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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2014 National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference! We are pleased to serve on your dais for the Security Council (SC). This year, the conference features three Security Council simulations. Doug Arseneault, Claudia Sanchez and Alfie Jones will serve as the directors for Conference A; while Jess Mace, Hallen Korn, and Stephan Berberich will direct the Conference B simulations.

Doug Arseneault is the senior Legislative Affairs Manager for the Valley Industry and Commerce Association in Los Angeles, California and is active with the California Young Democrats. Claudia Sanchez is finishing her MA in International Security at Sciences Po in Paris; this is her third year on staff. Alfie recently completed his MA in History at the University of Bristol, and now works for KAYAK.com in Berlin. Jess Mace recently completed her MA in Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University and is currently working for the University of Ottawa. Hallen is completing his studies at Columbia University and works part-time for the US Mission to the UN. Stephan Berberich recently graduated with his MA in International Relations from Université libre de Bruxelles in Brussels, Belgium.

The topics under discussion for Security Council are:

I. The Situation in Syria
II. Strengthening United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
III. Peace Consolidation in West Africa

The Security Council is the main UN body tasked with maintaining international peace and security. As a means to accomplish this goal, the Council is uniquely empowered to impose economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial sanctions, and travel bans, as well as orchestrate collective military actions. The Council is the only UN body which adopts legally binding resolutions and is responsive to emerging crises.

This background guide will help you as a delegate to better understand this unique UN body and the topics that it will discuss at the conference. It should be used as an introduction to your research, however, we strongly encourage you to advance the ideas given in the guide and further deepen your knowledge on the topics, especially regarding the perspective of your assigned country. The bibliography can be helpful as a starting point, but please consult a range of other materials for a fuller understanding of each issue.

All delegations must submit a position paper. Please take note of the NMUN plagiarism policy, which is available in this background guide and in the Delegate Preparation Guide. Delegates’ adherence to these guidelines is mandatory. If you have any questions regarding preparation, please feel free to contact us or the Under-Secretaries General for the Department of Peace and Security, Bobby Valentine (Conference A) and Cara Wagner (Conference B) at usg.ps@nmun.org. We wish you good luck with your preparations for the conference and look forward to seeing you in New York!

Sincerely,

Conferece A

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NMUN•NY Position Paper Guidelines
Due 1 March 2014

Each committee topic should be addressed in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned country, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), or expert role. You should identify and address international and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action that are relevant to the policy of your country or NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. A delegate’s role as a Member State, Observer State, or NGO should affect the way a position paper is written. To understand these differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide. It may also be helpful to view a Sample Position Paper.

A position paper should be submitted for each assigned committee.
- The two page position paper should cover all the topics in the background guide, not a separate paper for each topic.
- Do not submit papers for committees not assigned to your country/NGO (see matrix for Conf. A or Conf. B).
- No more than two delegates can represent a single country/NGO in a committee. If you assign two delegates to represent a country/NGO on a committee, they submit one position paper jointly, not separate position papers from each individual.

Please pay careful attention to the following guidelines when drafting and submitting your position papers. Only those delegations that follow the guidelines and meet the submission deadline will be eligible for position paper awards.

All papers must be typed and formatted according to the standards below:
- Length must not exceed two pages
- Margins must be set at 1 inch or 2.54 cm. for the whole paper
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, school name, and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections
- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers

Please note that position papers must be comprised of entirely original writing. The NMUN Conference will not tolerate plagiarism, including copying from Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy may result in dismissal from the conference. Although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents.

How to Submit Your Position Papers

Position papers need to be submitted by email in .pdf or .doc formats. As proof of submission, include yourself as an email recipient. Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the email subject line and in the filename (example: GA1_Cuba_Conf A_State College).

1. Send one complete set of all position papers for each of your country/NGO assignments to the Deputy Secretary-General for the conference you are attending:
   - Conference A: positionpapers.nya@nmun.org
   - Conference B: positionpapers.nyb@nmun.org

2. Send a copy of your position paper for each assigned committee to the corresponding committee email address listed on the Committee Background Guides page.

Your delegation may wish to submit a copy of their position papers to the permanent mission of the country/NGO headquarters along with an explanation of the conference. This is encouraged if requesting a briefing. Many, many papers will be read by the Secretariat. Your patience and cooperation in adhering to the above guidelines is greatly appreciated.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African Led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDAM</td>
<td>Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Study</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syrian Army</td>
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<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Co-operation Council</td>
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<td>GPF</td>
<td>Global Policy Forum</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced peoples</td>
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<td>IMB</td>
<td>International Maritime Bureau</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Co-ordination Committee</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>RWP</td>
<td>Responsibility While Protecting</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>SHARP</td>
<td>Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan</td>
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<td>SIF</td>
<td>Syrian Islamic Front</td>
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<td>SLF</td>
<td>Syrian Liberation Front</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>Supreme Military Command</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>Syrian National Council</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Syrian Opposition Coalition</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIPSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief Works Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria</td>
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Committee History

“The pursuit of peace and progress cannot end in a few years in either victory or defeat. The pursuit of peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and never abandoned.”

Introduction

Article 1(1) of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) states that the first purpose of the United Nations (UN) is "[to] maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats...." The UN Security Council (SC) is the main body tasked with fulfilling this responsibility. As such, the SC meets continuously year-round, with each member of the SC maintaining a representative at the UN at all times.

Since its creation, international rivalries and geopolitics have played a central role in shaping the SC's agenda and conduct. During the Cold War, the SC was a purposefully ineffectual body, authorizing only 13 peacekeeping operations between 1945 and 1978. Since the 1990s, however, it has taken a more proactive role on the world stage. Due to the significantly higher human cost of responding to crisis as they unfold, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called for the SC to work to prevent conflicts, as well as improve post-conflict peace building efforts.

Mandate

The Charter of the United Nations (1945) established the main functions for the SC: maintain international peace and security; develop friendly relations among states; cooperate to solve international problems and promote human rights; and be a center for harmonizing action among Member States. The SC is given a multitude of options to fulfill these duties, including economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial sanctions, travel bans, and collective military actions. Among its administrative roles, the SC recommends the admission of new members to the UN General Assembly (GA); advises the UN General Assembly on the appointment of the Secretary-General; and elects judges to the International Court of Justice in conjunction with the GA.

In addition to its distinctive mandate and powers, the SC is the only UN body that may pass legally binding resolutions, under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations which states that "Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council." While the other bodies of the UN pass non-binding resolutions that provide recommendations and sources of global consensus, the SC’s power to impose the binding resolutions allow it to act as a force of collective security.

Governance, Structure and Membership

The SC consists of 15 seats: ten non-permanent seats and five permanent seats. The membership of the SC was originally set at 11 seats when the UN was formed in 1945, including only six nonpermanent seats and the five permanent seats. In 1963, the UN General Assembly added four nonpermanent seats with the adoption of GA

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3 United Nations, Main Bodies, 2013.
6 Ibid.
7 Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, 2000, p. 46.
9 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Ch. 7.
12 UN Department of Public Information, The United Nations Today, 2008, p.73.
resolution 1991 (1963). One reason this change was enacted was to achieve better representation on the SC of diverse geographic regions. The five permanent seats, known as the P5, are held by the leaders of the victorious Allied nations of the Second World War that formed the UN – particularly the SC – as a forum to prevent future global war and that “men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.” Their current governments are the People's Republic of China; the French Republic; the Russian Federation; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and the United States of America. The 10 nonpermanent seats are held by other Member States for two-year terms and are selected by a majority vote by the GA; five seats are voted upon each year. As a means to provide equitable representation, 5 of the 10 are selected from Africa and Asia, 1 from Eastern Europe, 2 from Latin America, and 2 from Western Europe and other states that do not fall under the other regional designations.

For any procedural change or resolution to pass in the SC, it must garner at least nine votes. For any substantive action, no permanent member may vote against the action. This “veto power” is a unique privilege given to the permanent members in the Charter of the United Nations, which enables them to singularly deny any resolution from adoption by casting a negative vote. The use of the veto is rarely evoked, as consensus is the primary goal of the SC. Of the 1,859 draft resolutions voted upon between 1945 and 2008, the veto power was used only 261 times; only 18 draft resolutions have been vetoed since 1996. It must be considered, however, that the use of the veto is only ultimately unnecessary because its mere existence, and the threat of its use are sufficient. Of note, a permanent member may abstain on a substantive vote without denying the substantive issue to be approved, thereby allowing the member to maintain its national position of disagreement or indifference without hindering the work of the SC as a whole.

Functions and Powers

Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the SC is increasingly pro-active in addressing intra-state conflict, with recent interventions in Haiti, Sierra Leone and Somalia, despite the right to national sovereignty and self-determination under Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibiting the UN from intervening in matters of "domestic jurisdiction of any state." Chapter VII allows the SC to intervene, unless it judges any situation to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression; the SC uses this exception to Article 2(7) in order to justify inventions that could threaten international peace and security by expanding beyond national borders. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations grants special powers to the SC to enforce its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, such as economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial sanctions, travel bans, and collective military actions, including the power to deploy and direct peacekeeping forces. Before these powers are used, the SC will often pursue alternative courses under Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations. These alternative methods include: calling for ceasefires, requesting discussions to resolve the issues leading to conflict, and creating investigations into disputes or situations that may disrupt international peace. In order to promote long

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17 UN Security Council, Current Members [Web Site], 2013.
18 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Art. 23(2).
20 Charter of the United Nations 26 June 1945, Art. 27(2).
22 Ibid.
25 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Art. 27(3).
28 Ibid., Art. 42.
29 Ibid., Art. 34.
30 Ibid., Art. 34.
lasting peace, the SC established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) by adopting SC resolution 1645 (2005); the PBC advises and assists international actors to help Member States emerging from conflict.\footnote{UN Security Council, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (S/RES/1645 (2005)) [Resolution], 2005.}

**Recent Sessions**

As of October 2013, the SC adopted resolutions on the thematic issues of Women, Peace and Security and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.\footnote{UN Security Council, List of Resolutions passed in 2013, 2013.} In terms of regional and national conflicts, the SC adopted resolutions on Cyprus, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan, Iraq/Kuwait, the Middle East, Iran, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Western Sahara, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, Libya, Burundi, and the Central African Republic.\footnote{Ibid.} This multifaceted agenda demonstrates that the SC is not simply a crisis management committee, focusing on a few high profile situations a year; rather, it is an institution continually monitoring and managing the constantly changing range of issues and conflicts affecting the diverse regions of the world community.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Conclusion**

The modern SC focuses on the humanitarian aspect of security issues, even deeming certain humanitarian crises as justification for deploying peacekeeping troops.\footnote{Malone, The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era, 2003, p. 489.} The SC’s recent collaborative approach in addressing chemical weapons use by Syria demonstrates a shift in group dynamics.\footnote{BBC, Syria chemical weapons: UN adopts binding resolution [Web Site]. 2013.} Instead of splitting along pro- and anti-intervention caucuses, the P5 have come together to create a workable proposal for Syrian chemical disarmament.\footnote{Ibid.} Syria is now legally obligated to abandoning its chemical weapons stockpile, and to give UN inspectors unhindered access to verify this.\footnote{Ibid.} Delegates should draw upon this strategy when preparing for the SC at NMUN, bearing in mind that the values of cooperation and compromise are still paramount within the often highly charged atmosphere of SC sessions. The SC can act as an incredibly powerful force for world change, and delegates should reflect on its strengths as well as its weaknesses as they consider the Council’s agenda.

**Annotated Bibliography**


Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote this report for the 2000 Millennium Summit. Much of this report details what Annan believed the direction should be of the United Nations in the new millennium. A particular recurring theme throughout the report is the dramatic difference between the UN in 1945 and its role in 2000. Annan details his vision of how the United Nations should focus on preventative security. This report is a critical read due to its influence on the global body.


In this article, Borger highlights the growing divisions at the UN and in the SC over the 2013 international crisis involving Syria’s use of chemical weapons. He interviews a number of experts, including Michael Williams, former UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, and Richard Gowan, an expert on the UN at New York University. Their conclusion is that the stances of individual nation-states are to blame for the impasse, rather than the UN itself or its institutions. The article also analogized the crisis with the Cold War. The article highlights recent successes of the SC, notably its attempts to defuse the tensions between North and South Sudan, but argues that these efforts have been overshadowed by their failure to take deliberative action in...
Syria. Delegates should bear in mind that this is journalism, written to persuade, rather than an academic examination.


