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## SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BACKGROUND GUIDE 2015

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Written By: Michael Buechl, Claudia Sanchez, Farida El Kattan, Mike Hills



# NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS





# THE 2015 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to the 2015 National Model United Nations Conference in New York (NMUN•NY)! This year's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) staff is: Directors Michael Büchl (Conference A) and Claudia Sanchez (Conference B), and Assistant Directors Farida El Kattan (Conference A) and Mike Hills (Conference B). Michael recently completed his M.A. in Political Science, History and International Law at LMU Munich with a focus on International Relations and Security Policy. It is his fifth year on NMUN staff. Claudia recently completed her Master's Degree in International Security at Sciences Po in Paris, and specializes in UN Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations. This is her fourth year on staff at NMUN. Mike holds a B.A. in Political Science and is currently working for the president of Kwantlen Polytechnic University. It is his second year on staff. He will be attending graduate school this fall. Farida is finishing her Political Science degree from the American University in Cairo with a double specialization in International Law and International Relations and a double minor in History and Economics. It is her first year on NMUN staff.

The topics under discussion for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations are:

- I. Strengthening Regional Arrangements in Africa
- II. Enhancing Robust Mandates to Deal with Complex Crises
- III. Enhancing the Use of Technology in Peacekeeping Missions

The C-34 is a unique body within the UN system. It is tasked with conducting periodic reviews on the performance of UN peacekeeping operations, and with providing recommendations for their improvement. As such, its reports are not only essential to the General Assembly, but also to the Security Council, the Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support, and individual Member States. Given that the recommendations of the C-34 affect all aspects of peacekeeping and therefore all UN Member States, the Committee writes reports rather than resolutions, and operates on a consensus model seeking to achieve the best possible outcomes for the UN as a whole. As such, we encourage all delegates to emulate this during the conference.

We hope you will find this Background Guide useful as it serves to introduce you to the topics for this committee. It is not meant to replace further research and we highly encourage you explore in-depth your countries' policies as well as use the Annotated Bibliography and Bibliography to further your knowledge on these topics. Peacekeeping is constantly changing and delegates should stay up to date with the most recent developments. In preparation for the conference, each delegation will be submitting a [position paper](#). Please take note of the [NMUN policies](#) on the website and in the [Delegate Preparation Guide](#) regarding plagiarism, codes of conduct/dress code/sexual harassment, awards philosophy/evaluation method, etc. Adherence to these guidelines is mandatory.

The [NMUN Rules of Procedure](#) are available to download from the NMUN website. This document includes the long and short form of the rules, as well as an explanatory narrative and example script of the flow of procedure. It is thus an essential instrument in preparing for the conference, and a reference during committee.

If you have any questions concerning your preparation for the Committee or the Conference itself, feel free to contact the Under-Secretaries-General for the General Assembly, Kristina Getty (Conference A) and Cara Wagner (Conference B). You can reach either USG by contacting them at: [usg.ga@nmun.org](mailto:usg.ga@nmun.org).

We wish you all the best for your preparation for the Conference and look forward to seeing you at the conference!

Sincerely,

**Conference A**

Michael Büchl, *Director*  
Farida El Kattan, *Assistant Director*

**Conference B**

Claudia Sanchez, *Director*  
Mike Hills, *Assistant Director*



## Table of Contents


<b>Abbreviations</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>United Nations System at NMUN·NY</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Committee Overview</b> .....	<b>5</b>
Introduction.....	5
History.....	5
Mandate.....	7
Governance, Structure and Membership.....	8
Functions and Powers.....	9
Current Priorities.....	11
Recent Sessions.....	11
Conclusion.....	12
Annotated Bibliography.....	13
Bibliography.....	14
<b>I. Strengthening Regional Arrangements in Africa</b> .....	<b>18</b>
Introduction.....	18
International and Regional Framework.....	18
Role of the International System.....	19
Challenges for Peacekeeping in Africa.....	21
The African Standby Force.....	24
Conclusion.....	24
Further Research.....	25
Annotated Bibliography.....	26
Bibliography.....	27
<b>II. Enhancing Robust Mandates to Deal with Complex Crises</b> .....	<b>31</b>
Introduction.....	31
International and Regional Framework.....	32
Role of the International System.....	34
Understanding the Need for Robust Mandates.....	36
Concerns about Robust Mandates.....	37
Examples and Common Themes.....	37
Further Research.....	38
Annotated Bibliography.....	40
Bibliography.....	41
<b>III. Enhancing the Use of Technology in Peacekeeping Missions</b> .....	<b>46</b>
Introduction.....	46
International and Regional Framework.....	46
Role of the International System.....	47
Opportunities in Technology.....	48
Challenges to Enhancing Technology.....	50
Case Study: UAVs.....	51
Conclusion.....	52
Further Research.....	53
Annotated Bibliography.....	54
Bibliography.....	56

## Abbreviations

<b>AFISMA</b>	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
<b>AFRIPOL</b>	African Mechanism for Police Cooperation
<b>APF</b>	African Peace Facility
<b>APSA</b>	African Peace and Security Architecture
<b>ASF</b>	African Standby Force
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic
<b>CEWS</b>	Continental Early Warning System
<b>CIC</b>	Center on International Cooperation
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organizations
<b>DFS</b>	Department of Field Support
<b>DPKO</b>	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>EAC</b>	East African Community
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GA</b>	General Assembly
<b>GFSS</b>	Global Field Support Strategy
<b>GIS</b>	Geographic Information System
<b>ICISS</b>	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>IPI</b>	International Peace Institute
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>MPEPIL</b>	Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
<b>MSC</b>	Military Staff Committee
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organizations
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ONOC</b>	Of the United Nations Operation in the Congo
<b>ONUC</b>	United Nations Operation in the Congo
<b>PKO</b>	Peacekeeping operations
<b>POW</b>	Panel of the Wise
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>PSC</b>	Peace and Security Council
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Community
<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>SC</b>	Security Council
<b>SDS</b>	Strategic deployment stocks
<b>SWIS</b>	Security Warden Information System
<b>TCC</b>	Troop contributing countries
<b>UAV</b>	Unmanned aerial vehicle
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAMID</b>	United Nations Mission in Darfur
<b>UNAMSIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
<b>UNCS</b>	United Nations Cartographic Section
<b>UNIFIL</b>	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
<b>UNMISS</b>	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
<b>UNSMIS</b>	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
<b>UNTSO</b>	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

## United Nations System at NMUN·NY

This diagram illustrates the UN System simulated at NMUN·NY. It shows where each committee “sits” within the system, to help understand the reportage and relationships between the entities. Examine the diagram alongside the Committee Overview to gain a clear picture of the committee's position, purpose and powers within the UN System.



## Committee Overview

### Introduction

Peacekeeping describes a type of military action used as a tool in the United Nations' collective security arrangement.<sup>1</sup> Peacekeeping differs from other forms of conflict management, such as “enforcement action” outlined in Chapter VII of the *Charter of the United Nations*.<sup>2</sup> It is different because it is based on the consent of the conflict parties, especially the host state, and it tries to maintain or preserve peace with no, or only a minimal, use of force while relying on military troops.<sup>3</sup> The Security Council (SC) usually formally authorizes peacekeeping operations through an adopted resolution; however, in the past, the General Assembly (GA) has also mandated peacekeeping missions.<sup>4</sup> According to this division of functions, the SC resolution determines the mission's mandate and maximum size, and it provides details for the mission's tasks in the field.<sup>5</sup> The GA separately approves the budget of the mission, and the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, through its Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is tasked with the organizational aspects.<sup>6</sup> Peacekeeping operations can be conducted in different phases of a conflict and, as such, can be tasked with different primary goals: conflict prevention in a looming conflict, conflict management during a conflict, and post-conflict peacebuilding.<sup>7</sup> Modern peacekeeping missions thus can serve a multitude of different functions: transparency and confidence building as observer groups; separating parties of conflict as interposition forces; maintaining order in failed states in missions with a post-conflict peacekeeping profile; and verification, local disarmament, reintegration of fighters, demining, and assisting in the re-establishment of state functions.<sup>8</sup> In this context, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Missions (C-34), a subcommittee of the GA, has the task of reviewing all aspects of peacekeeping.<sup>9</sup> Through its annual report to the GA, C-34, together with the Secretary-General, is a key player in evaluating the status of peacekeeping, and in giving impetus for future reforms and peacekeeping initiatives.<sup>10</sup>

The **Special Committee on Peacekeeping Missions (C-34)** is a subcommittee of the General Assembly. It reports to the General Assembly through the Fourth Committee.

### History

Since 1948, the UN has mandated 69 peacekeeping operations in total and, as of 30 June 2014, there are 98,071 uniformed personnel serving in 16 peacekeeping operations.<sup>11</sup> Given this scope of peacekeeping operations, C-34 emerged out of the need to review and formalize the concept of peacekeeping because early peacekeeping attempts within the UN System lacked a clear definition and an institutional anchor in the UN System.<sup>12</sup>

The first attempts at peacekeeping operations were conducted by the League of Nations.<sup>13</sup> After the Second World War, the UN was founded to “maintain international peace and security.”<sup>14</sup> While its system of collective security, including a UN force enshrined in the Charter, did not prevent the Cold War, it did effectively deal with multiple crisis that soon broke out in the post-war world and which helped to define peacekeeping.<sup>15</sup> As one method for dealing with these crises, the UN used military elements as a means to uphold and restore peace; for example, the Security Council mandated observers in the Balkans in 1946 and Indonesia in 1947.<sup>16</sup> These early missions were observer missions that were ad-hoc and encompassed only a very small staff of not more than some dozen military

<sup>1</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011; Doyle & Sambanis, *Peacekeeping Operations*, 2007, p. 323.

<sup>2</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Bothe, *Peace-keeping*, 2002, pp. 684-686; UN Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Operations. What is Peacekeeping?*, 2014.

<sup>5</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Operations. Forming a new operation*, 2014.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> UN General Assembly, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy and related matters (A/RES/47/120)*, 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>9</sup> UN DPI, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>10</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Statistics*, 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007.

<sup>13</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>14</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 1(1).

<sup>15</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>16</sup> UN General Assembly, *Resolution 109 (II) Threats to the Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of Greece (A/RES/109(II))*, 1947; UN Security Council, *Resolution 67(1949) [The Indonesian Question] (S/RES/67)*, 1949.

observers.<sup>17</sup> Building on these actions, the Security Council established the first UN-led peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), in 1949 to address the situation in the Middle East.<sup>18</sup>

The concept of peacekeeping further transformed towards larger, more proactive operations with the establishment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to settle the Sinai crisis in 1956.<sup>19</sup> The United Kingdom and France prevented the SC from taking action due to their involvement in the conflict.<sup>20</sup> However, in a rare act of cooperation, the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union decided to call on the GA's "Uniting for Peace Resolution" to overcome this stalemate and pacify the conflict.<sup>21</sup> The GA therefore adopted resolution 998 on 30 October 1956, which established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the conflict parties, France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Egypt, and to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces afterwards.<sup>22</sup> The GA thus challenged the Security Council as the primary organ to mandate peacekeeping operations.<sup>23</sup> This action, however, did not affect the primary role of the Security Council on matters concerning international peace and security as the creation of UNEF I was based on the rare cooperation of the Soviet Union and the USA wanting to overcome the stalemate in the SC by France and the UK.<sup>24</sup> Because of this, the GA's action has remained a disputed anomaly in the history of peacekeeping.<sup>25</sup> Today, the general interpretation remains that the SC is the principle UN organ to mandate peacekeeping missions.<sup>26</sup> Still, UNEF I marked a vast expansion of the concept and scale of peacekeeping operations as it had the mandate to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities along the Suez Canal" with a staff of over 6,000 military personnel at its peak.<sup>27</sup> The trend towards larger peacekeeping operations continued under a SC mandate with the establishment of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONOC), in the Congo, presently known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>28</sup> In 1961 the mandate of ONUC was further increased to include "robust" elements such being tasked to maintain law and order and to facilitate the restoration and maintenance of the territorial integrity of the country.<sup>29</sup> In fact, ONUC was a fighting force with a military staff of over 19,000 soldiers at the peak in July 1961.<sup>30</sup>

Although these two missions were deemed mostly successful in pacifying the respective conflicts, these early peacekeeping attempts lacked a clear foundation both in the Charter and in the working mechanisms of the UN as can be seen in the question of the GA's right to mandate a peacekeeping mission.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, these missions, especially the very expensive ONOC, raised the vital question as to how peacekeeping missions should be budgeted.<sup>32</sup> In the GA, the body responsible for the UN's budget, Member States argued whether or not peacekeeping expenses constituted "expenses of the organization" according to Article 17 of the Charter.<sup>33</sup> As they were not able to agree on a common interpretation of Article 17, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), according to Article 96(1) of the Charter was requested to give an advisory opinion on the question whether the expenditures authorized by the GA for funding the peace operations in the Middle East and the Congo were to be considered as valid expenses of the United Nations.<sup>34</sup> Subsequently, according to Article 65 of the *Statute of the International Court of Justice* (1945), the ICJ ruled in its advisory opinion, "Certain Expenses of the United Nations," that these

<sup>17</sup> Bothe, *Peace-keeping*, 2002, p. 662; Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>18</sup> Bothe, *Peace-keeping*, 2002, p. 661; *Resolution 73 (1949) [The Palestine Question] (S/RES/73)*, 1949.

<sup>19</sup> General Assembly, *Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings: Resolution 998 (ES-I) (A/RES/998(ES-I))*, 1956; Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011; UN DPI, *Peacekeeping. UNEF I – Background*.

<sup>21</sup> UN General Assembly, *Resolution 377 Uniting for Peace (A/RES/377(V))*, 1950; Tomuschat, *Uniting for Peace: General Assembly resolution 377 (V)*, 2008.

<sup>22</sup> UN General Assembly, *Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings: Resolution 998 (ES-I) (A/RES/998(ES-I))*, 1956; UN DPI, *First United Nations Emergency Force*, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Bothe, *Peace-Keeping*, 2002, pp. 685-686.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 685.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 685.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 2002, pp. 684-686.

<sup>27</sup> UN General Assembly, *Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings: Resolution 998 (ES-I) (A/RES/998(ES-I))*, 1956; Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>28</sup> UN Security Council, *Resolution 143 (1960) [The Congo Question] (S/RES/143)*, 1960.

<sup>29</sup> UN Security Council, *Resolution 169 (1961) [Resolution of 24 November 1961] (S/RES/169)*, 1961.

<sup>30</sup> UN DPI, *Republic of the Congo - ONUC - Facts and Figures*, 2001; Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>31</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011; Tandon, *Consensus and Authority Behind United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 1967.

<sup>32</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>34</sup> International Court of Justice, *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, 1962; Bothe, *Peace-Keeping*, 2002, p. 689.

peacekeeping operations did fall under Article 17 of the Charter and, furthermore, that the GA was indeed able to mandate peacekeeping operations as in the case of UNEF I.<sup>35</sup> Although the question whether peacekeeping missions should be budgeted through the regular budget approved by the GA was thus solved, the question of how the financing of peacekeeping missions should be organized and, more generally, how peacekeeping missions could be implemented in a more formalized manner in the UN System remained unsolved.<sup>36</sup> As a consequence, the GA adopted resolution 2006 (XIX) on the “Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects” at its 19<sup>th</sup> session on 18 February 1965, thereby creating the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34).<sup>37</sup>

The creation of C-34 can be seen as the beginning of modern peacekeeping as for the first time the UN took the necessary steps to ensure that peacekeeping both existed as an acknowledged activity of the UN, and that those activities were to be funded by the budget of the UN.<sup>38</sup> In its first years of existence, two topics dominated the work of C-34: the development of basic principles and guidelines for peacekeeping operations and, thus, the questions of how to define peacekeeping operations and how to fund peacekeeping operations.<sup>39</sup> No definite consensus on these topics was reached before the end of the Cold War, so only an interim funding formula was developed.<sup>40</sup> Finally in 1990, C-34 decided that the interim formula should continue indefinitely.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, in the same session C-34 agreed that budgeting and financing questions concerning peacekeeping operations should be transferred to the General Assembly Fourth Committee.<sup>42</sup> Having set an organizational basis for its future work, C-34 has continued to strengthen and review its functioning and organizational goals in the following sessions; however, discussion has not always led to concrete changes.<sup>43</sup> For example, in its 1992 report, C-34 agreed on a draft declaration on a set of principles for peacekeeping missions.<sup>44</sup> However, C-34 never actually adopted the declaration, though it has used many of the ideas of the declaration in its following reports.<sup>45</sup>

In its most recent history, with the increase of number as well as depth of peacekeeping operations since the early 1990s, C-34 broadened the scope of its deliberations, especially in the field of practical issues concerning peacekeeping operations.<sup>46</sup> Since then, the Special Committee has given important recommendations in different fields.<sup>47</sup> These have included the issues of training of peacekeepers; encouraging regional organizations and arrangements to support UN peacekeeping missions; enhancing African peacekeeping capacities; standby arrangements in support of rapid deployment for mission start-up and reinforcement in crisis; safety and security of peacekeeping personnel; and peacekeeping and best practices learned.<sup>48</sup> The Special Committee also reacted directly to major concerns about the state of peacekeeping by holding an auxiliary session on the Brahimi Report, which endorsed and renewed the importance of many of the recommendations C-34 made in previous years.<sup>49</sup>

### ***Mandate***

The General Assembly, in compliance with Article 22 of the Charter and its rules of procedure (Rule 96 and Rule 102), created the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations as a subcommittee of the GA Fourth Committee

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<sup>35</sup> United Nations, *Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)*, 1945, Art. 65; International Court of Justice, *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, 1962; Bothe, *Peace-Keeping*, 2002, p. 685.

