National Model United Nations

Week B

March 24 – March 28, 2013

International Atomic Energy Agency

Documentation
Committee Staff

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Agenda

1. The Nuclear Situation in North Korea
2. Improving Global Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Crisis Situations

Resolutions adopted by the committee

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International Atomic Energy Agency Summary Report

The International Atomic Energy Agency held its annual session to consider the following agenda items: The Nuclear Situation in North Korea; Improving Global Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Crisis Situations; and Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards and the International Nuclear Security Framework.

The session was attended by representatives of 133 Member States and 1 Observer. The session opened with several statements concerning the adoption of the agenda. Within the first session, the body adopted its provisional agenda in the order of 1, 2, 3, beginning with consideration of “The Nuclear Situation in North Korea.”

The second day, consisting of two committee sessions, began with the body splitting into Working Groups focused on the core issues under this important topic. Much of the discussion was split between demanding stronger, stricter sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the other in favor of building incentives for the DPRK to return to the dialogue. Some of the key themes which arose included: the importance of restructuring the Six-Party Talks and improving diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Member States. Many delegates had submitted at least a first draft of their working paper by the end of the evening covering a range of solutions.

The third day, which consisted of three long committee sessions, saw the submission of 19 working papers, which in turn prompted calls for collaboration in order to merge similar ideas into fewer papers. As this process continued, new working papers and proposals were submitted. By the 2:00 p.m. deadline of new submissions, the dais had received 21 working papers. Several delegates mentioned the importance of incentivizing the denuclearization process.

The fourth and final day saw many subsequent submissions of the merged working papers. The morning session resulted in the approval of thirteen draft resolutions. As delegates continued to work and discuss their proposed draft resolutions, the dais approved six amendments, with only one of the amendments were unfriendly, demonstrating the consensus that was generally reached in the body about the topic. A total of nine out of thirteen papers were passed as resolutions during the voting procedure.

The resolutions passed covered a wide range of solutions, including the reestablishment of the Six-Party talks under the premise of an impartial mediator, the collaboration with other regional bodies in bringing the DPRK back into compliance with IAEA Safeguards Agreements. Several other resolutions addressed the reduction of sanctions as a potential method of incentivizing the DPRK to recommence its participation in the IAEA and the NPT. The committee, as a whole, showed dedication towards the reintegration of the DPRK into the international non-proliferation regime by proposing solutions that could be mutually agreed upon by the DPRK and the international community.
Recalling the basic principles stated within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute and the fundamental principle of state sovereignty,

Reiterating the importance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) adopting these measures through its own initiative, rather than through methods of force or coercion and keeping in mind that a collaborative effort is key for universal benefit in terms of safety and security from nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the need to lessen harsh rhetoric, calm tensions, and reopen diplomatic communications with the DPRK,

Deeply conscious of the threat that an unsupervised nuclear program in the DPRK poses to the international community as framed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and extended by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1977 (2011), which address the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials to non-state actors,

Emphasizing the role of the global community in preventing the escalation of conflict as addressed in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1874 (2009), 1718 (2006), and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 6756 (2013),

Observing the ease of withdrawal by any country from the NPT, which contributed to the escalation of the situation in the DPRK, as recognized in Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006) which expressed concern over the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT,

Bearing in mind the tendency of the DPRK to ignore warnings and sanctions from the global community,

Noting with regret the apparent ineffectiveness of sanctions on deterring the development of a nuclear weapons program in the DPRK,

Further noting that the events within the DPRK are further proof of the need for nuclear weapons free zones within an equitable global initiative;

Keeping in mind that a successful resolution of the situation in the DPRK would serve as an example for future development of peaceful nuclear energy programs in other parts of the world,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) Recommends the establishment of the Summit of Fourteen Talks (S.O.F.T.), which would:

   a. Be comprised of two parallel conferences of seven delegates each with the mandate to address the nuclear situation in the DPRK and advocate for the
departure from programs of weaponization of nuclear technology, by facilitating
dialogue between the DPRK and the international community;

b. Include representatives from the Korean Peninsula region, the various regions of
the world, including regional organizations, Member States with developed and
developing nuclear energy programs, and emphasizing Member States with
previous experience in denuclearization and Member States from nuclear
weapons free zones;

c. Establish the capacity for these parties to set, maintain and implement an agenda
which advances their goals;

d. Further invites the DPRK to introduce issues they wish to discuss in the S.O.F.T.
talks;

2) **Recommends** that, in the event that the DPRK has shown good faith efforts to rejoin the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the IAEA Board of Governors submits
recommendations to the relevant bodies, including the United Nations Security Council,
to progressively ease sanctions on information sharing, allowing the international
community to assist the DPRK in developing peaceful energy programs that cannot be
weaponized;

