National Model United Nations

Week A

March 17 – March 21, 2013

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Documentation
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

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Agenda

1. Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts

2. Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations

3. Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements

Resolutions adopted by the committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Code</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Vote (Y/ N/ Abstention/ Non-Voting)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.1</td>
<td>Peace Bonds</td>
<td>72/2/21/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.2</td>
<td>Gender perspective</td>
<td>85/5/6/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.3</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>84/4/6/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.4</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>89/1/6/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.5</td>
<td>Standby Peacekeeping Team</td>
<td>84/3/9/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.6</td>
<td>DKPO</td>
<td>78/3/16/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.7</td>
<td>Standardized Training</td>
<td>76/9/11/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.8</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>33/47/16/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/L.9</td>
<td>Civilian Capacity</td>
<td>85/2/9/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34/1/1</td>
<td>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts (compiled report segments)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary Report

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations assembled for the first time on Sunday evening to discuss, review, and report on crucial issues within the field of peacekeeping operations, namely the following topics:

1. Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts
2. Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements
3. Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations

The delegates of the Special Committee immediately began negotiations regarding the order of the topics to set priorities. After the first suspension, four varying motions to set the order of the agenda were brought forward and voted upon. The third suggestion was approved by the body and the agenda was set in the order of 1 - 3 - 2. In the following hour, delegates stated their opinions and exchanged views on the first topic, Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts. After several speeches and another informal caucus, the body suspended the session until the next day at 2:30 pm.

On Monday's session the delegates began forming groups to work on draft report segments. Remarks were made by speakers who expressed their ideas of reforms that would strengthen stabilization efforts in post-conflict areas in speeches and during informal caucusing. Proposed reforms included establishing joint training operations between regional partners, gender reforms that would encourage increased female participation in peacekeeping forces, finance reform, and the creation of standby forces. By the end of the evening, five draft report segments had been worked on.

During Tuesday morning’s session, work on the draft report segments continued. Delegates caucused and proceeded to work diligently on their drafts during the following sessions, with speeches focusing on the key sub-topics being discussed, including financial reform, gender equality in the peacekeeping process, the establishment of standby forces, and an infrastructure project. Even after several hours of tiring negotiating and revising, spirits remained high and by the end of the day, a total of ten draft report segments were under discussion. On Tuesday evening, delegates continued to further negotiated and cooperated on the content of the future report.

Wednesday’s session began with the presentation of the various segments that had been officially introduced. Between Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, several papers had been merged. The first draft report segments were accepted by the dais during the late hours of the morning session. A motion to close the speaker’s list was introduced and approved by the body. Throughout the afternoon, further improved working papers were submitted. The body saw nine draft report segments in total.

Of the nine draft report segments considered for voting, eight segments were accepted. Three segments were amended, with four amendments in total. The division of the question was introduced for segment number 2 in order to separate clause 9 and 10; however, only one delegate voted in favor of this motion. Lastly, delegates voted to adjourn the meeting for the year. The Special Committee’s final
report proposed innovative, comprehensive reforms with the promise to revolutionize the role of peacekeeping operations in post-conflict stabilization.
I. Introduction

A. PEACE BONDS

1. While approved resources for 1 July 2012-30 June 2013 are at 7.33 billion USD [A/C.5/66/18], current outstanding contributions to UN peacekeeping operations as of January 31, 2013 amount to 3.34 billion USD. Over 30 percent of all funding required for the peacekeeping operations’ budget is still outstanding. Inadequate funding gives rise to major security issues. The UN has an important responsibility to deliver on promised funding and troop levels. When the UN over-promises and under-delivers, higher civilian and military fatalities result.

2. In 2012, the Special Committee released in its annual report (A/66/19) a summary of the financial status and shortfalls of peacekeeping operations, which highlighted outstanding payments to donor countries as far back as 2002 (A/C.5/66/18). Current troop-contributing countries shoulder a substantial financial burden. The current funding system is unsustainable and could jeopardize future peacekeeping operations and post-conflict stabilization efforts.

3. The sale and trade of bonds to help in global development are not new concepts; in 1962, the UN General Assembly approved a three-point financial plan which included the issuing of UN bonds. This designated to the UN Secretary-General the authority to issue bonds. It also specifically recommended that the Secretary-General work in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, enabling the two to issue bonds as deemed appropriate. This precedent could be applied to peacekeeping operations that are continually under-funded or that lack funding when initially mandated by the Security Council.

4. In the past, the UN has experienced a lack of funding for major initiatives, such as the “Decade of Development” or the era of decolonization efforts throughout the world. To address the conflict in the Congo, General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) authorized the Secretary-General to issue bonds to finance a peacekeeping operation to resolve this conflict. At the time, this peacekeeping operation was the most costly in UN history. Most likely, due to limiting the bond sales to the American domestic market alone and to the UN fixing the overall interest rate as opposed to the market controlling the rate, the endeavor failed and left the project short of funds, as is the case with many of today’s peacekeeping operations.

5. Other departments within the UN, such as the Financing for Development Office of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), have more recently developed systems of trading and issuing bonds based off of a Member State’s GDP. While this has been effective in developing markets for the purpose of bolstering GDP and growth, this project has not yet been tailored to security or peacekeeping issues and remains only a program of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
B. INCENTIVES FOR MEMBER-STATES TO MEET QUOTAS

6. Approximately 31 percent of the donations Member States have pledged have not been received, indicating the absence of an incentive among UN Member States to fulfill their financial obligations. There is currently no system to deter Member States from failing to meet their predetermined quotas.

C. NON-FINANCIAL PRODUCT INVESTMENT MECHANISMS

7. Through non-financial product investment mechanisms, Member States can foster local ownership and the promotion of employment and development in post-conflict areas. Using local physical and human resources in conjunction with expertise for reconstruction can strengthen these states. In 2008, for instance, in the case of Lebanon, Qatar used a participant banking system and non-financial product investment mechanisms to reach a peace agreement between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government (Doha Agreement). The promise to provide foreign capital and investment in order to rebuild infrastructure contributed to the conclusion of the Doha Agreement, and is thus an outstanding example of how even the possibility of foreign investment can positively contribute to achieving peace and post-conflict stabilization.

D. THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION

8. Women provide a unique and comprehensive perspective when it comes to dealing with post-conflict stabilization (PCS). These insights are crucial in regards to the effects of armed conflict on women and children, and the process of sustainable peace after the peacekeeping mission has ended. Currently, over 235 officers have been specially trained in Women and Children Protective operations, and sent to over 15 counties in Liberia. These Protection Units are invaluable to communities affected by sexual and gender-based violence, and gives them a secure place to report crime and danger, especially considering, Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) which affirms that sexual violence against women and girls is an official war strategy and crime against humanity, giving victims a base for claiming justice. The Peacebuilding Fund has issued a 5 million USD gender promotion initiative to support women in peacebuilding. Additionally, the UN has a minimum of 15 percent of financing promised to post-conflict gender equality and women’s empowerment. The UN is also working to further increase that percent.

9. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on “Women and peace and security” calls for “equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.” In 2009, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) set a goal ratio of 20% female peacekeepers in police units by 2014 however as of December 2012, women represented 2% of all military peacekeeping personnel. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in his 2010 report on women in peacebuilding (A/65/354-S/2010/466), connects the inclusion of more women in peacekeeping operations to the protection and empowerment of women and post-conflict stabilization. The all-female Indian police force, deployed as part of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), empowered Liberian women through programs such as self-defense classes as well as promotion of hygiene and sanitation. With aid from the UN, the Liberia National Police has
increased its female representation, increasing the percentage of the police force that is female to 17% as of September 2012. As discussed in the 2012 UN Women report entitled “Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice”, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have developed mission-wide strategies and pre-deployment training procedures focused on protecting women from sexual violence. The Secretariat’s Senior Advisory Group on Troop Reimbursement Rates and Related Issues has made efforts to ensure that Member States are reimbursed for the provision of troops, police, and resources to peacekeeping operations, as most recently discussed by the General Assembly in 2002.

The importance of gender consideration in peacekeeping operations has been accepted by the international community in the past decade. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security served as a guideline for the actions that had to be taken in order to include gender consideration in peacekeeping operations. Following the recommendations a growing amount of countries have highlighted the importance of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) by creating and applying national action plans for implementation. These programs have underlined the need for a better integration of gender perspectives "into all projects, operations, policy making and legislation regarding peace, security and development issues" as stated in the aforementioned document. The challenge of sexual and gender based violence has also been further included in the training of the military, police and civilian personnel.

E. INVOLVEMENT, THE RULE OF LAW, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, AND NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH

Since the start of UN peacekeeping operations in 1948, the process of peacekeeping has evolved hand in hand with the specific needs of post-conflict states. Peacekeeping was originally limited to observational tasks for maintaining ceasefires in post-conflict situations and stabilizing situations on the ground. However, over the years the concept of peacekeeping has expanded to complex and multidimensional operations. Peace cannot be achieved without stable, legitimate, and transparent institutions of governance along with adherence to the rule of law. This multidimensional approach to peacekeeping was recently affirmed by Security Council resolution 2086, specifying especially in article 8 the wide variety of peacebuilding tasks UN Peacekeeping missions can and should take on.

The Policy Evaluation and Training Division currently lacks sufficient resources and capacities to effectively manage, research, and strategize on behalf of peacekeeping operations in the face of a growing need of peacekeeping forces globally.

The end of the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was initiated in 2000 by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Poland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, illustrated the issues such as: a lack of adequate resources, incoherent logistical frameworks, conflicting political support, and breakdowns in the lines of communication, that this standing force had to face. SHIRBRIG revealed the limits of cooperation between national disparate systems and the necessity of appropriate resources, more efficient lines of communication, and the need for coherent strategy between stakeholders. Given the expanding nature of peacekeeping, the same
problems in which undermined the success of SHIRBRIG put current peacekeeping operating
structures at as much risk to be undermined in the same manner.

14. Currently, over 120 Member States contribute military and police personnel that carry out the
mandates of a particular peacekeeping mission. However, problems have resulted from cultural
factors either within a post-conflict state or between peacekeeping forces themselves.

15. Member States have demonstrated a desire to take on larger roles in supporting peace within
their own regions. In 2013, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
assisted with stabilization efforts in the Republic of Mali. Similarly, the UN Stabilisation
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has benefitted greatly from Latin American involvement.

16. International normative values and declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provide recognized standards of good governance accepted by large parts of the
international community. Moreover, prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
sanctioned by the UN such as Amnesty International have proven to be vital assets in both
reporting and reforming legal, political, and judicial structures.

17. A particular problem continues to arise in which governance branches in post-conflict states
are viewed as illegitimate and lacking in transparency, as stated by the Security Council in
Resolution 2086. Under this circumstance, the rule of law deteriorates, and the resultant rise in
crime, violence, and conflict threatens the stability in post-conflict nations.

18. Ensuring both the military and police can adequately uphold the rule of law and maintain a
legitimate monopoly over violence is vital in stabilization efforts once conflict has subsided.
Efforts to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) following the War in Afghanistan demonstrate
both the hope and the struggles associated with SSR. Nevertheless, as the Security Council
iterates in resolution 2086, ensuring a sovereign state can maintain its own security is of the
utmost importance in continuing efforts for stabilization in post-conflict nations. However, in
accordance with sovereignty and the UN Charter, SSR should adhere to the voluntary conditions
the Special Committee previously suggested in its 2009 report to the General Assembly
(A/62/19).

19. The illicit trade and black markets for armaments and security equipment are a growing
problem. SSR endeavors must be cautious to ensure any armament trade or transfer adheres to
UN resolutions, such as General Assembly resolution 62/47, and international law, such as the
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) currently in negotiation.