<sup>36</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 29.

<sup>37</sup> UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/2006(XIX))*, 1965.

<sup>38</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>39</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 30.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/45/330)*, 1990.

<sup>43</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 31.

<sup>44</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/47/253)*, 1992.

<sup>45</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 31.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> UN General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (A/55/305-S/2000/809)*, 2000.



on 18 February 1965, in resolution 2006 XIX.<sup>50</sup> Since then, the GA has requested a new annual report from the committee each year.<sup>51</sup> In subsequent resolutions, the GA has consistently outlined the mandate to conduct “a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects;” review the “implementation of its previous proposals;” and to “consider any new proposals so as to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to fulfill its responsibilities in this field.”<sup>52</sup> Despite this consistency, the interpretation and application of this mandate has changed over time.<sup>53</sup> For example, during the Cold War the review of peacekeeping was restricted to financial issues and the development of basic guidelines for peacekeeping.<sup>54</sup> Since the 1990s, in line with the expansion of peacekeeping operations, C-34 has broadened its topics of concern considerably to now include truly all aspects of peacekeeping missions excluding budget questions.<sup>55</sup> These aspects are: the safety and security of peacekeepers, conduct and discipline, strategies for complex peacekeeping operations, cooperation with regional arrangements, the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacities, and best practices and the development of stronger UN field support arrangements.<sup>56</sup>

### ***Governance, Structure and Membership***

The Special Committee meets annually at the UN headquarters for a session of about four weeks with the aim of drafting and adopting by consensus its annual report to the GA Fourth Committee, typically in late March.<sup>57</sup> The first week of the plenary session opens with the election of officers, the adoption of the agenda, and the organization of work.<sup>58</sup> This is followed by two days of General Debate, with delegations to the Committee presenting their prepared remarks.<sup>59</sup> The first week is concluded with briefings from the DPKO, the Department of Field Support (DFS), and other parts of the Secretariat relevant to specific aspects of peacekeeping, especially the Advisers to the Secretary-General on specific issues, for example, the Special Adviser on sexual exploitation.<sup>60</sup> At the end of the week a draft report based on the submissions of Member States or blocs is distributed to the whole committee.<sup>61</sup> In the second week, Member States review the draft report, and consult with governments and within the blocs.<sup>62</sup> In the last two weeks, negotiations over the draft report’s conclusions and recommendations take place, mainly within the sub-workgroups of the Committee.<sup>63</sup> The last two days of the annual session are supposed to see the unanimous adoption of the report; however, if the Committee is unable to find a compromise in that time, then the session is prolonged.<sup>64</sup>

C-34 is presided over by a Chair, four Vice-Chairs, and a Rapporteur, with Nigeria traditionally serving as the Chair of the committee since 1972.<sup>65</sup> During the creation and review of the draft report, the Committee currently divides into eight sub-working groups and a Working Group of the Whole.<sup>66</sup> The Working Group of the Whole holds a special position as it is tasked with coordinating the recommendations of the Committee’s annual report and thus the

<sup>50</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945; UN General Assembly, *Rules of Procedure*, 1945; UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/2006(XIX))*, 1965.

<sup>51</sup> UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/68/277)*, 2014.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 30.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 30; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2; Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 36.

<sup>61</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>64</sup> Cutillo, *For Special Committee on Peacekeeping, the Devil is Still in the Details*, 2013.

<sup>65</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>66</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014, Annex I.

work of the other sub-working groups that draft the content of the annual report.<sup>67</sup> The Working Group of the Whole is traditionally chaired by Canada and has been since 1966.<sup>68</sup> The Chair of the Working Group of the Whole decides how to divide the work of the Committee into sub-working groups based on an assessment of the report draft.<sup>69</sup> Sub-working groups are formed, each responsible for different parts of the draft report, which are later combined and presented to the whole committee to be adopted as the annual report.<sup>70</sup> In 2014, C-34 decided to limit the number of sub-working groups to eight in order to streamline the drafting process of the annual report.<sup>71</sup> While some sub-working groups only address one specific thematic issue, e.g. peacebuilding, others combine sections dealing with a range of themes, based on the volume of paragraphs to be reviewed.<sup>72</sup> The combined draft segments are then later presented to the members of the committee for discussion and review.<sup>73</sup>

Since 2007, to facilitate all of the above, the duties of the secretariat of C-34 which provides the committee substantive support, has been shared with the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) for further streamlining the cooperation of the bodies involved in peacekeeping.<sup>74</sup> In addition, the Disarmament and Peace Affairs Branch of the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management provides technical and procedural support to the Committee.<sup>75</sup>

The membership of C-34 is “determined by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly after appropriate consultations.”<sup>76</sup> The GA has expanded membership of C-34 over the years as more Member States have become involved in the UN’s peacekeeping activities.<sup>77</sup> In 1989, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became the 34th member (leading to the common title C-34) after the PRC decided to send its first troops to a peacekeeping mission in the same year.<sup>78</sup> The membership was further increased in 1997 to include past or present troop and personnel contributors to peacekeeping operations.<sup>79</sup> From then on, Member States who served as observers at the 1996 session of C-34 and Member States which contribute personnel in future years or which participate as observers for three consecutive years can, upon written request, become members of C-34 at the following year’s session.<sup>80</sup> Also observers, having received a standing invitation to participate, may take part in the sessions of C-34, without the right to vote.<sup>81</sup> Consequently, intergovernmental organizations and other entities involved in aspects of peacekeeping such as the African Union, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), participate as observers.<sup>82</sup> As such, as of August 2014, C-34 had 147 members and an additional 14 other Member States, intergovernmental organizations, and entities attend as observers to the Committee.<sup>83</sup>

### **Functions and Powers**

The main function of C-34 is, as outlined in General Assembly resolution 2006 XIX and its consecutive resolutions, is the “comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects,” as well as

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<sup>67</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014, Annex I.

<sup>72</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 30.

<sup>78</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011,

<sup>79</sup> UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/51/136)*, 1997.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> UN General Assembly, *Observers*, 2014.

<sup>82</sup> UN DPI, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>83</sup> UN DPI, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*, 2014.

updating and advising the General Assembly on all peacekeeping operations.<sup>84</sup> Although C-34 was originally founded with the main aim of reviewing the methods of financing UN resolutions, its tasks have evolved and now encompass reviewing all issues related to peacekeeping operations.<sup>85</sup> It is thus the only entity within the UN System that has a comprehensive review and guidance mandate for all UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>86</sup> This mandate puts C-34 in the key position, together with the Secretary-General, of initiating reforms and further developing the field of peacekeeping as well as evaluating existing structures, concepts, and developments.<sup>87</sup> As C-34 is a body of the General Assembly, new issue areas and ideas for potential action are initiated by its Member States.<sup>88</sup> Before an idea or concept to be reviewed is brought to C-34, informal discussions between Member States and the Secretariat are held and concept papers are shared.<sup>89</sup> If Member States are receptive to the new concept, then it is presented at a formal session of C-34.<sup>90</sup> As a next step, the Secretariat is requested by Member States to deliver a report on the possible impact of the respective idea, including its financial implications.<sup>91</sup> If an idea then gains approval by consensus by C-34 it is implemented in its annual report section on proposals, recommendations, and conclusions.<sup>92</sup> The report is then presented before the General Assembly Fourth Committee and usually ultimately approved by the General Assembly.<sup>93</sup> The concept is then presented to the General Assembly Fifth Committee for budgetary considerations.<sup>94</sup> After approval by the Fifth Committee, the new concept is adopted by the General Assembly in a resolution.<sup>95</sup> For example, in 1989 C-34 in its annual report included the idea of compiling a registry containing information on the availability of troops for peacekeeping operations, which lead to vast consultations between the UN Secretariat and Member States throughout the 1990s.<sup>96</sup> This initiative ultimately led to an agreement in 2002 on “strategic deployment stocks” (SDS) of troops, which eases the rapid deployment of today’s peacekeeping missions.<sup>97</sup>

For the implementation of new initiatives on peacekeeping C-34 works very closely with other UN peacekeeping organs, especially the DPKO and the Peacebuilding Commission.<sup>98</sup> Conversely, the work of these relies heavily on the effectiveness and quality of C-34’s work both as a primary initiator of new programs from the side of the Member States and a reviewing organ of existing practices.<sup>99</sup> Specifically, the DPKO and the DFS often work directly with C-34, for example, on establishing training methods based on good practices that were recognized in the annual report.<sup>100</sup> Also, in response to the Committee’s annual reports, the Secretary-General’s office releases its own annual report detailing progress made in implementing the recommendations and proposals of C-34, as well as progress in the area of improving arrangements for the planning, management, and oversight of missions.<sup>101</sup> This means that C-34 has the task of evaluating the overall concepts behind peacekeeping and initiating reforms as it has done, for example, in the fields of training, troop safety and security, and the cooperation with regional

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<sup>84</sup> UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/2006(XIX))*, 1965; UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/68/277)*, 2014.

<sup>85</sup> UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/2006(XIX))*, 1965; Bothe, *Peace-Keeping*, 2002; Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 35; IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011.

<sup>86</sup> Cutillo, *For Special Committee on Peacekeeping, the Devil is Still in the Details*, 2013.

<sup>87</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 35.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/44/301)*, 1989, para. 32.

<sup>97</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 33.

<sup>98</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifth session (A/68/729)*, 2012.

<sup>100</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>101</sup> UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report by the Secretary General (A/67/632)*, 2012.

arrangements, especially in Africa.<sup>102</sup> Then, the Secretary-General reports on the progress made on the C34's recommendations in the "Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations," which is issued a few weeks before the opening of the following special session.<sup>103</sup> As such, the Secretary-General and especially the DPKO outlines, and in the case of the DPKO, executes concrete reform proposals and programs, for example, the development of standardized training modules for peacekeeping forces.<sup>104</sup>

### ***Current Priorities***

The current strategic framework of the General Assembly underlines the central position of C-34 in the field of peacekeeping. The DPKO and the Department of Field Operations are requested to "provide substantive and technical support to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, including follow-up on decisions related to peacekeeping operations taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly." Furthermore, the "Proposed strategic framework for the period 2014-2015" asserts that the departments of the GA "will implement the recommendations of the Special Committee."<sup>105</sup> C-34's current priority is to implement reforms of the Committee proposed from 2011-2014 on streamlining its working methods for drafting the annual report.<sup>106</sup> C-34's current substantial priorities include strengthening operational capacities; developing strategies for complex peacekeeping operations, including gender and peacekeeping as well as the protection of civilians; strengthening of regional arrangements, especially in Africa; and continuing efforts to improve the training of peacekeeping personnel.<sup>107</sup>

### ***Recent Sessions***

At the start of its 2014 annual meeting, C-34 was still in a reform period that was initiated by the Committee at the 2010 session and strengthened in its 2010 and 2011 draft reports.<sup>108</sup> This reform has dominated recent sessions. Disagreement on the working methods and the modalities of the Committee's annual report were the major cause of the delays of the report during the last few years.<sup>109</sup> The reforms aim at improving the efficiency of the work of the Committee by reviewing and adapting its working methods.<sup>110</sup> For this reason the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) were commissioned to carry out a short-term research project surveying C-34 Member States to identify ways and means to improve the working methods of the Committee.<sup>111</sup> As a result, C-34 has implemented several working method reforms since 2012, and the Committee further reformed the process of drafting the annual report in 2014.<sup>112</sup> Thus C-34 concluded its annual meeting in its planned time for the first time in many years, ending the session on 21 March 2014.<sup>113</sup>

Beyond the reform of its structure and working methods, C-34 in its most recent session addressed a wide range of topics: restructuring peacekeeping; enhancing African peacekeeping capacities; cooperating with troop contributing countries; developing stronger UN field support arrangements, accessing triangular cooperation between the SC, the

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<sup>102</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 35; UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report by the Secretary General (A/67/632)*, 2012.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 35, 42.

<sup>105</sup> UN General Assembly, *Proposed strategic framework for the period 2014-2015. Part two: biennial programme plan. Programme 4: Peacekeeping operations (A/67/6(Prog. 4))*, 2012.

<sup>106</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014, p. 5.

<sup>107</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>108</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/64/19)*, 2010; *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, (A/65/19)*, 2011; International Peace Institute, IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>109</sup> Cutillo, *For Special Committee on Peacekeeping, the Devil is Still in the Details*, 2013; International Peace Institute, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34*, 2011.

<sup>110</sup> IPI & CIC, *Enhancing the Work of the C-34: An options paper presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> Cutillo, *For Special Committee on Peacekeeping, the Devil is Still in the Details*, 2013; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>113</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

Secretariat, and troop contributing countries; and sharing best practices and training.<sup>114</sup> The issue of the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel is currently of special concern for C-34 and propositions to address these concerns range from strengthening the *Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the Optional Protocol* (1994) to assessing redeployment policies, leadership, and the use of modern technologies.<sup>115</sup> Another point of focus is the conduct and discipline of peacekeepers.<sup>116</sup> Specifically, in 2014 C-34 recognized improvements, but nevertheless reaffirmed the importance of continued and strengthened efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse.<sup>117</sup> Finally, one of the main issues in the 2014 report is the development of strategies for complex peacekeeping missions, taking into account issues such as the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, gender and peacekeeping, and the protection of civilians.<sup>118</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is the UN's primary organ for the evaluation of peacekeeping in all its aspects. Its annual report, once endorsed by the GA, is a crucial component of the process, providing legitimacy for the peacekeepers and their collective support by all Member States.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, C-34 is the key body for Member States to initiate reforms aiming at the overall improvement of the methods of peacekeeping, the training and equipment of peacekeepers, and cooperation with regional organizations and arrangements.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 36-55.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 56-71.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 56-71.

<sup>118</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014, paras. 106-226.

<sup>119</sup> Cutillo, *For Special Committee on Peacekeeping, the Devil is Still in the Details*, 2013.

<sup>120</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005*, 2007, p. 31.

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*Simma's commentary is commonly seen as the most decisive book on the Charter of the United Nations. The commentary also provides vast information on the legislative history of the Charter and discusses the general meaning and problems of the different Articles of the Charter in great detail. In addition to comments on each Article of the Charter, the commentary also includes a very comprehensive chapter on peacekeeping by Bothe that provides an overview of the development and legal grounding of peacekeeping missions. The chapter also encompasses a very extensive, although not up-to-date, bibliography on peacekeeping that can be consulted for further research.*

Doyle, M. & N. Sambanis. (2007). Peacekeeping Operations. T.G. Weiss & S. Daws (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (pp. 117-135). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

*The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations provides a good general overview of all relevant aspects of the UN. In this article, in particular, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis give an overview of the genesis of modern-day peacekeeping that also includes police missions and other state-building programs. The article addresses both historic developments as well as theoretic models for effective peacekeeping. The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations is a recommended read for all delegates that want to learn about the general principles of the functioning of the UN. For delegates more familiar with the topic, it also provides good theoretical insights.*

Hanrahan, M. (2007). The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005. *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Volume 11*. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, pp. 29-45.

