforts made by UNODA in regards to its Verified Declaration of Fissile Material Stock, established in 2017, to solidify existing processes in order to eradicate the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- 18. *Calls* upon all Member States to endeavor towards success of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

270 19. Recommends Member States model organizations off of the interconnected platform, the Agency-271 Wide Information System for Program Support (AIPS), for their regions to promote transparency and 272 control of nuclear weapons and energy in order to ensure established mechanisms with the aim of promoting absolute nuclear disarmament, along with the original APIS' goal of planning, finance, procurement, project management, human resources and administration;

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- 20. Calls upon the United Nations Secretary General to prepare a report on funding and nuclear activities to be submitted to UN General Assembly First Committee by 2021 in order to ensure funds are applied efficiently;
- 280 21. Creates an annual awareness summit for the existing youth assembly to promote knowledge on 281 peaceful thorium usages and innovations with funding requested from entities such as, but not limited 282 to, non-governmental organizations, individual states, and global corporations.



**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

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*Emphasizing* the purposes of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security as stated in Article I of the *Charter of the United Nations*,

Fully aware that nuclear weapons are one of the largest threats to international peace and security,

Reaffirming our commitment to negotiate in good faith towards complete nuclear disarmament as stated in Article IV of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) (1968),

Recognizing the value that regional and bilateral disarmament and confidence-building initiatives such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had in the past,

Referring to General Assembly resolution 71/258 in striving to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons,

*Noting with deep concern* gridlock the Conference on Disarmament (CD) faces, and the inefficiency these challenges create.

Stressing the importance of working persistently to universalize, implement, and verify the international non-proliferation values set out by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and to always address Member States' non-compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols and safeguards,

Recalling the NPT that led to substantial denuclearization efforts around the world,

Keeping in mind the existence of first-strike policies,

Recognizing the importance of the IAEA's mandate to ensure peaceful usage of uranium and its mandate,

Affirming that non-financial resources, such as labor, knowledge and best practices, are needed to ensure that the IAEA's Board of Governors is able to achieve its mandate and emphasizing the need for Member States to support the IAEA,

Convinced that transparency and information sharing is needed to develop best practices related to nuclear materials.

Defines for the present resolution nuclear weapons that are deployment-ready as nuclear-powered weapons with delivery systems in storage or capable of being deployed at air forces and naval bases,

Keeping in mind that self-imposed goals, where each Member State holds themselves accountable to a real reduction of nuclear weapons, are required for complete global nuclear disarmament,

Recognizing that new fora to encourage dialogue between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and others are necessary to facilitate the achievement of those goals,

1. *Proclaims* the year beginning on 1 January 2020 the International Year of Increased Nuclear Disarmament to draw attention to the international communities continued commitment to both non-

proliferation and pathways to a world free of weapons of mass destruction, to encourage the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, and to invite all Member States to actively participate in the 2020 NPT review conference cycle in order to build upon our commitments to further strengthen non-proliferation regimes;

- 2. Recommending participation in the 2020 NPT review conference cycle so that the main principles set forth in the NPT are represented in the Disarmament Supervision Committee (DSC) goals and inform the work of the DSC;
- 3. Supports Member States who are making necessary strides towards a nuclear weapon free world, such as reducing the development of nuclear weapons, and advocating for the voluntary formation of a joint renunciation of first-strike policies amongst all nuclear-capable Member States;
- 4. Requests that Member States increase their voluntary financial contribution to the IAEA in order to build the technical capacity of the IAEA and support the important work they perform;
- 5. Encourages Member States not already doing so to join the IAEA and NPT;

- 6. *Implores* Member States to provide the IAEA with greater non-financial assistance by providing the Agency with more specialized personnel, and calling upon non-governmental actors to voluntarily share nuclear expertise;
- 7. *Urges* the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to not only hold NPT review conferences, but to also organize forums that encourage dialogue between all Member States, by:
  - Organizing the first Disarmament Goals Conference in 2025, a conference that will be held yearly to allow all Member States with nuclear weapon capabilities to maintain an open dialogue and discuss the disarmament process with non-NWS;
  - Calling for the organization of meetings for the purpose of denuclearizing, held every year, between the leaders of all Member States that possess nuclear weapon capabilities, to which they can invite any other state leaders they feel would allow for faster denuclearization process;
  - c. Facilitating bilateral and multilateral trust-building measures between NWS and others such as voluntary inspections and information sharing in addition to IAEA measures;
- 8. Encourages Member States to disarm, set in percentages of a state's total original stockpile, as outlined below:
  - Starting in 2025 a stockpile reduction of 1% per year over a 5-year period, resulting in a 5% reduction by each Member State by 2030;
  - Beginning in 2030 increasing the reduction goal to 2% per year over another 5-year period, resulting in a 15% total reduction by each Member State by 2035;
  - c. Beginning in 2035 increasing the reduction goal to 4% per year over an additional 5-year period, resulting in a 35% total reduction by each Member State by 2040;
  - d. The 4% yearly goal would continue from then on;
  - e. By 2070 all NWS are encouraged to reach a goal of no more than 15 warheads in total or 5% of their 2025 total stockpile;
  - f. In 2070 NWS would assess the viability of and finalize the process towards Total Global Disarmament;

