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Documentation of the Work of the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Committee Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>María Luisa Ortega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>Kasey Erb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Kyra Murphy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapporteur</td>
<td>Simon Arias</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agenda

I. Ensuring the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention
II. Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions

Reports adopted by the Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Code</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Vote (Y/ N/ Abstention/ Non-Voting)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPCW/1/1</td>
<td>Universal Membership and Development</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creating an Incentivized Accreditation System for Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>76/11/49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Cooperation</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Cooperation and Best Practice Sharing</td>
<td>108/5/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revisiting the Action Plan</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three Point Protocol</td>
<td>92/16/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Regional Summit of the OPCW</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing The International Recognition Of The Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
<td>67/15/44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary Report

The Organisation of the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons (OPCW) held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

I. Ensuring the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention
II. Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions

The first session of Sunday consisted of 136 members. The session opened with an immediate vote to set the agenda as 1, 2. During the second session on Monday afternoon, the African Union group started working in two sub-regional groups focusing on education and other similar topics. On the other hand, the European Union group developed a three-part plan based on education, technology, and incentives for proper treatment of chemical waste. Furthermore, there were discussions involving chemical materials’ security, regional cooperation for implementing national legislation, safety protocol and guidelines, responsibility in upholding the CWC through international norms, beyond other subtopics.

The Tuesday morning session began with the addition of 4 working papers for a total of 17. Discussions during informal caucus sessions led working groups to find common ground on the necessity of education in regards to chemical weapon storage and disposal. States Parties focused on highlighting sub-points within working groups. Through intense discourse and much debate both the sub-regional African Union blocs merge their ideas. Another group began negotiations with the newly formed large African bloc to assimilate both commendable papers into a single piece of legislation. In the evening, there was an effort made throughout the committee to merge papers as they appeared to have similar proposals. There were 12 working papers submitted by the end of Tuesday.

After an exhaustive day of debate there was great headway in negotiations for multiple mergers. Several delegations concerned about environmental issues were able to successfully merge creating a draft report segment that addressed the sub-topic of environment as it relates to the CWC. The largest group of negotiations occurred which included a diverse majority of States Parties to the OPCW. The most difficult negotiations that occurred to form this merger were over the issue of explicit compliance interfering with state sovereignty. A greatest breakthrough on the issue of explicit compliance came from a combined effort to agree that international inspectors would work closely with regional bodies working specifically on request of individual nations.

The last day began with great enthusiasm as many working papers were successfully adopted as draft report segments. The African bloc and many other delegations were able to combine their ideas into a comprehensive sub-topic on the sharing of best practices. Through an intense process of diplomacy and cooperation, the body was able to move from the original 17 documents to 9.

Voting commenced in the final session where the body voted on all nine draft report segments. Altogether, four draft report segments were passed by consensus, five more draft report segments were passed by two-thirds majority, and one draft report segment, despite having a majority, failed to reach the two-thirds requirement to be adopted. Within the body, issues such as Information Sharing, addressing non-States Party concerns, Protection of the Environment, and upholding the peaceful use of chemicals were the most significant. The diligent effort of the body resulted in a high level of consensus being achieved within the final report.
I. Introduction

A. Universal Membership and Development

1. The OPCW (OPCW) is the implementing body of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (CWC). The Convention was adopted in 1994 and the Organisation was launched in 1997. The different bodies of the Organisation are the Technical Secretariat, the Conference of the States Party, the Executive Council.

2. The OPCW has the task of preventing any hostile use of chemicals, destroying existing stockpiles and monitoring chemical industry. It is therefore a technical body.

3. The Organisation works closely with the United Nations (UN). Article II of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) ensures the sovereignty of each and every Member State of the UN. The UN Security Council (UNSC) has set up, in 2004, a Committee 1540 in charge of imposing binding obligations to enact legislation so as to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

4. The core objective of the CWC is to free the world from the threat of Chemical Weapons. As of today, only six States have not yet joined the Organisation by acceding to the Convention. Two of them have not ratified but have signed the CWC, while the four others have neither signed nor ratified the CWC. In that perspective, the recent accession of Syria and Somalia to the CWC represents an outstanding and most welcome progress.

5. Article IX of the CWC leads States Party and the Organisation to conclude partnerships amongst themselves and with other international bodies and organizations. Article XI of the CWC, in its spirit, is aimed at facilitating and increasing economic and technological development in the field of chemistry.

6. The Conference recognizes our past relationships with the Biological Weapons Convention, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Security Council, and other international organizations. These partnerships have contributed to build and strengthen the recognition that any kind of WMD is equally reprehensible.

7. The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) was set up in 1998 and is composed of three (3) temporarily working groups respectively entitled with verification, convergence of chemistry and biology and education and outreach. The SAB write and submit reports to the Director-General and the Executive council. The larger reports are submitted to the Review Conferences every five years. The main purpose of the SAB is to keep the Organisation up to date with the aforementioned information.

8. As expressed in the note by the Director-General (RC-2/DG.1) and as stated in the report from the SAB (RC-3/DG.1), “science and technology continue to advance at an accelerating pace in areas that may impact on the Convention”. The SAB receives mandates to draft and publish reports about concerning situations on demand of the States Party. Two reports are also being drafted by each working group and submitted every year to the Director-General.

B. Creating an Incentivized Accreditation System for Civil Society Organizations

9. As stated in Project TE/RAS/09/003 published by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Accreditation Forum (IAF), and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), “accredited ISO 9001 certification brings positive results to certified organizations and their customers, and ultimately to economies.”
10. As stated in Article VII of the CWC, each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.

11. As mentioned in Article II of the CWC, all toxic chemicals and their precursors are prohibited when not used for the intended purpose.

C. Regional Cooperation

12. The founding basis for the OPCW lies not only within the idea of universal disarmament of chemical weapons but within the maintenance of international peace and security. Within the UN Charter, all members of the international community have agreed on the protection of the peoples, including the aspect of protection from chemical weapons and their precursors. With the achievement of the universality of the CWC, we can ensure increased protection of the international community from chemical weapons, thus ensuring increased international peace and security.

D. Technical Cooperation and Best Practice Sharing

13. The CWC was entered into force in 1997 as the main treaty involving chemical weapons and related materials. As an independent body from the United Nations (UN), as reinforced by the UN-OPCW Agreement, the OPCW along with 190 States Party to the CWC strive for a chemical weapons free world through international cooperation. Article X of the CWC focuses on assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and the need for training and education in relation to this. Economic and technological development, specifically emphasized in Article XI, involves the exchange of chemicals and related material, as well as technical cooperation and information in order to build the chemical industry in States Parties. Under the CWC, States Parties are obligated to ensure the provisions of Article VII are achieved, as it calls for national implementation measures involving chemical weapons, the safety of populations and cooperation with other States Parties. The Organisation’s Technical Secretariat seeks to improve the abilities of National Authorities by building their capacity to implement obligations under the CWC, as well as criminalize the misuse of chemicals.

14. Universal adherence to the CWC does not solely provide legal basis to the prohibitions of the CWC at the national level, but provides effective confidence-building measures for reliable and non-discriminatory implementation of the CWC. Regional organizations have provided opportunities to further the goal of universality, however, it is evident that there are challenges to accession and adherence to the CWC. International cooperation between States Party to the CWC remains an international priority, specifically on the regional level. In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, specifically Article 1.3, which promotes international cooperation in solving international problems, the OPCW urges States Party to the CWC to follow suit to ensure international cooperation. To this end, the OPCW requests further facilitation of regional efforts, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) Chemical Industry and Regional Economic Integration Agreement, to promote the maintenance of international peace and security, specifically with regards to chemicals, their precursors, and the possible weaponization of those chemicals. These regional partnerships remain of utmost priority and shall be facilitated through the OPCW to encourage further cooperation on the international level.

15. One of the principal missions of the OPCW, achieving universality, is not a matter of quantity but of quality as well. However, financial and training difficulties have hindered OPCW inspections, therefore prohibiting the achievement of universal adherence. In 2011, the OPCW was only able to comprehensively conduct 68% of the full 293 inspections that were initially outlined. As a result of these financial difficulties, 93 States Parties went without an annual inspection. Cooperation on the international level, with specific ties to voluntary regional cooperation, is imperative to further the universality of the CWC. As stated in the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Further Implementation of the Universality Action Plan, “the contribution of every new State Party to the CWC allows for the fostering of international peace and security”. With possible obstacles faced by States in acceding to the CWC, it is necessary to facilitate cooperation internationally to ensure all States sign and ratify the CWC.
16. The WCO’s Harmonized System along with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association have already established certain primary objectives that the ASEAN outlines in their framework for a chemical safety database. The Roadmap for the ASEAN chemical safety database strengthens the initiatives that have been previously created while also incorporating innovative aspects that would increase sharing information on risks and hazards of each State. This is to enhance transparency and to promote compliance by providing information on each States Parties regulation, to facilitate convergence of their members, and to reduce the costs of duplicative testing for all involved. These databases stand alone and share information within regional groups and international groups.

17. Adopted unanimously, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 highlights the importance of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation. This calls on Member States of the UN, regardless of their participation within international treaties, to develop and enforce legal and regulatory measures concerning the nonproliferation of these weapons. Although the international community has recognized the need for policy formation concerning this, States without the capacity to develop effective national legislation that criminalizes the distribution of chemical weapons components may not have had the opportunity to coordinate or streamline their efforts towards ensuring that nonproliferation is addressed.

18. In the current situation, the international community is facing a new reality where non-state actors, especially terrorist groups, have shown their increasing interest in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. As a consequence, the attacks orchestrated by these groups have increased in number and magnitude. In this order, we must consider illegal trafficking of such weapons as a high barrier for achieving the purposes of the CWC. Illegal trafficking has proven to be easier when borders lack strength and cooperation; therefore it is necessary that we establish border alliances on every level in order to ensure safety within our territories.

19. We are convinced that the Third Review Conference marks a shift in focus to the potential re-emergence of new chemical weapons and recognizing that re-appearance may come not only in form of non-compliance by States but also, and specially by non-state actors. Therefore, we find ourselves genuinely alarmed by the threat non-state actors represent as a significant obstacle for the non-proliferation of WMDs and therefore an obstacle for S/RES/1540 and S/RES/1977.