The Charter of the United Nations should be one of the first reads for anyone learning about the SC. The UN Charter presents the structure and powers of the Security Council and its purpose within the UN. By understanding the mandate of the Security Council, delegations can better understand the powers and limitations of the SC.


The Global Policy Forum (GPF) describes itself as an ‘independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of the United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking.’ This site contains an excellent overview of the historic and current membership of the SC. It outlines the current program of work for the SC, and provides regular updates on different Member States or regions represented on the SC. It is an excellent resource for delegates wishing to keep abreast of developments at the SC.


This volume gives a thorough and well-articulated analysis of the SC from its creation up to its publication in 2004. The academic approach in this book provides an unbiased critical view of the SC, giving accounts of failures, successes and general accounts of many different aspects of the SC. To understand the SC fully, academic discussions such as this are crucial.

Bibliography


I. The Situation in Syria

Introduction

The current conflict in Syria is one the most dynamic and complex items on the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s (SC) agenda. It poses a serious threat to regional stability, represents a massive and growing humanitarian crisis, and has proved to be an extremely divisive issue within the Council itself. What began as an example of a peaceful protest in the middle of March 2011, has grown into a full-fledged conflict spreading across the region, costing more than 100,000 lives, forcing over 2 million Syrians to flee their country, and displacing another 4.25 million within Syria itself. Numerous organized fighting forces from Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran have also entered the conflict, further spreading the consequences and complicating the dynamics of this constantly evolving crisis.

The UN plays a crucial role in any conflict threatening international peace and security; thus it is vital to present an overview of the UN’s involvement within the crisis thus far – with a particular focus on the SC. Whenever SC Member States address a failed state situation of spiraling violence like Syria, they often divide and conceptualize it in terms of its political, security, and humanitarian factors. In order to facilitate this type of thinking, this topic will also be divided into political, security, and humanitarian sections, beginning with an understanding of the international framework and role of the UN system. The dynamic nature of the Syrian conflict should also be at the forefront of delegates’ minds as they delve into this topic. While the situation as it is presented below is accurate and up-to-date at the time of writing, it is also constantly changing. Delegates should approach the following topic simply as a primer to be followed up rigorously with current and evolving information.

International Framework

While there are many international frameworks that are relevant to SC dynamics and the conflict in Syria, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is of particular interest. R2P is often discussed as having three pillars: 1) the responsibility of every state to protect its own citizens, 2) “the commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting these obligations,” and 3) the “responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.” The SC and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Libya in 2011 were hailed as the realization of these norms. While often deemed a success, however, the Libya intervention has also been cited as reason for caution in Syria. The Russian and Chinese delegations to the SC have stated their concerns that Libya could become a model for regime change in humanitarian guise; similarly, immediately following the Libyan intervention, Brazil brought its Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) proposal to the Council, which called for increased monitoring, review, and guidelines regulating R2P actions. Many have interpreted this as an attempt to constrain R2P as a useful doctrine. While some have argued that the Libya intervention has little to do with the use (or non-use) of R2P in the context of Syria, the 2011 intervention is still used as a rhetorical device in the current debate and serves as an essential counterpoint to the current deadlock.

40 Assessment Capacities Project, Regional Analysis: Syria, 2013; BBC News, Syria death toll now above 100,000, says UN chief Ban, 2013; UNHCR, Number of Syrian refugees tops 2 million mark with more on the way [Press Release], 2013.
42 Ibid., p. 1271.
43 Ibid., p. 1271.
44 ICRItoP, Impact of Action in Libya on the Responsibility to Protect, 2011.
48 Ibid., p. 1275-7.
Role of the United Nations System

On 3 August 2011 the SC first engaged the crisis with a Presidential Statement expressing its concern over the “deteriorating situation in Syria” and added Syria to its regular monthly Middle East briefings on 25 August 2011. However, on 4 October 2011 both China and the Russian Federation vetoed a draft resolution that included language condemning “grave and systematic human rights violations” in Syria and warnings of possible sanctions should the Syrian Government fail to “immediately stop using force against civilians.” In January 2012, the Arab League and the SC began working together to facilitate a political transition in Syria. While a Council draft resolution calling for the Secretary-General to appoint a UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syria was vetoed by China and Russia, a similar resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 February 2012. Within a week former Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed to the position, and on 21 March 2012 the SC adopted a Presidential Statement supporting Annan’s six-point mediation plan. April 2012 saw the adoption of two resolutions concerning Syria, one of which established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), and the initial response to the six-point plan within Syria was viewed in a positive light. Unfortunately, any success or progress that might have been felt in April 2012 was gone by August 2012.

In early July 2012 the Action Group for Syria – a group comprised of the Permanent Five (P5) Member States of the SC and several regional powers – adopted the Geneva Communiqué, a document intended to represent a comprehensive peace plan. Unfortunately, no notable progress from the Communiqué was registered. Around the same time the Secretary-General submitted a dismal report on UNSMIS’ findings, citing a failure to implement the six-point plan and an “upsurge in incitement and armed violence by the parties.” On 19 July 2012 a draft resolution that endorsed the Geneva Communiqué but also invoked the Council’s Chapter VII powers was vetoed by China and Russia. At the beginning of August, citing the SC’s inability to adopt the Geneva Communiqué, something he claimed should have been “automatic”, Kofi Annan resigned his post. Finally, on 19 August, UNSMIS’s mandate expired and was not renewed because the SC could not confirm “the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides sufficient to allow UNSMIS to implement its mandate,” as the Council had stipulated.

As the Council’s effectiveness in addressing the political aspects of the conflict waned it has increasingly focused on the humanitarian dimensions of the situation and other possible solutions to the crisis. At the end of August 2012, the Council held its first high-level meeting on the humanitarian situation in Syria. By December 2012 the Council

52 UN Security Council, Summary record of 6710th meeting (S/P.V. 6710), 2012.
53 UN General Assembly, The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (A/66/253) [Resolution], 2012; UN Security Council, Summary record of the 6710th meeting (S/P.V. 6710) [Meeting Record], 2012; UN Security Council, Summary record of the 6711th meeting (S/P.V. 6711) [Meeting Record], 2012; UN Security Council, Draft Resolution 77 (S/2012/77), 2011.
56 UN Secretary-General, Identical letters dated 5 July 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (A/66/865–S/2012/522), 2012.
58 UN Secretary-General, Identical letters dated 5 July 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (A/66/865–S/2012/522), 2012.
62 UN Security Council, Summary record of the 6826th meeting (S/P.V. 6826) [Meeting Record], 2012.
63 Ibid.
was meeting with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, and the head of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, regularly. In January of 2013 five Council Member States – the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Republic of Korea, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and Australia – and 48 other UN Member States published an open letter urging the SC to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.

Political Dimensions of the Conflict

Parties to the Conflict: The Ba’ath Party
While the media often refers to the Syrian political landscape as a binary, comprised solely of the Assad regime and the opposition, the reality is far more fragmented. Politically, it is beneficial to think of the Assad regime as the Ba’ath (or Baath) party, which has been the ruling political party in Syria since 1963. After a coup by Hafez al-Assad in 1970 the Syrian constitution was amended to make it the official “leader of the state and society”, effectively installing it into every aspect of Syrian political life. Essential positions across government, both military and civilian, became reserved for Ba’ath party members, which increased the party’s size and guaranteed its continued influence. There are additional sanctioned political parties in Syria, but they hold little, if any, political power and are subservient to the Ba’ath party. Traditionally, since the rise of the Assad family, the Ba’ath party has also heavily relied on the Syrian Alawite minority (to which the Assad family belongs) to fill government positions, often in such vital roles as leaders of elite security forces. While this overlap in Alawite-Ba’athist power can easily be oversimplified into ethno-religious terms, political opposition to the Assad regime’s decades-long hold on power has typically focused more on the Ba’ath party than on the Alawite minority.

Parties to the Conflict: The National Co-ordination Committee (NCC)
Unlike the Assad regime, the opposition is much more fragmented, complicating any potential political negotiations. The National Co-ordination Committee (NCC) was founded in September 2011, and is a political opposition group based in Damascus and made up of a coalition of mostly moderate opposition groups. It has consistently called for negotiations with the Assad regime despite the government’s escalation of violence, has urged against foreign intervention, and has stated that a political settlement, even if it keeps Assad and the Ba’athists in power, would be preferable to regime change because of the chaos it would cause. It is unclear, however, whether the NCC’s stance is a product of a relationship with the Assad regime or if – due to the limitations of operating within Syria – it has softened its stance as a means to protect itself against regime retaliation. The NCC would likely need to be part of any political resolution, both due to its presence within Syria and due to its relationship with the Syrian National Council (SNC).

Parties to the Conflict: The Syrian National Council
Expatriates in Istanbul officially formed the Syrian National Council (SNC) on 2 October 2011 and promptly received support from Turkey. The SNC is primarily comprised of exiled political opposition activists from prior Syrian political opposition movements. This, however, has not translated into a great deal of cooperation; not only has an NCC-SNC merger failed twice (in both December 2011 and January 2012), but the two groups’ fundamental

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64 UN Security Council, Letter dated 14 January 2013 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2013/19), 2013.
65 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
platforms are very different. The SNC has called for the overthrow of the Ba’athist government, rejected dialogue with Assad (despite appearing to weaken this stance briefly in July 2013), and, though officially against foreign military intervention, has requested the creation of an internationally maintained safe zone. The SNC is a highly diverse and fractured coalition, comprised of several groups. These divisions within the SNC have led to political positioning, infighting, and a perceived aloofness to the actual situation in Syria, which has affected their credibility. This has, in turn, made the relationship between the SNC and the Free Syrian Army – the major military opposition force in Syria – difficult; prompting then United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to say in November 2012 that the SNC could "no longer be viewed as the viable leader of the opposition". Despite this apparent dismissal from the international scene, the SNC continues to operate as a vital, yet distinct, part of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

**Parties to the Conflict: The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces**

As the NCC and SNC grew to be perceived as ineffective, a new coalition of opposition groups from both within and outside Syria began to set up a new and hopefully more effective leadership council. The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (also referred to as the ‘National Coalition’ or the ‘Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC)’) was announced in November 2012. In the end, the SOC became a new iteration of the SNC: inside Syria, the SOC is comprised of many of the same local coordination committees of the SNC, and outside of Syria it relies on much of the SNC bureaucracy and members for support. The SOC differentiates itself from the SNC, however, in its stronger relationships with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Supreme Military Council in Syria, something the SNC has been unable to achieve. The SOC has further distinguished itself by its disassociation from the NCC and several militant Islamist groups within Syria – such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Largely due to distancing itself from these Islamist groups, the SOC’s reception by the international community has been positive: the six Member States of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), France, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States have all recognized it as "the legitimate representative" of the Syrian people, and in December 2012, 100 countries at the Friends of the Syrian People conference similarly recognized the SOC. Notable absentees from the Friends of the Syrian People conference were Russia, China, and Iran. Subsequently, the SC held its first meeting with SOC on 26 July 2013.

