



NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA  
18 - 22 March (Conf. A) / 25 - 29 March (Conf. B)



## SECURITY COUNCIL BACKGROUND GUIDE 2018

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Martin Schunk, Director; Ivan G. Zhivkov, Director



# NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS



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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2018 National Model United Nations New York Conference (NMUN•NY)! We are pleased to welcome you to the Security Council (SC). This year's staff are: Directors Alfred Jones and Martin Schunk (Conference A), and Directors Lidia Marseglia and Ivan G. Zhivkov (Conference B). Alfie completed his M.A. in History, focusing on modern British politics, in 2013. He now works as a product manager for a global travel website. This is his 5th year on staff at NMUN-NY. Martin is pursuing his M.A. degree in Media Studies at a German university. He is currently an exchange student at Tel Aviv University in Israel, where he focuses on Political Communication. Lidia is currently enrolled in the final year of a Master's program in International Relations at the University LUISS Guido Carli of Rome. She is looking forward to returning for her fourth year on staff. Ivan completed his Master of Arts in International Relations degree in 2016, focusing on Security and Diplomacy. He is currently working on international development in Washington, DC. Ivan is looking forward to returning for his third year on staff.

The topics under discussion for the Security Council are:

1. Humanitarian Exemptions in Sanction Regimes
2. Preventing Terrorism and Extremism in the Horn of Africa
3. Women, Peace and Security

As one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, the Security Council is mandated by the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. It is the only body within the UN system with the authority to pass legally binding resolutions. The Council is composed of 15 Member States; 5 of which are permanent 'veto-wielding' nations and the other 10 are elected for 2-year terms. The main powers of the Security Council are: sanctions; the deployment, or approval of the deployment, of military forces; as well as diplomacy and building regional partnerships. In order to accurately simulate the committee, it will be key for delegates to emulate the cooperative and often consensus-based decision making practices of the Security Council.

This Background Guide serves as an introduction to the topics for this committee. However, it is not intended to replace individual research. We encourage you to explore your Member State's policies in depth and use the Annotated Bibliography and Bibliography to further your knowledge on these topics. In preparation for the Conference, each delegation will submit a [Position Paper](#) by 11:59 p.m. (Eastern) on 1 March 2018 in accordance with the guidelines in the [NMUN Position Paper Guide](#).

Two resources, to download from the [NMUN website](#), that serve as essential instruments in preparing for the Conference and as a reference during committee sessions are the:

1. [NMUN Delegate Preparation Guide](#) - explains each step in the delegate process, from pre-Conference research to the committee debate and resolution drafting processes. Please take note of the information on plagiarism, and the prohibition on pre-written working papers and resolutions. Delegates should not start discussion on the topics with other members of their committee until the first committee session.
2. [NMUN Rules of Procedure](#) - include the long and short form of the rules, as well as an explanatory narrative and example script of the flow of procedure.

In addition, please review the mandatory [NMUN Conduct Expectations](#) on the NMUN website. They include the Conference dress code and other expectations of all attendees. We want to emphasize that any instances of sexual harassment or discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, age, or disability will not be tolerated.

If you have any questions concerning your preparation for the committee or the Conference itself, please contact the Under-Secretaries-General for the Peace & Security Department, Tsesa Monaghan (Conference A) and Jess Mace (Conference B), at [usg.ps@nmun.org](mailto:usg.ps@nmun.org).

We wish you all the best in your preparations and look forward to seeing you at the Conference!

## Conference A

Alfred Jones and Martin Schunk, Directors

## Conference B

Lidia Marseglia, and Ivan G. Zhivkov, Directors




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## United Nations System at NMUN•NY

This diagram illustrates the UN system simulated at NMUN•NY and demonstrates the reportage and relationships between entities. Examine the diagram alongside the Committee Overview to gain a clear picture of the committee's position, purpose, and powers within the UN system.





## Abbreviations

<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BPfA</b>	<i>Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action</i>
<b>CEDAW</b>	Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organization
<b>CTC</b>	Counter-Terrorism Committee
<b>CTITF</b>	Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
<b>CVE</b>	Countering Violent Extremism
<b>DFS</b>	Department of Field Support
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>DPRK</b>	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
<b>EAPC</b>	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FARC-EP</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
<b>GCTS</b>	<i>The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy</i>
<b>IANWGE</b>	Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality
<b>ICTR</b>	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
<b>ICTY</b>	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>IMO</b>	International Maritime Organization
<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Criminal Police Organization
<b>IO</b>	Intergovernmental Organization
<b>ISIL</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
<b>MARA</b>	Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Arrangement
<b>MINUSCA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
<b>MINUSMA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
<b>NAP</b>	National Action Plan
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>PBC</b>	Peacebuilding Commission
<b>PKO</b>	Peacekeeping Operation
<b>RAP</b>	Regional Action Plan
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Community
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>TOE</b>	Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict
<b>UDHR</b>	<i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</i>
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UN-Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNMIK</b>	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
<b>UNSOM</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WPA</b>	Women's Protection Advisor
<b>WPS</b>	Women, Peace and Security



## Committee Overview

### *Introduction*

After the devastating effects of two world wars, the international community decided to establish the United Nations (UN) as an intergovernmental organization (IO) with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, creating the conditions conducive to economic and social development, while advancing universal respect for human rights.<sup>1</sup> The Security Council was established as one of its six principal organs and was given the primary responsibility of preserving international peace and security.<sup>2</sup>

The **United Nations Security Council** is one of the six primary organs of the United Nations, mandated by the *Charter of the United Nations* to maintain international peace and security. The Council submits an annual report to the General Assembly.

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House in London.<sup>3</sup> After its first meeting, the Council relocated to its permanent residence at the UN Headquarters in New York City.<sup>4</sup> At that time, five permanent members and six non-permanent members comprised the membership of the Council.<sup>5</sup> However, over subsequent years, discussions regarding the structure of the Council began to take place.<sup>6</sup> In 1965, the number of non-permanent members increased to ten, and although membership has not changed since then, discussions regarding a change in configuration take place frequently.<sup>7</sup>

During the Cold War, disagreements between the United States of America (USA) and the former Soviet Union blocked the Council from being an effective institution due to lack of agreement on even the most basic of issues.<sup>8</sup> However, over the past two decades, progress has been made, especially in the field of peacekeeping missions, which have improved to cover a wider range of issues, such as facilitating political processes, protecting human rights, and assisting with disarmament.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, traditional challenges to international peace and security have shifted, forcing the Council to adapt to new scenarios, such as the challenge of addressing multiple humanitarian crises simultaneously, and in different regions of the world.<sup>10</sup> After the year 2000, terrorism, extremism, and other thematic, rather than country-specific issues, became priorities of the Council, as evidenced by the adoption of a range of resolutions and the establishment of several subsidiary bodies on cross-cutting issues.<sup>11</sup>

### *Governance, Structure, and Membership*

The Security Council is the only UN body that has the power to adopt legally binding resolutions.<sup>12</sup> This means that when the Council adopts a resolution, Member States, under Article 25 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), are obliged to accept and carry out its recommendations and decisions.<sup>13</sup> The Security Council also has a variety of other tools to address issues on its agenda.<sup>14</sup> For example, the President of the Security Council may issue press statements or presidential statements to communicate the Council's position.<sup>15</sup> Although these are not legally binding, such statements are used to bring attention to important issues and to recommend solutions to conflicts.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Preamble.

<sup>2</sup> UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2017.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Hanhimäki, *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 32.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, 2005, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, *United Nations Security Council*, 2014.

<sup>9</sup> UN Security Council, *Structure*, 2017.

<sup>10</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *CFR Backgrounders: The UN Security Council*, 2015; Encyclopaedia Britannica, *United Nations Security Council*, 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Security Council Report, *September 2014 Monthly Forecast: Counter-Terrorism*, 2014.

<sup>12</sup> UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2017.

<sup>13</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 25.

<sup>14</sup> UN Security Council, *Functions and Powers*, 2017.

<sup>15</sup> NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, *Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the United Nations Security Council: Report of the NGOWG Monthly Action Points, 2009-2010*, 2010, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

### *Membership*

The Security Council is comprised of five permanent members and 10 non-permanent members.<sup>17</sup> The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.<sup>18</sup> Every year, the General Assembly elects five of the 10 non-permanent members for a two-year term.<sup>19</sup> Elections for non-permanent seats on the Council can be extremely competitive, with countries expressing interest years in advance.<sup>20</sup> Countries elected to serve on the Security Council are expected to represent the interests of their region; they usually have an influence at the international level and demonstrate leadership in specific areas of interest to their foreign policy.<sup>21</sup> Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, and Uruguay are the non-permanent members through the end of 2017.<sup>22</sup> Security Council elections are held in June, six months before the term starts.<sup>23</sup> This change allows Member States ample time to prepare for their new role.<sup>24</sup> The 10 non-permanent members represent countries from five groups: Africa, the Asia-Pacific Group, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Eastern European Group, and Western European and Other.<sup>25</sup> Italy and the Netherlands are currently splitting one of the European seats, with each holding the seat for one year.<sup>26</sup>

### *Presidency*

Each member of the Security Council holds the presidency of the Council for one month, rotating according to alphabetical order.<sup>27</sup> Security Council meetings can be held at any time when convened by the President, and by the request of any Member State.<sup>28</sup> Under Rule 1 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, the President shall call a meeting if a dispute or situation requires the Council's attention.<sup>29</sup>

### *Participation*

Any Member State of the UN may attend the Council's sessions if the body decides to extend an invitation.<sup>30</sup> Member States are invited if the Security Council is discussing an issue that directly concerns the interests of the Member State.<sup>31</sup> Invited Member States do not have the right to vote, but are allowed to submit proposals and draft resolutions.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, those Member States can inform the Council about a current crisis in their region.<sup>33</sup> However, such proposals may only be put to a vote at the request of a member of the Council.<sup>34</sup>

### *Subsidiary Organs*

The Security Council has many subsidiary bodies established under Article 29 of the Charter, including: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), sanctions committees, and ad hoc committees, such as the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia.<sup>35</sup> The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is a body that reports jointly to the General Assembly and the Security Council.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, Security Council Member States participate in various working groups, which discuss the topics of

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<sup>17</sup> UN Security Council, *Current members*, 2017.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> UN DPI, *Ahead of Security Council elections, General Assembly President explains how a country can get a non-permanent seat*, 2016.

<sup>21</sup> Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> UN Security Council, *Current members*, 2017.

<sup>23</sup> UN General Assembly, *Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly (A/RES/68/307)*, 2014, p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> UN DPI, *Ahead of Security Council elections, General Assembly President explains how a country can get a non-permanent seat*, 2016.

<sup>25</sup> UN General Assembly, *Rules of procedure*, 2017.

<sup>26</sup> *Italy, Netherlands ask to share Security Council seat*, Al Jazeera, 2016.

<sup>27</sup> UN Security Council, *Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (S/96/Rev.7)*, 1982.

<sup>28</sup> UN Security Council, *Repertoire of the practice of the Security Council*, 2017.

<sup>29</sup> UN Security Council, *Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (S/96/Rev.7)*, 1982.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 31.

<sup>32</sup> UN Security Council, *Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (S/96/Rev.7)*, 1982.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> UN Security Council, *Structure*, 2017.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

concern of the Security Council.<sup>37</sup> These working groups consist of some or all of the Security Council Member States, and focus on regional issues, as well as improving the working methods of the Security Council itself.<sup>38</sup> The Security Council is also responsible for determining if, when, and where a peacekeeping operation is needed.<sup>39</sup> A peacekeeping operation is created through an adopted Security Council resolution, and the Council must monitor the operation through reports issued by the Secretary-General, as well as specific Security Council meetings.<sup>40</sup>

### *Voting*

Every Member State of the Security Council has one vote.<sup>41</sup> Votes on all matters require a majority of nine Member States.<sup>42</sup> However, if one of the five permanent members of the Security Council votes “no” on a matter of substance, such as a draft resolution, it does not pass.<sup>43</sup> This is known as the “veto power.”<sup>44</sup> In the 1950s, Security Council Member States, in particular the former Soviet Union, made frequent use of their veto power, but its usage declined in the 1960s, rising again in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>45</sup> In the last decades, the use of the veto power has been on a comparatively low level.<sup>46</sup> In recent years, the Council has adopted many resolutions by consensus and has only been divided on a very limited number of issues, a prominent example being the case of Syria.<sup>47</sup>

### ***Mandate, Functions, and Powers***

The mandate of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security, and to take action whenever peace and security are threatened.<sup>48</sup> The Council’s authority is particularly relevant with respect to the UN’s four primary purposes, as specified in the *Charter of the United Nations*: maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; cooperating in solving international problems; promoting respect for human rights, as well as being a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.<sup>49</sup> Chapters VI and VII of the Charter specifically concern the Security Council and the range of actions that can be taken when settling disputes.<sup>50</sup> Although the main goal is always to dissolve the disputes, Chapter VI aims to achieve this by peaceful means, whereas Chapter VII explores further actions that can be taken.<sup>51</sup> As noted in Chapter VI, the role of the Security Council is to determine the severity of the dispute brought before the body and the impact of the dispute internationally.<sup>52</sup> The Security Council is responsible for making recommendations to broker peace that take into consideration the previously attempted measures by the parties involved.<sup>53</sup> Under Chapter VII, the Security Council has the authority to implement provisional measures aimed to de-escalate the situation.<sup>54</sup> If the provisional measures are ignored or are unsuccessful, the Security Council may decide to call upon military forces to act on behalf of the UN.<sup>55</sup> The Charter provides the Security Council with several powers to guarantee international security:

- **Sanctions:** Pursuant to Article 41 in the Charter, the Council can call on its members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or end violence.<sup>56</sup> These include economic sanctions, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans,

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<sup>37</sup> UN Security Council, *Repertoire of the practice of the Security Council*, 2017.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Role of the Security Council*, 2017.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 27.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Hanhimäki, *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 52.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: The Veto*, 2013; Security Council Report, *The Permanent Members and the Use of the Veto: An Abridged History*, 2013.

<sup>46</sup> Security Council Report, *The Permanent Members and the Use of the Veto: An Abridged History*, 2013.

<sup>47</sup> Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: Consensus in the Security Council*, 2014; Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: The Veto*, 2013.

<sup>48</sup> UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2016.