3) **Calls for** a benchmark incentive system wherein certain incentives will be granted to the
DPRK upon the compliance with global goals for peaceful nuclear cooperation, the
mandate of the IAEA, and the outcome of the S.O.F.T. talks, to include:

a. The removal of the sanctions on luxury goods and unfreezing of DPRK assets,
contingent upon the DPRK rejoining the IAEA as a voting member and
complying with all IAEA safeguards agreements;

b. The implementation of agricultural, infrastructural and medical technological aid
contingent on the DPRK’s willingness to attend the neutral S.O.F.T. talks;

c. The promotion of support of Member States for the opening of the Kaesong
Industrial Region in the DPRK and establishing standards of operation for foreign
companies that would invest in the region to foster economic growth in the
DPRK, contingent upon the willingness to accept new nuclear technology for
sustainable peaceful purposes, and the cessation of a nuclear weapons program;

d. Further benchmarks for the reintegration of the DPRK with the international
community which can be developed in consultation with the Member States
present at S.O.F.T. talks;

4) **Recommends** the reevaluation of the process by which signatories to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty withdraw in order to create a more effective and politically viable
means of addressing nuclear problems in the international community;
5) **Urges** the DPRK to abide with the incentive program as stated above in order to establish more positive relations with the global community at large, with the end goal being a safe and efficient nuclear program;

6) **Decides** to remain seized of the matter, and to include the item in the agenda for its fifty-eighth (2014) regular session.
Recalling General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/14 and previous resolutions and reports by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),

Further Recalling United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013), which provide for comprehensive sanctions,

Alarmed by refusal of the DPRK to abide by existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Security Council protocol, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) and corresponding IAEA safeguards agreement (1992),

Deeply regretting the failure of Member States to fulfill their obligations in the previously stated resolutions to inspect all cargo and discard prohibited materials,

Acknowledging that the actions taken towards DPRK will set a precedent for future negotiations with uncooperative states,

Bearing in mind that trade immediately impacting civilians must not be restricted and the welfare of the civilians of the DPRK must not be compromised,

Fully believing that communication with the DPRK will provide the basis for the success of this program,

Noting with grave concern the multiple reports of exports from the DPRK in violation of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, and that these exports are not confined to North-east Asia,

Further recognizing that the export of North Korean nuclear weapons technology and their means of delivery poses a serious threat to global and regional peace and security,

Reaffirming the IAEA’s spirit of cooperation and commitment to seeking diplomatic solutions to issues related to nuclear safety,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) Stresses the importance of information in combating the illicit trade of nuclear materials and in enforcing sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the role of Agency inspectors, as outlined in Article XII, Section C, to report any non-compliance with safeguard agreements to the Director General, who informs the Board of Governors, which notifies the Security Council and the UN General Assembly;

2) Strongly urges Member States to abide by Security Council Resolutions 1874 (2009), and 2094 (2013) and conduct inspections of DPRK vessels suspected to be in violation of

3) **Reaffirms** the importance of Project GEIGER, the joint initiative between INTERPOL and the Agency to gather comprehensive data on the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials, in making that data available, in sharing expertise, coordinating analyses, prevention, and response activities, thereby assisting in stalling development of the nuclear program of the DPRK by increasing the effectiveness of sanctions on materials entering and exiting the DRPK;

4) **Recommends** the creation of a program entitled the Preventing Atomic Detonations, Launches, and Operations Created by (North) Korea (PADLOCK) which will:

   a. Function as an unbiased third-party, in communication between the IAEA and the DPRK;

   b. Reaffirm the importance of enforcing import and export sanctions, as put forth in Security Councils Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013) in regards to:

      i. The prevention of the DPRK from obtaining materials that could be utilized in the creation of nuclear weapons;
      
      ii. Ballistic missile delivery systems;

5) **Suggests** that PADLOCK be composed of:

   a. The Board of Directors that will:

      i. Consist of 14 unbiased experts including, but not limited to, nuclear specialists and aerospace engineers;
      
      ii. Be composed of two representatives from North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania and Middle East;
      
      iii. Be appointed by the IAEA based on professional experience, regardless of all political and other such factors including but not limited to national citizenship, previous offices held, or current offices held;
      
      iv. Be charged with maintaining constant communication with the DPRK and the IAEA, as well as organizing and overseeing all inspection processes pertaining to the DPRK;

   b. The Ground Specialists that will:

      i. Consist of a team of highly trained inspectors, who have been appointed by the Board of Directors based upon professional qualifications;
      
      ii. Be charged with the task of conducting the physical inspections of all cargo transiting to DPRK, confiscating prohibited materials, and ensuring the destruction of said materials;
6) **Further recommends** the implementation of a two tiered system of inspection that will:

   a. Begin with full naval inspection check points, located outside of territorial waters of the DPRK, within proximity of commercial ports where:
      
      i. Member States will be urged to stop at these checkpoints and allow the Ground Specialists to search and inspect all cargo.
      
      ii. Continued non-compliance with said inspections will follow the information sharing procedure as stated in operative paragraph 1 above.

   b. Be contingent on the success and effectiveness of the first tier:
      
      i. The Board of Directors may proceed to the second tier, establishing check points for land trade;
      
      ii. With the approval of bordering countries, these check points will be established outside of the DPRK, inspecting all cargo transiting to the DPRK;

