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Documentation of the Work of the  
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

# Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

## Committee Staff

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## Agenda

- I. Ensuring the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention
- II. Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions

## Reports adopted by the Committee

Document Code	Topic	Vote (Y/ N/ Abstention/ Non-Voting)
OPCW/1/1	Universal Membership and Development	Consensus
	Creating an Incentivized Accreditation System for Civil Society Organizations	76/11/49
	Regional Cooperation	Consensus
	Technical Cooperation and Best Practice Sharing	108/5/13
	Revisiting the Action Plan	Consensus
	Three Point Protocol	92/16/18
	International Regional Summit of the OPCW	Consensus
	Increasing The International Recognition Of The Chemical Weapons Convention	67/15/44

# Summary Report

The Organisation of the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons (OPCW) held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

- I. Ensuring the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention
- II. Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions

The first session of Sunday consisted of 136 members. The session opened with an immediate vote to set the agenda as 1, 2. During the second session on Monday afternoon, the African Union group started working in two sub-regional groups focusing on education and other similar topics. On the other hand, the European Union group developed a three-part plan based on education, technology, and incentives for proper treatment of chemical waste. Furthermore, there were discussions involving chemical materials' security, regional cooperation for implementing national legislation, safety protocol and guidelines, responsibility in upholding the CWC through international norms, beyond other subtopics.

The Tuesday morning session began with the addition of 4 working papers for a total of 17. Discussions during informal caucus sessions led working groups to find common ground on the necessity of education in regards to chemical weapon storage and disposal. States Parties focused on highlighting sub-points within working groups. Through intense discourse and much debate both the sub-regional African Union blocs merge their ideas. Another group began negotiations with the newly formed large African bloc to assimilate both commendable papers into a single piece of legislation. In the evening, there was an effort made throughout the committee to merge papers as they appeared to have similar proposals. There were 12 working papers submitted by the end of Tuesday.

After an exhaustive day of debate there was great headway in negotiations for multiple mergers. Several delegations concerned about environmental issues were able to successfully merge creating a draft report segment that addressed the sub-topic of environment as it relates to the CWC. The largest group of negotiations occurred which included a diverse majority of States Parties to the OPCW. The most difficult negotiations that occurred to form this merger were over the issue of explicit compliance interfering with state sovereignty. A greatest breakthrough on the issue of explicit compliance came from a combined effort to agree that international inspectors would work closely with regional bodies working specifically on request of individual nations.

The last day began with great enthusiasm as many working papers were successfully adopted as draft report segments. The African bloc and many other delegations were able to combine their ideas into a comprehensive sub-topic on the sharing of best practices. Through an intense process of diplomacy and cooperation, the body was able to move from the original 17 documents to 9.

Voting commenced in the final session where the body voted on all nine draft report segments. Altogether, four draft report segments were passed by consensus, five more draft report segments were passed by two-thirds majority, and one draft report segment, despite having a majority, failed to reach the two-thirds requirement to be adopted. Within the body, issues such as Information Sharing, addressing non-States Party concerns, Protection of the Environment, and upholding the peaceful use of chemicals were the most significant. The diligent effort of the body resulted in a high level of consensus being achieved within the final report.



**Code:** OPCW/1/1

**Committee:** Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

**Topic:** Ensuring the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention

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1 **I. Introduction**  
2

3 **A. Universal Membership and Development**  
4

- 5 1. The OPCW (OPCW) is the implementing body of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,*  
6 *Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (CWC)*. The Convention was  
7 adopted in 1994 and the Organisation was launched in 1997. The different bodies of the Organisation are the  
8 Technical Secretariat, the Conference of the States Party, the Executive Council.  
9
- 10 2. The OPCW has the task of preventing any hostile use of chemicals, destroying existing stockpiles and  
11 monitoring chemical industry. It is therefore a technical body.  
12
- 13 3. The Organisation works closely with the United Nations (UN). Article II of the *Charter of the United Nations*  
14 (UN Charter) ensures the sovereignty of each and every Member State of the UN. The UN Security Council  
15 (UNSC) has set up, in 2004, a Committee 1540 in charge of imposing binding obligations to enact legislation so  
16 as to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  
17
- 18 4. The core objective of the CWC is to free the world from the threat of Chemical Weapons. As of today, only six  
19 States have not yet joined the Organisation by acceding to the Convention. Two of them have not ratified but  
20 have signed the CWC, while the four others have neither signed nor ratified the CWC. In that perspective, the  
21 recent accession of Syria and Somalia to the CWC represents an outstanding and most welcome progress.  
22
- 23 5. Article IX of the CWC leads States Party and the Organisation to conclude partnerships amongst themselves  
24 and with other international bodies and organizations. Article XI of the CWC, in its spirit, is aimed at  
25 facilitating and increasing economic and technological development in the field of chemistry.  
26
- 27 6. The Conference recognizes our past relationships with the *Biological Weapons Convention*, the International  
28 Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Security Council, and other international organizations. These  
29 partnerships have contributed to build and strengthen the recognition that any kind of WMD is equally  
30 reprehensible.  
31
- 32 7. The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) was set up in 1998 and is composed of three (3) temporarily working  
33 groups respectively entitled with verification, convergence of chemistry and biology and education and  
34 outreach. The SAB write and submit reports to the Director-General and the Executive council. The larger  
35 reports are submitted to the Review Conferences every five years. The main purpose of the SAB is to keep the  
36 Organisation up to date with the aforementioned information.  
37
- 38 8. As expressed in the note by the Director-General (RC-2/DG.1) and as stated in the report from the SAB (RC-  
39 3/DG.1), “science and technology continue to advance at an accelerating pace in areas that may impact on the  
40 Convention”. The SAB receives mandates to draft and publish reports about concerning situations on demand of  
41 the States Party. Two reports are also being drafted by each working group and submitted every year to the  
42 Director-General.  
43

44 **B. Creating an Incentivized Accreditation System for Civil Society Organizations**  
45

- 46 9. As stated in Project TE/RAS/09/003 published by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization  
47 (UNIDO), the International Accreditation Forum (IAF), and the International Organization for Standardization  
48 (ISO), “accredited ISO 9001 certification brings positive results to certified organizations and their customers,  
49 and ultimately to economies.”  
50

- 51 10. As stated in Article VII of the CWC, each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes,  
52 adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.  
53
- 54 11. As mentioned in Article II of the CWC, all toxic chemicals and their precursors are prohibited when not used  
55 for the intended purpose.  
56

### 57 **C. Regional Cooperation** 58

- 59 12. The founding basis for the OPCW lies not only within the idea of universal disarmament of chemical weapons  
60 but within the maintenance of international peace and security. Within the UN Charter, all members of the  
61 international community have agreed on the protection of the peoples, including the aspect of protection from  
62 chemical weapons and their precursors. With the achievement of the universality of the CWC, we can ensure  
63 increased protection of the international community from chemical weapons, thus ensuring increased  
64 international peace and security.  
65

### 66 **D. Technical Cooperation and Best Practice Sharing** 67

- 68 13. The CWC was entered into force in 1997 as the main treaty involving chemical weapons and related materials.  
69 As an independent body from the United Nations (UN), as reinforced by the UN-OPCW Agreement, the OPCW  
70 along with 190 States Party to the CWC strive for a chemical weapons free world through international  
71 cooperation. Article X of the CWC focuses on assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and the need  
72 for training and education in relation to this. Economic and technological development, specifically emphasized  
73 in Article XI, involves the exchange of chemicals and related material, as well as technical cooperation and  
74 information in order to build the chemical industry in States Parties. Under the CWC, States Parties are  
75 obligated to ensure the provisions of Article VII are achieved, as it calls for national implementation measures  
76 involving chemical weapons, the safety of populations and cooperation with other States Parties. The  
77 Organisation's Technical Secretariat seeks to improve the abilities of National Authorities by building their  
78 capacity to implement obligations under the CWC, as well as criminalize the misuse of chemicals.  
79
- 80 14. Universal adherence to the CWC does not solely provide legal basis to the prohibitions of the CWC at the  
81 national level, but provides effective confidence-building measures for reliable and non-discriminatory  
82 implementation of the CWC. Regional organizations have provided opportunities to further the goal of  
83 universality, however, it is evident that there are challenges to accession and adherence to the CWC.  
84 International cooperation between States Party to the CWC remains an international priority, specifically on the  
85 regional level. In accordance with the *Charter of the United Nations*, specifically Article 1.3, which promotes  
86 international cooperation in solving international problems, the OPCW urges States Party to the CWC to follow  
87 suit to ensure international cooperation. To this end, the OPCW requests further facilitation of regional efforts,  
88 such as Association of Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) Chemical Industry and Regional Economic  
89 Integration Agreement, to promote the maintenance of international peace and security, specifically with  
90 regards to chemicals, their precursors, and the possible weaponization of those chemicals. These regional  
91 partnerships remain of utmost priority and shall be facilitated through the OPCW to encourage further co-  
92 operation on the international level.  
93
- 94 15. One of the principal missions of the OPCW, achieving universality, is not a matter of quantity but of quality as  
95 well. However, financial and training difficulties have hindered OPCW inspections, therefore prohibiting the  
96 achievement of universal adherence. In 2011, the OPCW was only able to comprehensively conduct 68% of the  
97 full 293 inspections that were initially outlined. As a result of these financial difficulties, 93 States Parties went  
98 without an annual inspection. Cooperation on the international level, with specific ties to voluntary regional  
99 cooperation, is imperative to further the universality of the CWC. As stated in the *Universality of the Chemical  
100 Weapons Convention and the Further Implementation of the Universality Action Plan*, "the contribution of  
101 every new State Party to the CWC allows for the fostering of international peace and security". With possible  
102 obstacles faced by States in acceding to the CWC, it is necessary to facilitate cooperation internationally to  
103 ensure all States sign and ratify the CWC.  
104