<sup>49</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., Art. 34.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., Art. 36.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., Art. 40.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., Art. 41.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., Art. 41.



severance of diplomatic relations, and blockades.<sup>57</sup> It may further mandate arms embargoes, enforce disarmament, or call upon international criminal mechanisms to become active.<sup>58</sup>

- **Diplomatic Tools:** The Council is mandated to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to aggressions between states or other non-state groups or within states' territories.<sup>59</sup> To do so, it may "recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression, and recommend what action should be taken."<sup>60</sup>
- **Military Action:** Aside from diplomatic instruments, the Council may also take military action against a state or other entity threatening international peace and security and may further decide on the deployment of troops or observers.<sup>61</sup> Article 39 of the Charter states that the Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."<sup>62</sup> The Council may also decide upon the deployment of new UN peacekeeping operations to be led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as the extensions of their mandates and subsequent modification or drawdown of any troops.<sup>63</sup>
- **Partnerships:** The Council also cooperates with a number of international and regional organizations as well as non-governmental organizations to implement its decisions.<sup>64</sup> Cooperation between the Security Council and UN-related organizations, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, is significant, but partnerships with independent IOs, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU), are also of paramount importance for addressing a broad range of issues such as terrorism, disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and extreme violence from non-state actors.<sup>65</sup>

### *Recent Sessions and Current Priorities*

The topic of Africa has occupied the Council during much of 2017, with 18 resolutions adopted focusing on the continent in the first half of the year. This included resolution 2359 on "Peace and Security in Africa," which discussed the countries of the Sahel region, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.<sup>66</sup> The resolution commended the deployment of an AU force to the region.<sup>67</sup> Further, the Security Council noted both the slow implementation of the 2015 peace accords and the spread of violence throughout Mali, where more than 100 peacekeepers from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in 2013 by the Council, have been killed.<sup>68</sup> The Council requested that the force take "a more proactive and robust posture" in the resolution extending MINUSMA's mandate through to 2018.<sup>69</sup>

The other region receiving the most attention from the Council is the Middle East, on which five resolutions have been adopted in so far in 2017.<sup>70</sup> This included resolution 2362 on "The Situation in Libya," which reaffirmed existing measures in place in Libya, including an arms embargo, and asset freezes and travel bans targeting

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<sup>57</sup> Biersteker et al., *The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions: Findings from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium*, 2013; UN Security Council, *United Nations Security Council: About*, 2014.

<sup>58</sup> Cousens & Malone, *Conflict Prevention in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, 2004, p. 111.

<sup>59</sup> UN Security Council, *Functions and Powers*, 2017.

<sup>60</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> UN DPKO, *Forming a New Operation*, 2017.

<sup>64</sup> UN Security Council, *Repertoire of the practice of the Security Council*, 2017.

<sup>65</sup> UN Security Council, *Structure*, 2017; UN Security Council, *Middle East (S/RES/2118 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>66</sup> UN Security Council, *Peace and Security in Africa (S/RES/2359 (2017))*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>68</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Fatalities by mission, year, and incident type*, 2017, p. 1; UN Security Council, *The situation in Mali (S/RES/2100 (2013))*, 2013; UN Security Council, *The situation in Mali (S/RES/2364 (2017))*, 2017.

<sup>69</sup> UN Security Council, *The situation in Mali (S/RES/2364 (2017))*, 2017, p. 7.

<sup>70</sup> UN Security Council, *Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 2017*, 2017.



individuals in violation of existing resolutions.<sup>71</sup> The resolution further identified illegal export of petroleum as a key factor fueling Libya's conflict and undermining the Government of National Accord, and condemned the practice.<sup>72</sup>

Turning to South America, in support of sustainable peacebuilding in Colombia after the 2016 agreement to end the decades-long civil war, the Council adopted resolution 2366 in July 2017.<sup>73</sup> This resolution welcomed the disarming of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), and established a political mission in Colombia, the Verification Mission, which will report on the implementation of the peace accords.<sup>74</sup>

Nuclear non-proliferation is also back on the Council agenda in 2017. In response to ballistic missile tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and rising tensions on the Korean peninsula, two resolutions were adopted, this first of which condemned the tests and reiterated the demand of the complete dismantling of DPRK's nuclear weapons program, as well as setting out additional asset freezes and travel bans.<sup>75</sup> A second resolution, 2372, in response to further missile tests in July tightened the implementation of economic sanctions, introducing further restrictions on a diverse range of activities, from the financial sector to seafood.<sup>76</sup>

In addition to focusing on regional issues, the Council has also attempted to address global, thematic problems in 2017. Four resolutions have been adopted focusing on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts," the most recent in June concentrating specifically on preventing terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons.<sup>77</sup> A resolution was also adopted in June focusing on landmines.<sup>78</sup> While this topic has long been a focus of the international community, the increased use more recently of improvised explosive devices by terrorist and non-state actors has to be factored into the Council's thinking when addressing this problem.<sup>79</sup>

### **Conclusion**

As the international community faces increasing asymmetrical threats from non-state actors and transnational organized crime, the Security Council has tried to adapt to new working methods.<sup>80</sup> The peace agreement signed in Colombia demonstrates that no conflict, however long running, is intractable. The current situations in Somalia, Mali, Libya, and the Korean peninsula showcase the Security Council's inability to completely guarantee peace and security in all regions of the world, but they also represent the systemic divides among Council members.<sup>81</sup> This lacking capacity can be partially explained by the Council's controversial decision-making process, specifically the veto power of the five permanent members.<sup>82</sup> However, as the Security Council is the only UN body with the power to adopt binding resolutions, it is still the most important entity for maintaining international peace and security.<sup>83</sup>

### **Annotated Bibliography**

*Charter of the United Nations*. (1945). Retrieved 23 August 2017 from: <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html>

*As the fundamental principles of the Security Council are written down in the Charter, this document should be the first resource to consider. Article 23, which sets the membership structure*

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<sup>71</sup> UN Security Council, *The situation in Libya (S/RES/2362 (2017))*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>73</sup> UN DPI, *Security Council reiterates commitment to Colombian peace process*, 2016; UN Security Council, *Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/RES/2366(2017))*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>74</sup> UN Security Council, *Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/RES/2366 (2017))*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>75</sup> UN Security Council, *Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea (S/RES/2356 (2017))*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3.

<sup>77</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts - Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons (S/RES/2370 (2017))*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>78</sup> UN Security Council, *Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Mine Action (S/RES/2365 (2017))*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> UN Security Council, *Structure*, 2017; UN Security Council, *1540 Committee*, 2015.

<sup>81</sup> Security Council Report, *The Permanent Members and the Use of the Veto: An Abridged History*, 2013.

<sup>82</sup> Security Council Report, *The Permanent Members and the Use of the Veto: An Abridged History*, 2013.

<sup>83</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 24.

*and articles 23 to 26, which discuss its basic functions and powers, are important for understanding both the structure and function of the Security Council. In addition, articles 27 to 32 explain the Council's voting procedure and its overall structure. The Charter can be particularly helpful for delegates in understanding the powers and limitations of the body. Delegates will find Chapters VI and VII most helpful when researching the mandate of the Security Council, and while at the conference simulating the body.*

Council on Foreign Relations. (2013). *CFR Backgrounders: The UN Security Council* [Website]. Retrieved 23 August 2017 from: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council>

*The Council on Foreign Relations provides a comprehensive introduction into the structure and work of the Security Council and therefore constitutes a good starting point for more detailed research. The website discusses the Council's powers and possibilities in taking coercive actions and addresses broadly discussed issues as criticism to the Security Council's structure as well as possible reforms. In addition, the website contains links on further resources on the Security Council and recent international security issues as, for example, the Global Governance Monitor, which evaluates the international regime for armed conflict.*

Cousens, E., & Malone, D. (2004). *Conflict Prevention, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

*This volume provides readers with a very detailed overview of the Security Council and its past and present challenges. This book touches upon many of the Council's themes, institutions, and operations, explaining the Council's structure in depth. As it discusses major operations on four continents, the document can be a useful tool for detailed analysis on various international security crises.*

Hanhimäki, J. M. (2008). *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, New York, New York: Oxford University Press.

*While giving a brief overview of the history, structure, mandate, and perspective of the UN in general, this volume also includes a comprehensive section on the Security Council, as well as a separate chapter on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The book offers a succinct explanation of the Council's political and operational constraints, including the veto power principle. It further provides delegates with a general overview of the importance of the Security Council for international security from its creation until now. Due to its comprehensive contents, this book may serve delegates as a first starting point for further research on the Security Council as well as on international power relations.*

Security Council Report. (2017). *Security Council Report* [Website]. Retrieved 23 August 2017 from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/>

*On the Security Council Report website, there is a separate page for each month that describes the action plan for the Security Council meetings that will take place. The website is updated monthly to reflect the current agenda of the Security Council. Delegates will be able to review these pages throughout the year, beyond what is discussed in the guide. Delegates will also find links to UN source documents on this website, which will be helpful during their research.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2017). *What is the Security Council?* [Website]. Retrieved 23 August 2017 from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/>

*This website gives an overview of the Security Council's history, its mandate, and its basic functions and powers. It should be considered one of the most important resources and a foundation for delegates' further research, since it provides detailed information on how the Security Council works in practice. The website contains the body's provisional rules of procedure and a section on frequently asked questions. The latter is particularly useful when it comes to understanding the Council's functions and powers. Delegates will find on this website detailed information about the Council's recent sessions as well as other worth noting outputs.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7958<sup>th</sup> meeting. (2017). *Non-proliferation – Democratic People's Republic of Korea (S/RES/2356 (2017))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 16 July 2017 from: [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2356\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2356(2017))

*This resolution was in response to ballistic missile tests conducted by DPRK, prohibited by the Council in a series of earlier resolutions. While the resolution condemns the missile tests and DPRK's nuclear program "in the strongest terms" and reaffirms existing sanctions, it does not add any new measures, reflected a level of disagreement within the P5 as to the best approach to this long-standing problem. This document shows delegates the Council's current approach to addressing conflict with DPRK, as well as demonstrating how to craft resolutions despite divisions within the Council on policy.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7991<sup>st</sup> meeting. (2017). *The situation in Mali (S/RES/2364 (2017))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 16 July 2017 from: [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2364\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2364(2017))

*This resolution, adopted in June 2017, renews and expands the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Following criticism that the mandate was insufficiently robust, and that the casualty rate of the 15,000-strong mission was too high, MINUSMA is instructed to take a "more proactive and robust posture." MINUSMA's main role is to support the faltering peace agreement, the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed by the government and various armed groups in 2015. This document is a useful example of a peacekeeping mandate for delegates, as well as demonstrating appropriate language to strengthen the mandate of a mission.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7997<sup>th</sup> meeting. (2017). *Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/RES/2366 (2017))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 16 July 2017 from: [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2366\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2366(2017))

*This resolution, adopted in July 2017, welcomes the signing of the final peace deal in Colombia between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP). It welcomes the disarming of individual FARC members, and establishes a political mission in Colombia, called the Verification Mission, which will monitor and report on the implementation of the signed peace deal. Delegates will find a useful overview of the Council's current involvement with the Colombian peace process here, serving as an example of how the Council remains involved even after final peace accords are signed.*

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## I. Humanitarian Exemptions in Sanctions Regimes

### *Introduction*

Sanctions are one of the methods the Security Council uses to maintain international peace and security.<sup>84</sup> They are legal measures provided for in the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), and they can target individuals, Member States, or non-state actors that the Security Council deems as threats to the peace.<sup>85</sup> Sanctions were first introduced in 1963 against the Apartheid regime in South Africa.<sup>86</sup> Yet, it was not until the end of the Cold War that the Security Council increased its overall activity and sanctions saw a surge in their use as the primary mechanism for the Security Council to resolve conflicts in a non-violent manner.<sup>87</sup> Since the 1960s, the Security Council has created 27 sanctions regimes, 14 of which are still currently active.<sup>88</sup> There are a variety of sanctions measures the Security Council has at its disposal; the most commonly used types of sanctions measures are diplomatic sanctions, travel and commodity bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes.<sup>89</sup> None of these measures are used in isolation, but are always combined with one another within country-specific contexts.<sup>90</sup> For example, the sanctions regime against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) includes arms embargoes, travel bans, and asset freezes, whereas the sanctions regime against Iraq only consists of an arms embargo and asset freezes.<sup>91</sup> It is important to note that while the Security Council is the body that imposes sanctions through binding resolutions, Member States are required to implement these sanctions in their national legislation.<sup>92</sup>

Many sanctions imposed by the Security Council target countries and regions experiencing crises that require the assistance of humanitarian actors, due to a lack of state capacity to help the population.<sup>93</sup> This poses a challenge for the Security Council, whose actions could have negative consequences for civilians, when humanitarian actors are prevented from effectively providing aid and development assistance to people in need.<sup>94</sup> For instance, the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP) has highlighted that the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which require the thorough inspection of any goods entering the country, adds an extra logistical obstacle to WFP's supply chain, and ultimately harms food security within the DPRK.<sup>95</sup> Likewise, when individuals under sanctions require humanitarian assistance, it is crucial that the Security Council offer them the possibility to be temporarily excluded from sanctioning measures.<sup>96</sup> The Security Council first introduced humanitarian exemptions to a travel ban and commodity interdictions in 1968 within the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime.<sup>97</sup> Since then, most sanctions regimes have included some form of exemptions for humanitarian purposes.<sup>98</sup>

Overall, the recent discussion on sanctions predominantly revolves around the reform of sanctions in order to enhance their effectiveness.<sup>99</sup> This is important, as effective sanctions would also greatly increase the legitimacy of

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<sup>84</sup> UN Security Council, *What is the Security Council?*, 2017.

<sup>85</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (A/RES/64/115)*, 2009, p. 5; *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 41.

<sup>86</sup> Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, p. 3.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> UN Security Council, *Sanctions*, 2017; UN Security Council, *The situation in Mali (S/RES/2374 (2017))*, 2017.

<sup>89</sup> Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, pp. 10-13.

<sup>90</sup> Biersteker et al., *The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions: Findings from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium*, 2013, p. 7.

<sup>91</sup> UN Security Council, *Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)*, 2017; UN Security Council, *Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)*, 2017.

<sup>92</sup> Carisch & Rickard-Martin, *Global Threats and the Role of United Nations Sanctions*, 2011, pp. 15-16.

<sup>93</sup> UN Security Council, *Sanctions*, 2017; UN OCHA, *Somalia*; UN OCHA, *Democratic People's Republic of Korea*.

<sup>94</sup> King et al., *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U.N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*, 2016, pp. 3-7.

<sup>95</sup> UN WFP, *Nutrition Support for Children and Women and Strengthening Community Capacity to Reduce Disaster Risks: Standard Project Report 2016*, 2016, p. 8; UN WFP, *Democratic People's Republic of Korea Transitional Interim Country Strategic Plan (Year 2018)*, 2017, p. 2.

<sup>96</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 5; Wallenstein & Grussel, *Targeting the Right Targets? The UN Use of Individual Sanctions*, 2012, p. 212.

<sup>97</sup> UN Security Council, *Question Concerning the Situation in Southern Rhodesia (S/RES/253 (1968))*, 1968.