7) **Requests** that the PADLOCK program be funded by a portion of the budget designated for IAEA inspections and encourages all Member States to contribute the equivalence of .003 percent of their GDP to this program to supplement the IAEA budget;

8) **Expresses** its hope that the PADLOCK program will be terminated upon the return of the DPRK to international negotiations and its ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

9) **Decides** to remain seized of the matter and to place an item entitled *The illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technologies in violation of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council* on the agenda of the General Conference at its fifty-eighth session.
Recognizing the sovereignty of every Member State, as declared in the United Nation Charter, Chapter I, Article 2.1 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Article XVI of the IAEA Statute which authorizes the Agency to recommend and facilitate cooperation with other organizations,

Bearing in mind that transparency is the foundation of trust and respect in the international community regarding a Member State’s nuclear capabilities as promoted in General Assembly Resolution 66/39 (2011),

Confident that the reestablishment of lines of communication between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the international community will ease tensions,

Noting the importance of dialogue in the process of constructing a relationship and the difficulties such talks have encountered,

Deeply concerned with the lack of food, water, shelter, proper sanitation and other basic needs of much of the population of the DPRK,

Emphasizing the beneficial nuclear technologies that are available to nations regarding human health, food safety, water resources and further civil purposes,

Convinced that the successful implementation of a cooperative framework by all agencies will foster an open forum of communication and the establishment of peaceful relations within the global community and ensure the success of such a framework;

Recognizing that the DPRK’s cooperation with the international community is not time sensitive but dependent on the gradual process of reintegration within the global community,

Firmly believing that adopting a dual approach by combining existing sanctions and incentives is an effective mode of facilitating reintegration and peaceful cooperation,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) **Reaffirms** the sanctions that have been put in place through United Nations Security Council resolution 2087 (2013);

2) **Invites** all Member States to support an international approach to this issue, including talks, meetings and conferences discussing basic issues on international cooperation and other fundamental issues, in order to rebuild a common ground to negotiate on;
3) **Recommends** the establishment of a global multilateral platform for dialogue and development which will:

   a. Meet annually to discuss the fundamental topics mentioned in Article 55 of Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations and include:

      i. Specialized agencies and organizations that work toward national development such as the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations World Food Programme;

      ii. Additional unaligned and unbiased NGOs, such as the Amnesty International and Doctor’s Without Borders, to monitor the distribution of humanitarian aid including but not limited to items such as food, water and clothing, agriculture technologies for the purpose of developing the citizen’s self-sufficiency;

   b. Involve all countries interested in working towards the improvement of relations with DPRK;

   c. Monitor the allowance and the implementation of the aid under the condition that progress and improvements from the DPRK regarding safeguards are duly established by the IAEA;

4) **Appeals** to the DPRK to allow inspections of their active nuclear facilities and their imports and exports of nuclear materials and technologies;

5) **Suggests** that the United Nations Security Council pledge to progressively lift the economic and financial sanctions, outlined in resolution 1874 (2009) paragraph 18 as well as identified in the initial resolution 1718 (2006) paragraph 8 (d) as soon as the DPRK allows inspections of its facilities and complies with the IAEA Safeguard Agreements;

6) **Further suggests** that the United Nations Security Council, as soon as the IAEA inspections can verify that the DPRK is no longer pursuing nuclear programs other than for peaceful purposes, pledge to lift the technological sanctions;

7) **Further encourages** as authorized by Article XVI of the IAEA Statute, when a verification of progress in the process of nuclear disarmament is reported, the deployment of an aid package to the DPRK of nuclear technologies based on the ideas of the Medium Term Strategy, which are:

   a. important for human health such as radiation diagnosis and treatment of cancer and chronic diseases;

   b. supportive of improved livestock production, crop production and food safety;
c. and leading to better water resource management;

8) **Decides** to remain seized of the matter and to include the item in the agenda for its fifty-eighth (2014) regular session.
Deploring the withdraw of the DPRK as a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003,

Fully regretting the withdraw of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a Member State of the IAEA,

Underlining the importance of monitoring the trade of dual use technologies and fissile materials,

Bearing in mind to all Member States of the IAEA their obligation toward chapter III, paragraph 3 of the charter of the IAEA, and therefore the impossibility to provide any items, which is on the Trigger List to any non Member States of the IAEA;

Deploring the fact that DPRK is using dual-use technologies to develop its military nuclear program,

Recognizing efforts that have been made by the Zangger Committee members to edit the Zangger Committee Trigger List and to raise awareness toward fissile material understandings,

Realizing that the Zangger Committee Trigger List is not complete and that the monitoring of these items is not fully secured,

Further recalling our involvement in the Fissile Materials Cut off Treaty and the current problem of this Treaty to be fully efficient,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) Invites the DPRK to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2) Calls upon the DPRK to comply with all IAEA safeguards agreements;