*Mike Hanrahan was the Military Adviser to Canada's Permanent Mission to the United Nations and served as the Canadian Representative to C-34 from 2002 to 2006. This paper, although it puts a special emphasis on the 2005 report, provides a good overview over the history of the Special Committee. It elaborates on the working methods of the Committee and its relation to other UN institutions. Furthermore, C-34's most important initiatives of the 1990s and their genesis are explained in detail. The paper is thus central for getting an inside view into the work of C-34.*

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*The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations tasked the International Peace Institute (IPI) with conducting this study and survey of the members of C-34 on concerns related to the working methods and output of the Committee. Based on over 100 interviews with representatives of Member States, the IPI outlines concerns raised and then lists reform options for consideration by C-34. For delegates, the paper also provides an excellent overview of the working methods and inner mechanisms of C-34.*

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*The annual report released by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations outlines and provides updates on various subjects related to peacekeeping efforts, as well as the Committee's membership. It is essential for delegates to familiarize themselves with this report, not only because it is the most recently released report, but because it is the principal document summarizing the Special Committee's activities and findings each year. Moreover, the 2014 report contains an annex on the new working methods of C-34 that finally reforms the Committee's working methods.*

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## I. Strengthening Regional Arrangements in Africa

*“The African Union has taken on responsibilities in complex political environments with the authorization of the Security Council, often in cases where the African Union has a comparative advantage and where conditions have not been conducive to a United Nations peacekeeping role or where the United Nations and the broader international community have been divided on the best course of action.”<sup>121</sup>*

### **Introduction**

Chapter VIII of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) outlines the important role that regional organizations play in maintaining international peace and security, and to echo this ideal, there has been increased coordination between the world’s principle peacekeeping organ and regional arrangements.<sup>122</sup> Since 2006, the United Nations (UN) has placed more emphasis on its relation to regional organizations and especially the African Union (AU) given its large involvement with conflict in the region.<sup>123</sup> It is mentioned separately in each report by the UN Secretary-General on peacekeeping and also has its own section in every report by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34).<sup>124</sup> In a recent speech, the Director of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Hervé Ladsous, emphasized the importance of the African continent to the practice of peacekeeping, as 87% of peacekeeping personnel currently work in Africa.<sup>125</sup> Ladsous emphasized that a strong partnership with the major actors on the continent is essential to accomplishing peacekeeping mandates.<sup>126</sup>

Many challenges remain for peacekeeping in Africa. A proper understanding of the limitations of peacekeeping on the continent, as well as the options available for coordination between the UN and African regional arrangements, will pave the way for finding new solutions.<sup>127</sup> To facilitate the understanding of its overall structure and how it is used to maintain peace and security in the African continent, an introduction to the AU and its development of mechanisms to maintain peace and security will be presented. To further develop this, an analysis of the main issues facing peacekeeping missions in Africa and the critical role of the C-34 is included, followed by a case study of the African Standby Force (ASF), which offers an explanation of its unique role in regional peacekeeping in Africa.<sup>128</sup>

### **International and Regional Framework**

#### *The African Union and the African Peace and Security Architecture*

In the 2002 AU Summit in Durban, Member States of the AU adopted the *AU Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council*.<sup>129</sup> This new protocol intended to practice a policy of collective responsibility and “non-indifference” in the face of conflicts in Africa.<sup>130</sup> The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was subsequently adopted as a “framework for conflict management,” and its efforts include: collecting information about possible and ongoing crises, mediation efforts, prevention initiatives, peacekeeping initiatives as well as ensuring financing for peace and security endeavors.<sup>131</sup> In 2003, the AU officially created the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a body analogous to that of the UN Security Council (SC), which has the mandate of preventing and managing aftermath of conflict on the continent.<sup>132</sup> Like its UN counterpart, its decisions are binding for all AU Member States.<sup>133</sup> The PSC is composed of 15 members, selected from each of the five sub-regions in Africa:

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<sup>121</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009, p. 17.

<sup>122</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VIII.

<sup>123</sup> UN General Assembly, *Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU (A/61/630)*, 2006.

<sup>124</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012 Substantive Session (A/66/19)*, 2012.

<sup>125</sup> Ladsous, *New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> Security Council Report, *Adoption of a Resolution on Regional Partnerships in Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>129</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 2.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>132</sup> AU, *Peace and Security Council (PSC)*.

<sup>133</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 5.

Central Africa, East Africa, North Africa, South Africa, and West Africa.<sup>134</sup> Each of these sub-regions has a dedicated regional organization known as a Regional Economic Community (REC) that works with the AU to implement the APSA, among other responsibilities.<sup>135</sup> They are individually responsible for the management and prevention of conflict within their sub-region.<sup>136</sup> Examples include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the East African Community (EAC).<sup>137</sup> The PSC is at the core of the APSA's implementation, and oversees four distinct mechanisms: the Panel of the Wise (POW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the African Standby Force (ASF), it also manages the African Peace Fund.<sup>138</sup> The African Peace Fund was created to provide the central financing of peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and the MSC to provide guidance on military matters.<sup>139</sup>

The uniqueness of this arrangement is that it provides autonomy for the AU when dealing with conflict situations, and allows the continent to take increased responsibility for its own security.<sup>140</sup> As explained in a 2007 statement by the president of the UN SC: "regional organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of many conflicts closer to home and to influence the prevention or resolution, owing to their knowledge of the region."<sup>141</sup> Nonetheless, the AU relies heavily on the UN system for guidance on peace and security issues, and their mutual collaboration has proven exemplary in the field of peacekeeping.<sup>142</sup>

#### *AU-UN Partnership*

During the 2005 World Summit, UN Member States committed to a capacity-building program for the AU over 10 years.<sup>143</sup> In 2010, the UN established the UN Office to the African Union to provide support and capacity-building to the AU in its peacekeeping endeavors.<sup>144</sup> The UN Office was specifically created to provide support in the areas of planning, operations, capacity-building, technical expertise, and management.<sup>145</sup> The 2012 report of the C-34 explains that the UN and the AU have a "strategic relationship," one that must be cultivated at all levels (operational, tactical, and strategic).<sup>146</sup> Likewise, the 2012 Secretary-General's report on the "Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations" (A/67/632) notes: "[i]n Africa, integrating the strengths of the United Nations and the African Union has become an indispensable part of the international community's response to crises on the continent. It has proven essential for the United Nations to work in tandem with regional or subregional actors."<sup>147</sup> UN Security Council resolution 2167 (2014) on "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," the most recent resolution adopted in cooperation with regional partners, specifically highlights regional organizations' ability to provide unique help to a conflict by offering an understanding of its root causes, providing early warning and early assistance, protecting women and children, or even adding flexibility to a peacekeeping mission.<sup>148</sup>

#### *Role of the International System*

Given the preeminence of PKOs in Africa, it is important to understand the current state of the partnership between the UN and the AU in terms of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping in Africa works on a "three-tier approach": first, the UN SC must authorize an AU-led mission, and following, the AU PSC authorizes the RECs to operationalize and deploy

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<sup>134</sup> AU, *Peace and Security Council (PSC)*.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014.

<sup>138</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 5.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007, p. 2.

<sup>142</sup> AU, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study*, 2010.

<sup>143</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 7.

<sup>144</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security (S/2011/805)*, 2011, p. 7.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>146</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 2012 Substantive Session (A/66/19)*, 2012, pp. 45-46.

<sup>147</sup> UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/67/632)*, 2012, p. 12.

<sup>148</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014.

a force.<sup>149</sup> There have been times, however, when if a crisis requires it, the AU will deploy an independent force without UN SC authorization, as was the case with ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone.<sup>150</sup> In resolution 1631 (2005) the SC also requested that the AU have a dedicated section in each Secretary-General's report about an African PKO.<sup>151</sup> The UN Security Council asserted the importance of this cooperation with the AU in several presidential statements, including 2004/27, 2004/44, 2007/7, and 2007/31.<sup>152</sup> Relevant SC resolutions on the subject include 2167 (2014) on "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations" and 2033 (2012) on "Cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security."<sup>153</sup>

DPKO has had an AU Peace Support Team since 2006, which provides particular support for and attention to cooperation between the AU.<sup>154</sup> The UN has also established a Joint Task Force for Peace and Security to discuss specific issues as they arise, and which involves the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), DPKO, the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security.<sup>155</sup> The Department of Political Affairs provides targeted support to the AU for the development of the POW.<sup>156</sup> Cooperation between the two organizations was furthered with the creation of the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2006.<sup>157</sup> It is an excellent example of the advantages of UN-AU cooperation: in preparation for the deployment of the mission, the AU provided critical political leverage with the government of Sudan, and facilitated the rapid deployment of African troops to the country, thus addressing the need for protection of the local population in the midst of violent conflict.<sup>158</sup>

A number of other actors also play a role in supporting African peacekeeping. The AU receives guidance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and financial support from the European Union (EU).<sup>159</sup> The EU is the largest donor to the AU PSC, with contributions of over 300 million Euros in 2009.<sup>160</sup> As part of this ongoing partnership, the EU established the AMANI Africa exercise, a training exercise through which the AU evaluates its readiness to respond to crises.<sup>161</sup>

Civil society organizations (CSOs) have a crucial role in the protection of peace and security in Africa.<sup>162</sup> An AU report documenting the outcome of a meeting between the AU and 28 CSOs in Africa notes the unique position of CSOs in supporting the work of the PSC.<sup>163</sup> Firstly, CSOs are identified as an important component of the CEWS, as they can provide information on developing conflicts on the ground.<sup>164</sup> As the CEWS is still being developed, particularly in its relationship with the RECs, CSOs are able to fill a crucial gap in providing on the ground information and analysis for conflict early warning. As noted by the EU Commissioner for Development in his closing speech for the 2013 CSO Forum of the EU-Africa Partnership: "we support the emergence of a civil society that can act as a watchdog and partner in dialogue with national governments."<sup>165</sup> A 2007 research paper called

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<sup>149</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 10.

<sup>150</sup> Boutellis & Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships*.

<sup>151</sup> UN Security Council, *Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (S/RES/1631(2005))*, 2005.

<sup>152</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2004/27)*, 2004; UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2004/44)*, 2004; UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007; UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/31)*, 2007.

<sup>153</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014; UN Security Council, *Cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (S/RES/2033(2012))*, 2012.

<sup>154</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 7.

<sup>155</sup> Boutellis & Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships*, p. 5.

<sup>156</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014.

<sup>157</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 7.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> Lamprey, *Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping*, 2007.

<sup>163</sup> African Union Centre for Citizens' Participation, *Civil Society at the AU? What Impact?* 2012, p. 11.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> European Commission, *Civil Society Organisations, a key role to play in Africa-EU relation (SPEECH/13/855)*, 2013.

“Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping” acknowledges that CSOs have unique insight into the dynamics of the host communities within which PKOs are operating.<sup>166</sup> The paper also acknowledges that they can provide support for peacekeeping endeavors both at the policy and operational level, and can facilitate the engagement of peacekeepers with the community.<sup>167</sup> Aside from providing advice and expertise, they can be sources of accountability for the host government.<sup>168</sup> Finally, non-governmental organizations like the International Peace Institute (IPI) provide targeted policy support for the AU.<sup>169</sup> In 2010, the IPI hosted a retreat with AU peacekeeping officials, in the hopes of identifying the main issues facing the ASF and the APSA.<sup>170</sup> The outcome paper identified several issues obstructing the work of the AU and its ability to improve its performance in peacekeeping, including limited resources, financing, and insufficient training and mission capacity.<sup>171</sup> Despite the AU’s efforts in peacekeeping, and its strong connection to the UN system, the organization continues to face several challenges, such as these, that make the fulfillment of peacekeeping mandates on the continent very difficult.<sup>172</sup>

### ***Challenges for Peacekeeping in Africa***

A 2009 report on UN Support to African PKOs highlights the core issues facing the AU, namely the lack of military and civilian capacity, appropriate policy and planning mechanisms, and financial resources.<sup>173</sup> With the evolution of conflicts in Africa, PKOs in the region have been given more robust mandates, particularly focusing on the protection of civilians.<sup>174</sup> These limitations make it difficult for peacekeeping missions to fulfill their increasingly demanding mandates.<sup>175</sup> Yet, they are not the only challenges that face peacekeeping in Africa. When looking at the UN’s and the AU’s assessment of PKOs in the past decade, the following overarching issues have been identified: leadership, capacity and training, coordination with partners, financial support, and safety of peacekeepers.<sup>176</sup>

#### ***Leadership***

According to the 2011 report of the Secretary-General on the “United Nations-African Union Cooperation in peace and security” (S/2011/805), the practice of peacekeeping in Africa suffers from a lack of strong leadership.<sup>177</sup> The SC has stressed the importance of harmonized command and control structures in Africa, using UNAMID as an example.<sup>178</sup> UNAMID is representative of the difficulties of running a joint-operation: duplication of efforts as well as confusion over the line of command and the purpose of the PKO, given that each body provides its own guidance documents for peacekeeping missions.<sup>179</sup> The AU itself is aware of this limitation and explained in its 2010 assessment of the APSA that AU missions often suffer from confusion over their lines of authority and command.<sup>180</sup> Thus, the SC has emphasized the need for a proper definition of roles and lines of authority within African and African-led missions.<sup>181</sup>

Another issue is the difference in priorities between the AU and its RECs; where the AU PSC is concerned with peace and security issues directly the RECs often prioritize issues of poverty, good governance, and overall stability

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<sup>166</sup> Lamptey, *Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping*, 2007, p. 5.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Lamptey, *Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping*, 2007, p. 5.

<sup>169</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>174</sup> Bellamy, *Are New Robust Mandates Putting Peacekeepers More at Risk?* 2014.

<sup>175</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009, p. 5.

<sup>176</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009, p. 5; International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010.

<sup>177</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security (S/2011/805)*, 2011, p. 8.

<sup>178</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007, pp. 11-12.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> AU, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study*, 2010.

<sup>181</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007.

of their societies.<sup>182</sup> As IPI explained in its 2010 report: while the ASF is an important tool, no African conflict will be truly resolved without appropriate peacebuilding, state-building, and conflict prevention strategies.<sup>183</sup> The AU thus must clarify the nature of its interaction with the RECs, maintaining AU leadership but allowing for enough independence at the subregional level so that RECs can respond to urgent crises in a timely manner.<sup>184</sup>

### *Capacity and Training*

Both the UN and the AU have noted that the primary constraint on the performance of the AU is a lack of sufficient administrative staff.<sup>185</sup> The UN recognized that a “lack of sufficient institutional capacity in key management, support and strategic planning functions” is a major challenge for African peacekeeping operations.<sup>186</sup> In a 2007 statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7), the SC noted that the AU needs more and better trained personnel to carry out its peacekeeping tasks.<sup>187</sup> It further emphasized the need for training on gender perspectives in peacekeeping, as well as the need for more female personnel in leadership positions.<sup>188</sup> Managerial-level training has also proven inadequate within the AU.<sup>189</sup> The result of this is that the AU can be especially slow when making critical decisions or operationalizing a mission.<sup>190</sup>

The AU also needs assistance with force generation for its missions.<sup>191</sup> Furthermore, several PKOs in the region lack sufficient equipment.<sup>192</sup> UNAMID, for example, lacks in military equipment, at times limiting the mission’s ability to protect civilians.<sup>193</sup> In the latest Secretary-General’s report (S/2014/562) about the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the Secretary-General noted that one of the main difficulties in the handover from the AU mission to the UN mission was the lack of capacity of the African contingent: AU soldiers had inadequate crowd-control and monitoring abilities, and lacked the necessary medical, transportation and communications tools.<sup>194</sup>

The Secretary-General’s report (A/64/359) outlines a number of ways in which the UN could support AU peacekeeping missions to be more efficient, chiefly by providing expertise, consultation, as well as access to many of its resources, training, planning and administrative material, which the AU could use as a model and adapt to its specific needs.<sup>195</sup> DPKO and DFS could provide institutional support through consultations prior to the deployment of a mission, and assistance in planning and logistics.<sup>196</sup> In 2011, C-34 noted the need for better training centers for the AU’s peacekeeping forces.<sup>197</sup> The 2012 C-34 report additionally suggested using the Integrated Training Service of DPKO to support the AU.<sup>198</sup> In Resolution 2167 (2014), the SC again recommended the exchange of personnel between the UN and the AU.<sup>199</sup>

### *Coordination with Partners*

<sup>182</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 9.

<sup>183</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 9.

<sup>184</sup> Boutellis & Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships*, p. 6.

<sup>185</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007.

<sup>186</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/470)*, 2009, p. 11.

