Documentation of the Work of the General Assembly First
General Assembly First Committee

Committee Staff

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Agenda

1. *Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring WMDs*

2. *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development*

3. *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space*

Delegate Awards

- Belarus
- Saudi Arabia
- Ukraine

Resolutions adopted by the committee

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Summary Report

The General Assembly First Committee held its annual session to consider the following agenda: Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction; The Relationship Between Disarmament and Development; and The Prevention of Arms in Outer Space. The first committee session was attended by 140 members and after the body discussed the agenda in formal debate and suspensions of the meeting; they quickly adopted the agenda as Topic I, II, and III on the first vote and proceeded to debate about the varying aspects of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

The second session opened with 141 Member States present with one non-member state observer. In the session, regional blocs began to form, especially with the Latin American countries. These groups worked diligently to share ideas about theme of terrorism and varying sub-topics that could be discussed within the committee. Discussion was dominated by groups looking to discuss and propose a United Nations definition of terrorism and methods to develop such a definition. No working papers were submitted during this session.

Over the next few sessions, working groups began to form discussing a greater range of topics. Formal session had well-developed speeches which were focused on fighting terrorism in every possible way, including sufficient border control, addressing the root cause of terrorism, strategies to prevent WMD and material acquisition, and addressing terrorist finance. The body continued to discuss how to develop a clear definition of terrorism. The committee used informal sessions to discuss how to solve the topic in the best possible manner, which brought forth new discussion points that included creating nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ), and coordinating international and regional cooperation of WMD dismantling. By the end of the day, 10 working papers had been submitted to the dais.

The total increased to 18 working papers in the committee by the end of the fourth session. As similarities were found in the working papers, such as financing and the definition of terrorism, mergers were suggested by the dais in the fifth session to find the best possible consensus among the committee. This proposition was extraordinarily well taken by the committee, who immediately to look for possible cooperation with other working groups. Formal sessions were shaped speeches dealing with the educational aspect of terrorism and best practice sharing, among others. This enabled the body to further discuss in informal sessions.

With the end of the sixth session, six merged papers were submitted to the dais, decreasing the number of working papers from 18 to 12. These included topics, such as an increasing international cooperation to limit terrorist access to WMD material, as well as focusing on capacity building, largely developed by the Central and South American states.

The seventh session had been marked by further negotiations and merges of the working groups. During the session, several motions were adopted, such as the closure of the speakers list, as well as changing the speaker’s time to 45 seconds, in order to ensure more delegates were heard during formal session. By the end of the session, seven working papers were approved to be Draft Resolutions by the dais. The total number of Draft Resolutions entering voting bloc was seven.

Prior to the Committee entered voting bloc in the eighth session, several friendly amendments were submitted to further strengthen the resolutions. After the motion to close the debate had been passed, the committee went straight into voting procedure, with seven draft resolutions on the table. Draft Resolutions GA/1/1 and GA/1/2 voted by a roll call vote. GA/1/1 passed while GA/1/2 failed with a number of abstentions. Draft Resolutions 3 through 7 were all adopted by the body as resolutions, with two motions to divide the question in voting bloc. Following closing announcements, the committee adjourned.
Recalling the sovereign equality of the members of the United Nations as stated in Article 2, and their right to self-defense as stated in Article 51, of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling General Assembly Resolutions “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (A/RES/66/282) and “Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction” (A/RES/68/41),

Aware of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), recognizing non-state proliferation as a threat to the peace under the terms of Chapter VII of The United Nations Charter,

Taking into consideration the significance of concluding the verification protocols of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), as it concerns the only WMD category that is not subject to any reporting process within the international community,

Noting that terrorism does not originate with any particular religion or ethnicity, that it poses a threat to the entire global community regardless of origin or gender, and that all groups must be included in addressing it,

Observing the high potential of law enforcement – civil society dialogue in addressing the threat terrorism poses to all communities,

Expressing with deep concern that the acquisition of WMDs by terrorists could gravely endanger global security and stability,

Considering the recommendation by the Ministerial Declaration of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the inclusion of Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring WMDs into the debate about universal disarmament,

Recognizing the potential of development to prevent terrorism by promoting safety, security and stability,

Stressing the necessity of global cooperation, as seen in the 1540 Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which requests states to share and report information on the topic,

Referring to the important outcome of the INTERPOL Counter-Smuggling Training held in Antalya, Turkey in December 2013, which led to the establishment of Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams that fight illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials and to the promotion of national and regional inter-agency cooperation,

Bearing in mind that a universal, non-discriminatory reduction of WMD stockpiles decreases the risk that terrorists acquire such weaponry,

Noting that WMD stockpiles around the globe might lack the necessary security to protect the weapons therein,

Conscious that terrorists might be able to produce WMDs from a wide variety of materials, many of which can be found in the private sector, and especially those of chemical and biological nature,

Acknowledging the necessity to eliminate terrorists funding in order to weaken their capabilities for terrorist attacks,

Affirming the perspectives put forward in the 2013 Plenary Meeting of the Financial Action Task Force in Oslo, Norway, which emphasize the importance of application and improvement of financial inclusion measures proven to effectively prevent money laundering and terrorist financing,
Viewing with appreciation the existing organizations devoted to preventing non-state proliferation of WMDs, especially the IAEA, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’ (UNODA) Safer Guard System, which strengthens security of stockpiles and assists in training personnel if requested and on a voluntary basis,

*Seeking* further cooperation of international organizations in order to increase their efficiency,

The General Assembly First Committee,

1. **Encourages** the issue of WMDs in the hands of terrorists be included as a part of the topic of general disarmament in the discussion on the Post-2015 Development Agenda;

2. **Proposes** to establish the Database for the Prevention of Terrorist Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (DPTAWMD) which will foster cooperation among the relevant international organizations via:
   
   a. A digital forum for mutual contributions about best practices and experiences through information sharing and open debate,
   
   b. Annual reports to the General Assembly on the progress of the information sharing,
   
   c. Suggestions for participating organizations made by the General Assembly and appointed by the Secretary General,
   
   d. Supervision and funding under the UNODA;

3. **Urges** states with strong counter-terrorism capacities to assist interested countries, developing countries in particular, both in their anti-proliferation efforts and in counter-terrorism capacity-building, and in detecting and identifying imminent terrorist threats through:
   
   a. Taking advantage of the data provided by DPTAWMD to disseminate the best practices, technological expertise, and scientific knowledge concerning WMDs, according to states’ own discretion and national security interests,
   
   b. Arranging regular bilateral briefings between interested governments, for the purpose of sharing relevant information regarding WMDs proliferation and imminent terrorist threats;