3) Calls upon all Member States that are part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to extend the Zangger Committee Trigger List by:

   a. Advising IAEA Member States which are not member of the Zangger Committee to become party to it;

   b. Increasing the number of listed technologies regarding their dual-use aspect;

   c. Increasing the number of technological fields anticipating the use of new nuclear technologies based on the use of new fissile materials such as Thorium and Molten salts;
4) *Requests* that the inspections undertaken by all Member States of the cargos in provenance of the DPRK within or transiting through their territory, as requested by United Nations Security Council resolution 2094 (2013), be based on the most current Trigger List submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors;

5) *Proposes* to create an ad hoc commission under the IAEA framework to re-launch the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) process, which was stopped after the Conference on Disarmament hosted in 1995, following the Zangger Committee recommendations about fissile materials comprehension;

6) *Further invites* Member States to participate in the research and development of new processes of verification for the purpose of extending the dual-use technologies list to make the trade monitoring between DPRK and other Member States more efficient;

7) *Calls upon* all Members States of the Zangger Committee to promote the role of the IAEA experts in the redaction of the Zangger Committee Trigger List in order to ensure its objectivity and completeness;

8) *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to include the item in the agenda for its fifty-eight (2014) regular session.
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 67/29, Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (2013), and 67/34, Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments (2013), and 67/60, Nuclear disarmament (2013) which recognize that the possession or use of nuclear weapons intrinsically jeopardizes world peace and universal human and environmental flourishing,

Highlighting the successful implementation of nuclear-weapons-free zones, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty in Latin American, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,

Believing that disarmament of Member States that possess nuclear weapons will relieve expressed concerns of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in terms of national security thereby relieving their desire to develop nuclear weapons,

Persuaded that commitment by nuclear States to disarmament is the only way to slow and ultimately halt the nuclear weapons race as demonstrated through the success of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (2013) between the United States and Russia,

Reaffirming the unanimous call of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for complete worldwide disarmament of nuclear weapons and rejecting the idea that some States should have a right to perpetual possession of nuclear weapons and be excluded from this call to nuclear disarmament,

Encouraged by General Assembly resolution 66/38 (2012), Confidence-Building Measures in the regional and sub-regional context, which promotes regional confidence building in conflicting situations,

Keeping in mind the promise made by the DPRK to close their nuclear weapons program as stated on the 19th of September 2005 in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,

Drawing attention to United Nations Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) and 2087 (2013) that, inter alia, which established additional travel bans and sanctions on the DPRK,

Guided by the IAEA statute, which tasks Member States with "furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament", and hoping to fulfill this responsibility in the DPRK region before moving to worldwide action,

Noting General Assembly resolution 32/50 (1977), Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development which reaffirms the right of all nations to peaceful uses of nuclear power and technology which aid in achieving the Millennium Development Goals as presented in General Assembly resolution 55/2 (2000), United Nations Millennium Declaration,
Reaffirming our commitment to Article 25 of the United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949)* that advocates for the universal human right to food and medical care,

*The International Atomic Energy Agency,*

1) *Emphasizes* the role of the five *Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT) recognized nuclear-weapon States in setting an example of responsible and mutually beneficial progressive nuclear weapon disarmament as set forward in Article VI of the NPT;

2) *Urges* all Member States to refrain from threat or use of nuclear force against the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, or political independence of any Member State;

3) *Strongly urges* the remaining Annex 2 Member States, especially the DPRK and those Member States most poised to impact the DPRK, which have not yet signed and ratified the *Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty* (CTBT) to sign and ratify the CTBT in order to expedite the process of regional disarmament;

4) *Requests* immediate and verifiable withdrawal and relocation of nuclear weapons located outside the borders from which they originated, most urgently in Eastern Asia as a preliminary step to reduce the threats perceived by the DPRK;

5) *Calls upon* Member States maintaining a nuclear presence on the Asian continent to commit to simultaneous nuclear weapons disarmament in keeping with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in order to create an Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone by working through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) to:

   a. Create a timetable of proportional disarmament until complete nuclear disarmament is achieved;

   b. Provide transparency by inviting IAEA experts to join in negotiating the terms of this disarmament to ensure that the process is consistent with IAEA standards and safeguards and to facilitate and document communication among these States;

6) *Expresses its hope* that these efforts towards disarmament may serve as the impetus for reconciliation of relations and communications between the DPRK and the IAEA;

7) *Encourages* the DPRK to join regional economic and security organizations:

   a. Such as the East Asian Summit (EAS) or the Conference on Interaction and confidence building measures in Asia;

   b. In which these organizations might consider including in their membership requirements for the DPRK an agreement to host regional nuclear safety inspectors that:
i. Would be selected by the respective organizations;

ii. Would only be tasked with ensuring the safety and security of the nuclear facilities in the DPRK;

c. Where the Member States of the organizations should grant the DPRK a trade and aid package:

   i. In a manner determined by the respective Member States;

   ii. Should they host the inspectors;

d. As promoted and facilitated by UNRCPD;