20. The Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations 2000 (A/55/305), or commonly known
as the Brahimi Report, stated national and regional security is greatly enhanced when economic
conditions are sufficient for providing necessary goods, services, and necessities required to
sustain the well-being of post-conflict actors as noted in General Assembly resolution A/62/19.
The report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on UN
peace operations (A/55/502) reiterates this belief.
21. Currently, the World Bank’s International Development Association’s Trust Fund for East Timor is assisting in providing capital to facilitate reconstructive efforts that lend towards stabilization and human security efforts. The World Bank’s efforts have emphasized and helped create stakeholder partnerships to ensure transparency, accountability, prosperity, stabilization to East Timor. These efforts are largely mitigating the many contributing factors to a re-escalation in conflict and violence.

22. UN bodies, arms-length organizations, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have a continuing positive effect on reducing the extraneous causes of conflict and contributing towards peaceful post-conflict stabilization efforts as found within General Assembly resolution 56/201 and *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*.

F. FINANCIAL ISSUES

23. The financing of peacekeeping operations is a collective responsibility of all Member States of the UN, and should be carried out in full observance of the general principles and cost-sharing guidelines established in General Assembly resolutions 1874 (S-IV) and 28/3101.

24. In his speech during the 62nd Annual DPI/NGO Conference, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon addressed the challenges in the current financing of peacekeeping, claiming that “the world is over-armed and peace is under-funded”. The budget for UN peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year of 1 July 2012-30 June 2013 is approximately 7.33 billion dollars, as stated in A/C.5/66/18. This is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures, which have risen to 1,738 billion dollars according to 2011 estimates.

25. The transition from conflict-phase peacekeeping activities to a post-conflict stabilization stage poses special challenges concerning financing as different funding mechanisms apply under a crisis management framework versus under traditional programmatic UN work. Currently, a number of actors who operate in post-conflict settings are not acknowledged under or bound by peacekeeping guidelines, namely Special Political Missions and the donor community.

26. Proliferation of field-based Special Political Missions, which have transcended their original reporting and monitoring mandates to take on multidimensional tasks, are increasingly becoming a significant financing concern. The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with administrative and budgetary matters, has expressed concern over the proposed 567 million dollars needed for continuing expansion of these missions. The budget for special political missions has risen by 1,256 percent in the last decade. The Report of the Secretary General to the Fifth Committee (A/66/340) acknowledged that by 2000, the average core sets of mandated tasks for Special Political Missions was 4, and included traditional roles such as political process facilitation, peace agreement implementation, coordination with the UN country team, and mobilization of international assistance in connection to elections. Only one decade later, half of the 14 existing Special Political Missions had grown to include mandates containing 12 to 24 tasks.
27. This expansion is only expected to continue, bringing about a concomitant increase in the 
demand for resources. Although there are currently 31 deployed special political missions with 
33 proposed for 2013 and most of them discharge traditional, more limited mandates, the subset 
of 15 field-based missions entrusted with multidimensional mandates utilize 94 percent of all 
resources destined for Special Political Missions. This discrepancy in cost, added to the potential 
redundancy of duties vis-à-vis peacekeeping forces deployed in the transition and handover 
phase, has invited questions about their classification as political missions.

28. Funding for the Special Political Missions is currently set up under the perennial programme 
budget process, namely from regular budget appropriations. This alternative has been singled out 
as problematic through debates and addressed fruitlessly by the Secretary-General in A/66/340.

29. Firstly, these missions do not follow the programmatic budget cycle, as they can be set up at 
any time of the year, and thereby present a challenge to a budgeting process founded upon 
predictability.

30. Secondly, although field-based Special Political Missions are largely indistinguishable from 
peacekeeping operations, financing them through the regular budget ignores both the special 
responsibility of the Permanent Members of the Security Council in the area of peace and 
security, and the fundamental difference in capacity between the developed and developing 
nations enshrined in A/RES/1874 and A/RES/28/3101.

31. Thirdly, given the recurrent shortfalls in the regular budget, it is common practice to fund 
Special Political Missions through closed accounts of Peacekeeping Operations, instead of 
allocating those funds to cover overdue reimbursements to Troop- and Police-Contributing 
Countries (TCC/PCC).

32. Fourthly, although the DPKO is singularly tasked with providing support and backstopping 
to Special Political Missions, the budgetary distinction between Peacekeeping and the Special 
Political Missions that follow and/or overlap in deployment leads to efficiency losses: staff 
whose posts are funded through a specific Peacekeeping support account cannot lend assistance 
to Special Political Missions, so that the DPKO must make available other staff whose posts will 
be funded through the programmatic budget. This disconnect places a serious burden on the 
DPKO and drains existing capacity.

33. The development of general principles for the financing of UN peacekeeping operations 
under General Assembly resolution 67/224 was not followed up with prompt and effective 
implementation. Current financing methods for peacekeeping operations will remain ineffective 
unless additional changes are made in the preexisting finance framework for peacekeeping 
operations. As established in General Assembly resolution 64/249, regular UN budget 
procedures are not sufficient to meet expenditures arising from such operations.

34. The Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning (ST/SGB/2000/8), particularly 
rules 104.7(a) and 105.4(a) which calls for budgetary allocations to clearly contribute to program 
objectives, constitute a framework for the formulation of feasible peacekeeping strategies. 
Peacekeeping plans should be thoroughly formulated and defined in order to avoid situations
where underfinanced missions continue to operate without accomplishing their specified
mandate. Responsible implementation of peacekeeping strategies will allow for a more
comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding under the auspices of the UN.

G. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL STANDBY PEACE BUILDING TEAMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

35. Military and police presence alone does not always prevent the reoccurrence of crisis in a
post-conflict zone. The present categorization of peacekeeping personnel into civilian, military,
and police overlooks the need to address the crucial role infrastructure plays in post-conflict
stabilization.