20. The OPCW is deeply concerned by the lack of an international consensus on a definition for terrorism and therefore the lack of a strong basis to condemn such actions within the OPCW and other UN peace and security bodies. Accordingly, we strongly believe that when fighting terrorism within the international community the optimal strategy has proven to be counterterrorism. On this purpose, we recall that the sharing of data to ensure good practices when eradicating terrorism is of highest importance, as recognized by the S/RES/2129, which notes the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in its publication of framework documentation and good practices regarding counterterrorism on national and international levels.

21. The OPCW recognizes the importance of having a global scope when discussing terrorism; hence it is of utmost importance that we treat it as a universal concept with the aim to establish universal legal obligations for the fight against terrorism. However, we are fully aware that the diversity of legal systems must be taken into account when defining terrorism.

22. As States Parties are diversifying their economies, it is important to track the chemicals or their precursors that could potentially be used towards weaponization. After the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s Harmonized System, which is used by more than 200 Countries, chemicals began to be coded in order to ensure proper transportation and recognition of those chemicals. Understanding the need to further record chemicals is imperative to safety and security of the international community. The Harmonized System will help to track organic chemical compounds that can potentially be used as chemical precursors for their creation of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the Conference of the States Parties recommends that the Technical Secretariat begin open discussions with the Australia Group (AG) to facilitate possible partnerships between the OPCW and the AG entities for the trade of chemicals and precursors.

23. The OPCW recognizes the rapidly changing nature of the chemical industry, which correlates directly for the need of an updated annex on chemical agents. The CWC’s Article XI gives States Parties the opportunity to engage in peaceful chemical trade and information exchange for peaceful purposes, as well as its stipulation that...
States Parties “[n]ot maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in international agreements…which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge”. In line with this, \textit{The Working Paper by the States Parties to the CWC which are Members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and China: Indicative Elements of a Plan of Action on the Full Implementation of Article XI} explores a wide range of solutions concerning peaceful purposes of chemicals and related materials through education and technical cooperation. The paper emphasizes that international cooperation, with stress placed on North-South Cooperation to share information, plays a large role in facilitating these solutions, and also applies to the issues highlighted in the \textit{Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management}. This action plan notes the goal agreed upon in the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, which emphasizes that chemicals are used in ways that minimize significant negative impacts on the environment and human health by the year 2020.

24. The OPCW working in conjunction with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), can execute seminars and programs, which have been done in the past, an example being the thematic workshop entitled \textit{Strengthening National Capacities for Chemical Analysis and Monitoring for Sound Management of Chemical at the OPCW Secretariat at The Hague, The Netherlands}.

25. The OPCW has seen recent success with education programs at the national and regional level. In 2013, El Salvador hosted a basic training course for countries in the Central American and Caribbean region for addressing Toxic Industrial Chemicals. In April 2014, Costa Rica hosted a similar regional advanced training course for responding to toxic chemical exposure. In a most recent effort to garner collaborative education, Argentina hosted the first regional meeting on Education in the Responsible Application of Knowledge of Dual Use Chemicals. The Director-General of the OPCW applauded the efforts of the States Parties for promoting integration among academia and private sector engineers in their work to address dual-use chemicals. Also, since 1996 The Finnish Institute for Verification of the CWC (VERIFIN) has been working directly with the OPCW. Accordingly, its collaboration through providing research and provisions for chemical analysis. VERIFIN is one of the most renowned laboratories and scores high in proficiency tests since its cooperation.

26. Currently, the OPCW provides universal timelines for countries to destroy their respective chemical weapon stockpiles. Given the troubles of existing programs implemented to facilitate this, the OPCW and international community should be more concerned regarding the failure of States Party to adhere to the proposed 2015 time frame for achieving destruction.

27. \textit{The Conference of the States Parties' Decision, Submission of Information Regarding National Programmes Related to Protective Purposes, Pursuant to Article X, Paragraph 4 of the Convention (C-9/DEC.10)} promotes the development of action plans to assist States Parties against threats of chemical warfare. The exchange of resources, personnel, and information in line with such action plans are necessary to continue the work of the Organisation in prohibiting chemical weapon production by States Parties, as well as providing protection in the event of a chemical attack or incident.

28. The Organisation offers incentives under the \textit{CWC’s Article XI} towards the peaceful uses of chemistry while allowing States Parties to develop their chemical industries and pursue economic gains. A list of benefits to joining the \textit{CWC} has been provided by the OPCW, with a focus on financial assistance to support scientific advances and exchanges. States Parties have continued to promote the \textit{CWC} and ensure its relevance by increasing technological cooperation.

E. Revisiting The Action Plan

29. The OPCW (OPCW) is the implementing body of the CWC, which has been signed and ratified by 190 States Party since its inception in 1997. The OPCW has expressed its concerns over the adherence of the CWC to States Party in the global community today, as well as the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by both parties and non-parties of the CWC. The OPCW was also the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

30. The four main responsibilities of the OPCW as listed in the CWC are: destruction of all existing chemical-based weapons under international verification by the OPCW; monitoring the chemical industry to prevent new weapons from emerging; providing assistance and protection to States Party against threats from chemical-
based weapons; and fostering international cooperation to strengthen the implementation of the CWC to
promote the peaceful use of chemistry.

31. All States that are signatories to the CWC are automatically parties of the OPCW. Of the 193 Member States
recognized by the United Nations (UN), six States are not party to the CWC, which include: Angola, Egypt,
Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, and South Sudan. Syria is the latest entrant to the CWC after submitting its
instrument of accession in April of last year. With assistance from the international community and the OPCW,
Angola and Myanmar are on track to ratifying the CWC. South Sudan, which is a relatively newer State in the
international system, intends on joining the organization soon.

32. Ever since the Action Plan was announced by the Executive Council of 2003, thirty-five States Party have
ratified or acceded to the CWC, needless to say, the measures outlined in the Action Plan do provide a
reasonable framework to aid States to ratify the CWC and meet its obligations.

33. The OPCW paid a technical assistance visit to Myanmar in February 2013 and expressed pleasure with the
progress made by the State while suggesting that Myanmar is one step closer to ratifying the CWC. The OPCW
also co-organized two workshops in Luanda on April 22-23, 2013, that were designed to support Angola’s
accession to the CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

34. Two of the key provisions of the OPCW are the monitoring of chemical industry to prevent new chemical
weapons from being introduced to the market and the fostering of international cooperation to strengthen
implementation of the CWC to promote the peaceful use of chemistry.

35. The OPCW is also cognizant of the importance of national sovereignty and notes that assistance with the
education, evaluation and management of chemicals and chemical materials should be conducted on a requested
basis.

F. Three Point Protocol

36. As of March 2014, 190 States Parties have signed onto the CWC. However, it is the disarmament of 98% of
existing chemical weapons that truly underlines the OPCW’s collective statement that the use of chemical
weapons is not acceptable. The 24 articles and 3 annexes of the CWC outline the framework to promote the
peaceful usage of chemistry.

37. The OPCW Convention of 2011 recommends that the remaining 2% of chemical weapons must be
decommissioned, once declared to the United Nations or once registered under inspections conducted by the
OPCW. The OPCW continues to call upon all States not party to accede to the CWC, in accordance with the
mandate and the agreed deadline of disarmament in order to assure global peace and unilateral non-
proliferation.

38. Many States Parties do not have the resources or internal infrastructure that allows for security from chemical
weapons, effective control systems, or available education to effectively implement the standards set by the
CWC. Article X of the CWC calls for technical assistance and collaboration between States Party to the CWC.
The OPCW now needs to focus on extending its provisions towards advocating for national legislation adopted
by States Party. This enables States Party to take charge of their own path through their own national policies
advocating the strengthening of chemical weapons safety and protocol and allowing for positive development.

39. The OPCW recognizes the challenges that have arisen regarding technological advancement over the past 17
years and acknowledges the necessity of adapting to this development.

40. The OPCW encourages the adoption of the International Labor Organization’s Chemicals Convention, No. 170
(1990) into national institutions within any voluntary States Party to the CWC, where such legislation will be
relevant and beneficiary. The Chemicals Convention is the legal instrument that establishes national policies for
the classification, labeling, marking, and the regulation of the storage, disposal, and usage of chemicals utilized
in the workplace. Furthermore, the Chemicals Convention promotes the information sharing of more cost-effective and better chemical practices in the workplace.

41. States Party without chemical licenses risk an increased probability of chemical attacks and also an increased probability of chemical dual-use substances becoming available to dangerous non-state actors.

G. International Regional Summit (IRS) of the OPCW

42. The efforts of the OPCW to achieve universality of the CWC have been hindered by obstacles such as the changes in global economy, advances in science and technology, and the evolving nature of international peace and security.

a. States Party to the OPCW contribute to the growing OPCW budget based on the United Nations scale of assessments. Within a 10-year span, the budget of the OPCW has increased from approximately $59 million in 2003 to $95 million in 2013 with the greatest projected budget totaling $101.2 million in 2010. This budget is contingent on the global economy; States Parties with struggling economies find it difficult to contribute, resulting in diminished funding appropriated to various categories that attempt to achieve universality of the CWC.

b. New advances in sciences and technology yield positive results with respect to positive developments in medicine and technology. However, these same results yield dangerous chemical compounds that can be turned into chemical weapons. Detection and prevention of the use and spread of chemical weapons pose a challenge to ensuring universality. Furthermore, the costs associated with developing technologies and equipment is directly correlated with the changing global economy.

c. The global economy and scientific advancements have direct implications on international peace and security due to the fact that technological developments in the chemical industry can lead to the creation of new weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, there is an increased need for law enforcement officials and government authorities to detect the spread of chemical weapons and prevent the use of chemical weapons.

43. As highlighted in the UN General Assembly Resolution 67/8 on increased cooperation between the OPCW and the United Nations, the OPCW recognizes the need for increased cooperation with international and regional bodies to ensure the universality of the CWC.