8) *Reminds* the body that, pursuant to Article XIX section B of the *Statute of the IAEA*, the privileges of membership can be suspended if a Member State is found in violation of Article III section C and encourages the body to:

a. Maintain respect for sovereignty and remain unbiased in determining if a Member State is in violation of Article III section C;

b. Ensure the immediate cessation of IAEA enforcement policies invoked against those Member States in violation of Article III section C as soon as Member States have ceased these activities;

c. Bear in mind that this does not restrict the ability of Member States to mine radiological materials or produce their own fissile material or conduct bilateral fissile trades for peaceful purposes with Member States who have Safeguard Agreements with the IAEA;

9) *Calls upon* all Member States, within their means, to assist the DPRK in the transition back to the use of peaceful nuclear technology pending the adoption by the DPRK of an IAEA Safeguards Agreement;

10) *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session (2014) an item entitled “Worldwide Nuclear Disarmament” to address the status and efficiency of the proposed suggestions to discuss expanding this plan to a worldwide nuclear weapons free zone.

Acknowledging the absence of the DPRK as a Member State of the IAEA and as a signatory of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970,

Acknowledging the Press Communiqué of the Heads of the Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six Party talks of 12 July 2008 by the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the State of Japan on 12 July 2008 and their efforts to establish a peaceful resolution to the security concerns of the nuclear weapons program of the DPRK,

Acknowledging the efforts of the Atoms for Peace Agency to establish safety, security, science, technology, safeguards, and verification,

Bearing in mind the efforts of the international community to obtain a peaceful nuclear community in the recent past regarding the nuclear situation in the DPRK,

Bearing in mind that in order for the DPRK to consider a peaceful and more collaborative future, the IAEA should acknowledge encouragements regarding security management such as a UN initiative consisting of an immediate assistance assessment of the needs of the DPRK, in the case of a nuclear crisis situation,

Believing that peaceful nuclear research and development should be the right of all Member States,

Convinced that a long-term solution requires additional programs to increase intergovernmental partnerships,

Expressing concern in response to the incidents of the recent past regarding the utilization of ballistic missile technology and the nuclear tests performed by the DPRK in violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013),

Reiterating that nuclear proliferation is a threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the mission of the IAEA to the global maintenance of safe nuclear power utilization,

Recognizing the sovereignty of the DPRK requires utmost respect while being cognizant that all countries must collaborate on issues of international safety and security,
Recognizing the need for alternatives with the intention of beginning the transition from the current nuclear utilization within the DPRK from threatening to peaceful,

Reiterating the hope that the reconstructed Six Party talks will reduce the nuclear tension between the DPRK and the international community,

Reminding the DPRK that if it doesn’t accept the aforementioned proposals, the Security Council may partake in the unfortunate task of imposing new, coercive measures if deemed necessary,

Welcoming all IAEA Member States to work toward nuclear non-proliferation as stated in the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) Encourages the DPRK to ratify, at the earliest date possible, the NPT and adhere to the IAEA safeguards, recognizing the rights and obligations of State parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all State parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations, as stated in the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) while collaborating more closely in the efforts to disarm the nuclear arsenal in the DPRK;

2) Calls upon all Member States, to continue to withhold technology sharing and assistance, as pertaining to Annex III of United Nations Security Council resolution 2094 (2013), and also to continue to withhold energy subsidies designated for the DPRK, specifically oil and natural gas, in order to return the DPRK to the negotiation table;

3) Strongly suggests the DPRK to commit to peaceful exploration of nuclear energy by offering full support and cooperation with the IAEA and the NPT;

4) Suggests utilization of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to meet with the DPRK within the next 12 months, encouraging the DPRK to return to the Six-Party talks and promoting the stability and security of the Korean peninsula by:
   a. Recommends an expansion of the ASEAN purview to include security concerns of the region to discuss key issues and concerns as they affect the Asian nations in a solely regional forum;
   b. Requests the selected mediator be present for observation purposes;
   c. Extends an invitation to China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to participate in the regional talks;
5) *Further calls* for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks within six months of confirmation of success at the ASEAN regional talks with the following specifications:

a. All involved parties agree to return to the Six-Party Talks with no preconditions for discussion;

b. The participating countries will include the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the State of Japan, and one mediator;

c. Recommends that the DPRK elect five potential Member States to serve as the mediator and the IAEA General Conference will select one from these suggestions to be the mediator;

d. Recommends that the mediating nation hosts the Six-Party Talks;

e. Suggests that the mediator not be one of the original Six Party talk members;

f. The mediator will serve for a recommended one year term;

g. The countries involved within the Six Party talks agreement are recommended to meet biannually;

6) *Expresses* the hope that these reconstructed Six Party talks will reduce the nuclear tension between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the international community;

7) *Suggests* that the United Nations Security Council remain open to discussing further actions regarding the DPRK with their agreement of their presence at the restructured Six Party talks agreement;

8) *Invites* Member States of the IAEA to declare their willingness to cooperate diplomatically with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in regards to international peace and security;

9) *Emphasizes* the importance of maintaining peace and stability throughout the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large;