<sup>98</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>99</sup> Security Council Report, *August 2017 Monthly Forecast: Sanctions*, 2017.

the Security Council and the UN as a whole.<sup>100</sup> Going forward, it is therefore crucial that the Security Council considers some of the current recommendations for sanctions reform regarding humanitarian exemptions, in order to ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, and to help mitigate unintended harmful humanitarian consequences.<sup>101</sup>

### ***International and Regional Framework***

The basis for the legal framework on humanitarian exemptions in sanction regimes is laid out in the *Charter of the United Nations*, international human rights instruments, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and Security Council resolutions.<sup>102</sup> The Security Council derives its powers to establish sanctions from Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>103</sup> Chapter VII, Article 41, specifically grants the Security Council the authority to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.”<sup>104</sup> While Article 41 does not explicitly mention the term “sanctions,” the intention behind this article is to allow the Security Council to impose concrete measures against Member States and other actors in order to peacefully settle conflicts.<sup>105</sup>

While the Charter establishes the Security Council’s power to set sanctions, sanctions themselves find their constraints in international human rights instruments and IHL.<sup>106</sup> Article 25 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) (1948) maintains that every person has a right to adequate living standards, which includes access to medical care as well as security in cases of sickness and disability.<sup>107</sup> Similarly, IHL, in particular the *Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (1949), asserts that humanitarian assistance to civilians should not be restricted.<sup>108</sup> As a consequence, humanitarian exemptions are needed in order to prevent sanctions from depriving persons of their basic human rights and the right to humanitarian assistance.<sup>109</sup> The importance of humanitarian exemptions to sanctions were further recognized by the UN in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit, the *2005 World Summit Outcome*.<sup>110</sup> While covering a broad range of humanitarian issues, it also discussed the reform of the process for individual exemptions for persons and entities on a sanctions list.<sup>111</sup>

Security Council resolutions play the most central role in establishing humanitarian exemptions in sanctions regimes.<sup>112</sup> Through its resolutions, the Security Council creates sanctions regimes and sanction committees, and also establishes appropriate exemptions therein.<sup>113</sup> For example, with resolution 2374 (2017) on the “The situation in Mali,” the Security Council authorized sanctions against individuals in Mali, incorporated humanitarian exemptions in paragraphs 2 and 5, and instituted the most recent sanctions committee.<sup>114</sup> Since sanctions regimes are time-limited, they are in need of constant renewal through Security Council resolutions, if determined necessary.<sup>115</sup> Security Council resolutions also require reporting mechanisms within sanctions regimes, which can be exemplified by the annual reports of sanctions committees, such as the 2016 report of the 2140 Sanctions Committee regarding Yemen.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> UN Security Council, *General issues relating to sanctions: Enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions* (S/PV.8018), 2017, p. 16.

<sup>101</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 5.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*; Segall, *Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints*, 1999; *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.

<sup>103</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VII.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, Art. 41.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*; Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, pp. 2-3.

<sup>106</sup> Segall, *Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints*, 1999.

<sup>107</sup> UN General Assembly, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (A/RES/217 A (III))*, 1948.

<sup>108</sup> *Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (2nd part)*, 1949, Art. 23.

<sup>109</sup> Segall, *Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints*, 1999.

<sup>110</sup> UN General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1)*, 2005, pp. 25-26.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>112</sup> Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, p. 6.

<sup>113</sup> UN Security Council, *The situation in Mali (S/RES/2374 (2017))*, 2017.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> UN Security Council, *The situation in Somalia (S/RES/2317 (2016))*, 2016.

<sup>116</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) (S/2016/1122)*, 2016.



## *Role of the International System*

Aside from the Security Council, the work within the international system regarding sanctions is led by a variety of actors.<sup>117</sup> For each sanctions regime, Article 29 of the Charter enables the Security Council to create subsidiary organs to help administer the sanctions regime.<sup>118</sup> These subsidiary organs are called sanctions committees, and they are usually named after the resolution that established the particular committee.<sup>119</sup> Corresponding to the 14 active sanctions regimes, the Security Council currently maintains 14 different sanctions committees.<sup>120</sup> The actual implementation of sanctions and their measures ultimately falls upon Member States, but the committees are the sole entities responsible for monitoring this implementation and managing exemptions.<sup>121</sup> Additionally, sanctions committees are usually supported by monitoring groups or panels of experts who assist the committees in their monitoring and reporting processes.<sup>122</sup> Within the mandate provided by the Security Council, sanctions committees adopt their own rules and guidelines for administering sanctions regimes.<sup>123</sup> Sanctions committees also regularly present annual reports on their activities, including their decisions on exemption requests, to the Security Council.<sup>124</sup> In order to ensure that humanitarian exemptions to sanctions are implemented correctly, the work of sanctions committees is crucial.<sup>125</sup> For example, the 2127 Sanctions Committee, responsible for the sanctions on the Central African Republic, authorized three exemption requests to the asset freeze applied in the country in 2016.<sup>126</sup>

Throughout the past 25 years, Member States and the Security Council itself have attempted to review and reform sanction processes.<sup>127</sup> In the 1990s, sanctions shifted from indiscriminate comprehensive sanctions towards individual states, to an increasingly targeted approach, in which sanctions focused predominantly on political leadership, rather than on the general population.<sup>128</sup> This transformation process took place primarily because comprehensive sanctions were more likely to have unintended negative consequences for civilians and humanitarian action than targeted ones.<sup>129</sup> All of the 14 active sanctions regimes are to some degree targeted in their approach.<sup>130</sup> Between 1998 and 2003, three initiatives set out to reform and develop the targeted approach of Security Council sanctions regimes: the Interlaken Process, the Bonn-Berlin Process, and the Stockholm Process.<sup>131</sup> The main discussion points of the Interlaken Process were targeted financial sanctions and how to counteract the adverse effects they can have on humanitarian actors.<sup>132</sup> One suggestion of the Interlaken Process was to create model clauses for humanitarian exemptions to financial sanctions, which were intended for the Security Council to draw upon when drafting its resolutions.<sup>133</sup> The Bonn-Berlin Process focused on arms embargoes, travel bans, and aircraft-related sanctions.<sup>134</sup> Within this context, the 2001 report of the Bonn-Berlin Process also recommended model clauses for humanitarian exemptions to these types of sanctions.<sup>135</sup> Lastly, the Stockholm Process

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<sup>117</sup> Carisch & Rickard-Martin, *Global Threats and the Role of United Nations Sanctions*, 2011, pp. 4-6.

<sup>118</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 29; Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, pp. 6-7.

<sup>119</sup> Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, p. 7.

<sup>120</sup> UN Security Council, *Sanctions*.

<sup>121</sup> Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, p. 13.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>123</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, pp. 135-137.

<sup>124</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (S/2016/1094)*, 2016, pp. 4-5; UN Security Council, *Report of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea (S/2016/1121)*, 2016, p. 4.

<sup>125</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, pp. 135-137.

<sup>126</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic (S/2016/1080)*, 2016, p. 4.

<sup>127</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, p. 30.

<sup>128</sup> Security Council Report, *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*, 2013, p. 3.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*; Biersteker et al., *The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions: Findings from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium*, 2013, p. 9.

<sup>130</sup> Biersteker et al., *The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions: Findings from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium*, 2013, p. 9.

<sup>131</sup> Bessler et al., *Sanctions Assessment Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of Sanctions*, 2004, p. 8.

<sup>132</sup> Biersteker et al., *Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation*, 2001.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72-75.

<sup>134</sup> Brzoska, *Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the 'Bonn-Berlin Process'*, 2001.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31-38.

concentrated its efforts on the implementation of targeted sanctions.<sup>136</sup> Some of the recommendations that emerged from this process call for a strengthened role of sanctions committees in administering sanctions regimes, and for clearer definitions of humanitarian exemptions to sanctions within Security Council resolutions.<sup>137</sup> The findings of the Stockholm Process were eventually presented to the Security Council in February 2003.<sup>138</sup> While no decisive action was taken in the aftermath of the reform processes, they did provide an impulse for reform in the procedure for exemptions.<sup>139</sup>

Parallel to the three reform processes led by Member States, the Security Council started its own review process of sanctions in 1999, leading to the creation of the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions in 2000.<sup>140</sup> Their tasks included reviewing the working methods of sanctions committees, examining the unintended impacts of sanctions, and improving humanitarian exemptions.<sup>141</sup> In its final report, the working group recommended that the Security Council use standardized language for humanitarian exemptions in all of its sanctions regimes.<sup>142</sup> However, the only substantive outcome of the report was the creation of the Focal Point for Delisting as per Security Council resolution 1730 (2006) on “General issues relating to sanctions.”<sup>143</sup> The Focal Point is part of the UN Secretariat and responsible for removing designated individuals from sanctions lists.<sup>144</sup> As a central point of contact for individuals seeking to be delisted, the Focal Point’s goal was to simplify the process for delisting designated individuals.<sup>145</sup> Prior to the Focal Point, designated individuals had to initiate the delisting process through their respective Member State who then contacted the respective sanctions committee.<sup>146</sup> Still, the decision-making power on delisting remains with the sanctions committees.<sup>147</sup> Following its final report, the mandate of the informal working group ended in 2006.<sup>148</sup>

More recently, the High-Level Review of Sanctions was initiated in 2014 by several Member States and intended to change the current sanctioning process.<sup>149</sup> The goal was to survey the current state of Security Council sanctions and provide recommendations in order to make them more effective.<sup>150</sup> The High-Level Review is structured into working groups, out of which Working Group 3 issued a report in 2015 on “UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges,” which made several suggestions for the reform of humanitarian exemptions.<sup>151</sup> It recommended that the Security Council review all humanitarian exemptions currently in place and allow the Focal Point for Delisting to receive exemption requests directly.<sup>152</sup> Also, the group proposed that the Security Council establish standing humanitarian exemptions for all sanctions regimes where this was applicable, and highlighted the need to make information regarding the processes for exemptions easily accessible to those who are eligible.<sup>153</sup> In June 2017, an assessment report of the High-Level Review presented the Security Council with templates for exemption requests to asset freezes and travel bans within the 1267 Sanctions Regime against Al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the 1988 regime against Afghanistan.<sup>154</sup> While the High-Level

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<sup>136</sup> Wallensteen, *Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options*, 2003.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

<sup>138</sup> UN DPI, ‘*Stockholm Process*’ Findings – Year-long Study on Targeted Sanctions – Presented to Security Council (S/7672), 2003.

<sup>139</sup> Watson Institute for International Studies, *Background Paper on Targeted Sanctions*, 2014, pp. 8-10.

<sup>140</sup> UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council: The Work of the Sanctions Committees (S/1999/92)*, 1999; UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2000/319)*, 2000.

<sup>141</sup> UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2000/319)*, 2000.

<sup>142</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997)*, 2006, p. 4.

<sup>143</sup> UN Security Council, *General issues relating to sanctions (S/RES/1730 (2006))*, 2006.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, pp. 149-151.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> UN Security Council, *General issues relating to sanctions (S/RES/1732 (2006))*, 2006.

<sup>149</sup> UNIWAG, *High Level Review of UN Sanctions (2014)*, 2014.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>151</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> UN Security Council, *Assessment Report: Achievements, challenges and opportunities resulting from the recommendations of the Compendium of the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions (S/2017/534)*, 2017, pp. 17-22.

Review was lauded for its recommendations at the Security Council meeting on “General issues relating to sanctions” in August 2017 and the Egypt-led Arria-formula meeting of July 2017, the implementation of said recommendations is still pending due to a lack of political commitment.<sup>155</sup>

### *Humanitarian Exemptions: A Current Overview*

Two types of humanitarian exemptions exist: individual and sectoral exemptions.<sup>156</sup> There are some issues with both types of exemptions, such as unifying the processes for individual exemptions across all sanctions regimes, or communicating the exemptions and their procedures to humanitarian organizations, Member States, and listed individuals more clearly.<sup>157</sup> The most recent efforts to reform sanctions regimes focus on these specific issues.<sup>158</sup>

#### *Individual Humanitarian Exemptions*

Individual humanitarian exemptions are “designed to allow listed individuals (individuals listed on a designation list of a specific sanctions regime) to receive assistance in response to specific humanitarian needs.”<sup>159</sup> This means that individuals who, for instance, would not be allowed to travel or access their bank accounts under a sanctions regime, could be temporarily excluded from these measures in order to receive humanitarian or medical assistance.<sup>160</sup>

Individual humanitarian exemptions are granted on a case-by-case basis after requests for exemption have been sent to be approved by the respective sanctions committee.<sup>161</sup> Depending on the guidelines of the sanctions committee, individual exemption requests, such as the lifting of travel bans, can only be transmitted by Member States, whereas exemptions to asset freezes can be requested by either a Member State or the designated individual.<sup>162</sup> In order to attempt to communicate the process of requesting exemptions more clearly, sanctions committees have provided guidelines on what information and details formal exemption requests need to contain.<sup>163</sup> In the past few years, the procedure for individual humanitarian exemptions has become increasingly standardized across most sanctions committees, based on the exemption request form provided by the 1267 Sanctions Committee relating to Al-Qaida and ISIL.<sup>164</sup> Nonetheless, the templates, such as the ones presented in the annex of the assessment report of the High-Level Review of UN Sanctions from June 2017, are not yet formally incorporated into the guidelines of other committees, which presents an opportunity for further standardization.<sup>165</sup>

In order to ensure fair procedures for individual exemptions, the Working Group 3 of the High-Level Review also recommended that requests for individual exemptions be received through the Focal Point for Delisting for most sanctions committees.<sup>166</sup> Initially, the Focal Point was only mandated to support sanctions committees in processing delisting requests from designated individuals.<sup>167</sup> As per resolutions 2083 (2012) and 2255 (2015) on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” however, the Focal Point’s mandate now includes receiving individual exemption requests for the 1267 and 1988 Sanctions Regimes.<sup>168</sup> Yet, the remaining regimes still receive exemption requests through their sanctions committee.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> UN Security Council, *General issues relating to sanctions: Enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions (S/PV.8018)*, 2017; Security Council Report, *August 2017 Monthly Forecast: Sanctions*, 2017.

<sup>156</sup> King et al., *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U.N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*, 2016, pp. 7-8.

<sup>157</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>160</sup> King et al., *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U.N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*, 2016, p. 8.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> UN Security Council, 1267 Sanctions Committee, *Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work*, 2016, pp. 15-18.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>164</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 5.

<sup>165</sup> UN Security Council, *Assessment Report: Achievements, challenges and opportunities resulting from the recommendations of the Compendium of the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions (S/2017/534)*, 2017, p. 7.

<sup>166</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>167</sup> UN Security Council, *General issues relating to sanctions (S/RES/1730(2006))*, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>168</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2083 (2012))*, 2012, pp. 8-9.; UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2255 (2015))*, 2015, pp. 6-7.

<sup>169</sup> UN Security Council, *Libya Sanctions Committee: Travel Ban*, 2017.