- 9. Trusts that this initiative of decreasing nuclear armament based on the aforementioned percentage approach will continue until the Member State reaches 15 nuclear warheads or 5% of their 2025 total stockpile, and upon reaching this the Member State is encouraged to continue disarmament at their own pace: 10. Further Recommends that the percentage of deployment ready nuclear weapons is gradually decreased through: a. A goal of 2% global reduction from 2025 levels in deployment-ready nuclear weapons by 2030; b. Ongoing reduction within a recurring five-year timeframe at a level of at least 5%, or 15
  - warheads, whatever is the most, and extending up to 2070;

- Calls upon Member States to recognize the importance of the immediate safety of the international community;
- d. Reminds Member States that monetary resources saved via the reduction in nuclear armament maintenance could be allocated to denuclearization processes such as disarmament;
- 11. *Encourages* all Member States who possess nuclear weapons to slowly divert a percentage of the yearly funds that were being spent on maintaining and securing existing nuclear weapons to the development of infrastructure in nuclear energy production by:
  - a. Encouraging expert reports on the transformation of actual nuclear weapons complexes to nuclear power facilities;
  - b. Encouraging the use of alternative energy production methods to sustain the increasing global energy demand;
  - Creating national funds which would invest in transforming and building new nuclear power facilities.



**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

Keeping in mind that true progress cannot be made without multilateral initiatives involving the cooperation of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states,

Reaffirming the right of every Member State to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as noted in General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 1977,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 67/56 of 2012, 68/46 of 2013, 69/41 of 2014, and 70/33 of 2015, and 72/77 of 2017 emphasizing the importance of global frameworks in the elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Viewing with appreciation* the Oil-For-Food Program (OIP), established by the United Nations in 1995 aiming to allow the sale of oil on the world market in exchange for food,

Recognizing the need for nuclear deterrents as the international community is gradually working to decrease stockpiles in a total nuclear disarmament long-term perspective,

*Encouraging* the continuation of the work done by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to guide and train Member States developing security for nuclear energy programs,

Bearing in mind Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.4, aiming to limit illicit arms flows and strengthen return of loss and stolen assets,

*Firmly convinced* that effective international security and the prevention of the use of nuclear energy for malicious purposes can only be achieved through the total commitment and cooperation of the globe's most influential entities.

Recognizing the need of transparency measures regarding nuclear capabilities and security throughout the international community,

Guided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Energy Series document, Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development which outlines the necessary steps for the development and improvement of critical nuclear energy infrastructure including proper implementation and information sharing,

*Recognizing* the importance of nuclear deterrence to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear disarmament by ensuring appropriate measures for verification of disarmament by Member States,

Further reaffirming the importance of international law and multilateral dialogues among Member States to enhance accountability and combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive,

*Stressing* the importance of the prevention of discrimination against developing states in the process of disarmament,

*Recognizing* that nuclear energy is a sustainable and efficient source of energy for the world despite its negative history and reputation,

Assessing the importance of the adoption of a non-first nuclear strike policy by Member States, in order to install an enduring peacebuilding confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear actors,

*Encouraging* all nuclear states and potential nuclear states to adopt a new doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the limitations of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in incorporating the viewpoints of all Member States.