36. As determined by EuropeAid, an organization concerned with the design of development
policies in the European Union (EU), the four key pillars of infrastructure development are
energy, transportation, communication, and sanitation and water supply.

37. Peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Sudan and Liberia have shown,
that UN experts are not always familiar with regional cultural, traditional, religious, or political
affairs during post-conflict situations. The Brahimi Report outlined that under the current system
in the UN, there is currently no way to identify, recruit, and efficiently deploy qualified civilian
specialists in substantive and support functions in peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report
also outlines the number of vacancies present in field and administrative positions, as the field
operations are operating at only 50 percent efficiency, while administrative positions are
operating at 40 percent efficiency. This is due to the rate of recruitment and the rate of departure
by mission personnel.

38. Security Council Resolution 2086 is committed to strengthening the UN’s fundamental role
through a multidimensional approach. It emphasizes the connection between making, building
and identifies peace as essential to effectively approach post-conflict situations.

39. The state of emergency that arises from post-conflict situations requires an immediate
response. The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was created in 2000 and
subsequently decommissioned in 2009 due to a decision-making process that proved to be
unreliable because of conflicting political support. Presently, the UN lacks a standby
peacekeeping force.

H. STRUCTURAL AND ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES WITHIN DPKO AND DFS

40. The decade since the publishing of the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations (the Brahimi Report) has seen a substantial increase in the level of peacekeeping
operations being undertaken, as well as increases to aggregate UN peacekeeping force numbers
and the UN budget for peacekeeping operations. In the last ten years alone, the number of
military/police deployed on DPKO operations increase from 36,948 to 93,368 in January 2013.
The reforms put in place by the report therefore have not kept up with the current mission
demands on the DPKO and Department of Field Services. Both departments are operating
passed the level that was envisioned during their individual formation.
41. Furthermore, the necessary expedited nature and *ad hoc* process of mandate creation and mission phase development, done before the necessary resources are fully sought out, has led to the inability of both the DPKO and DFS to fulfill mandated tasks. This is particularly true in the post-conflict stabilization phase, whereby too often the ability of both departments is hindered by lack of critical capabilities. Moreover, the lack of asset-management due to overstretched DPKO and DFS leads to reduced efficiency of resources and increase losses. The Security Council, in resolutions 1327 and 1353, reiterates the aforementioned as well as increased systematic consultation needed between the Security Council and UN peacekeeping entities for enhanced dialogue and reduction of highlighted critical capacity deficiencies.

I. STRUCTURE OF RESOURCES CONTRIBUTION

42. At the heart of the UN Charter is its duty to propagate peace. The DPKO is the central UN organ for preparing and coordinating peacekeeping operations. It is further assisted by the Departments for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and Political Affairs (DPA). The Special Committee recognizes their key roles. But in many points there is still a lack in systematic and efficient execution.

43. The Special Committee recognizes that the transition to a post-conflict stabilization phase of peacekeeping mandates should be effective and prompt, as the initial stage of any mandate is the time with the greatest risk to relapse into conflict. Moreover, the continued contribution of adequate resources for mandate completion during the entirety of post-conflict stabilization is crucial.

44. The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), as an effort to create the UN’s own rapid deployment force, was launched under Danish patronage in 2000. Unfortunately it was discontinued in 2009. Next to the shortage of member state commitments, it is problematic to entertain a standby force, as it is financially exhausting. Additionally, an institutionalized army at the UN-level raises problems regarding national sovereignty and can therefore be questioned in terms of legitimacy. Further, the transfer of knowledge and information on Member States commitments weakened SHIRBRIGs effectiveness.

45. Troop contribution is an expensive effort that deserves the highest appreciation, as it is a necessary pillar for UN peacekeeping’s ability to function. Often, there is a shortage or misallocation of resources when UN peacekeeping operations are mandated. Furthermore, situations exist where countries have a comparative advantage in their resources, either in funding or the capability to supply troops. However, too often resources are not allocated efficiently because of asymmetries of information.

46. The present and prior increasing of the capability of UN efforts through regional arrangements has been of great value to post conflict stabilization. Hereby the UN offices to the African Union and the European Union are of great value in terms of cooperation and information exchange.
J. STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN A MULTINATIONAL NETWORK

47. There has been a lack of standardization and multinational cooperation of peacekeeping training, which lead to misunderstandings and a suboptimal allocation of funds and resources.

K. TRAINING ON HIGH-TECH USAGE

48. Peacekeeping relies on the collection and unbiased reporting of information. The use of updated and latest technologies enhances the monitoring technologies at checkpoint, port of entry and international line of control and in disarmament activities. This enhances the prospect of success to implement a peace agreement.

49. Global positioning systems have been utilized successfully by militaries and other UN missions such as the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan to aid military operations, the Carlog system used by the DPKO in vehicle location information, and UN Protection Force to track aid and supply convoys. Global Positioning Force has become a standard for the operations of the modern world.

50. The use of technology especially in post conflict areas for the protection of civilians, monitoring of imported shipments such as humanitarian supplies or collected weapons, can be extremely beneficial.

51. The integration of monitoring technologies into peacekeeping operations improves the security, effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping by protecting personnel, extending the peacekeepers capabilities, providing objective and verifiable information, and saving resources. It is recognized that modern technologies are a vital part of a successful public sector. It is proven that computers and software aid in facilitating communication on a local level. However as post-conflict areas are in the process of creating stability and order, they are not always provided with the adequate means to do so.

52. The use of aerial vehicles have been incorporated into surveillance from the moment the camera was invented by applying this once revolutionary technology into hot air balloons and kites. However, the most recent advances in technology on aerial surveillance is extraordinary and could be better integrated into peacekeeping missions.

53. Internet offers new ways to allow for the unrestricted transfer of needed information in order to assist in the operations of UN peacekeepers in post conflict areas, by increasing the accessibility of vital data and information as well as allowing for the easy communication across difficult terrain.