The only exception for the expansion of the Focal Point's mandate would be the 1267 Committee, for which the Office of the Ombudsperson would become responsible for receiving exemption requests.<sup>170</sup> The Office of the Ombudsperson was established specifically for the 1267 Sanctions Regime regarding ISIL and Al-Qaida in Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts," in order to have an independent actor within the committee responsible for the delisting process.<sup>171</sup> Its mandate entails outsourcing the delisting process to an impartial person outside of the UN Secretariat.<sup>172</sup> By allowing the Ombudsperson to receive exemption requests, the Focal Point would be completely replaced by the Ombudsperson in the case of the 1267 Sanctions Regime.<sup>173</sup> For now, however, the mandates of the Focal Point and the Ombudsperson are intertwined for the 1267 Sanctions Regime, as the Focal Point continues to receive exemption requests from designated individuals, while the Ombudsperson reviews their delisting requests.<sup>174</sup>

### *Sectoral Humanitarian Exemptions*

Sectoral humanitarian exemptions refer to exemptions for "humanitarian organizations and their actors [...] who constitute the sector of principled humanitarian" action.<sup>175</sup> They therefore allow humanitarian actors to be excluded from any sanctions measures in order for them to effectively deliver aid.<sup>176</sup> Sectoral exemptions are implemented through standing exemptions to sanctions regimes, i.e. exemptions that are incorporated directly into the resolution of a sanctions regime and thus do not require approval from a sanctions committee.<sup>177</sup> This can best be exemplified by the standing exemption within the sanctions regime for Somalia.<sup>178</sup> Therein, only UN humanitarian actors and humanitarian organizations that have observer status at the UN General Assembly are currently exempted from the asset freezes, as established in paragraph three of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) on "The situation in Somalia."<sup>179</sup> However, other humanitarian organizations are not exempted.<sup>180</sup> Nonetheless, this allows some humanitarian actors in Somalia to deliver aid without any obstructions or delays resulting from sanctions.<sup>181</sup> In the 2016 report of the Monitoring Group of the Somalia sanctions regime, this standing exemption was deemed effective in enabling efficient humanitarian action in areas where civilians would not otherwise receive enough humanitarian assistance due to legal constraints stemming from sanctions.<sup>182</sup> At the High-Level Review of UN Sanctions, humanitarian actors recommended that the standing exemption be implemented in all other relevant sanctions regimes against countries in which fast and efficient humanitarian assistance is needed.<sup>183</sup>

However, regarding the standing exemptions for humanitarian actors, one major concern is the diversion of aid.<sup>184</sup> This issue concerns the possibility that exemptions could be abused under the guise of humanitarian assistance in order to support terrorists and other actors that pose a threat to international peace.<sup>185</sup> This was at the center of a controversy between UN humanitarian actors and the Monitoring Group of the Somalia Sanctions Regime in March

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<sup>170</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>171</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1904 (2009))*, 2009, pp. 5-6.

<sup>172</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, p. 152.

<sup>173</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2255 (2015))*, 2015, pp. 6-7; High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>174</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2368 (2017))*, 2017.

<sup>175</sup> King et al., *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U.N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*, 2016, p. 8.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>178</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9; UN Security Council, *The situation in Somalia (S/RES/2317 (2016))*, 2016.

<sup>179</sup> UN Security Council, *The situation in Somalia (S/RES/2317 (2016))*, 2016, p. 6; UN Security Council, *The situation in Somalia (S/RES/1844 (2008))*, 2008, p. 2.

<sup>180</sup> Pantuliano, *Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action: Tension, impact and ways forward*, 2011, p. 9.

<sup>181</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (S/2016/827)*, 2016, p. 11.

<sup>182</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia (S/2016/919)*, 2016, pp. 132-133.

<sup>183</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 7.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*

2010.<sup>186</sup> The 2010 report of the Monitoring Group highlighted several instances of diversion of aid to Al-Shabaab-related militia and businessmen.<sup>187</sup> However, according to then-UN Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator for Somalia, Mark Bowden, these instances were merely allegations without any evidence.<sup>188</sup> When incorporating standing exemptions for humanitarian actors into other sanctions regimes, the Security Council has to consider the problem of diversion and allow for structures that prevent it from happening.<sup>189</sup>

### ***Challenges to Requesting and Following Exemptions***

In general, there are two challenges regarding requesting and following exemptions.<sup>190</sup> First, there is a lack of understanding of what type of actions are allowed within the constraints of humanitarian exemptions.<sup>191</sup> Second, information on the procedure for requesting exemptions is a challenge concerning both types of humanitarian exemptions, as it is often not easily accessible.<sup>192</sup> For instance, misunderstanding the extent of humanitarian exemptions can lead to either unintentional violations of sanctions by humanitarian actors or over-compliance, that is, adhering to an overly strict interpretation of exemptions in fear of violating sanctions.<sup>193</sup> Thus, humanitarian actors run the risk of either being punished for violating sanctions or not being able to be as efficient as they could in delivering aid.<sup>194</sup> For example, in 2016, financial institutions, out of fear of violating sanctions, withheld funds for humanitarian organizations working in the DPRK.<sup>195</sup> Similarly, if information on the procedure and criteria for granting humanitarian exemptions was clearly transparent to sanctioned individuals, the decision-making process could be optimized, since the amount of unjustified exemption requests (requests that would evidently be rejected by sanctions committees) could be reduced.<sup>196</sup>

Therefore, a possibility to prevent these problems would be a consideration by the Security Council and its sanctions committees to make information regarding exemptions widely and easily accessible to all relevant actors.<sup>197</sup> Most sanction committees are already required by their corresponding Security Council resolutions to provide access to information on exemptions and their processes.<sup>198</sup> The 1267 Sanctions Committee against ISIL and Al-Qaida can function as a role model, as it meticulously codified its committee guidelines, has provided sample forms for exemptions to asset freezes on its website, and is generally proactive in its communication with external actors, such as designated individuals or humanitarian organizations.<sup>199</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

Humanitarian exemptions to sanctions are crucial in order to ensure that the work of humanitarian actors is not negatively affected by sanctions, and that individuals that have been placed on sanctions lists still have access to humanitarian assistance.<sup>200</sup> While there have been many reform and review processes for sanctions that also touched upon humanitarian exemptions, the standardization of individual exemptions in sanctions regimes has not reached its

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<sup>186</sup> Nebehay, Exclusive: Somalia funds dry up after aid diversion report: U.N., *Reuters*, 2010.

<sup>187</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008) (S/2010/91)*, 2010, pp. 60-64.

<sup>188</sup> Nebehay, Exclusive: Somalia funds dry up after aid diversion report: U.N., *Reuters*, 2010.

<sup>189</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 7.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.* p. 6.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> Murphy, U.N. sanctions on North Korea hurts aid efforts, *Humanosphere*, 2016.

<sup>196</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, p. 399.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.

<sup>198</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>199</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, pp. 399-400; UN Security Council, 1267 Sanctions Committee, *Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work*, 2016; UN Security Council, *Assessment Report: Achievements, challenges and opportunities resulting from the recommendations of the Compendium of the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions (S/2017/534)*, 2017, p. 19.

<sup>200</sup> King et al., *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U.N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*, 2016, pp. 7-8.

full potential in ensuring fair and transparent procedures for listed individuals.<sup>201</sup> Similarly, incorporating standing exemptions for principled humanitarian actors across all relevant sanctions regimes could guarantee that humanitarian action is not impeded by sanctions.<sup>202</sup> Finally, a lack of adequate access to information on the availability and extent of exemptions to both listed individuals and humanitarian actors can be detrimental to the effectiveness of humanitarian exemptions.<sup>203</sup> Thus, Security Council action to resolve these issues is necessary.

### **Further Research**

When researching this topic, delegates should consider the following questions: Why have not all recommendations on reforming the process for sanctions been implemented by the Security Council and into relevant sanctions regimes? To what extent have the governments of Member States implemented humanitarian exemptions to sanctions into national legislation? What are best practices of national implementation of sanctions and humanitarian exemptions? What are the lessons learned from the Sanctions Regimes against Somalia, ISIL and Al-Qaida, and the DPRK? How can the processes of receiving exemption requests be streamlined? Which sanctions regimes could benefit from standing exemptions for humanitarian actors? Lastly, delegates should consider how they want to approach this complex topic: Should particular sanctions be revised or should mechanisms be implemented in general resolutions, similar to how the Ombudsperson and the Focal Point reformed the UN sanctions system?

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*This handbook for UN humanitarian actors provides interesting and foundational insights into the challenges humanitarian actors face in light of Security Council sanctions. It presents assessment models, based on comprehensive analyses of humanitarian indicators, such as health, food, and water, for identifying humanitarian risks resulting from the implementation of sanctions measures. Delegates should reference this handbook when reviewing the design and construction of sanctions regimes in order to safeguard humanitarian action, while at the same time maintaining peace and security.*

High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions. (2015). *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*. Retrieved 18 July 2017 from: [http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR\\_WG3\\_report\\_final.19.1.15.pdf](http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_report_final.19.1.15.pdf)

*This report of Working Group 3 at the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions addresses sanctions from a humanitarian standpoint. It is divided into four topics, which cover the challenges humanitarian actors face due to sanctions, and the need to enhance communication and information-sharing between all relevant sanctions stakeholders. This report provides concrete recommendations regarding humanitarian exemptions, such as a thorough review of all sanctions regimes concerning humanitarian exemptions, the implementation of standing exemptions for humanitarian actors, and the extension of the mandate of the Focal Point for Delisting. When developing solutions for the issue of humanitarian exemptions in sanctions regimes, delegates can draw upon these recommendations for guidance.*

King, K., et al. (2016). *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U.N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflicts. Retrieved 18 July 2017 from: [http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding\\_Humanitarian\\_Exemptions\\_April\\_2016.pdf](http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding_Humanitarian_Exemptions_April_2016.pdf)

*This briefing memorandum was part of a November 2015 workshop on humanitarian exemptions, and was designed specifically for UN agencies and NGOs as a guideline for acting within the exemptions of a Security Council sanctions regime. Its question-and-answer format covers the most important information about the inclusion of humanitarian exemptions in sanctions regimes. Some of the topics covered in this memorandum include the differentiation between individual and sectoral exemptions, and how to counteract the abuse of such exemptions. For delegates, this*

<sup>201</sup> High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015, p. 9.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Dörfler, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: From power-based to rule-based decision-making?*, 2016, pp. 399-400.



*memorandum serves as a clear and concise introduction to some of the most important concepts of humanitarian action in the face of Security Council sanctions.*

Segall, A. (1999). Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 836. Retrieved 24 September 2017 from: <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jq73.htm>

*This journal article was written by a former member of the International Committee of the Red Cross Legal Division and published in 1999 in the International Review of the Red Cross. It provides an overview of the limitations of sanctions, particularly from a legal and policy-related perspective, which serve as the basis for humanitarian exemptions. In this regard, the article provides crucial insights into the framework of IHL and human rights. Delegates should read this article in order to understand how sanctions function within the framework of IHL and human rights and, by extension, also understand why humanitarian exemptions are necessary.*

Security Council Report. (2013). *Special Research Report: UN Sanctions*. Retrieved 17 July 2017 from: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special\\_research\\_report\\_sanctions\\_2013.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf)

*This report by Security Council Report provides a comprehensive overview of Security Council sanctions regimes. While the issue of the adverse effects of sanctions on humanitarian action is only marginally discussed in the document, it nonetheless provides delegates with a thorough introduction to the topic of sanctions. Thus, with this report, delegates will be able better grasp the background of sanctions, their purpose and functions, and the different types of sanctioning measures. In this regard, the sections on the background, objectives, and framework are particularly helpful.*

Security Council Report. (2017). *August 2017 Monthly Forecast: Sanctions* [Website]. Retrieved 24 October 2017 from: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-08/sanctions\\_1.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-08/sanctions_1.php)

*The Security Council Report initiative provides monthly forecasts on Security Council meetings and resolutions on a broad variety of topics. The forecast from August 2017 focuses solely on the topic of sanctions. It lists not only recent developments on that topic and actions that the Security Council could undertake, but also outlines a short history of sanctions and its various reform processes. For delegates wishing to have a short and very recent overview on sanctions in general, this forecast functions as an ideal starting point.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2016). *Report of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea (S/2016/1121)*. Retrieved 26 August 2017 from: <http://undocs.org/S/2016/1121>

*This is the latest report of the Somalia Sanctions Committee to the Security Council. Aside from presenting a summary of the activities of the committee in 2016, it also dedicates a short section to exemptions and exemption requests. In order to be able to assess reform possibilities to sanctions regimes with respect to humanitarian exemptions, it is crucial that delegates understand how sanctions committees operate internally. Thus, this report can be used as a basis to understand the background and inner workings of a sanctions committee, especially since the Somalia sanctions regime is viewed as a best-case example for standing humanitarian exemptions.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2017). *Assessment Report: Achievements, challenges and opportunities resulting from the recommendations of the Compendium of the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions (S/2017/534)*. Retrieved 22 August 2017 from: <http://undocs.org/S/2017/534>

*In June 2017, the Security Council presented its assessment report of the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions process. The report assesses progress made since the launch of the High-Level Review, and highlights areas where further action is needed. Thus, this report provides delegates with the latest insights into the current state of sanctions regime reform. Additionally, this document also suggests further improvements to exemption processes, such as sample forms for exemption requests or standardized exemption language.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2017). *Sanctions* [Website]. Retrieved 15 August 2017 from: <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information>

*This page on the Security Council's website presents a short and concise overview of sanctions. It lists all currently active sanctions regimes and highlights the institutions of the Focal Point for Delisting and the Ombudsperson. In preparation for the conference, it will be crucial for delegates to have gained an understanding of all current sanctions regimes. The website functions as an excellent starting point for delegates to research each sanctions regime and their respective committees, as the links to the websites of each Sanctions Committee can be found on this website.*

United Nations, Security Council, 8007<sup>th</sup> meeting. (2017). *Threats to international peace and security caused by Terrorist Acts (S/RES/2368(2017))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 25 August 2017 from: [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2368\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2368(2017))

*Resolution 2368 (2017) was unanimously adopted on 20 July 2017 by all Member States of the Security Council. It provides the most recent update to the Al-Qaida/ Da'esh sanctions regime. For delegates looking at a reform of the mandate of the Focal Point for Delisting and the Ombudsperson, this resolution provides important insights in paragraphs 60 to 84 into how these roles are designed and crafted in a resolution. Within the 1267 Sanctions Regime, this resolution enables delegates to contrast the Focal Point and the Ombudsperson with one another and consider any further changes to their mandates, especially across other relevant regimes.*

United Nations, Security Council, Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2353 (2015) Concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups Undertakings and Entities. (2016). *Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work* [Report]. Retrieved 24 August 2017 from: [https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/guidelines\\_of\\_the\\_committee\\_for\\_the\\_conduct\\_of\\_its\\_work.pdf](https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/guidelines_of_the_committee_for_the_conduct_of_its_work.pdf)

*These committee guidelines represent the most recent update to the rules of procedure for the 1267 Sanctions Committee. They cover all aspects that are relevant for administering the Al-Qaida/ Da'esh sanctions, ranging from the mandate of the committee to the procedure for exemption requests. Since the 1267 Sanctions Committee is regarded as a best-case example for codifying criteria for exemption requests, delegates can refer to these guidelines to understand how exemption processes can be streamlined further across all sanctions regimes.*

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## II. Preventing Terrorism and Extremism in the Horn of Africa

*“The greatest shortcoming of the international community today is its failure to prevent conflict and maintain global security.”*<sup>204</sup>