44. The OPCW recognizes the importance of regional capacity building and training in the trajectory towards universality of the CWC, focusing on Articles IX, X, and XI. Germane to this value, the OPCW has conducted or sponsored various training and capacity building initiatives. However, various capacity building measures with regards to chemical weapons on the regional level focus on efforts targeting the region exclusively, with little to no emphasis on strengthening international bonds between regional organizations. Some recent programs that are region-specific include:

a. The OPCW and the National Authority of Saudi Arabia organized an advanced training course for 22 States Parties in the region in April 2014 for personnel of CWC National Authorities providing practical assistance to participants on preparation and submission of Article VI declarations and Article VI inspections.

b. The OPCW and the CWC National Authority of Costa Rica conducted an advanced course for eight regional States Parties on specialized responses to chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals in April 2014.

c. The OPCW and the CWC National Authority of Chile conducted a basic course for 19 States Parties in the Latin American and Caribbean region on specialized responses to chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals.

45. Programs or initiatives that include a collaboration of regional bodies and the OPCW already conducted include the Programme for Africa, a feature of the European Union Council decision in 2009 and continued in 2012,
which addresses the needs of African countries in implementing the CWC. In addition, the OPCW and the
government of Indonesia conducted a regional workshop for Asian State Parties in April 2014 addressing the
issues of regional cooperation in assistance and emergency response that was funded by the European Union.

46. Aside from limited previous engagements, there is a partnership void to be filled in the international community
concerning, but not limited to, organizations such as the Arab League, Organization of American States, Pacific
Island Forum, East Asia Summit, Association of Southeast Asian States, and the Non-Aligned Movement. The
variations in necessities such as training, environmental protection, emergency response, and handling of
chemical weapons as well as issues in implementing the CWC may be achieved with open dialogue,
suggestions, and strengthened multilateral cooperation amongst regional, sub-regional and international
organizations.

47. States Parties to the CWC can benefit from the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from
insight, expertise, and alternative perspectives towards achieving universality. A relationship between NGOs
and the OPCW currently exists through attendance and participation of NGOs in the Session of the Conference
of States Parties.

H. Increasing The International Recognition Of The Chemical Weapons Convention

48. The international community has established three treaties in the course of the last century, which has set a
precedent for the illegality of the use and possession of Chemical weapons.

   a. The Geneva Protocol to the Hague Convention bans the use of all forms of chemical and
      biological warfare. There are currently 138 States that are party to the Protocol.

   b. The Biological Weapons Convention serves as a supplementary successor to the Geneva Protocol
      and formally banned the development, production, and stockpile of biological agents for use in
      war. As of today, 170 States are party to the BWC.

   c. The CWC prohibits the development and use of chemical weapons and also provides for the
      destruction of the weaponry. There are 190 States that are party to the CWC.

49. Entered into force on April 29, 1997, the CWC sought to establish standards and a protocol regarding the
possession and use of chemical weapons. As established in Article I of the Treaty, all States Party must identify
and destroy all chemical weapons stockpiles.

50. To more efficiently implement the treaty and provide benefits for States Party to the CWC, the OPCW was
formed in conjunction with the creation of the Treaty.

   a. States within the OPCW recognize the need for the CWC to be not only universally applied but
      also universally respected and recognized.

51. There are several States that have not signed the CWC and therefore do not receive the benefits provided to
members of the OPCW.

52. Other States Party within the OPCW question some of the organization’s fundamental articles. While a united
treaty, the support for the CWC hinges upon the willingness of its members to participate. While currently
sufficient, more reason for participation is required.

53. The International Court of Justice is defined in the Charter of the United Nations as its designated judicial body.

54. Article 96, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations empowers the UN General Assembly & the
Security Council to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on any legal question.

55. Under International Court of Justice procedure for advisory opinions, first all laws and treaties are examined,
and second, if no clear decision is provided by the laws and treaties, the UN charter is referred to.
56. The international community recognizes the legal weight of the Court’s advisory opinions. As a result, the opinions serve as an instrument of humanitarian authority. Advisory opinions also contribute to the clarification and definition of international law:

a. In the situation of the 1994 question regarding nuclear weapons, States reacted definitively in support of the International Court of Justice opinion.


c. The Australian Government established an independent commission entitled the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in November 1995, citing the opinion as a fundamental obligation.

57. Through providing an opinion on a treaty, the International Court of Justice also provides clear and independent legal justification. This justification is important in maintaining the unity of the CWC and the global recognition it currently holds.

58. On December 19, 1994, the General Assembly passed Resolution 49/45, “Request for Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.” This resolution asked for a ruling by the International Court of Justice to determine if, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?” The question was asked with the intent of not only defining the official United Nations position on nuclear weapon possession, but also calling attention to the gravity of the issue.

59. Within the situation of Syria, the appeal to humanitarian principles swayed the nation on the issue of their use of chemical weaponry and their willingness to allow OPCW inspectors into the country.

60. It is necessary to note is that the opinions given by the International Court of Justice are not criminal legal proceedings, and do not determine punitive action. The essence of International Court of Justice opinions within the United Nations and with relation to the actions of the General Assembly is that the opinions are merely advisory. They require no direct action or sentencing of actors contrary to the opinion.

II. Mandate

61. The OPCW is the implementing body of the CWC, and it is located in The Hague, Netherlands. The Organisation is given the mandate to fulfill the object and purpose of the CWC, guaranteeing the implementation of its provisions and providing a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. The OPCW mission is “to implement the provisions of the CWC in order to achieve a world free of chemical weapons and of the threat of their use.”

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Universal Membership and Development

62. The universality of the CWC is the premier goal and it is thus of crucial importance that the remaining States not party accede to the CWC. Any measures taken to curtail the production or uses of chemical weapons fall short of achieving the goals of the CWC until all States are members of the Organisation.

63. We recognize the fact that all States Party voluntarily join the CWC, and that no measure created by the OPCW should by any means infringe or impugn on a State’s sovereignty in the spirit of their voluntary accession. Syria’s and Somalia’s recent accession to the CWC are an illustration of State Party’s understanding that being part of the OPCW means greater freedom in a more secure world.
We believe that an annual invitation to voluntarily accede the CWC should be extended to any State not Party to the CWC. The most respectful and efficient way to invite non-party States to accede to the CWC is to create an environment of understanding and unfettered and open dialogue. This would indeed allow non-party States to improve their understanding of the CWC and thereby ease their worries, as well as it would enable the Organisation to understand the reason of their reluctances. To create such an environment, the Conference of the State Parties recommends the empowerment of a delegation of States Party within the External Relations Division (ERD) of the OPCW, as recommended by the Director-General or the Action Plan to Promote Universality of the CWC adopted in 2003.

A non-party State wishing to discuss the concerns it may have regarding the Organisation and the obligations implied in the CWC may contact the Technical Secretariat. The ERD shall forward the demand to the delegation, which shall open the dialogue with the demanding non-party State. The delegation can also relate to the OPCW any changes non-Party States would like to see to make them feel more welcome and secure. The delegation shall be made of six States Party that rotate every three years, starting with three amongst longest ratified and three amongst the latest ratified States Party. After the first meeting, the six States shall be elected by the Conference, following the rules of consensus and taking regional representation into account.

The Conference recognizes that one of the obstacles to disarmament and destruction of chemical weapons and true cooperation is the sheer weight of the cost of doing so. Currently the burden of this cost falls on the more economically stable States Party. To ensure universality the cost can to be shared and lowered on an individual State basis. This could be accomplished by encouraging States and trade unions to offer economic and trade incentives for cooperation and chemical industrial development. By encouraging such measures, we create and facilitate positive reinforcement to steadfast cooperation with the CWC.

Articles IX and XI of the CWC enable that such measures be fostered by partnerships between the OPCW and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Combining the Organisation’s technical expertise and understanding of the goals of the CWC with the competences of UNCTAD, UNIDO and ECOSOC would enable the creation of powerful incentives related to the global economy and industrial development. The Conference therefore suggests that such partnerships between the OPCW and the aforementioned UN bodies be set up in order to enhance the longevity of the CWC by economically stabilization as many States Party wishing to participate.

What is more, a rapid advance in chemical technology may be harmful if not known or not foreseen. It is therefore needed to increase the scientific awareness and education of States Party. The Conference recommends that the SAB, in cooperation with the ERD, be given the permanent task to report annually on scientific development and emerging technologies that would have an immediate impact on achieving the objectives of the CWC. In this way, the competences of the SAB are extended to new technologies related to chemistry. A fourth working group would be established on a permanent basis to carry on the aforementioned task. This report would be made available to all States Party of the OPCW and forwarded to the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General.

B. Creating an Incentivized Accreditation System for Civil Society Organizations

A large percentage of the chemicals listed in Schedule 1 and 2 of the CWC are produced by the private sector and are sold on the international market. Most of those industries are not delimited in their acts and if they are, it is without any consideration to their specialisation in chemicals. Thus, the OPCW recommends the creation of an incentivized accreditation program implemented by the International Organisation for Standardisation (IOS) that would encourage civil society organizations to voluntarily integrate themselves in order to increase their business chances.

Historically, peaceful and non-binding measures such as the CWC based on positive incentives have been more effective than those based on negative incentives. Actors accessing voluntarily are much more willing to apply changes to their national legislation. Considering the importance of civil society organizations in the chemical domain, we recommend the Executive Council to take this matter under its mandate. We expect the
implementation of such accreditation to help secure the chemical industry through the standardization of its production and transaction norms.

71. The aforementioned accreditation program would encourage all industries involved in the chemical industry mentioned in Schedule 1 and 2 to adopt peaceful and secure politics. By adhering to the conditions mentioned under the accreditation, State Parties’ chemical-producing industries would be able to access the economic market of each other. Such an accreditation program would enable the security aspect in the international chemical trade. This safety can be achieved through:

a. All chemicals listed in Schedule 1 and 2 being produced and sold according to the conditions mentioned in the CWC;

b. All chemicals listed in Schedule 1 and 2 being sold to actors abiding to the CWC.