**Security Dimensions of the Conflict**

**Military Breakdown: the Syrian Arab Army and its Allies**

The makeup and deployment of the Syrian Arab Army reflects the current conflict and history of Syria. As the conflict has progressed, defections have reduced the size of the Syrian Arab Army from 220,000 to 110,000 in the past year alone, but Bashar al-Assad has maintained a loyal command structure of Ba’athists and Alawites to retain control. To achieve this, Assad has selectively divided the military forces and put “forces that are politically reliable and frequently majority Alawite, much as his father did during the Muslim Brotherhood uprising” of the early 1980s, in charge of less reliable battalions, thus stemming defection. This selective reallocation of Army

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82 Ibid., pp. 13-18.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
94 Ibid., p. 19.
battalions explains why the 4th Armored Division, the Republican Guards, and the Special Forces are ubiquitous throughout the conflict: they have been divided and spread across the entire army.\textsuperscript{96} The Syrian Arab Army has displayed a deliberate strategy of clearing and holding urban populations.\textsuperscript{97} The 2012 siege of Homs reflected this, as massive shelling cleared both insurgents and civilian population from the city, allowing it to be effectively controlled by government forces.\textsuperscript{98} This strategy has devolved, however, as the Syrian Arab Army’s numbers dwindled post-2012, forcing Assad to concentrate his forces around vital urban hubs, withdraw from other areas, and simply shell, without maintaining control of these areas.\textsuperscript{99} There are three fundamental reasons that Assad is only contesting western Syria: it is an area of Alawite strength, it contains the M4 and M5 highways which are vital transportation routes, and it ensures contact with and relief from Hezbollah in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{100}

Foreign military assistance from Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia has been vital to the Syrian government.\textsuperscript{101} Assistance from Hezbollah and Iran’s Quds Force has been suspected since the beginning of hostilities but has become more pronounced and, in the case of Hezbollah, openly declared.\textsuperscript{102} Hezbollah, recently designated a terrorist group by the European Union, is widely regarded as an Iranian proxy organization.\textsuperscript{103} Many have speculated that both Iran and Hezbollah’s involvement in the crisis is driven by their mutual relationship; both geographically and politically Syria has been an essential connection between Iran and Hezbollah that both will go to great lengths to maintain.\textsuperscript{104} The involvement of Iranian Quds force (the foreign arm of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guard, often cited for its involvement in Iraq and in supporting Hezbollah) has been less overt, but arguably equally significant.\textsuperscript{105} They, along with Hezbollah, have been credited with providing essential supplies to the Syrian government, logistical support and advice in combat situations, and training and weapons for the shabiha militia forces.\textsuperscript{106} Russia has also been an important foreign player in the Syrian government’s military efforts; Syria has had a long relationship of buying arms from Russia and recently received an advanced air-defense system from them.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Military Breakdown: Opposition Forces}

Similar to its political composition and development, the Syrian Opposition’s military configuration is diverse, often fractured, and its command structure has changed significantly over time.\textsuperscript{108} After growing somewhat organically in the initial stages of the conflict in late 2011, rebel leaders from across Syria joined together on 7 December 2012 and created a new 30-member unified command structure, known as the Supreme Military Command (SMC).\textsuperscript{109} The SMC is the overarching organization that aims to coordinate the operation of a diverse set of groups, which include the FSA, the Syrian Liberation Front (SLF), the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and a diverse set of Kurdish militias.\textsuperscript{110} In order to achieve this the SMC’s structure has been divided into five fronts (Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western/Central Syria, and Homs), but at its core is comprised of two previously disparate networks of rebels: a Saudi Arabian–backed network and the Qatari-backed network of fighters.\textsuperscript{111} While the SMC has increased coordination of efforts, operationally, command appears to still be based on local leaders and function on a bottom-up, not on a more conventional top-down, approach.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[98] Ibid., p. 15.
\item[99] Ibid., p. 16.
\item[100] EDAM, \textit{The Syrian Civil War: A Military Strategic Assessment}, 2013, pp. 3-6.
\item[101] Ibid., pp. 15-18.
\item[105] Bruno, Bajoria, & Masters, \textit{Iran’s Revolutionary Guard}, 2013.
\item[110] Ibid., pp. 28-32.
\item[112] Ibid., pp. 8-22.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Another important component of the opposition forces are Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).113 Both have ties to Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) – a connection that has often meant these groups have had better access to weapons and more training and experience since many of its members fought against United States’ forces in Iraq.114 While many observers of the conflict have voiced concern over the ideological convictions of some of the groups included in the SMC, the SMC has made a concerted effort to exclude groups with clear ties to Al-Qaida, like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS.115 Given the nature of the conflict, however, and that distinctions between groups are typically clearer in the abstract than reality, there has also been concern that funding or weapons given to the SMC could find its way into the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIS.116

Beyond the military advantage often credited to these groups, there is also concern over a legitimacy gap between Jabhat al-Nusra and SMC affiliates.117 In late 2012, the FSA began governing towns and villages, which it controlled with disastrous results: there were reports of food shortages, looting, rampant corruption, and taxes imposed at checkpoints by FSA members.118 Jabhat al-Nusra began distributing food and providing protection from FSA members in many of these areas, thus earning the group a great amount of legitimacy and trust with portions of the Syrian populace.119 There have been many instances where SMC affiliates and either Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIS have fought together to take a town or fortification.120 Yet, there has also been open conflict between Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS, and SMC affiliated groups, particularly for control of oil rich regions or with Kurdish rebels affiliated with the SMC.121 For instance, the town of Azaz near the Syrian-Turkish border saw an intense and protracted battle between ISIS and SMC forces before the Al-Qaeda affiliates took control of the city, and Jabhat al-Nusra militants have often driven Kurdish forces from areas that they control.122

### The Use of Chemical Weapons

The issue of chemical weapons use in Syria has been at the forefront of the international community’s concerns, and the UN has been involved in investigating these allegations.123 In late March 2013 accusations began to circulate that chemical weapons had been used in Syria.124 Responding to the initial accusations on 20 March 2013 that it used chemical weapons against its own people, the Syrian government requested that the Secretary-General investigate the use of chemical weapons by opposition forces in the Kafr Da’il region of the Aleppo governorate.125 But as the UN chemical weapons investigation team was trying to gain access to the country in April 2013, a time when fellow Member States began to claim they had evidence of their use by the Assad regime, the Syrian government denied the UN access to the region.126 It was not until August 2013 that the investigation team was finally able to begin their investigations.127 Soon after being granted access into Syria, however, there was another reported attack on 21 August 2013.128 This second instance produced weeks of political posturing and threats of international military response.129 In the end, however, the SC unanimously adopted a Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), which set

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114 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
118 Ibid., pp. 25-6.
119 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 UN Secretary-General, *Letter dated 22 March 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/184)*, 2013.
126 Foreign Policy, *Ban ups pressure on Syrian chemical weapons*, 2013.
127 Nichols, *U.N. says chemical weapons inspectors to visit three Syria sites*, 2013.
in motion a process of verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles.\textsuperscript{130} The SC also asked the Secretary-General (SG) to consult with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and make recommendations on how the UN should be involved in the process of destroying Syria’s chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{131} In response, the SG submitted a three-phased plan that would create a joint UN-OPCW mission to Syria to identify and eliminate chemical weapons stockpiles.\textsuperscript{132} The SC promptly adopted the plan.\textsuperscript{133}

The Spread of the Conflict
Beyond chemical weapons, one of the most concerning aspects of the conflict to the Security Council is its spread into neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{134} The Syrian conflict has been attributed to the growing sectarian tensions in both Lebanon and Iraq, which have been manifested in bombings and armed conflict along and across the borders of these countries.\textsuperscript{135} For instance, in March 2013, unidentified gunmen killed at least 40 Syrian government soldiers who had crossed into Iraq for medical treatment.\textsuperscript{136} Similarly, much of the fighting that has broken out inside Lebanon has been attributed to Hezbollah’s outright support of the Syrian government as Syrian rebels, and those allied with them inside Lebanon, have attempted reprisals intended to weaken Hezbollah at its base.\textsuperscript{137}

Humanitarian Dimensions of the Conflict

Refugee Crisis
The Syrian refugee crisis is one of the most daunting results of the conflict in Syria, and particularly of the Syrian government’s strategy of shelling urban landscapes to drive out insurgents.\textsuperscript{138} While the numbers themselves are staggering – over 2 million refugees, approximately 100,000 in Egypt, 200,000 in Iraq, 500,00 in Turkey, 500,00 in Jordan, and 750,000 in Lebanon – the speed at which this crisis has emerged, and the levels it is anticipated to reach, is even more troubling.\textsuperscript{139} In September 2012 there were approximately 150,000 refugees registered with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR); currently, there are even more refugees awaiting registration (roughly 175,000).\textsuperscript{140} That means that the UNHCR has registered 1.8 million refugees in 12 months.\textsuperscript{141} The refugee crisis is expanding at such a rapid pace that the UNHCR is predicting that nearly 3.45 million refugees might need assistance by the end of 2013.\textsuperscript{142}

The overarching challenge is protection of refugees.\textsuperscript{143} Unregistered refugees are at the greatest risk, and the rapidity with which refugees are arriving in all host countries has made the simple process of registration, a prerequisite for assistance, difficult to execute quickly: some camps and refugee registration sites are having difficulty registering at risk individuals within a month of their arrival.\textsuperscript{144} Child protection is another urgent concern, as more than half of Syrian refugees are 17 or under and over 40% are 11 and under.\textsuperscript{145} These children are often unaccompanied and in

\textsuperscript{130} UN Security Council, Resolution 2118 (2013) [Middle East] (S/RES/2118), 2013.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} UN Secretary-General, Letter dated 7 October 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 2013.
\textsuperscript{133} United Nations, Security Council approves joint OPCW-UN mission to oversee destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons [Article], 2013.
\textsuperscript{134} Sly, Turkey strikes back at Syria after shell kills at least 5 Turkish civilians, 2012; Parkinson and Albyarak, Turkey Shoots Down Syrian Helicopter, 2013.
\textsuperscript{135} Saad & Droubi, Hezbollah and Rebels of Syria in Border Fight, 2013; Barnard & Hubbard, Clashes Continue on Second Day in South Lebanon City, 25 June 2013; Barber, Political Intrigue Surrounding Bombing in Tripoli, Lebanon, Syria Comment, 1 September 2013; Hauslohner, Sectarianism in Iraq stoked by Syrian war, 2013.
\textsuperscript{137} Lavender, Blowback: The Unintended Consequences of Hezbollah’s Role in Syria, 2013, pp. 5-7.
\textsuperscript{138} Holiday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2012, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{139} UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 2013.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} UNHCR, Syria Regional Response Plan 5: January to December 2013, Regional overview, 2013, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{145} UNHCR, Syria Regional Response Plan 5: January to December 2013, 2013, p. 9.
need of physical and psychological care. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) is another problem that is affecting Syrian refugee communities across the region. Factors such as separated families, poverty and a lack of shelter contribute to an increased risk of SGBV for refugees, often resulting in trafficked persons, forced marriage, domestic violence, and sexual harassment." Beyond just protection, however, access to potable water, health services, adequate food, and the protection of human rights are significant issues, amongst many others, which affect refugees differently across the region.

In Lebanon, there are over 1,200 municipalities hosting refugees who have fled Syria. This influx has severely stressed local economies and their ability to absorb more refugees. Lebanon, thus far, has been able to absorb the influx of refugees into their communities without a large, separate refugee camp but there is a fear that the limits of this approach are being reached. Accordingly much of the UNHCR’s approach in Lebanon has been about providing relief to the 1.2 million Lebanese nationals that are being affected by the refugee influx, as well as providing assistance to the refugees themselves. There is also the concern that the refugee crisis in Lebanon could lead to the internal displacement of Lebanese nationals as both the conflict and those escaping it move deeper into the country. For instance, since the gas attack on 21 August 2013, Lebanese immigration officials have reported roughly 10,000 Syrians per day crossing into Lebanon. The United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), which is tasked with providing relief and human service to Palestinian refugees, has registered over 40,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon, and expects that number to double within the year.

Jordan has also been greatly affected by the influx of Syrian Refugees. While, like Lebanon, Jordanian communities have absorbed a large number of Syrian refugees into their communities, the UNHCR does have several large refugee camps operating inside Jordan, the largest of which are the Za’atri and Azraq camps. These camps are proving insufficient in fully absorbing the refugee influence, however, and tensions in Jordan are rising. A recent poll showed that 3 out of 4 Jordanians feel negatively affected by the refugee influx and want the government to close border. The Jordanian ambassador to the UN even brought the issue to the SC in a private meeting on 30 April 2013 in order to convince the Council that the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan represents “a threat to international peace and security” and “threatens the security and stability of [their] country.” The Jordanian government’s budget deficits, in large part due to government subsidies of staples such as bread and gas, are also being greatly stressed as Syrian refugees living outside of UNHCR camps are adding stress to these social safety nets. Jordan’s dense populations and endemic water shortages only exacerbate the stresses that refugees living outside of camps are creating. While a burden for the Jordanian population, the situation is equally daunting for the refugees living outside of camps themselves: more than 50% have no access to running water, 77% have no access to potable water, 72% are in debt, and 34% have no income at all.