L. STRENGTHENING LOCAL SECURITY FORCES

54. It is most important for security forces to be accepted among the people they are working with. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations feels that in the current stage the
acceptance of local security forces is not sufficient in order to guarantee long-lasting successful stabilization.

55. Communicational lines between local authorities, regional actors and UN responsibility holders have been sub standard. The past has shown that a lack of communication between the parties leads to loss of efficiency and transparency.

M. TRAINING PEACEKEEPERS IN REGARDS TO MEDIATION AND CULTURAL SENSITIVITY

56. Mediation has been a key tool in stabilizing post-conflict areas such as South Africa, Lesotho, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. There is no specific type of mediation that is used during the stabilization process. However, mediators are always third party, non-biased participants who can conduct a fair mediation. This allows for all parties involved to feel non-threatened and the stabilization process to be neutral and impartial.

57. After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as reported in the 2011 Policy and Practice Brief by The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, mediation was used as a tool for conflict resolution and dispute settlement between the Tutsis and Hutus. More specifically, Rwanda used Abunzi Mediation, which consisted of local Rwandan mediators, who were chosen based on their good character and morals. Rwanda then passed the Organic Law in 2006 to fully recognize the Abunzis as mediators. This mediation process also allowed for the idea of decentralizing power, participation in community, and consensus-based decision making. The Abunzi mediation proved to be a successful dispute settlement mechanism, and allowed stabilization.

58. The UN Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II), as reported by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics in 2009, proved to be unsuccessful partly because peacekeeping troops were not trained to be culturally sensitive. The Somali people could not identify with the peacekeeping troops, which led to more violence and conflict within the region.

N. CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION IN PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS

59. In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305, Brahimi Report) discussed the importance of the extent to which local authorities are willing and able to take difficult but necessary political and social decisions and to participate in the establishment of processes and mechanisms to manage internal disputes, and pre-empt violence or the re-emergence of conflict in the context of peacekeeping operations in post-conflict scenarios. Affirming that cooperation is critical in determining the success of a peace operation, the Brahimi Report supported political and social changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining.

60. The best practices highlighted by Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005) aimed at post-conflict peacebuilding have not yet been implemented to their full capacity. The role of women
in the peacebuilding process has improved but is still lacking and could, as the resolution attests, contribute to civilian participation in post-conflict stabilization.

61. In reporting to the General Assembly on 24 February 2006 on the maintenance of peacekeeping operations (A/60/696), the Secretary-General highlighted the importance of integration for a wider peacebuilding effort by emphasizing the need for predictable frameworks for cooperation with regional organizations and national governments, common peacekeeping standards and modalities for cooperation and transition, and joint training exercises.

O. ACCORDANCE OF LAW INCORPORATING CIVILIAN NEED

62. In 2009, the New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping highlighted the fact that UN peacekeeping has in over 60 years of experience and with 63 missions accumulated an extensive expertise to help establish rule of law and security institutions. However, at times, peacekeeping missions have failed due to the fact that the strategies implemented were poorly adapted to creating the conditions and structures for a sustainable peace, with peacekeepers departing, perhaps too early, only to return.

63. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) was implemented in 2001 after the political violence during the era of the Shining Path. The TRC was largely implemented by civilian initiative and, as a result, incorporated civilian interests and investment in the reconciliation process. The TRC was critical in the rebuilding of national identity and in post-conflict national healing.

64. Initiatives in Cameroon have demonstrated how cooperation and increased participation of regional authorities, national authorities, and civilians in peacebuilding can advance post-conflict stabilization efforts. Such initiatives have included the project for Institutional Capacity Enhancement of the International Security Forces Training School (EIFORCES) in 2011, as well as the Seminar on the Role for Civilians in Peace-building and Peace Support Operations.

65. In the Special Report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region (S/2013/119), the Secretary-General stressed that the lack of progress towards building well-trained and well-equipped security forces constitutes a major threat to the stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as it comprises one of the critical pillars to strengthening state authority and achieving stability, in addition to other national actions, such as governance and structural reforms, and the maintenance of the rule of law, human rights and democratization.

66. Civilians are consistently a group that suffers greatest during times of conflict; yet, they have the quietest voice in the rebuilding process. In one of the most recent peacekeeping missions, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the civil society had the greatest number of casualties. Though various civil committees were given some voice in the rebuilding process, the continuation of that voice throughout not only the initial but the ongoing stages of the peacebuilding process is critical.
The Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities program (RECAMP) is a successful model for UN peacekeeping agents to transition power to the sovereign nations in an orderly and self-sufficient process. New schools generated by this program were produced in a uniform way to increase efficiency, but implemented with regionally appropriate considerations.

II. Mandate

68. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was established in 1965 through General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX) and was originally tasked to undertake a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects in order to facilitate consultations on peacekeeping within the General Assembly.

69. In 1996, the General Assembly adopted resolution 51/136, which decided that the Special Committee, in accordance with its mandate, should continue its efforts for a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, and should review the implementation of its previous proposals and consider new proposals so as to enhance the capacity of the UN to fulfil its responsibilities in this field.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. PEACE BONDS

70. UN peacekeeping operations consistently lack funding, as stated previously 3.4 billion USD is outstanding for this year’s annual budget. In order to supplement resources that may be lacking at the time of a mandated peacekeeping operation; the Special Committee recommends, in addition to all prior recommendations made by the Committee, the increased participation of global citizens and the private sector in the funding strategy of the UN through the sale and trade of Peacekeeping bonds.