72. The accreditation can be divided into four parts: ecological responsibility, working conditions, economical aspect, and security. In this regard:

a. All industries leave an ecological footprint caused by the excessive use of the natural resources. As noted by UNEP during its work on the harmful substances and hazardous wastes, inadequately managed chemicals represent a great risk for humans and other living creatures. Their report concluded that the health-related effects of chemicals can range from acute pain to cancer, but can also affect the neurological and hormonal conditions. We consider this to be a serious issue that needs to be amended through a larger participation of the industries in the ecological efforts of the receiving nations. This can be achieved by keeping account of the industry’s efforts when confronted by a chemical accident; implementing environmental policies and regulations inside and outside of the industries; and inserting itself in environmental programs specific to its local communities.

b. This accreditation should also focus on the bettering of working conditions for the labor sector in chemical-producing industries. A study published by the International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics shows that workers in petrochemical plants face a higher percentage of health risks due to some stressors and concluded that there needs to be an improvement in the work area. The conditions of work areas are suggested to be assessed and analyzed by comparing the data of working conditions with data made available by the International Labor Organization and workers’ labor conditions are suggested to be adjusted and improved by using the International Labor Standards.

c. Economic prosperity through corporate efficiency is one of the most important and most valued objectives for States Party. Having such an accreditation will promote more prosperous and accountable economic conditions in the private chemical-producing industry sector by emphasizing a management trained according to standards set by the international community as well as those set by regional communities.

d. In regards to the issue of security of chemicals, Article VII of the CWC notes that States Party should consider the safety of its people and the environment as a priority and should cooperate with other States Party on the matter. Such cooperation would not be possible without transparency of databases of chemical stocks in industries. Furthermore, educating the managers of the chemical industries and local citizens in the surrounding areas with safety protocols in the instance of a chemical accident is crucial in maintaining the security of chemicals.

73. In conclusion, the universality of the CWC does not only concern States it also affects civil society organizations involved in the industrial private sector. We highlight four subjects: environmental factors, economy, labour conditions, and security measures. The measures adopted through the accreditation system, previously outlined, would benefit the population of the public sector, which will get access to secure jobs, environmentally friendly industries, and a stable economy. We also stress the importance of the promotion of human rights and the protection of workers condition.
C. Regional Cooperation

74. Multilateral regional cooperation is essential for the achievement of the universality of the CWC. Without regional support for States that need assistance in implementing the CWC, there is a misunderstanding of the benefits of accession due to lack of discussion and support for those State. This could result in no implementation of or accession to the CWC. By including States not Party in regional discussion concerning technical, scientific, financial, and information assistance needed to implement the CWC. We are effectively reassuring States that there is support provided by the OPCW and the OPCW international community to effectively implement the CWC, and that there are increased benefits for accession.

75. The lack of universality of the CWC can arise from the multitude of regional concerns. Without providing States a regional open forum in which they can express their concerns and needs, we miss the opportunity to support States in obtaining the capacity they may require in order to implement the CWC. The acquisition of capacity needs to be met regionally in order for proper dispersion of funds throughout a region. Fortunately, with transparent handling of voluntary funds, regional centers can accurately allocate monetary needs throughout a region, therefore potentially meeting a State’s capacity needs for the implementation of the CWC.

76. Following the ideals pursued in *The Benefits of Joining the CWC*, the cooperation between programs dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security is essential to the enhancement of regional cooperation. An interagency approach addresses the gap that sometimes divides regional needs and international efforts. Together, programs can provide incentives for States not Party to meet regional and international standards concerning hazardous chemicals and their precursors. Such an action could include the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Centers of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) projects that enhance local expertise in regards to chemical handling, which provides enhancement of a region’s safety and security. These projects are conducted in a regionally-focused fashion, in order to maintain sovereignty. An example includes the OPCW-IUPAC International Science and Technology Workshop, which is co-funded between organizations to assess the impact of developing science technologies in addressing the CWC.

77. Maintaining discussion and participation of States not Party to the CWC in the international community further raises the likelihood of ratification to the CWC; providing a regional forum in which they may participate and raise questions concerning implementation capacity with neighboring States strengthens regional cooperation and support. This in turn leads to cooperation within the international community in addressing the concerns States not Party would hold in implementing the CWC. Upon addressing the needs within the international community, universality will be a certain outcome.

78. This body concludes that international and regional cooperation is necessary to expedite achieving universality of the CWC and maximizing its efficiency. However, problems remain with communication and gaps between regional needs and international direction. While progress has been made, a greater presence in regional discussion of the OPCW, paired with regional organizations, could further persuade States not party to the CWC to ratify and consequently join the OPCW.

79. We acknowledge the need for the sharing of technology and the presence of trained personnel in regions that include States not Party to the CWC. This could further aid the facilitation of international dialogue and show the benefits of accession to the OPCW.

80. We are aware of the allocation of funding available to its Technical Secretariat, but recognizes that there is a need for increased transparency in allocation of funding towards the Implementation Support Branch.

81. The international community has observed that the European Union’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centers of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) has done thorough and effective work in enhancing regional cooperation, and it can be noted that their work coincides with the objectives of the OPCW. As a result, the OPCW, along with other relevant organizations such as the IAEA or the UNSCR 1540 Committee, is committed to interagency cooperation with the EU CBRN CoE. Both the OPCW and the CoE aim for sustainability and local expertise to create a strong bridge to close the gap between international directions and
regional needs. The OPCW considers the CoE Regional Secretariats as powerful tools to achieve universality of the CWC; they attempt to achieve universality through regional cooperative approaches, rather than through international mandates. Thus, the Conference of States Party to the OPCW understand that there is an intrinsic link between regional cooperation of sovereign states and achieving universality of the CWC.

82. In accordance with these ideas, this body recommends the consideration of the creation of the Collaborating Regionally to Ensure Weapons Safety (CREWS) program. CREWS is committed to maintaining safety against chemical weapons and hazardous chemicals with regional cooperation. It should take the form of workshops, platforms, summits, etc., that would be seen as a bridge between the international community and individual States. Therefore, using the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats as outstanding models, the Organisation encourages increasing regional cooperation and communication. Through interagency approaches, enhanced cooperation is one of the main goals of the EU CBRN CoE. Several programs and tools are available:

a. The CBRN Needs Assessment Tool, which provides States with a specific methodology to assess the needs of a State in adopting the measures required by Articles under the CWC by identifying and analyzing any difficulties. The Regional Secretariat could additionally report common issues had by regions in addressing implementation of the CWC to the OPCW.

b. The CBRN National Teams provide all necessary feedback to the Regional Secretariats. They also provide criteria for assessing partner countries’ needs.

c. The CBRN also provides guidelines for National Action Plans. Their main goal can be summarized as complementing national measures in order to address existing issues. They address three main areas: prevention, detection, and preparedness, combined with response. We suggest establishing a widespread awareness campaign, distributing flyers, and placing posters with emergency procedures that prepare for an attack by chemical weapons with focus on higher risk areas.

d. Additional guidelines also exist for Regional Secretariats so as to maximize their efficiency and coherence when corresponding with other Regional Secretariats. Additional guidelines can further be utilized for the CBRN National Teams.

83. Realizing the potential benefits of regional and international dialogue through the sharing of technological resources and the assistance of area personnel, we recommend expanding the range of areas in which the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats will be active. In this regard:

a. States Party may create a network for open discussion concerning technological advancement in terms of the detection and decontamination of hazardous chemicals and their precursors, following the model of the Spiez Laboratory in Switzerland. The regions in which the Regional Secretariats are being established at this time include the African Atlantic Façade, Central Asia, Eastern and Central Africa, Gulf Cooperation Countries, the Middle East, North Africa, South East Asia, South East Europe, the Southern Caucasus, Moldova, and Ukraine. This could be expanded to include South Asia, East Asia, Latin America, and other regions.

b. The expertise and assistance offered by the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats should be used to develop an educational training program of regional instructors, who focus on the technical information concerning hazardous chemicals based on region-specific needs, which may include topics such as: proper handling techniques, transportation security concerning export control policies in advocating effective export control criteria by countries outside existing regimes and arrangements with special focus on natural resources-dependent regions, regional higher education programs, chemical awareness campaigns within the chemical industry, and the implementation of the E-Learning Tool for National Authorities.

c. We further recommend that the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats, when dispensing information, include OPCW programmes and initiatives relative to the CoE information being dispensed in order to effectively communicate to all regions that the OPCW can indeed provide
the support and assistance needed in implementing the CWC, and further the effort of achieving universality of the CWC. The OPCW should similarly dispense related CBRN CoE information. There are also specific programs within the OPCW that the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats could potentially recommend, such as: the Associate Programme, Research Projects Programme, Laboratory Assistance Programme, etc. The OPCW also recommends that EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats possibly collaborate with the Financial Action Task Force in addressing regional issues regarding illicit financial transactions used to acquire hazardous materials.

84. We recommend transparency in the distribution of funding throughout the OPCW and, therefore, propose that the Technical Secretariat reports in a more transparent fashion on the allocation of funding towards the Implementation Support Branch, in order for the OPCW to make well-informed decisions if there should ever be a change in funding priorities.

85. We further suggest that the Technical Secretariat sets up a Voluntary Regional Trust Fund, which would provide the necessary financial backup to establish the essential measures for emergency situations, also for training exercises, as well as spreading expertise and funding workshops. Voluntary funding would be provided through sources including, but not limited to, States Parties. Funds created in the past, such as the success of the Syria Trust Fund, demonstrates that voluntary trust funds are indeed capable of providing necessary support in times of need.

86. As previously mentioned, regional cooperation should serve as a bridge between the international community and individual States. The EU CBRN CoE encourages States not Party to ratify the CWC, as these Centers have the potential to increase regional economic development and partnerships. Furthermore, the enhanced presence of the EU CBRN CoE would help support States not Party, so that they can meet the international and regional standards associated with chemical weapons and hazardous chemicals, thus incentivizing the CWC.

87. In conclusion, the Conference of the States Party to the OPCW strongly emphasizes the need for the incentivization of the CWC through regional cooperative efforts to ensure that the goal of universality of the CWC can be met. The maintenance of international peace and security rides upon universal disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, any step towards universality is a step towards a WMD-free world.