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146 UNHCR, Syria Regional Response Plan 5: January to December 2013, 2013, p. 9.
149 Ibid., pp. 6-10.
152 UNHCR, Lebanon: Inter-Agency Contingency Plan for Syrian Refugees [V.2], 2013, p. 9.
153 Ibid., 2013, p. 9.
154 Ibid., 2013, p. 124.
155 Ibid., p. 124.
156 Ibid., p. 124.
159 Ibid.
161 Ibid., p. 166.
162 Ibid., p. 166.
Refugee influxes have also greatly affected Turkey and Iraq. Half of the refugee population in Turkey has been absorbed into host communities while the second half is spread across 17 camps operated by the Turkish government and the Turkish Red Crescent Society. There are over 155,000 unregistered refugees in Turkey, however, which have made it difficult to relocate, provide protection for at risk individuals, and decrease the stresses they cause on local populations. Further, Iraq saw a spike in refugees in late 2013 as Jabhat al-Nusra forces attacked Kurdish villages near its northern border, resulting in over 35,000 refugees entering the country in less than a week in late August 2013. Iraq and the UNHCR have been working hard to build new camps to accommodate this rapid influx, but these efforts have been hampered by an enormous budget gap of 71%.

Another essential humanitarian concern is the growing population of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) living inside Syria. IDPs often leave their homes and communities because of food shortages, lack of available water, and the destruction of other essential infrastructure and utilities such as waste disposal, electricity, and fuel. IDPs are subject to all of the protection concerns that refugees are, but are at even greater risk because they are often beyond the reach of international assistance. Providing humanitarian assistance to these IDPs has been particularly challenging as a combination of visa restrictions, the closure of routes and entire areas, and the besiegement of cities has severely limited access of humanitarian workers. While the UN estimates that there are approximately 4.25 million IDPs in Syria (a third of its total population), these numbers are highly fluid and dynamic. Many IDPs report being displaced several times, and many refugees who have made it across the border often report being IDPs for an extended period prior to successfully leaving Syria. Internal displacement has significantly affected the Palestinian refugee population that was living in Syria prior to hostilities; the UNRWA reports that 235,000 Palestinian refugees are displaced within Syria and that nearly every Palestinian refugee camp has been affected by the conflict. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by government and dissident forces are often cited as key drivers of internal displacement. The largely unaddressed issue of IDPs, thus, is one of the most severe aspects of the Syrian humanitarian crisis.

Conclusion

The SC’s limited involvement and leadership on the situation in Syria should not deter the international community from thinking creatively about addressing this topic. There are numerous opportunities available for SC Member States to make meaningful interventions to ameliorate the conflict and its consequences. By focusing on particular aspects of the situation – opposed to trying to address it in its entirety – the SC should be able to identify and collaborate on issues where progress is possible and needed. The situation in Syria is dire and in need of leadership at every level. If unaddressed by the UN’s most powerful body, the political, security, and humanitarian consequences of the Syrian conflict could haunt the international community for decades to come.

As delegates begin to formulate their proposals, they should keep questions like these in mind: Is there a political solution to this conflict? And if so, what viable political partners exist that the SC can meaningfully engage with to ameliorate it? Given the current state of the conflict, and the wide array of groups involved, what outcomes could be acceptable to all parties? What are the available alternatives? How can the international community better protect

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165 Ibid., p. 212.
166 Ibid., pp. 218-20.
170 Ibid. 13-6.
171 Ibid., pp. iii-iv, 17-8.
172 Ibid., pp. iii-iv, 17-8.
173 Ibid., pp. iii-iv, 1.
174 Ibid., p. iii.
175 Ibid., pp. 11-2.
176 Ibid., p. 6.
177 Ibid., p. 6.
and provide assistance to internally displaced persons in Syria? And, finally, are there other ways for the international community to increase humanitarian assistance and address the ongoing humanitarian crisis?

Annotated Bibliography


This report provides an integrated and detailed analysis of the conflict’s various aspects – including military, humanitarian, and political. It provides extensive data on the situation, followed by an up-to-date analysis of how different trends in the country are affecting the development of the conflict and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the region. Every aspect is inspected within a regional analysis of Syria, allowing for a quick and detailed understanding of how the conflict is affecting the different regions within the country.


This report was created by a well-respected Turkish think-tank to assess the geostrategic factors that are affecting the conflict. It provides a unique analysis and perspective on regional security concerns and how these various factors have and are affecting the development of the conflict. It does an excellent job of highlighting factors and possibilities that are left out of other accounts of the crisis. Furthermore, as a research institute from a country highly affected by the conflict, this report provides a welcome perspective in a policy world dominated by American and European research organizations.


While familiarity with UN Charter is essential for any delegate, representatives to the Security Council have a particular set of powers. In order to fully comprehend and faithfully simulate the responsibilities of the Security Council, delegates should be familiar with the specifics of the UN Charter and specifically the Chapter VII. Chapter VII defines particular powers unique solely to the Security Council, which thusly affect the Council’s actions and should inform delegates’ debate.


The Geneva Conventions form the foundation of codified international humanitarian law. As delegates considering a conflict where accusations of humanitarian law violations have been widespread, familiarity with the specifics of the Geneva Conventions are a necessity, especially to the delegates of the Security Council. The International Committee of the Red Cross has defined the Syrian Conflict as a non-international armed-conflict, making Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions the most pertinent of these international documents.


The Geneva Conventions were supplemented with these (and other) additional protocols, enhancing the foundation of codified international humanitarian law. As delegates consider a conflict where accusations of humanitarian law violations have been widespread, familiarity with these additional protocols is equally necessary. Syria is not party to Additional Protocols II and III, however, making Protocol I the most relevant. That being said, many legal scholars argue that international humanitarian law is based on custom and practice, making the specifics of which protocol has been signed by who relatively unimportant and all international humanitarian law applicable to a situation such as currently occurring in Syria.

This report is intended to inform United States decision makers about the conflict in Syria, and accordingly has a particular focus and perspective. It is intended to provide an assessment of the various political and security factors that should be considered in any United States involvement in Syria. So while this perspective and focus could be limiting, it still provides a good assessment of the various factions operating within the country.


While the ICC has as of yet not become involved in or began to focus on the Syrian conflict, delegates to the Security Council should be familiar with the statues of the ICC. Of particular interest is the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC as the Rome Statute defines it. The preeminence in setting the ICC’s agenda and referring cases or issues to the Court that the Security Council enjoys is relevant to the situation in Syria and should be maintained as an option in Council deliberations.


This is a comprehensive report on United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees’ (UNHCR) plan and efforts around the situation in Syria. It details the varying challenges that the developing refugee crisis entails. It is divided by country, allowing the reader to examine the different situations in each country (i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt) and the differing goals and responses that UNHCR has taken to alleviate the situation in Syria.


This report is the product of cooperation between the Syrian government and a variety of humanitarian organizations that have been allowed to operate within Syria. It provides data concerning the needs of Syrian civilians and outlines the coordinated plan for responding to the numerous challenges and funding deficiencies within the region. The report is structured thematically, addressing health, hygiene, food, nutrition, and education amongst other concerns. It should be noted again, however, that this report is a product of consultations with the Syrian Government. While this does not discredit the report, the reader should keep in mind the limitations that this entails.


This is the Geneva Communiqué. In some circles it is still regarded as the best road forward for a political transition sanctioned and supported by the Security Council and the international community. While its vision was never realized, and some have criticized it for being too vague to be effective or implementable, it is still a consensus document produced by all of the Permanent Five Members on the Security Council as well as the major powers in the region. Delegates should be intimately familiar with its contents and proposals, as it will likely serve as the basis for any further negotiations at the Council.


Contained within this letter from the Secretary-General is the outline of the plan for the joint UN-OPCW mission to Syria that has been adopted by the Security Council. It is the most explicit and fully developed statement by the United Nations and the Security Council regarding its mission in Syria. It also does an excellent job of showing the nature of the working relationship between the
United Nations Security Council and the OPCW. As such it is essential reading for all delegates to the Security Council.


With this resolution the Security Council adopted Kofi Annan’s six-point plan. Delegates should be familiar with this resolution and its annex which contains the six point-plan developed by Mr. Annan. However, the essence of the six points are: 1) “work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process”; 2) “stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence”; 3) “ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting”; 4) “intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons”; 5) “ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists”; and 6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.”


With this resolution the Security Council endorsed a process of verification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, called for a second round of Geneva peace talks, and reiterated its support for a portion of the Geneva Communiqué: the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers in Syria. While the resolution does not address several of the most pressing issues of the situation in Syria, it represents the most progressive action the Council has been able to make at the time of writing, and looks to be a major step forward in regards to the use chemical weapons in Syria. Additionally, though not enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it does make reference to such powers of the Council. As such, every delegate to the Security Council should be familiar with this resolution and its operative clauses.

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II. Strengthening United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Introduction

The first UN peacekeeping operation (PKO), the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was created in 1948 with the purpose of overseeing a ceasefire in the former British Mandate of Palestine.178 In light of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Security Council (Council) decided to deploy neutral military personnel act as guarantors of the ceasefire agreement.179 With this, the Council exerted its authority to deploy peacekeeping personnel for the first time, thus asserting its role in the “maintenance of international peace and security,” as dictated by the United Nations Charter (UN Charter).180 Over the years, UN peacekeeping has been subject to frequent review and criticism as PKOs evolved into their current proactive, multi-front approach. Some of the detractors of peacekeeping have chosen violent methods to express their disagreement with the practice. In the past year particularly, UN PKOs have suffered more personnel losses than any time in the last decade, causing widespread alarm within the UN system, especially the Council.181 The increase in attacks against peacekeepers prompted the Council to review the performance of peacekeeping through Security Council Resolution 2086 (2013) in an effort to prevent further violence.182

The first section of this guide provides an overview of the role and performance of peacekeeping. In the next section, the guide addresses expert assessments of the most recent difficulties and failures concerning PKOs, and the most recent cases of violence against peacekeeping personnel. The guide concludes with a discussion of Resolution 2086 and the potential for the Council to improve its leadership over peacekeeping operations.

International Framework

The Security Council is the only UN body with the authority to establish a peacekeeping operation.183 Although peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, the Council has the authority to create PKOs under Chapter VI of the Charter, regarding the pacific settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII, authorizing international security enforcement actions.184 Peacekeeping is not intended to directly resolve a conflict; instead, it is used to facilitate the conditions needed for the culmination of a conflict.185 In this role, the Council serves as a stabilizer rather than a mediator.186 As such, peacekeeping is intended to be conducted alongside, and correspond with, a political process.187 In order to institute a peacekeeping operation, the Council must determine whether the mission will have a political purpose and must ensure that this purpose is reflected in the operation’s mandate.188

During the Cold War, the Council interpreted the role of UN PKOs as operating solely to oversee ceasefire agreements.189 Beginning in 1991, the Council took a more proactive approach to international peace and security, using PKOs for civilian protection, demobilization and disarmament of former combatants, peacebuilding coordination, and election monitoring, among other activities.190 These modern PKOs are multi-dimensional, encompassing the full spectrum of peace efforts within a theater of conflict: enforcement through the presence of peacekeeping troops; mediation through the operation’s Civil Affairs committee; and peacebuilding through the implementation of transitional peacebuilding projects.191 Peacebuilding activities include the overseeing of free and fair elections, training local security forces, and providing protection for international and local political actors.