Bearing in mind the environmental risks associated with the proper management of radioactive waste created by nuclear activities,

Deeply concerned about the potential of cyber threats to nuclear facilities as outlined by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) report, References for Cyber Incidents at Nuclear Facilities,

Following the suggestions of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction on interagency coordination mechanisms that include regular consultations alongside full-scale exercises for nuclear incident response,

Aware of the necessity of ensuring the secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology through the development of both national and regional legal frameworks for the peaceful use of nuclear energy as outlined in the IAEA Brief for Policymakers "The Importance of Having an Adequate National Legal Framework for the Safe, Secure and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology",

Acknowledging General Assembly resolution 72/27 of 2017 calling upon Member States to contribute to the prevention of placement of weapons, such as nuclear weapons, in outer space,

Deeply disturbed by the potential of threat to life and security posed by malicious cyber activities on nuclear facilities as seen by the development of malware such as the TRITON and Stuxnet which could lead to catastrophe and the loss of life,

*Noting* that not all nuclear weapons possessing Member States are signatories to the *Non-Proliferation Treaty* (1968),

1. *Encourages* all nuclear and potential nuclear states to improve confidence building measures through committing to never have first use of nuclear weapons;

 Invites Member States that have expertise on the peaceful usage of nuclear energy to, on a voluntary basis, share their strategies and knowledge with countries developing nuclear energy at the CD 2020 aiming to address topics such as preventing illicit access to fissile material including Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU);

3. Suggests the implementation of a program by the Security Council similar to the *Oil for Food* program conducted in Iraq from 1995-2003, to prevent the loss of life of civilians which are put at risk by current sanctions over nuclear weapons, through:

a. Allowing sanctioned nations to be granted non-military and non-financial resources, such as food and medication, in exchange for concrete nuclear disarmament actions;

b. Favoring the reintegration of sanctioned nations into the global economy through economic opportunities which could be granted for nuclear disarmament and/or appeasement actions, including permissions to conduct international commercial activities in some specific and limited fields;

4. Advises all Member States to facilitate the efficient sharing of information and the creation of regional communication centers that link developed Member States with Least Developing Countries (LDCs),

positively contributing to and expanding the working relationships being cultivated among them, thus aiding in the prevention of the production of additional nuclear weapons once the capacity to sustainably create and utilize nuclear energy is established;

- 5. Calls upon the Fellowship on Disarmament to establish an annual meeting with the current and former fellows, including other interested Member States, to discuss international nuclear disarmament and peaceful applications of nuclear energy by:
  - Addressing the need for a conference in the setting of the United Nations in which they may discuss effective nuclear disarmament as well as research and scientific knowledge of peaceful applications of nuclear energy;
  - b. Inviting Member States which have begun the nuclear disarmament process, as well as peaceful applications of nuclear energy to, on a voluntary basis, share their research with participants at this meeting;
- 6. Encourages Member StateS to adhere to existing international principles that combat smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials aiming to improve international security by preventing harmful use and proliferation of nuclear technology by:
  - a. Referring to SDG 16.4, emphasizing on the prevention of illicit access to nuclear materials;
  - Linking civil society organizations, such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), with their respective regional cooperative agreements;
  - c. Reporting inappropriate or suspicious transactions of nuclear and radioactive materials to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA);
- 7. Encourages the establishment of regional nuclear energy forums that maintain and encourage guidelines for peaceful uses, safeguards, and nuclear safety in order to minimize the threat of nuclear weaponization and enhance the transparency of information exchanges by detailed reporting on existing stockpiles of nuclear material;
- 8. Recommends an annual reduction, equivalent to 1% of the initial amount of all nuclear arsenals in all nuclear stockpiles globally, starting in 2021 with meetings annually to address, recommit, and adjust as necessary the rate of nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total global denuclearization by 2120;
- Invites the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cooperate with the IAEA to renew the Enhancing Cybersecurity for Least Developed Countries, considering the creation of a program which will implement a special training for cyber defense personnel in the judicial, administrative, and digital forensics fields with the aim of creating basic defenses for nuclear energy and nuclear armament cyber infrastructures;
- 10. Recommends addressing the question of nuclear non-proliferation in any eventual conference or framework on the peaceful uses, safeguards, and nuclear safety in order to prevent potential developments outside of the current framework, through:
  - a. Establishing a legislation concerning the avoidance of a potential nuclear arms race in space, taking into consideration the limitations of the term atmosphere and the lack of consensus regarding its exact demarcation in the *Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty* (CTBT);
  - b. Involving the International Space Inspector to temporarily or permanently dispatch an international expert team to national space launch states for verification;

- 160 c. Involving the contribution of the European Space Agency and other willing national space 161 programs;
  - 11. Recommends modern technologies such as remote satellite sensors and Uranium concentration detectors near semi-conductors producing nuclear radiation be added to the nuclear verification process to clarify and simplify detection to improve transparency and guarantee the absence of weaponized nuclear technologies;
  - 12. Invites all Member States to take part in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety;