### **Introduction**

The Horn of Africa is a diverse region with a growing trend of terrorist and violent extremist activity.<sup>205</sup> The term “Horn of Africa” refers to Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, along with the accompanying coastline.<sup>206</sup> While the United Nations (UN) has not endorsed a definitive definition of terrorism, a widely accepted meaning of the word is the use and/or threat of use of violence against civilians for the purposes of achieving political, ideological, economic, and/or social goals.<sup>207</sup> The League of Nations *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism* in 1937 stated that, “acts of terrorism means criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.”<sup>208</sup> The Security Council has categorized terrorism as one of the most significant threats to international peace and security.<sup>209</sup> Another threat that has been recognized by the Security Council as a factor leading to terrorism, is violent extremism.<sup>210</sup> Extremism is the belief in extreme ideologies, advocating for violence and lack of tolerance, and can translate to terrorism if an individual acts on those beliefs.<sup>211</sup>

A continuing case of rising terrorist and violent extremist activity in the region is in Somalia.<sup>212</sup> Al-Shabaab, a radical Islamic terrorist group active since 2006, is the largest and most lethal terrorist organization in the region.<sup>213</sup> With areas of operation in Somalia and northern Kenya, Al-Shabaab engages in open attacks against civilians, youth radicalization, and encouragement of extremist ideology.<sup>214</sup> Al-Shabaab controls large swathes of Somalia, enabling it to launch attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia, resulting in the spread of terrorism and regional insecurity.<sup>215</sup> Piracy, economic stagnation, and vast human rights violations have led to Somalia being labeled as a failed state.<sup>216</sup> The Security Council has taken a strong stand against terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa through, among other areas of work, dispatching the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to assist the African Union (AU) in security, peacebuilding, and humanitarian issues.<sup>217</sup> Through its work with the Somali government and civil society organizations (CSOs), like the Centre for Peace Initiative and Development, and the Coalition for Grass Roots and Women Organization, UNSOM forces are helping gain the trust of the local population.<sup>218</sup> Working together with the Somali government to ensure the security apparatus of the country, provide humanitarian aid, and help to build infrastructure, is paramount to preventing terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa.<sup>219</sup> UNSOM, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), along with military campaigns by the United States, Ethiopia, and most recently Kenya, have led to Al-Shabaab retreating and subsequently launching guerilla warfare tactics.<sup>220</sup> A provisional government in Somalia was established with the aim of strengthening stability and addressing regional terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>221</sup> The lack of effective regional collaboration to combat terrorism and its root causes has resulted in deterioration of security, the rise of terrorist and extremist groups, and the increased

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<sup>204</sup> UN DPI, *In opinion piece, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres shares new vision for UN*, 2017.

<sup>205</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>206</sup> Korybko, *Hybrid Wars in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia-Eritrea, “Greater Somalia”*, 2016.

<sup>207</sup> UN DPI, *Terrorism*, 2017.

<sup>208</sup> League of Nations, *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism*, 1937, p. 6, article 1.2.

<sup>209</sup> UN DPI, *UN Chief, Security Council strongly condemn terrorist attack on Manchester concert*, 2017.

<sup>210</sup> UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*, 2015, pp. 1-4.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>213</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Somalia: Events of 2015*, 2015.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>216</sup> *Somalia - Most-failed state: Twenty-five years of chaos in the Horn of Africa*, *The Economist*, 2016.

<sup>217</sup> UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.

<sup>218</sup> UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>220</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>221</sup> AMISOM, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2017.

radicalization of young people.<sup>222</sup> Border safety continues to deteriorate in the region, leading to greater militarization of Member States in the Horn of Africa.<sup>223</sup> This increase in military presence has created a security dilemma in a region where terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a threat.<sup>224</sup> Focusing on the causes of instability, like youth radicalization, underdevelopment, and the financing of terrorist groups, will enable the international community to successfully prevent further developments in terrorist activities and extremism in the Horn of Africa.<sup>225</sup> The overall stability of the region remains a concern for the international community and will require further steps to be taken to mitigate impending risks.<sup>226</sup>

### ***International and Regional Framework***

As a response to the rise in terrorist activity around the world, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (GCTS) was adopted by consensus in the UN General Assembly in 2006 and is subject to review every two years.<sup>227</sup> The GCTS calls for the strengthening of Member States' national capacities to successfully combat terrorist groups.<sup>228</sup> Enhancing Member States' capabilities to monitor, track, apprehend, and prosecute individuals and financiers of terrorist groups results in greater internal and, in turn, regional and global security.<sup>229</sup> The GCTS also created a global database to track terrorism around the world, compiling information from national police agencies on known terrorist groups, individuals, and activities.<sup>230</sup> The database allows Member States to conduct criminal investigations and police work more efficiently, while disrupting terrorist activities within their territory.<sup>231</sup> Lastly, the GCTS places the respect for human rights and the rule of law at the crux for the fight against terrorism.<sup>232</sup> The fifth review of the GCTS in 2016 resulted in General Assembly resolution 70/291, which stressed the need for the UN and government agencies to adapt to new developments and threats of international terrorism, such as the widespread use of social media as a propaganda disseminator and homegrown/lone-wolf acts of terror.<sup>233</sup>

The international community has also taken a number of steps to address the financial structures that allow for enduring terrorist activity.<sup>234</sup> The *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* (1999) set forth a framework for combatting the financing of terrorism through Member States collaboration, and by tracking suspicious financial transactions.<sup>235</sup> Likewise, UN Security Council resolutions 1456 (2003) and 2178 (2014) on suppressing terrorism outlined the need to combat financial contributions through targeted sanctions, the freezing of accounts, and the active interception of movement between borders.<sup>236</sup> In 2014, the Security Council adopted resolution 2178 on "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE).<sup>237</sup> This resolution called for Member States to prevent the movement of terrorists, to prosecute cases dealing with forgeries of travel documents, and to establish greater international cooperation between national security agencies focusing on transnational terrorism.<sup>238</sup> It draws special attention to the financing of international terrorism and calls for the strengthening criminal offense laws.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, pp. 1-5.

<sup>223</sup> *Ethiopia and Eritrea blame each other for border clash*, BBC, 2016.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, pp. 1-5.

<sup>226</sup> UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>227</sup> UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>229</sup> UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.

<sup>233</sup> UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review (A/RES/70/291)*, 2016.

<sup>234</sup> UN General Assembly, *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109)*, 1999; UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178)*, 2014.

<sup>235</sup> UN General Assembly, *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109)*, 1999.

<sup>236</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178)*, 2014; UN Security Council, *High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism (S/RES/1456 (2003))*, 2003.

<sup>237</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178 (2014))*, 2014, pp. 4-8.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*

During the Geneva Conference in 2015, Member States adopted the *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*.<sup>240</sup> The Plan of Action stated that violent extremism is conducive to terrorist activity, and noted conditions that can lead to radicalization, such as economic marginalization, lack of opportunities and resources for economic development, and political repression.<sup>241</sup> The Plan of Action also recognized the role of poor governance in fostering conditions conducive to terrorism; through repressive policies and practices, the exclusion of specific groups from governance, and direct state action against certain communities.<sup>242</sup> It stressed the need for a more comprehensive security-based approach, involving the military and intelligence apparatuses of Member States, to address violent extremism and combat terrorism.<sup>243</sup> The Plan of Action advocates for a global framework for preventing violent extremism, encouraging Member States to adopt national plans of action to implement anti-violent extremism policies at the local level, involving government actors, law enforcement, and civil society.<sup>244</sup> The national plans of action are highly encouraged to include provisions for regional security cooperation in order to track individuals suspected of terrorist activity.<sup>245</sup> The Plan of Action also includes provisions that call for direct action of the international community.<sup>246</sup> It further calls for the engagement of religious leaders and funding for programs that are aimed at de-radicalization of individuals that were engaged in terrorist and/or violent extremist activities.<sup>247</sup> Lastly, the Plan of Action lists the strengthening of communications, greater monitoring of social media activities, respect for the rule of law, gender equality, and the development of economic opportunity as prime concerns in order to combat of international terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>248</sup>

### ***Role of the International System***

The international community has taken multiple steps to prevent terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa.<sup>249</sup> General Assembly resolution 51/210 on “Measures to Eliminate Internal Terrorism” (1997) created the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, a body of 35 Member States focused on the implementation of the GCTS.<sup>250</sup> The Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism serves to complement the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), created in Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).<sup>251</sup> The CTC is a subsidiary body of the Security Council, and is tasked with identifying major developments in international terrorism and recommending steps to combat it.<sup>252</sup> The UN CVE strategy calls for the Counter-Terrorism Committee to identify any gaps in CVE efforts and report regularly on them to the Security Council.<sup>253</sup> Finally, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) takes a multi-faceted approach to fighting terrorism, by coordinating the efforts of 37 agencies within the UN system and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).<sup>254</sup>

### ***African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)***

Noting the proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, the African Union established AMISOM in February of 2007.<sup>255</sup> AMISOM is a peacekeeping mission composed of military, police, and civilian components.<sup>256</sup> The main objective of AMISOM is the reduction of the threat of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, assisting Somali Security Forces, and ensuring that the government of Somalia and UN personnel can continue their vital functions through the creation of a secure context.<sup>257</sup> The AMISOM force is composed of 22,126 uniformed

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<sup>240</sup> UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*, 2015, p. 1.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-4.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-10.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-22.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>249</sup> UN Security Council, *Counter-Terrorism Committee: Mandate*, 2017.

<sup>250</sup> UN General Assembly, *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/51/210)*, 1997.

<sup>251</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373(2001))*, 2001.

<sup>252</sup> UN Security Council, *Counter-Terrorism Committee: Mandate*, 2017.

<sup>253</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178(2014))*, 2014, pp. 4-8.

<sup>254</sup> UN CTITF, *About the Task Force*; UN CTITF, *Entities*.

<sup>255</sup> AMISOM, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2017.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

personnel, split into military and police units.<sup>258</sup> The military component's goal is to stabilize Somalia in order to allow the access of humanitarian assistance into the country.<sup>259</sup> While the AMISOM forces are credited with destabilizing Al-Shabaab in their strongholds, a recent report by Human Rights Watch detailed wide sexual exploitation and abuse by AU forces in Somalia.<sup>260</sup> Incoming AMISOM units are now required to undergo Sexual and Gender-Based Violence training and greater attention has been reserved in dispatching Gender Units composed of female soldiers, as a necessary way to instill trust within communities and collaborate on peacebuilding.<sup>261</sup>

#### *United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)*

In support of AMISOM, in 2013 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2102, formally establishing UNSOM.<sup>262</sup> UNSOM is mandated to assist the Somali government with policy development, peacebuilding, and effective governance.<sup>263</sup> The core functions of UNSOM include: assistance in governance, security sector reform, and application of the rule of law.<sup>264</sup> UNSOM police units work together with Somali police to reclaim and stabilize neighborhoods that were formerly controlled by extremist groups.<sup>265</sup> A notable achievement of UNSOM is working with the Somali government to create the National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia, a joint effort to help former Al-Shabaab members reintegrate into society, while working to understand the factors and circumstances that continue to lead Somali youth to join extremist organizations.<sup>266</sup>

### ***Factors Leading to a Rise of Terrorism and Violent Extremism***

#### *Youth Radicalization*

The Horn of Africa is a region with an increasing rate of youth radicalization.<sup>267</sup> According to the Institute for Security Studies, 40% of all recruits of Al-Shabaab are children or young adults, between the ages of 15-19 years.<sup>268</sup> The name Al-Shabaab translates to “The Youth,” and it incentivizes young people to join the organization by providing structure and a sense of purpose.<sup>269</sup> The factors that lead to youth radicalization include a lack of economic opportunities in the region, underdevelopment, natural calamities, and ongoing civil strife.<sup>270</sup> The region has experienced an ongoing conflict since the Border War between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1988.<sup>271</sup> The conflict resulted in the deaths of over 80,000 people with continual violence in border areas.<sup>272</sup> The resulting humanitarian situation has further deteriorated due to a continual drought in Somalia, the failure of crops, and the rise of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of terrorist violence.<sup>273</sup> Through the combination of these factors, the number of people in Somalia in need of humanitarian assistance has risen to 6.7 million.<sup>274</sup> A large component of those internally displaced people are youth under 25 years of age, with limited education, a lack of viable financial and economic opportunities, and continual government repression.<sup>275</sup>

One of the most urgent tasks of the international community is to ensure the safety of young men and women in this region.<sup>276</sup> Strengthening UN forces active in the Horn of Africa will enable greater capability and protection for communities in the region, effectively safeguarding youth who are increasingly susceptible to terrorist

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<sup>258</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>259</sup> AMISOM, *AMISOM Military Component*, 2017.

<sup>260</sup> Human Rights Watch, “*The Power These Men Have Over Us*”; *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia*, 2014.

<sup>261</sup> AMISOM, *AMISOM soldiers undergo Sexual and Gender Based Violence Training in Baidoa*, 2017.

<sup>262</sup> UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*; UN Security Council, *The situation in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>265</sup> UNSOM, *Police Section*, 2017.

<sup>266</sup> UNSOM, *Voices of Al-Shabaab: Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center*, 2016.

<sup>267</sup> Arigatou International, *GNRC Annual Report 2016/2017*, 2017, pp. 16-30.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.

<sup>270</sup> Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.

<sup>271</sup> *Ethiopia and Eritrea blame each other for border clash*, BBC, 2016.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>273</sup> Burke, *Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid*, 2017.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>275</sup> Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.

<sup>276</sup> UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.



recruitment.<sup>277</sup> Greater educational and economic opportunities in the Horn of Africa are needed in order to empower young people to reject extremist ideology.<sup>278</sup> Terrorist and extremist organizations depend on recruiting disenfranchised young people, who lack better options in their home countries.<sup>279</sup> Ensuring regional trade, increasing the safety and resilience of communities, and empowering civil society, are vital components in the effort to empower youth in the Horn of Africa.<sup>280</sup> Several aspects have proven fruitful in this endeavor, including providing aid, ensuring security, and helping to set the foundation for providing opportunities to young men and women.<sup>281</sup> Ensuring female representation in government and peacebuilding initiatives will also lead to better societal involvement.<sup>282</sup>

### *Financing of Terrorism*

The financing of terrorist organizations includes a multitude of components that enable these groups to recruit and operate, such as large money transfers and the trading of natural resources to fund terrorist activities.<sup>283</sup> Untracked money transfers from anonymous individuals enables radical organizations to garner the resources necessary to launch terrorist attacks.<sup>284</sup> The availability of financial capital further increases the active recruitment of people from impoverished communities.<sup>285</sup> Al-Qaida and ISIL affiliates are reported in many Member States in the Horn of Africa as a direct result of untracked monetary flows.<sup>286</sup> Radical Islamist ideology has also spread through the financing of madrassas and other religious schools by Saudi Arabia, and the proliferation of Wahhabi-trained imams in those institutions.<sup>287</sup> Young children in the region that are educated in these madrassas are exposed to an extreme type of Islam, characterized by the rejection of democratic institutions and the promotion of extreme ideas.<sup>288</sup>

Some of the financial resources that contributed to the arming of Al-Shabaab militants come as a direct result of piracy.<sup>289</sup> Somali pirates operating from Puntland prey on international shipping vessels whose cargoes bring revenue to finance terrorist organizations.<sup>290</sup> This increase of piracy in the region led the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to issue the *Djibouti Code of Conduct* in 2015, to ensure mutual cooperation for security off the coast of East Africa.<sup>291</sup> It is important to consider piracy as a grave threat, because it allows for the transfer of money and weapons that arm terrorist and extremist factions.<sup>292</sup> While the *Djibouti Code of Conduct* is extensive in its scope, the international community must ensure its effective implementation in the Horn of Africa.<sup>293</sup>

### *Case Study: Somalia*

Somalia has not had a functional national government for the past twenty years.<sup>294</sup> The existing Somali government, assisted by 22,000 African Union troops, controls only small pockets of the state, with the vast majority of the landmass being either autonomous (Somaliland), semi-autonomous (Puntland), or in the hands of extremist groups.<sup>295</sup> In Mogadishu, the capital, the government controls approximately one-third of the city.<sup>296</sup> The remainder of the territory is controlled by Al-Shabaab, and the group has expanded its attacks to northern Kenya.<sup>297</sup> Al-

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<sup>277</sup> AMISOM, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2017.