178 UN Security Council, Resolution 50 (S/RES/50), 1948.
179 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNTSO Background [Website]
182 Ibid.
183 UN DPKO & DFS, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 16.
184 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Chapter VII, Article 42.
186 Ibid.
187 UN DPKO & DPI, Background Note: UN Peacekeeping, 2012, p. 1.
189 Ibid., p. 20-21.
190 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Post-Cold War Surge [Website].
including humanitarian aid workers.\textsuperscript{192} As a result of this expansion of duties, peacekeeping has become the Council’s primary tool for human protection.\textsuperscript{193} Of note, the “peacekeeping footprint” of PKOs—its impact on a host country’s economy, population, culture, humanitarian situation, and political development—can be significant, a topic which the Council has begun to explore over the past decade.\textsuperscript{194}

**Role of the United Nations System**

Although peacekeeping is an exclusive activity of the Council, other UN bodies have an important role in PKO management and administration. The Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (GA) is in charge of overseeing the budget for peacekeeping operations, while the Fourth Committee reports to the GA on the yearly reviews conducted by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34).\textsuperscript{195} All peacekeeping efforts are streamlined through the UN Secretariat’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which is in charge of PKO deployment, coordination, performance and review.\textsuperscript{196} The DPKO oversees the operational, strategic, and military aspects of peacekeeping, providing policy guidance, performance standards, and predictable military sources.\textsuperscript{197} The UN Department of Field Support provides logistical support for PKOs in the form of resources, personnel, telecommunications, financing, and training.\textsuperscript{198} Its role in supporting PKOs on the field can extend from providing food, technology and infrastructure for peacekeepers to ensuring performance standards.\textsuperscript{199}

Peacekeeping has evolved significantly over the past two decades.\textsuperscript{200} In 1992, then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali authored \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, in which he asserted that, in order to succeed, PKOs needed both a sound mandate and appropriate administrative and financial support.\textsuperscript{201} Three years later, the \textit{Supplement to an Agenda for Peace} designated the division of responsibilities within peacekeeping missions: the Council is in charge of the mandate and political purpose of the mission; the UN Secretariat provides executive direction and support; and the UN Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) direct the mission itself.\textsuperscript{202} In 2000, UN peacekeeping went through an all-encompassing review process, performed under the guidance of former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi.\textsuperscript{203} The resulting document, known as the Brahimi Report, set the precedent for the modern policy of PKO routine evaluations conducted through the C34 and documented in the Secretary-General’s mission reports.\textsuperscript{204}

One of the key issues emphasized by the Brahimi Report was the importance of proper planning and assessment of resources prior to the drafting of a mission’s mandate.\textsuperscript{205} Citing the UN’s failure to impede past humanitarian crises, the document encourages transparency from all UN actors, especially the Secretariat when reporting to the Council.\textsuperscript{206} The report explains: “the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.”\textsuperscript{207} Another important recommendation was the creation of UN Standby Arrangement Systems (UNSAS) – dedicated peacekeeping forces ready to deploy at short notice.\textsuperscript{208} In 2009, the General Assembly adopted the \textit{New Horizon} document, which calls for a better coordination between all actors at the UN and state level, as well as clear and defined objectives for each peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{209}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{192} Ibid., pp. 97, 160.
  \item \textsuperscript{193} Ibid., p. 101.
  \item \textsuperscript{194} UN DPKO & DFS, \textit{UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines}, 2008, p. 55-56.
  \item \textsuperscript{195} UN DPKO, \textit{Role of the General Assembly} [Website].
  \item \textsuperscript{196} UN DPKO, \textit{Department of Peacekeeping Operations} [Website].
  \item \textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{198} UN DPKO, \textit{Department of Field Support} [Website].
  \item \textsuperscript{199} UN DPKO, \textit{Field Support} [Website].
  \item \textsuperscript{200} Sutterlin, \textit{An Agenda for Peace: Fifteen Years Later}, 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{201} UN General Assembly, \textit{An Agenda for Peace} (A/47/277 - S/24111), 1992, p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{202} UN General Assembly, \textit{Supplement to An Agenda For Peace} (A/50/60-S/1995/1), 1995, paragraph 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{204} Ibid., ix.
  \item \textsuperscript{205} Ibid., p. 9-12.
  \item \textsuperscript{206} Ibid., p. 44-45.
  \item \textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{208} Ibid., p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{209} UN DPKO & DFS, \textit{The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1}, 2010, p. 5.
\end{itemize}
Key Challenges involving Peacekeeping Operations

**Troop Contributions**

UN peacekeeping encompasses the second-largest military activity in the world, with approximately 100,000 uniformed personnel. Unlike a traditional militia, UN peacekeeping relies solely on voluntary contributions from Member States. The DPKO must bear the difficult task of coordinating contingents from over 100 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs). Troop contributions to peacekeeping suffer from three main constraints: theoretical, financial, and administrative. UN PKOs are often the “last resort” for many TCCs and PCCs, as Member States tend to prioritize domestic issues or security concerns in their regions before contributing to PKOs. Moreover, during this time of financial crisis, TCCs often find the UN compensation for troop contribution to be insufficient. As a result, many Member States opt to contribute only a very small number of non-specialized troops that chronically lack the proper preparation to face arising challenges during PKOs. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stressed the critical state of troop and police contributions to UN peacekeeping, even stating that he is “begging leaders to make resources available.”

**Materials and Performance:**

While the UN has secured a larger number of uniformed personnel than discrete military alliances over the last decade, most of these contributions prove to be insufficient, as peacekeeping personnel lack the proper equipment or preparation to conduct their operations effectively. For example, due to a lack of helicopters, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) are limited in their ability to protect civilians and monitor human rights violations in difficult territories. The 2013 Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (S/2013/366), estimates that UNMISS currently carries out its operations at a mere 50 percent of engineering capability. The DPKO also lacks performance standards with which to measure a force. Pre-Deployment Visits (PDVs), conducted to determine the readiness of a troop, tend to focus ineffectively on aircraft and weaponry rather than preparation of the troops themselves.

The Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), a peacekeeping review document adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2010, outlines the ways in which the DFS can improve the management of resources for peacekeeping operations. The GFSS proposes the creation of regional service centers to provide resource support to PKOs, building upon the two existing bases in Italy and Uganda. These would be managed by the DFS and could provide fast and cost-effective support for missions. In addition, the GFSS calls for a funding model upon which the new or growing operations could be financed.

**Training**

According to the C34 Committee, proper training enables UN peacekeepers to successfully implement mandates on the ground and to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers in volatile environments. Given that

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211 Ibid., p. 3.
212 Ibid.
215 Ibid., p. 9.
216 UN Department of Public Information, *Secretary-General, In Lecture At Oxford*, 2011.
217 Bellamy, and Williams, *Broadening the Base of UN Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries*, 2012, p. 3.
221 Ibid.
223 Ibid., pp. 17-19.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid., p. 16.
peacekeeping operations are formed with troops from diverse Member States –each with individual training methods –gaps between levels or systems of training of troops within a same operation are common.227 Although there are a number of peacekeeping training institutes throughout the world, there is no overarching training standard for peacekeepers.228 For example, lack of appropriate POC training severely limits the activities of the UN Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).229 Enforcement measures are primarily carried out by the French contingent, which has the appropriate expertise to carry out protection of civilians (POC) activities.230 As a result of these similar gaps in the preparation, training has focused increasingly in the past two years on POC with the adoption of protection-of-civilians training modules.231

The C34 has stressed the need for support both for civilian affairs officers and police officers, with special emphasis on the use of best practices and lessons learned.232 At a recent round table of European TCCs and PCCs hosted by the International Peace Institute (IPI), participants discussed the creation of a special directorate within the DPKO to evaluate the performance of personnel on the field and provide feedback to Member States on troop performance.233 Another recent report by a former fellow of the IPI recommends the creation of “minimum standards” of performance for peacekeeping forces before a PKO is deployed.234

Cases of misconduct
As neutral representatives of the Council and the entire UN system, UN peacekeepers are held to the highest standards of conduct.235 Cases of misconduct, particularly sexual violence and abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers, represent a violation of the trust that the international community has placed in the UN.236 In response to these incidents, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 62/214.237 This resolution condemns sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in its strongest terms and emphasizes that any case of misconduct by a peacekeeper must be addressed swiftly under both national and international laws through UN Memorandums of Understanding.238

One of the main issues with misconduct is the timely notification of incidents due to the lack of a centralized reporting system.239 Additionally, there is no standard vetting system for peacekeeping personnel, which allows past perpetrators to remain in a peacekeeping force.240 In their 2012 report, the C34 stresses the importance of incorporating gender issues in training, in order to prevent cases of sexual exploitation and abuse.241 The lack of a proper gender balance in missions is another key challenge, as women account for less than 4 percent of peacekeepers.242 The C34 calls for the number of women engaged in peacekeeping operations to be increased by 20 percent before 2015.243 A recent report from the Providing for Peacekeeping series of the IPI recommends appointing a gender adviser for each PKO, as well as stronger advocacy to TCCs and PCCs on the need for a gender approach to troop contribution.244

227 Ibid.
228 Cutillo, Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for UN Peacekeepers, 2013, p. 1.
232 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
233 International Peace Institute, Enhancing European Military and Police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping, 2013.
234 Cutillo, Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for UN Peacekeepers, August 2013, p. 2.
236 Ibid.
238 Ibid., p. 12.
239 Ibid., p. 13.
241 Ibid., p. 33.
244 Dharmapuri, Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping, 2013, p. 1.
Attacks against peacekeepers
PKOs can have dire consequences for the physical wellbeing of peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{245} Six peacekeepers working for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) were victims of armed robbery in the first half of 2013, as well as 45 incidents of unarmed attack.\textsuperscript{246} In Lebanon, UN property was seized, and UN patrol movements have been restricted over the past year due to violence and insecurity for UN personnel.\textsuperscript{247} MONUSCO forces also came under violent attack between February and June 2013, prompting a review of the security situation of the mission.\textsuperscript{248} In South Sudan, 51 violent incidents targeted against UN personnel occurred, including hijackings, kidnappings, the use of landmines, and damage to UN offices.\textsuperscript{249} Ambushes and gunfire on UN convoys, helicopters and individual workers resulted in a dozen UN fatalities.\textsuperscript{250} The UNMISS report highlights “ill-discipline, command and control challenges, and lack of understanding among national security services of the rights and privileges of United Nations personnel” as causes of attacks on UN personnel.\textsuperscript{251} This rising level of violence implies not only a security threat for peacekeepers, but also a misunderstanding of the purpose of PKOs. Consequently, several operations, particularly UNMISS, are educating civilians on their mandate, in order to promote a better understanding and positive reception of their activities.\textsuperscript{252} UNMISS is also considering the use of unmanned, unarmed aircraft as a more secure way of monitoring South Sudan.\textsuperscript{253}

While attacks against peacekeepers occur haphazardly in several operations, the situation concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Syria has brought the issue of protecting peacekeepers to the forefront.\textsuperscript{254} Clashes between the Syrian government and opposition forces have spilled over to neighboring regions, resulting in damage to UN infrastructure.\textsuperscript{255} UNDOF has reported increasing violations of the ceasefire line set out in the 1974 \textit{Disengagement Agreement} between Syria and Israel.\textsuperscript{256} These violations have not only hindered UNDOF’s operations, but also affected the operations of the UNTSO in Israel by blocking their supply lines and limiting their monitoring activities.\textsuperscript{257} The 2013 report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF mentions at least four cases of abduction of UN personnel between the months of April and June of that year.\textsuperscript{258} UNDOF peacekeepers were also subject to hijackings, and UN property was stolen.\textsuperscript{259} As a result, Austria – one of the oldest TCCs and the largest contributor with 378 troops (over one-third of the entire PKO force) – withdrew its contingent on June 6, 2013.\textsuperscript{260} The Secretary-General noted in his April/June 2013 report that this withdrawal will significantly affect the efforts of UNDOF.\textsuperscript{261} The situation with UNDOF called into question the entire role of peacekeeping and its use by the Council, resulting in the adoption of Resolution 2086 (2013).\textsuperscript{262}

Conclusion
Resolution 2086 marks the first time in over a decade that the Council conducted a review of peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{263} In this resolution, the Council expresses “grave concern about the security threats and targeted attacks against United Nations peacekeepers.” The resolution establishes a renewed commitment to peacebuilding, with an emphasis on early planning, support for local authorities, and the crucial role of PKOs in disarmament.

\textsuperscript{245} UN Security Council, \textit{Resolution 2086 (S/RES/2086)}, 2013.
\textsuperscript{246} UN Security Council, \textit{Twenty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/479)}, 2013, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{247} UN Security Council, \textit{Letter dated 14 August 2012 from the Secretary-General (S/2012/632)}, 2012, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{250} UN Security Council, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (S/2013/366)}, 2013, pp. 5-7.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{254} UN Security Council, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/345)}, 2013.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{260} Security Council Report, \textit{What’s in Blue: Consultations on the UN Disengagement Observer Force} [Website].
\textsuperscript{262} UN Security Council, \textit{Resolution 2086 (S/RES/2086)}, 2013.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.\textsuperscript{264} Notably, Resolution 2086 focuses on POC, stating that a PKO must strive to protect civilians including against sexual abuse.\textsuperscript{265} Another key element of the resolution is a request that all Member States continue providing troops to peacekeeping, yet ensure that these forces have the proper training particularly regarding gender issues.\textsuperscript{266} The resolution calls for the coordination of activities between all actors in the conflict area and distinct role designations.\textsuperscript{267} Overall, Resolution 2086 is aimed at achieving “clear, credible and achievable mandates.”\textsuperscript{268}

Bearing in mind this resolution as the Council’s latest focusing document on PKOs, delegates should ask themselves: what can the Council do to ensure proper mission mandates? How can the Council improve its planning process to ensure that potential TCCs/PCCs are well informed and peacekeeping personnel have appropriate preparation for the challenges they will face during field operations? What actions can the Council take to ensure that cases of misconduct are properly addressed? Regarding the issue of peacekeeper safety, what else can the Council do to protect UN peacekeepers from injury and death?