D. Technical Cooperation and Best Practice Sharing

88. We encourage States Party to support and implement the Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of Article VII, specifically the provision that applies to establishing individual National Authorities, as this will hold the international community accountable to updating practices and policies for implementation agencies of the CWC, as well as enable regional organizations and States Parties to develop individualized and sustainable solutions. Multilateral collaboration to prevent attacks and chemical accidents, with respect to Article X of the CWC, will ensure that States Parties share best practices for defensive techniques and build trust within the international community. The OPCW affirms the need for sound management of chemical precursors, specifically concerning the transfer of chemicals and related materials. This committee thus encourages the expansion of the Implementation Support Branch of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to continue to work with National Authorities and include the development of States infrastructure that will be able to effectively implement the model legislation given by the programme of legal technical assistance. These conferences should be assisted upon request by the conference support program under the OPCW, with such conferences focusing specifically on Article VII of the CWC.

89. The OPCW encourages public and private sectors to work together in line with the Tarnow Declaration, specifically on the development of international cooperation to enhance chemical safety and security along with the promotion of the Global Chemical Security Culture.

90. The OPCW encourages the development of regional and national networks of professionals to exchange ideas as part of the implementation of Article XI of the CWC. This has been pioneered by the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa (Africa Programme), which specifically addresses challenges to the African region, similar to the Argentine Project on Education and the CWC. These networks will be tasked with arranging educational events to ensure that chemical professionals and people in related fields are familiar with
the work of the OPCW as well as the principles of the CWC. Special emphasis should be placed on raising awareness on the potential adverse impacts of the misuse of chemicals, especially including but not limited to dual-use chemicals. Moreover, the above-mentioned networks should promote knowledge of the use of non-hazardous chemicals, including the use of substances that are not harmful to the environment, whenever possible, and proper waste disposal procedures regarding both chemicals and non-toxic chemicals. Furthermore, the networks are recommended to share technical and scientific information and strengthen research efforts to explore the peaceful uses of chemicals. The OPCW promotes safe development of the chemical industry, as well as increasing capacity building in States Parties. Moreover, the OPCW strongly recommends that challenges within the above-mentioned areas should be addressed in the proposed regional networks, if this is deemed to be preferable by the States Parties.

91. The OPCW concludes that data and universal access to that information is paramount to confidence building measures between States Parties. Updating tools and databases under the OPCW and its Scheduled Chemicals Annex, to include new classifications and definitions, is becoming increasingly important.

a. The Conference of States Parties recommends the continuous updating of the Verification Information System under the OPCW, which is crucial for effective data storing, analyzing, and universal access to ensure transparency within the OPCW as well as States Parties.

b. After recognizing the need for furthering chemical coding, the OPCW recommends that recording should take place through the OPCW’s Electronic Declaration Tool for National Authorities (EDNA) to ensure chemicals are properly recorded and information remains up to date throughout the international community.

c. We recommend the establishment of an OPCW Chemical Safety Standard Database. The main objectives of this proposed database would be to share information of risks and hazards of the handling of chemical weapons, reduce the risk of compliance failures through access to information, and to promote the convergence of regulations among States Parties.

i. Sharing of information on the risks and hazards of handling chemical weapons will allow officials and professionals to be better prepared in situations of disarming and dismantling stockpiles and dealing with post chemical weapon usage situations. This will allow States to be better prepared to deal with these issues in an efficient manner.

ii. With better access to standards for safety the CWC and States Party have, national leaders and private industries will be less likely to fail to comply with the multitude of standards that are in existence.

iii. If we can compile easy access to these various regulations for States, they may be encouraged to create more universal safety standard practices. This will allow for the OPCW and State authorities to become more effective in their interactions and training workshops.

d. The OPCW concludes that the classification of chemical production facilities has not been recently discussed in depth. The OPCW recommends that the Scientific Advisory Board begins discussion on a new classification system of chemical production facilities.

e. The OPCW recommends the Advisory Panel on Future OPCW Priorities to be reinstated in order to facilitate with efforts towards an inclusive and comprehensive CWC, which shall include new emerging chemicals and compounds that have the possibility of weaponization, as well as their precursors.

92. The Conference of States Parties recommends that the Director-General create an annex of the annual report of the OPCW on the Implementation on the CWC. This annex will report the various stages of implementation of the CWC of each State Party at a national level. The annex will be under Article VII of the CWC and shall:
a. Request States Parties to submit comprehensive reports detailing the implementation status and any initiatives aimed at capacity building in order to strengthen the universality of the CWC.

b. Possess the following sections:
   i. Situation of any non-state actors seen as a potential threat to the CWC.
   ii. Progress of domestic legislation in the area of terrorism.
   iii. Evaluation of border safety and security.
   iv. Evaluation of the progress of Border Alliances within the subject of terrorism and illegal trafficking of chemical weapons or any weapons of mass destruction.

c. Establish a mechanism to verify the details of the report Annex. It will comprise of the following procedures:
   i. Allow any State Party to raise questions concerning the content of another State Party’s contribution to the annex.
   ii. Encourages the creation of an independent body of technical experts to verify the subject of concern.
   iii. The independent team will be appointed by the Director-General of the OPCW that will conduct an assessment and produce a report that verifies States’ implementation of the principles of the CWC.
   iv. The implementation of this independent team will be under a voluntary basis, subject to approval by the State Party in question.
   v. Approve the request of any States Party for assistance from the OPCW in order to effectively comply with the recommendations made by the independent body of technical experts.

93. With concerns to the topic of disarmament and non-state actors, we regard terrorism as an undeniable threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. We believe that the issue of illegal trafficking of chemicals does not allow the effective control of chemical weapons and related materials, and that without adequate controls non-state actors are more able to acquire chemicals precursors. OPCW recognizes that illicit trafficking is an international threat, specifically regarding port and airport security. Building capacity for border security plays a major role in preventing the illegal trade of chemicals and chemical weapons between States Parties. We find that the World Customs Organization (WCO) and UN Office on Drug and Crime’s (UNODC) Container Control Programme (CCP) and the UNODC, INTERPOL, and WCO’s joint Airport Communication Programme (AIRCOP) have expanded their initiatives to include chemicals and related materials, and both have been successful in training border personnel in recognizing illicit trafficked items. We recommend that States that have not utilized the CCP and AIRCOP to consider implementing these programmes on a national level in order to effectively train their national personnel to increase national security by being able to better identify the chemical precursors at their boarders. Further cooperation with existing programmes for training of security forces is encouraged.

a. The Organisation encourages States Parties to continue training various authorities, cooperation, and protective methods to teach authorities on how to better assist their States. Collaboration through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), including the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP), teaches States to strengthen local policing forces in order to ensure the prevention of terrorist acquisition of weapons and to integrate internal police forces. States are able to coordinate data collection through a multilateral platform.
b. The OPCW suggests coordination between the organizations underneath the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC) and UNODC, INTERPOL, and WCO’s Global Shield Programme to both raise awareness of the dangers of chemicals and train security personnel in the handling of chemicals precursors and related materials. This will assist in improving the health and safety of border security personnel and ensure more efficient management procedures of chemicals on a national security level. We suggest that cooperation is continued on all levels to ensure financial, technical and logistic support is upheld.

c. The Organisation recommends all States Parties to adopt a border security alliance, within the guidelines established in Article X based on Assistance and Protection against chemical weapons, premised on cooperation at local, regional and global basis, with the purpose of tracking down all illegal chemicals. The alliance shall work with the aim of:

i. Sharing information on technologies to tackle terrorist groups and their involvement on chemical weapons.

ii. Sharing security tactics and initiatives in order to establish a strong cooperation system.

iii. Establishing global border alliances in order to tackle the illegal trafficking of chemicals.

94. OPCW draws attention to the limits of educating civilians on a national level, particularly within developing nations, about the scourges of chemical weapons and related materials. Due to these limitations, we recommend that civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work in line with international organizations such as the UN Department of Public of Information (DPI) in order to facilitate the sharing of information regarding the CWC and its provisions on a larger scale within developing nations and their populations.

95. We recommend the creation of a forum of technical experts under the CWC that continually evaluates and updates training and educational programs and their learning curriculum. This forum would be tasked to ensure that educational programs are aligned with the latest developments in technology relevant to chemical weapons detection and Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIC) decontamination. This forum will provide States Parties with a framework for immediate response as well as guidelines for addressing potential threats.

96. The OPCW acknowledges that the response forces in the event of a chemical accident or attack are vital to protecting and aiding victims of chemical incidents. The training and preparation of said response forces is imperative to ensure effective results. The World Health Organization’s (WHO) Global Chemical Incident Emergency Response Network (ChemiNet), as the chemical arm of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, works to mitigate chemical incidents through early detection and response. The OPCW calls on WHO to expand ChemiNet to increase the network’s capacity to train national, regional, and international response forces to diminish the effects of chemical incidents.

a. In order to have the most comprehensive approach, collaboration at the regional level with NGOs and civil societies will produce the most effective results and provide a framework for a stabilized response to chemical emergencies as well as lay the foundation for safe removal and depletion of chemical weapons stockpiles. In order to achieve these goals, the Conference of States Parties recommends the integration among national institutions such as universities, science laboratories, chemical industry entrepreneurs and government agencies.

b. Through the integration of multiple channels of resources and expertise, implementation programs will gain legitimacy and support from a wider sector of involved parties, thus working to achieve universality. Following the example of the training program hosted in Costa Rica earlier this year, we recommend that cooperation with emergency response and disaster relief teams, including training and response education will further involve the civil society in States Parties to take a vested interest in the matter.
97. It is recognized by the OPCW that developing countries may not have the capacity to fund programmes of actions by their National Authorities. The OPCW therefore supports the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities and requests that able and willing States Parties provide resources to the Office of Disarmament Affairs to assist States in implementing their obligations in respect to S/RES/1540. The financing given to this trust fund should be used specifically to assist States in developing the legislation and infrastructure to counter non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, specifically chemical weapons.

a. Financial assistance can be difficult to obtain for the implementation of chemical weapons destruction procedures of various OPCW programmes, as mentioned in the Decision-Cost of Inspections of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (C-IV/DEC.5). To this end, the OPCW wishes to strengthen assistance and contributions to the OPCW Trust Fund, so that upon request States can receive funds specifically for destruction of chemical weapons, such as the preexisting framework for Syria.

b. States should continue to support Security Council Resolution 1540 in order to ensure plans of action may be accessed by the Organisation. States should continue to trade only with legitimate State actors in accordance with resolution, while refraining from trading with non-state actors. Documents maintained will include the destruction of existing chemical weapons and conversion of present.

c. Due to the fact that some States Parties fall behind their implementation deadlines on account of insufficient economic capacity to fulfill their obligations to the CWC, it is clear that development and capacity building must take precedence. To accomplish this, existing capacity-building programmes, such as the Laboratory Assistance Programme and Equipment Exchange Programme, can be expanded as well as OPCW States Parties should review their national legislation to identify discrepancies between CWC Article XI and their own trade restrictions. It is encouraged that OPCW States Parties review their chemical trade regulations by November 14th, 2015, making necessary adjustments by August 20, 2016, which will allow for the emergence of free and peaceful chemical trade to foster development.

d. Furthermore, the Implementation Support Branch of the OPCW Technical Secretariat should assist States that lack the capacity to implement the Action Plan on the Implementation of Article VII of the CWC through technical, logistical, and financial means.