<sup>278</sup> Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

<sup>280</sup> IMO, Maritime Safety Division, *Djibouti Code of Conduct*, 2015.

<sup>281</sup> Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.

<sup>282</sup> Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.

<sup>283</sup> UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178 (2014))*, 2014.

<sup>284</sup> UN General Assembly, *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109)*, 1999.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>287</sup> Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.

<sup>288</sup> Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.

<sup>289</sup> Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, p. 19.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid.

<sup>291</sup> IMO, Maritime Safety Division, *Djibouti Code of Conduct*, 2015.

<sup>292</sup> Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, p. 19.

<sup>293</sup> IMO, Maritime Safety Division, *Djibouti Code of Conduct*, 2015.

<sup>294</sup> *Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?*, BBC, 2016.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid.

<sup>296</sup> Dickinson, *How much turf does the Somali government really control?*, 2010.

<sup>297</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

Shabaab consists of 7,000-9,000 fighters, with close to half being younger than 20 years of age.<sup>298</sup> At its height, Al-Shabaab controlled the port city of Kismayo, large parts of the capital Mogadishu, and swathes of land in south and central Somalia.<sup>299</sup> The land control allowed the group to expand its operations, receive funds and goods through Kismayo, and control the local population through summary executions and the banning of access to food aid for Somalis in areas under its control.<sup>300</sup> The continued violence has resulted in 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia.<sup>301</sup> In 2016, the Somali President issued a National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in response to Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations operating in Somalia.<sup>302</sup> The National Strategy outlines the role of the Somali government in combatting the root causes of radicalization in its territory.<sup>303</sup> It highlights factors that lead to radicalization among the Somali youth, such as underdevelopment, lack of access to education and employment opportunities, and social marginalization.<sup>304</sup> The core objectives of the National Strategy are to strengthen the Somali government, enhance research and communications, measure progress, and build capacity for CVE.<sup>305</sup>

The rise of Al-Shabaab and the ideological competition within the group between Al-Qaida and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) sympathizers has led to a further deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.<sup>306</sup> Splinter groups have formed among Al-Shabaab and competing groups for the loyalty of the population, which has led to violence and open attacks against civilians.<sup>307</sup> As a result of Al-Shabaab's expansion into neighboring Kenya, in 2011, the government of Kenya, in collaboration with the Somali government, launched Operation Linda Nchi.<sup>308</sup> The operation deployed the Kenyan air force to strike Al-Shabaab bases, and ordered military units to cross into Somalia and dislodge the terrorists from their strongholds.<sup>309</sup> The active military approach was to stabilize the region and eradicate Al-Shabaab's sphere of influence.<sup>310</sup> Approximately one month after the launch of Operation Linda Nchi, Kenyan forces officially joined the AMISOM mission in Somalia, increasing African Union forces to 22,000.<sup>311</sup> As a result of Kenya's involvement in Somalia, Al-Shabaab began to directly target Kenya, with high-profile terrorist attacks in at a shopping mall, a university, and a military base.<sup>312</sup> On 19 August 2017, Kenyan Security Forces terminated the most wanted Al-Shabaab leader in Kenya.<sup>313</sup>

## Conclusion

The Horn of Africa is a region that serves as a safe haven for terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>314</sup> The GCTS and the *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* serve as core documents of the implementation of efforts of the international community to prevent these threats.<sup>315</sup> The international community has demonstrated its resolve in combatting terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa through the assistance missions deployed by the AU and the UN, respectively.<sup>316</sup> Both missions are responsible for engaging in military efforts against Al-Shabaab to prevent their expansion, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population.<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

<sup>299</sup> *Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?*, BBC, 2016.

<sup>300</sup> Burke, *Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid*, 2017.

<sup>301</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Somalia: country Profile*, 2015.

<sup>302</sup> Federal Republic of Somalia, *National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism*, 2016, pp. 2-4.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., pp. 7-21.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>307</sup> Anderson & McKnight, *Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa*, 2015.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid.

<sup>311</sup> AMISOM, *Kenya-KDF*, 2017.

<sup>312</sup> Anderson & McKnight, *Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa*, 2015.

<sup>313</sup> *Kenya Says Police Killed Most Wanted Al-Shabaab Commander*, AllAfrica, 2017.

<sup>314</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>315</sup> UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.

<sup>316</sup> UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

However, through the proliferation of propaganda, economic marginalization, and underdevelopment in the Horn of Africa, young people continue to be susceptible to recruitment from terrorist and extremist organizations.<sup>318</sup> Moreover, the financing of terrorist groups enables greater access to weapons and resources, along with serving as a lucrative recruitment tool for marginalized, unemployed youth.<sup>319</sup> Somalia serves as an example of the front line in the fight to prevent and destroy terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>320</sup> Ensuring the safety and security of Somali communities will enable international organizations to provide humanitarian aid and resources to help revive the local economy.<sup>321</sup> However, terrorist and violent extremist activity remains widespread in the Horn of Africa.<sup>322</sup> The UN Security Council must be resolute in setting the international standard for the response to this crisis.<sup>323</sup>

### ***Further Research***

When researching this topic, delegates should consider the security, economic, and social situation in the Horn of Africa. Questions to consider are: How can the Security Council leverage its capabilities to meet the demands of local governments to combat terrorism and extremism? How can the international community adapt to meet new challenges, like youth radicalization, propaganda spreading, and the financing of terrorism? Does UNSOM need to be strengthened? What factors can lead to an increase in security in the region? Would the expansion of operations in the region lead to dislodging terrorists from their strongholds? How can the Security Council strengthen security cooperation in the region to fight Al-Shabaab? What is missing in the operational method of the two assistance missions? How can the Security Council prevent the current and potential future rise in terrorist and extremist groups in the Horn of Africa? What aspects of de-radicalization policies must be improved for greater effectiveness in deterring young people from joining terrorist and extremist organizations?

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*This is a vital document for this topic, since it is the National Strategy and Plan of Action of the Somali government. Somalia was chosen as a signature case study for the topic to demonstrate the effects that the lack of an effective government, environmental calamities, economic factors, and the proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism can have on society. The National Strategy of Somalia shows the direction in which the government wishes to take the country pertaining to consolidation of power, administrative duties of the state, and ensuring that terrorist groups cease operations. It outlines the factors that the government sees as the main causes of the rise of terrorism and violent extremism, and recommends certain steps in order to ensure the safety of Somalis and security in the state.*

Human Rights Watch. (2014). *“The Power These Men Have Over Us”; Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia*. Retrieved 10 August 2017 from: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces>

*This report allows delegates to see some of the complications of foreign intervention in Somalia. A culture of impunity and lack of accountability has allowed AMISOM forces to commit sexual assault against the people that they are mandated to protect. Targeting some of the most vulnerable groups, like displaced Somali women, erodes the trust of the local populace and threatens any progress made against terrorist groups. This report outlines the extent of sexual violence perpetrated by AMISOM forces. It is very important for delegates to consider this report because it examines some of the obstacles to foreign assistance missions, which can erode the trust of the host population, and create the next generation of extremists.*

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<sup>318</sup> Hoehne, *Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions*, 2015.

<sup>319</sup> Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.

<sup>320</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

<sup>321</sup> Burke, *Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid*, 2017.

<sup>322</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Somalia: country Profile*, 2015.

<sup>323</sup> UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*, 2015, p. 1.

Ploch, L. et al. (2011). *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*. United States Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 20 August 2017 from: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf>

*This is a detailed report on piracy near the Horn of Africa, its causes, effects, and the steps taken by the international community and individual Member States to counter their influence and ensure the safety of shipping lanes. Piracy is one of the biggest issues affecting the development of the region, and the report provides a thorough account of the factors that give rise to it. A challenge presented is the overfishing practices leading local communities to turn to crime, and the political support that pirates receive from the warlords of Puntland. Given the proliferation of Somali piracy towards Mozambique and as far as India, and its relation to the financing of terrorist groups, delegates will need to take this issue into account during their deliberations in committee.*

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2016). *Voices of Al-Shabaab: Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center* [Report]. Retrieved 15 August 2017 from:

[https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/voices\\_of\\_al-shabaab\\_understanding\\_former\\_combatants\\_from\\_the\\_baidoa\\_reintegration\\_center.pdf](https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/voices_of_al-shabaab_understanding_former_combatants_from_the_baidoa_reintegration_center.pdf)

*This report examines the factors that lead people to join extremist organizations. It focuses on former Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia and it helps to identify the various causes that lead to radicalization of an individual, such as economic marginalization and governmental repression. By understanding the root causes of radicalization, the international community can make informed decisions when combatting terrorism and violent extremism. Based on research and interviews of former members of Al-Shabaab in a Reintegration Center, the report offers a myriad of first-person accounts that shine a more personal light on members of a terrorist group and their motivations. Delegates can draw lessons from this document about the causes of radicalization, which they can apply to their proposals in committee.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixtieth Session. (2006). *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)* [Resolution]. Adopted without a reference to a Main Committee. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: <http://undocs.org/A/RES/60/288>

*This is the official document outlining the counter-terrorism strategy of the UN. It reaffirms that terrorism cannot be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization, or ethnic group. While the strategy offers brief remarks on previous reports regarding the topic, it sets forth a clear Plan of Action to deal with the threat of terrorism. It unequivocally condemns terrorism in all its forms, and stresses the need to take action by offering various steps that will aid in the implementation of existing international conventions and protocols. The Plan of Action seeks to strengthen the UN's position to prevent conflicts, by actively seeking to serve as a mediator, enforce the rule of law, protect human rights, and ensure peacekeeping and peacebuilding.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Seventieth session. (2015). *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*. Retrieved 16 July 2017 from: <http://undocs.org/A/70/674>

*The Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism outlines the position of the UN against violent extremism, notes the factors that contribute to the rise of extremist organizations, and lays a foundation for the international community to begin to combat this trend. It draws a link between violent extremism and terrorism, and examines the military and intelligence measures that were previously adopted against Al-Qaida and ISIL as examples. It also stresses the need for a comprehensive and collaborative approach from the international community to prevent violent extremism. Delegates should use this source as a foundation for their research, as it outlines the UN's current priorities in countering violent extremism.*

United Nations, Security Council, 4688<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (2003). *High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism (S/RES/1456(2003))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1456\(2003\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1456(2003))

*Resolution 1456 of the UN Security Council aims to suppress any organizations, individuals, and/or Member States that support terrorist organizations financially and/or with other resources. It further calls upon the Counter-Terrorism Committee to intensify its efforts in combatting terrorism and to receive reports from Member States pertaining to terrorist activities in their territories. This document sets into motion a very important precedent: urging collaboration*

*between Member States and the UN to curb terrorist financing. This collaboration entails information-sharing, tracking of financial transfers, and financial support.*

United Nations, Security Council, 6959<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (2013). *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2102\(2013\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2102(2013))

*Security Council resolution 2102 established the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). This resolution serves as the foundational document for the mission, whose mandate includes: the ensuring of security sector reform, the disengagement and disarmament of combatants, and coordinating international donor support. Evaluating UNSOM's achievements in light of the mandate outlined by this resolution will enable delegates to determine shortcomings, assess loopholes, and identify other factors that hinder the implementation and effectiveness of the mission.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7272<sup>nd</sup> Meeting. (2014). *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178 (2014))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2178\(2014\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2178(2014))

*Resolution 2178 outlines concerns about the proliferation of global terrorist networks, the radicalization of young people, continual recruitment efforts, and financial support for terrorist activities. It calls for Member States to increase cooperation efforts to end the flow of foreign fighters to terrorist organizations. It echoes resolution 1373, emphasizing that Member States must bring suspected terrorists to justice. The resolution also requires Member States to implement specific measures to better address terrorism across borders, such as having access to passenger information for local airlines, and collaborating with INTERPOL to intensify efforts to identify and apprehend transnational terrorists. Delegates should be familiar with this resolution, as it draws attention to the connection between terrorism and extremism, and mentions specific action items, like closer security cooperation and information-sharing among Member States, that can be used to depress the efforts of international terrorist organizations.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7968<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (2017). *The Situation in Somalia (S/RES/2358 (2017)) [Resolution]*. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2358\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2358(2017))

*This is the most recent resolution of the UN Security Council extending the Mandate of UNSOM. The worsening of the political and security crisis in Somalia, along with the breakdown of the electoral process in the country, prompted the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of the mission. This resolution serves to reaffirm UNSOM's continual importance and highlights the progress and shortcomings of the mission thus far. Some of the successes of the mission include helping to determine the possibility of a famine early and supporting reconciliation between communities and former extremists. Delegates will benefit from a mission overview and the plans to move forward, amid a continual rise of terrorism and violent extremism in Somalia.*

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### III. Women, Peace and Security

#### *Introduction*

During the 21<sup>st</sup> century the international community has recognized the need to address the specific impact of armed conflict on women, and to actively work to increase their participation in peace processes.<sup>324</sup> Modern armed conflicts affect more civilians than soldiers.<sup>325</sup> In particular, conflict tends to significantly impact the human rights of women in various ways, for example in regards to their access to health care services, or with the proliferation of systematic discrimination and gender-based violence.<sup>326</sup> Sexual violence is among the most common forms of human rights violations in conflict and crisis situations.<sup>327</sup> In Colombia, after the conclusion of a civil war in 2016, the Attorney-General adopted an investigation protocol for the 634 cases of sexual violence that had been reported by the Constitutional Court.<sup>328</sup> Only two percent of those reported cases have led to convictions thus far.<sup>329</sup> In 2016, 179 cases of conflict-related sexual violence committed by ex-militants of the Séléka group, an alliance of rebels, were reported to the United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).<sup>330</sup> However, there are reasons to believe that the actual number of cases largely exceeded those reported.<sup>331</sup> The stigma that surrounds sexual violence and the shame that affects the victims of such crimes often prevents them from going to the authorities.<sup>332</sup> In addition, the limited presence of women in the national police forces of Member States affected by conflict, contributes to the underreporting of sexual violence.<sup>333</sup> Moreover, women are still underrepresented in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs); as of June 2017, only 4,240 out of the 96,853 police and military peacekeeping officials and soldiers were women.<sup>334</sup>

Generally, women's access to decision-making roles remains restricted, especially in politics, despite many studies showing that, when the number of women in democratic institutions increases by five percent, the state is proportionally less likely to use violence to face international conflict.<sup>335</sup> Moreover, a study of 40 peace processes in 35 Member States showed that when women participate in the drafting of peace agreements, these are 35% more likely to last for at least 15 years.<sup>336</sup> However, in the conflicts resolved between 1992 and 2011, less than 10% of negotiators involved in peace processes were women.<sup>337</sup> The conditions that act as barriers for women's participation in peace processes vary.<sup>338</sup> In some cases, women refrain from participating in peace negotiations due to security concerns.<sup>339</sup> However, more often, they are hindered by economic reasons, as they cannot afford to finance election campaigns that may lead to their appointment as political representatives, or their access to decision-making roles is denied by social norms or national laws.<sup>340</sup> Therefore, there is still a strong need to mainstream gender perspectives in societies, which means that any decision-making entity should take into consideration the implications that their legislations, programs, plans, and policies have on men and women, and shape its strategies based on the specific gender-related needs of the society in order to achieve equality.<sup>341</sup> For this purpose, some Member States, such as Canada, incorporate gender-based analysis into their policy development processes, which is an analytical tool

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<sup>324</sup> PeaceWomen, *About Women, Peace and Security in the Security Council*.