\textbf{Annotated Bibliography}


\textit{The International Peace Institute, a think tank that makes important contributions to peacekeeping literature, has recently created a website called Providing for Peacekeeping. The website gathers reports and assessments from leading peacekeeping experts. This report in particular provides an analysis of the main issues involved in generating appropriate sources for peacekeeping operations. The report discusses some of the main constraints both for TCCs and the UN system, and provides a number of recommendations. Delegates should be aware that this is the opinion of the authors, and not an official UN document.}


\textit{The Brahimi report is the cornerstone for modern peacekeeping operations. The review conducted by the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations encompasses all operational and planning aspects of PKOs. The report focuses heavily on the criticism of PKOs, yet provides ample recommendations for the future. Some of these recommendations have been incorporated into the practice of peacekeeping (such as the importance of transparency between the Council and the Secretariat), yet others have not. Delegates can look to this report not only to better understand peacekeeping operations, but also as a source of new ideas, since many recommendations (such as the creation of a UN Standby Army) were never implemented.}


\textit{The Comprehensive Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly is a crucial tool for understanding the scope of the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions. The document thoroughly explains the gravity of these incidents, providing a framework through which to act in the future. Furthermore, the document includes a detailed description of the}

\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{267} UN Security Council, \textit{Resolution 2086} (S/RES/2086), 2013.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid.
process for assisting victims and reporting cases of abuse. Delegates can look to this strategy as a base from which the Council can address the issue of sexual abuse.


One of the most essential documents for delegates’ research, this report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping provides a structured description of the performance of peacekeeping operations in 2012. The report includes sections on safety of peacekeepers, conduct and discipline, force generation, coordination with other UN actors and regional organizations, and places special emphasis on PKOs in Africa. The report also includes an assessment of the main challenges facing peacekeeping, especially financial issues.


Among the myriad documents available on UN peacekeeping, the Principles and Guidelines paper (also known as the Capstone Doctrine), constitutes one of the most accessible for readers. The first chapter of the first section explains the framework of peacekeeping operations. The second chapter discusses the evolution of peacekeeping and the emergence of multi-dimensional PKOs. Finally, the third chapter provides an overview of the basic elements of peacekeeping. Sections Two and Three of the Capstone Doctrine explain the two main components for a successful operation: the planning process within the UN system and the establishment of a solid mandate. Section Three is especially useful for Council delegates, as the mandate of an operation falls entirely under the authority of the Council.


The web site of the UNDPKO will be instrumental for delegates’ research. Here, delegates can find useful background information on all current and previous peacekeeping operations, including the context of the conflict situation and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the web site provides an overall description of the history of peacekeeping, as well as an explanation of the role of the different departments within the UN system that address peacekeeping. The site is a good source for current news on the situation of peacekeeping, and delegates should check it regularly to be aware of what issues are in the forefront for the Council.


The Secretary-General’s reports on each mission are a useful tool for delegates to monitor the performance and progress of PKOs. Studying several reports will give delegates a solid vision of the overarching issues facing peacekeeping. Moreover, each report includes a commentary by the Secretary-General on the most outstanding issues, and delegates can use this for policy guidance. This particular report is of great importance, because MONUSCO is one of the oldest operations of the United Nations, and faces a greater number of difficulties given the scope of its mandate. The main challenges for MONUSCO are posed by the size of the terrain in which it must operate, as well as the volatile political situation that impedes the mandate of MONUSCO.


This report is of particular significance, because the events concerning UNDOF prompted an overall review of peacekeeping within the UN system. The report notes the incidents concerning violence against peacekeepers from the start of 2013. While violence is always expected in a conflict situation, the high levels of insecurity for peacekeepers in this operation prompted the
withdrawal of one of the largest TCCs – evidence of the gravity of the situation. It also discusses the progress in the implementation of relevant Council resolutions, and as such can be useful for measuring the effectiveness of the Council.


As the first Council resolution to address the question of peacekeeping as a whole in the past decade, Resolution 2086 represents a solid building block for delegate’s debate in committee. Its preamble and operative clauses should be carefully studied, as they detail the recent course of action and motivations outlined by the Council. Delegates should note the emphasis placed on post-conflict peacebuilding as a crucial partner for peacekeeping. Other important clauses pertain to the provisions for human protection and protection of UN personnel, as they represent some of the current priorities of peacekeeping operations. Overall, the resolution serves as a good outline of some of the Council’s main concerns regarding UN peacekeeping.


This website is especially useful by providing academic analysis of the work of the Council. The site follows Council proceedings in a timely manner, and delegates can use it to monitor the development of negotiations. Moreover, the What’s In Blue site provides an analysis of the dynamics among Member States, as well as an estimation of the expected action of the Council. This particular source focuses on the developments concerning UNDOF. In its entirety, however, the site is a great resource for delegates, as it provides a chronological review of the issues under debate as well as links to important documents.

Bibliography


III. Peace Consolidation in West Africa

“In the moment of crisis, the wise build bridges and the foolish build dams.”

Introduction

Peace consolidation is a process associated with post-conflict efforts after a violent and armed conflict has ended, both at the interstate and intrastate levels. The main goal is to create peaceful structures within society in order to avoid a resurgence of hostilities. These can be found both within institutions and in social relations.

A consolidated peace can be defined as a self-sustaining peace. It becomes sustainable when conflicts that arise within a state can be resolved peacefully through the use of national norms, institutions, and practices (both established and ad hoc). A consolidated peace is marked by more than just the absence of military conflict in a state; it is characterized by the absence of major threats to public security as well, such as political repression and discrimination against vulnerable groups (women, ethnic and other minorities), torture, and widespread serious crime. External assistance may contribute to the maintenance of a peace but a consolidated peace must be able to sustain itself.

The region of West Africa is comprised of the 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mauritania. All of these states have low scores on the United Nations Development Programme’s human development index and face similar challenges in terms of political instability. Additionally, conflicts of varying natures have plagued the region since the end of colonialism, particularly following the end of the Cold War. These intrastate conflicts are multi-causal, multidimensional, and interconnected. This has strong implications as the most recent conflicts in Africa have had catastrophic consequences for the civilian populations, especially as intrastate conflicts often affect civilians more heavily. In West Africa, these conflicts have largely been over land and natural resources and caused severe violence and affected national stability in the region. Additionally, the lack of good governance, continuous instability, poor economic growth and organized crime are amongst the region’s biggest challenges.

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269 Nigerian proverb, Sangonet, 2013.
271 Ibid., p. 6.
272 Ibid., p. 6.
275 Ibid., p. 7.
277 Ibid., p. 10.
278 Harris, Civil War and Democracy in West Africa, 2011, p. 10.
279 Kumar, Building National “Infrastructures for Peace”, 2011, p. 385.
Within West Africa, there are many threats to security and these contribute to the high complexity of the overall attempts to consolidate peace.\textsuperscript{281} As recently shown in the cases of Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Togo, election-related tensions are an ongoing source of instability and border disputes such as those between Niger and Burkina Faso.\textsuperscript{282} Societal problems, derived from youth unemployment and poverty, are also a grave concern in the region and can be a source of significant insecurity and increased criminality.\textsuperscript{283} Further still, political and economic exclusion of large portions of populations are a major source of instability that facing West African states.\textsuperscript{284} Finally, organized crime has become one of the most problematic concerns as it can undermine political stability via the spread of corruption, becoming a source for the financing of terrorism.\textsuperscript{285} Activities of criminal organizations include the trafficking of firearms and the trafficking of human beings, although drug trafficking remains the most lucrative, especially particularly due to its location heavy presence in Latin America and Europe.\textsuperscript{286} More recently, the production of the methamphetamine drug has increased in the West African region, causing concerns now over not simply trafficking but also the region’s role as a production site.\textsuperscript{287}

**Building Peace**

The achievement of self-sustaining peace is called positive peace, as opposed to negative peace, which is limited to the ending of a violent conflict.\textsuperscript{288} Involving internal stakeholders and giving them the opportunity to actively participate in the process is important as to achieve order one needs legitimacy.\textsuperscript{289} Indeed, the best way to build durable peace is a bottom-up approach.\textsuperscript{290} Therefore, peace consolidation should include all concerned actors within a society.\textsuperscript{291} The mobilization of resources as well as the invested individuals to solve problems in a collective or collaborative manner is a key element for the pacification of conflicting relations within a state.\textsuperscript{292} In fact, peacebuilding is most effective when it’s the product of discursive practice between concerned actors and stakeholders instead of being externally imposed.\textsuperscript{293} Inclusive mediation processes, which provide opportunities for engagement and input to local communities and civil society organizations, therefore, are an effective tool and can be supported by cooperation with regional organizations.\textsuperscript{294}

Infrastructures for peace include institutional mechanisms and cooperative approaches as a means through which societal dialogue and stable relationships between and within communities can be established.\textsuperscript{295} Such infrastructures can be supported by advocacy campaigns for peace, mediation and, most importantly, building national and local capacities for conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{296} Peaceful elections are also quintessential in preventing the strong polarization of opposing groups, which can lead to conflict, and the need for technical assistance, dialogue between these groups and peace advocacy, as well as the support of civil society actors.\textsuperscript{297} However, one of the most significant external inputs remains financial aid to help build infrastructures for peace.\textsuperscript{298} Peacebuilding from below seeks to develop partnerships with and between local actors from all sectors of society including the military, economic and political fields, civil society such as health groups, youth workers, and women’s associations.\textsuperscript{299} This

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\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., p. 4.

\textsuperscript{284} Harris, *Civil War and Democracy in West Africa*, 2011, p. 17.


\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{290} Ramsbotham, et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 2011, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{291} Harris, *Civil War and Democracy in West Africa*, 2011, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{292} Kumar, *Building National “Infrastructures for Peace”*, 2011, p. 395.

\textsuperscript{293} Ramsbotham, et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 2011, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{294} Kumar, *Building National “Infrastructures for Peace”*, 2011, p. 387

\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., p. 386.

\textsuperscript{296} Ibid., p. 386.

\textsuperscript{297} Ibid., p. 395.

\textsuperscript{298} Ibid., p. 397.

\textsuperscript{299} Ramsbotham, et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 2011, p. 234.
way, greater volumes of actors are involved in the process and thus can contribute their unique perspective, with the objective being the active participation of all levels of society.\footnote{Ibid., p. 234.} Therefore, it is vital to recognize that including as many concerned actors as possible is an effective way for peace consolidation because it allows a broader consensus and demonstrates to the populations that all opinions are valuable.\footnote{Ramsbotham, et al., \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}, 2011, p. 234.} Although several United Nations (UN) missions with military deployment have been enacted over the past decades, the international community’s response to establishing sustainable peace has been mainly characterized by conflict mediation.\footnote{Harris, \textit{Civil War and Democracy in West Africa}, 2011, p. 2.} Yet, the UN, as well as other international organizations, plays a key role in consolidating peace in the West Africa.

\textbf{International Framework}

The UN has developed a close cooperation with the African Union (AU) with the purpose of maintaining peace and security, under the umbrella of what is referred to as the “Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme.”\footnote{UN Department of Political Affairs, \textit{United Nations – African Union Cooperation} [Website], 2013.} This framework agreement was conceived to enhance capacity-building of the AU and other regional organizations, as well as to provide electoral assistance.\footnote{Ibid.} In this regard, ECOWAS adopted in 2001 the \textit{Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance} to develop a series of norms aiming to avoid political instability and foster good governance.\footnote{Economic Community of West African States, \textit{Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance} 2001.} Further, between 2008 and 2011 a \textit{Regional Action Plan} was developed by ECOWAS in order to address problems related to drugs and organized crime in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).\footnote{UN Office on Drugs and Crime, \textit{Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crimes and Drug Abuse in West Africa} [Report], 2013.} In 2008, ECOWAS also adopted a \textit{Conflict Prevention Framework} underlining its role as a facilitator in the region, stressing the importance of structural factors and the need for operational prevention tools.\footnote{Economic Community of West African States, \textit{ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework}, 2008, p. 9.}

In continuity with these efforts, the \textit{Regional Programme for West Africa} covering the period from 2010 to 2014 focuses on areas related to UNODC’s mandate in which national and regional initiatives are foreseen.\footnote{UN Office on Drugs and Crime, \textit{Regional Programme for West Africa 2010–2014} [Report], 2010, p. 9.} It aims to respond to health and security threats by supporting states as well as regional organizations and civil society actors.\footnote{Ibid., p. 5.} The main principles are to achieve sustainable reforms by reinforcing partnerships between the mentioned actors while promoting shared ownership at the state level.\footnote{Ibid.} In support of this, the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), a joint program between ECOWAS, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the UNODC, and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) that targets capacity-building in response to criminal activities such as drug trafficking or organized crime, was established in 2009.\footnote{UN Office for West Africa, \textit{West Africa Coast Initiative} [Website], 2013.} It was launched as a response to the priorities identified by the ECOWAS \textit{Regional Action Plan} and one of its main elements is the establishment of a Transnational Crime Unit in each country, which plays a fundamental role in fostering international cooperation in the fight against organized crime.\footnote{Ibid., 2013.} As exemplified, the current foundations for peacebuilding in West Africa rely heavily on the United Nations system.