10) *Encourages* the consideration of United Nations bodies and Intergovernmental Organizations to assist the DPRK in establishing peaceful nuclear energy programs contingent upon cooperation and referring to:

a. Nuclear Energy Agency within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD);
11) *Suggests* the utilization of the current international Conference by the World
Energy Agency to encourage all Member States of the IAEA to attend in addition to:

   a. Extending a special invitation to the DPRK to participate in the Conference;
   b. Requesting the mediator present the focus of the conference to the following
      Six Party talks;
   c. Requesting the presence of the selected mediator to provide a report of the
      progress of the Six Party talks at the Conference;

12) *Suggests* the implementation of a verification mandate for the DPRK upon its
possible agreement to return to the IAEA. The verification mandate will:

   a. Initiate systematic dialogue on a responsibility system to be implemented and
      overseen by the IAEA;
   b. Recommend negotiations between the IAEA and the DPRK nuclear
      regulatory agencies to define measures of accountability and transparency to
      the IAEA;
   c. Be evaluated by the IAEA and the DPRK in order to measure the
      effectiveness of the aforementioned verification mandate and propose
      adjustments to the system as deemed necessary;

13) *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to include the item in the agenda for its
fifty-eighth (2014) regular session.
Noting that the implementation of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Korean peninsula is in the interest of all parties involved, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),

Fully supporting the right of the DPRK to establish an efficient and peaceful civilian nuclear program in order to achieve energy independence following their re-ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),

Underscores the need for all parties to agree on a common security mechanism in order to achieve nuclear safety,

Recalling the progress made by the previous rounds of the Six Party Talks, including the 2005 and 2007 joint statements, and that the Six Party talks were the first attempt in a much needed inclusive multilateral cooperation for nuclear security in the Southeast Asian region,

Reaffirming the need for improvement of regional security protocol and trade networks of nuclear technologies,

Conscious of the positive and productive relationship that the IAEA has with India and Pakistan who are non-NPT Member States with possession of nuclear weapons,

Observing that this relationship was built with positive and proactive actions taken by NPT Member States in facilitating an atmosphere of trust and friendship with India and Pakistan,

Noting that the DPRK is still at a state of war with its neighbor Republic of Korea and its allies,

Emphasizing the need for local regional bodies such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to play a role in re-opening peaceful negotiations with the DPRK,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) Invites the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks;

2) Supports the Six Party talks as an effective mechanism for dealing with the nuclear issue in the Southeast Asian region;

3) Emphasizes the role of the Member States in the maintenance of peace within the region by taking necessary measures to prevent the escalation of tension and conflict in East Asia;

4) Recommends Member States party to the NPT emulate the process taken in the case of India by establishing trilateral agreement between it, the DPRK, and the IAEA in order
to progressively establish an item-specific safeguard agreement of sites specified in the bilateral interaction between the NPT Member States and the DPRK:

5) **Encourages** the building of trust between the DPRK and the IAEA in the endeavor to reach common ground for future negotiations by:

a) Reaffirming commitment to the IAEA-DPRK technical talks that will strengthen cooperation between the IAEA and DPRK in updating relevant data and reports to ensure accountability from both parties in abiding by this agreement;

b) Ensuring a balance between confidentiality and transparency while managing the information that is shared with the IAEA;

c) Establishing confidence-building measures such as goodwill visits and relief operations between IAEA Member States and the DPRK to help build up rapport;

6) **Actively Suggests** that the United Nations Security Council provides a more proactive path of action in addressing the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula by lifting sanctions against the DPRK upon adoption of safeguards agreements and recommend NPT Member States to engage in exchange of agricultural technology and civilian nuclear technology for its progressive suspension of certain aspects of its military nuclear program by:

a) Providing agricultural technology for its suspension of nuclear reactors not providing electricity to the electrical grid;

b) Providing radio medicine technology for its suspension of highly enriched uranium for none-reactor purposes;

c) Providing food-irradiation technology for its suspension of bomb assembly;

7) **Strongly recommends** all Member States party to the NPT to take part in the execution of clause 6 of this resolution;

8) **Defines** suspension as the temporary cessation of activities;

9) Decides to remain ceased of the matter and to include the item into the agenda for its fifty-eighth (2014) regular session.
Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons pose a serious and imminent threat to the health and survival of humanity,

Deeply alarmed by the recent missile launches made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that escalated tensions within the international community,

Deeply concerned of the progress made by the DPRK in pursuing its nuclear program for non-peaceful purposes,

Recognizing the need for heightened action in order to more effectively address the potential consequences of the nuclear program of the DPRK,

Fully aware of the role United Nations (UN) Member States and institutions must fulfill in order to prevent the escalation of conflict in the Northeast Asian region,

Recalling previous United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874, which were not respected by DPRK,

Recognizing that the victims of nuclear crises are not confined to the State in which the disaster initiated,

Affirming the necessity to come to an agreement regarding the proper response to the nuclear threat posed by the DPRK,

Reaffirming that nuclear proliferation is a significant threat to international peace and security,

Frowning upon the refusal of the DPRK to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to verify reported data,

Realizing the inefficacy of recent sanctions,

Believing that negotiations are crucial to obtain a long-term agreement on DPRK’s nuclear situation,