- 13. Recommends the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) perform biannual digital gap analyses for nuclear energy facilities in accordance to their formal plans which aim to inform Member States about digital vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities in order to create solutions to fill these gaps to ensure their systems are protected against breaches which may cause serious international security issues:
- 14. Further recommends implementing IAEA collaborative centers in nuclear security;
- 15. *Urges* Member States to share knowledge and collaborate on nuclear safety and security through the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network (GNSSN);
- 16. *Invites* multilateral frameworks within existing regional groups aimed at preventing and responding to disruptive cyber incidents at nuclear facilities to have proper response for nuclear emergencies caused by cyber breaches, in order to ensure such breaches will not pose a threat to international peace and security;
- 17. Requests Member States that have recently begun nuclear energy programs, and therefore gained experience to, on a voluntary basis, present their strategies as topics for knowledge and best practice exchange at the Nuclear Security Summit's 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting through:
  - a. Aiming to educate Member States of the ease of accessibility to and potential peaceful applications of nuclear power;
  - b. Opportunities for Member States to improve confidence and information sharing through transparency, thereby strengthening cooperation with standards of international security;
- 18. Further suggests extending the work IAEA Nuclear Knowledge Management Section on the issue of nuclear safety with regard to newly established plants and research institutions to protect against threats by non-State actors;
- 19. Supports expansion of the IAEA's Regional Workshop on Nuclear Law for African Member States to a global program, held in different regions on a rotating basis within sponsor Member States, in order to update and improve laws on nuclear use in countries developing nuclear legislation;
- 20. States that this resolution does not in any way influence the current recognition status of nuclear weapon possessing Member States.



**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

Reminding Member States of Article I of the Charter of the United Nations (1945), which underlines the importance of establishing peace and security between states,

*Upholding* the sovereignty of all Member States in their domestic activities, with the confidence that the United Nations General Assembly will not infringe upon such sovereignty in any and all actions associated with this body,

*Deeply concerned* about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences associated with the use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017), which stipulated numerous prohibitions on Member States designing, developing, producing, possessing, acquiring, and, amongst others, subsequently deploying nuclear arms within the international community,

Recalling Article 5 of the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), which specified an explicit distinction between "nuclear weapons" and extraneous technologies designed for the transport or propulsion of such weapons through the following statement: "a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes,"

Recalling Article VII of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) (1968), which delegates the right to establish nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs),

Recalling General Assembly resolution 3472B, which defines "nuclear weapon free zones,"

Recalling, collectively, the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* (1967), the *Treaty of Rarotonga* (1985), the *Treaty of Bangkok* (1995), the *Treaty of Pelindaba* (1996), and the *Treaty of Semipalatinsk* (2006), which cohesively created the five existing nuclear weapon free zones across Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, respectively,

Reaffirming the relevance of reports submitted by Member States to the IAEA concerning their fissile material stockpiles,

Recognizing that various agencies, such as the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Accident Response Group (ARG), are in place to respond and, if possible, resolve accidental nuclear power disasters,

Reiterating the call to all Member States who have not already done so to ratify the NPT to disarm weapons and allow nuclear capacities among Member States to be utilized for more peaceful purposes,

Bearing in mind United Nations General Assembly resolution 69/52 on "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons," which stressed the holistic and future elimination of nuclear weapons within the totality of the international community,

*Noting with approval* United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/258, which emphasized the collaboration among all Member States, through the ideal of multilateralism, in ensuring the success of future projects associated with sustainable nuclear technologies.

*Reiterating* the guiding principles of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which establishes and subsequently enforces global obligations relative to the issue of proliferation among weapons of mass destruction, heretofore designated as those employing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear components, amongst others,

Considering the development and subsequent use of nuclear weapons as a holistic cycle, wherein the manufacturing, export, and employment of nuclear weapons are interconnected and interdependent elements.

*Underlining* the existing framework provided by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Nonproliferation Treaty Conference (2010) as specified in Action 21, which urged Member States to initiate a uniform reporting mechanism for existing nuclear-weapon states pertaining to such states' nuclear arsenal.