4. **Recommends** that all Member States share knowledge and experiences on the provision of security of WMD stockpiles in order to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs;

5. **Encourages** Member States to voluntarily seek to employ former weapons scientists in congruence with the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction through North-South initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in an effort to disincentivize the illegal proliferation of knowledge components and means of production of WMDs;

6. **Invites** all states to facilitate law enforcement-civilian dialogue on emerging terrorist threats in the community and to promote civilian compliance with anti-WMD trafficking, incorporating the perspectives of indigenous, female and marginalized populations;

7. **Welcomes** Member States to take part in financial inclusion measures as proposed by the Financial Action Taskforce, particularly those proven to effectively counter money laundering and terrorist financing;

8. **Encourages** all members to work on the conclusion of the verification protocol of the BWC;
9. *Suggests* the UNODA expands its Safer Guard System to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons stockpiles;

10. *Calls upon* CTITF to build capacity of companies that deal with chemical and biological materials, including standards for the sale of these materials and registration systems for non-state actors who buy these materials;

11. *Further recommends* continuation and expansion of Interpol Counter Nuclear-Smuggling Trainings, by:

   a. Expanding training in scope to include prevention of illegal trafficking of chemical and biological weapons,

   b. Focusing on best practices to secure WMD stockpiles, WMD materials, and related infrastructure,

   c. Holding regional trainings, with annual meetings of counter-smuggling task forces for information sharing and the forming of regional response plans in the event of breaches of WMD stockpiles or materials,

   d. Annually contributing to the Secretary General Reports, as requested by the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Reaffirming the necessity of preventing terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) currently in the hands of terrorists or in circulation between other non-state actors, as mentioned in the conclusions of the recently held Nuclear Security Summit,

Welcomes all efforts made by Member States, the United Nations (UN), and all organizations involved in the control and eradication of WMDs and the use of safely regulated nuclear energy,


Recalling all related measures for preventing terrorists from acquiring WMDs, particularly the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC),

Guided by “Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring WMDs” (A/RES/66/50), and “Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring WMDs,” (A/RES/68/164),

Affirming its commitment to the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which established legally binding obligations to establish and enforce measures and controls against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems,

Reaffirming the importance of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in September 2006 by the UN General Assembly,

Noting with deep concern the increasing number of states struggling with the rise of terrorism and their vulnerability to the creation of new terrorist organizations and inability to apply physical protection measures, such as border control and the monitoring and tracking of WMDs,

Being alarmed by the increasing prevalence of terrorist activities and growth in developing Member States as well as the rising number of global terrorist attacks, as sampled by the European continent and reported by Europol in 2012,

Concerned by the potential dangers emerging from stockpiles of fissile material,

Taking note of the consensus agreement to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ensure stronger physical protection of nuclear material,

Alarmed by the lack of standardized border control measures among Member States,

Acknowledging the crucial role played by non-governmental organizations and non-state actors,

Deeply convinced of the crucial role the exchange of information and technologies plays in the fight against terrorism,

Declaring the importance of implementing capacity-building measures in all Member States to increase their ability to counter the threat of terrorist’s acquisition of WMDs,
Recognizing the success of the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

Raising awareness of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as established by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and supported by the EU and Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, with the intention of deterring nuclear terrorism,

Recalling the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, initiated by the Commonwealth of Australia and the state of Japan to work towards strengthening and supporting disarmament around the world,

The General Assembly First Committee,

1. Reinforces the fundamental principle of state sovereignty, as defined in Article 2 as well as Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

2. Endorses all international efforts that have already been implemented by the accession and ratification of pre-existing resolutions;

3. Urges all Member States to increase measures to combat the illicit production of WMDs and their trade and transport by strengthening legislation and law enforcement;

4. Urges Member States to recognize the need for disarmament as a global security issue to prevent all forms of terrorism;

5. Encourages Member States to further develop an international network of knowledge and information sharing that helps building capacities to monitor and track all components necessary in the creation of WMD;


7. Recommends that all member states join the ITDB of the IAEA and also encourages that Member States sign and ratify already existing treaties and agreements on WMDs, such as the OPCW;

8. Recommends further strengthening cooperation between Member States and Non-Governmental Organizations as a link between all political levels and emphasizes the importance of their contributions to the dialogue;

9. Suggests willing Member States to assist each other in multilateral cooperation to ensure adequate capacity to deal with the threat of a WMD attack and to eradicate any terrorist organization within the borders of Member States around the world by:

   a. Raising awareness of the international and regional dangers of WMD use to discourage proliferation,

   b. Instigating intelligence exchange and co-operation on capacity building measures to counter the terrorist threat as well as increasing the tracking and monitoring capabilities in regard to WMDs and the protection of hazardous components from a technological perspective, using INTERPOL as a global platform with the assistance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate,

   c. Supplying the necessary training to develop Member States military and law enforcement personnel through an exchange process,

   d. Requesting willing Member States to offer military and law enforcement assistance to Member States in need, for the purpose of security and ensuring a high level of protection for a period of time decided upon by the Member States bilaterally,
e. Assisting Member States that are unable to protect their borders and thus their nuclear, biological or chemical resources that could be used in the production of WMD by encouraging other Member States to support the aforementioned Member States via monetary and instrumental means as well as best-practice sharing,

f. Offering aid in regards to the implementation of the aims of the CWC and BWC on a national level to ensure continuous ratification;

10. **Asks** the General Assembly Fifth Committee to encourage developed Member States to finance the implementation of capacity-building training programs in all Member States and particularly in countries where known terrorist organizations operate, which would improve their ability to respond to attacks from WMD through:

   a. The assistance of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Directorate with regards to allocating funding options,

   b. Contribution from public and private donors;