Further believing that negotiations will allow the DPRK to reintegrate into the international community and restore economic activities between the DPRK and other Member States,

Hoping that regional forums become a viable option for negotiation regarding internationally relevant nuclear policy,

Recognizing the efficiency of other co-regional programs such as the Argentina - Brazil Program, the Asian Program, Regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, and others,
Commending the excellent work and further potential of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Korean Atomic Industrial Forum (KAIF) in the North Korean conflict,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) Recommends the creation of an autonomous regional organization, the East Asian Security Association (EASA), inclusive of the DPRK, for the purpose of promoting stability and security with regard to nuclear power and armament as well as ensuring nuclear material control, similar to and inspired by the Swedish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assistance Programme (SNNAP);

a. This organization would provide a forum through which NGOs could facilitate the communication and transfer of personnel between Member States, including the DPRK, to execute the following:

i. Basic nuclear legislation, including means and measures for limiting risk of theft, sabotage and terrorist attacks on and during the transfer of nuclear material and the establishment of centers like a Radiation Control Center (RCC);

ii. Nuclear material control, specifically reinforcement of external border control by using technology like the Cherenkov Viewing Device (CVD) to verify spent fuel and the use of groups like the Illicit Trafficking Combat Project Group (ITCPG) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG);

iii. Nuclear material transport safety standards with regard to the design and reinforcement of nuclear transport vehicles;

iv. Safety of nuclear facilities through the sharing of technical nuclear safety expertise and by collaboration regarding maintenance procedures;

b. EASA is invited to establish a Nuclear Materials and Technology Management Initiative to develop a framework, guided by the following principles:

i. Regulating the transport and production of nuclear materials and technology within EASA Member States;

ii. Regulating the processing of raw fissionable material among Member States;

iii. Regulating the extraction of fissionable materials from Member States;

iv. Preventing illicit trade, transport, and acquisition of nuclear materials and technology;

v. Committing Member States to abide by provisions of this initiative through the enforcement of measures such as regulatory policies with respect to the amount of technology, resources, funds, and manpower involved in the transport, production, and extraction of nuclear material;

c. Requesting that the DPRK submit data of their nuclear activities to the regional group EASA, including;

i. The quantity of highly enriched fissionable material available for use;
ii. The consumption of this highly enriched fissionable material;

iii. The different uses of said highly enriched fissionable material;

d. Recognizes that the Korean Peninsula can only be declared a nuclear safe region if the safeguards agreed upon in the IAEA - DPRK Agreement are applied in the DPRK;

2) *Asks* that the EASA works alongside the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Korea Atomic Industrial Forum and other NGOs with regards to the clauses found in the EASA proposed functions;

3) *Refers* the question of funding the NGOs for said project to ECOSOC and the Security Council and also encourages Member States of the EASA to contribute in terms of funds, technology, and personnel to the NGOs to facilitate the realization of previously specified goals in accordance with the provisions of their initiative;

4) *Proposes* that if the any of the following actions were to occur to stop the formation of the EASA, the NGOs would carry on the work of creating a nuclear safe DPRK according to the set functions of the EASA;

a. United Nations Security Council refusing to temporarily cease denuclearization efforts;

b. DPRK refusing to work with the UN and its member states according to the EASA guidelines and function;

5) *Assures* that during this process sanctions already placed on the DPRK shall remain unchanged;

6) *Encourages* an agreement between co-regional states to provide medical and agricultural aid in return for the cooperation of the DPRK in the safe removal and disposal of weapons-grade materials by the IAEA, in accordance with the IAEA Statute Article 3 Paragraph B;

7) *Refers* the case of cultural exchange to ECOSOC such that member States would take steps toward confidence-building and promoting international nuclear peace and security by coordinating DPRK-relevant activities that are not limited to:

a. State visits;

b. Relief operations;

c. Trade and investment programs;

8) *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to include the item in the agenda for its fifty-eighth (2014) regular session.
Further recalling Article II of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wherein the Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and property throughout the world,

Recognizing the Pacific Settlement of disputes as outlined in the United Nations Charter as the only viable method for solving the currently debated international crisis,

Concerned with the continued non-compliance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with its international nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament obligations,

Aware of the current challenges posed in regards to the application of safeguards and monitoring of facilities by the IAEA within the DPRK,

Cognizant of the ill effects imposed upon the population of the DPRK by the increased use of sanctions as coercive measures in response to the recent nuclear and ballistic missile tests,

Viewing with appreciation the 1953 Armistice Agreement for the Korean Peninsula as it embodies peace and stability within the Korean Peninsula,

Reiterating the importance of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones as established in the African Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and The Caribbean, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as an additional means for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing the importance of the international and widespread support for the policies outlined in the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),

Noting with regret the limited implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework,

Drawing attention to the 1992 Safeguards Agreement as having continued binding effect between the DPRK and the IAEA as stated in the Report of the Director General on the Application of Safeguards in the DPRK,

Noting with regret the DPRK’s withdrawal from the IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