\textbf{Role of the United Nations System}

Established in 2002, UNOWA is the main UN entity involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the region.\footnote{UN Office for West Africa, \textit{Mandate} [Website], 2013.} Its main functions are to monitor political developments in West Africa, promote good governance, and facilitate regional efforts to address threats to security.\footnote{Ibid., 2013.} UNOWA holds a crucial position as it promotes information sharing between the UN entities active in the region and acts as a bridge between the UN system and the...
governments of regional Member States. Furthermore, a close cooperation with ECOWAS and AU has been developed with UNOWA and thus the whole of the UN system. UNOWA’s activities cover a wide range of issues both at the country-specific and sub-regional levels. Efforts to promote good governance and the rule of law and the promotion of the human rights as well as support to ensure peaceful elections are amongst UNOWA’s highest priorities. However, its current mandate expires on 31 December 2013 and can only be renewed by the Security Council (SC).

Role of the Security Council
Although the SC has the power to enable military means for the maintenance of international peace and security, it primarily encourages peaceful settlements via negotiation, judicial settlement, or seeking the help of regional agencies. In the past, West Africa has often drawn the SC’s attention and several recent resolutions have addressed individual states such as SC resolution 2101 (2013) on “Côte d’Ivoire” targeting arms trafficking in the country. In addition, one of the SC’s main tasks in West Africa is monitoring the missions and offices deployed in the region, such as the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). Moreover, the coordination of national, regional, and international actors is a key issue for the SC in the region, and in so doing the use of security sector reform by the SC as a tool for peacebuilding is of utmost importance. Ensuring UNOWA’s provision of support is also crucial as it plays a key role in encouraging regional cooperation on urgent matters such as piracy, terrorism, drugs, and crime. Currently, the SC is considering the ways in which UNOWA could play a more influential role towards building a sustained peace for the region. Furthermore, the SC has regular interactions with the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) to consider forms of conflict prevention and how collaborative missions could be envisaged in the future.

Women’s Empowerment
Peace consolidation needs to address society as whole; positive trends can be underlined as regional cooperation is increasing and strategies are developed to address the complex web of interconnected issues in the region. This is also the case for the empowerment of women which is one of the UN’s major concerns as can be seen by the recent declaration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on “Women’s Economic Empowerment for Peacebuilding” which emphasizes their role in sustaining peace. This commitment is further confirmed by the open debate held by the Security Council on 18 October 2013 on “Women, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict-Affected Situations”; its main purpose will be to share best practices and progress in order to identify measures that need to be adopted. The outcome of this debate was the adoption of a seventh resolution on “Women, peace and security” focused on women’s participation in post-conflict peacebuilding and rule of law: Security Council resolution 2122 (2013). This resolution, along with its predecessor, Resolution 1889 (2009), serve as the normative basis for women’s participation and empowerment in all aspects of peacebuilding. Efforts to empower women, thusly, are being implemented by West African states as can be seen in the case of Nigeria, where mediation efforts conducted

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315 UN Office for West Africa, Cooperation with the UN System [Website], 2013.
316 UN Office for West Africa, Cooperation with Regional Organizations [Website], 2013.
317 UN Office for West Africa, Cross-Border Challenges, [Website], 2013.
318 Ibid.
320 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Ch. VI, art. 33 (1).
325 Ibid., p. 15.
326 Ibid., p. 2.
328 UN Peacebuilding Commission, Declaration: Women’s Economic Empowerment for Peacebuilding (PBC/7/OC/3), 2013.
by women’s organizations helped solve intercommunity violence and improved the livelihood of women in the country.\textsuperscript{331}

In this vein, the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on “Women and Peace and Security” is paramount; it is encouraging that 11 West African states have implemented national plans of action to strengthen their efforts in fulfilling this resolution.\textsuperscript{332} Reinforcing this in this regard, a regional forum was held in 2010 addressing the implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000) to continue this progress.\textsuperscript{333} Amongst the main outcomes were: the promotion of women’s participation in political life, the protection of women against sexual violence, as well as the integration of gender in peacebuilding efforts.\textsuperscript{334} Modeled off of the success Ghana has had, in order to better include women within the security sector in Liberia and Sierra Leone, women’s associations have been involved in the reform of the police sectors so as to improve gender-sensitive approaches within law enforcement, a key component to addressing gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{335} Such experiences should encourage national and international stakeholders to further explore opportunities for the inclusion of women in the security sector and be good examples of potential enhancements towards gender-sensitivity.\textsuperscript{336}

**Case Studies: Guinea and Mali**

**Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea**

During the last few years, acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea have continuously grown, and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) estimates there have been at least 100 successful attacks per year.\textsuperscript{337} Typically, acts of piracy consist of kidnapping for ransom, hijacking of ships, and armed robbery, with the third being the most frequent in the Gulf of Guinea.\textsuperscript{338} A high proportion of attacks are carried out on vessels transporting petroleum products and most of them can be traced back to the Niger Delta where these products are sold on the black market.\textsuperscript{339} As oil has become an indispensable source of income in the region, piracy not only affects the security of the people on board the vessels, but it also has strong economic implications for the concerned states.\textsuperscript{340} Therefore, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea may pose a significant threat to the international community as well.\textsuperscript{341} Moreover, besides affecting a state’s economy from the loss of goods, a growing number of commercial ships are now avoiding the region due to the increase in insecurity, which in turn stifles trade, investment, and tax revenues.\textsuperscript{342} Estimations show that Benin’s tax losses could be up to 28% of its government revenue due to piracy.\textsuperscript{343}

Piracy is by definition an international crime and is, therefore, punishable by any state capturing pirates outside the jurisdiction of another state, mainly in the high seas.\textsuperscript{344} The *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas* (UNCLOS) defines piracy as any illegal act committed against a ship on the high seas.\textsuperscript{345} Therefore, according to UNCLOS, acts of piracy committed within the area up to 12 nautical miles from the coast, known as the territorial seas, do not fit this definition and fall under the jurisdiction of the coastal state.\textsuperscript{346} Despite attempts by the IMB,
efforts to recognize similar acts committed in territorial seas as piracy have been fruitless.\textsuperscript{347} Thus, the criminalization of piracy under domestic law remains important since acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are almost exclusively committed within territorial seas.\textsuperscript{348} Thus, it is clear that the current legislative framework concerning the problem of piracy is inadequate.\textsuperscript{349} Furthermore, the situation indicates interconnections between piracy and organized crime as well as trafficking and money laundering.\textsuperscript{350} SC resolution 2039 on “Peace Consolidation in West Africa” has already addressed piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, encouraged states to take necessary measures to combat the problem, and called for regional cooperation to better address this issue.\textsuperscript{351} However, to date only draft declarations have been made by Member States in this regard.\textsuperscript{352} Yet, a Code of Conduct developed by ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, has been adopted by 22 West and Central African states.\textsuperscript{353} This code encourages information sharing and the interdicting of ships suspected of being engaged in acts of piracy.\textsuperscript{354} It also engages states to prosecute pirates and aims to facilitate the proper treatment of convicted individuals.\textsuperscript{355} This code was been inspired by the Djibouti Code of Conduct implemented to address piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, which has shown positive outcomes.\textsuperscript{356}

In spite of such basic successes in the fight against piracy, there are still concerns. A major concern for the region is the lack of equipment and personnel at the local level to ensure effective patrolling of the area.\textsuperscript{357} Local law enforcement capacities are needed in order to properly address the problem of piracy, including naval patrols as well as improved fuel regulations devised to undermine illegal trade and piracy.\textsuperscript{358} In the case of piracy in Somalia, SC resolution 1816 on “the Situation in Somalia” authorized Member States, with the permission of the Transitional Federal Government, to enter Somali waters in order to pursue and arrest pirates.\textsuperscript{359} If the situation is in need of continued control or if it worsens, operations such as those enabled in the Gulf of Aden could be envisaged in order to support states in their fight against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.\textsuperscript{360} Furthermore, cooperation on judicial matters as in the Gulf of Aden, mainly focusing on effective prosecution of arrested pirates is also needed.\textsuperscript{361} It is of utmost importance, then, to tackle the root causes of piracy in order to achieve long-term stability in the region.\textsuperscript{362} One such approach that has been proposed is that which takes into account interconnections with organized crime.\textsuperscript{363} Such an approach would include development cooperation projects as well as security sector reform and assistance for the training of national coast guards.\textsuperscript{364} Additionally, legal reforms effectively targeting corruption are also needed.\textsuperscript{365} In addition to this, the elaboration of long-term solutions should be sought in cooperation with other regional bodies, as mentioned above; the PSC has regular interactions with the SC and can play an important role in this regard.\textsuperscript{366}

\textit{The Situation in Mali and the Threat of Terrorism}

West Africa continues to be a key concern in the international fight against terrorism, which remains a further obstacle to peace, particularly as local extremist groups align with global terrorist authorities like Al-Qaida.\textsuperscript{367} Since

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\bibitem{} UN Office on Drugs and Crime, \textit{Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment} [Report], 2013, p. 49.
\bibitem{}Barrios, \textit{Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Offshore and Onshore}, 2013, p. 3.
\bibitem{}International Maritime Organization, \textit{IMO Secretary-General welcomes adoption of new west and central Africa piracy and maritime law enforcement code by Heads of State} [Press Release], 2013.
\bibitem{}International Maritime Organization, \textit{IMO Secretary-General welcomes adoption of new west and central Africa piracy and maritime law enforcement code by Heads of State} [Press Release], 2013.
\bibitem{}Ibid.
\bibitem{}Ibid.
\bibitem{}Ibid.
\bibitem{}Barrios, \textit{Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Offshore and Onshore}, 2013, p. 3.
\bibitem{}Ibid., p. 4.
\bibitem{}Ibid., p. 4.
\bibitem{}Ibid., p. 4.
\bibitem{}Ibid., p. 4.
\bibitem{}Ibid., p. 4.
\end{thebibliography}
the recent crisis in the northern part of Mali, which threatened both the country’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity leading to a French-led military operation, terrorism has become an increased threat for the region, as well as the international community.\textsuperscript{368} In its nature, terrorism is transnational, and this holds true for West Africa where an attack may be planned in one state but executed in another.\textsuperscript{369} This becomes even more significant if the weaknesses in regional security and border control shown during the recent crisis are considered.\textsuperscript{370}

Making the situation more difficult are the links to criminal organizations that are financing these terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{371} The Member States of ECOWAS adopted in February 2013 the Political Declaration on a Common Position Against Terrorism, which is the first policy framework addressing the problem in the region.\textsuperscript{372} Furthermore, Malian authorities have initiated efforts to engage with non-terrorist groups and representatives of populations from the northern regions where the crisis started.\textsuperscript{373} This has already led to an agreement between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels putting an end to armed violence between the two.\textsuperscript{374} SC resolution 2085 on “Mali” authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA); it urged the Malian authorities and its main interlocutors to finalize the transitional roadmap with the assistance of ECOWAS in order to restore stability in Mali.\textsuperscript{375} In order to strengthen international support, SC resolution 2100 on “Mali” established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).\textsuperscript{376} More recently, the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sahel presented to the SC a framework for the region that addressed resilience, cross-border threats and inclusive governance.\textsuperscript{377} This strategy is based on a “four by four” approach focusing on governance, security, humanitarian requirements, and development and includes Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, and has been published in the last report of the Special Envoy.\textsuperscript{378}

The priority is now the implementation of the strategy in cooperation with local authorities and in consultation with the UNDP, which requires short-term development priorities based on local expertise.\textsuperscript{379} The gathering of sufficient financial support to do so is also essential; while the SC itself is not a financier, first steps may be in consulting with such organizations as the World Bank and the African Development Bank.\textsuperscript{380} While actively addressing the terrorist threat in the region, the SC has to act as a key orchestrator, in cooperation with local authorities, of the different active bodies and organizations so as to establish the foundations for sustained peace.\textsuperscript{381}

**Conclusion**

Much has been done so far, and important guidelines already exist for a majority of the issues mentioned above. Durable peace necessitates strong structures and the SC has the authority to coordinate these processes, but maintaining ownership at the country-level should be a priority. UNOWA can play a key role in this regard and alternative ways to increase its role in the region should be considered by delegates while researching the topic. The cooperation with ECOWAS and the AU is also as important and needs to be kept in mind when developing strategies of peace consolidation.