- 105 16. The WCO's Harmonized System along with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association, have already  
106 established certain primary objectives that the ASEAN outlines in their framework for a chemical safety  
107 database. The Roadmap for the ASEAN chemical safety database strengthens the initiatives that have been  
108 previously created while also incorporating innovative aspects that would increase sharing information on risks  
109 and hazards of each State. This is to enhance transparency and to promote compliance by providing information  
110 on each States Parties regulation, to facilitate convergence of their members, and to reduce the costs of  
111 duplicative testing for all involved. These databases stand alone and share information within regional groups  
112 and international groups.  
113
- 114 17. Adopted unanimously, United Nations Security Council *Resolution 1540* highlights the importance of weapons  
115 of mass destruction nonproliferation. This calls on Member States of the UN, regardless of their participation  
116 within international treaties, to develop and enforce legal and regulatory measures concerning the  
117 nonproliferation of these weapons. Although the international community has recognized the need for policy  
118 formation concerning this, States without the capacity to develop effective national legislation that criminalizes  
119 the distribution of chemical weapons components may not have had the opportunity to coordinate or streamline  
120 their efforts towards ensuring that nonproliferation is addressed.  
121
- 122 18. In the current situation, the international community is facing a new reality where non-state actors, especially  
123 terrorist groups, have shown their increasing interest in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. As a  
124 consequence, the attacks orchestrated by these groups have increased in number and magnitude. In this order,  
125 we must consider illegal trafficking of such weapons as a high barrier for achieving the purposes of the *CWC*.  
126 Illegal trafficking has proven to be easier when borders lack strength and cooperation; therefore it is necessary  
127 that we establish border alliances on every level in order to ensure safety within our territories.  
128
- 129 19. We are convinced that the Third Review Conference marks a shift in focus to the potential re-emergence of new  
130 chemical weapons and recognizing that re-appearance may come not only in form of non-compliance by States  
131 but also, and specially by non-state actors. Therefore, we find ourselves genuinely alarmed by the threat non-  
132 state actors represent as a significant obstacle for the non-proliferation of WMDs and therefore an obstacle for  
133 *S/RES/1540* and *S/RES/1977*.  
134
- 135 20. The OPCW is deeply concerned by the lack of an international consensus on a definition for terrorism and  
136 therefore the lack of a strong basis to condemn such actions within the OPCW and other UN peace and security  
137 bodies. Accordingly, we strongly believe that when fighting terrorism within the international community the  
138 optimal strategy has proven to be counterterrorism. On this purpose, we recall that the sharing of data to ensure  
139 good practices when eradicating terrorism is of highest importance, as recognized by the *S/RES/2129*, which  
140 notes the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in its publication of framework documentation  
141 and good practices regarding counterterrorism on national and international levels.  
142
- 143 21. The OPCW recognizes the importance of having a global scope when discussing terrorism; hence it is of utmost  
144 importance that we treat it as a universal concept with the aim to establish universal legal obligations for the  
145 fight against terrorism. However, we are fully aware that the diversity of legal systems must be taken into  
146 account when defining terrorism.  
147
- 148 22. As States Parties are diversifying their economies, it is important to track the chemicals or their precursors that  
149 could potentially be used towards weaponization. After the implementation of the World Customs  
150 Organization's Harmonized System, which is used by more than 200 Countries, chemicals began to be coded in  
151 order to ensure proper transportation and recognition of those chemicals. Understanding the need to further  
152 record chemicals is imperative to safety and security of the international community. The Harmonized System  
153 will help to track organic chemical compounds that can potentially be used as chemical precursors for their  
154 creation of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the Conference of the States Parties recommends that the Technical  
155 Secretariat begin open discussions with the Australia Group (AG) to facilitate possible partnerships between the  
156 OPCW and the AG entities for the trade of chemicals and precursors.  
157
- 158 23. The OPCW recognizes the rapidly changing nature of the chemical industry, which correlates directly for the  
159 need of an updated annex on chemical agents. The *CWC's* Article XI gives States Parties the opportunity to  
160 engage in peaceful chemical trade and information exchange for peaceful purposes, as well as its stipulation that

161 States Parties “[n]ot maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in international  
162 agreements...which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and  
163 technological knowledge”. In line with this, *The Working Paper by the States Parties to the CWC which are*  
164 *Members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and China: Indicative Elements of a Plan of Action on the Full*  
165 *Implementation of Article XI* explores a wide range of solutions concerning peaceful purposes of chemicals and  
166 related materials through education and technical cooperation. The paper emphasizes that international  
167 cooperation, with stress placed on North-South Cooperation to share information, plays a large role in  
168 facilitating these solutions, and also applies to the issues highlighted in the *Strategic Approach to International*  
169 *Chemicals Management*. This action plan notes the goal agreed upon in the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit  
170 on Sustainable Development, which emphasizes that chemicals are used in ways that minimize significant  
171 negative impacts on the environment and human health by the year 2020.  
172

- 173 24. The OPCW working in conjunction with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), can  
174 execute seminars and programs, which have been done in the past, an example being the thematic workshop  
175 entitled *Strengthening National Capacities for Chemical Analysis and Monitoring for Sound Management of*  
176 *Chemical at the OPCW Secretariat at The Hague, The Netherlands*.  
177
- 178 25. The OPCW has seen recent success with education programs at the national and regional level. In 2013, El  
179 Salvador hosted a basic training course for countries in the Central American and Caribbean region for  
180 addressing Toxic Industrial Chemicals. In April 2014, Costa Rica hosted a similar regional advanced training  
181 course for responding to toxic chemical exposure. In a most recent effort to garner collaborative education,  
182 Argentina hosted the first regional meeting on Education in the Responsible Application of Knowledge of Dual  
183 Use Chemicals. The Director-General of the OPCW applauded the efforts of the States Parties for promoting  
184 integration among academia and private sector engineers in their work to address dual-use chemicals. Also,  
185 since 1996 The Finnish Institute for Verification of the CWC (VERIFIN) has been working directly with the  
186 OPCW. Accordingly, its collaboration through providing research and provisions for chemical analysis.  
187 VERIFIN is one of the most renowned laboratories and scores high in proficiency tests since its cooperation.  
188
- 189 26. Currently, the OPCW provides universal timelines for countries to destroy their respective chemical weapon  
190 stockpiles. Given the troubles of existing programs implemented to facilitate this, the OPCW and international  
191 community should be more concerned regarding the failure of States Party to adhere to the proposed 2015 time  
192 frame for achieving destruction.  
193
- 194 27. *The Conference of the States Parties' Decision, Submission of Information Regarding National Programmes*  
195 *Related to Protective Purposes, Pursuant to Article X, Paragraph 4 of the Convention (C-9/DEC.10)* promotes  
196 the development of action plans to assist States Parties against threats of chemical warfare. The exchange of  
197 resources, personnel, and information in line with such action plans are necessary to continue the work of the  
198 Organisation in prohibiting chemical weapon production by States Parties, as well as providing protection in the  
199 event of a chemical attack or incident.  
200
- 201 28. The Organisation offers incentives under the *CWC's* Article XI towards the peaceful uses of chemistry while  
202 allowing States Parties to develop their chemical industries and pursue economic gains. A list of benefits to  
203 joining the *CWC* has been provided by the OPCW, with a focus on financial assistance to support scientific  
204 advances and exchanges. States Parties have continued to promote the *CWC* and ensure its relevance by  
205 increasing technological cooperation.  
206

## 207 **E. Revisiting The Action Plan**

208

- 209 29. The OPCW (OPCW) is the implementing body of the CWC, which has been signed and ratified by 190 States  
210 Party since its inception in 1997. The OPCW has expressed its concerns over the adherence of the CWC to  
211 States Party in the global community today, as well as the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by both  
212 parties and non-parties of the CWC. The OPCW was also the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.  
213
- 214 30. The four main responsibilities of the OPCW as listed in the CWC are: destruction of all existing chemical-based  
215 weapons under international verification by the OPCW; monitoring the chemical industry to prevent new  
216 weapons from emerging; providing assistance and protection to States Party against threats from chemical-

- 217 based weapons; and fostering international cooperation to strengthen the implementation of the CWC to  
218 promote the peaceful use of chemistry.  
219
- 220 31. All States that are signatories to the CWC are automatically parties of the OPCW. Of the 193 Member States  
221 recognized by the United Nations (UN), six States are not party to the CWC, which include: Angola, Egypt,  
222 Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, and South Sudan. Syria is the latest entrant to the CWC after submitting its  
223 instrument of accession in April of last year. With assistance from the international community and the OPCW,  
224 Angola and Myanmar are on track to ratifying the CWC. South Sudan, which is a relatively newer State in the  
225 international system, intends on joining the organization soon.  
226
- 227 32. Ever since the Action Plan was announced by the Executive Council of 2003, thirty-five States Party have  
228 ratified or acceded to the CWC, needless to say, the measures outlined in the Action Plan do provide a  
229 reasonable framework to aid States to ratify the CWC and meet its obligations.  
230
- 231 33. The OPCW paid a technical assistance visit to Myanmar in February 2013 and expressed pleasure with the  
232 progress made by the State while suggesting that Myanmar is one step closer to ratifying the CWC. The OPCW  
233 also co-organized two workshops in Luanda on April 22-23, 2013, that were designed to support Angola's  
234 accession to the CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).  
235
- 236 34. Two of the key provisions of the OPCW are the monitoring of chemical industry to prevent new chemical  
237 weapons from being introduced to the market and the fostering of international cooperation to strengthen  
238 implementation of the CWC to promote the peaceful use of chemistry.  
239
- 240 35. The OPCW is also cognizant of the importance of national sovereignty and notes that assistance with the  
241 education, evaluation and management of chemicals and chemical materials should be conducted on a requested  
242 basis.  
243

## 244 **F. Three Point Protocol**

- 245
- 246 36. As of March 2014, 190 States Parties have signed onto the CWC. However, it is the disarmament of 98% of  
247 existing chemical weapons that truly underlines the OPCW's collective statement that the use of chemical  
248 weapons is not acceptable. The 24 articles and 3 annexes of the CWC outline the framework to promote the  
249 peaceful usage of chemistry.  
250
- 251 37. The OPCW Convention of 2011 recommends that the remaining 2% of chemical weapons must be  
252 decommissioned, once declared to the United Nations or once registered under inspections conducted by the  
253 OPCW. The OPCW continues to call upon all States not party to accede to the CWC, in accordance with the  
254 mandate and the agreed deadline of disarmament in order to assure global peace and unilateral non-  
255 proliferation.  
256
- 257 38. Many States Parties do not have the resources or internal infrastructure that allows for security from chemical  
258 weapons, effective control systems, or available education to effectively implement the standards set by the  
259 CWC. Article X of the CWC calls for technical assistance and collaboration between States Party to the CWC.  
260 The OPCW now needs to focus on extending its provisions towards advocating for national legislation adopted  
261 by States Party. This enables States Party to take charge of their own path through their own national policies  
262 advocating the strengthening of chemical weapons safety and protocol and allowing for positive development.  
263
- 264 39. The OPCW recognizes the challenges that have arisen regarding technological advancement over the past 17  
265 years and acknowledges the necessity of adapting to this development.  
266
- 267 40. The OPCW encourages the adoption of the International Labor Organization's Chemicals Convention, No. 170  
268 (1990) into national institutions within any voluntary States Party to the CWC, where such legislation will be  
269 relevant and beneficiary. The Chemicals Convention is the legal instrument that establishes national policies for  
270 the classification, labeling, marking, and the regulation of the storage, disposal, and usage of chemicals utilized



271 in the workplace. Furthermore, the Chemicals Convention promotes the information sharing of more cost-  
272 effective and better chemical practices in the workplace.  
273

- 274 41. States Party without chemical licenses risk an increased probability of chemical attacks and also an increased  
275 probability of chemical dual-use substances becoming available to dangerous non-state actors.  
276

## 277 **G. International Regional Summit (IRS) of the OPCW** 278

- 279 42. The efforts of the OPCW to achieve universality of the CWC have been hindered by obstacles such as the  
280 changes in global economy, advances in science and technology, and the evolving nature of international peace  
281 and security.  
282
- 283 a. States Party to the OPCW contribute to the growing OPCW budget based on the United Nations scale of  
284 assessments. Within a 10-year span, the budget of the OPCW has increased from approximately \$59  
285 million in 2003 to \$95 million in 2013 with the greatest projected budget totaling \$101.2 million in 2010.  
286 This budget is contingent on the global economy; States Parties with struggling economies find it difficult  
287 to contribute, resulting in diminished funding appropriated to various categories that attempt to achieve  
288 universality of the CWC.  
289
  - 290 b. New advances in sciences and technology yield positive results with respect to positive developments in  
291 medicine and technology. However, these same results yield dangerous chemical compounds that can be  
292 turned into chemical weapons. Detection and prevention of the use and spread of chemical weapons pose a  
293 challenge to ensuring universality. Furthermore, the costs associated with developing technologies and  
294 equipment is directly correlated with the changing global economy.  
295
  - 296 c. The global economy and scientific advancements have direct implications on international peace and  
297 security due to the fact that technological developments in the chemical industry can lead to the creation of  
298 new weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, there is an increased need for law enforcement officials and  
299 government authorities to detect the spread of chemical weapons and prevent the use of chemical weapons.  
300
- 301 43. As highlighted in the UN General Assembly Resolution 67/8 on increased cooperation between the OPCW and  
302 the United Nations, the OPCW recognizes the need for increased cooperation with international and regional  
303 bodies to ensure the universality of the CWC.  
304
- 305 44. The OPCW recognizes the importance of regional capacity building and training in the trajectory towards  
306 universality of the CWC, focusing on Articles IX, X, and XI. Germane to this value, the OPCW has conducted  
307 or sponsored various training and capacity building initiatives. However, various capacity building measures  
308 with regards to chemical weapons on the regional level focus on efforts targeting the region exclusively, with  
309 little to no emphasis on strengthening international bonds between regional organizations. Some recent  
310 programs that are region-specific include:  
311
- 312 a. The OPCW and the National Authority of Saudi Arabia organized an advanced training course for 22  
313 States Parties in the region in April 2014 for personnel of CWC National Authorities providing  
314 practical assistance to participants on preparation and submission of Article VI declarations and Article  
315 VI inspections.  
316
  - 317 b. The OPCW and the CWC National Authority of Costa Rica conducted an advanced course for eight  
318 regional States Parties on specialized responses to chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial  
319 chemicals in April 2014.  
320
  - 321 c. The OPCW and the CWC National Authority of Chile conducted a basic course for 19 States Parties in  
322 the Latin American and Caribbean region on specialized responses to chemical warfare agents and  
323 toxic industrial chemicals.  
324
- 325 45. Programs or initiatives that include a collaboration of regional bodies and the OPCW already conducted include  
326 the Programme for Africa, a feature of the European Union Council decision in 2009 and continued in 2012,