11. **Recommends** the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force as the coordinating UN body through which the international community is able to advise Member States for the creation of domestic response initiatives that are proportional, rapid and organized in the event of a terrorist attack involving the use of WMD by:

   a. Providing experts towards developing emergency response infrastructure including but not limited to;

      i. Alert all Member States of the event immediately according to the outlined standards in Article 5 Section 2 of the CPPNM to better publicize the event and track and secure the WMD as quickly as possible,

      ii. Formulate a common evacuation plan to ensure the relevant personnel of Member States, regions and the United Nations to be able to work together in the event of the detection of a WMD,

      iii. Gather regional forces for the purpose of quarantining the weapon,

   b. Recommending best practice methods to maintaining stability and social integrity in the aftermath of an attack,

   c. Encouraging Member States to appeal to regional groups to coordinate in the creation and implementation of these response plans,

   d. Inviting the United Nations Security Council to deliberate the option of involving UN Peacekeepers within the response plans,

   e. Drawing upon such models as Canada’s Building Resilience Against Terrorism Program, the South Asia Workshop on Non-State Actors and Weapons of Mass Destruction, and U.S Defense Department WMD response-training initiative currently ongoing in Kenya and Uganda;

12. **Calls upon** the Conference on Disarmament to further engage in the drafting of the fissile material cut-off treaty and to prohibit the production of fissile materials such as but not limited to, highly enriched uranium and plutonium and reducing existing stockpiles of fissile materials;

13. **Highly encourages** Member States to collaborate on the establishment of standardized border control measures to prevent the proliferation of WMDs as well as necessary components in development and production;
14. **Emphasizes** that South-South cooperation between Member States should be fostered on an unconditional level and in parallel with North-South cooperation to coordinate and standardize legislation and measures to prevent terrorist acquisition and the cross-border transport of WMDs;

15. **Strongly emphasizes** the importance of United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy to ensure Member States have a unified strategic framework and policy guidance on countering terrorism by:
   a. Highlighting the growing need to build a culture of dialogue and understanding among and between Member States as well as stakeholders such as NGOs to prevent terrorism,
   b. Establishing a symposium organized by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) in order to share knowledge, expertise and success in relation to border reinforcement,
   c. Encouraging neighboring countries to establish and reinforce border control measures that could meet international standards;

16. **Asks** the General Assembly Fifth Committee to encourage developed Member States to finance the implementation of capacity-building training programs in all Member States and particularly in countries where known terrorist organizations operate, which would improve their ability to respond to attacks and better contribute to the fight against terrorism through training and capacity-building, noting that this fund:
   a. Must be supervised by the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate,
   b. Must be used to strengthen measures to control the process of weapons production and trade, supervised by the General Assembly Fifth Committee,
   c. Encourages training in detecting, investigating and suppressing the financing of terrorism overseen by UNDP and UNODA,
   d. Endorses the further ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
   e. Can be accessed by countries only after having submitted their plans and measures on the matter to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research through a program similar to the Group of Governmental Experts on Education for Disarmament and Nonproliferation on the basis of proportional representation between the member States and having their acceptance.
Guided by the belief that the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether they be nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological, pose a grave threat to international peace and security,

Concerned by the threat that terrorism poses to global peace, security and stability,

Recalling the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2055 (2012), Security Council Resolution 1957 (2010), “Reducing Nuclear Danger” (A/RES/68/40), and “Women, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control” (A/RES/68/33), which all reaffirm the international community’s commitment to limit the proliferation of WMDs

Recalling Article 2 Section 7 of the United Nations (UN) Charter regarding equal sovereignty for all Member States as a founding principle of the organization,

Guided by Article 11 Section 1 of the UN Charter emphasizing the importance of the principles of disarmament and regulation of armaments in order to prevent risks of terrorist acquiring WMDs because the existent of stockpiles always presents the risk of non-state theft,

Condemning all non-state actors who are seeking to acquire and use WMDs, in line with Security Council Resolution 1456 (2004), which deplores acts of terrorism,

Drawing attention to the “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (A/RES/60/288) which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which monitors conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,

Alarmed by the risk of fissile and radiological materials falling into the hands of terrorist organizations,

Recognizing that the use of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) is a highly effective means towards limiting nuclear and radiological material which may be employed for nefarious uses,

Recalling the resolution titled the “Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in all its Aspects” (A/RES/3472) and its definition of NWFZ,

Noting with approval the many NWFZs such as the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, Treaty of Bangkok, Treaty of Pelindaba, and the Treaty of Tlateloco,

Welcoming calls for a NWFZ in the Middle East, as proposed in “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East” (A/RES/67/28),

Deeply conscious of the large amount of pre-existing materials that could be used in the construction of WMDs, including but not limited to dirty bombs, nuclear devices, biological agents, and chemical weapons,

Recognizing the need for cooperative and coordinated action with regard to efforts in the international community toward limiting terrorist access to biological, chemical, and nuclear WMDs,

Recalling the adoption of “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (A/RES/63/58), “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” (A/RES/63/60), and “Transparency in armaments” (A/RES/63/69) which promote fortification of domestic policies to prevent terrorist acquisition of WMDs and related materials,

Keeping in mind Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and its establishment of the 1540 Committee, which has been highly effective in preventing non-state actors for acquiring WMD as recognized by the multiple past Presidents of the Security Council previously in the Statement of the President of the Security Council S/PRS/2012/14 and S/PRS/2007/4,
Applauding the document of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 for its role in the fight against terrorism,

Stressing the need for increased cooperation and communication between the IAEA, OPCW, Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWCISU), and Member States,

Further recognizing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its revision made in the resolution “Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Transport Safety and Waste Management” (GC47/RES/7), as well as its Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), as two efficient measures for states to comply with in order to secure nuclear assets and prevent them from falling into harm’s way,

Reiterating the 2005 Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Report (MANFCR), which stresses ways in which the IAEA can more effectively enforce its statute, as well as the Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) in 2011, which summarizes the OPCW’s effectiveness in carrying out the CWC,

Having Studied the OPCW Annex on Implementation and Verification, specifically Parts IV(A), VI, and VII which address state-level approaches to combating chemical weapon use by terrorists,

Noting regretfully the interruption of negotiations on a binding verification protocol for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) in accordance with the “Special Conference of the State Parties to the BWC” (BWC/SPCONF/1),

Realizing that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with proper security is an excellent method for bolstering the electrical grids of many countries,

Further acknowledging the need to combat conditions that lead to humiliation, marginalization, and disempowerment which are likely conducive to making people susceptible to recruitment by terrorist networks,

Emphasizing the principle outlined in the UN Charter Article 26 that describes the benefits of education as a whole, such as understanding, tolerance and dialogue among nations, races and religions, for all people, thereby acting as an empowering preventative measure that diminishes conditions leading to humiliation, marginalization, and disempowerment.