98. The conclusion of the OPCW is to recognize Article XI of the CWC, which calls for technical assistance sharing between States Party to the CWC. The OPCW asks for the utilization and the expansion of already existing programmes, such as the Internship Support Programme, under the Technical Secretariat, to facilitate the sharing of information between already existing laboratories and their staff. Collaborating with other UN organizations, such as UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as regional organizations to accomplish such priorities is vital to reach universality. The sharing of information can be accomplished through annual reports to the OPCW or the 1540 Committee during the annual meetings and workshops about scientific and technological advancements.

99. This Organisation understands the importance of the Implementation Support Branch of the OPCW Technical Secretariat as it has established a programme of legal technical assistance that provides comprehensive legislation, models, and explanatory documentation to States Parties upon request. This is best accomplished when regional actors collaborate with the Technical Secretariat to implement relevant processes in order to address the concerns of specific national needs, particularly when it comes to both the process of chemical weapons destruction and peaceful uses of chemicals. It is important that conferences take place on international, regional, and national levels, which would include such meetings as the Southern African Development Community-OPCW joint workshop for States to the CWC, and that these conferences and programmes should invite States Party, States not party, IGOs, NGOs, and civil society organizations when possible.
a. Legislation towards implementation efforts of the *CWC* by National Authorities should be expanded to all States Parties by incorporating training programmes, meetings, workshops, and seminars. The Special Commission of the OPCW should provide professional trainings pertaining to the implementation of the provisions of the *CWC* on a regional and multilateral basis. States Parties may be referred to the UN Sponsorship Programme to receive grants to support this education.

b. It is vital to further implement the Equipment Exchange Programme under the OPCW Technical Secretariat in order to support the voluntary transport of chemical laboratory equipment from facilities in developed States to those in developing States. The exchange of this equipment is intrinsic to those economies that are diversifying, as well as, those who already are involved in the chemical industry.

c. Free academic open-source material by universities to promote ethical development of chemical compounds, biological technologies and nanotechnologies. That material shall be used to form a new line of informed students that shall act as a line of defense in the case of future developments of CW, BW and nanotechnologies. The funding and the execution shall be decided by the States own national government or with the help of the OPCW funding.

d. Seminars and programs for the purpose of educating scientists on safe and proper handling of chemicals, and the proper dismantling of chemical weapons, as well as how to dispose of chemical waste.

   i. We recommend that UNITAR send representatives to individual nations as request to cooperate with and educate the local scientists towards working on proper ethical handling of chemical handling and the risks of developing chemical weapons as well as biological weapons.

   ii. These seminars and programs would raise awareness of the *CWC* amongst the international scientific community, build networks in chemical education, facilitate chemical compounds’ safety, promote the provisions of article VI of the *CWC*, and implement transfer provisions, like the program of Finnish National Authority, which is the VERIFIN program, which can be used as a model for the international community.

   iii. Using the Argentine Project on Education and the *CWC* as a model for this open-source educational program that will promote an environment in which professionals will be held responsible for the misusage of chemical components.

e. We support the use of rapid result teams may be relied on in the event of a chemical threat within national borders as well. We recommend the regional organizations establish centers by collaborating with the OPCW to ensure chemical rapid result teams are deployed efficiently.

f. We would like to see the Technical Secretariat author an additional document, in the style of the OPCW’s Legislation Implementation Kit, to advise State Parties on addressing and reporting individual concerns regarding timeframes. The Conference of States Parties, working in conjunction with the national authorities of States parties, shall utilize the kit to implement chemical weapons destruction timelines specific to each state's case. We believe this is in the best interest of individual States Parties and the international community, as utilization of this on a state level is paramount to promoting international peace and security and fulfilling *CWC* obligations.

g. States Parties will be classified into two categories according to their nationally reported needs including: States Party (A) will be provided training given by practitioners and professional staff of the OPCW upon request, and States Party (B) will be provided with implementation plan to be incorporated in their legislation systems upon request.
h. Legal training programmes developed by international, regional, and National Authorities should be intended to help develop legislation in compliance with Article VII of the 
CWC. IGOs and NGOs enhance implementation processes of the 
CWC to ensure efficient methods of coordinative strategies. This programme will be providing assistance by implanting national legislation in accordance with the CWC to States when deemed necessary

100. We recommend strengthening cooperation with States Parties to the CWC at the regional level with regards to capacity building and information sharing between the OPCW and regional organizations to further promote universality. This will allow us to take advantage of existing networks, capital, and institutions. As three of the four countries that have not yet signed the CWC are in Africa, the African Union (AU) has a specific role to play in the realization of this plan. Potential areas of increased cooperation are as follows:

a. The OPCW encourages States Parties at the regional level and regional institutions to make CWC accession and implementation a priority on their agendas.

b. We call for regional organizations to promote economic and technological development, including through trade and resource sharing, as an incentive for CWC accession and implementation. We suggest that further benefits of this cooperation, such as favorable trade terms or access to multilateral aid, be linked to this accession and implementation.

c. We will continue providing funding and expertise through the Africa Programme toward the training of AU peacekeepers in Africa (and in regions where requested), specifically to address the threat of chemical weapons. These capacity building programs shall be designed and executed with input from States Parties that have contributed to the Africa Programme.

d. The de facto inspectors of the OPCW will be international. Upon the explicit request from the State Party being inspected, regional inspectors will be present in addition to international inspectors. With respect to the explicit request for regional monitors by the State Party being inspected, the OPCW urges regional inspectors to be trained and to establish additional inspection committees to address commitment to universality in their own region. By partnering with the OPCW, regional inspection regimes can better tailor their work to the specific needs of the States Parties if so requested by the States Party being inspected. This would provide an additional intermediate level of protection and communication between the OPCW and national governments.

e. We propose that States Parties at the regional level explore security cooperation and disaster mitigation against common threats as a way to incentivize CWC accession and implementation. We recognize that concern over security is one of the main contentions States might have against the CWC.

101. The OPCW recommends the use of positive financial and economic incentives to stimulate progress toward universality. Such incentives should be tied to ratification of the CWC and implementation measures including, but not limited to, the disposal of chemical weapons and effective oversight of chemical precursors for chemical weapons. Positive incentives can be used as a primary motivation to gain support in the implementation of the CWC. Offering financial and economic incentives aids in eliminating chemical weapons use and further the development of under-resourced countries. The OPCW, recognizing the economic importance of both privatized and national chemical industries in promoting development, as well as the significance of modern technological and scientific uses of chemicals, supports the creation of chemical industries operating under the restrictions set forth in the CWC. Furthermore, we encourage the sharing of chemicals, equipment, and scientific information for purposes not prohibited by the CWC. However, chemical industries must be monitored and subject to oversight by National Authorities. To this end, the OPCW stresses the importance of internal compliance mechanisms in both the public and privatized chemical industry.

a. The OPCW urges the use of financial incentives for signing and ratification of the CWC, such as the possibility of waiving membership dues for the remaining States that choose to ratify. Current States not party to the CWC and future independently sovereign states should continue to be given
the funds needed to carry out their obligations as parties to the CWC. This will allow financially
unstable or insolvent states to maintain control of chemical weapons stockpiles in the process of
disposal. Specifically, we call for funds from the Africa Programme to be increased and
reallocated to incentivize ratification of the CWC by South Sudan, Angola, and Egypt.

b. There are States that are not yet Party to the CWC and therefore have restrictions placed upon
them regarding the transportation of chemicals, as well as types, quantities, etc., as noted in the
CWC (Part VIII, C). It is of utmost importance to the OPCW that States which are not party to the
CWC have encouragement and incentives through partnerships to facilitate dialogue and open
forums for the facilitation of accessing to the CWC. The OPCW recommends that the Technical
Secretariat continues their effort and open dialogue to have all UN Member States sign and ratify
the CWC by promoting such benefits to joining the CWC, such as:

i. Assistance for technical and scientific infrastructure

ii. Capacity-building for peaceful use of chemicals

c. We suggest that States be given financial compensation for the destruction of chemical stockpiles
reported before a start date determined through negotiations with the OPCW. The compensation
will be allotted on the basis of the cost of destruction and shall be evaluated by the OPCW.

d. States Parties to the OPCW are encouraged by the effective spread of information regarding
chemical safety that the Associate Programme of the CWC has been able to foster. The OPCW
therefore recommends that NGOs and IGOs explore the idea of increased donations of human and
financial resources in implementing the CWC, especially in collaboration with the OPCW’s
Conference Support Programme, as it provides States Parties with financial assistance to existing
scientific organizations and institutions.