327 which addresses the needs of African countries in implementing the CWC. In addition, the OPCW and the  
328 government of Indonesia conducted a regional workshop for Asian State Parties in April 2014 addressing the  
329 issues of regional cooperation in assistance and emergency response that was funded by the European Union.  
330

- 331 46. Aside from limited previous engagements, there is a partnership void to be filled in the international community  
332 concerning, but not limited to, organizations such as the Arab League, Organization of American States, Pacific  
333 Island Forum, East Asia Summit, Association of Southeast Asian States, and the Non-Aligned Movement. The  
334 variations in necessities such as training, environmental protection, emergency response, and handling of  
335 chemical weapons as well as issues in implementing the CWC may be achieved with open dialogue,  
336 suggestions, and strengthened multilateral cooperation amongst regional, sub-regional and international  
337 organizations.  
338
- 339 47. States Parties to the CWC can benefit from the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from  
340 insight, expertise, and alternative perspectives towards achieving universality. A relationship between NGOs  
341 and the OPCW currently exists through attendance and participation of NGOs in the Session of the Conference  
342 of States Parties.  
343

## 344 **H. Increasing The International Recognition Of The Chemical Weapons Convention**

345

- 346 48. The international community has established three treaties in the course of the last century, which has set a  
347 precedent for the illegality of the use and possession of Chemical weapons.  
348
- 349 a. The Geneva Protocol to the Hague Convention bans the use of all forms of chemical and  
350 biological warfare. There are currently 138 States that are party to the Protocol.  
351
  - 352 b. The Biological Weapons Convention serves as a supplementary successor to the Geneva Protocol  
353 and formally banned the development, production, and stockpile of biological agents for use in  
354 war. As of today, 170 States are party to the BWC.  
355
  - 356 c. The CWC prohibits the development and use of chemical weapons and also provides for the  
357 destruction of the weaponry. There are 190 States that are party to the CWC.  
358
- 359 49. Entered into force on April 29, 1997, the CWC sought to establish standards and a protocol regarding the  
360 possession and use of chemical weapons. As established in Article I of the Treaty, all States Party must identify  
361 and destroy all chemical weapons stockpiles.  
362
- 363 50. To more efficiently implement the treaty and provide benefits for States Party to the CWC, the OPCW was  
364 formed in conjunction with the creation of the Treaty.  
365
- 366 a. States within the OPCW recognize the need for the CWC to be not only universally applied but  
367 also universally respected and recognized.  
368
- 369 51. There are several States that have not signed the CWC and therefore do not receive the benefits provided to  
370 members of the OPCW.  
371
- 372 52. Other States Party within the OPCW question some of the organization's fundamental articles. While a united  
373 treaty, the support for the CWC hinges upon the willingness of its members to participate. While currently  
374 sufficient, more reason for participation is required.  
375
- 376 53. The International Court of Justice is defined in the Charter of the United Nations as its designated judicial body.  
377
- 378 54. Article 96, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations empowers the UN General Assembly & the  
379 Security Council to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on any legal question.  
380
- 381 55. Under International Court of Justice procedure for advisory opinions, first all laws and treaties are examined,  
382 and second, if no clear decision is provided by the laws and treaties, the UN charter is referred to.

- 383  
384 56. The international community recognizes the legal weight of the Court’s advisory opinions. As a result, the  
385 opinions serve as an instrument of humanitarian authority. Advisory opinions also contribute to the clarification  
386 and definition of international law:  
387  
388 a. In the situation of the 1994 question regarding nuclear weapons, States reacted definitively in  
389 support of the International Court of Justice opinion.  
390  
391 b. The United States House of Representatives passed two resolutions citing the opinion in support  
392 of nuclear disarmament - H. Res. 479 on June 18, 1998 and H. Res. 17 on Jan 1. 2001.  
393  
394 c. The Australian Government established an independent commission entitled the Canberra  
395 Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in November 1995, citing the opinion as a  
396 fundamental obligation.  
397  
398 57. Through providing an opinion on a treaty, the International Court of Justice also provides clear and independent  
399 legal justification. This justification is important in maintaining the unity of the CWC and the global recognition  
400 it currently holds.  
401  
402 58. On December 19, 1994, the General Assembly passed Resolution 49/45, “Request for Advisory Opinion on the  
403 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.” This resolution asked for a ruling by the International Court  
404 of Justice to determine if, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under  
405 international law?” The question was asked with the intent of not only defining the official United Nations  
406 position on nuclear weapon possession, but also calling attention to the gravity of the issue.  
407  
408 59. Within the situation of Syria, the appeal to humanitarian principles swayed the nation on the issue of their use of  
409 chemical weaponry and their willingness to allow OPCW inspectors into the country.  
410  
411 60. It is necessary to note is that the opinions given by the International Court of Justice are not criminal legal  
412 proceedings, and do not determine punitive action. The essence of International Court of Justice opinions within  
413 the United Nations and with relation to the actions of the General Assembly is that the opinions are merely  
414 advisory. They require no direct action or sentencing of actors contrary to the opinion.  
415

## 416 **II. Mandate**

- 417  
418 61. The OPCW is the implementing body of the CWC, and it is located in The Hague, Netherlands. The  
419 Organisation is given the mandate to fulfill the object and purpose of the CWC, guaranteeing the  
420 implementation of its provisions and providing a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.  
421 The OPCW mission is “to implement the provisions of the CWC in order to achieve a world free of chemical  
422 weapons and of the threat of their use.”  
423

## 424 **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

### 425 **A. Universal Membership and Development**

- 426  
427  
428 62. The universality of the CWC is the premier goal and it is thus of crucial importance that the remaining States  
429 not party accede to the CWC. Any measures taken to curbe the production or uses of chemical weapons fall  
430 short of achieving the goals of the CWC until all States are members of the Organisation.  
431  
432 63. We recognize the fact that all States Party voluntarily join the CWC, and that no measure created by the OPCW  
433 should by any means infringe or impugn on a State’s sovereignty in the spirit of their voluntary accession.  
434 Syria’s and Somalia’s recent accession to the CWC are an illustration of State Party’s understanding that being  
435 part of the OPCW means greater freedom in a more secure world.  
436

- 437 64. We believe that an annual invitation to voluntarily accede the CWC should be extended to any State not Party to  
438 the CWC. The most respectful and efficient way to invite non-party States to accede to the CWC is to create an  
439 environment of understanding and unfettered and open dialogue. This would indeed allow non-party States to  
440 improve their understanding of the CWC and thereby ease their worries, as well as it would enable the  
441 Organisation to understand the reason of their reluctances. To create such an environment, the Conference of  
442 the State Parties recommends the empowerment of a delegation of States Party within the External Relations  
443 Division (ERD) of the OPCW, as recommended by the Director-General or the Action Plan to Promote  
444 Universality of the CWC adopted in 2003.  
445
- 446 65. A non-party State wishing to discuss the concerns it may have regarding the Organisation and the obligations  
447 implied in the CWC may contact the Technical Secretariat. The ERD shall forward the demand to the  
448 delegation, which shall open the dialogue with the demanding non-party State. The delegation can also relate to  
449 the OPCW any changes non-Party States would like to see to make them feel more welcome and secure. The  
450 delegation shall be made of six States Party that rotate every three years, starting with three amongst longest  
451 ratified and three amongst the latest ratified States Party. After the first meeting, the six States shall be elected  
452 by the Conference, following the rules of consensus and taking regional representation into account.  
453
- 454 66. The Conference recognizes that one of the obstacles to disarmament and destruction of chemical weapons and  
455 true cooperation is the sheer weight of the cost of doing so. Currently the burden of this cost falls on the more  
456 economically stable States Party. To ensure universality the cost can be shared and lowered on an individual  
457 State basis. This could be accomplished by encouraging States and trade unions to offer economic and trade  
458 incentives for cooperation and chemical industrial development. By encouraging such measures, we create and  
459 facilitate positive reinforcement to steadfast cooperation with the CWC.  
460
- 461 67. Articles IX and XI of the CWC enable that such measures be fostered by partnerships between the OPCW and  
462 the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Industrial Development Organisation  
463 (UNIDO) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Combining the Organisation's technical expertise  
464 and understanding of the goals of the CWC with the competences of UNCTAD, UNIDO and ECOSOC would  
465 enable the creation of powerful incentives related to the global economy and industrial development. The  
466 Conference therefore suggests that such partnerships between the OPCW and the aforementioned UN bodies be  
467 set up in order to enhance the longevity of the CWC by economically stabilization as many States Party wishing  
468 to participate.  
469
- 470 68. What is more, a rapid advance in chemical technology may be harmful if not known or not foreseen. It is  
471 therefore needed to increase the scientific awareness and education of States Party. The Conference  
472 recommends that the SAB, in cooperation with the ERD, be given the permanent task to report annually on  
473 scientific development and emerging technologies that would have an immediate impact on achieving the  
474 objectives of the CWC. In this way, the competences of the SAB are extended to new technologies related to  
475 chemistry. A fourth working group would be established on a permanent basis to carry on the aforementioned  
476 task. This report would be made available to all States Party of the OPCW and forwarded to the UNSC and the  
477 UN Secretary-General.  
478

## 479 **B. Creating an Incentivized Accreditation System for Civil Society Organizations**

- 480
- 481 69. A large percentage of the chemicals listed in Schedule 1 and 2 of the CWC are produced by the private sector  
482 and are sold on the international market. Most of those industries are not delimited in their acts and if they are,  
483 it is without any consideration to their specialisation in chemicals. Thus, the OPCW recommends the creation of  
484 an incentivized accreditation program implemented by the International Organisation for Standardisation (IOS)  
485 that would encourage civil society organizations to voluntarily integrate themselves in order to increase their  
486 business chances.  
487
- 488 70. Historically, peaceful and non-binding measures such as the CWC based on positive incentives have been more  
489 effective than those based on negative incentives. Actors accessing voluntarily are much more willing to apply  
490 changes to their national legislation. Considering the importance of civil society organizations in the chemical  
491 domain, we recommend the Executive Council to take this matter under its mandate. We expect the

492 implementation of such accreditation to help secure the chemical industry through the standardization of its  
493 production and transaction norms.