Reaffirming Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and its efforts to halt the sources of financing via the freezing of assets and funds for terrorism,

The General Assembly First Committee,

1. Recommends establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East to promote peace and security in the region and to encourage other regions around the globe to do the same;

2. Urges Member States to prioritize and improve their efforts to better secure their fissile, radiological, biological and chemical materials, as well as their borders, in order to ensure global safety through collaborative efforts between states through an exchange of technological and experiential expertise such as Personnel Reliability Programs, Radiation Portal Monitors, Quick Response Codes, and Radio Frequency Identifications, and private contractors and training for local law enforcement including but not limited to border patrols, counter terrorism investigators, airport security and maritime transport security;

3. Encourages Member States to engage in important actions needed for the prevention of the proliferation and the acquisition of WMDs by terrorist groups, including:
a. Trade restrictions and border controls involving the trade of arms, as well as raw materials that can be utilized in the manufacturing of any of the three types of WMDs,

b. Monitoring of weapons development and categorizing raw materials into three categories, as has been done by the OPCW with chemical weaponry and materials, according to their possible involvement in the manufacturing process of arms;

4. Invites Member States to investigate the commonly used routes in illicit trade of WMDs to help Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force better prevent illegal transportation of these various dangerous substances;

5. Expresses its hope that Member States can work collaboratively to dispose of existing WMD materials in an equal and un-biased manner in accordance with state sovereignty for all Member States;

6. Calls upon Member States developing nuclear material, potentially dangerous chemicals, and conducting or holding hypothetically dangerous biological research to engage cooperatively with other knowledgeable entities such as but not limited to pre-existing nuclear states, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the BWCISU in order to exchange ideas, bolster progress, and work safely without the risk of terrorists acquiring WMD materials;

7. Urges Member States to limit terrorists’ access to the materials necessary for the creation of WMD by implementing the recommendations of the IAEA Expert Group’s findings on Multilateral Nuclear Approaches by:

a. Maintaining and strengthening, as necessary, the existing mechanisms in the public industrial market for nuclear material designed to secure the trade of such materials between States which may include long-term contracts and transparent suppliers’ arrangements with government backing...fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, and commercial fuel banks,

b. Including the IAEA in the implementation and development of international supply, and safe access to, technologies and materials as well as designating the organization as fuel bank administrator and the backer of other such services,

c. Inviting NPT nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as non-NPT states party, to take part in confidence-building measures, including the voluntary transformation of existing nuclear facilities into multilateral nuclear facilities,

d. Encouraging contracts and agreements between states designed to promote regional and multilateral approaches for new jointly-owned and co-managed facilities to deal with tasks including, but not limited to “uranium enrichment, fuel reprocessing, disposal and storage of spent fuel (and combinations thereof)...[and] integrated nuclear power parks,” as stated in the Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Report,

e. Including the IAEA in future regional or continental nuclear energy agreements in order to protect the process of developing nuclear material and energy;

8. Urges Member States in the process of nuclear armament to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with weapon disarmament, and calls for development incentives for Member States without WMDs through regional groups to facilitate the development implementation and coordination between agencies and Member States of the region, in addition to the gathering and sharing of information and intelligence to the IAEA and UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, among others;

9. Further suggests that economic incentives be provided by willing and able Member States, as well as relevant NGOs, directed towards Member States who take measurable action to address the prevention of terrorists from
acquiring WMDs, particularly those in areas with a high occurrence of terrorism, engaging actions such as, but not limited to:

- The implementation of penalizing national legislation of significant severity to deter potential terrorists from acquiring WMDs if such laws do not already exist,

- Routine reporting of such legislation and enforcement to the OPCW including, if desired, requesting assistance from the Secretariat, National Authority, or fellow Member States in the preparation of said laws and regulations to be implemented,

- Measures implemented in order to further secure facilities which handle Schedule 1 materials and hold them more accountable,

- Consideration of the adoption of measures to provide increased physical protection for chemical plants and storage facilities holding toxic materials in order to minimize the possibility of the attacks and utilization of such toxic materials by terrorist groups;

10. Proposes the establishment of an annual cooperative meeting between the IAEA, OPCW, and BWCISU to encourage the spirit of cooperation and collaboration by:

- Streamlining consideration of crucial matters, as determined by the concerned parties, to the appropriate organizations regarding the materials of WMDs in an effort to better address any issues of WMDs,

- Facilitating communication between the aforementioned organizations, while maintaining privacy regarding the specifics of possibly sensitive information in regard to national and international security,

- Sharing best methods and practices, exchanging Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs), and information on national legislation to better detect, standardize, regulate, and dispose of WMD materials by Member States,

- Managing raw materials of both biological and chemical weapons natures that can be weaponized to prevent their misuse, as well as establishing new and better international norms to fight the illicit trade involving these materials,

- Submitting a report to the General Assembly detailing its needs and the efforts undertaken following a probationary period of eighteen months, and every two years thereafter;

11. Further invites this new cooperative meeting to develop and refine training curricula for the personnel of the IAEA, OPCW, and BWCISU, respectively in order to increase the cooperation between these organizations and Member States;

12. Calls for the renewal of discussions regarding the conclusion of a verification protocol for the BWC during the upcoming Eighth Review Conference in 2016 in order to improve the full implementation of the Convention and thereby preventing terrorist groups from acquiring such biological WMDs;

13. Urges the international community, mostly volunteer developed Member States and UN specialized agencies such as UNESCO, to participate in the financing of the educational and development programs in developing countries to diminish the impact of marginalizing, humiliating and disempowering conditions so as to limit the susceptibility of people to terrorist recruitment;

14. Suggests strong improvement in the educational systems of willing Member States, for the reason that most terrorist groups can emerge from such areas, through:
a. Building public schools in developing countries, in countries in need, and in countries suffering most from illiteracy,

b. Overhauling the educational system by the countries themselves, with help of the international community, if need be,

c. Providing instructors, teachers and volunteers from developed nations to aid in the improvement of the system to reach progress in education of the new generation via increased attention, support and funding of UN specialized agencies such as UNESCO;

15. **Invites** Member States to prevent terrorists from moving between countries, obtaining weapons, and receiving financial aid of any form as called for in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 by:

a. Encouraging Member States to increase national anti-terrorism finance measures, such as addressing the sources of funding for such terrorist groups engaging in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, corruption and other lapses in transparency,

b. Enhancing interstate cooperation to fight transnational terrorism,

c. Promoting bilateral and multilateral partnership by providing surveillance mechanisms aimed at securing ports of entry including but not limited sea ports, air transit, rail, and roads;