Recognizing that many Member States do not presently have nuclear power or access to nuclear energy in an efficient and safe manner, but are willing and wanting to develop this capacity in the near future,

*Emphasizing* the need for a narrative change surrounding nuclear energy, based on the negative connotations associated with utilizing nuclear energy to create militarized weapons of mass destruction,

Stressing the legal, economic, and political debates that must accompany the development and use of nuclear energy in order to maximize transparency and, concurrently, minimize concern among the international community on the manufacturing, export, and use of nuclear materials,

1. *Urges* the promotion of multilateral, nuclear projects for specifically peaceful purposes, including transportation mechanisms and various public infrastructure projects, done by simultaneously repurposing former weapons-grade nuclear materials and while also incentivizing collaboration between developed and developing states;

2. *Encourages* the use of public-private partnerships for the purposes of sharing information and costs amongst all Member States in the campaign for global non-proliferation by:

 Encouraging the establishment of post-secondary education programs by Member States that will train current nuclear energy specialists affected by the transition away from fields related to military, nuclear, proliferation;

b. Promoting the expansion of internship and vocational training programs among graduate-level students and young professionals within UN institutions including but not limited to:

i. International Atomic Energy Agency;

safer, less globally-threatening products of nuclear fission;

ii. UN-Energy;iii. United Nations affiliated youth development programs;

c. Creating policies that would attract individuals into careers related to nuclear energy;

  Welcoming interested non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and stakeholders to implement campaigns advocating for information regarding the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;

4. Advises that the Under-Secretary General, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs works towards:

production of nuclear weapons and the promotion of nuclear proliferation to be redirected toward

3. Encourages gains to be employed in the reinvestment of funds used by Member States in the

- c. Ensuring that various Member States do not lag behind in order to maintain a nuclear advantage;
- d. Encouraging Member States that have agreed upon reciprocal disarmament to cede control over the agreed to be repurposed stockpile temporarily to the Under-Secretary General of UNODA, which will, in assistance with the International Atomic Energy Agency:
  - Determine if all parties have honored their part of the contract and will approve the repurposing of said stockpiles, thus handing access back to the Member State of origin and overall supervision to the International Atomic Energy Agency;
  - ii. Provide technical advice to those that claim to have issues fulfilling the agreement in a timely manner;
  - iii. Submit a report to the United Nations Security Council detailing the difficulties of a proposed treaty party to uphold the terms of the agreement;
- 5. *Encourages* Member States possessing fissile materials for civilian and military use to maintain transparency and good faith by:
  - a. Cooperating fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to promote nuclear disarmament through various means including:
    - i. Complying with all IAEA guidelines in nuclear activity;
    - ii. Providing regular voluntary updates on local safety and security conditions when they are requested;
    - iii. Allowing the IAEA to complete inspections of nuclear energy generation facilities and enrichment plants within the limits of national sovereignty and the safeguarding of technology;
  - b. Attending and contributing to international forums and conferences on the subject of nuclear disarmament:
  - c. Duly informing relevant Member States and United Nations bodies of major developments and events of relevance on nuclear safety and disarmament within their territories;
- 6. *Encourages* Member States to establish new nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) within their territories, with particular emphases on:
  - a. Encouraging Member States in conflict-prone and vulnerable regions, such as the Middle East, to denuclearize as a buttress against global escalation of initially regional conflicts;
  - b. Creating regional bilateral and multilateral frameworks for nuclear cooperation;
  - c. Maximizing nuclear-free areas around the world to mitigate the risk of nuclear conflagration;

d. Supporting the United Nations in designating areas of international oceans as NWFZs;

- 7. Endorses further collaboration and dialogue within the Conference of Disarmament (CD), with a particular focus placed on tracking existing nuclear arms stockpiles and fissile materials and developing plans of actions to disincentivize the development of nuclear weapons;
- 8. Recommends that the annual United Nations Member States Expert Representatives Meeting to establish a non-exhaustive and regularly updated list that specifies which Member States are already or potentially invested in the construction of nuclear weapons, whilst also taking into consideration the development of all associated technologies, peaceful and otherwise, in enumerating such a collective;
- Recommends Member States facilitate the transfer of military-owned nuclear power operations to the
  control of state and/or energy sectors, thus ensuring the capabilities of nuclear energy will be used for
  peaceful purposes alone;
- 10. Further invites all Member States to promote nuclear energy development as an opportunity for occupational creation and renewable energy expansion rather than as a tool for global weaponization in the goals of reducing the threat of nuclear power, all accomplished via:
  - a. Inviting all Member States to adopt legislative systems in order to avoid misunderstandings and established rule discrepancies;
  - b. Facilitating the transfer of military-owned nuclear power operations to either state and/or private energy sectors, thus ensuring that capabilities of the energy will be used for peaceful purposes alone;
  - Utilizing social media and other online platforms to spread awareness of the sustainability of nuclear energy and to inform citizens that nuclear energy can be managed peacefully for safe and clean implementation;
  - 11. *Encourages* the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the United Nations as a whole, to implement an idealized deadline of 2050 for total nuclear disarmament, done under the aforementioned Under-Secretary General for the UNODA and including the following tenets:
    - a. Set, with the purpose of a total ban of nuclear weapons in a period of maximum 50 years, a periodical conference ban during which Member States will discuss and decide, freely and in the respect of sovereignty of all Member States, a percentage that will represent the amount of reduction throughout the entirety of the international system;
    - Include, simultaneously, a proposal for a general timetable for overall global disarmament, which specifies the following goals:
      - i. A global quota of 2% disarmament per year with a reviewal every five years that the implied 10% has been accomplished;
      - ii. Complete global disarmament, by 2070.