494  
495 71. The aforementioned accreditation program would encourage all industries involved in the chemical industry  
496 mentioned in Schedule 1 and 2 to adopt peaceful and secure politics. By adhering to the conditions mentioned  
497 under the accreditation, State Parties' chemical-producing industries would be able to access the economic  
498 market of each other. Such an accreditation program would enable the security aspect in the international  
499 chemical trade. This safety can be achieved through:

500  
501 a. All chemicals listed in Schedule 1 and 2 being produced and sold according to the conditions  
502 mentioned in the CWC;

503  
504 b. All chemicals listed in Schedule 1 and 2 being sold to actors abiding to the CWC.

505  
506 72. The accreditation can be divided into four parts: ecological responsibility, working conditions, economical  
507 aspect, and security. In this regard:

508  
509 a. All industries leave an ecological footprint caused by the excessive use of the natural resources.  
510 As noted by UNEP during its work on the harmful substances and hazardous wastes, inadequately  
511 managed chemicals represent a great risk for humans and other living creatures. Their report  
512 concluded that the health-related effects of chemicals can range from acute pain to cancer, but can  
513 also affect the neurological and hormonal conditions. We consider this to be a serious issue that  
514 needs to be amended through a larger participation of the industries in the ecological efforts of the  
515 receiving nations. This can be achieved by keeping account of the industry's efforts when  
516 confronted by a chemical accident; implementing environmental policies and regulations inside  
517 and outside of the industries; and inserting itself in environmental programs specific to its local  
518 communities.

519  
520 b. This accreditation should also focus on the bettering of working conditions for the labor sector in  
521 chemical-producing industries. A study published by the International Journal of Industrial  
522 Ergonomics shows that workers in petrochemical plants face a higher percentage of health risks  
523 due to some stressors and concluded that there needs to be an improvement in the work area. The  
524 conditions of work areas are suggested to be assessed and analyzed by comparing the data of  
525 working conditions with data made available by the International Labor Organization and  
526 workers' labor conditions are suggested to be adjusted and improved by using the International  
527 Labor Standards.

528  
529 c. Economic prosperity through corporate efficiency is one of the most important and most valued  
530 objectives for States Party. Having such an accreditation will promote more prosperous and  
531 accountable economic conditions in the private chemical-producing industry sector by  
532 emphasizing a management trained according to standards set by the international community as  
533 well as those set by regional communities.

534  
535 d. In regards to the issue of security of chemicals, Article VII of the CWC notes that States Party  
536 should consider the safety of its people and the environment as a priority and should cooperate  
537 with other States Party on the matter. Such cooperation would not be possible without  
538 transparency of databases of chemical stocks in industries. Furthermore, educating the managers  
539 of the chemical industries and local citizens in the surrounding areas with safety protocols in the  
540 instance of a chemical accident is crucial in maintaining the security of chemicals.

541  
542 73. In conclusion, the universality of the CWC does not only concern States it also affects civil society  
543 organizations involved in the industrial private sector. We highlight four subjects: environmental factors,  
544 economy, labour conditions, and security measures. The measures adopted through the accreditation system,  
545 previously outlined, would benefit the population of the public sector, which will get access to secure jobs,  
546 environmentally friendly industries, and a stable economy. We also stress the importance of the promotion of  
547 human rights and the protection of workers condition.

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## C. Regional Cooperation

74. Multilateral regional cooperation is essential for the achievement of the universality of the CWC. Without regional support for States that need assistance in implementing the CWC, there is a misunderstanding of the benefits of accession due to lack of discussion and support for those State. This could result in no implementation of or accession to the CWC. By including States not Party in regional discussion concerning technical, scientific, financial, and information assistance needed to implement the CWC. We are effectively reassuring States that there is support provided by the OPCW and the OPCW international community to effectively implement the CWC, and that there are increased benefits for accession.
75. The lack of universality of the CWC can arise from the multitude of regional concerns. Without providing States a regional open forum in which they can express their concerns and needs, we miss the opportunity to support States in obtaining the capacity they may require in order to implement the CWC. The acquisition of capacity needs to be met regionally in order for proper dispersion of funds throughout a region. Fortunately, with transparent handling of voluntary funds, regional centers can accurately allocate monetary needs throughout a region, therefore potentially meeting a State's capacity needs for the implementation of the CWC.
76. Following the ideals pursued in *The Benefits of Joining the CWC*, the cooperation between programs dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security is essential to the enhancement of regional cooperation. An interagency approach addresses the gap that sometimes divides regional needs and international efforts. Together, programs can provide incentives for States not Party to meet regional and international standards concerning hazardous chemicals and their precursors. Such an action could include the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Centers of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) projects that enhance local expertise in regards to chemical handling, which provides enhancement of a region's safety and security. These projects are conducted in a regionally-focused fashion, in order to maintain sovereignty. An example includes the OPCW-IUPAC International Science and Technology Workshop, which is co-funded between organizations to assess the impact of developing science technologies in addressing the CWC.
77. Maintaining discussion and participation of States not Party to the CWC in the international community further raises the likelihood of ratification to the CWC; providing a regional forum in which they may participate and raise questions concerning implementation capacity with neighboring States strengthens regional cooperation and support. This in turn leads to cooperation within the international community in addressing the concerns States not Party would hold in implementing the CWC. Upon addressing the needs within the international community, universality will be a certain outcome.
78. This body concludes that international and regional cooperation is necessary to expedite achieving universality of the CWC and maximizing its efficiency. However, problems remain with communication and gaps between regional needs and international direction. While progress has been made, a greater presence in regional discussion of the OPCW, paired with regional organizations, could further persuade States not party to the CWC to ratify and consequently join the OPCW.
79. We acknowledge the need for the sharing of technology and the presence of trained personnel in regions that include States not Party to the CWC. This could further aid the facilitation of international dialogue and show the benefits of accession to the OPCW.
80. We are aware of the allocation of funding available to its Technical Secretariat, but recognizes that there is a need for increased transparency in allocation of funding towards the Implementation Support Branch.
81. The international community has observed that the European Union's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centers of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) has done thorough and effective work in enhancing regional cooperation, and it can be noted that their work coincides with the objectives of the OPCW. As a result, the OPCW, along with other relevant organizations such as the IAEA or the UNSCR 1540 Committee, is committed to interagency cooperation with the EU CBRN CoE. Both the OPCW and the CoE aim for sustainability and local expertise to create a strong bridge to close the gap between international directions and

603 regional needs. The OPCW considers the CoE Regional Secretariats as powerful tools to achieve universality of  
604 the CWC; they attempt to achieve universality through regional cooperative approaches, rather than through  
605 international mandates. Thus, the Conference of States Party to the OPCW understand that there is an intrinsic  
606 link between regional cooperation of sovereign states and achieving universality of the CWC.  
607

608 82. In accordance with these ideas, this body recommends the consideration of the creation of the Collaborating  
609 Regionally to Ensure Weapons Safety (CREWS) program. CREWS is committed to maintaining safety against  
610 chemical weapons and hazardous chemicals with regional cooperation. It should take the form of workshops,  
611 platforms, summits, etc., that would be seen as a bridge between the international community and individual  
612 States. Therefore, using the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats as outstanding models, the Organisation  
613 encourages increasing regional cooperation and communication. Through interagency approaches, enhanced  
614 cooperation is one of the main goals of the EU CBRN CoE. Several programs and tools are available:  
615

616 a. The CBRN Needs Assessment Tool, which provides States with a specific methodology to assess  
617 the needs of a State in adopting the measures required by Articles under the CWC by identifying  
618 and analyzing any difficulties. The Regional Secretariat could additionally report common issues  
619 had by regions in addressing implementation of the CWC to the OPCW.

620 b. The CBRN National Teams provide all necessary feedback to the Regional Secretariats. They also  
621 provide criteria for assessing partner countries' needs.

622 c. The CBRN also provides guidelines for National Action Plans. Their main goal can be  
623 summarized as complementing national measures in order to address existing issues. They address  
624 three main areas: prevention, detection, and preparedness, combined with response. We suggest  
625 establishing a widespread awareness campaign, distributing flyers, and placing posters with  
626 emergency procedures that prepare for an attack by chemical weapons with focus on higher risk  
627 areas.

628 d. Additional guidelines also exist for Regional Secretariats so as to maximize their efficiency and  
629 coherence when corresponding with other Regional Secretariats. Additional guidelines can further  
630 be utilized for the CBRN National Teams.

631 83. Realizing the potential benefits of regional and international dialogue through the sharing of technological  
632 resources and the assistance of area personnel, we recommend expanding the range of areas in which the EU  
633 CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats will be active. In this regard:  
634

635 a. States Party may create a network for open discussion concerning technological advancement in  
636 terms of the detection and decontamination of hazardous chemicals and their precursors, following  
637 the model of the Spiez Laboratory in Switzerland. The regions in which the Regional Secretariats  
638 are being established at this time include the African Atlantic Façade, Central Asia, Eastern and  
639 Central Africa, Gulf Cooperation Countries, the Middle East, North Africa, South East Asia,  
640 South East Europe, the Southern Caucasus, Moldova, and Ukraine. This could be expanded to  
641 include South Asia, East Asia, Latin America, and other regions.  
642

643 b. The expertise and assistance offered by the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats should be used  
644 to develop an educational training program of regional instructors, who focus on the technical  
645 information concerning hazardous chemicals based on region-specific needs, which may include  
646 topics such as: proper handling techniques, transportation security concerning export control  
647 policies in advocating effective export control criteria by countries outside existing regimes and  
648 arrangements with special focus on natural resources-dependent regions, regional higher education  
649 programs, chemical awareness campaigns within the chemical industry, and the implementation of  
650 the E-Learning Tool for National Authorities.  
651

652 c. We further recommend that the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats, when dispensing  
653 information, include OPCW programmes and initiatives relative to the CoE information being  
654 dispensed in order to effectively communicate to all regions that the OPCW can indeed provide

655 the support and assistance needed in implementing the CWC, and further the effort of achieving  
656 universality of the CWC. The OPCW should similarly dispense related CBRN CoE information.  
657 There are also specific programs within the OPCW that the EU CBRN CoE Regional Secretariats  
658 could potentially recommend, such as: the Associate Programme, Research Projects Programme,  
659 Laboratory Assistance Programme, etc. The OPCW also recommends that EU CBRN CoE  
660 Regional Secretariats possibly collaborate with the Financial Action Task Force in addressing  
661 regional issues regarding illicit financial transactions used to acquire hazardous materials.  
662

- 663 84. We recommend transparency in the distribution of funding throughout the OPCW and, therefore, propose that  
664 the Technical Secretariat reports in a more transparent fashion on the allocation of funding towards the  
665 Implementation Support Branch, in order for the OPCW to make well-informed decisions if there should ever  
666 be a change in funding priorities.  
667
- 668 85. We further suggest that the Technical Secretariat sets up a Voluntary Regional Trust Fund, which would  
669 provide the necessary financial backup to establish the essential measures for emergency situations, also for  
670 training exercises, as well as spreading expertise and funding workshops. Voluntary funding would be provided  
671 through sources including, but not limited to, States Parties. Funds created in the past, such as the success of the  
672 Syria Trust Fund, demonstrates that voluntary trust funds are indeed capable of providing necessary support in  
673 times of need.  
674
- 675 86. As previously mentioned, regional cooperation should serve as a bridge between the international community  
676 and individual States. The EU CBRN CoE encourages States not Party to ratify the CWC, as these Centers have  
677 the potential to increase regional economic development and partnerships. Furthermore, the enhanced presence  
678 of the EU CBRN CoE would help support States not Party, so that they can meet the international and regional  
679 standards associated with chemical weapons and hazardous chemicals, thus incentivizing the CWC.  
680
- 681 87. In conclusion, the Conference of the States Party to the OPCW strongly emphasizes the need for the  
682 incentivization of the CWC through regional cooperative efforts to ensure that the goal of universality of the  
683 CWC can be met. The maintenance of international peace and security rides upon universal disarmament of  
684 weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, any step towards universality is a step towards a WMD-free world.  
685