16. **Further recommends** that the international community coordinates a cooperation with financial organizations and INTERPOL to supervise and report suspicious transactions and freeze assets of terrorists if detected.
Acknowledging the extremely dangerous and inherently unstable nature of biological weapons and the urgent threat they would pose to member states if they were obtained by non-state actors,

Reiterating Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003), which reaffirms that states should take any and all measures in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ensuring that states follow international and domestic laws in convicting those who participate in illegal activities,

Acknowledging the success of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Declaration Advisor, created in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) Article VI, in helping track chemical weapons and their components, as well as the inspections of facilities containing these,

Noting with satisfaction the success of the CWC’s scheduling system in establishing safety measures and close monitoring of chemical weapon components based on the danger of each schedule,

Alarmed by the lack of an organization focused exclusively on maintaining the implementation of and adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC),

Recognizing the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties that meets annually to discuss the BWC,

Concerned by the limited scope of the Implementation Support Unit for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWCISU), which at present includes only transparency measures,

Bearing in mind the need for the expansion of the BWCISU to include implementation and enforcement,

Guided by the Train the Trainer program of the Caribbean Community, which provides uniform training for regional government officials,

Recognizing the important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the OPCW in monitoring weapons of mass destruction and preventing them from falling into non-state actor’s hands,

Having examined the existing framework for biocontainment facility biosafety and biosecurity procedures, as well as the protocols for combating biological agent outbreaks established in the 2004 Third Edition Manual of the World Health Organization (WHO),

Deeply concerned by the lack of adherence to the WHO’s 2004 Third Edition Manual on Biosafety on behalf of private and public sector entities in regards to the proliferation and transport of hazardous biological and bacteriological substances for purposes pertaining to research and experimentation,

Further recognizing the success of the incentivized peaceful technology-sharing used by the IAEA in order to support ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all its aspects,

Recognizing that non-state actors will be unable to obtain and employ biological agents as weapons of mass destruction if these biological agents are kept extremely secure,

Expressing its appreciation for the successful efforts of the UN Security Council 1540 Committee in addressing proliferation of WMD, as they pertain to prevention of non-state actors from procuring WMDs,

Emphasizing the importance of the WHO’s 2006 Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance document,
Reaffirming the IAEA’s mechanisms for reporting and monitoring nuclear containment facilities, such as the Department of Safeguard’s preventive measures for early identification of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, Recognizing the importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring any and all forms of WMD, including biological and chemical weapons, Remembering Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and increased inter-state cooperation on fighting terrorism and sharing of information in order to prevent terrorist acts from occurring, Bearing in mind border security and transportation verification using end user certificates is crucial to maintaining state and international safety by providing secure borders and ports of entry as well as keeping illicit biological materials out of their territory, Reaffirming “Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction” (A/RES/68/41), which focuses on preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD through strengthening national measures and work through the United Nations as well as other regional organizations, Fully aware of the diverse nature of biological agents and the significantly different protocols to address safety, disposal, and management of each type, Acknowledging steps that have already been taken to address the importance of safeguarding both chemical and biological weapons by creating verification bodies to oversee the dismantling of existing chemical and biological weapons, in the CWC and BWC, respectively, Bearing in mind the ongoing need to secure states borders in order to prevent the illicit trafficking of WMD materials, Noting the importance of taking all measures possible to keep humankind and the international community as a whole secure, Appreciating the work of the international organizations on this issue, including Interpol and its Operation Fail Safe, which deals with smuggling of WMD material and supports international law enforcement, Viewing with appreciation the United Nations Organization on Disarmament’s (UNODA), current and continuing efforts of the BWC to address the proliferation of biological agents, such as the review conferences of the BWC, The General Assembly First Committee, 1. Recommends the drafting of a resolution by the Security Council designed to enhance the BWC include a Class System, similar to the Scheduling System of the CWC, which:
  a. Classifies agents in accordance with their biological agent Risk Factor group established by the WHO’s 2004 Third Edition Manual,
  b. Establishes facility security measures based on the toxicity and danger of the biological agent classification, in concurrence with the respective biosafety levels defined by the WHO’s Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance document of 2006, to aid in the prevention of access to these materials by non-state actors and individuals,
  c. Assists in tracking the flow of materials used for potentially hazardous bioengineering via close monitoring of the number and location of each Class System, as seen with the Scheduling System of the CWC;
2. **Suggests** the expansion of the BWC to watch over biological components to provide a service of early detection of the possibility of non-state actors obtaining biological weapons, in a system that mimics the OPCW’s Assistance and Protection Detection System;

3. **Recommends** that the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention expand the BWCISU to include:
   a. The selection of impartial United Nations representatives from the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to function as the inspectors for both the short-notice inspections and scheduled inspections,
   b. A voluntary review body to inspect security measures for biological agents’ storage sites, for the purpose of advancing biosafety and biosecurity framework infrastructures, based off of the OPCW’s Assistance and Protection inspection system, in which:
      i. Facilities of states party to the BWC will be inspected on a voluntary basis by the review body, and inspection reports will be presented to the BWCISU,
      ii. The BWCISU will oversee this voluntary review body,
   c. Short-notice voluntary inspections in exchange for shared practices for governmental research purposes;

4. **Suggests** the creation of regional sub-units to facilitate communication and cooperation between neighboring states, under the direct administration of the BWCISU, which will:
   a. Operate under the supervision of the BWCISU and with the mandate of promoting the direct communication of pertinent information from the BWCISU to Member States in regional bodies, so as to facilitate more streamlined communication and implementation of procedures while tailoring the dissemination of information, technology, and resources more specific to the needs of the respective regions,
   b. Meet annually in the six months before Review Conferences with the same respective timeline status and the overarching review as the BWCISU,
   c. Consist of a voluntary membership from all Member States within the designated region, which will mirror those regions already identified by the UN,
   d. Be chaired by a representative nominated by participating regional Member States, and serving on a five-year rotation, upon the adoption of time-frame extension by said Member States,
   e. Submit annual reports on developments for progression, action, and implementation achievements of states within the regional unit,
   f. Request that Member States provide intelligence pertaining to biological and toxin WMD proliferation to other participating Member States;