<sup>187</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007.

<sup>188</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014.

<sup>189</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>191</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012 Substantive Session (A/66/19)*, 2012, p. 46.

<sup>192</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2014/515)*, 2014, p. 7.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>194</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2014/562)*, 2014, p. 14-15.

<sup>195</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009, p. 11-13.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>197</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 2011 Substantive Session (A/65/19)*, 2011, pp. 41-42.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>199</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014, p. 6.

Moreover, past instances of duplication of efforts have shown that better communication between the AU and its partners is necessary.<sup>200</sup> A lack of proper coordination in peacekeeping can leave certain security priorities for the AU unmet.<sup>201</sup> The AU also has limited and outdated communications technology, which further hinders coordination with partners.<sup>202</sup> Specifically, there is a need for better coordination with the UN at the policy level to facilitate any future handover from the AU to the UN.<sup>203</sup> The SC has suggested increased consultation in the mission planning process so that both AU and UN needs are met.<sup>204</sup> It has also emphasized that increased political cooperation will lead to more efficient and better implemented peacekeeping mandates.<sup>205</sup> Furthermore, it has suggested using the coordination and information-sharing mechanism established within UNAMID as a point of reference for future peacekeeping missions.<sup>206</sup> The retreat facilitated by the IPI in 2010 showed how the experience of an alliance like NATO could provide guidance for the improvement of the APSA.<sup>207</sup> As explained by the IPI outcome paper: “[s]ixty years of military cooperation, training, and exercises have done “miracles” for interoperability.”<sup>208</sup> Indeed, NATO is a good example of rapid coordination between countries in a conflict situation, and increased collaboration with the organization could prove beneficial for the AU.<sup>209</sup>

### *Financial Support*

The 2010 Assessment Study on the APSA noted that the AU lacked financial independence in the conduct of its peacekeeping operations.<sup>210</sup> The Secretary-General has noted the need for “predictable and sustainable funding” for African PKOs.<sup>211</sup> Insufficient funding means inadequate troop capacity and technology; these limited resources make the transition to an operation led by the UN more difficult and hampers the fulfillment of the mandate.<sup>212</sup> The 2010 Tripoli summit on the EU-AU strategic partnership highlighted and established three main objectives, one of which was “[e]nsuring predictable funding for African-led peace support operations.”<sup>213</sup> So far, voluntary contributions to the African Peace Facility (APF) have proved insufficient to maintain the cost of the operations the AU needs to undertake.<sup>214</sup> Moreover, the AU lacks the proper financial management capacity, making its handling of donations an inefficient process.<sup>215</sup>

### *Safety of Peacekeepers*

UN peacekeeping has evolved over the past year, with a shift towards peace enforcement, both with the intervention brigades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the enforcement component of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).<sup>216</sup> MINUSMA had been authorized to use “all necessary measures” to fulfill its mandate, which implies the use of force.<sup>217</sup> Yet, in the DRC, DPKO decided to deploy specialized forces, “designed to break the persistent cycles of violence in DRC and protect civilians by carrying out targeted operations to neutralize rebel forces” indicating that the previous mandate was in fact limited.<sup>218</sup> Critics argue that this initiative contravenes the peacekeeping principle of impartiality.<sup>219</sup> DPKO has stressed that this will not change the nature and conduct of peacekeeping and that this kind of operation was created

<sup>200</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007.

<sup>201</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security (S/2011/805)*, 2011, p. 8.

<sup>202</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>203</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10-11.

<sup>205</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014, p. 4.

<sup>206</sup> UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7)*, 2007, p. 12.

<sup>207</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 8.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>210</sup> AU, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study*, 2010.

<sup>211</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>213</sup> European Union, *EU Support to African Capabilities*.

<sup>214</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009, p. 6.

<sup>215</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 4.

<sup>216</sup> Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013*, 2014.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>218</sup> International Peace Institute, *Issue Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2013, p. 1.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*



only due to the need of protecting civilians.<sup>220</sup> According to an IPI paper, however, these brigades effectively make the UN a party in the conflict, which has resulted in a violent backlash against both peacekeepers and civilians.<sup>221</sup> UN Peacekeepers and infrastructure have been particularly targeted by this backlash.<sup>222</sup> In addition, similar incidents have taken place in South Sudan, where United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) material has been stolen or damaged, and several of the mission staff have come under harassment and assault.<sup>223</sup> Indeed, UNAMID and UNMISS have the most fatalities out of all operations in 2013 and 2014.<sup>224</sup> Such incidents have been the cause for great concern in the past and have served as a prompt for critical review in previous Secretary-General and C-34 reports.<sup>225</sup>

### ***The African Standby Force***

Article 13 of the AU PSC Protocol establishes that the AU has the right to intervene in cases of “grave circumstances” such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.<sup>226</sup> As such, the ASF was created with the rationale that the AU should address any threat on the African continent before it is referred to the UN.<sup>227</sup> Therefore, the ASF is often seen as an excellent experiment for the improvement of peacekeeping in Africa. The ASF could act as a humanitarian force, a preventive or reactive force, or simply a monitoring one.<sup>228</sup> The ASF is to be comprised by five distinct brigades in each of the five sub-regions of Africa.<sup>229</sup> Each of these components will be based in the home country and will be ready to deploy if an emergency requires it.<sup>230</sup>

The ASF is modeled after UN Standby Arrangement Systems and takes UN peacekeeping as its guidance.<sup>231</sup> All operations are to be based on UN standards and draw from UN guidelines and resources to allow an easier handover to a UN DPKO mission if needed.<sup>232</sup> Likewise, the mandate of any ASF mission must always abide by international Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law standards.<sup>233</sup> Once authorized, ASF operations should be prepared to deploy within 30 days for basic operations, 90 days for multidimensional operations and 14 days for a “robust force” in response to a crisis.<sup>234</sup> The ASF is meant to be operational by 2015; however delays are expected in its establishment.<sup>235</sup> In a press statement in July 2014, the AU PSC explained that the main difficulties with the operationalization of the ASF are “inadequate logistical capacities and funding.”<sup>236</sup> At the logistics level, the framework for the logistics of an operation might differ from the way they are envisioned and carried out by the military staff.<sup>237</sup> Additionally, the PSC requested funding and support for the AU Peace Fund and the Continental Logistics Base, but donations remain low.<sup>238</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

Overall, peacekeeping missions in Africa face a myriad of challenges. The gaps in African peacekeeping missions (lack of sufficient staff, inadequate training, funding, and policy-making) make it clear that peacekeeping in Africa

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<sup>220</sup> International Peace Institute, *Issue Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2013 p. 7.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-13.

<sup>222</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2014/450)*, 2014, p. 14.

<sup>223</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (S/2014/537)*, 2014, p. 14.

<sup>224</sup> Bellamy, *Are New Robust Mandates Putting Peacekeepers More at Risk?* 2014.

<sup>225</sup> UN General Assembly, *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*, 2009.

<sup>226</sup> AU, *The African Standby Force*.

<sup>227</sup> AU, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*, p. 1.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 5.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>235</sup> European Union, *EU Support to African Capabilities*.

<sup>236</sup> AU, *Convening of the First Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)*, 2014.

<sup>237</sup> International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>238</sup> AU, *Convening of the First Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)*, 2014.

needs more support from its UN partners. While many of these issues are related to the AU and its capacity, the C-34 has an important role to play in providing increased and more targeted support for African and African-led PKOs through thorough and guided research and recommendations to the UN system. Through existing coordinating structures, like the AU Peace Support Team, DPKO can provide assistance with training packages or mentoring efforts. The UN Secretariat can also increase its help to the AU by providing more guidance on administrative matters. Moreover, as peacekeeping missions are increasingly given expanded mandates, they will require more financial and human resources. UN SC resolution 2167 (2014) expressed a renewed commitment to the UN-AU partnership in peacekeeping, and has specifically asked for a document on the lessons learned from the handovers in Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, to be submitted by December 2014.<sup>239</sup> This will further influence the decisions of the C-34 in pursuing recommendations for supporting and strengthening regional arrangements in Africa moving forward.

### ***Further Research***

Given these challenges delegates should consider: What expertise can the C-34 provide, and how can it enhance coordination between the UN and the AU on peacekeeping issues? In light of the limitations facing peacekeeping, what can the C-34 do to help improve the performance of the AU and the implementation of the APSA? How can the C-34 work with other UN organs to better support the AU? How can the UN better use its existing coordinating structures with the AU? Given that the ASF is scheduled to be operational within a year, how can UN peacekeeping better support its development? What kind of training expertise can be provided? Finally, given the increased attacks on peacekeepers in certain regions, what can the C-34 suggest to ensure the safety of peacekeeping personnel?

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<sup>239</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))*, 2014, p. 5.

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African Union. (2010). *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study*. Retrieved 30 July 2014 from: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-of-the-apsa-assessment-study-july-oct-2010-eng.pdf>

*The APSA is a complex and ambitious endeavor. Understanding its different elements properly can be difficult, yet this paper simplifies the task. The paper provides ample explanation and historical background for the APSA and its elements and explains the priorities of the AU in that respect. It also identifies some of the limitations of the AU in terms of peace and security. The document is helpful for understanding the way that AU peacekeeping operates and the organization's vision for the future of peacekeeping in the continent.*

African Union. (2013). *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*. Retrieved 11 July 2014 from: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/asf-policy-framework-en.pdf>

*This document is the cornerstone text for the creation of the ASF. The document not only provides a good context for the reasons and motivations behind the creation of the force, but also provides a comprehensive description of its aim and scope. It is a crucial document for delegates to be able to understand the nature of the AU's unique peacekeeping force.*

International Peace Institute. (2010). *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*. Retrieved 28 August 2014 from: [http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi\\_meetnote\\_african\\_standby\\_force\\_8.pdf](http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_meetnote_african_standby_force_8.pdf)

*This is a very insightful paper from the International Peace Institute. It is the outcome paper of a retreat of African military and civilian leaders in 2010. Aside from providing a brief yet comprehensive explanation of the APSA, it also outlines some of the main difficulties in the operationalization of the ASF. As noted in this guide, some of the main issues concern training, capacity, policy and funding. The paper goes into detail on each of these and later provides a list of recommendations for the future.*

International Peace Institute. (2013). *Issue Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Retrieved 11 July 2014 from:

[http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi\\_e\\_pub\\_un\\_intervention\\_brigade\\_rev.pdf](http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_e_pub_un_intervention_brigade_rev.pdf)

*The UN Intervention Brigade was a topic of debate in 2014. Some academics suggest that this unique type of force might acquire greater primacy in peacekeeping missions. Some have suggested that the model used in MONUSCO can be used in Côte d'Ivoire and even potentially in Mali. The IPI provides a thorough analysis of the Brigade and poses crucial questions about operability, functionality, and its implications. Delegates should pay close attention to the questions raised by the paper, as these questions can be applied to any aspect of a peacekeeping mission, particularly in the context of African peacekeeping missions.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-fourth session. (2009). *Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/359)*. Retrieved 2 July 2014 from:

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/359](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/359)

*This report is a crucial resource for this topic. The report brings together the efforts of various departments at the UN, including the Departments of Political Affairs, Field Support, and the Peacekeeping Operations. It also gives an analysis of strategic partnerships. The second section describes the practical necessities of deploying a mission, with a focus on the financial aspect. Further, the third section discusses deployment and describes the objectives of the ASF and the wider objectives of the AU for peace and security alongside it. Together, all of these elements will provide a solid background for delegates on AU peacekeeping.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session. (2012). *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 2012 Substantive Session (A/66/19)*. Retrieved 2 July 2014 from: <http://undocs.org/A/66/19>

*As representatives in the C-34 committee, delegates should look at all the most recent reports by the body itself. This report, dating back to 2012, outlines the committee's latest priorities and endeavors. The list of recommendations provides a good roadmap for delegates to build upon. Furthermore, the dedicated section to the collaboration with the AU will greatly influence the discussions delegates will be having in committee.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-seventh session. (2012). *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/67/632)*. Retrieved 2 July 2014 from: <http://undocs.org/A/67/632>

*This report will be helpful to delegates when considering to what extent the recommendations of this committee have affected the policy and practice of UN peacekeeping. The second section points out specific developments in terms of operations, using UNOCI, AMISOM, MINURSO, and United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) as case studies. Given that these are all African PKOs, this section would be helpful for delegates to track the improvement and remaining difficulties in implementing C-34 recommendations. The sixth section of the report specifically concerns partnerships and focuses on the AU and the developments made on its recommendations for better partnership with the organization.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2011). *Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations-African Union cooperation in peace and security (S/2011/805)*. Retrieved 10 July 2014 from: <http://undocs.org/S/2011/805>

*Section V of this report discusses peacekeeping at length. In particular, it details the development of the African Standby Force, and explains the AMANI training program (2010) and its results. The first sub-section explains the link between the AU and the UN. The second section then tackles lessons learned, giving priority to issues of strategic planning, operational issues, guidance and coordination. Delegates can focus on these sections to improve their knowledge about the UN-AU partnership and its effect on peacekeeping in particular.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2014). *Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2014/515)*. Retrieved 8 August 2014 from: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/515](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/515)

*The latest report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID will provide a good specific example for delegates on the advantages and challenges of AU-UN cooperation. This report explains the context of the situation in Darfur, Sudan, and then engages in a discussion of the main issues that threaten the security of the region. Moreover, the report lists the operational difficulties of UNAMID and provides insight into the nature of the UN's cooperation with the AU. Delegates can use this case as a basis for future mission planning.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2014). *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 1 September 2014 from:

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2167\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2167(2014))

*This is the most recent resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on regional partnerships in the context of peacekeeping missions. The resolution makes several allusions to the AU in particular, emphasizing the historical cooperation it has had with the UN. The resolution commends the work of the AU in certain aspects and encourages further progress in matters of policy development, training, capacity-building, and financing. This resolution outlines the Security Council's priorities in terms of peacekeeping in Africa and should be carefully examined for this reason.*

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United Nations, Security Council, 7228<sup>th</sup> meeting. (2014). *Resolution 2167 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (S/RES/2167(2014))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 1 September 2014 from: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2167\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2167(2014))

Security Council Report. (2014, 25 July). *Adoption of a Resolution on Regional Partnerships in Peacekeeping*. What's In Blue. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from: <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2014/07/adoption-of-a-resolution-on-regional-partnerships-in-peacekeeping.php>

## II. Enhancing Robust Mandates to Deal with Complex Crises

### *Introduction*

Peacekeeping is a primary way in which the United Nations (UN) seeks to achieve its goal of promoting international peace and security.<sup>240</sup> As of July 2014, UN peacekeeping consists of 83,327 serving troops and military observers, 11,420 police personnel, 5,323 international civilian personnel, 11,954 local civilian staff, and 1,798 UN Volunteers that help countries that are devastated by conflict create conditions for lasting peace.<sup>241</sup> Since the UN's first peacekeeping initiatives in the late 1940s, field operations have changed "from "traditional" missions involving generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex "multidimensional" enterprises."<sup>242</sup> The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956, and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONOC) in 1961, were the first steps towards more proactive mandates that involved armed military personnel.<sup>243</sup> Recent conflicts elicited a re-evaluation of peacekeeping as the nature of conflict and conflict prevention has evolved from inter-state to intra-state conflict.<sup>244</sup> As such, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeepers have been "increasingly asked to undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, security sector reform, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants."<sup>245</sup>

Subsequently, the concept of "robust peacekeeping" was developed as an answer to the crisis peacekeeping faced in the 1990s.<sup>246</sup> Robust peacekeeping is an operational doctrine on the use of force for enhancing the United Nations' capacity to protect civilians from human rights violations, and generally enforce the mandate of a peacekeeping mission.<sup>247</sup> By definition, "robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level, with the consent of the host state or the main parties to the conflict."<sup>248</sup> For the Security Council, robust mandates mean the authorization of "the 'use of all necessary means' to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process and protect civilians under imminent threat of attack."<sup>249</sup> Still, an important distinction must be made between robust mandates and "peace enforcement." Though robust mandates allow for the use of force, peace enforcement is what is specifically codified in Art. 42 of the *Charter of the United Nations*.<sup>250</sup> Accordingly, "peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council."<sup>251</sup>

Nowadays robust mandates are the basis for multidimensional peacekeeping missions in a number of complex crises such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali.<sup>252</sup> The concept is also applied in the AU hybrid mission in Somalia.<sup>253</sup> However, the concept is not unchallenged, and multiple actors voice criticism against it.<sup>254</sup> Given this, UN peacekeeping missions are now continuously focused on how best to achieve the goal of promoting international peace and security, and balancing this action with ensuring stability and safety for those involved in missions.<sup>255</sup> As the main UN body dedicated to evaluating peacekeeping missions, this debate falls to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34).<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>241</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *About Us*, 2014.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*; UN Peacekeeping, *Post Cold-War surge*, 2014.