102. The OPCW acknowledges that international cooperation on the issue of terrorism is crucial and that the
diversity of definitions of the term “terrorism” has represented an obstacle for such cooperation, enhancing the
need to establish a global definition within the international community. We determine the need to establish an
exact definition through the cooperation with the UN Security Council and providing a strong basis for
condemning the illegal trafficking, stockpile or use of dangerous chemical precursors. Further, we extend a
recommendation to the UN Security Council, and to the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, wishing for
their joint work, to establish a common ground on the official definition of “terrorism” that would be accepted
by state actors and non-state actors alike, such definition shall include the following parameters:

a. An exact definition of terrorism.

b. Specific types of terrorism, such as chemical terrorism, nuclear terrorism, inter alia.

103. We determined the necessity to establish cooperation between the OPCW with UN bodies that specialize in
peace and security with the purpose of establishing a coherent and united work within the international system.
Hence, we encourage the implementation of a joint work branch within the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which
would, when implemented, aim to establish connected and coherent work with UN peace and security bodies,
including the Security Council and the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Such a branch shall be specialized in
terrorism affairs and acquirement of chemical weapons by non-state actors. Furthermore, the Conference of
States Parties calls for the implementation of pertinent and necessary initiatives in order to tackle the obstacle
terrorism represents for ensuring the universality of the CWC.

104. We further invite the United Nations Member States to ratify and accede to the CWC considering it as a strong
instrument for the establishment of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.

E. Revisiting The Action Plan
We consider that of the six States that are not party to the CWC, two States are on track to ratifying the CWC in the near future. Two other States consider each other as potential threats to their security and therefore are unwilling to ratify and/or meet the obligations of the CWC. One of the States that is not party to the CWC is a relatively newer State to the international community, as intends on signing and ratifying the CWC in the near future. We strongly believe that with the active participation and support of the States Party we can encourage non-party States to sign and ratify the CWC.

We further conclude that the measures outlined in the *Action Plan of the Executive Council of 2003* are still relevant. We believe that adopting these measures and applying them while attempting to convince a non-party States to sign the CWC could result in a more enthusiastic response from non-party States. We believe that the measures outlined in the Action Plan have been instrumental in persuading States to ratify the CWC and can play an increasingly important role in attaining the universality of the CWC.

The OPCW calls upon States that are not yet party to the CWC to take positive and significant strides towards signing and ratifying the CWC. We understand that comprehensive destruction of stockpiles of chemical-based weapons can be a daunting task for developing states, therefore we remind the States that are still in transition to becoming chemical weapons are free to request assistance from the international community whenever required.

We emphasize the need for the Conference of States Parties to aid in the facilitation of a functional timeline for states that are not yet party to the CWC for chemical weapon stockpile disarmament. We further urge the committee to create a more lenient timeline for new States Parties, thereby offering them the opportunity to comprehensively eradicate stockpiles of chemical weapons while simultaneously integrating them into the CWC. We encourage States Parties to oblige to the fundamental concepts of disarmament established by the CWC.

For non-party States, we encourage regional and sub-regional cooperation efforts with States Party and regional organizations, thus non-party States can learn of the benefits of signing and ratifying the CWC and fulfilling its obligations. For States that are not party to the CWC due to systemic hardships or infrastructure-related challenges, we remind them that States in the international community may be willing to provide assistance when required. We also urge States to request assistance from their allies or other States Party as they deem necessary. As State sovereignty is of utmost importance to us, we support assistance and evaluation visits on a ‘request only’ basis.

The OPCW, under the supervision of the Technical Secretariat mandate has the ability to recommend the training of regional organizations and regional NGOs with the capacities possible to assist States Party and non-party States in the respective region. This recommendation will ensure the efficient and effective assistance to States in order to implement the CWC. By establishing a strong regional basis, the regional organizations and NGOs will play the role of medium between the OPCW and States in the respective region. Such projects will assure the enduring aspect of the project and will consequently facilitate access to assistance for States upon request.

Additionally, we request the Technical Secretariat to formulate innovative ideas that could aid in ensuring universality. We further request comprehensive measures to increase awareness about the CWC in non-party States. This can be achieved by enlightening the States Party about the OPCW and offer the publications in official and recognized languages of the non-party States. We also call upon States Parties to strengthen their efforts to bring about universality and to pursue it as an important objective and urge their allies that aren’t party to the CWC, or haven’t ratified the CWC, to do so at the earliest. We believe that by exerting internal pressure and external influence, States would be more likely to be party to the CWC and actively attempt to do away with chemical weapons.

We understand that there are States that refuse to destroy their stockpiles of chemical-based weapons due to hostile relations with other States who still possess such weapons. We would like to remind these States that the concern of the international community is fairness and the States in question and their regions would be more secure once these weapons have been destroyed. We consider the provision of security as a huge incentive for a State once they ratify and meet the obligations of the CWC. We further remind non-party States that the States Party laud any and every positive step taken by these States to help attain the universality of the CWC.
113. We recognize that the four nations that have not signed the CWC continue to resist signing and ratifying this document because of reasons that are unique to their own policies, therefore we recommend the committee to consider the following:

d. The committee should consider using the framework of organizations such as the Australia Group, a voluntary coalition designed to advocate export licensing yet lacking a means of formal implementation. Additionally, we advise the strengthening of the coordination of export control in order to properly identify the trade of chemical weapons as well as the materials used to handle said volatile matter by the cataloging of chemicals and chemical materials and providing the State Party with the database information.

e. With the results gathered from these additions, we urge the Conference of States Parties to share the wealth of information provided with the implementation of the chemical database to regions and OPCW States Party who would otherwise not be able to afford said information or technology if asked to pursue this issue individually.

f. We support the education of pertinent personnel in the handling and disposal of chemical weapons by hosting regional workshops designed to target the issues that are most relevant to these regions and also addressing the universality of the CWC.

g. Finally, we further encourage the States who have not signed the CWC to reconsider their stance by strengthening border security and therefore, regional security, thus promoting national sovereignty through diplomatic strategy.

114. We recommend States Party to consider the development of national legislation through their own political systems in order to establish export licensing for chemical products and the materials used to handle them; thus, when a database system is established and shared amongst States Party, the framework for cooperation and peaceful chemical trade among States Party will be present within this legislation.

115. We also recommend States Party to absorb the cost of removal of chemical weapons via regional partnerships as well as any incurred fees related to the education of nations that do not possess the knowledge or means to remove chemical weapons from their borders, and disposal of chemical weapons upon the immediate approval of regional States Party. Additionally, we also encourage NGOs directly concerned or involved with chemicals and their manufacturing to consider monetary donations towards the education and disposal of chemical weapons.

116. For funding mechanisms, we further recommend requesting greater involvement from the International Foundation for Science to aid developing States to follow through with the comprehensive destruction of chemical-based weapons and the implementation of the CWC. We also appreciate the efforts of developed States Party to the CWC that have routines provided financial aid to developing States to implement the CWC and encourage more of such actions from the developed states. We propose for the budget to be available for and initially limited to the safe destruction of any existing chemical weapons therefore declared or found, the dismantling of chemical munitions, the maintenance and safety of inspectors and other OPCW personnel deployed on-site; the transportation of chemical weapon related materials and dismantling equipment; and the safeguarding of chemical weapons facilities.

117. All States Parties’ sovereignty will be upheld in the application and implementation of actions covered in this report, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In line with this, there will be no active negative consequences against States Parties that have not implemented such actions.

F. Three Point Protocol
The States Party would recommend the expansion of the operational budget of the OPCW in order to increase the effectiveness of present and future programs. We suggest that additional funding determined on the basis of existing nations' economic size. This contribution will continue to be under a voluntary mandate.

The OPCW encourages States Party to develop and improve educational programs. For the protection of the safety of individuals, the OPCW calls for the creation of voluntary training sessions and preparation seminars, to teach citizens how to protect themselves from chemical weapons usage. In efforts to facilitate educative purposes the OPCW suggests each State Party to enact scientific bodies similar to the Federation of American Scientist dedicated to providing easily accessible and comprehensive research. Those shall address measures that different parties such as civil society, government and chemical facilities can draw on to promote awareness while minimizing the threat of bioterrorism.

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We acknowledge the importance of education and awareness-raising in the chemical industry. The OPCW wishes to further promote and develop the Industry-Outreach program that gives States Parties and their industries the knowledge and tools to react to accidents and to provide a safe industrial environment. Introducing codes of practice for chemical enterprises' employees and strengthening safety procedures can help fostering a new security culture.

The State Party to the OPCW promote the continued expansion of technological aid and transfers to enable states willing to be fully CWC compliant to achieve universality through the methods of:

a. Branching out current information sharing platforms to connect institutions, universities, chemical industry and non governmental organizations around the world to enable wider networking program for nations to gain access to the skills and expertise required to safely initiate disarmament programs.

b. Promoting available resources regarding capital technology to dispose of chemical weapon destruction byproducts in an environmentally conscientious way, in order to advance the destruction through the hydrolysis process, as this is the least environmentally destructive method.

c. Continuing of research and education on alternative synthetic procedures in the chemical industry in order to reach its aim to reduce unwanted byproducts generated by chemical processes and the use of potentially hazardous precursors.

d. Advocating for a study by domestic agencies in partnership with the OPCW to realign the role of the chemical industry in post chemical weapons states, in order to ensure that related industries are not negatively impacted by the transition.

This committee encourages the development of an advisor council, made of OPCW experts, for domestic import and export monitoring and the promotion of a suitable legal agency to control the peaceful use of chemical agents. The European Union and the Australian group of nations have established a common framework and a legal permit structure for export controls, which has had a positive effect on promoting the ethical conduct of business operating in domestic and international markets. We support the use of a licensing scheme for the transfer of chemical agents between industries and State Parties, ensuring the end destination of such products is following CWC guidelines and falls under the inspection the domestic state agencies and legal structure.

The OPCW is also deeply concerned about the transportation of chemical bi-production after the destruction process of chemical weapons stockpile. The OPCW wishes to see a monitoring program concerning the transportation of such chemicals to ensure that no environmentally detrimental results would occur due to spilt chemical agents or the miss disposal of chemical waste.