5. **Further Recommends** that the expansion of the BWCISU’s Confidence Building Measures sector include a Declaration Advisor, modeled after the OPCW’s Declaration Advisor, in order to increase cooperation between all nations, that:
   a. Unifies international and regional policy as it pertains to biosafety and biosecurity infrastructure,
   b. Operates in cooperation with all public and private sector entities to mitigate the risk of proliferation of hazardous materials by hostile state and non-state actors,
c. Aids in the establishment of Best Practice Guidelines relating to the response to a biological or toxicological attack or accidental release into the environment so as to provide Member States with the informational capacity to facilitate immediate and substantive action,

d. Ensures the regions in which biocontainment and biolaboratory facilities are located maintain a proper status of safety, security, and defense infrastructure so as to protect sensitive facility, property, and information from theft and acquisition by hostile non-state actors in addition to establishing pre-emptive measures to securely transfer hazardous material out of areas that are politically volatile in nature or are in the midst of a rapidly deteriorating situation in terms of civil disorder or open warfare;

6. **Welcomes** the BWCISU to implement a tracking mechanism for legal shipments, both international and domestic, of biological organisms similar to the Kimberley Process, which worked to track the transnational movement of illicit diamonds during the Sierra Leone civil war, by implementing:

   a. End-user certificates that are issued at the place of origin and destination in order to ensure that weapons are not diverted during transportation,

   b. Training for port authorities and other transit officials to work with biological organisms when shipping and receiving them in order have a streamlined, safe shipping and receiving process,

   c. Training for local authorities on how to recognize illegal trading of biological organisms;

7. **Recommends** that the BWCISU further the regulation of specific biological substances and materials, and to establish an international framework to prohibit non-state actor acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee;

8. **Requests** that Member States comply with the registration, verification, identification, and reporting of the geographical locations of all existing storage facilities for biological agents, run by the BWCISU in a similar practice to the IAEA’s reporting system of nuclear containment facilities;

9. **Suggests** that the BWCISU be funded by Member States of the BWC, all of whom should pay their dues based off of a model from the OPCW’s modified scale of assessments;

10. **Affirms** that the BWC and the proposed international regulatory agency of the BWCISU will be a forum of communication and discussion with regards to Member State inquiries as they pertain to the proliferation of biological and toxin agents in addition to non-state actor acquisition of such weapons;

11. **Suggests** that all biocontainment facilities adhere to the WHO’s 2004 Third Edition Manual on biosafety and biosecurity so as to establish adequate procedures regarding facility and laboratory functions and operations;

12. **Encourages** all states not currently party to the BWC to ratify the BWC and fully implement its goals in their state’s domestic policy, thereby aiding in the promotion and implementation of the aforementioned resolution;

13. **Urges** the United Nations Organization on Disarmament (UNODA) to continue their efforts on compliance with the BWC;

14. **Calls upon** Member States to continue their efforts to secure and safely use biological organisms going forward and to make this a matter of annual discussion.
Acknowledging the importance of the first worldwide joint customs operation, Operation Atlas, that targeted money laundering across borders that seized 3.5 million US dollars with the help of 70 participating states,

Viewing with appreciation that the Brazilian Anti-Money Laundering Laboratories (Lab-LD) program has successfully identified money laundering risk in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors through techniques such as joint operations with private sector banks to identify abnormal banking actions,

Taking note that past accomplishments of the UNODC’s Global Programme Against Money Laundering and further noting that incentives are need to encourage Member States to partake in costly anti-money laundering initiatives,

Expressing satisfaction with the success of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which has been expanded to eighty-five Member States,

Reiterating the importance of public education in assimilating traditionally marginalized groups to alleviate the perceived need to resort to terrorist tactics,

Having considered that the link between WMDs and their ramifications for both the preservation of the environment and the peace and security of the citizens of every Member State is prioritized in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),

Taking into consideration the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) guidelines, whose Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Financial Terrorism policy offers forty recommendations that analyzes the severity of money laundering issues amongst Member States, as well as nine recommendations that are specific to money laundering amongst terrorist organizations,

Noting with satisfaction the authority and successes of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and its Law Enforcement, Organized Crime and Anti-Money-Laundering Unit,

Observing the lack of oversight policies in the UNODC to provide identification and management of dual-use materials that serve for both energy and weaponry purpose,

Taking into account that regional agreements, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Bangkok have been effective tools for forming lasting agreements on peace and security issues by establishing fully de-nuclearized regions,

Recognizing the challenge facing regional organizations to train officials to protect Member States from non-state actors (NSA) and the program addressing this challenge such as the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Strengthening Strategies on Emerging Terrorist Threats,

Recalling “Measures to Prevent Terrorists From Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction” (A/RES/67/44) that requests Member States to submit a report on measures already taken by international organizations to the Secretary-General,

Bearing in mind the importance of the 1540 Committee to help Member States understand the persuasive and complex regulatory legislation involved in its mandate to stop the spreading of WMDs,

Welcoming initiative such as Partnerships for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), designed to combat terrorism by focusing on capacity and capability building of Member States by expanding border security, focusing on enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation of security organizations, and by using national law enforcement and military,
Further recalling Security Council Resolution 2129 (2013) which encourages Member States to facilitate information and communication technologies to prevent terrorism through education,

Having considered further Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000), Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002), and other subsequent resolutions and reports regarding the establishment and sanctions regarding active and recognized terrorists and violent NSA,

Aware of the need for regional organizations and Member States to implement regional and national legislations targeting terrorism and to utilize experts such as the Global Center on Cooperative Security,

Guided by the efforts of the 1540 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee based on Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technologies to non-state actors,

Remembering Article VI in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which states that all states party to the treaty must pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on measures for nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Fully aware of the link between WMD and their ramifications for both the integrity of the environment and the peace and security of the citizens of every Member State becomes more evident,

Welcoming the work of the Emerging Technologies and High-End Threats Project of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), specifically exploring new advancements in science and technology in regards to new weapons and their potential to be a WMD,

Recognizing the Secretary-General's Five-Point Plan that recommends multilateral negotiations as an effective means to make progress towards nuclear disarmament:

Acknowledges the work done by the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTCED) on providing dialogue between Member States to combat terrorism;

The General Assembly First Committee,

1. Calls for the mirroring of the current INTERPOL program Operation Atlas to be included in the 1540 Committee in order to promote best practice sharing for customs agents to detect vast amounts of currency being smuggled across Member States borders;

2. Urges the Financial Action Taskforce (FAFT) of the G8 to empower domestic law enforcement agencies through adopting the Brazilian program Anti-Money Laundering Laboratories which trains law enforcement agencies to detect money laundering and report it to relevant international organizations such as INTERPOL;