<sup>325</sup> UN Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, *Background Information on Sexual Violence Used as a Tool of War*, 2017.

<sup>326</sup> UNFPA, *A UNFPA Strategy for Gender Mainstreaming in Areas of Conflict and Reconstruction*, 2002, p. 3.

<sup>327</sup> Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, *Sexual and Gender-based Violence in Crisis and Conflicts – The Responsibility to Speak Out*, 2008.

<sup>328</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (S/2017/249)*, 2017.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>334</sup> UN DPKO, *Summary of Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Mission, Post and Gender*, 2017.

<sup>335</sup> O'Reilly, *Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies*, 2015.

<sup>336</sup> O'Reilly et al., *Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes*, 2015.

<sup>337</sup> UN-Women, *Facts and Figures: Peace and Security*, 2017.

<sup>338</sup> Kvinna Till Kvinna Foundation, *Equal Power – Lasting Peace: Obstacles for Women's Participation in Peace Processes*, 2012, p. 103.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>341</sup> ILO, *Gender Equality Tool*, 2017.

aimed at developing ad hoc policies and programs assessing the different socio-economic realities of men and women.<sup>342</sup>

### ***International and Regional Framework***

The UN General Assembly adopted the *Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict* in 1974, which consisted of a series of principles regarding the protection of women and children in conflict situations.<sup>343</sup> Article 6 of this declaration states that “women and children belonging to the civilian population and finding themselves in circumstances of emergency and armed conflict in the struggle for peace, self-determination, national liberation and independence, or who live in occupied territories, shall not be deprived of shelter, food, medical aid or other inalienable rights (...).”<sup>344</sup> Since then, the agenda of the General Assembly has often included issues related to women’s protection in conflict and their participation in conflict resolution and prevention.<sup>345</sup> In 1979, the General Assembly adopted the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women*, which created binding legal obligations regarding the protection of women’s rights.<sup>346</sup> The Convention addresses the various areas in which women experience discrimination, providing guidelines on policy measures that State parties should consider in order to address the issue.<sup>347</sup> A fundamental feature of the convention is the prohibition of derogation from the obligations set in the convention during periods of conflict or public emergency.<sup>348</sup> The convention also established the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women (CEDAW) which, in 2013, adopted General Recommendation 30, providing guidelines for States parties to the convention on appropriate ways to comply with the obligations of CEDAW on the issues of women in conflict prevention, and in conflict and post-conflict situations.<sup>349</sup> The Fourth World Conference on Women adopted the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* (BPfA) (1995), which serves as a guiding document for the eradication of discrimination against women.<sup>350</sup> In 2015, the General Assembly convened to adopt 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as part of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.<sup>351</sup> All the goals present a gender-sensitive perspective, and three of them directly address women’s empowerment.<sup>352</sup> SDGs 15 and 16 address the role of women in peace processes, and SDG 5 calls for the equal treatment of women and men in the development of peaceful societies for sustainable development.<sup>353</sup> In the framework of the newly adopted SDGs, at the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing +20, the international community recommitted to revitalizing its efforts to implement the BPfA.<sup>354</sup>

In 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on the topic of “Women and Peace and Security,” which was aimed at addressing the impact of armed conflict on women, and women’s participation in peace processes for the first time.<sup>355</sup> This resolution, which is a normative milestone for the work of the Security Council, is based on the four main pillars of prevention, participation, protection, peacebuilding, and recovery.<sup>356</sup> During the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Security Council’s work on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) has led to the adoption of seven additional

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<sup>342</sup> Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, 2009.

<sup>343</sup> UN General Assembly, *Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict* (A/RES/3318 (XXIX)), 1974.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>345</sup> UN-Women, *UN General Assembly 71<sup>st</sup> Session* (2016), 2016.

<sup>346</sup> UN-Women, *Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation no. 30 and the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*, 2015, p. 8.

<sup>347</sup> UN General Assembly, *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (A/RES/34/180), 1979.

<sup>348</sup> UN-Women, *Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation no. 30 and the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*, 2015, p. 8.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>350</sup> UN Fourth World Conference on Women, *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*, 1995.

<sup>351</sup> UN-Women, *Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation no. 30 and the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*, 2015, p. 32.

<sup>352</sup> UN General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (A/RES/70/1), 2015.

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>354</sup> UN-Women, *Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation no. 30 and the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*, 2015, p. 32.

<sup>355</sup> UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security* (S/RES/1325 (2000)), 2000.

<sup>356</sup> UN-Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 28.

resolutions on the topic: resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), and 2242 (2015).<sup>357</sup> Each one addresses conflict-related sexual violence, outlining specific provisions for developing accountability measures for such crimes.<sup>358</sup> Resolutions 1889 (2009) and 2122 (2013) implement resolution 1325, focus on the issues of women's marginalization in decision-making, and strengthen the normative framework for increasing women's participation.<sup>359</sup>

### ***Role of the International System***

Security Council resolution 1325 set the basis for the inclusion of women in conflict prevention and resolution, and in peacebuilding and peacekeeping processes.<sup>360</sup> Since the adoption of resolution 1325, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in joint action with the Department of Field Support (DFS), has been active in implementing Security Council resolutions on WPS, adopting gender-sensitive policies, and increasing the number of female officers, troops, and civilians involved in peacekeeping missions.<sup>361</sup> In 2010, DPKO and DFS published the *Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective in the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations*.<sup>362</sup> In 2014, the DPKO and DFS developed the *Gender Forward Looking Strategy 2014-2018*.<sup>363</sup> The Gender Strategy has several objectives: capacity-building, strengthening of the accountability system, reconsidering the gender perspective in the development of peacekeeping operations, promoting data collection and providing analysis of progress made.<sup>364</sup>

In 2009, the Security Council created the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict.<sup>365</sup> The SRSG's mandate is to monitor and report to the Security Council on sexual violence against women in conflict situations.<sup>366</sup> The SRSG also receives reports from the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict (TOE), which was established by the Security Council to provide technical and strategic support to national institutions for the investigation and prosecution of acts of sexual violence.<sup>367</sup> The TOE is composed of specialists from the DPKO, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).<sup>368</sup> Currently, the TOE is conducting ad hoc technical missions to the governments of the Central African Republic, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and South Sudan.<sup>369</sup> In particular, the TOE supports Member States by reviewing national legislation, with a special focus on legislation addressing sexual violence, and making recommendations.<sup>370</sup>

The UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) was established in 2010 to address the challenges faced by the international community in promoting gender equality and women's

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<sup>357</sup> UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/1820 (2008))*, 2008; UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/1888 (2009))*, 2009; UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/1960 (2010))*, 2010; UN Security Council, *Women Peace and Security (S/RES/2106 (2013))*, 2013; UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/2242 (2015))*, 2015.

<sup>358</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>359</sup> UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/1889 (2009))*, 2009; UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/2122 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>360</sup> UN DPKO, *Women, Peace and Security*, 2017.

<sup>361</sup> UN Police Division, *Gender Initiatives*, 2017; Dharmapuri, *Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping*, 2013.

<sup>362</sup> UN DPKO & DFS, *Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective in the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations*, 2010.

<sup>363</sup> UN DPKO & DFS, *Gender Forward Looking Strategy 2014-2018*, 2014.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>365</sup> UN-Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 13.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>367</sup> UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, *Team of Experts*, 2017.

<sup>368</sup> UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, *Annual Report 2013*, 2013, p. 8.

<sup>369</sup> UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, *Team of Experts*, 2017.

<sup>370</sup> UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, *Annual Report 2013*, 2013, p. 8.

empowerment.<sup>371</sup> One of the tasks of UN-Women is to support PKOs through gender-sensitive training.<sup>372</sup> UN-Women partners with DPKO to implement tactical responses to address sexual violence experienced by women in conflict, post-conflict, and emergency situations.<sup>373</sup> In 2010, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, precursor to UN-Women, published a document, *Addressing Conflict-related Sexual Violence: Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice*, which includes training material for peacekeepers on the protection of civilians from sexual violence.<sup>374</sup> Moreover, UN-Women is committed to the implementation of the WPS agenda by encouraging Member States to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) through which national authorities can consider gender perspectives in the development of national legislation.<sup>375</sup> As of August 2017, 67 Member States have developed NAPs.<sup>376</sup> Women's advancement and gender equality are also promoted by the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE), a committee chaired by UN-Women.<sup>377</sup> IANWGE works to ensure a gender perspective in all UN actions; it also contributes, through various task forces, to the production of the Secretary-General's report on WPS.<sup>378</sup> These task forces have a time-limited mandate and focus on specific issues, including WPS.<sup>379</sup>

Similarly, Regional Action Plans (RAPs) on WPS have been developed by the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and in the Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and Caribbean regions.<sup>380</sup> In 2015, the Department for Women, Peace and Security of the AU developed an Architecture Roadmap to make gender mainstreaming a priority in the implementation of the RAP in the African continent.<sup>381</sup> In 2014, the AU also launched the Gender, Peace and Security Programme, to be implemented between 2015 and 2020.<sup>382</sup> This program is meant to serve as an operational framework providing guidelines for the development of policies, plans, and programs to the AU, the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) within Africa, national institutions, and civil society organizations (CSOs).<sup>383</sup> Further contributions to the implementation of the Security Council's WPS agenda come from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).<sup>384</sup> NATO has sought to facilitate women's participation in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, together with the reduction of conflict-related gender-based violence.<sup>385</sup> NATO has also partnered with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which adopted a joint policy for the implementation of resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on WPS.<sup>386</sup> The policy aims to increase women's participation in NATO's operations and institutions through education and training, as well as the development of gender-sensitive policies for the Department of Human Resources.<sup>387</sup>

Since the adoption of resolution 1325, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and CSOs have committed themselves to the implementation of the WPS agenda at different levels.<sup>388</sup> In the Pacific region, especially in Australia and Asia, an independent coalition named the Australian Civil Society Coalition on WPS, composed of representatives of the civil society with an expertise on gender and peace, works to bring expertise to national governments and advocates for the implementation of the WPS agenda at the national level.<sup>389</sup> In February 2017, the coalition submitted a paper to the Australian government containing recommendations on how to integrate a gender

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<sup>371</sup> UN-Women, *About UN-Women*, 2017.

<sup>372</sup> UN-Women, *UN-Women Sourcebook on Women, Peace and Security: Overview of Content*, 2012, p. 6.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> UNIFEM et al, *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice*, 2010.

<sup>375</sup> UN-Women, *UN-Women Sourcebook on Women, Peace and Security: Overview of Content*, 2012, p. 4.

<sup>376</sup> PeaceWomen, *National Action Plans for the Implementation of UNSC 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*, 2017.

<sup>377</sup> UN-Women, *Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE)*, 2017.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*; UN IANWGE, *IANWGE Standing Committee on Women, Peace, and Security*, 2017.

<sup>379</sup> UN IANWGE, *Task Forces*.

<sup>380</sup> PeaceWomen, *National Action Plans for the Implementation of UNSC 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*, 2017.

<sup>381</sup> African Union Commission, *Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa*, 2016.

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>384</sup> NATO, *Women, Peace and Security*, 2017.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>387</sup> NATO & EAPC, *NATO/EAPC Action Plan for the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security*, 2014.

<sup>388</sup> Australian Civil Society Coalition on Women, Peace and Security, *About Us*.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*

perspective in the foreign policy of the country, in particular on the WPS agenda.<sup>390</sup> An example of an NGO cooperating with the Security Council is the NGO Working Group on WPS, a network of 14 international NGOs working on the WPS agenda through advocacy, monitoring and analysis, and peacebuilding.<sup>391</sup> Through their role as expert consultants to the Security Council, this NGO advocates for the inclusion of a gender perspective in the work of the Security Council, emphasizing the important connection between gender equality and conflict prevention and resolution.<sup>392</sup> The Working Group on WPS also works in partnership with CSOs, such as human rights defenders, peace builders, and civil society leaders from Member States affected by conflict.<sup>393</sup>

### ***Gender-Based Violence in Crisis and Conflict Situations***

#### *Sexual Violence as a Means of War and Terrorism*

A definition of conflict-related sexual violence can be found in the 2017 report of the Secretary-General on the topic of “Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,” where it is defined as: “rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict. (...) The term also encompasses trafficking in persons when committed in situations of conflict for the purpose of sexual violence/exploitation.”<sup>394</sup> The UN has increased its focus on addressing sexual violence as a tactic of terrorism, which is often committed by extremist groups in Yemen, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Nigeria, among other countries.<sup>395</sup> Such groups use sexual violence to incentivize recruitment, displace civilians, and force religious conversion through marriage.<sup>396</sup> Sex trafficking, sexual slavery, and forced prostitution are also used by terrorist groups to generate revenue as part of their shadow economies.<sup>397</sup> As highlighted by the SRSRG on Sexual Violence in Conflict during the Security Council’s 7704<sup>th</sup> meeting, sexual violence cannot be considered incidental, but is rather an integral tactic for the achievement of the strategic objectives of extremist groups.<sup>398</sup>

#### *Protection Strategies*

The Security Council, in several of its resolutions on WPS, has focused on the implementation of appropriate and effective measures to address sexual violence in conflict and crisis situations.<sup>399</sup> Pressure has been placed on Member States to develop legal frameworks that can provide protection for civilians and sanctioning mechanisms to prosecute those found guilty of these crimes.<sup>400</sup> In resolution 1960, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to include an annex to its annual report on conflict-related sexual violence, comprised of a list of parties suspected of being responsible of sexual violence to serve as a basis for eventual sanctioning measures.<sup>401</sup> In resolution 1820, the Security Council declared that Member States that are parties to armed conflict have the responsibility to take appropriate measures to protect civilians.<sup>402</sup> The measures directly outlined by the Security Council were: the enforcement of military disciplinary measures, the training of troops on rules of conduct, and the vetting of all armed and security forces, taking into account a past history of sexual abuse.<sup>403</sup> Furthermore, in Resolution 1807

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<sup>390</sup> Australian Civil Society Coalition on Women, Peace and Security, *Submission to the Foreign Policy White Paper: Practical and Effective Integration of a Gender Equality Perspective and Women, Peace and Security*, 2017.