\textsuperscript{376} Ibid., 2013.


\textsuperscript{379} UN Security Council, *Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Sahel Briefs Security Council on New ‘Four-By-Four Strategy’ to Combat Extremism, Arms Proliferation, Crime* [Website], 2013.

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., 2013.

\textsuperscript{381} UN Security Council, *Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Sahel Briefs Security Council on New ‘Four-By-Four Strategy’ to Combat Extremism, Arms Proliferation, Crime* [Website], 2013.
Based on important documents such as the Political Declaration on a Common Position Against Terrorism, the Regional Programme for West Africa, or the Code of Conduct on maritime piracy, delegates should keep in mind the following series of questions. How can situations like piracy in the Gulf of Guinea or the Malian crisis be addressed while simultaneously searching for long-term solutions? How can the SC develop interconnected strategies bridging multiple issue areas such as poverty, development, or crime? What gaps are currently present in the framework for peace consolidation in West Africa? What can be done to support the proper implementation of existing provisions, addressing root causes, and assisting the inclusion of all concerned actors, especially civil society? What is the most appropriate balance between the SC, regional actors, and national authorities regarding intervention, implementation, and policy?

**Annotated Bibliography**


The Economic Community of West African States Conflict Prevention Framework was adopted in 2008. Its purpose is to guarantee peace and security in the region. Amongst the nine major objectives included in this document are: the implementation of conflict prevention policies, increasing cooperation between states and civil society, and raising awareness in order to achieve self-sustaining peace. Delegates will be able to inform themselves about commitments on human rights and good governance that have already been made by the Member States of ECOWAS. In this way, delegates can identify areas that have not been fully addressed and may need improvement.


Daniel Guilfoyle gathers in this article the most influential international legal texts related to maritime piracy. It provides a complete overview of the subject and an analysis of weaknesses and loopholes in the international legal framework. It allows the reader to develop a strong understanding of the legal framework concerning piracy, which will be helpful to delegates when debating the current piracy situation in the Gulf of Guinea.


Chetan Kumar offers an interesting study of the practical implementation of peacebuilding. This article provides a cogent explanation of the concept of infrastructures for peace and insists on the importance of internal solutions through mediated consensus based on the dialogue between concerned actors. Several factual examples, such as the establishment of a National Peace Council in Ghana during the 2008 elections, will help delegates to elaborate ideas for West Africa.


This book provides an in-depth presentation of theoretical and practical approaches to conflict resolution. It covers all stages ranging from conflict prevention to reconciliation. By adding a series of case studies and providing a comprehensive overview of current methodologies such as hybrid peacemaking or peacebuilding from below, it becomes a unique source of information for understanding conflict resolution both from a theoretical and practical point of view.

Security Council Report is an independent non-governmental organization covering the activities of the Security Council. It offers delegates the opportunity to inform themselves about the latest developments and decisions. Furthermore, it also addresses upcoming meetings, points out areas in need of action and highlights potential decisions to be taken. It is, therefore, an important source of information for delegates while preparing for the conference.


This document addresses the concept of peace consolidation. It provides an analysis of and practical implications for covering all major aspects. Thus, through this source, delegates can get a complete understanding of peace consolidation and will be able to find which areas need individual attention. In addition, it will prove highly informative as it addresses specific challenges for Africa.


This publication of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime addresses organized crime in West Africa. It provides information including the most recent statistics on the subject and examines drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, and the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. It further recommends improving regional and international cooperation and suggests ways to better address these problems. This report will prove useful to delegates when identifying areas in need of improvements in West Africa.


The annual World Drug Report issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime examines global flows of drug trafficking. West Africa is one the most important hubs for the traffic of cocaine and heroin. This document highlights the vulnerability of the populations living within these regions as a result of the high levels of drug trafficking, and further details the violence that is associated with this type of criminal activity. Delegates will be provided with useful data on organized crime and drug trafficking in West Africa from this source.


This report presents the activities of the United Nations Office in West Africa between January and July 2013. It explains the current situation concerning the peace process, humanitarian issues, and security with regards to piracy, terrorism, and organized crime. The specific situation in regards to peace consolidation in every state in the region is also detailed in this report. Furthermore, the importance of sub-regional cooperation is emphasized. Through this report, delegates will be able to inform themselves about the latest developments in the region.


Security Council resolution 2085, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The importance of the protection of civilians and the need to finalize a transitional roadmap with the assistance of ECOWAS and the Secretary-General are recalled in order to restore stability. It was one of the major resolutions during the conflict in the northern part of Mali and it laid the foundations for the peacebuilding process.

Bibliography


Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to Security Council (hereinafter referred to as “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.

2. For purposes of these rules, the Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”

3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Deputy Secretary-General or her/his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations (NMUN) and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.

4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Commission, which can be any member of the Secretariat or their designate.

5. The practice of striving for consensus in decision-making shall be encouraged. NMUN also acknowledges it may sometimes be necessary for a Member State to abstain or vote against a resolution it cannot support for policy reasons.

I. MEETINGS

Rule 1
Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time he or she deems necessary.

Rule 2
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any of its members.

Rule 3
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any questions to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4 - Periodic meetings
Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held at least once a year at such times the Security Council may decide.

The meeting at NMUN-NY should be considered a periodic meeting

Rule 5 - Meeting location
Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.

Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such a place.

II. AGENDA
Rule 6
The Secretary-General, or his or her designate, shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7
The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8
The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives of the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9 - Adoption of the agenda
The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, it requires nine votes in favor to pass in accordance with Article 27 (2) of the United Nations Charter. The veto does not apply for procedural votes. All must vote on procedural votes. Should the Council not reach a decision by conclusion of the first night’s meeting, the agenda will be automatically set in the order in which it was first communicated.

Rule 10
Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless otherwise decided, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11 - Periodic meetings – circulation of the agenda
The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.

For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item as “urgent” is subject to the discretion of the Members of the Council. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires 9 votes in favor to be placed on the agenda. The votes described in this rule are substantive votes. For purposes of this rule, —the members “present and voting” — means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Rule 12
Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.
Rule 13
Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose.

IV. PRESIDENCY

Rule 14 - Selection of the President
The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, inter alia, chair the Council for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 15 - Replacement of the President
If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General or her/his designate.

V. SECRETARIAT

Rule 16 - Duties of the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

Rule 17 - Oral and written statements
The Secretary-General or her/his designate, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 18 - Staff
The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 19 - Notification of meetings
The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 20 - Duties of the Secretariat
The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 21 - Order of speakers
The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
The President shall indicate the method in which they shall add speakers to a speakers list. One common method is by asking delegates to place their placards vertically to indicate the desire to speak.

**Rule 22 - Subsidiary entities**

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

**Rule 23**

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

**Rule 24 - Appeal the Chair**

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

**Rule 25 - Closure of debate**

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Council favors the closure of debate, the Council shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

**Rule 26**

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

**Rule 27 - Order of motions**

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. To suspend the meeting;
2. To adjourn the meeting;
3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

*As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council’s next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.*

**Rule 28**

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

**Rule 29 - Withdrawal of motions**

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.
Rule 30 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 31 - Participation by Member States of the United Nations in Council Meetings

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

The Secretariat will determine which specific member of a delegation to approach. If the Council considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Council according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Council is no longer required.

Rule 32 - Participation by non-Member States in Council meetings

The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

For the purposes of this rule, this, in most cases, invitations will be in line with Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, which state that members whom are particularly affected by a situation under consideration or a party to a dispute under consideration may address the Council as observers. Should this be the case for a delegate, the Secretariat will inform them in line with Rule 31.

Rule 33 - Quorum

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least nine members of the Council are present. The presence of nine representatives of the Council shall be required for any decision to be taken.

Rule 34 - General powers of the President

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Council, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Council and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. The President may propose to the Council the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the speakers time and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President (will be referred to as “Chair” at the conference) is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference and is limited to entertaining motions.
**Rule 35 - Points of order**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with the rules of procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting. A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

*Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. They should be used exclusively to correct an error in procedure. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, on her/his own accord, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.**

**Rule 36**

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

**Rule 37 - Speeches**

No representative may address the Council without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

*In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, the Secretariat will set a time limit for all speeches which may be amended by the Council through a vote if the President, at his or her discretion, decides to allow the Council to decide. In no case shall the speakers time be changed during the first scheduled session of the Council. may be amended by the President at his/her discretion. Consequently, motions to alter the speaker’s time will not be entertained by the President. The content of speeches should be pertinent to the agenda as set by the Council.***

**Rule 38 - List of Speakers**

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate, the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Council declare the list closed. Once the list has been closed, it can be reopened upon by a vote of the Council. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Council.

*The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Council. A motion to close the speakers list or reopen (if the list has already been closed) is within the purview of the Council and the President should not act on her/his own motion.***

**Rule 39 - Right of reply**

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative’s State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

*For purposes of this rule, a remark that impugns the integrity of a representative’s State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State’s sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Council by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose. The right of reply will not be approved should it impugn the integrity of another State.*
**Rule 40 - Suspension of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. Delegates should not state a purpose for the suspension.

This motion should be used to suspend the meeting for lunch or at the end of the scheduled Council session time. Delegates should properly phrase this motion as “suspension of the meeting,” and provide a length of time when making the motion.

**Rule 41 - Adjournment of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move to the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Council shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Committee's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Committee.

**Rule 42 - Adjournment of debate**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. Two representatives may speak in favor of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule.

**Rule 43 - Closure of debate**

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Council favors the closure of debate, the Council shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

**Rule 44 - Withdrawal of motions**

A motion may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before voting has commenced, provided that the motion has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any member.

**Rule 45 - Reconsideration of a topic**

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Council, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule.

**VII. VOTING**

**Rule 46 - Majority required**

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

According to Article 27(2) of the Charter, decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Article 27(3) states that all (substantive) decisions shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, which is interpreted as to refer to no vetoes.
**Rule 47 - Request for a vote**

A proposal or motion before the Council for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Council may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

*For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote. Adoption by “acclamation” or “without a vote” is in line not only with the educational mission of the conference but also the way in which the United Nations adopts a majority of its proposals.*

**Rule 48 - Method of voting**

The Council shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll-call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each member shall be called in any roll-call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

*Only those members who designate themselves as present or present and voting during the attendance roll-call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying pass must, when requested a second time, respond with either a yes or no vote. A pass cannot be followed by a second pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.*

1. When the Council votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Council shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.

2. The vote of each member participating in a roll-call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

**Rule 49 - Explanations of vote**

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

*All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends. Only delegates who are sponsors of a draft resolution that has been adopted with an unfriendly amendment, whom subsequently voted against the draft resolution may explain their vote.*

**Rule 50 - Conduct during voting**

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

*For purposes of this rule, there shall be no communication among delegates, and if any delegate leaves the Council room during voting procedure, they will not be allowed back into the room until the Council has convened voting procedure. Should a delegate who is also serving as Head Delegate leave the room, they may reenter but they may not retake their seat and participate in the vote.*
Rule 51 - Division of proposals and amendments

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If an objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are approved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 52 - Amendments

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal. Permission to speak on the amendment shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete entire operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect preambular clauses or sub-clauses of operative clauses. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule. These speeches are substantive in nature.

Rule 53 - Voting on amendments

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 54 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the committee decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 55 - The President shall not vote

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VIII. LANGUAGE

Rule 56 - Official and working language

English shall be the official and working language of the Council during scheduled sessions of the Council.

Rule 57 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.
This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit. The language should be the official language of the country you are representing at NMUN.