#### 686 **D. Technical Cooperation and Best Practice Sharing**

687

- 688 88. We encourage States Party to support and implement the *Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of*  
689 *Article VII*, specifically the provision that applies to establishing individual National Authorities, as this will  
690 hold the international community accountable to updating practices and policies for implementation agencies of  
691 the CWC, as well as enable regional organizations and States Parties to develop individualized and sustainable  
692 solutions. Multilateral collaboration to prevent attacks and chemical accidents, with respect to Article X of the  
693 CWC, will ensure that States Parties share best practices for defensive techniques and build trust within the  
694 international community. The OPCW affirms the need for sound management of chemical precursors,  
695 specifically concerning the transfer of chemicals and related materials. This committee thus encourages the  
696 expansion of the Implementation Support Branch of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to continue to work with  
697 National Authorities and include the development of States infrastructure that will be able to effectively  
698 implement the model legislation given by the programme of legal technical assistance. These conferences  
699 should be assisted upon request by the conference support program under the OPCW, with such conferences  
700 focusing specifically on Article VII of the CWC.  
701
- 702 89. The OPCW encourages public and private sectors to work together in line with the Tarnow Declaration,  
703 specifically on the development of international cooperation to enhance chemical safety and security along with  
704 the promotion of the Global Chemical Security Culture.  
705
- 706 90. The OPCW encourages the development of regional and national networks of professionals to exchange ideas  
707 as part of the implementation of Article XI of the CWC. This has been pioneered by the Programme to  
708 Strengthen Cooperation with Africa (Africa Programme), which specifically addresses challenges to the African  
709 region, similar to the Argentine Project on Education and the CWC. These networks will be tasked with  
710 arranging educational events to ensure that chemical professionals and people in related fields are familiar with



711 the work of the OPCW as well as the principles of the *CWC*. Special emphasis should be placed on raising  
712 awareness on the potential adverse impacts of the misuse of chemicals, especially including but not limited to  
713 dual-use chemicals. Moreover, the above-mentioned networks should promote knowledge of the use of non-  
714 hazardous chemicals, including the use of substances that are not harmful to the environment, whenever  
715 possible, and proper waste disposal procedures regarding both chemicals and non-toxic chemicals. Furthermore,  
716 the networks are recommended to share technical and scientific information and strengthen research efforts to  
717 explore the peaceful uses of chemicals. The OPCW promotes safe development of the chemical industry, as  
718 well as increasing capacity building in States Parties. Moreover, the OPCW strongly recommends that  
719 challenges within the above-mentioned areas should be addressed in the proposed regional networks, if this is  
720 deemed to be preferable by the States Parties.

721  
722 91. The OPCW concludes that data and universal access to that information is paramount to confidence building  
723 measures between States Parties. Updating tools and databases under the OPCW and its Scheduled Chemicals  
724 Annex, to include new classifications and definitions, is becoming increasingly important.

725  
726 a. The Conference of States Parties recommends the continuous updating of the Verification  
727 Information System under the OPCW, which is crucial for effective data storing, analyzing, and  
728 universal access to ensure transparency within the OPCW as well as States Parties.

729  
730 b. After recognizing the need for furthering chemical coding, the OPCW recommends that recording  
731 should take place through the OPCW's Electronic Declaration Tool for National Authorities  
732 (EDNA) to ensure chemicals are properly recorded and information remains up to date throughout  
733 the international community.

734  
735 c. We recommend the establishment of an OPCW Chemical Safety Standard Database. The main  
736 objectives of this proposed database would be to share information of risks and hazards of the  
737 handling of chemical weapons, reduce the risk of compliance failures through access to  
738 information, and to promote the convergence of regulations among States Parties.

739  
740 i. Sharing of information on the risks and hazards of handling chemical weapons will allow  
741 officials and professionals to be better prepared in situations of disarming and  
742 dismantling stockpiles and dealing with post chemical weapon usage situations. This will  
743 allow States to be better prepared to deal with these issues in an efficient manner.

744  
745 ii. With better access to standards for safety the *CWC* and States Party have, national leaders  
746 and private industries will be less likely to fail to comply with the multitude of standards  
747 that are in existence.

748  
749 iii. If we can compile easy access to these various regulations for States, they may be  
750 encouraged to create more universal safety standard practices. This will allow for the  
751 OPCW and State authorities to become more effective in their interactions and training  
752 workshops.

753  
754 d. The OPCW concludes that the classification of chemical production facilities has not been  
755 recently discussed in depth. The OPCW recommends that the Scientific Advisory Board begins  
756 discussion on a new classification system of chemical production facilities.

757  
758 e. The OPCW recommends the Advisory Panel on Future OPCW Priorities to be reinstated in order  
759 to facilitate with efforts towards an inclusive and comprehensive *CWC*, which shall include new  
760 emerging chemicals and compounds that have the possibility of weaponization, as well as their  
761 precursors.

762  
763 92. The Conference of States Parties recommends that the Director-General create an annex of the annual report of  
764 the OPCW on the Implementation on the *CWC*. This annex will report the various stages of implementation of  
765 the *CWC* of each State Party at a national level. The annex will be under Article VII of the *CWC* and shall:

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- a. Request States Parties to submit comprehensive reports detailing the implementation status and any initiatives aimed at capacity building in order to strengthen the universality of the *CWC*.
  - b. Possess the following sections:
    - i. Situation of any non-state actors seen as a potential threat to the *CWC*.
    - ii. Progress of domestic legislation in the area of terrorism.
    - iii. Evaluation of border safety and security.
    - iv. Evaluation of the progress of Border Alliances within the subject of terrorism and illegal trafficking of chemical weapons or any weapons of mass destruction.
  - c. Establish a mechanism to verify the details of the report Annex. It will comprise of the following procedures:
    - i. Allow any State Party to raise questions concerning the content of another State Party's contribution to the annex.
    - ii. Encourages the creation of an independent body of technical experts to verify the subject of concern.
    - iii. The independent team will be appointed by the Director-General of the OPCW that will conduct an assessment and produce a report that verifies States' implementation of the principles of the *CWC*.
    - iv. The implementation of this independent team will be under a voluntary basis, subject to approval by the State Party in question.
    - v. Approve the request of any States Party for assistance from the OPCW in order to effectively comply with the recommendations made by the independent body of technical experts.
- 801 93. With concerns to the topic of disarmament and non-state actors, we regard terrorism as an undeniable threat to  
802 the maintenance of international peace and security. We believe that the issue of illegal trafficking of chemicals  
803 does not allow the effective control of chemical weapons and related materials, and that without adequate  
804 controls non-state actors are more able to acquire chemicals precursors. OPCW recognizes that illicit trafficking  
805 is an international threat, specifically regarding port and airport security. Building capacity for border security  
806 plays a major role in preventing the illegal trade of chemicals and chemical weapons between States Parties. We  
807 find that the World Customs Organization (WCO) and UN Office on Drug and Crime's (UNODC) Container  
808 Control Programme (CCP) and the UNODC, INTERPOL, and WCO's joint Airport Communication  
809 Programme (AIRCOP) have expanded their initiatives to include chemicals and related materials, and both have  
810 been successful in training border personnel in recognizing illicit trafficked items. We recommend that States  
811 that have not utilized the CCP and AIRCOP to consider implementing these programmes on a national level in  
812 order to effectively train their national personnel to increase national security by being able to better identify the  
813 chemical precursors at their borders. Further cooperation with existing programmes for training of security  
814 forces is encouraged.  
815
- a. The Organisation encourages States Parties to continue training various authorities, cooperation,  
816 and protective methods to teach authorities on how to better assist their States. Collaboration  
817 through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), including the International Criminal  
818 Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP), teaches States to strengthen local  
819 policing forces in order to ensure the prevention of terrorist acquisition of weapons and to  
820 integrate internal police forces. States are able to coordinate data collection through a multilateral  
821 platform.  
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- b. The OPCW suggests coordination between the organizations underneath the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC) and UNODC, INTERPOL, and WCO's Global Shield Programme to both raise awareness of the dangers of chemicals and train security personnel in the handling of chemicals precursors and related materials. This will assist in improving the health and safety of border security personnel and ensure more efficient management procedures of chemicals on a national security level. We suggest that cooperation is continued on all levels to ensure financial, technical and logistic support is upheld.
- c. The Organisation recommends all States Parties to adopt a border security alliance, within the guidelines established in Article X based on Assistance and Protection against chemical weapons, premised on cooperation at local, regional and global basis, with the purpose of tracking down all illegal chemicals. The alliance shall work with the aim of:
  - i. Sharing information on technologies to tackle terrorist groups and their involvement on chemical weapons.
  - ii. Sharing security tactics and initiatives in order to establish a strong cooperation system.
  - iii. Establishing global border alliances in order to tackle the illegal trafficking of chemicals.

94. OPCW draws attention to the limits of educating civilians on a national level, particularly within developing nations, about the scourges of chemical weapons and related materials. Due to these limitations, we recommend that civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work in line with international organizations such as the UN Department of Public of Information (DPI) in order to facilitate the sharing of information regarding the CWC and its provisions on a larger scale within developing nations and their populations.

95. We recommend the creation of a forum of technical experts under the CWC that continually evaluates and updates training and educational programs and their learning curriculum. This forum would be tasked to ensure that educational programs are aligned with the latest developments in technology relevant to chemical weapons detection and Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIC) decontamination. This forum will provide States Parties with a framework for immediate response as well as guidelines for addressing potential threats.

96. The OPCW acknowledges that the response forces in the event of a chemical accident or attack are vital to protecting and aiding victims of chemical incidents. The training and preparation of said response forces is imperative to ensure effective results. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Chemical Incident Emergency Response Network (ChemiNet), as the chemical arm of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, works to mitigate chemical incidents through early detection and response. The OPCW calls on WHO to expand ChemiNet to increase the network's capacity to train national, regional, and international response forces to diminish the effects of chemical incidents.

- a. In order to have the most comprehensive approach, collaboration at the regional level with NGOs and civil societies will produce the most effective results and provide a framework for a stabilized response to chemical emergencies as well as lay the foundation for safe removal and depletion of chemical weapons stockpiles. In order to achieve these goals, the Conference of States Parties recommends the integration among national institutions such as universities, science laboratories, chemical industry entrepreneurs and government agencies.
- b. Through the integration of multiple channels of resources and expertise, implementation programs will gain legitimacy and support from a wider sector of involved parties, thus working to achieve universality. Following the example of the training program hosted in Costa Rica earlier this year, we recommend that cooperation with emergency response and disaster relief teams, including training and response education will further involve the civil society in States Parties to take a vested interest in the matter.