3. Recommends the creation of incentive measures to promote compliance with Member States to UNODC initiatives by:
   a. Advising the UNODC to reallocate assets from their Crime Fund, under Special Purpose Funding of the Law Enforcement, Organized Crime and Anti-Money-Laundering Unit to be used specifically for anti-money-laundering measures,
   b. Providing Member States who have utilized UNODC actions plans and have displayed a decrease in money laundering operations a preferential access to funds,
   c. Advising that the CTC promotes best practice sharing by annually acknowledging an individual Member State who displays excellence in compliance with the standards set by the CTC,
d. Affirming the importance states participating in international cooperation and information sharing in combating terrorism through INTERPOL’s CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Program;

4. Encourages all Member States to join in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to decrease the threat of nuclear material falling into the hands of extremist groups;

5. Recommends that the IAEA expands upon its NUCLEUS database to include an online list of the identification and description of such materials and in which regions they are mainly concentrated;

6. Calls upon all Member States to implement national action plans to eliminate money laundering and its effects on the sustenance of terrorist groups by:
   a. Following and implementing the 40 + IX special recommendations of the FATF,
   b. Create laws for the seizure of illegal funds, to be reallocated toward anti-money-laundering efforts,
   c. Designate a national body that will act as a liaison with international organizations combating money laundering, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and UNODC;

7. Reaffirms its support to the work of International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) on the following aspects:
   a. Encouraging the recognition of differences and diversity of peoples in the world within public education,
   b. Stating the recognition of the right of states to maintain their sovereignty and individuality;

8. Further encouraging a closer cooperation among UN agencies which already exist, including but not limited to UNODA, OPCW and IAEA, by increasing communication and information sharing in order to achieve more transparency and efficiency;

9. Invites multilateral and bilateral cooperation of Member States as an effective way to share best practice methods related to law enforcement techniques to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs and recommends that the FATF achieve this through an international initiative;

10. Suggests enhancing the communication between UN bodies, such as the IAEA and UNODC, national law enforcement, intelligence agencies and monitoring forces to facilitate cooperation and transparency in financial oversight bodies that deal with the intricacies of money laundering as well as introducing a minimum standard level of information that would be shared among all states in order to prevent the trafficking of funds by terrorist organizations as outlined by INTERPOL;

11. Encourages the enhancement of the UNODC to implement oversight measures that distinguish materials that act dually as safe contributions to international society and components of WMDs, which will:
   a. Advise the IAEA to expand its’ NUCLEUS database system to include an online list of the identification and description of such materials and in which regions they are most concentrated,
   b. Allow Member States to request recommendations from the UNODC and similar international organizations if they fear for their security and require information on how to best regulate the use of WMD materials,
   c. Create national program to investigate any outgoing freight with alleged WMD paraphernalia and materials capable of weaponization, and if need be share information with other concerned national authorities,
12. **Calls for** the expansion of nuclear weapons free zone treaties to include more categories of CBRN weapons at a regional and international level, modeled after the Treaties for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that have already been successful in establishing nuclear weapon free zones;

13. **Encourages** regional organizations to adopt methods similar to the OAS Strengthening Strategies on Emerging Terrorist Threats program, which will allow for officials to be prepared for a variety of terrorism;

14. **Recommends** all Member States submit reports to the 1540 Committee to improve capacity building based on their own national measures already taken in dealing with the threat of terrorists acquiring WMDs, consisting of a classification of all national disarmament agencies and their accomplishments; legislation and regulations concerning disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control, preventing terrorists and other criminals from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; all timetables and available budgets, seen as financial constraints may influence measures that should be taken in order to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs, and a listing of all institutional support structures; In order to achieve this, each Member State should also submit a yearly report over the situation of the existing stockpiles within their borders through possible programs including the Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RARS);

15. **Calls upon** Member States to further develop educational and capacity building programs, using successful initiatives such as the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) as examples to build their counter-terrorism capacity building, counter violent extremism and promote civility, and prevent the proliferation of WMD;

16. **Further encourages** North-South cooperation between developed and least developed States in increasing capacity to combat terrorism and border security through programs such as the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARS) in which developed states aid in the training of Least Developed States’ security forces;

17. **Suggests** the expansion of the 1267 Committee's terrorist list in order to create a dialogue between Member States for the identification and prevention of terrorists acquiring WMD’s, under the approval and oversight of the CTC and 1540 Committee to take into account relevant international agencies and regional organizations terrorist watch list; accept submissions from concerned Member States for the list; annually review the list for purpose to maintain status of selected groups on the list or seek removal of listed groups; and coordinate with the ICC as a legal outlet to which selected groups can seek a process from the list;

18. **Suggests** that Member States and their regional organizations work with the Global Center on Cooperative Security, a non-profit NGO that assists in multilateral security as well as responsive, fair, and accessible justice and security systems to counter-terrorism;

19. **Endorses** the establishment of national measures based on international guidelines such as those stated in the IAEA and the OPCW Mandate to both reduce the amount of the raw materials available to produce WMDs and to increase the security around wastes that can be used to create a CBRN, thus ensuring that nuclear and chemical waste can be used for peaceful energy or scientific purposes;

20. **Recommends** the international community to collaborate with and incorporate the goals of the IATG’s SaferGuard Programme;

21. **Suggests** that Member States work to incorporate a program similar to that of the FAS for the purpose of expanding the definition of WMD;

22. **Recommends** the CTC and the CTED investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of terrorist rehabilitation centers and the potential societal benefits of these centers.
Deeply concerned with the threat to international peace and security that the acquisition and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist organizations and other non-state actors poses to all Member States; recalling General Assembly resolution “Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction” (A/RES/68/41) and desiring to continue the work of General Assembly resolution “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (A/RES/60/288) in partnership with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force,

Reaffirming the necessity of commitment of Member States to address the threat of terrorist acquisition of WMD through new, integrative and international approaches,

Acknowledging the particular risk for acquisition and misappropriation of WMD, dual-use fissile materials, biological agents, and other dangerous materials during transportation, and urging for the strengthening of border controls and training programs,

Noting with satisfaction the existing training programs within INTERPOL dealing with border protection, and advocating for their re-evaluation and expansion,

Noting with concern the gaps in training programs of sharing best practices between inspectors to expedite detection of WMD and dual-use materials that can be used to create WMD,