<sup>243</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>244</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *About Us*, 2014.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*; UN Peacekeeping, *Post Cold-War surge*, 2014.

<sup>246</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>248</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2014; UN Peacekeeping, *Principles of UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>249</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Principles of UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>252</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014, 32.

<sup>253</sup> African Union Mission in Somalia, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2013.

<sup>254</sup> Bellamy, *Are New Robust Mandates Putting UN Peacekeepers More at Risk?*, 2014; Tardy, *A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations*, 2011; Hultman, *Robust Peacekeeping: A Desirable Development?*, 2014.

<sup>255</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014, p. 11.

<sup>256</sup> UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/68/277)*, 2014; UN DPI, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*, 2014.



### *International and Regional Framework*

The term “peacekeeping” is not mentioned in the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945).<sup>257</sup> Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping missions, especially robust mandates, are usually authorized by Chapters VI and VII of the Charter by the Security Council.<sup>258</sup> Chapter VI details “the peaceful settlement of disputes” and Chapter VII relates to taking “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”<sup>259</sup> Out of these understandings of when and how the Council can act, UN peacekeeping missions are based on three principles: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in either self-defense or the defense of the mandate.<sup>260</sup> Consent is a key principle because it demonstrates the parties are committed to a political process, and this provides the UN with “the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks.”<sup>261</sup> Impartiality is thus vital to maintaining consent, because it ensures the peacekeeping operation does not become a party to the conflict.<sup>262</sup> Together, this means UN peacekeepers are requested to be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.<sup>263</sup> Finally, “UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool.”<sup>264</sup> However, with the development of the robust mandate, “they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and or defense of the mandate.”<sup>265</sup> On these grounds, the concepts of peacekeeping and robust mandates have been further developed by the UN through various reports by the Secretary-General, mandated groups of experts, and C-34.<sup>266</sup>

#### *1992 Agenda for Peace*

In the 1990s, Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* (1992), requested by the Security Council, was paramount in the development of robust mandates as it redefined peacekeeping and peacemaking specifically towards strengthening, peacekeeping and peacemaking processes.<sup>267</sup> The *Agenda for Peace* emphasized the need for preemptive approaches that countries and international organizations could try, before approaching peacekeeping.<sup>268</sup> It called for peacemaking and peacekeeping in a way that would allow military engagement without necessary conditions of consent of both parties.<sup>269</sup> However, the agenda was based on the premises that peace building is not sufficient to keep the peace, introducing the concept of post-conflict peace building.<sup>270</sup>

#### *Brahimi Report and the Capstone Doctrine*

In 2000, to address the failures of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda and Srebrenica, a panel of experts wrote the *Brahimi Report*.<sup>271</sup> According to experts, the report continues the themes of the *Agenda for Peace*, such as by focusing on the commitment of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>272</sup> The report reinforces the concepts of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force as the key principles of peacekeeping.<sup>273</sup> Furthermore, based on these principles, the report proposed solutions to a number of challenges to peacekeeping; these challenges included the failure to prevent mass atrocities, and the inability of peacekeeping

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<sup>257</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014; Bothe, *Peace-keeping*, 2002, p. 684.

<sup>258</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. VI, VII; Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014; Bothe, *Peace-keeping*, 2002, p. 684.

<sup>259</sup> *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Ch. VI, VII.

<sup>260</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Principles of UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*; Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>262</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Principles of UN Peacekeeping*, 2014; Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>263</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Principles of UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>264</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Principles of UN Peacekeeping*, 2014; Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>266</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014; Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011.

<sup>267</sup> UN Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (A/47/277 - S/24111)*, 1992.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>271</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>272</sup> Durand, *How Did the Brahimi Report Improve the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations?*, 2012; UN General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (21 A/55/305–S/2000/809)*, 2000.

<sup>273</sup> UN General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (21 A/55/305–S/2000/809)*, 2000, p. 48.

missions to deal with de facto hostile “spoiler” groups that seek to undermine peacekeeping missions.<sup>274</sup> The report recommended well-conceived and clearly defined mandates that would allow the use of peacekeeping forces robust enough to fully carry out their mandates and pose a threat to belligerents to discourage them from renegeing on peace agreements.<sup>275</sup> However, more robust mandates, as demonstrated by the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) did not improve the safety of peacekeepers or lead to improved outcomes for the mission.<sup>276</sup>

Reflecting on this, and the partial failure of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Department on Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) published the Capstone Doctrine in 2008, which related the duties and responsibilities of peacekeeping.<sup>277</sup> The doctrine reframed the principles of peacekeeping: First, the impartiality of the peacekeepers was now understood as a lack of partiality, thus, peacekeepers should refrain from taking sides in a conflict only to the extent that this does not undermine their mandate.<sup>278</sup> Furthermore, the host states’ consent on certain robust actions, although still desirable, can be dispensed with if a hostile faction withholds its consent.<sup>279</sup> Additionally, the Capstone Doctrine states that the use of force beyond self-defense can, and should be used to secure the respective mandate of the mission, including, protecting civilians.<sup>280</sup> The Capstone Doctrine thus can be seen as an endorsement of a strategy that involves peace enforcement as an element of peacekeeping missions.<sup>281</sup> The Security Council, however, so far has not endorsed the notion of peace enforcement action in its mandating of peacekeeping operations.<sup>282</sup> Nevertheless, many commentators argue that the robust mandates of missions such as United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC,) now the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are de facto an implementation of the Capstone Doctrine.<sup>283</sup> Finally, most recently, a year before the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Brahimi Report, in early 2009, the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) presented a “non-paper” entitled the *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon of Peacekeeping*.<sup>284</sup> This has created the New Horizon Initiative, which is focused on the future of peacekeeping.<sup>285</sup>

#### *Responsibility to Protect*

At a higher-level, evolving out of the genocides and mass atrocities of the 1990s, such as the genocide in Rwanda, discussions around peacekeeping have recently been greatly informed by discussion around the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect.”<sup>286</sup> As such, in 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formally elaborated on the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P).<sup>287</sup> According to the R2P every state has the responsibility to protect its population from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.<sup>288</sup> If a state is unwilling or unable to fulfill this task, the international community, through the UN and in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means to use “all means necessary” to protect civilians, with or without the consent of the host government.<sup>289</sup> The concept was agreed upon by all the Heads of State and Government at the 2005

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<sup>274</sup> UN General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (21 A/55/305–S/2000/809)*, 2000, pp. 15-28.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>276</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>278</sup> UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 2008, p. 50.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>282</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>284</sup> Jones et al., *Building on Brahimi: a Coalition for Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty*, 2009.

<sup>285</sup> UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1*, 2010, p. 2.

<sup>286</sup> Gerber, *Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect*, 2014.

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>288</sup> UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2014.

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.*

World Summit Outcome and has led to changes to the concept of humanitarian intervention.<sup>290</sup> Despite this global endorsement, R2P's status is weak as many states have concerns about its implementation.<sup>291</sup> The concept nevertheless reflects on the issue of robust mandates in complex crisis as the protection of civilians is now typically one of the main goals formulated in the mandates of missions such of MINUSMA, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MUNOSCO), and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).<sup>292</sup>

### ***Role of the International System***

For the mandating and deployment of robust peacekeeping missions several UN Organs and entities have to work in alliance with troop contributing Member States.<sup>293</sup> This means, in the context of the work by C-34 that dialogue on, and assessment of critical peacekeeping challenges and opportunities has occurs among the Secretariat, General Assembly, Security Council, troop contributing countries, and partners within and beyond the UN System.<sup>294</sup>

#### *Security Council*

The Security Council is the only UN Organ which makes decisions, according to Article 25 of the Charter, that Member States are obligated to implement.<sup>295</sup> Moreover, "it is the UN Security Council that crafts the mandates and determines the character of each new UN peacekeeping deployment."<sup>296</sup> In the context of peacekeeping missions, "the Security Council can vote to extend, amend or end mission mandates, as it deems appropriate."<sup>297</sup> The Security Council also then "monitors the work of UN peacekeeping operations on an ongoing basis through periodic reports from the Secretary-General and by holding dedicated Security Council sessions to discuss the work of specific operations."<sup>298</sup> There are many instances in which peacekeeping is not the best action and so the Security Council is also responsible for potentially sanctioning the deployment of a non-UN peace enforcement mission.<sup>299</sup> Besides the SC's mandating of individual missions the Council also addresses the issue of peacekeeping in general.<sup>300</sup> For example, the Security Council responded to the *Brahimi Report* by adopting the UN Security Council resolution 1327(2000) on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations concerned with improvement of peacekeeping operations.<sup>301</sup>

#### *Secretary-General*

The UN Secretary-General holds a key role in UN peacekeeping.<sup>302</sup> After the Security Council mandates a mission it functions as a subsidiary organ of the SC so the Secretary-General becomes the de facto administrative authority and Commander in Chief over the peacekeepers.<sup>303</sup> The Secretary-General, together with C-34 and Security Council, is also a major initiator of reforms and initiatives in the field of peacekeeping by evaluating existing structures, concepts, and developments.<sup>304</sup> For example, the priority areas of the peacekeeping reform agenda presented in the

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<sup>290</sup> UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2014.

<sup>291</sup> Gerber, *Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect*, 2014.

<sup>292</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (S/RES/2100 (2013))*, 2013; United Nations Security Council, *Extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (S/RES/1925 (2010))*, 2010; United Nations Security Council, *Extension of the Mandate UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/RES/2147 (2014))*, 2014; United Nations Security Council, *Establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 30 Apr. 2015 (S/RES/2149 (2014))*, 2014.

<sup>293</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>294</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005, 2007*, p. 35.

<sup>295</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Principles of UN Peacekeeping*, 2014; UN Peacekeeping, *Role of the Security Council*, 2014.

<sup>296</sup> Weir, *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, 2009.

<sup>297</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Role of the Security Council*, 2014.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

<sup>299</sup> Weir, *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, 2009.

<sup>300</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Role of the Security Council*, 2014.

<sup>301</sup> UN Security Council, *The implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (S/RES/1327 (2000))*, 2000.

<sup>302</sup> Bothe, *Peace-keeping*, 2002, p. 686.

<sup>303</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>304</sup> Hanrahan, *The United Nations Special committee on Peacekeeping Operations: From 1965 to 2005, 2007*, p. 35.

Secretary-General's *Report on Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations* arose out of recent formal and informal discussions.<sup>305</sup>

### DPKO

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations “is dedicated to assisting Member States and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security.”<sup>306</sup> Specifically, the department supports operations by providing political and executive direction and coordinating between the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to conflicts in the implementation of Security Council mandates.<sup>307</sup> This means DPKO combines and coordinates the work of UN, governmental, and non-governmental actors engaged on peacekeeping operations.<sup>308</sup> Finally, “DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions.”<sup>309</sup> For example, in relation to the New Horizon Initiative, DPKO and DFS requested a report by the Center of International Cooperation (CIC), *Building on Brahimi: a Coalition for Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty*, to foster debate on the challenges and opportunities for UN peacekeeping.<sup>310</sup>

### C-34

The role and main function of C-34 is to provide a “comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects” and all issues related to peacekeeping operations, as stated in the *General Assembly Resolution 2006 XIX(1965)* on the comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects and its consecutive resolutions.<sup>311</sup> It is thus the only entity within the UN System that has a comprehensive review and guidance mandate for all UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>312</sup> Consequently, the growing complexity of peacekeeping missions as well as the development towards more robust peacekeeping mandates is a recurring topic in C-34's annual reports.<sup>313</sup> Specifically, C-34 addresses robust mandates under the report items “safety and security” and “strategies for complex peacekeeping operations.”<sup>314</sup> Although other reports such as the Capstone Doctrine have developed strategies that make the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement hard to draw, C-34 in its 2014 report reiterated that it deems the “respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping, such as the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and in the defense of a mandate authorized by the Security Council” as essential to the success of peacekeeping missions.<sup>315</sup> The C-34 also addresses the issue of the ongoing reluctance of states to send troops and personnel to missions, which is a crucial issue for large-scale, multidimensional robust missions.<sup>316</sup>

### Regional Organizations

Regional organizations also have adapted to, and take part in, peacekeeping efforts under robust mandates.<sup>317</sup> The major regional organization, which has a strong and active role in peacekeeping, is the African Union (AU).<sup>318</sup> The UN Security Council and the AU work in close collaboration in their peacekeeping efforts, as demonstrated in Somalia, where a UN mandated robust AU peacekeeping force is deployed.<sup>319</sup> The UN and the AU have also worked together to launch hybrid missions; the UNAMID mission in Darfur, established in 2007, was the first such

<sup>305</sup> UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/64/573)*, 2009; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1*, 2010.

<sup>306</sup> UN Peacekeeping, *Department for Peacekeeping Operations*, 2014.

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>310</sup> Jones et al., *Building on Brahimi: a Coalition for Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty*, 2009.

<sup>311</sup> UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/2006(XIX))*, 1965; UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/RES/68/277)*, 2014.

<sup>312</sup> Cutillo, *For Special Committee on Peacekeeping, the Devil is Still in the Detail*, 2013.

<sup>313</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>317</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>319</sup> African Union Mission in Somalia, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2013.

mission.<sup>320</sup> Other regional organizations that engaged in UN mandated missions with a peacekeeping component are the EU and NATO.<sup>321</sup> Both have independently engaged in robust peacekeeping missions, most notably in the case of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.<sup>322</sup>

### *Understanding the Need for Robust Mandates*

United Nations peacekeeping missions struggle to fulfill their mandates in regards to protecting civilians and preventing parties from derailing the peace process.<sup>323</sup> This means, “They have at times been forced to navigate limited consent and differences within the international community regarding the strategy they should follow.”<sup>324</sup> These difficult missions have been confronted with “lack of adequate capabilities and support structures to enable effective mandate implementation.”<sup>325</sup> Yet, there are several reasons why robust mandates are considered necessary.

#### *Protection of Civilians and the Mandate*

In the last 20 years, peacekeeping expanded following an increase in conflicts at the end of the Cold War.<sup>326</sup> At the same time, peacekeeping shifted towards multidimensional missions deployed in inner state conflicts.<sup>327</sup> However, many peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, especially in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia, were not mandated and not equipped and prepared to deal with complex crises that involved multiple, partly hostile actors; they failed in preventing mass atrocities and genocide.<sup>328</sup> Peacekeeping forces face harsh challenges in retaining peace, ranging from violence, the absence of a cease-fire in the country, overly ambitious goals, very hostile internal environments, and withdrawal of state consent.<sup>329</sup> Clear, yet robust mandates, combined with highly trained and disciplined troops in sufficient numbers therefore seem to be a possible answer to today’s complex crisis.<sup>330</sup>

#### *Safety and security of UN Peacekeeping Forces*

When peacekeeping missions first began, it was assumed that UN personnel would not be attacked if they ended up in a compromised situation external to their mission.<sup>331</sup> This began to change in 1992, however.<sup>332</sup> Then, “The threat to United Nations personnel was directed explicitly to voice disagreement with, and opposition to the decisions of the Organization with regard to its Charter mandates.”<sup>333</sup> As such, UN personnel were attacked just because they worked for the UN.<sup>334</sup> Moreover, UN “operations in impoverished areas of the world led to yet further resentment on the part of local populations who viewed UN personnel as representing a superior economic class. This generated animosity against UN personnel which, to those affected, justified, attacks on UN personnel and property.”<sup>335</sup>

The increasing trend of attacks against peacekeeping forces has also prompted states to seek more effective legal protection for their UN personnel.<sup>336</sup> As a result, states adopted the *Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel* in 1994, and subsequently, its Optional Protocol in 2005.<sup>337</sup> Specifically, “The Convention was a quick attempt to fill a legal vacuum, mindful that there were a number of reasons behind the escalation of attacks against United Nations personnel that could not be resolved by a legal instrument. The Convention imposes

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<sup>320</sup> UN African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, *African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 2014.

<sup>321</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014, p. 57.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>323</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1*, 2010, p. 7.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>326</sup> Bothe, *Peacekeeping Forces*, 2011, p. 15; Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014, p. 10.