71. In order to allow increased funding for UN peacekeeping operations, the Special Committee recommends that the Secretary-General issue UN peace bonds in accordance with the annex to General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI). The Committee further recommends the Secretary General work in tandem with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The Special Committee reminds the General Assembly Fifth Committee of their responsibility for budgetary aspects of peacekeeping operations and the Secretary General of the authority to issue and monitor bonds as granted by the 1961 annex to Resolution 1739 for the conflict in the Congo. However, today’s program differs in that the peace bonds would be diversified bonds or multiple mission bonds, sold on all international markets, and the rates would be subject to market demand and supply as opposed to the UN autonomously establishing the rate. The new peace bonds would be accessible at an individual, corporate, and country level, thus increasing demand and access to the peace bonds, helping to make the project sustainable in the long run.

72. For countries still embroiled in conflict, the funding received from bonds sold would supplement normal UN funding for peacekeeping operations. This additional funding would enable more rapid troop deployment, higher levels of technology for operations, and spread the
burden of cost for the mission more evenly among Member States, private citizens, and other
global entities.

Post-conflict, the bond issuing governments would be able to invest the received funds in
construction, agriculture, real estate, and other industries related to long-term infrastructure and
economic growth. A key to long-term political stability is a strong domestic economy. Prior to
infrastructure investment as the conflict is still the primary concern, the bonds would be used to
fund the initial UN peacekeeping response.

There are three investment options available, a hedged bond, country specific bond, and
corporate bond. The hedge bond is a traditional bond package, the country specific bond focuses
on one conflict area for investment, and the corporate bond allows for increased funding
specifically for a recipient’s private sector. The three investment packages would mature after a
15-year term. The initial funding from the loan issues would enable countries to fund
peacekeeping operations, and post-conflict infrastructure projects. Each country specific bond
issuer would be strongly recommended to add additional incentives to attract businesses to their
lands post-conflict.

In order to secure the long-term bond market, the UN would insure the bonds up to 50%;
this would still be less expensive than the current UN system of fully financing all peacekeeping
operations. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations reminds the General Assembly
of Resolution 1739 (XVI) Annex, particularly paragraph six, which further highlights historical
precedence for UN bond issue. Demand for UN issued bonds would be higher than in the 1960’s,
because of the increased levels of convergence in our world markets and global economy; which
makes this a profitable long-term investment for both parties.

B. INCENTIVES FOR MEMBER-STATES TO MEET QUOTAS

Because funding is always crucial for peacekeeping operations, including those that engage
in post-conflict stabilization efforts, the Special Committee encourages the establishment of a
point system in which Member States who have met their donation quotas receive a 10%
increase to their application for administrative and managerial appointments. Thus allowing skill,
experience, and background to play the biggest role, but add an additional incentive for Member
States to follow through on their financial commitments. Donation quotas can be met in a variety
or combination of ways, including, but not limited to financial donations, troop recruitment,
technological donations, and research. The comparative advantage of the Member States should
be considered when donations are received and peacekeeping quotas are met. This multi-
dimensional approach to supporting peacekeeping operations offers incentives to countries to
provide peacekeeping operations with the full quantity of funds promised by UN Member
States.

C. NON-FINANCIAL PRODUCT INVESTMENT MECHANISMS

The Special Committee underlines the importance of promptly identifying infrastructure
projects for reconstruction in post-conflict areas. The Special Committee suggests that
peacekeeping personnel prioritize the identification of projects suitable for investment from both
the public and private sectors from the conflict region and from abroad. Sharing risks and burdens of reconstruction between the loan bank and the investor with the means of a participant banking system guarantee both short-term and long-term development and reconstruction as it has proven a very successful tool in reconstruction, particularly in the Arab region.

D. THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE POST-CONFLICT

78. The Special Committee recommends that an organ such as the Security Council include a local female perspective on the current socio-political situation in post-conflict areas because of their difference in perspective compared to men in the same region. Institutions such as governments, police forces, and the military within post-conflict zones (PCZs) should increase the number of females in their respective bodies to further PCS efforts and ensure sustainable peace following the conclusion of UN missions.

79. The Special Committee recommends the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) and subsequent resolutions as part of a broader framework for strengthening and developing the implementation of zero-tolerance laws in regards to punishing sexual assault offenders. The prosecution of all sexual offenders will aid in the stabilization of post-conflict regions by establishing the authority of the rule of law.

80. The Special Committee proposes the creation of educational campaigns based on women’s role in societies in post-conflict situations to convey the importance of women’s rights and capabilities at even greater level. In making this recommendation, the Special Committee reaffirms the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, meeting the Millennium Development Goal 3 of supporting gender equality and women’s empowerment.

81. The Special Committee proposes that the local regional post-conflict stabilization forces are further informed and counseled about the significance and effects of sexual violence and exploitation of women and young girls after the UN mission has expired.

a. Peacekeepers ought to provide more aid in the form of counseling, psychological, and trauma services to victims of sexual violence. These services should include counseling and psychological services to enable victims of sexual violence to develop the tools necessary to deal with these instances. These services will provide rape victims with rehabilitation and coping mechanisms, thereby help stabilize post-conflict zones.

b. In addition, women peacekeepers should take on the role of educators and mentors for young women and girls in order to inform them on the topic of sexual exploitation, sexual discrimination and other forms of sexual based violence and provide guidance to aid in PCS and perpetual peace.

82. Furthermore, women should be encouraged to share and utilize their experience for in peacebuilding initiatives as mediators and activists. Social forums could provide an all-
encompassing group of women from the local community with a safe space to discuss gender-sensitive issues. The forums would seek to include local female leaders, activist organizations, and NGO’s speaking and connecting with local women. Furthermore, the forums could promote collective efforts for public outreach campaigns disseminating gender-sensitive information to local entities. The forum would also provide more aid in the form of counseling, psychological, and trauma services to victims of sexual violence to women become healthier more contributing members of the community. The local forum would be facilitated by women peacekeepers and staff trained in women sensitive issues in order to negate any intervention from unwanted forces. Building effective partnerships with civil society and mobilizing financial and political support is a crucial step for these initiatives to be successful.