The International Atomic Energy Agency,

1) Encourages all States to settle disputes, especially in relation to the current situation in the DPRK, through peaceful means in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and Chapter 6 of the Charter of the United Nations;
2) Calls upon Member States to uphold their obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2012), and of 2094 (2013);

3) Urges States to utilize the 1718 Committee for technical assistance and support in submitting national implementation reports in conjunction with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;

4) Encourages Member States to submit national implementation reports to the 1718 Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) in order to assist the Committee in the execution of its mandate as outlined in paragraph XII of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1718 (2006);

5) Instructs the IAEA Department of Technical Cooperation to increase training seminars and workshops to better develop the capacity of States under the existing Security Council framework relating to the DPRK in areas such as border controls and monitoring;

6) Invites the DPRK to rejoin the IAEA and its safeguards agreements as well as NPT in order for the DPRK to be in a position to receive assistance from the IAEA relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

7) Encourages the DPRK to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);

8) Recommends the promotion of confidence-building activities between Member States and the DPRK in order to promote dialogue through cooperative visits within the Agency;

9) Supports the use of dialogue and the normalization of relations between Member States and the DPRK in place of the expansion of sanctions initiatives in order to facilitate cooperation and diplomatic correspondence;

10) Strongly supports the re-evaluation and re-opening the Six-Party talks composed of the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Russian Federation, as a means of facilitating dialogue and peace agreements leading to the eventual reduction of nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula;

11) Supports the emphasized role of the People’s Republic of China within a future reformed and structuralized Six Party framework, acting as an intermediary in the Six Party Talks in order to establish refreshed goals of nuclear peace and security;

12) Recommends the establishment of Conversations for the Future and Development of the DPRK, an ad hoc mediating conference to meet biannually to address the following:

   a. The encouragement for the establishment of bilateral relations between the DPRK and the Member States of Agency;
b. The creation of nuclear energy sources for peaceful purposes for the DPRK through bilateral cooperation between the mentioned and Member States of the Agency;

c. The opening of the Kaesong Industrial Region in the DPRK to other companies beyond South Korean enterprises and to establish standards of operation for the foreign companies that would operate in the region to help foster DPRK economic growth;

13) Invites the DPRK to join the conference to foster progress and development within their territory, and suggest issues they wish to discuss for the agenda setting of future mediation conferences;

14) Further recommends the aforementioned Conversations for the Future and Development of the DPRK Conference will be duly structured and consist of the following:

a. Representatives designated by region and modeled off of the distribution used in the establishment of the members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA;

b. Each region could elect one representing Member State to an unnamed group of consultation and the subsequent membership of said State would be limited to a period of four years with the possibility of reelection;

c. The group of consultation would subsequently report to the duly appointed intermediary of the Six Party Talks, in order to advise on technical aspects of negotiations that are within the pursue of the IAEA;

d. The consulting delegations would consist of neutral relevant experts including but not limited to diplomats, nuclear specialists, and economists that are interested in moderating negotiations;

15) Recommends that within negotiations derived from the Six Party Talks, the parties involved coordinate with the DPRK for a moratorium on nuclear and ballistic missile testing;

16) Endorses the conclusion of peace agreements with the DPRK on a bilateral and or multilateral basis among the relevant parties as a means of normalizing relations and opening constructive dialogue among those involved;

17) Welcomes further the continued use of bilateral and multilateral incentives coordinated by relevant actors as a means of facilitating dialogue and normalization of relations between the DPRK and the international community, utilizing incentives such as;

18) Encourages cooperation of relevant United Nations bodies to include but not be limited to the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Development Program, the World Health Organization, and the World Food Program with the aim of improving the
preexisting dialogue between the DPRK and all Member States involved in the Six Party
Talks;

19) **Endorses** the development and use of practical and effective energy incentives that aid in
accomplishing the goals of the IAEA in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy
such as the adoption of 3rd and 4th generation nuclear reactors which exponentially
increase the safety, efficiency, and reduction of operation costs such as:

a. Trans-atomic Power’s Waste Annihilating Molten Salt Reactor (MSR);

b. Small, Sealed, and Transportable Autonomous Reactors (SSTAR);

20) **Strongly supports** the use of comprises as a means of enhancing bilateral and multilateral
incentive frameworks to improve dialogue and diplomatic cooperation, such as the
suggested preconditions as:

a. Reestablishment of communication between parties and preliminary normalization of
diplomatic correspondence;

b. Reduction of military provocations by both the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and other Member States in response to rising tensions on the Korean
Peninsula;

21) **Recommends** the institution by the DPRK of a moratorium on nuclear or ballistic missile
testing as well as further responsive military actions due to the ill effects that such
activities have on international peace and security;

22) **Further recommends** the expansion of the membership of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organisation (KEDO) and the reorganization of its Executive Board in an
attempt to revitalize its work and make it a tool for implementation of incentives in
relation to the nuclear situation in the DPRK:

23) **Decides** to remain seized of the matter and to include the item in the agenda for its fifty-eighth (2014) regular session.