<sup>327</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014, p. 10.

<sup>328</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>330</sup> UN General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (21 A/55/305–S/2000/809)*, 2000.

<sup>331</sup> Arsanjani, *Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*, 2013.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*

an obligation on a State hosting a United Nations operation to protect UN personnel and property.”<sup>338</sup> Yet, the fact is that many United Nations operations are in failed states or states where governments do not have complete sovereignty, so this protection is not only difficult, but also unrealistic.<sup>339</sup> Unfortunately, this means that with the Convention, “attacks against United Nations personnel have continued and in some cases even escalated.”<sup>340</sup> These concerns have led to a focus on robust mandates, giving peacekeepers better means by which to protect themselves and civilians in mandates.<sup>341</sup>

### ***Concerns about Robust Mandates***

Despite the above reasons why robust peacekeeping mandates are warranted, the concept is not free of concerns and criticisms.<sup>342</sup> It is feared that by allowing a peacekeeping mission to enforce its mandate with force that the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement distinguishes, the line between them is detrimentally blurred.<sup>343</sup> Furthermore, it is argued that the new robust mandates implemented in the missions in Mali, the DRC, and the CAR might put peacekeepers more at risk of being killed in action, which might also lead to Member States becoming less willing to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions.<sup>344</sup> An example for these concerns is the debate on the expansion of the mandate of MONUC.<sup>345</sup> Despite the fact that expanding the mission to a robust mandate was seen as the best logistical option, there were, and are, serious reservations expressed about doing so, including lack of proper negotiation time for Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013) on the situation in the DRC.<sup>346</sup>

As well as reiterating fears about the safety and security of peacekeepers, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation have expressed their fears that “involvement in peace enforcement could compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations.”<sup>347</sup> On the UN peace enforcement option for Mali, Assistant Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, Edmond Mulet, warned that UN peacekeepers “are neither trained nor equipped to implement such a mandate.”<sup>348</sup> Moreover, as “What’s in Blue”, an organization that reports on the UN Security Council explained, “Russia, the only Council member that explained its vote on resolution 2100, expressed its concern about the growing shift towards the military aspects of peacekeeping and highlighted that ‘what was once the exception now threatens to become unacknowledged standard practice.’”<sup>349</sup> Should UN peacekeepers lose impartiality, they may be perceived of as a party to an armed conflict, with implications under international humanitarian law such as being considered combatants and legitimate targets.<sup>350</sup> Finally, along with these concerns about impartiality, safety, the militarization of peacekeeping and higher death tolls, there are also other concerns regarding, training capabilities and feasibility of such resources.<sup>351</sup>

### ***Examples and Common Themes***

Many different recent examples such as missions in Goma in the DRC, Mali, and CAR demonstrate the purpose of robust mandates to carry out offensive operations to neutralize armed groups that threaten the authority of the state and the security of civilians.<sup>352</sup> In 2013, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2098 (2013) on the

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<sup>338</sup> Arsanjani, *Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*, 2013.

<sup>339</sup> Bellamy, *Are New Robust Mandates Putting UN Peacekeepers More at Risk?*, 2014; Tardy, *A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in contemporary Peace Operations*, 2011.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> Labuda, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*, 2014.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

<sup>344</sup> Bellamy, *Are New Robust Mandates Putting UN Peacekeepers More at Risk?*, 2014.

<sup>345</sup> What's In Blue, *Open Debate on New Trends in UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>346</sup> Ibid.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> Security Council Report, *February 2014 Monthly Forecast: In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013*, 2014.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>351</sup> Bellamy, *Are New Robust Mandates Putting UN Peacekeepers More at Risk?*, 2014; Tardy, *A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in contemporary Peace Operations*, 2011.

<sup>352</sup> UN Security Council, *Extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 31 Mar. 2014 (S/RES/2098 (2013))*, 2013; Security Council Report, *February 2014 Monthly Forecast: In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013*, 2014.

situation in DRC, which aimed at establishing an intervention brigade in Goma in the DRC.<sup>353</sup> In Mali, the AU Peace and Security Council asked on 7 March 2013 that “the new mission be given a peace enforcement mandate to actively sustain efforts aimed at dismantling the terrorist and criminal networks operating in the north of the country.”<sup>354</sup> With regards to Mali, Security Council members had only a few options such as “establishing a UN political mission alongside the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) or a multidimensional integrated UN stabilization mission under Chapter VII alongside French forces.”<sup>355</sup> On 10 April 2014, the Security Council voted to authorize a UN force in CAR with a robust mandate to protect civilians under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>356</sup> The recommendation was part of a report from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the Security Council relating to the concern that the violence could evolve into genocide and that a “de facto partition” of the country was becoming established in CAR.<sup>357</sup> According to the report from the Secretary-General, “The key focus of the United Nations mission in the initial stage must be the protection of civilians.”<sup>358</sup> The report also stresses that more troops are needed in the CAR to address the situation in the initial phase of the peacekeeping operation.<sup>359</sup> Some Security Council Members are expected to be less enthusiastic due to the costs associated with an operation like this.<sup>360</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Robust mandates were developed as a reaction to the failures of UN peacekeeping methods in dealing with the complex, mostly internal, state crises that began to dominate peacekeeping efforts in the 1990s. Peacekeepers were neither able to protect civilians from mass atrocities and genocide nor enforce their respective mandates. Furthermore peacekeepers themselves became targets by conflict parties that did not adhere to previous cease-fires and other agreements. Although certain missions with robust mandates like UNAMID were not deemed successful, the currently-deployed missions in the CAR, the DRC, and Mali appear to be better suited than the previous missions in protecting the civilian populations. However, robust mandates have suffered from many problems, including lack of governmental consent, high expenses, higher numbers of casualties among peacekeepers, and the reluctance of some key international players to embrace the concept. Moreover, it is clear that robust mandates can only be one aspect of contemporary peacekeeping tools such as post-conflict reconstruction, the (re)establishment of the rule of law, or demobilization and disarmament efforts. Ultimately, as the Security Council Report, a non-profit that reports on the UN Security Council states, if UN peacekeepers “are to be deployed in increasingly volatile settings with more robust mandates, a shared understanding about the new boundaries of peacekeeping will probably need to be developed, not only taking into account specific situations, but also reflecting on the broader legal, political, and operational implications.”<sup>361</sup> Based upon this evaluation, the implementation of the concept be further refined. The role of C-34 is to provide a general report for the problems that face all robust mandates, rather than discussing each mandate specifically.

### **Further Research**

Examining the problems and prospects of robust mandates as a tool for resolving complex crises, delegates should consider several questions for further research, and their Member State’s position on the issue. Issues and questions to consider include: is the “militarization” of peacekeeping and the blurring of lines towards peace enforcement the right way to address inner state conflicts? Should peacekeepers become actively involved or should they rely on the consent of the conflict parties? How could more Member States be convinced to contribute troops and funds to peacekeeping missions, robust, and otherwise? How should countries finance robust mandates, as they are more expensive than observer mandates? How can large-scale robust peacekeeping forces be deployed more

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<sup>353</sup> UN Security Council, *Extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 31 Mar. 2014 (S/RES/2098 (2013))*, 2013.

<sup>354</sup> UN Security Council, *Letter dated 15 March 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/163)*, 2013.

<sup>355</sup> Tardy, *Mali: the UN takes over*, 2013.

<sup>356</sup> Better World Campaign, *The UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Central African Republic*, 2014.

<sup>357</sup> Charbonneau, *U.N. proposes Central African Republic peacekeeping force*, 2014.

<sup>358</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>361</sup> Security Council *February 2014 Monthly Forecast: In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013*, 2014.

economically? What kind of training do peacekeepers in robust mandates need to fulfill their tasks in the field? How can casualties among peacekeepers be reduced?



## Annotated Bibliography

Bellamy, A. (2014). Are New Robust Mandates Putting UN Peacekeepers More at Risk? [Website]. *IPI Global Observatory*. Retrieved 2 August 2014 from: <http://theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/750-new-robust-mandates-putting-un-peacekeepers-at-risk.html>

*This source explains the variety of ways in which robust mandates have made being a UN peacekeeper even riskier. Specifically, the source explains this comes from the fact peacekeepers are now more closely with contestable political objectives, which means they are frequently closer to armed groups. Moreover, peacekeepers, such as in Mali, the DRC, and CAR, are no longer guaranteed to be perceived of as neutral and impartial which makes them more at risk. Finally, this source explains that these threats to UN peacekeepers also potentially impact those the peacekeepers are there to protect.*

Better World Campaign. (2014). *The UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Central African Republic* [Website]. Retrieved 1 August 2014 from: <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping/missions/central-african-republic.html>

*This source explains the conditions in CAR regarding the measures that are to be taken in order to calm things down in the area. It provides a detailed list of the UN peacekeeping mandate mission in addition to the number of UN peacekeeping troops that are to be deployed. It goes into detail regarding the threats that were posed on the UN missions in CAR due to the instability in the region and the inability of peacekeeping missions to take effective measures. Gaining control and proving the basic necessities of having a functional state was hard.*

Charbonneau, L. (3 March 2014). UN proposes Central African Republic peacekeeping force. *Reuters*. Retrieved 30 July 2014 from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/us-centralafrican-un-idUSBREA221UL20140303>

*This source is important because it evaluates the complex relationship between countries that fund and countries that contribute troops to UN peacekeeping missions. It also explains how countries may need to obtain domestic approval for peacekeeping missions. Beyond these generalities, this source is also useful because it then details the peacekeeping force in the Central African Republic, which provides a concrete example of the challenges facing peacekeeping missions.*

Gerber, R. (2012). Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect. *The Interdependent*. Retrieved 10 October, 2014 from: <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=485>

*This short piece explains the evolution of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect and how this has coincided and informed a discussion by the international community to “refine the basic identity of UN peace operations.” Specifically, the piece details many tensions in the notion of current peacekeeping such as how operating in ambiguity has led to a focus on mandates and missions focused on civilian protection. Based on this, the author then focuses on how the principle of the Responsibility to Protect changes the discussion around political consent in peacekeeping. Despite this, the author highlights that though the Responsibility to Protect is contentious, it is not necessarily contentious in peacekeeping.*

Security Council Report. (2014). *February 2014 Monthly Forecast: In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013*. Retrieved 27 July 2014 from: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-02/in\\_hindsight\\_changes\\_to\\_un\\_peacekeeping\\_in\\_2013.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-02/in_hindsight_changes_to_un_peacekeeping_in_2013.php)

*This source provides an overview of the conditions occurring in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali regarding the use of robust mandates. It refers to resolutions 2098(2013) and 2100(2013) adopted by the Security Council. The first deals with the intervention brigade in DRC and the second deals with establishing the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which are integral in explaining the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in these two countries as instability continues to occur.*

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. (2010). *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1*. Retrieved 11 November 2014 from: [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon\\_update01.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon_update01.pdf)

*This source is a crucial read for delegates because it outlines the New Horizon Initiative, which was presented in 2009 on how to reform the UN peacekeeping agenda, and provides a critical review of the reform process. The report explains that having a “robust approach” falls into policy development reforms around the creation of peacekeeping mandates, and in this point the paper also stresses the role of C-34 for this discussion. Finally, though brief, this report is also useful because it highlights some differences between Member States and the UN in terms of how robust mandates are perceived. As a response to this, the report lists many areas that Member States want more information and discussion on which will probably align with the concerns and areas of research for delegates as well.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-eighth session. (2014). *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*. Retrieved July 13 2014 from: <http://undocs.org/A/68/19>

*This is the most recent report of C-34 to the General Assembly on all aspects of peacekeeping and, as such, it is important that delegates read this document to understand the current priorities and issue areas being debated by the committee. While there are many specific conclusions and recommendations, delegates should read this to understand the relationship between C-34 and the Security Council and the ways in which they uphold the Charter. Also, although robust mandates are not explicitly discussed, there are several different recommendations related to the safety and security of peacekeepers and especially the strengthening operational capacity that relate to the issue of evaluating robust mandates.*

United Nations Peacekeeping. (2014). *Principles of UN Peacekeeping* [Website]. Retrieved 5 September 2014 from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml>

*This Website is a great initial source for delegates seeking to understand the UN’s approach to peacekeeping. In particular, it details the three principles of peacekeeping outlined in the above guide: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. For each, the page clarifies why the principle is needed. In presenting these principles, the page relates to how these principles reflect the Charter and touches on how evaluation of these principles is conducted.*

Weiss, T. (2014). The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to protect in a Uni polar Era, *Security Dialogue*, 35(2).

*This source is useful with regards to the debate over drawing the lines between humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. It also addresses the debate over sovereignty and the right of the state to not allow such intervention in its internal affairs, since peacekeepers require the consent of states.*

What’s in Blue. (2014, June 10). *Open Debate on New Trends in UN Peacekeeping* [Website]. Retrieved 1 August 2014 from: <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2014/06/open-debate-on-new-trends-in-un-peacekeeping.php>

*This report provides an inside look into the inner workings and debates at the Security Council, specifically as relates to the 2014 open debate on peacekeeping. As the page explains, this debate for 2014 focused on “establishment of more robust mandates, the use of new technology in peacekeeping operations, inter-mission cooperation and multidimensional mandates.” In reviewing robust mandates, this source is a good starting point for delegates because it explains the evolution of debate on the topic in terms of the events of 2013 and peacekeeping missions such as MINUSMA. Finally, as the guide mentions throughout, there is a difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and this source highlights this debate and, to this end, the report presents a brief discussion about the debate around “muscular” mandates in dangerous environments.*

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### III. Enhancing the Use of Technology in Peacekeeping Missions

*“The “low-tech” or “no-tech” attitude of some UN officials could endanger the lives of the peacekeepers and the civilians that the UN forces are mandated to help protect.”<sup>362</sup>*

#### **Introduction**

The United Nations (UN) is tasked with addressing challenges at the global scale, and one such challenge lies in its role as an international peacekeeping body. UN peacekeepers are deployed to some of the world’s most dangerous and less visible conflict zones.<sup>363</sup> Discussion regarding the role of peacekeepers can often be dominated on how to implement the Responsibility to Protect or what level of force peacekeepers should be able to use.<sup>364</sup> Technology has become increasingly important in modern militaries; however, UN peacekeeping forces lag far behind these modern militaries given their failure to actively adopt technology as it evolves, at times even lagging behind rebel forces.<sup>365</sup> The Force Commander of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) reiterated this idea, stating: “negative forces are increasingly resorting to the use of more sophisticated military technology to achieve their objectives.”<sup>366</sup>

Rapid technological advancements have impacted military capabilities in extraordinary ways.<sup>367</sup> Not only has new technology led to more powerful and precise weaponry, but it has also increased the ability to monitor opponents.<sup>368</sup> While the UN has taken small steps in addressing its technological shortcomings with substantive materials, technological advances have not been widely accepted and implemented in peacekeeping operations.<sup>369</sup> The UN has not taken a direct approach to addressing its lack of action on technology; procurement has been slow, and there have been few documents referring directly to technology in peacekeeping operations.<sup>370</sup> Opportunities for technological implementation include surveillance, intelligence gathering, and promoting safety of civilians and peacekeepers, among others.<sup>371</sup> There is a long way to go, but with developments in technology, there is great potential to vastly improve the planning and execution of peacekeeping operations with items like Geographic Information System (GIS), mobile phones, and Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs).<sup>372</sup> As security operations become more complex, the UN must continue to reevaluate the use of technology in peacekeeping operations to protect both the lives of peacekeepers and civilians, and to successfully fulfill the operation’s mandate, all while maintaining cost effectiveness.<sup>373</sup>

#### **International and Regional Framework**

The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament is a relatively new topic for the UN.<sup>374</sup> The first of such discussions occurred on 7 December 1988 with GA resolution 43/77 followed by the first report 45/568, adopted in 1990. Resolution 45/60 was also adopted on 4 December 1990.<sup>375</sup> Resolution 43/77 noted the importance of the role of technology in promoting international security.<sup>376</sup> Following these developments, *An Agenda for Peace: Prevention diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping* was published in 1992 by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.<sup>377</sup> In the report, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali looked to analyze the weaknesses

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<sup>362</sup> Dorn, *Give peacekeepers the tools they need*, 2011.

<sup>363</sup> Dorn, *Technology for Peacekeeping: Tools of the Trade?* 2007.

<sup>364</sup> Holt & Taylor, *Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations*, 2009.