Committee: General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

*Reminding* Member States about the repercussions of nuclear matters on humanitarian affairs such as social and economic development, nutrition standards and the quality of life of current and future generations,

Noting with satisfaction the standards in fissile material management, security and transportation set by The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980),

Bearing in mind the success of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) (1968) under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in decreasing the total amount of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming the 1996 International Court of Justice opinion that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are a violation of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), a violation of International Humanitarian Law, and constitute a crime against humanity,

Recalling the vital role of the General Assembly First Committee in the maintenance of international peace and security, in compliance with the *Charter of the United Nations* and *the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948),

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 73/27 of 5 December 2018 as it emphasizes the need for cooperation between states on increasing cyber security capacity building,

Emphasizing the importance of Article VI of the Treaty on the NPT on complete nuclear disarmament encouraging participating Member States to move forward in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations as well as involving civil society organizations in processes involving total disarmament,

Acknowledging that nuclear energy programs pose a potential security threat if not developed with the appropriate safeguards and oversight as established in the IAEA Milestone Program,

Aiming to forward the progress on the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (MENWFZ) as highlighted in General Assembly resolution 72/24 of 4 December 2017, with special regard to the Declaration for the Conference of NWFZ (2005),

*Reiterating* General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, which honors the rights of nations to possess nuclear energy for peaceful purposes such as scientific research and as a means to produce carbon-free sustainable energy in accordance with Sustainable Development Goal 7,

Noting with appreciation General Assembly resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, especially Sustainable Development Goal 4 on education to ensure inclusive and equitable education for all and to raise awareness of nuclear weapon usage in connection with ongoing peace-building efforts involving youth,

Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 70/10 of 17 November 2015, which recognizes the importance of the IAEA as an international forum of intergovernmental and civil society cooperation in regards to assisting member states in the development of atomic energy and its input into the safety of nuclear facilities,

Recognizing the potential danger of high enriched uranium as a precursor to nuclear weapons and Low Enriched Uranium is a safer alternative.

Recognizing that furthering Member States' knowledge in the field of nuclear science and technology though regional IAEA partnerships and the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network would mitigate the threat of nuclear weapon use and the role of the scientific community in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power,

Expressing concern towards the possible cyber security vulnerabilities of nuclear energy sites, such as aggressive computer viruses and malware, particularly in least developed countries as noted in General Assembly resolution 64/211 of 21 December 2009, and the lack of transparency surrounding nuclear weapon sites and their security apparatuses,

Encouraging Member States to accede and comply to the Technical Cooperation Programme and the annual report system set out by the IAEA with the view for Member States would be able to attain nuclear knowledge and further develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,

Cognizant of the horrific human consequences that the usage of nuclear weapons entail, such as mentioned in the International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent report on the effect of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima on the 6th of August 1945, which emphasizes the repercussions of radiation exposure resulting in vast destruction to the environment and extreme threat to good health and well-being of all the world's people,

Concerned by the lack of universal consensus on the path to achieving nuclear disarmament and the difficulty of reaching a unanimous decision for disarmament effort programs,

- 1. Recommends all Member States who have not yet ratified, consider ratifying the NPT and the *Treaty* on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017);
- 2. Encourages Member States party to the NPT to propose an amendment at the 2020 NPT Review Conference that declares the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a contradiction of the principles of the UN Charter, an infringement of international humanitarian law under jurisdiction of the ICC;
- 3. *Fully endorses* inclusion of confidence-building civilian briefings in forums hosted by Member States, the UN, and CSOs regarding nuclear weapons and disarmament focusing on the direct impacts of these issues on their daily lives to inform development of inclusive and effective solutions;
- 4. Suggests collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to further initiate dialogue between Member States and confidence-building measure by presenting their strategies as topics for knowledge and best practice exchange at the Nuclear Security Summit 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting in October 2020;
- 5. *Further reminds* the international community of the utility of education in raising grass-roots pressure to remind Member States of their international humanitarian law obligations to advance the discussion regarding international nuclear disarmament by:
  - a. Facilitating public education through social media campaigns funded by the Center for International Security and Cooperation towards the severe humanitarian consequences of nuclear warfare and the peaceful use of nuclear energy:
  - b. Welcoming the role of social media in denuclearization campaigns targeted at children and younger populations with the goal of promoting humanitarian law for young generations;
  - c. Recognizing the role of educational personnel in the promotion of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of atomic energy;