83. The Special Committee supports the promotion of women into influential and/or leadership roles. The Special Committee advocates the establishment of a baseline in gender equity in partnership with the Declaration of Human Rights, but strongly encourages nation-states to take proactive measures to fully integrate women into influential and/or leadership roles in the public and private sectors. This Committee recommends that all Member States abide by these standards, with consideration of cultural customs, national priorities, and international norms and policies.

84. The Special Committee recognizes that women peacekeepers, police, and advisors play a crucial role in the stabilization of a post-conflict society, as a female perspective helps combat gender-based sexual violence, implement rights for women and girls, and empower women. New efforts must be introduced in order to increase the percentage of women peacekeepers. Therefore, the Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly revisit its reimbursement rate policy for troop and police contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs), and that they implement a policy which provides these countries greater reimbursements for the provision of women peacekeepers within the current reimbursement process. This would incentivize Member States to contribute more women troops and police, thereby meeting the call made by the Security Council in Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) for increased women participation in peacekeeping and reaching the DPKO’s goal of women representing 20% of all peacekeepers.

85. In addition, the Special Committee suggests that troop-contributing countries actively promote women as UN peacekeepers whether as military, police or civilian personnel, possibly through informational material about UN peacekeeping aimed to appeal to women. Additionally, select experienced female peacekeepers can present their own experiences and serve as contact personnel and role models for potential female peacekeepers.

86. The Special Committee recognizes the value that all-women police units bring to post-conflict stabilization efforts. We therefore propose the creation of more special all-women police units in peacekeeping operations, similar to the one which served in UNMIL, in order to better address the needs of women victims of sexual and/or domestic violence, and to better protect women from such violence.

87. The Special Committee recommends that the DPKO, DFS, and individual Member States integrate peacekeeping strategies specific to protecting women against sexual violence and other
forms of violence in post-conflict situations, including, but not limited to, armed patrols and
escorts, joint protection teams, quick impact projects, cordon-and-search operations, and other
techniques suggested in the 2012 UN Women report on addressing conflict-related sexual
violence.

88. The Special Committee does not believe that the original deadline for the Security Council’s
goal for attaining a ratio of 20 percent female peacekeepers, set by the DPKO for completion by
2014, is realistic, and suggests an extension of the deadline to 2019.

89. The Special Committee emphasizes with appreciation the fact that with the implementation
of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, improvements have
been made to the training of uniformed capacities to include a gender perspective. In order to
obtain better results, the special committee calls upon the general assembly to take action by
encouraging member states to evaluate the current status of their national and regional training
program on the matter of gender sensitive issues, such as sexual and gender based violence. To
ensure that these evaluations become actions of change, the special committee recommends that
these evaluations should be followed by the implementations of specific action plans.

90. The Special Committee continues to appreciate the fact that efforts have been made to
include a gender perspective in the training of civilian staff. The Special Committee recommends
that the General Assembly call upon Member States to adopt standardized policies regarding the
role of women in civilian staff training in order to enhance the implementation of a gender
perspective.

E. INVOLVEMENT, THE RULE OF LAW, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, AND
NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH

91. The Special Committee reaffirms the importance of upholding the spirit and mandates of the
UN Charter in all peacekeeping operations. The Special Committee therefore advises the General
Assembly to uphold Articles 1 and 2 in the course of ensuring human security for all within post-
conflict zones.

92. The Special Committee recognizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility of
maintaining international peace and security pursuant to Article 24 of the UN Charter. The
legitimate deployment of peacekeeping forces results only from the directive and guidance of the
Security Council pursuant from Article 42 of the UN Charter.

93. The Special Committee promotes the mission of the Policy Evaluation and Training Division
and its two sections: Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS) and the Integrated Training
Service (ITS). These institutions require the resources and ability to gather pertinent information
for policy formation to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in operations throughout missions at
all levels.

94. The Special Committee suggests an overview of the Department of Field Support (DFS) to
ensure that sufficient resources are available for the DFS to carry out its mandate. Moreover, this
mandate ought to include an evaluation of particular missions, their costs, core issues the mission
is to resolve, and the possible integration and collaboration with relevant parties to resolve found
problems so to maximize the success of the mission.

95. In order to ensure effective mandates, a common culture of civic involvement between
peacekeepers and their chain of command should be developed with involved Member States.
Clear mandates, open communication and understanding of both regional cultural factors and
those between peacekeepers will further contribute to ensuring that peacekeepers and civilians
are protected in the highest regard.

96. The Special Committee encourages regional organizations such as but not limited to the
European Union, NATO, ECOWAS, and the African Union to share their experiences and best
practices in regards to regional standby forces and rapid deployment forces in order to
supplement the effort of the PBPS in deployment policy and strategy.

97. The Special Committee recognizes that reestablishing the rule of law, effective law
enforcement, and judicial capacities are of the utmost important foundations in reconstructing
stability within post-conflict nations and regions. Moreover, the transparency of and congruence
with human and civil rights of the aforementioned foundations is vital in maintaining peace and
order within post-conflict nations and regions.

98. The Special Committee suggests to the General Assembly that impartial and proven
nongovernmental organizations, peacekeeping field leaders, and the Security Council actively
communicate and collaborate to review the transparency and effectiveness of a post-conflict
state’s legal and political institutions responsible for ensuring and enforcing the rule of law.

99. The Special Committee suggests that all relevant actors, in conjunction with leading experts
in relevant fields, develop programmes of action that will promote the highest capacity for
maintaining the rule of law, judicial effectiveness and transparency, and legitimate enforcement.

100. The Special Committee further suggests all relevant parties make strong efforts to ensure
enforcement, adjudication, and legislative institutions act in harmony towards common goals and
interests of the post-conflict state, and moreover endeavor to maintain peace and order through
their unified goals and interests.