<sup>391</sup> NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, *About*, 2017.

<sup>392</sup> NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, *Our Work*, 2017.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>394</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (S/2017/249)*, 2017, p. 1.

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>398</sup> UN DPI, *Secretary-General, Other Speakers in Security Council Voice Concern over Evolution of Sexual Violence into “Tactic of Terrorism” (SC/12386)*, 2016; UN DPI, *Shame, Stigma Integral to Logic of Sexual Violence as War Tactic, Special Adviser Tells Security Council, as Speakers Demand Recognition of Survivors*, 2017.

<sup>399</sup> UN DPI, *Security Council Demands Immediate and Complete Halt to Acts of Sexual Violence Against Civilians in Conflict Zones, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1820 (2008) (SC/9364)*, 2008.

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>401</sup> UN-Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 332.

<sup>402</sup> UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/1820 (2008))*, 2008.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*

(2008) on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and resolution 2002 (2011) on Somalia, sexual violence was indicated by the Security Council as a designation criteria for the application of targeted sanctions.<sup>404</sup>

In resolutions 1888 and 1889, the Women Human Rights Unit within UN-Women established Women's Protection Advisors (WPA), which are meant to work as facilitators for the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions on sexual violence.<sup>405</sup> The mandate of these advisors encompasses various activities, including the coordination and development of strategies to prevent and protect women from sexual violence, and to advocate for the inclusion of sexual violence considerations in policies, operations, and programs of PKOs and special political missions.<sup>406</sup> The Security Council has also placed significant emphasis on the development of Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting arrangements (MARA) on conflict-related sexual violence.<sup>407</sup> Through the MARA, the Security Council receives information necessary to develop adequate responses to conflict-related sexual violence.<sup>408</sup> WPAs' role in this sense is to cooperate with police and military forces deployed in PKOs in order to develop mission-specific approaches for the protection of civilians from acts of sexual violence.<sup>409</sup> In 2014, the Security Council called for WPAs in five missions out of 16, but it only established the MARA for two missions.<sup>410</sup>

### ***Women's Participation in Peace Processes***

#### *Women's Impact on Peace Processes and Their Role in Peacekeeping*

Resolution 1325 stressed the need for a greater involvement of women in all levels of decision-making.<sup>411</sup> Since women are more likely to apply a gender perspective in peace negotiations, their inclusion in the process of conflict prevention and in the creation of recovery frameworks is crucial for the development of prevention strategies, post-conflict resettlement, and to ensure that women's rights are taken into consideration.<sup>412</sup> In Kenya, women's organizations have worked to prevent the spread of radicalization in marginalized areas; in Mali, women have worked to ensure the reintegration of combatants; and in Burundi, women groups have served as mediators in local conflicts, preventing further escalation of tensions.<sup>413</sup>

#### *Incorporating a Gender Perspective in Peacekeeping Activities*

Resolution 1325 laid the foundation for women's participation in peace and security activities, including PKOs.<sup>414</sup> Their role is essential for many functions, including gathering information for human rights investigations, addressing the unique needs of female ex-combatants and victims of gender-based violence in post-conflict situations, and providing gender-sensitive mentorship to military and police forces.<sup>415</sup> The DPKO and DFS Policy on Gender Equality sets guidelines for ensuring the equal participation of women.<sup>416</sup> The policy addresses women's inclusion in different frameworks, covering the stages of conflict prevention, management, and resolution.<sup>417</sup> This includes the restoration of stability and protection of civilians, the establishment of pre-conditions for peace, and consensus-building.<sup>418</sup> More specifically, the policy advocates for a greater deployment of female officers in PKOs, and for the recruitment of women in national police services.<sup>419</sup> As of 2017, 10% of the police officers serving in

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<sup>404</sup> UN-Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 332.

<sup>405</sup> UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, *Implementing 1960*, 2017.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*; UN-Women, *Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Arrangements on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2017.

<sup>408</sup> UN-Women, *Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Arrangements on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2017.

<sup>409</sup> UN-Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 335.

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>411</sup> UN Security Council, *Women and peace and security (S/RES/1325(2000))*, 2000.

<sup>412</sup> UN General Assembly, *Women's Participation in Peacebuilding: Report of the Secretary-General (A/65/354-S/2010/466)*, 2010, p. 4.

<sup>413</sup> UN DPI, *Key Forums Lack Women's Presence, Speakers Stress During Security Council Open Debate on Conflict Prevention, Resolution in Africa (SC/12304)*, 2016.

<sup>414</sup> UN Security Council, *Women and peace and security (S/RES/1325 (2000))*, 2000.

<sup>415</sup> UN Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, *Why We Need Women Peacekeepers*, 2016.

<sup>416</sup> UN DPKO & DFS, *Policy: Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 2010.

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>419</sup> UN Police Division, *Gender Initiatives*, 2017.

PKOs are women.<sup>420</sup> Some Member States have also developed NAPs to include the appointment of military gender advisors within their military forces.<sup>421</sup> In 2012, the Irish Defense Forces appointed a military gender advisor to promote gender-sensitive approaches in their defense forces.<sup>422</sup> Likewise, as a basis for the implementation of the Gender Strategy, the DPKO and DFS are committed to further integrating gender perspectives in their policies, programs, and resources.<sup>423</sup> In fact, they have encouraged the inclusion of Gender Advisors, which provide assistance to PKO personnel on gender issues, in providing technical support for the development and implementation of gender-sensitive policies.<sup>424</sup>

UN missions interface with the local community through Civil Affairs Officers, whose mandate is to represent the mission at the local level.<sup>425</sup> In many cases, Civil Affairs Officers have helped mainstream gender in post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>426</sup> In the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Civil Affairs Officers developed relationships with local organizations providing women and youth with a wide range of educational and training activities.<sup>427</sup> In the Mitrovica Municipality, a Romani woman who had played an important advocacy role in the community, focusing attention on internally displaced persons (IDPs), was appointed as Municipal Returns Officer.<sup>428</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Since the year 2000, the protection of women in conflict situations and their role in peace processes have been ongoing topics of discussion for the Security Council.<sup>429</sup> Member States have been active in implementing the Security Council's resolutions on WPS, working closely with NGOs, CSOs, and policymakers to develop adequate legal frameworks and effective NAPs.<sup>430</sup> However, the number of women affected by sexual violence in conflict keeps rising, and women are still marginalized in political and peace processes.<sup>431</sup> The issues of women under-representation in such processes still has to be addressed in existing national and international frameworks.<sup>432</sup> Addressing WPS must become a priority for Member States, as the protection of women's rights and their inclusion in peace processes is crucial for the wellbeing of society.<sup>433</sup> While the adoption of resolution 1325 increased awareness of WPS issues, there is still a need for further coordination and cooperation for the implementation of the provisions of the Security Council on WPS.<sup>434</sup>

### **Further Research**

While doing further research on this topic, delegates should consider the following: Are there gender-related issues that have not been addressed in previous Security Council resolutions on WPS? How could the consideration of other issues lead to an implementation of Security Council's action on WPS? How should the Security Council collaborate with Member States in which conflict-related sexual violence remains unaddressed? What further actions can the Security Council take to address this issue? How can the Security Council promote coordinated actions among UN bodies to further implement resolution 1325? How can the Security Council work with the DPKO to increase women's participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding? How can the Security Council benefit from the inclusion of NGOs and CSOs when addressing WPS?

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<sup>420</sup> UN Police Division, *Gender Initiatives*, 2017.

<sup>421</sup> Dharmapuri, *Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping*, 2013.

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>423</sup> UN DPKO & DFS, *Gender Forward Looking Strategy 2014-2018*, 2014, p. 4.

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>425</sup> UN DPKO & DFS, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 2012, p. 131.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>429</sup> UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/2242 (2015))*, 2015.

<sup>430</sup> UN-Women, *Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation no. 30 and the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*, 2015.

<sup>431</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (S/2017/249)*, 2017.

<sup>432</sup> UN-Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015.

<sup>433</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*



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*This report from the African Union Commission provides practical examples of a Regional Action Plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on “Women and Peace and Security.” It explains the 2016-2020 African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap, which indicates gender mainstreaming as a priority, with a specific focus on gender-related issues. Furthermore, it provides a detailed overview on the status of the implementation of the WPS agenda in Africa. This information can be a useful starting point for delegates to understand the position of the Member State they are representing.*

Non-Governmental Organization Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. (2017). *About* [Website]. Retrieved 17 July 2017 from: <http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/>

*The website of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security can be a useful resource for delegates to gain a better understanding of the influence that NGOs and civil society organizations can have on the work of the Security Council. The website has a section named “Issues” which includes country-specific analysis in relation to the Member States’ progresses in the implementation of WPS agenda. The Working Group also publishes a Monthly Action Plan for the Security Council, which consists in an overview of the current debates and actions, and sometimes includes recommendations to the Security Council.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization & European Association for Palliative Care. (2014). *NATO/EAPC Action Plan for the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security*. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_t\\_2016\\_07/160718-wps-action-plan.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_t_2016_07/160718-wps-action-plan.pdf)

*This document provides a detailed description of the NATO/EAPC Action Plan for the implementation of the policy on WPS. The policy addresses two issues: the inclusion of women within NATO activities, and the integration and institutionalization of gender perspectives within NATO. The document highlights the expected outcome in connection with the necessary actions, such as the implementation of gender-sensitive Human Resources policies to improve the gender balance within the organization. Overall, it is useful for delegates to understand how entities outside the UN system cooperate and take action to implement Security Council resolutions on WPS.*

O’Reilly M., et al. (2015). *Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes*. International Peace Institute. Retrieved 27 August 2017 from: <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPI-E-pub-Reimagining-Peacemaking.pdf>

*This publication of the International Peace Institute provides an analysis of the role of women in peace processes. It begins by addressing the barriers regarding women’s participation, focusing on the difficulties that women as mediators can face in the framework of modern conflicts. The document also provides a detailed analysis of the impact that women can have on peace processes. The third chapter provides practical examples of the different forms of women’s participation in peace processes, such as direct participation at the negotiations, consultation, having an observer status, etc. The fifth chapter outlines the possible strategies for increasing women’s participation in peace processes. Although the document focuses on Member States and not on the Security Council, it is important for delegates to have a multidimensional approach to the topic, understanding how Member States can implement eventual provisions of the Security Council.*

United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality. (2017). *IANWGE Standing Committee on Women, Peace, and Security* [Website]. Retrieved 27 August 2017 from: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/tfwpsecurity.htm>

*Delegates should utilize this source to better understand the issues to be addressed when implementing gender-related policies. Understanding these issues is also crucial for the development of effective strategies. This webpage focuses on the IANWGE standing committee on WPS, explaining how it provides support to UN bodies, facilitating coherence and coordination in*

*the UN approach to WPS. This source can also serve as a starting point for further research on other IANWGE task forces, which address the issue of gender equality.*

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support. (2010). *Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective in the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations* [Report]. Retrieved 28 August 2017 from:

[http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dpko\\_dfs\\_gender\\_military\\_perspective.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dpko_dfs_gender_military_perspective.pdf)

*This document from the DPKO and the DFS provides a set of guidelines for the integration of a gender perspective in missions. The guidelines are developed in relation to three military fields: strategic-level guidance, operational-level activities, and tactical-level tasks. Understanding how the DPKO addresses gender mainstreaming in its military forces can be useful for delegates to understand how to address specific recommendations on the integration of a gender perspective in peacekeeping.*

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2017, May 15). *Shame, Stigma Integral to Logic of Sexual Violence as War Tactic, Special Advisor Tells Security Council, as Speakers Demand Recognition of Survivors* [Meeting Coverage]. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12819.doc.htm>

*This is the coverage of the 7938<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Security Council, during which Adama Dieng, the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, called for the Security Council to focus on the prevention of sexual violence. This source provides different perspectives on the issue of women's protection from sexual violence in conflict situations, outlining the root causes that make the identification of perpetrators of such crimes more difficult. In particular, it highlights how the shame that affects victims of sexual violence prevents them from reporting the crime. It also provides an analysis of the correlation between terrorism, sexual trafficking, and sexual violence. It is a useful source for delegates to begin to understand the interconnected nature of sexual violence, conflict, and terrorism.*

United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. (2015). *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325* [Report]. Retrieved 17 July 2017 from:

<http://www.unwomen.org/~media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf>

*This resource is the most recent document released by UN-Women on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325. It begins with an analysis of the legal framework for WPS and then provides a detailed analysis of the issue of women's protection in conflicts, and on their involvement in peacebuilding processes. Furthermore, the 11<sup>th</sup> chapter of the guide provides a description of the work of the Security Council in the implementation of the WPS agenda. This chapter also explores the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse, the involvement of civil society, and explains the sanctioning mechanisms of the Security Council.*

United Nations, Security Council, 4213th meeting. (2000). *Women and Peace and Security (S/RES/1325 (2000))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 9 August 2017 from:

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325\(2000\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325(2000))

*This resolution is vital in order to understand how the Security Council approaches issues related to women in conflict. In fact, it still guides the UN system in the development of programs and policies addressing women's human rights protection in conflict and post-conflict situations. It also serves as a basis for the development of NAPs, as well as regional and international plans, programs, and policies. It will allow delegates to gain a better understanding of how the Security Council addresses the protection of women in conflict, which is also crucial for studying preventive measures. Moreover, the resolution sets the basis for increasing women's inclusion in peace processes, which is a fundamental aspect of the WPS agenda.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2017). *Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (S/2017/249)*. Retrieved 17 July 2017 from: <http://www.undocs.org/S/2017/249>

*In this report, the Secretary-General analyses the issue of conflict-related sexual violence in the framework of modern conflicts. In particular, the second section concerns sexual violence in conflict as a tactic of war and terrorism, providing an overview on the current trends and emerging concerns regarding sexual violence in conflict, to be addressed by the Security Council.*



Furthermore, the report directly addresses several conflict situations, including those in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and the Syrian Arab Republic, and makes recommendations to Member States on how to implement effective policies to prevent sexual violence in conflict. Therefore, it will be a useful source for delegates to understand how Member States can directly address the issue.

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