- 879 97. It is recognized by the OPCW that developing countries may not have the capacity to fund programmes of  
880 actions by their National Authorities. The OPCW therefore supports the UN Trust Fund for Global and  
881 Regional Disarmament Activities and requests that able and willing States Parties provide resources to the  
882 Office of Disarmament Affairs to assist States in implementing their obligations in respect to *S/RES/1540*. The  
883 financing given to this trust fund should be used specifically to assist States in developing the legislation and  
884 infrastructure to counter non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, specifically chemical  
885 weapons.  
886
- 887 a. Financial assistance can be difficult to obtain for the implementation of chemical weapons  
888 destruction procedures of various OPCW programmes, as mentioned in the *Decision-Cost of*  
889 *Inspections of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (C-IV/DEC.5)*. To this end, the OPCW wishes to  
890 strengthen assistance and contributions to the OPCW Trust Fund, so that upon request States can  
891 receive funds specifically for destruction of chemical weapons, such as the preexisting framework  
892 for Syria.  
893
  - 894 b. States should continue to support Security Council *Resolution 1540* in order to ensure plans of  
895 action may be accessed by the Organisation. States should continue to trade only with legitimate  
896 State actors in accordance with resolution, while refraining from trading with non-state actors.  
897 Documents maintained will include the destruction of existing chemical weapons and conversion  
898 of present.  
899
  - 900 c. Due to the fact that some States Parties fall behind their implementation deadlines on account of  
901 insufficient economic capacity to fulfill their obligations to the *CWC*, it is clear that development  
902 and capacity building must take precedence. To accomplish this, existing capacity-building  
903 programmes, such as the Laboratory Assistance Programme and Equipment Exchange  
904 Programme, can be expanded as well as OPCW States Parties should review their national  
905 legislation to identify discrepancies between *CWC* Article XI and their own trade restrictions. It is  
906 encouraged that OPCW States Parties review their chemical trade regulations by November 14<sup>th</sup>,  
907 2015, making necessary adjustments by August 20, 2016, which will allow for the emergence of  
908 free and peaceful chemical trade to foster development.  
909
  - 910 d. Furthermore, the Implementation Support Branch of the OPCW Technical Secretariat should  
911 assist States that lack the capacity to implement the *Action Plan on the Implementation of Article*  
912 *VII of the CWC* through technical, logistical, and financial means.  
913
- 914 98. The conclusion of the OPCW is to recognize Article XI of the *CWC*, which calls for technical assistance sharing  
915 between States Party to the *CWC*. The OPCW asks for the utilization and the expansion of already existing  
916 programmes, such as the Internship Support Programme, under the Technical Secretariat, to facilitate the  
917 sharing of information between already existing laboratories and their staff. Collaborating with other UN  
918 organizations, such as UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
919 (DPKO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as regional organizations to accomplish such  
920 priorities is vital to reach universality. The sharing of information can be accomplished through annual reports  
921 to the OPCW or the 1540 Committee during the annual meetings and workshops about scientific and  
922 technological advancements.  
923
- 924 99. This Organisation understands the importance of the Implementation Support Branch of the OPCW Technical  
925 Secretariat as it has established a programme of legal technical assistance that provides comprehensive  
926 legislation, models, and explanatory documentation to States Parties upon request. This is best accomplished  
927 when regional actors collaborate with the Technical Secretariat to implement relevant processes in order to  
928 address the concerns of specific national needs, particularly when it comes to both the process of chemical  
929 weapons destruction and peaceful uses of chemicals. It is important that conferences take place on international,  
930 regional, and national levels, which would include such meetings as the Southern African Development  
931 Community-OPCW joint workshop for States to the *CWC*, and that these conferences and programmes should  
932 invite States Party, States not party, IGOs, NGOs, and civil society organizations when possible.  
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- a. Legislation towards implementation efforts of the *CWC* by National Authorities should be expanded to all States Parties by incorporating training programmes, meetings, workshops, and seminars. The Special Commission of the OPCW should provide professional trainings pertaining to the implementation of the provisions of the *CWC* on a regional and multilateral basis. States Parties may be referred to the UN Sponsorship Programme to receive grants to support this education.
  - b. It is vital to further implement the Equipment Exchange Programme under the OPCW Technical Secretariat in order to support the voluntary transport of chemical laboratory equipment from facilities in developed States to those in developing States. The exchange of this equipment is intrinsic to those economies that are diversifying, as well as, those who already are involved in the chemical industry.
  - c. Free academic open-source material by universities to promote ethical development of chemical compounds, biological technologies and nanotechnologies. That material shall be used to form a new line of informed students that shall act as a line of defense in the case of future developments of CW, BW and nanotechnologies. The funding and the execution shall be decided by the States own national government or with the help of the OPCW funding.
  - d. Seminars and programs for the purpose of educating scientists on safe and proper handling of chemicals, and the proper dismantling of chemical weapons, as well as how to dispose of chemical waste.
    - i. We recommend that UNITAR send representatives to individual nations as request to cooperate with and educate the local scientists towards working on proper ethical handling of chemical handling and the risks of developing chemical weapons as well as biological weapons.
    - ii. These seminars and programs would raise awareness of the *CWC* amongst the international scientific community, build networks in chemical education, facilitate chemical compounds' safety, promote the provisions of article VI of the *CWC*, and implement transfer provisions, like the program of Finnish National Authority, which is the VERIFIN program, which can be used as a model for the international community.
    - iii. Using the Argentine Project on Education and the *CWC* as a model for this open-source educational program that will promote an environment in which professionals will be held responsible for the misuse of chemical components.
  - e. We support the use of rapid result teams may be relied on in the event of a chemical threat within national borders as well. We recommend the regional organizations establish centers by collaborating with the OPCW to ensure chemical rapid result teams are deployed efficiently.
  - f. We would like to see the Technical Secretariat author an additional document, in the style of the OPCW's Legislation Implementation Kit, to advise State Parties on addressing and reporting individual concerns regarding timeframes. The Conference of States Parties, working in conjunction with the national authorities of States parties, shall utilize the kit to implement chemical weapons destruction timelines specific to each state's case. We believe this is in the best interest of individual States Parties and the international community, as utilization of this on a state level is paramount to promoting international peace and security and fulfilling *CWC* obligations.
  - g. States Parties will be classified into two categories according to their nationally reported needs including: States Party (A) will be provided training given by practitioners and professional staff of the OPCW upon request, and States Party (B) will be provided with implementation plan to be incorporated in their legislation systems upon request.

990 h. Legal training programmes developed by international, regional, and National Authorities should  
991 be intended to help develop legislation in compliance with Article VII of the *CWC*. IGOs and  
992 NGOs enhance implementation processes of the *CWC* to ensure efficient methods of coordinative  
993 strategies. This programme will be providing assistance by implanting national legislation in  
994 accordance with the *CWC* to States when deemed necessary  
995

996 100. We recommend strengthening cooperation with States Parties to the *CWC* at the regional level with regards to  
997 capacity building and information sharing between the OPCW and regional organizations to further promote  
998 universality. This will allow us to take advantage of existing networks, capital, and institutions. As three of the  
999 four countries that have not yet signed the *CWC* are in Africa, the African Union (AU) has a specific role to  
1000 play in the realization of this plan. Potential areas of increased cooperation are as follows:  
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1002 a. The OPCW encourages States Parties at the regional level and regional institutions to make *CWC*  
1003 accession and implementation a priority on their agendas.  
1004

1005 b. We call for regional organizations to promote economic and technological development, including  
1006 through trade and resource sharing, as an incentive for *CWC* accession and implementation. We  
1007 suggest that further benefits of this cooperation, such as favorable trade terms or access to  
1008 multilateral aid, be linked to this accession and implementation.  
1009

1010 c. We will continue providing funding and expertise through the Africa Programme toward the  
1011 training of AU peacekeepers in Africa (and in regions where requested), specifically to address the  
1012 threat of chemical weapons. These capacity building programs shall be designed and executed  
1013 with input from States Parties that have contributed to the Africa Programme.  
1014

1015 d. The de facto inspectors of the OPCW will be international. Upon the explicit request from the  
1016 State Party being inspected, regional inspectors will be present in addition to international  
1017 inspectors. With respect to the explicit request for regional monitors by the State Party being  
1018 inspected, the OPCW urges regional inspectors to be trained and to establish additional inspection  
1019 committees to address commitment to universality in their own region. By partnering with the  
1020 OPCW, regional inspection regimes can better tailor their work to the specific needs of the States  
1021 Parties if so requested by the States Party being inspected. This would provide an additional  
1022 intermediate level of protection and communication between the OPCW and national  
1023 governments.  
1024

1025 e. We propose that States Parties at the regional level explore security cooperation and disaster  
1026 mitigation against common threats as a way to incentivize *CWC* accession and implementation.  
1027 We recognize that concern over security is one of the main contentions States might have against  
1028 the *CWC*.  
1029

1030 101. The OPCW recommends the use of positive financial and economic incentives to stimulate progress toward  
1031 universality. Such incentives should be tied to ratification of the *CWC* and implementation measures including,  
1032 but not limited to, the disposal of chemical weapons and effective oversight of chemical precursors for chemical  
1033 weapons. Positive incentives can be used as a primary motivation to gain support in the implementation of the  
1034 *CWC*. Offering financial and economic incentives aids in eliminating chemical weapons use and furthers the  
1035 development of under-resourced countries. The OPCW, recognizing the economic importance of both  
1036 privatized and national chemical industries in promoting development, as well as the significance of modern  
1037 technological and scientific uses of chemicals, supports the creation of chemical industries operating under the  
1038 restrictions set forth in the *CWC*. Furthermore, we encourage the sharing of chemicals, equipment, and  
1039 scientific information for purposes not prohibited by the *CWC*. However, chemical industries must be  
1040 monitored and subject to oversight by National Authorities. To this end, the OPCW stresses the importance of  
1041 internal compliance mechanisms in both the public and privatized chemical industry.  
1042

1043 a. The OPCW urges the use of financial incentives for signing and ratification of the *CWC*, such as  
1044 the possibility of waiving membership dues for the remaining States that choose to ratify. Current  
1045 States not party to the *CWC* and future independently sovereign states should continue to be given

1046 the funds needed to carry out their obligations as parties to the *CWC*. This will allow financially  
1047 unstable or insolvent states to maintain control of chemical weapons stockpiles in the process of  
1048 disposal. Specifically, we call for funds from the Africa Programme to be increased and  
1049 reallocated to incentivize ratification of the *CWC* by South Sudan, Angola, and Egypt.  
1050

1051 b. There are States that are not yet Party to the *CWC* and therefore have restrictions placed upon  
1052 them regarding the transportation of chemicals, as well as types, quantities, etc., as noted in the  
1053 *CWC* (Part VIII, C). It is of utmost importance to the OPCW that States which are not party to the  
1054 *CWC* have encouragement and incentives through partnerships to facilitate dialogue and open  
1055 forums for the facilitation of acceding to the *CWC*. The OPCW recommends that the Technical  
1056 Secretariat continues their effort and open dialogue to have all UN Member States sign and ratify  
1057 the *CWC* by promoting such benefits to joining the *CWC*, such as:

1058 i. Assistance for technical and scientific infrastructure

1059 ii. Capacity-building for peaceful use of chemicals

1060 c. We suggest that States be given financial compensation for the destruction of chemical stockpiles  
1061 reported before a start date determined through negotiations with the OPCW. The compensation  
1062 will be allotted on the basis of the cost of destruction and shall be evaluated by the OPCW.  
1063

1064 d. States Parties to the OPCW are encouraged by the effective spread of information regarding  
1065 chemical safety that the Associate Programme of the *CWC* has been able to foster. The OPCW  
1066 therefore recommends that NGOs and IGOs explore the idea of increased donations of human and  
1067 financial resources in implementing the *CWC*, especially in collaboration with the OPCW's  
1068 Conference Support Programme, as it provides States Parties with financial assistance to existing  
1069 scientific organizations and institutions.  
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1074 102. The OPCW acknowledges that international cooperation on the issue of terrorism is crucial and that the  
1075 diversity of definitions of the term "terrorism" has represented an obstacle for such cooperation, enhancing the  
1076 need to establish a global definition within the international community. We determine the need to establish an  
1077 exact definition through the cooperation with the UN Security Council and providing a strong basis for  
1078 condemning the illegal trafficking, stockpile or use of dangerous chemical precursors. Further, we extend a  
1079 recommendation to the UN Security Council, and to the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, wishing for  
1080 their joint work, to establish a common ground on the official definition of "terrorism" that would be accepted  
1081 by state actors and non-state actors alike, such definition shall include the following parameters:  
1082

1083 a. An exact definition of terrorism.