6. Recommends the expansion of the Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters under the UNODA possibly depending on program donations from groups such as the Peaceful Uses Initiative which would consist of experts selected by Member States to oversee international cooperation in disarmament efforts and research through:

- Implementing laboratories in various Member States following guidelines established by the advisory board to enhance diplomatic relations through the ability of science to communicate beyond political divides in the name of furthering mankind's scientific understanding thus assisting in guiding global disarmament efforts;
- b. Ensuring the involvement and continued support of Member States in the critical nature of nuclear disarmament by encouraging Member States to provide students pursuing a higher education with opportunities to assist the advisory board experts in research;
- Hosting semiannual international conferences featuring scientific professionals to discuss the
  present state of affairs and possible future actions as influenced by the global presence of
  nuclear weapons;
- 7. Encourages the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization to promote conferences, workshops, exhibitions which retell the stories of those stories of those survivors of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to foster participation in humanitarian efforts, in the hope that Member States will build confidence between themselves and gradually commit to greater nuclear disarmament by:
  - a. Creating the foundation for an international young arts competition through partnerships with art-based NGOs in which aspiring artists take the stories of nuclear attack survivors as recorded by the UNODA and represent them through differing artistic mediums;
  - b. Display the work of the competition winners at an established event such as the International Festival of Arts and Ideas, with the suggestion that subsequent proceeds may go towards the more than 160,000 Japanese atomic bomb survivors who still live to this day with mental and physical scars;
- 8. Encourages the cooperation between Member States and the IAEA to facilitate efforts towards denuclearization by:
  - a. Permitting open inspections of nuclear facilities and nuclear programs by the IAEA, to result in annual reports;
  - b. Strengthening existing frameworks provided by the IAEA;
  - c. Allowing oversight into all uses of nuclear materials in order to benefit the development of sustainable energy sources;
  - d. Considering the IAEA Milestone approach in all new nuclear energy programs, emphasizing human resource development regarding nuclear infrastructures;
- 9. Recommends the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to publish yearly nuclear arsenal numbers, nuclear disarmament plans and progress for each Member State, and provide information and resources on peace, security, and nuclear disarmament;
- 10. Reminds Member States of their responsibility to increase international cooperation regarding the development of nuclear security and establishment of global cyber norms;

11. Urges Member States to consider the establishment of further NWFZs.



**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

Topic: Nuclear Disarmament and International Security

The General Assembly First Committee,

Reminding Member States of the core mission of this body of the United Nations – ensuring peace and security worldwide – a goal reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 65/72 "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" and General Assembly resolution 72/38 "Nuclear Disarmament", calling on Member States to take effective measures to eliminate nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the fact that nuclear weapons are the greatest threat to international security,

Reaffirming the General Assembly Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (A/C.1/67/L.41), yet to be formally adopted,

*Regretting* the lack of progress towards the adoption and implementation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT),

Deeply concerned with Member States' and international banks' continued investment in their nuclear arsenals,

*Emphasizing* the positive impact that nuclear technology can contribute to the fulfilment of the Sustainable Developments Goals as an alternative to being misused for war purposes,

Acknowledging the power that information and technology sharing can have in curbing the rise and instability in nuclear material, specifically, the sharing of Permissive Action Link and similar technologies,

*Emphasizing* the role of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the only multilateral disarmament body for discussion,

*Re-emphasizing* the value of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN), and the work that has been done on its part,

Referring to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), specifically the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), as its work is based on continued monitoring of events in Member States as well as outside of the OECD area, and includes regular projections of short and medium-term economic developments,

Recognizing that global nuclear disarmament can direct economic development and growth for nuclear states through the transformation of nuclear warheads into nuclear energy,

Noting the UN Conference on a Nuclear Arms Ban Treaty of 2017, wherein only 123 Member States attended the conference, with none of those Member States that possess nuclear weapons attending,

Keeping in mind the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.4 indicating intentions to greatly reduce arms flows while intensifying efforts to recover and return stolen assets.

Gravely concerned that only 25 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is required to produce a nuclear weapon, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative report Why Highly Enriched Uranium is a Threat,

*Viewing with appreciation* the Megatons to Megawatts program between the United States and Russia which converts HEU to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).