<sup>365</sup> Dorn, *Give peacekeepers the tools they need*, 2011.

<sup>366</sup> UN Security Council, *Force commanders of UN peacekeeping missions brief on main challenges*, 2013.

<sup>367</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> UNODA, *The Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security and Disarmament*, 2014.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>376</sup> UN General Assembly, *Scientific and technological development and their impacts on international security (A/RES/43/77)*, 1990.

<sup>377</sup> UN General Assembly, *An Agenda for Peace Preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General (A/47/277)*, 1992.

of peacekeeping and recommend ways to strengthen and increase their efficiency.<sup>378</sup> The document established the direction the UN would take to improve its peacekeeping operations and to fulfill each operation's specific mandate.<sup>379</sup> According to the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the "Brahimi Report," the UN must make changes in order to meet critical 21<sup>st</sup> century peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges.<sup>380</sup> One of the changes included encourages the UN to be adaptable in adopting technology.<sup>381</sup> The UN followed the Brahimi Report with the *Global Field Support Strategy* (GFSS), which examines the importance and challenges of optimal logistical support, such as communication, transportation of personnel and supplies, or access to water for peacekeeping operations.<sup>382</sup> The goal of the GFSS is to build on the Brahimi Report and develop a forward thinking agenda for UN Peacekeeping.<sup>383</sup> In a world that has rapidly adopted technology in both the civilian and military capacity, UN peacekeepers are followers, not leaders, in adopting technology.<sup>384</sup> While the Brahimi Report included some discussion about the use of technology, it examined many other aspects in peacekeeping operations, leaving the topic of technology use by peacekeeping forces incomplete and subsequently rarely addressed by other peacekeeping doctrines.<sup>385</sup>

### ***Role of the International System***

UN peacekeepers have been applying various forms of technology to aid locals and work towards fulfilling the peacebuilding element of more complex mission mandates.<sup>386</sup> These technologies range from Boat Simulators in Haiti to Literacy apps for female police in Afghanistan, to a fingerprints program in South Sudan.<sup>387</sup> As peacekeeping missions continue to become increasingly complex and span across multiple UN departments, the UN will need to adopt the technology to sustain missions and better fulfill peacekeeping mandates.<sup>388</sup> The gradual implementation of technologies into the UN system demonstrates this understanding but lacks the speed to match the growing for demand for peacekeeping and expanding mandates of missions.<sup>389</sup> Further, the lack of full-preparedness of UN peacekeepers to uphold with their prime directive of providing peace and security, notably lackluster equipment because their preparedness is decided based on differing national standards, has garnered concern about personnel safety from troop contributing countries (TCCs).<sup>390</sup>

Thus, understanding the need for technology, as the Brahimi Report has suggested, requires numerous actors to better fulfill peacekeeping mandates.<sup>391</sup> The United Nations Cartographic Section (UNCS) provides support for Geographic Information Systems (GIS) research and, in collaboration with other experts, has created and maintained a geodatabase on international boundaries.<sup>392</sup> The use and analysis of data generated by GIS continues to support UN missions and the participating agencies in a variety of ways.<sup>393</sup> For example, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) uses GIS to evaluate humanitarian situations and to coordinate aspects like camp management, health, communications, water, and sanitation.<sup>394</sup>

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), which reports to GA on the state of peacekeeping in the organization and provides recommendations for the UN on potential system-wide improvements to peacekeeping.<sup>395</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> UN General Assembly, *An Agenda for Peace Preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General (A/47/277)*, 1992.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>380</sup> Durch, Holt, Earle, et al., *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*, 2003.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>382</sup> UN DPKO, *The "New Horizon" Process*, 2014; UN General Assembly, *Global field support Strategy: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/633)*, 2010.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>384</sup> Dorn, *Tools of the Trade?: Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007.

<sup>385</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping (A/55/305)*, 2000.

<sup>386</sup> UN DPKO, *A Force for Peace. Change. The Future*, 2014.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>390</sup> Dorn, *Technology for Peacekeeping: Tools of the Trade?* 2007.

<sup>391</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 2000.

<sup>392</sup> Esri, *UN Uses GIS to Promote Peace and Provide Aid*, 2010.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>395</sup> UN General Assembly, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*, 2014.



As such, the C-34 can play a vital role in updating outdated legal frameworks, such as the Brahimi Report, to include more modern concerns.<sup>396</sup> While the 2013 session ended without the adoption of a substantive report, the 2014 report reiterated that technology is becoming imperative for success in peacekeeping and should be integrated in all peacekeeping operations, especially to improve situational awareness and the safety of peacekeepers.<sup>397</sup> However, it also stated that technology used in peacekeeping must adhere to the principles of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945).<sup>398</sup>

Beyond C-34, peacekeeping agencies at the UN will play a crucial role in bringing technological advancements to peacekeeping. In June 2014, on the recommendation of C-34, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) announced the appointment of a five-member Expert Panel to advise the DPKO and DFS on how best to use new technologies to benefit peacekeeping.<sup>399</sup> The panel was convened in response to both departments looking to discover the efficiency gains and cost savings from the use of new and emerging technologies and innovations.<sup>400</sup> From here on, the panel will advise on how technologies can be used in the increasing number of complex and multidimensional tasks in the field, as well as increasing operational effectiveness and safety.<sup>401</sup> The report from the panel is expected by November 2014.<sup>402</sup>

### ***Opportunities in Technology***

Technological improvements can support peacekeeping through information gathering, operational deployment, public information capacity, and logistical support.<sup>403</sup> Technology for the UN can be broken into two themes, uses and types. Intelligence is vital to any military mission, and peacekeeping missions are no different.<sup>404</sup> The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) demonstrates how technology can be used to support peacekeepers.<sup>405</sup> To address the challenge of gangs that had taken control of the country, MINUSTAH implemented a variety of surveillance technologies, such as image intensifiers and night-vision, and they also concealed plans from local police (often who were corrupt and worked to thwart UN operations).<sup>406</sup> As shown by MINUSTAH, enhancing technology goes beyond supplying heavy equipment, like satellites or UAVs.<sup>407</sup> It also means employing the use of surveillance, alerting, and prevention technology such as GIS, acoustic sensors, and taught wire fencing.<sup>408</sup>

#### *Surveillance*

Surveillance is the practice of observing the sky, surface, or sub-surface and recording the results for further examination and implementation of humanitarian or military operations.<sup>409</sup> One of the newest surveillance tools are UAVs, which are difficult to detect given their small size and decreased sound, allowing them to better track enemy troop movements and provide safer conditions for peacekeepers while surveying the field.<sup>410</sup> UAVs have a number of advantages over traditional fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters: the UN does not allow for planes to fly at night for fear of crashing; however, a downed UAV is not a time-sensitive recovery operation, given that there is no pilot to retrieve.<sup>411</sup> Thus, eliminating this concern.<sup>412</sup> Furthermore, UAVs leave helicopters free to provide support to

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<sup>396</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/66/19)*, 2012.

<sup>397</sup> UN DPI, *Approving Draft Resolution, Fourth Committee Urges Implementation Of Proposals By Special Committee On Peacekeeping Operations*, 2014; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>398</sup> UN DPI, *Approving Draft Resolution, Fourth Committee Urges Implementation Of Proposals By Special Committee On Peacekeeping Operations*, 2014; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>399</sup> UN DPKO, *USGs Announce Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>403</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 2000.

<sup>404</sup> Dorn, *United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence*, 2010.

<sup>405</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>408</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>409</sup> Global Security, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations*, 2014.

<sup>410</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011; Better World Campaign, *The UN's Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: US Support and Potential Foreign Policy Advantages*, 2013.

<sup>411</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011, p. 70.

other portions of the operation and are a more cost-effective alternative for surveillance.<sup>413</sup> In one month, a UAV can accomplish the same amount of surveillance in 200-250 flying hours compared to 600-700 helicopter flying hours.<sup>414</sup>

In addition to fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs, aerial surveillance uses satellites and balloons to provide stable and long-term information.<sup>415</sup> Satellites provide a record of what actually exists on the ground, which provides a common ground for stating facts and making decisions.<sup>416</sup> Furthermore, balloons can serve as permanently visible markers of borders or cease-fire lines, navigation aids, or communication relays.<sup>417</sup> Though seeming to be a step away from advanced technology, tethered balloons are useful for observing areas like corridors or choke points; these balloons can stay in the air for weeks without needing to refuel.<sup>418</sup> All of these technologies can make missions safer for peacekeepers, allowing them to better fulfill their mandates.<sup>419</sup>

### *Intelligence and Information Gathering*

Intelligence is the result of the collection and analysis of information through surveillance.<sup>420</sup> In addition to physical technologies, such as UAVs or helicopters, software like GIS add an additional level of providing information and support on sensitive and important decision-making.<sup>421</sup> GIS are systems that allow the user to “visualize, question, analyze, and interpret [visual] data to understand relationships, patterns, and trends” or create and manipulate “interactive maps.”<sup>422</sup>

At the UN, GIS infrastructure allows information to flow between offices and field missions to coordinate support in operations.<sup>423</sup> The database uses authoritative information such as treaty maps and text, coordinates, and satellite imagery to highlight potential conflict areas to support conflict prevention activities and to enhance readiness for boundary demarcation issues.<sup>424</sup> GIS was used by the African Union and United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to implement the Darfur Mapping Project.<sup>425</sup> During the UNAMID mission, GIS-generated maps of the Darfur region gave peacekeepers detailed topographic information, which allowed them to optimize operation effectiveness and efficiency.<sup>426</sup> GIS was also used in Lebanon by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to create a Security Warden Information System (SWIS), which provided security teams accurate visual information related to important locations, such as UN positions, evacuation locations, and incident locations.<sup>427</sup>

In addition to the military functions, GIS is used to support humanitarian operations.<sup>428</sup> MINUSTAH provides an example of the uses of GIS in humanitarian situations.<sup>429</sup> Following the earthquake Haiti in 2010, MINUSTAH and UNCS used GIS to optimize situational awareness and support operations on the ground; the data was additionally made available to the public, which helped non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Member States, and other UN entities in Haiti conduct their humanitarian operations.<sup>430</sup> While the cost of satellite imagery and professional GIS services are expensive, the prices are decreasing over time, which will make the technology more widely available to use in the future.<sup>431</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011, p. 70.

<sup>413</sup> Better World Campaign, *The UN’s Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: US Support and Potential Foreign Policy Advantages*, 2013.

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>415</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011.

<sup>416</sup> UN DPKO, *The Use of Digital Satellite Images in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2003.

<sup>417</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011.

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>419</sup> New York University Center on International Cooperation, *Technological Innovations and Peace Operations*, 2012.

<sup>420</sup> Global Security, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations*. 2014.

<sup>421</sup> Esri, *UN Uses GIS to Promote Peace and Provide Aid*, 2010.

<sup>422</sup> Esri, *UN Uses GIS to Promote Peace and Provide Aid*, 2010; Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011.

<sup>423</sup> Esri, *UN Uses GIS to Promote Peace and Provide Aid*, 2010.

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>425</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>429</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>430</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>431</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011.

### *Communications and Mobile Technology*

While mobile networks and mobile technology around the world have continued to improve, the UN has yet to harness the growing reality of a wider communication network.<sup>432</sup> Handheld devices have moved from being mere telephones to being handheld computers or “smartphones.”<sup>433</sup> Smartphones allow the user to use a camera, a GPS, or the Internet, in addition to maintaining voice and text functionality.<sup>434</sup> Adopting smartphones allows peacekeepers to access and share information quickly and effectively about situations on the ground, like outbreaks of violence.<sup>435</sup> Mobile networks also allow for peacekeepers to engage with the local population through ‘crowdsourcing,’ where civilians can provide SMS or voice information about human rights abuses, outbreaks of violence, or infrastructure damage.<sup>436</sup> Furthermore, smartphones allow peacekeepers to visualize the specific path of violence through voice and SMS alerts sent by the local population, giving details regarding the time, location, and a description of the event.<sup>437</sup>

Other technologies include the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) and motion sensors.<sup>438</sup> Both technologies provide ample time to alert security forces and other personnel about intruders.<sup>439</sup> In Cyprus, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland demonstrated that with only 6 CCTV cameras, the cost of monitoring a cease-fire could be cut by nearly 90% each year, while this also allowing the footage to be shown to both conflicting sides during negotiations to aid in achieving a peace outcome.<sup>440</sup> Motion sensors not only detect intruders, but can also trigger lights or CCTV.<sup>441</sup> Both of these technologies remain inexpensive, meaning they could be widely applied in UN missions; yet they rarely are.<sup>442</sup>

### *Safety and Security*

Peacekeeping is a 24-hour operation, and thus a great deal of activity occurs at night.<sup>443</sup> With the lack of night-vision technology, peacekeeping becomes a “daytime job.”<sup>444</sup> Illegal activity is often carried out at night, not during the light of day, which means peacekeepers lose their ability to counter such activity, thus hampering the success of the mandate.<sup>445</sup> In short, peacekeepers are blind for nearly 12 hours while the enemy has complete control over the region.<sup>446</sup> The DPKO has several hundred night-vision devices, all of which are deployed over various missions; however, this is far from sufficiently supplying the thousands of personnel deployed across the globe, many of which should be on night patrols and conducting effective night sentries.<sup>447</sup>

### *Challenges to Enhancing Technology*

The DPKO has recognized the challenges peacekeepers face when working with dated equipment, as noted particularly by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous.<sup>448</sup> He explained, “we are operating in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and we cannot continue just using tools of 50 to 100 years ago. We have to be current with all the developments in the world.”<sup>449</sup> Realizing the necessity to provide proper equipment to their personnel, the DPKO has slowly begun to address the problem to ensure peacekeepers are a strong force.<sup>450</sup> One of the greatest

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<sup>432</sup> Martin, Martin-Shields, & Dorn, *Smartphones for Smart Peacekeeping*, 2011.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid.

<sup>434</sup> Martin, Martin-Shields, & Dorn, *Smartphones for Smart Peacekeeping*, 2011; Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011, p. 56.

<sup>435</sup> Martin, Martin-Shields, & Dorn, *Smartphones for Smart Peacekeeping*, 2011.

<sup>436</sup> Martin, Martin-Shields, & Dorn, *Smartphones for Smart Peacekeeping*, 2011; Dorn, *Keeping Watch Chapter 4*, 2011, p. 55.

<sup>437</sup> Martin, Martin-Shields, & Dorn, *Smartphones for Smart Peacekeeping*, 2011.

<sup>438</sup> Dorn, *Tools of the Trade?: Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007.

<sup>439</sup> Ibid.

<sup>440</sup> Piesing, *Why are UN peacekeepers so badly equipped for modern conflict?*, 2011; Dorn, *Tools of the Trade?: Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007.

<sup>441</sup> Dorn, *Tools of the Trade?: Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007.

<sup>442</sup> Ibid.

<sup>443</sup> Dorn, *Tools of the Trade?: Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007.

<sup>444</sup> Ibid.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

<sup>446</sup> Ibid.

<sup>447</sup> Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011, p. 43.

<sup>448</sup> UN DPKO, *Reform of peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>449</sup> UN DPI, *New challenges spur UN peacekeeping to become ‘a force for the future’*, 2014.

<sup>450</sup> UN DPKO, *Reform of peacekeeping*, 2014.

challenges faced by the DPKO, however, is the cost associated with obtaining equipment.<sup>451</sup> Given that the UN does not own sophisticated equipment, it is reliant on the use of loaned resources, which are essential to carry out operations.<sup>452</sup> Specifically, TCCs lease the expensive equipment to the UN.<sup>453</sup> Guidelines for these leases are ill defined, and contributions do not cover some of the most important technologies, leaving the DPKO to use older or outdated equipment and forms of technologies.<sup>454</sup>

While there seems to be widespread consensus that new technology is required to support peacekeepers, there remains hesitation in the actual implementation. One of the most glaring issues of sophisticated monitoring and surveillance techniques is the perception that it can be used as a form of espionage by host states or non-state actors on the ground.<sup>455</sup> Concerns have been raised about data gathered by technology, particularly, in regards to the amount of information that would be utilized, how it would be stored, and who would have access.<sup>456</sup>

Technology cannot simply be implemented, however; it also requires training.<sup>457</sup> The Force Commander of MONUSCO Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz noted this concern in regard to surveillance: “[it] could be seen as excessively intrusive unless properly controlled,” he cautioned, adding that advanced technology often required skilled operators and analysis”, resources that are frequently in short supply for UN missions.<sup>458</sup> These concerns were addressed in the 2014 C-34 report, which outlined the importance of a training curriculum in using technologies, which is often lacking, though they have not yet been implemented.<sup>459</sup>

### **Case Study: UAVs**

The UN took a large step forward in intelligence gathering when the Security Council (SC) granted permission for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, for the first time as part of MONUSCO; they were deployed in December 2013.<sup>460</sup> The expansive eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where most of the fighting currently takes place, is dominated by a lack of infrastructure and dense forests, making it dangerous and difficult for UN ground forces to patrol and maintain security.<sup>461</sup> With the lack of night-vision technology, peacekeepers were forced to end patrols at sunset.<sup>462</sup> With UAVs, however, these same peacekeepers would be able to survey 24-hours a day using infrared thermal technology.<sup>463</sup> Now with full operational capacity of five UAVs, the mission has constant surveillance of the difficult and dangerous border regions of the DRC.<sup>464</sup> Using drones gives peacekeepers on the ground an added and greater level of situational awareness, which allows them to carry out their mission mandate more cost-effectively, with greater safety, and in more time-efficient ways.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>451</sup> New York University Center on International Cooperation, *Technological Innovations and Peace Operations*, 2012.