In order to enhance import and export monitoring, the OPCW supports joint border partnerships between neighboring State Parties, training customs personnel and advancing technical equipment. Joint regional exercises can foster the efficient use of resources, thereby alleviating the burden for countries to effectively implement relevant provisions of the CWC.
125. We recommend the implementation of chemical facility licensing and facility background checks for dual use chemicals. Companies, research universities and governments are allowed to receive licenses only through an application process. Each industry facility should be continually inspected by domestic agencies. It is also encouraged that the State Parties allow inspection and bilateral assistance from the OPCW for chemical agents monitoring in order to insure adherence to safety protocols. Specialists’ recommendations for limiting chemical transitions or transportation should be adhered in all circumstances as a standard practice unless a creditable domestic agency deems such contrary to the CWC.

126. In the spirit of Article XI of the CWC it is recommended:

   a. Developed State Parties should assist developing nations who request support with fiscal aid for capacity building for scientific and laboratory equipment to enable disarmament programs to be initiated, and transforming chemical industries through investment for the production of peaceful chemical products, enabling adherence to the CWC.

   b. These States should also assist with capacity building through international co-operation to promote other peaceful uses of chemistry. Further developing the projects of The Electronic Declaration Tool for National Authorities (EDNA) and the Verification and Information System (VIS), the OPCW aims to further improve the efficient use of technology by national authorities and chemical enterprises. Under voluntary agreement between OPCW State Parties, a scientific exchange program, which includes capital technologies, that would provide States aiming for disarmament the access to technology to do so.

   c. Developed State Parties should provide technical assistance for States Party that request it, with direct infrastructure projects and direct capacity building projects and the personnel required for the aforementioned infrastructure and capacity building projects.

   d. The OPCW will provide technical assistance in the methods of symposiums, seminars, internships and scientific exchanges for the purpose of; training in the best practices and methods for each country’s national authority through use of the Implementation Assistance Program (IAP).

127. According to the CWC Article 2.9, incapacitating biochemical agents are not prohibited for the purposes of law enforcement, including domestic riot control. Nevertheless, the CWC does not specifically define what “law enforcement” entails. The problems related to the lack of definition are twofold:

   a. First, without a clear definition of law enforcement the usage of incapacitating biochemical agents can potentially be used in scenarios close to warfare which the CWC is established to prohibit.

   b. Second, while States are obliged to identify and provide information to the OPCW of all chemicals used for riot control purposes, States are not obliged to inform the OPCW concerning any stockpiling of incapacitating biochemical agents, nor any research on any such agents, for the purposes of law enforcement that goes beyond riot control.

128. To that end, the States Party to the CWC recognizes the importance of establishing a working body that will introduce a definition of law enforcement that sets limits to the degree to which incapacitating biochemical agents are used.

G. International Regional Summit (IRS) of the OPCW

129. The OPCW recognizes the multitude of obstacles and barriers that inhibit States Party from implementing the CWC, thus hindering universality. A need for an open forum and dialogue with all State Parties that effectively target the needs of the country and region is necessary. A holistic approach on achieving universality amongst States Party to the CWC should encompass education and research, public awareness, private and public cooperation, collaboration of law enforcement personnel, and technical support. Ensuring universality may be contingent upon a collective effort and assistance beyond the immediate region of a State Party.
In recognizing this need, the OPCW recommends a biannual summit titled the International Regional Summit (IRS) of the OPCW. Current approaches in strengthening regional arrangements focus on the specific region, with limited engagement from other regional organizations. A broader collaboration with other regional and international arrangements is necessary and this summit will attempt to accomplish such. All States Party will be represented in this summit, as well as recognized regional and international organizations that wish to have a presence.

a. The IRS will be held on a biannual basis to minimize costs while ensuring that the locations of the Summits are conducted on a rotating basis internationally so that each region or sub-region is represented equally throughout the years.

b. The OPCW Conference Support Program and the various conference support programs of the regional organizations in participation will fund this Summit. Private organizations and commercial enterprises that have a stake in the chemical industry may be invited to contribute to a portion of the costs associated with this program and participate in the forum.

c. The Technical Secretariat, in conjunction with the Executive Council, will provide oversight on all administrative duties including the provision of a budget and program for each Summit in the scope of their powers as highlighted in Article VIII of the CWC.

d. The Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat will identify an Advisory Board consisting of seven States Party based on regional representation. The Advisory Board will determine the general program of each Summit, and serve as a liaison with the State Party hosting the Summit in selecting venue, inviting education and NGO partners, and selecting personnel for the Summit.

e. The program of the summit will change depending on the demands and necessities of the host region in ensuring the universality of the CWC.

131. The first Summit will be held in Athens, Greece, and the program will include the themes of educational and research initiatives identifying the best practices in chemical safety handling weapons precursors; NGO participation and collaboration with OPCW in raising public awareness of chemical safety; and sharing of best practices between law enforcement agencies across the globe. In this regard:

a. International and regional research institutions as well as institutions of higher learning will be invited to present to government officials on current research initiatives. Policy analysts shall also be invited to discuss and present the nexus between public and private sectors of the chemical industry, and the dangers of precursors for chemical weapons. This summit will call upon research initiatives and programs to examine means to minimize the risks of chemical weapons stockpiles on the environment and civilian populations. Higher priority will be given to institutions concerned with environmental issues posed by chemical weapons.

b. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may be invited to the IRS and will be allowed to showcase projects aimed at raising public awareness of chemical safety. NGOs must be invited by at least one State Party in order to be considered for participation and will submit a proposal with the NGO to be forwarded to the Technical Secretariat and Executive Council. NGOs nominated and given an invitation will be allowed to showcase their initiative ideas for possible funding from States Party and other international organizations. The OPCW’s Executive Council will select from the NGOs nominated to participate in the Summit. Furthermore, the OPCW Executive Council will select the initiatives based on best practices and feasibility. Funding for these initiatives will be partially funded by the OPCW for a period of 18 months. In the conclusion of 18 months, a report will be submitted by the NGO detailing the progress and highlights. If the NGO opts for additional funding, the NGO may submit a proposal for further funding. NGOs chosen by the Executive Council will have the support of the OPCW and will be encourage to make use of the good name, reputation, and network of the OPCW to progress their programs of chemical safety awareness in ways that coincide with the principles of the CWC, at the discretion of the

...
States Party. NGOs will be encouraged to work closely with private sector firms supporting corporate social responsibility. Higher priority will be given to NGOs concerning environmental issues.

c. A segment of this Summit will be devoted to promoting best practices amongst national, regional and international law enforcement agencies concerning border control measures, information sharing and increasing cooperation in combating the manufacturing, use and transportation of chemical weapons. Specialized financial bodies of law enforcement agencies will host seminars and work in cooperation to identify best practices in identifying and monitoring the finances of non-state actors as a means to combat terrorist activity, especially activities concerning chemical weapons.

d. Technical assistance will be provided to share best practices on providing protection against chemical weapons from a team of specialized experts. Using the model of the joint-Swiss and OPCW Exercise Course on Protection against Chemical Weapons that provides assistance and training, this Summit will provide similar training. The main objectives will be to train individuals that educate and advise on chemicals weapons safety and destruction, provide insights on procedural matters, and provide training on proper use of protection equipment, monitoring and detection techniques, and sampling and detection methods.

132. Those States not party to the OPCW will be invited to participate and engage in the Summit and the work that this body is currently engaged in. While not offering a direct incentive to become party to the CWC, this Summit will engage these States in open dialogue and participation every two years.

H. Increasing The International Recognition Of The Chemical Weapons Convention

133. Noting the current treaties, the international mindset is that the possession and use of chemical weapons is a threat to humanity. Furthermore, any decision merely reiterating this position likely will be accepted by the international community.

134. The International Justice Court not only has the jurisdiction to advise upon this situation, but also is the appropriate actor of which to request legal opinions concerning treaties and legislation.

135. The General Assembly may request an opinion of the International Court of Justice.

136. The General Assembly is allowed under the UN Charter to request opinions from the Court; the opinion requested is on a legal question; and the question one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting agency. Therefore, the International Justice Court will accept the request of the General Assembly and provide an opinion.

137. As set in precedent by the International Court of Justice ruling in 1994, the Court is willing and ready to advise on issues considering weapons of mass destruction. As aforementioned, weapons of mass destruction include nuclear and chemical weapons. Since the Court previously advised specifically regarding nuclear weapons, therefore, the Court is also likely to advise specifically regarding biochemical weapons.

138. In addition, in following with the previous opinion provided, the Court also likely will advise in support of the principles already outlined within the CWC.

139. States Party within the United Nations hold IJC opinions in high regard, and allow the opinions to shape an influence their policy.

140. As exemplified by the Syrian situation, appeal to humanitarian principles is an effective approach regarding the implementation of the CWC.
The above signed recognize the need for the CWC to be not only universally applied but also universally respected and recognized. In that vein, the OPCW recommends that the General Assembly request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.

Similarly, the undersigned recommend the General Assembly specifically request an opinion of the International Court of Justice addressing the question: “Is the possession of active chemical weapons stockpiles or the use of such weapons permitted under international law?”

By reiterating the gravity of the issue of Chemical weapons, the International Court of Justice would encourage the global community to recognize the severe humanitarian issues that come with the use of active chemical weapons. Upon garnering the esteemed judicial opinion of such an august body, the CWC becomes no longer a legislative whim, but an overarching question of humanitarian responsibility.

With regard to the universality of the CWC, establishing Chemical Weapons as a pointedly humanitarian issue has had great success with countries ambivalent towards the OPCW and CWC mindset.

Obviously, some parties are concerned regarding the preservation of state sovereignty. However, this recommendation takes no action to infringe upon state individuality.

First, the recommendation of the International Court of Justice mandates no direct course of action against countries that refuse the CWC.

Second, as mentioned previously this recommendation does not require drastic change in the international diplomacy processes that currently occur. This action is merely pointedly reiterating the international approach already outlined. However, with increased estimation and recognition of the treaty, ratified States Party the treaty will have a firm foundation from which to pressure and negotiate with non-signed States.

Essentially, if successful the opinion of the International Court of Justice will transform the CWC from a mere legislative entity into the recognized and legitimate moral treaty necessary to combat Chemical Weapons around the world.

Ultimately this potential opinion from the International Court of Justice is simply to strictly reinforce the principle of the CWC, and not to enforce the Convention by direct action.