 Recalling the work done by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) that recommended the verification of the Declarations on Fissile Material Stocks signaling that there is approximately 2,000 metric tons of uranium and plutonium and affirming that the inventory of these numbers is an important aspect to nuclear disarmament,

- 1. Calls on Member States to consider the newly emerging challenges and the changes in the international system to ensure the commitment and transparency of Member States regarding nuclear weapons and fissile materials, including:
  - a. The control of transuranic elements with fission capacity as recommended by the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
  - b. The reduction of nuclear weapons with a verification of the irreversibility of fissile materials to reduce the risk of proliferation and military use;
  - c. The declaration the amount of existing fissionable material destined for recycling and peaceful use;
  - d. The promotion of the use of LEU and the reuse of fissile material thereby stopping its use for the production of weapons and nuclear devices;
- 2. *Encourages* Member States and financial institutions to divest and divert funds from nuclear weapons corporations in order to invest in sustainable development;
- 3. Recommends the creation and implementation of the "Sustainable Energy as Development Initiative" to promote peace and security worldwide and reduce the quantity of nuclear warheads inside nuclear states by working with the IAEA to transform fissile material by:
  - a. Utilizing the knowledge from the IAEA to educate, support, and guide nuclear states on the process of recycling and transforming nuclear weapons into sustainable nuclear power;
  - b. Encouraging the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to provide funding and support Member States who wish to participate to guarantee that this initiative will not be limited by economic conditions;
  - c. Strengthening direct and indirect commerce between discordant Member States to ensure lasting peace and security via expanding the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)'s mandate;
- 4. Calls upon Member States in CD to modify their agenda by:
  - a. Increasing the frequency of meetings of CD for the execution of biannual meetings to facilitate the multilateral conversation on disarmament;
  - b. Expanding the mandate of CD to include the recycling and reuse of fissile materials;
  - c. Sharing and reviewing technology to improve information and knowledge about fissile material while also reviewing technology meant to protect current storage of nuclear-ready materials and weapons by:
    - Bringing together civilian, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and various other experts in the fields of advanced security, nuclear security, and new security technologies;

- Using these conferences to promote the widespread adoption of technologies similar ii. to Permissive Action Links, meant to secure current stores of nuclear grade material and the future transfer of fissile material: Cooperating with regional and international civil society organizations and NGOs, iii. specifically with ICAN, with the purpose of promoting civil society participation in global nuclear sisarmament, including the topic of preventing non-state actors' access to nuclear weapons and fissile materials; 5. Supports the continuation of the collaboration within the negotiation committee of the CD for the creation of FMCT by:
  - Encouraging Member States to expand upon the challenges and opportunities presented by the FMCT at CD and allow inclusive language and productive dialogue among treaty signatories and non-signatories;
  - b. Working through the General Assembly Sixth Committee to expand the treaty to include a focus on general reduction in fissile material and allow inclusive language;
  - c. Extending the currently proposed treaty to include current stockpiles of fissile materials;
  - d. Reminding future treaty signatories of the goals in the creation of the FMCT to reduce fissile materials, and work towards disarmament and global peace;
  - e. Urging the development of a monitoring system for fissile materials in Member States that are lacking such infrastructure in order to ascertain the world supply of weapons-grade resources;
  - 6. Recommends the addition of a monitoring system within the proposed FMCT, which includes:
    - a. the mining/transforming of HEU and plutonium;

- b. all transfers of fissile material between Member States;
- c. usage of the fissile material by the nuclear reactors in Member States;
- d. the dilution of HEU and plutonium by Member States;
- 7. Appeals to other Member States to assist in forming programs for recycling and reuse of fissile material by:
  - a. Bringing together civilian and governmental experts in the fields of nuclear waste and recycling technologies to present updates in their respective industries in front of CD at their yearly meetings laid out and planned in an updated agenda;
  - b. Urging the assistance and expansion of the OECD NEA experts to advise on radioactive waste management and nuclear material transport, and provide technical analysis to Member States for the trade of energy generated using recycled nuclear materials, as expanded upon in clause 4:
  - c. Encouraging increased frequencies of at least two reports per year, prepared by the IAEA to be presented to the meetings of CD;
  - d. Promoting the use of these technologies to achieve SDG 16.4, as the recycling of nuclear materials limits the amount of these chemicals that can be turned into nuclear weapons;

8. Encourages Member States to use the Megatons to Megawatts program as a model, where HEU is diluted to LEU and then used as commercial nuclear reactor fuel, as used by the United States and Russia.