<sup>452</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>453</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>454</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>455</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>456</sup> *Ibid*; Apuuli, *The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones) in United Nations Peacekeeping: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo*, 2014.

<sup>457</sup> UN DPI, *Force Commanders Dwell On New Technology, Pre-Deployment Training, Inter-Mission Cooperation In Briefing Security Council On Peacekeeping Operations (SC/11047)*, 2012.

<sup>458</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>459</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>460</sup> UN Security Council, *United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (S/RES/2086 (2013))*, 2013; UN DPKO, *Reform of peacekeeping*, 2014; Patrick, *The Global Response to Armed Conflict: From Aleppo to Kinshasa*, 2014;

<sup>461</sup> Better World Campaign, *The UN's Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: US Support and Potential Foreign Policy Advantages*, 2013.

<sup>462</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>463</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>464</sup> UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2014/450)*, 2014.; Calfas, *IntelBrief: Unmanned Peacekeeping: Are Drones The New Blue Helmets?*, 2014; Better World Campaign, *The UN's Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: US Support and Potential Foreign Policy Advantages*, 2013.

<sup>465</sup> Patrick, *The Global Response to Armed Conflict: From Aleppo to Kinshasa*, 2014.

DRC has also been able to show how UAVs can be utilized as technical aids in improving surveillance and situational awareness.<sup>466</sup> An example of this is when a UAV spotted a ferry in distress On Lake Kivu in eastern DRC a UAV located ferry boat in distress; this resulted in MONUSCO dispatching boats and helicopters to aid the sinking vessel and were able to rescue 15 people.<sup>467</sup> Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ameerah Haq, argued that the ferry rescue demonstrated the flexibility and ability of UAVs to “enhance situational awareness and aid life-saving operations by the provision of real-time imagery to support reactions to incidents.”<sup>468</sup> UAVs may also help to more efficiently track export routes of illicit goods, such as conflict minerals and arms shipments.<sup>469</sup> However, UAVs will not be the all-saving asset for UN peacekeepers; it will require peacekeepers to have the capacity and training to act on the information gathered by the technology.<sup>470</sup> Failure to provide this capacity means the new expectations of peacekeepers will not be met, further damaging the perception of peacekeepers.<sup>471</sup>

Like other data-storing technologies, some SC Member States have expressed concerns over the processing and distribution of the data that UAVs collect.<sup>472</sup> While UAVS often fill the news due to their military capabilities, as stated, MONUSCO UAVs are used only for surveillance purposes and are unarmed.<sup>473</sup> The DRC experience reveals a key challenge regarding data: analyzing it.<sup>474</sup> UAVs have been successfully deployed across the world but have predominantly been used in the desert, where groundcover is sparse.<sup>475</sup> Operations in places of heavy vegetation, topography, and weather conditions, such as the DRC, make analyzing the data significantly more difficult, as these elements reduce or eliminate the visibility of the ground.<sup>476</sup>

UAVs do not come without criticism, however. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that armed drones have a unique ability to destabilize relations and intensify conflict.<sup>477</sup> One aspect, they argue, is by reducing the threshold for authorizing military action through the elimination of pilot casualty, as with no onboard pilot, drones are less responsive to danger warnings that could lessen or prevent a clash.<sup>478</sup> This perspective has fed into the negative connotation with the term “drone”, where drone is often associated with offensive counterterrorism measures, which has challenged the idea of sovereignty and acted with questionable regard towards human rights.<sup>479</sup> The UN consequently must fight against this negative public opinion about drones.<sup>480</sup> For example, MONUSCO first requested UAVs in 2008 and spent the following five years dispelling rumors that it would use armed drones against DRC’s rebel groups.<sup>481</sup> With concerns about armed drones, accountability and transparency, raised by Ben Emmerson, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the UN must continue to demonstrate the benefits of using drones to Member States while also respecting its own recommendations and adequately supporting peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers.<sup>482</sup>

## Conclusion

A decade ago, the UN relied on single-source human intelligence from host country personnel.<sup>483</sup> That reporting is insufficient, inaccurate, and outdated, which puts peacekeepers at risk and threatens the success of missions.<sup>484</sup> By

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<sup>466</sup> Patrick, *The Global Response to Armed Conflict: From Aleppo to Kinshasa*, 2014.

<sup>467</sup> Ibid.

<sup>468</sup> UN DPKO, *Reform of peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>469</sup> Calfas, IntelBrief: *Unmanned Peacekeeping: Are Drones The New Blue Helmets?* 2014.

<sup>470</sup> Blyth, *UN Peacekeeping Deploys Unarmed Drones to Eastern Congo*, 2013; Karlsrud & Rosen, *In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and Use of Drones to Protect Civilians*, 2013; Dorn, *Keeping Watch*, 2011.

<sup>471</sup> Blyth, *UN Peacekeeping Deploys Unarmed Drones to Eastern Congo*, 2013.

<sup>472</sup> Calfas, IntelBrief: *Unmanned Peacekeeping: Are Drones The New Blue Helmets?*, 2014.

<sup>473</sup> UN DPKO, *Reform of peacekeeping*, 2014.

<sup>474</sup> Blyth, *UN Peacekeeping Deploys Unarmed Drones to Eastern Congo*, 2013.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid.

<sup>477</sup> Patrick, *The Global Response to Armed Conflict: From Aleppo to Kinshasa*, 2014.

<sup>478</sup> Zenko and Kreps, *Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation*, 2014.

<sup>479</sup> Blyth, *UN Peacekeeping Deploys Unarmed Drones to Eastern Congo*, 2013.

<sup>480</sup> Calfas, IntelBrief: *Unmanned Peacekeeping: Are Drones The New Blue Helmets?* 2014.

<sup>481</sup> Ibid.

<sup>482</sup> UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Drone attacks UN rights experts express concern about the potential illegal use of armed drones*, 2013.

<sup>483</sup> The Soufan Group, *TSG IntelBrief: UN Mission and ISR Support in Africa: A New Paradigm*, 2013.

adopting new technology for surveillance, intelligence, and defense, the DPKO has the ability to gain the trust of the local and global population to better protect both themselves and their personnel.<sup>485</sup> Simply purchasing technology is not the answer, however.<sup>486</sup> There must be considerations when deciding on what technology to purchase, including operational, legal, political, and institutional implications.<sup>487</sup> There is also a necessity to train peacekeepers on the technology.<sup>488</sup> The technologies must: be useful and practical to UN missions, adhere to the *Charter of the UN* and international laws, deal with the evolving political nature of the UN, handle the differing role of contributing states, and address procurement challenges while also addressing the challenge of financing the upgrades.<sup>489</sup> C-34 has recognized its responsibilities in examining challenges of and given recommendations for technology in peacekeeping; however, Member State and UN implementation remains an issue. Modern and well-utilized technology is key to achieving the objectives of the UN in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and beyond.<sup>490</sup> Failing to address technological shortcomings continues to put peacekeepers in harm's way and continues to waste resources, hindering the progress of missions.<sup>491</sup> Best practices will need to be adapted, but ultimately the integration, proper use, and developing and understanding of technology will provide the best path to success in the future for UN peacekeeping.<sup>492</sup>

### ***Further Research***

Moving forward, delegates should consider the reality that with an interconnected world, the impact that technology has great repercussion not just on the lives of civilians and the world economy, but also on peacekeeping. Lack of adaptation can endanger peacekeepers' lives, the lives of civilians, and the success of entire peacekeeping operations. Delegates should thus consider: how does technology impact the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations? How can technology impact the training of peacekeepers? Can technology support peacekeeping operations while also being integrated into and developing the host community? How can the C-34 best support the UN in pursuing greater use of technology in peacekeeping?

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<sup>484</sup> The Soufan Group, *TSG IntelBrief: UN Mission and ISR Support in Africa: A New Paradigm*, 2013.

<sup>485</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>486</sup> Dorn, *Tools of the Trade?: Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007.

<sup>487</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>489</sup> Dorn, *Tools of the Trade?: Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/68/19)*, 2014.

<sup>490</sup> UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping (A/55/305)*, 2000.

<sup>491</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>492</sup> UN DPKO, "Peace operations 2010" reform strategy: excerpts from the report of the Secretary-General, 2006.

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<http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/assets/pdf/bwc-white-paper-the-uns-use-of-uavs-in-th-drc-may-2013.pdf>

*The document provides delegates with an overview of the impact of UAVs in the MONUSCO operation. By providing a situational background of MONUSCO and the DRC landscape, the report is able to demonstrate why and how the UN decided that UAVs were a necessity to improving their impact in the DRC by reviewing the pros and cons and technical abilities of UAVs. It outlines the benefits to using UAVs and provides polling data regarding public attitudes towards the UN using them.*

Dorn, W. (2007). *Tools of the Trade? Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*. Retrieved 3 August 2014 from:

[http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Library/ToolsOfTheTrade\\_DPKO\\_Dorn\\_10Sept2007.pdf](http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Library/ToolsOfTheTrade_DPKO_Dorn_10Sept2007.pdf)

*As a prominent scholar, Dorn's article provides details and background that demonstrate the necessity for the UN to adopt technology in order to improve work conditions for peacekeepers. The report breaks down the current needs of the UN (improved technology for surveillance, intelligence, and safety), explains how urgent the needs are, surveys the proposed technologies, explains the current UN standards, outlines the challenges of adopting technology, and concludes with recommendations for moving forward. As such, the document provides a robust overview of the challenges facing the UN while also not entering into extremely technical details and language, thus making it an easy read and a key piece in understanding the current state and challenges technology.*

Dorn, W. (2011). *Keeping Watch: Monitoring Technology and Innovation in UN Peace Operations*. United Nations University Press. Retrieved 9 July 2014 from:

[http://walterdorn.net/pdf/KeepingWatch\\_Dorn\\_CompleteBook-WithCovers\\_UNUP\\_2011.pdf](http://walterdorn.net/pdf/KeepingWatch_Dorn_CompleteBook-WithCovers_UNUP_2011.pdf)

*This book outlines the technology and innovation that peacekeepers have and what is needed for peacekeepers to ensure mandate success. It reviews the various aspects of procurement and the technologies that can be used in the field. It also provides case studies to demonstrate the current shortcomings and how technology has positively impacted operations. The book has become a seminal piece in the industry and is written by one of the key scholars in the field, making it a vital resource for delegates.*

Durch, W., V. Holt, C. Earle, & M. Shanahan. (2003). *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*. The Henry L. Stimson Center. Retrieved 10 July 2014 from:

<http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf>

*In response to the Brahimi Report, these scholars undertook to examine how the UN was supporting and intended to support peacekeepers. It takes the ideas put forth in the report, examines the challenges the UN faces in accomplishing them, and looks to provide context on how to accomplish the difficult task that the Brahimi Report urges the UN to work towards. In working towards the goal of consensus, this is all done in an effort to demonstrate that diplomacy and multilateralism are the way of the future to truly promote a safer world in a post-September 11 environment. Finally, it provides recommendations on how to achieve the goals outlined in the Brahimi Report.*

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support. (2009). *A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* [Report]. Retrieved 10 July 2014 from:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>

*The New Horizons Initiative explains the challenges of peacekeepers from the UN's perspective following the Brahimi Report. Such challenges include working with a limited budget (especially during a global recession) with the number of operations requiring peacekeeping assistance rising. Furthermore, it looks to contribute to the dialogue on the future of peacekeeping and stimulate discussion to strengthen UN peacekeeping for the future, by outlining themes that the UN has deemed key to the success of peacekeeping reforms. These themes include: establishing*

*and managing missions; delivery in the field; building capacity; and a new horizon for UN peacekeeping.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Forty-seventh session. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace Prevention diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (A/47/277)* [Report]. Retrieved 4 September 2014 from: [http://www.unrol.org/files/A\\_47\\_277.pdf](http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf)

*An Agenda for Peace is a central document in the development of modern UN peacekeeping. Understanding the changing nature of the world, the UN knew the nature of peacekeeping needed to change. The document outlines the shortcomings and failures of the UN and provides recommendations on how to address them and work towards an improved system. These areas are: peacemaking; peacekeeping; preventive diplomacy; post-conflict building; cooperation with regional arrangement and organizations; safety of personnel; and financing. As this document has been a seminal document dictating the UN's approach to peace and security in recent decades, it is a crucial source of reference to develop comprehensive recommendations.*

United Nations Information Centre: Canberra. (2014, June 28). *Peacekeeping mission commanders brief Security Council* [Press Release]. Retrieved 5 August 2014 from: <http://un.org.au/2013/06/28/peacekeeping-mission-commanders-brief-security-council/>

*Peacekeepers who are impacted directly by the use of technology can provide invaluable insight to the benefits and challenges of implementing technology in the operation. Given their expertise, the Security Council held a meeting to hear insight from senior commanders of UN Peacekeeping Operations. In the meeting, they outlined the benefits their forces have experienced from the use of technology, and reported on where and how the UN can improve, according to their necessity. The commanders talked about issues ranging from UAVs to pre-mission deployment. Understanding perspectives from the field are imperative to understanding the reality of peacekeeping and the full range of the debate.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-eighth session. (2013). *Fourth annual progress report on implementation of the Global Field Support Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General (A/68/637)*. Retrieved 10 July 2014 from: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/637](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/637)

*The report is an annual publication to follow up the initial report on the Global Field Support Strategy. (A/64/633). This update provides delegates with improvements to the field support strategy and outlines the refined end vision for each of the pillars of the strategy. These pillars are: end state for the financial framework and strategic resourcing pillar; end state for the human resources pillar; end state for supply chain management and modularization; end state of shared services; end state for process re-engineering and alignment with other change process; and end state for organization and functional specialization. It also highlights two important priorities that will inform the final phase of its implementation: to ensure the global field support strategy delivers results and alignment with the Secretariat's enterprise-wide solutions as listed above.*

United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2014). *Unmanned Ariel Vehicles in Humanitarian Responses* [Report]. Retrieved 29 September 2014 from: <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Unmanned%20Aerial%20Vehicles%20in%20Humanitarian%20Response%20OCHA%20July%202014.pdf>

*The versatility of Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV) is not overlooked in the UN nor is the organization unaware of the negative public perception towards UAVs. The document outlines the potential use of UAVs for humanitarian situations and purposeful does not cover the legal and ethical implications of armed UAVs or autonomous weapon systems so as to highlight the vital implications of UAVs in humanitarian situations. It provides a technical overview of UAVs, the potential humanitarian use, the challenges to effective use of UAVs, and examines UAVs in conflict settings using three distinct case studies (demonstrating damage assessment, mapping and disaster risk reduction, and assisting peacekeeping efforts).*

United Nations, Security Council, 6987<sup>th</sup> meeting. (2013, June 26). *United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (S/PV.6987)* [Summary Record]. Retrieved 9 July 2014 from: <https://www.undocs.org/S/PV.6987>

*This document is a transcript from the session discussing UN peacekeeping operations and the necessity of expanding the use of technology among UN forces. The meeting included high-*



ranking military officials who provided their expert opinion on procurement and the necessity to improve technology to keep peacekeepers safe, as well as giving them the tools necessary to fulfill their mandate. The experts and members also outlined the items they felt necessary for improving technology in UN peacekeeping forces, including training for technology, surveillance, and intelligence.

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