1084 b. Specific types of terrorism, such as chemical terrorism, nuclear terrorism, inter alia.  
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1087 103. We determined the necessity to establish cooperation between the OPCW with UN bodies that specialize in  
1088 peace and security with the purpose of establishing a coherent and united work within the international system.  
1089 Hence, we encourage the implementation of a joint work branch within the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which  
1090 would, when implemented, aim to establish connected and coherent work with UN peace and security bodies,  
1091 including the Security Council and the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Such a branch shall be specialized in  
1092 terrorism affairs and acquirement of chemical weapons by non-state actors. Furthermore, the Conference of  
1093 States Parties calls for the implementation of pertinent and necessary initiatives in order to tackle the obstacle  
1094 terrorism represents for ensuring the universality of the *CWC*.  
1095

1096 104. We further invite the United Nations Member States to ratify and accede to the *CWC* considering it as a strong  
1097 instrument for the establishment of international peace and security in accordance with the *Charter of the*  
1098 *United Nations*.  
1099

## 1100 **E. Revisiting The Action Plan**

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1102 105. We consider that of the six States that are not party to the CWC, two States are on track to ratifying the CWC in  
1103 the near future. Two other States consider each other as potential threats to their security and therefore are  
1104 unwilling to ratify and/or meet the obligations of the CWC. One of the States that is not party to the CWC is a  
1105 relatively newer State to the international community, as intends on signing and ratifying the CWC in the near  
1106 future. We strongly believe that with the active participation and support of the States Party we can encourage  
1107 non-party States to sign and ratify the CWC.  
1108

1109 106. We further conclude that the measures outlined in the *Action Plan of the Executive Council of 2003* are still  
1110 relevant. We believe that adopting these measures and applying them while attempting to convince a non-party  
1111 States to sign the CWC could result in a more enthusiastic response from non-party States. We believe that the  
1112 measures outlined in the Action Plan have been instrumental in persuading States to ratify the CWC and can  
1113 play an increasingly important role in attaining the universality of the CWC.  
1114

1115 107. The OPCW calls upon States that are not yet party to the CWC to take positive and significant strides towards  
1116 signing and ratifying the CWC. We understand that comprehensive destruction of stockpiles of chemical-based  
1117 weapons can be a daunting task for developing states, therefore we remind the States that are still in transition to  
1118 becoming chemical weapons are free to request assistance from the international community whenever required.  
1119

1120 108. We emphasize the need for the Conference of States Parties to aid in the facilitation of a functional timeline for  
1121 states that are not yet party to the CWC for chemical weapon stockpile disarmament. We further urge the  
1122 committee to create a more lenient timeline for new States Parties, thereby offering them the opportunity to  
1123 comprehensively eradicate stockpiles of chemical weapons while simultaneously integrating them into the  
1124 CWC. We encourage States Parties to oblige to the fundamental concepts of disarmament established by the  
1125 CWC.  
1126

1127 109. For non-party States, we encourage regional and sub-regional cooperation efforts with States Party and regional  
1128 organizations, thus non-party States can learn of the benefits of signing and ratifying the CWC and fulfilling its  
1129 obligations. For States that are not party to the CWC due to systemic hardships or infrastructure-related  
1130 challenges, we remind them that States in the international community may be willing to provide assistance  
1131 when required. We also urge States to request assistance from their allies or other States Party as they deem  
1132 necessary. As State sovereignty is of utmost importance to us, we support assistance and evaluation visits on a  
1133 'request only' basis.  
1134

1135 110. The OPCW, under the supervision of the Technical Secretariat mandate has the ability to recommend the  
1136 training of regional organizations and regional NGOs with the capacities possible to assist States Party and non-  
1137 party States in the respective region. This recommendation will ensure the efficient and effective assistance to  
1138 States in order to implement the CWC. By establishing a strong regional basis, the regional organizations and  
1139 NGOs will play the role of medium between the OPCW and States in the respective region. Such projects will  
1140 assure the enduring aspect of the project and will consequently facilitate access to assistance for States upon  
1141 request.  
1142

1143 111. Additionally, we request the Technical Secretariat to formulate innovative ideas that could aid in ensuring  
1144 universality. We further request comprehensive measures to increase awareness about the CWC in non-party  
1145 States. This can be achieved by enlightening the States Party about the OPCW and offer the publications in  
1146 official and recognized languages of the non-party States. We also call upon States Parties to strengthen their  
1147 efforts to bring about universality and to pursue it as an important objective and urge their allies that aren't  
1148 party to the CWC, or haven't ratified the CWC, to do so at the earliest. We believe that by exerting internal  
1149 pressure and external influence, States would be more likely to be party to the CWC and actively attempt to do  
1150 away with chemical weapons.  
1151

1152 112. We understand that there are States that refuse to destroy their stockpiles of chemical-based weapons due to  
1153 hostile relations with other States who still possess such weapons. We would like to remind these States that the  
1154 concern of the international community is fairness and the States in question and their regions would be more  
1155 secure once these weapons have been destroyed. We consider the provision of security as a huge incentive for a  
1156 State once they ratify and meet the obligations of the CWC. We further remind non-party States that the States  
1157 Party laud any and every positive step taken by these States to help attain the universality of the CWC.



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113. We recognize that the four nations that have not signed the CWC continue to resist signing and ratifying this document because of reasons that are unique to their own policies, therefore we recommend the committee to consider the following:

- d. The committee should consider using the framework of organizations such as the Australia Group, a voluntary coalition designed to advocate export licensing yet lacking a means of formal implementation. Additionally, we advise the strengthening of the coordination of export control in order to properly identify the trade of chemical weapons as well as the materials used to handle said volatile matter by the cataloging of chemicals and chemical materials and providing the State Party with the database information.
- e. With the results gathered from these additions, we urge the Conference of States Parties to share the wealth of information provided with the implementation of the chemical database to regions and OPCW States Party who would otherwise not be able to afford said information or technology if asked to pursue this issue individually.
- f. We support the education of pertinent personnel in the handling and disposal of chemical weapons by hosting regional workshops designed to target the issues that are most relevant to these regions and also addressing the universality of the CWC.
- g. Finally, we further encourage the States who have not signed the CWC to reconsider their stance by strengthening border security and therefore, regional security, thus promoting national sovereignty through diplomatic strategy.

114. We recommend States Party to consider the development of national legislation through their own political systems in order to establish export licensing for chemical products and the materials used to handle them; thus, when a database system is established and shared amongst States Party, the framework for cooperation and peaceful chemical trade among States Party will be present within this legislation.

115. We also recommend States Party to absorb the cost of removal of chemical weapons via regional partnerships as well as any incurred fees related to the education of nations that do not possess the knowledge or means to remove chemical weapons from their borders, and disposal of chemical weapons upon the immediate approval of regional States Party. Additionally, we also encourage NGOs directly concerned or involved with chemicals and their manufacturing to consider monetary donations towards the education and disposal of chemical weapons.

116. For funding mechanisms, we further recommend requesting greater involvement from the International Foundation for Science to aid developing States to follow through with the comprehensive destruction of chemical-based weapons and the implementation of the CWC. We also appreciate the efforts of developed States Party to the CWC that have routines provided financial aid to developing States to implement the CWC and encourage more of such actions from the developed states. We propose for the budget to be available for and initially limited to the safe destruction of any existing chemical weapons therefore declared or found, the dismantling of chemical munitions, the maintenance and safety of inspectors and other OPCW personnel deployed on-site; the transportation of chemical weapon related materials and dismantling equipment; and the safeguarding of chemical weapons facilities.

117. All States Parties' sovereignty will be upheld in the application and implementation of actions covered in this report, in accordance with the *Charter of the United Nations*. In line with this, there will be no active negative consequences against States Parties that have not implemented such actions.

**F. Three Point Protocol**

1211 118.The States Party would recommend the expansion of the operational budget of the OPCW in order to increase  
1212 the effectiveness of present and future programs. We suggest that additional funding determined on the basis of  
1213 existing nations' economic size. This contribution will continue to be under a voluntary mandate.  
1214

1215 119.The OPCW encourages States Party to develop and improve educational programs. For the protection of the  
1216 safety of individuals, the OPCW calls for the creation of voluntary training sessions and preparation seminars,  
1217 to teach citizens how to protect themselves from chemical weapons usage. In efforts to facilitate educative  
1218 purposes the OPCW suggests each State Party to enact scientific bodies similar to the Federation of American  
1219 Scientist dedicated to providing easily accessible and comprehensive research. Those shall address measures  
1220 that different parties such as civil society, government and chemical facilities can draw on to promote  
1221 awareness while minimizing the threat of bioterrorism.  
1222

1223 120.We acknowledge the importance of education and awareness-raising in the chemical industry. The OPCW  
1224 wishes to further promote and develop the Industry-Outreach program that gives States Parties and their  
1225 industries the knowledge and tools to react to accidents and to provide a safe industrial environment.  
1226 Introducing codes of practice for chemical enterprises' employees and strengthening safety procedures can help  
1227 fostering a new security culture.  
1228

1229 121.The State Party to the OPCW promote the continued expansion of technological aid and transfers to enable  
1230 states willing to be fully CWC compliant to achieve universality through the methods of:  
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- 1232 a. Branching out current information sharing platforms to connect institutions, universities, chemical  
1233 industry and non governmental organizations around the world to enable wider networking  
1234 program for nations to gain access to the skills and expertise required to safely initiate  
1235 disarmament programs.  
1236
- 1237 b. Promoting available resources regarding capital technology to dispose of chemical weapon  
1238 destruction byproducts in an environmentally conscientious way, in order to advance the  
1239 destruction through the hydrolysis process, as this is the least environmentally destructive method.  
1240
- 1241 c. Continuing of research and education on alternative synthetic procedures in the chemical industry  
1242 in order to reach its aim to reduce unwanted byproducts generated by chemical processes and the  
1243 use of potentially hazardous precursors.  
1244
- 1245 d. Advocating for a study by domestic agencies in partnership with the OPCW to realign the role of  
1246 the chemical industry in post chemical weapons states, in order to ensure that related industries are  
1247 not negatively impacted by the transition.  
1248

1249 122.This committee encourages the development of an advisor council, made of OPCW experts, for domestic  
1250 import and export monitoring and the promotion of a suitable legal agency to control the peaceful use of  
1251 chemical agents. The European Union and the Australian group of nations have established a common  
1252 framework and a legal permit structure for export controls, which has had a positive effect on promoting the  
1253 ethical conduct of business operating in domestic and international markets. We support the use of a licensing  
1254 scheme for the transfer of chemical agents between industries and State Parties, ensuring the end destination of  
1255 such products is following CWC guidelines and falls under the inspection the domestic state agencies and legal  
1256 structure.  
1257

1258 123.The OPCW is also deeply concerned about the transportation of chemical bi-production after the destruction  
1259 process of chemical weapons stockpile. The OPCW wishes to see a monitoring program concerning the  
1260 transportation of such chemicals to ensure that no environmentally detrimental results would occur due to spilt  
1261 chemical agents or the miss disposal of chemical waste.  
1262

1263 124.In order to enhance import and export monitoring, the OPCW supports joint border partnerships between  
1264 neighboring State Parties, training customs personnel and advancing technical equipment. Joint regional  
1265 exercises can foster the efficient use of resources, thereby alleviating the burden for countries to effectively  
1266 implement relevant provisions of the CWC.