Recognizing the continued success and implementation of existing regional mechanisms aimed towards eliminating terrorist and non-state actor use of WMD and strengthening regional cooperation and information sharing, such as ASEAN’s Convention on Counter Terrorism, NATO’s Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Task Force, and the European Union EEAS (European External Action Service),

Guided by Security Council Resolution 1540, that calls for the development and enforcement of regulatory measures relative to the non-proliferation of biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons, as well as the submission of reports from all Member States, and the important role in the prevention of terrorist acquisition of WMDs,

Recognizing the need to increase dialogue through the Conference on Disarmament on the issues of nonproliferation and prevention of terrorist acquisition of WMD, and emphasizing the importance of every region having a voice in the matter,

Stressing the continued use of information channels and international cooperation regarding nonproliferation and border control and advocating the use of international initiatives as blueprints for national and regional efforts,

Commending the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons as well as the World Health Organization (WHO) and INTERPOL’s CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Program,

Emphasizing the importance of the contributions of the 2005 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in their efforts to reduce the use of WMD, in proposing measures to control the proliferation and exchange of all types of WMD, and in prevent the acquisition of such weapons by terrorists and other non-state actors,

Having examined existing national and international programs and mechanisms for the protocols regarding discoveries of terrorist organizations in possession of WMD stockpiles and wishing to acknowledge and expand upon them,

Recognizing the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the mandates of the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force as models for the creation of an international convention to prevent terrorist organizations and other non-state actors from acquiring any and all types of WMDs and the materials and components necessary to produce WMD,
The General Assembly First Committee,

1. **Calls** for the expansion of the mandate of the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorists facilitated by the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), through the establishment of an international, non-binding document to be called the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist and Non-State Actor Acquisition of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction (ICST);

2. **Further calls** for the ICST to increase international standards for border controls by strengthening the security of imports and exports of dual-use fissile materials and biological agents through expanding existing international and regional training programs, such as those conducted by INTERPOL, so as to assist Member States’ capacity to regulate hazardous materials and existing WMD stockpile, and to criminalize non-state use of WMDs;

3. **Encourages the use of INTERPOL’s Counter Nuclear Smuggling Training,** a program which works to train and develop teams to fight illicit trafficking and black market trade of materials used to create WMD, wherein the ICST would expand upon them by:
   a. Implementing a broader training program that will include all nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological WMDs and materials used in the creation of such weapons,
   b. Including customs and border agents and other law enforcement officials, UN regulatory agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and government officials to increase border controls between Member States to combat illicit trade networks modeled on existing programs,
   c. Using the expertise of individuals with specialized knowledge of WMD, specifically dual-use fissile materials for both industrialized and weaponry capabilities to train customs and border agents and other law enforcement officials;

4. **Endorses** the need for continued national and international efforts in monitoring illegal trade by working through existing agencies and organizations in conducting detailed division of control and monitoring borders and trade networks in individual countries by:
   a. Assigning national authorities to be responsible for controlling and monitoring the movement of WMD and related materials in the form of imports and exports,
   b. Providing technological assistance and best practice methods to all Member States in regard to the import and export of WMD and their materials;

5. **Recommends** the creation of subsidiary bodies and conventions in UN agencies partnering with the CTITF and other international organizations dealing specifically with prevention of terrorist or non-state actor acquisition of WMD that will allow the further implementation of ICST training programs, following the examples of bilateral and regional initiatives such as:
   a. The ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, which deals with the facilitation of information between regional Member States and judicial proceedings of terrorists or smugglers taken into custody,
   b. NATO’s Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Task Force which aims to address the universal treaty of CBRNE weapons of mass destruction,
   c. The European Union EEAS (European External Action Service), which implements projects for the European region concerning non-proliferation, disarmament and export control of all types of weapons, including WMD;
6. **Urges** the Conference on Disarmament to consider creating a sub-committee named the Committee on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to Non-State Actors (NOPWA) to work in conjunction with the mandate of the CTITF and the ICST, which will:

   a. Meet in Geneva every 18 months,

   b. Be composed of delegations made up of two delegates comprised from:

      i. Eighteen experts nominated from each of the geographical regions in the United Nations geoscheme and elected by the United Nations General Assembly First Committee for a term of eighteen months,

      ii. One representative from each of the geographical regions in the United Nations geoscheme, elected by the United Nations General Assembly for a term of eighteen months;

   c. Include in its mandate:

      i. A list of materials that will be considered integral to manufacture Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs),

      ii. The implementation of safeguards for WMD-useful material in cooperation with the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),

      iii. The investigation of creating a coordinated tracking system for the movements of materials that could be used to create WMDs using technology such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID);

7. **Further encourages** NOPWA to provide the Conference on Disarmament with reports every eighteen months on its work and the status of the possibility of terrorists acquiring WMDs;

8. **Emphasizes** the utilization of information-sharing platforms regarding non-proliferation and border control among Member States by measures such as:

   a. Encouraging the assigned national authorities to promote the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on nuclear safety and the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, which provides Member States with technical blueprints for their own national frameworks for nuclear safety and security;

9. **Urges** the cooperation of Member States with the ICST supporting all Member States vulnerable to terrorist activity, with the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 by building upon existing mechanisms to control WMDs and implement national and international counter-terrorism strategies such as:

   a. The State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCSU) partnership with the USA’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on the institutionalization of Commodity Identification Training (CIT),

   b. The Costa Rica-Panama Binational Border Security Commission which aims to secure the borders between both countries from possible terrorist threats,

   c. The Montenegrin-Albanian Cross-Border Programme on cross-border cooperation regarding not only WMDs but also social and economic matters;
10. **Encourages** the renewal of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in the spirit of the expanded mandate of the CTITF, and calls for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission to subsequently submit a report every five years to the Secretary-General on:

a. Member State compliance with the ICST and the success of ICST training programs,

b. State of security of Member States and status of any current threats of terrorist or non-state actor acquisition of WMD,

c. Further measures to increase border controls and combat illicit trade;

11. **Promotes** the continued use of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and INTERPOL’s CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Program, and moves for the use of these the systems in matters of handling protocols for discoveries of terrorist organizations or non-state actors in the possession of WMD or WMD stockpiles;

12. **Calls upon** all Member States to ratify existing treaties and conventions pertaining to WMDs, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, the International Convention to Suppress Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the ICS;

13. **Further reminds** all Member States to continue support for international and regional cooperation initiatives and on the matter of measures to prevent acquisition of WMD by terrorist organizations or non-state actors.