1267  
1268 125. We recommend the implementation of chemical facility licensing and facility background checks for dual use  
1269 chemicals. Companies, research universities and governments are allowed to receive licenses only through an  
1270 application process. Each industry facility should be continually inspected by domestic agencies. It is also  
1271 encouraged that the State Parties allow inspection and bilateral assistance from the OPCW for chemical agents  
1272 monitoring in order to insure adherence to safety protocols. Specialists' recommendations for limiting chemical  
1273 transitions or transportation should be adhered in all circumstances as a standard practice unless a creditable  
1274 domestic agency deems such contrary to the CWC.

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1276 126. In the spirit of Article XI of the CWC it is recommended:

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- 1278 a. Developed State Parties should assist developing nations who request support with fiscal aid for  
1279 capacity building for scientific and laboratory equipment to enable disarmament programs to be  
1280 initiated, and transforming chemical industries through investment for the production of peaceful  
1281 chemical products, enabling adherence to the CWC.
  - 1282
  - 1283 b. These States should also assist with capacity building through international co-operation to  
1284 promote other peaceful uses of chemistry. Further developing the projects of The Electronic  
1285 Declaration Tool for National Authorities (EDNA) and the Verification and Information System  
1286 (VIS), the OPCW aims to further improve the efficient use of technology by national authorities  
1287 and chemical enterprises. Under voluntary agreement between OPCW State Parties, a scientific  
1288 exchange program, which includes capital technologies, that would provide States aiming for  
1289 disarmament the access to technology to do so.
  - 1290
  - 1291 c. Developed State Parties should provide technical assistance for States Party that request it, with  
1292 direct infrastructure projects and direct capacity building projects and the personnel required for  
1293 the aforementioned infrastructure and capacity building projects.
  - 1294
  - 1295 d. The OPCW will provide technical assistance in the methods of symposiums, seminars, internships  
1296 and scientific exchanges for the purpose of; training in the best practices and methods for each  
1297 country's national authority through use of the Implementation Assistance Program (IAP).
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1299 127. According to the CWC Article 2.9, incapacitating biochemical agents are not prohibited for the purposes of law  
1300 enforcement, including domestic riot control. Nevertheless, the CWC does not specifically define what "law  
1301 enforcement" entails. The problems related to the lack of definition are twofold:

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- 1303 a. First, without a clear definition of law enforcement the usage of incapacitating biochemical agents  
1304 can potentially be used in scenarios close to warfare which the CWC is established to prohibit.
  - 1305
  - 1306 b. Second, while States are obliged to identify and provide information to the OPCW of all  
1307 chemicals used for riot control purposes, States are not obliged to inform the OPCW concerning  
1308 any stockpiling of incapacitating biochemical agents, nor any research on any such agents, for the  
1309 purposes of law enforcement that goes beyond riot control.
  - 1310

1311 128. To that end, the States Party to the CWC recognizes the importance of establishing a working body that will  
1312 introduce a definition of law enforcement that sets limits to the degree to which incapacitating biochemical  
1313 agents are used.

## 1314 1315 **G. International Regional Summit (IRS) of the OPCW**

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1317 129. The OPCW recognizes the multitude of obstacles and barriers that inhibit States Party from implementing the  
1318 CWC, thus hindering universality. A need for an open forum and dialogue with all State Parties that effectively  
1319 target the needs of the country and region is necessary. A holistic approach on achieving universality amongst  
1320 States Party to the CWC should encompass education and research, public awareness, private and public  
1321 cooperation, collaboration of law enforcement personnel, and technical support. Ensuring universality may be  
1322 contingent upon a collective effort and assistance beyond the immediate region of a State Party.

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130. In recognizing this need, the OPCW recommends a biannual summit titled the International Regional Summit (IRS) of the OPCW. Current approaches in strengthening regional arrangements focus on the specific region, with limited engagement from other regional organizations. A broader collaboration with other regional and international arrangements is necessary and this summit will attempt to accomplish such. All States Party will be represented in this summit, as well as recognized regional and international organizations that wish to have a presence.

- a. The IRS will be held on a biannual basis to minimize costs while ensuring that the locations of the Summits are conducted on a rotating basis internationally so that each region or sub-region is represented equally throughout the years.
- b. The OPCW Conference Support Program and the various conference support programs of the regional organizations in participation will fund this Summit. Private organizations and commercial enterprises that have a stake in the chemical industry may be invited to contribute to a portion of the costs associated with this program and participate in the forum.
- c. The Technical Secretariat, in conjunction with the Executive Council, will provide oversight on all administrative duties including the provision of a budget and program for each Summit in the scope of their powers as highlighted in Article VIII of the CWC.
- d. The Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat will identify an Advisory Board consisting of seven States Party based on regional representation. The Advisory Board will determine the general program of each Summit, and serve as a liaison with the State Party hosting the Summit in selecting venue, inviting education and NGO partners, and selecting personnel for the Summit.
- e. The program of the summit will change depending on the demands and necessities of the host region in ensuring the universality of the CWC.

131. The first Summit will be held in Athens, Greece, and the program will include the themes of educational and research initiatives identifying the best practices in chemical safety handling weapons precursors; NGO participation and collaboration with OPCW in raising public awareness of chemical safety; and sharing of best practices between law enforcement agencies across the globe. In this regard:

- a. International and regional research institutions as well as institutions of higher learning will be invited to present to government officials on current research initiatives. Policy analysts shall also be invited to discuss and present the nexus between public and private sectors of the chemical industry, and the dangers of precursors for chemical weapons. This summit will call upon research initiatives and programs to examine means to minimize the risks of chemical weapons stockpiles on the environment and civilian populations. Higher priority will be given to institutions concerned with environmental issues posed by chemical weapons.
- b. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may be invited to the IRS and will be allowed to showcase projects aimed at raising public awareness of chemical safety. NGOs must be invited by at least one State Party in order to be considered for participation and will submit a proposal with the NGO to be forwarded to the Technical Secretariat and Executive Council. NGOs nominated and given an invitation will be allowed to showcase their initiative ideas for possible funding from States Party and other international organizations. The OPCW's Executive Council will select from the NGOs nominated to participate in the Summit. Furthermore, the OPCW Executive Council will select the initiatives based on best practices and feasibility. Funding for these initiatives will be partially funded by the OPCW for a period of 18 months. In the conclusion of 18 months, a report will be submitted by the NGO detailing the progress and highlights. If the NGO opts for additional funding, the NGO may submit a proposal for further funding. NGOs chosen by the Executive Council will have the support of the OPCW and will be encouraged to make use of the good name, reputation, and network of the OPCW to progress their programs of chemical safety awareness in ways that coincide with the principles of the CWC, at the discretion of the

1379 States Party. NGOs will be encouraged to work closely with private sector firms supporting  
1380 corporate social responsibility. Higher priority will be given to NGOs concerning environmental  
1381 issues.

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1383 c. A segment of this Summit will be devoted to promoting best practices amongst national, regional  
1384 and international law enforcement agencies concerning border control measures, information  
1385 sharing and increasing cooperation in combating the manufacturing, use and transportation of  
1386 chemical weapons. Specialized financial bodies of law enforcement agencies will host seminars  
1387 and work in cooperation to identify best practices in identifying and monitoring the finances of  
1388 non-state actors as a means to combat terrorist activity, especially activities concerning chemical  
1389 weapons.

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1391 d. Technical assistance will be provided to share best practices on providing protection against  
1392 chemical weapons from a team of specialized experts. Using the model of the joint-Swiss and  
1393 OPCW Exercise Course on Protection against Chemical Weapons that provides assistance and  
1394 training, this Summit will provide similar training. The main objectives will be to train individuals  
1395 that educate and advise on chemicals weapons safety and destruction, provide insights on  
1396 procedural matters, and provide training on proper use of protection equipment, monitoring and  
1397 detection techniques, and sampling and detection methods.

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1399 132.Those States not party to the OPCW will be invited to participate and engage in the Summit and the work that  
1400 this body is currently engaged in. While not offering a direct incentive to become party to the CWC, this  
1401 Summit will engage these States in open dialogue and participation every two years.

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## 1403 **H. Increasing The International Recognition Of The Chemical Weapons Convention**

1404  
1405 133.Noting the current treaties, the international mindset is that the possession and use of chemical weapons is a  
1406 threat to humanity. Furthermore, any decision merely reiterating this position likely will be accepted by the  
1407 international community.

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1409 134.The International Justice Court not only has the jurisdiction to advise upon this situation, but also is the  
1410 appropriate actor of which to request legal opinions concerning treaties and legislation.

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1412 135.The General Assembly may request an opinion of the International Court of Justice.

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1414 136.The General Assembly is allowed under the UN Charter to request opinions from the Court; the opinion  
1415 requested is on a legal question; and the question one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting  
1416 agency. Therefore, the International Justice Court will accept the request of the General Assembly and provide  
1417 an opinion.

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1419 137.As set in precedent by the International Court of Justice ruling in 1994, the Court is willing and ready to advise  
1420 on issues considering weapons of mass destruction. As aforementioned, weapons of mass destruction include  
1421 nuclear and chemical weapons. Since the Court previously advised specifically regarding nuclear weapons,  
1422 therefore, the Court is also likely to advise specifically regarding biochemical weapons.

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1424 138.In addition, in following with the previous opinion provided, the Court also likely will advise in support of the  
1425 principles already outlined within the CWC.

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1427 139.States Party within the United Nations hold IJC opinions in high regard, and allow the opinions to shape an  
1428 influence their policy.

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1430 140.As exemplified by the Syrian situation, appeal to humanitarian principles is an effective approach regarding the  
1431 implementation of the CWC.

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1433 141.The above signed recognize the need for the CWC to be not only universally applied but also universally  
1434 respected and recognized. In that vein, the OPCW recommends that the General Assembly request an advisory  
1435 opinion from the International Court of Justice.  
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1437 142.Similarly, the undersigned recommend the General Assembly specifically request an opinion of the  
1438 International Court of Justice addressing the question: “Is the possession of active chemical weapons stockpiles  
1439 or the use of such weapons permitted under international law?”  
1440

1441 143.By reiterating the gravity of the issue of Chemical weapons, the International Court of Justice would encourage  
1442 the global community to recognize the severe humanitarian issues that come with the use of active chemical  
1443 weapons. Upon garnering the esteemed judicial opinion of such an august body, the CWC becomes no longer a  
1444 legislative whim, but an overarching question of humanitarian responsibility.  
1445

1446 144.With regard to the universality of the CWC, establishing Chemical Weapons as a pointedly humanitarian issue  
1447 has had great success with countries ambivalent towards the OPCW and CWC mindset.  
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1449 145.Obviously, some parties are concerned regarding the preservation of state sovereignty. However, this  
1450 recommendation takes no action to infringe upon state individuality.  
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1452 146.First, the recommendation of the International Court of Justice mandates no direct course of action against  
1453 countries that refuse the CWC.  
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1455 147.Second, as mentioned previously this recommendation does not require drastic change in the international  
1456 diplomacy processes that currently occur. This action is merely pointedly reiterating the international approach  
1457 already outlined. However, with increased estimation and recognition of the treaty, ratified States Party the  
1458 treaty will have a firm foundation from which to pressure and negotiate with non-signed States.  
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1460 148.Essentially, if successful the opinion of the International Court of Justice will transform the CWC from a mere  
1461 legislative entity into the recognized and legitimate moral treaty necessary to combat Chemical Weapons  
1462 around the world.  
1463

1464 149.Ultimately this potential opinion from the International Court of Justice is simply to strictly reinforce the  
1465 principle of the CWC, and not to enforce the Convention by direct action.