101. The enforcement, legislation, and adjudication of law within a post-conflict nation ought to
reflect the normative values found within human rights agreements. The Special Committee
emphasizes that capacity building for human rights with respect to the rule of law within post-
conflict nations ought to be included within peacekeeping mandates. This is a necessary function
of stabilizing post-conflict areas to ensure that governing branches of the post-conflict nation
retain legitimacy in their actions.

102. The Special Committee recommends that peacekeeping mandates continue to include the
assistance for electoral processes in relevant states, and the continuation of promoting of
democratic values in conjunction with UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) activities.
103. In accordance with creating the necessary foundations for the rule of law, the Special Committee stresses the importance of SSR. In essence, to not only maintain peace but to facilitate it, Member States must retain a legitimate monopoly over violence so the rule of law is maintained within their borders. The Special Committee therefore would like to particularly stress the establishment of security sector capacity building to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, SSR should incorporate mandates including the protection of human rights so as to ensure the proper maintenance of human security, as well as legitimacy of security actors within post-conflict nations and regions.

104. The Special Committee recommends three aspects SSR reforms ought to reflect: forming a unified spirit and coherent strategy within a national security force; ensuring security forces are adequately equipped and trained to maintain the peace; and clear and coherent security structures are sustained within a post-conflict nation or region.

105. The Special Committee recommends that Member States assist in providing security equipment to legitimized post-conflict Member States in accordance with international law for trade of armaments and military equipment.

106. The Special Committee recommends that Member States, NGOs, and the Security Council assist a post-conflict nation in developing strong and effective security sector structures upon request of the host state. This process can be facilitated either through direct consultations, bilateral or multilateral relations, or through the adherence to commonly accepted normative values currently followed by Member States in this regard. Many various functional and effective security sector models are currently in existence. A thorough research and developmental program should be undertaken before SSR begins to gain insight into the requirements of the host country. Replication of an existing security system model that best fits the particularities of a host nation would be the most effective, efficient, and direct method in assuring SSR is successful.

107. The Special Committee further suggests the implementation of methods, including facilitation of consultations, dialogues, and negotiations between parties; assisting in integrating post-conflict nations into economic unions, and assisting in meeting requirements for agreements and loans. This would greatly further cooperation and collaboration between post-conflict nations and international organizations (IOs), such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or other arrangements, to assist in allocating capital and expertise or facilitating trade arrangements to assist in economic restructuring and reconstruction.

108. The Special Committee furthermore advises that the General Assembly review the structures and processes by which economic stabilization and peacekeeping coincide so to make this as effective and efficient as possible. A general review of individual cases ought to take place before investment and economic restructuring is undertaken so that investment, aid, and efforts are not hindered by unforeseen inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.

109. The PBC presents great capacity for the facilitating and integration of processes by which various UN organs, NGOs, Member States, and other relevant actors can actively participate in peacebuilding within post-conflict nations and regions. The Special Committee therefore
suggests the General Assembly review the financial aspects, logistical aspects, and structural aspects of the PBC in order to ensure the expert advice found within this organization can be fully utilized for nation building. Moreover, the integration of relevant bodies would assist in adding to the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in its current struggles in the peacebuilding process.

F. FINANCIAL ISSUES

110. The Special Committee reaffirms General Assembly resolution 55/231 on results-based budgeting for peacekeeping operations, and emphasizes that it should encompass not only the sole costs of the in-conflict deployment, but also the foreseeable costs of peace-building efforts. This approach will bolster the likelihood of success and sustainability of the post-conflict stabilization efforts.

111. The Special Committee recommends the implementation of a budgetary framework that takes into consideration the different timeframes of the commitment to peace and addresses both the immediate security concerns, as well as the long-term development needs. These two dimensions are inextricably linked, and there should be a robust and smooth transition through the stages of conflict management beginning with conflict emergence and culminating in post-conflict peacebuilding. Such a transition will not obtain unless bureaucratic and funding structures are reformed to reduce redundancy and to provide greater accountability and transparency. The necessary performance improvement will necessarily require a long-term vision for the incorporation of and/or the cooperation with relevant actors, which operate in post-conflict settings.

112. The Special Committee urges the consolidation of strategies that address immediate security and political stability concerns on the ground, both on doctrinal and financial terms. In this context, there is a need for a comprehensive review of the mandate of Special Political Missions by this Committee, in fulfillment of our responsibility for the comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping.

113. The Special Committee recognizes the need for operational flexibility in response to severely unstable deployment environments, but also stresses the imperative to enhance doctrinal coherence, accountability, transparency, and consistent performance through the development of a standing framework. Such a framework should include a provision for funding of Special Political Missions through the Peacekeeping Fund. This arrangement would properly allocate the financial burden for such a critical component of the UN peace and security architecture, and not through the diversion of closed peacekeeping account resources intended for reimbursement to Troop and Police Contributing Countries.

114. The Special Committee recommends that all regional arrangements and individual Member States, especially those with emerging economies, wield an increased role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. To accomplish this, the Committee endorses the designation of a percentage of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for peace-building purposes to promote closer and deeper cooperation with national and regional stakeholders. The Committee recommends the funding of security and development activities through the ODA/aid budgets, in
accordance with the guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Development (OECD). Funding priorities should include:

1. management of security expenditures;
2. civil society initiatives in the security sector;
3. protection and reintegration of child soldiers through legislation;
4. security system reform;
5. peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution developed by civilians;
6. control and prevention of proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
7. nuclear energy in peaceful capacities; and
8. reimbursement of net bilateral costs of UN peace operations.

115. The Special Committee, in accordance with the DAC criteria for ODA eligibility, encourages institutions involved in this process to preclude funding of the following activities:

1. enforcement aspects of peacekeeping, such as mine clearance;
2. supply and financing of military equipment or services;
3. counterinsurgency or anti-terrorism training for paramilitary functions;
4. military applications of nuclear energy; and
5. anti-terrorism activities.

116. The Special Committee urges the exclusion of items mentioned in the previous paragraph to emphasize that under the proposed framework, ODA is not the recommended funding channel for UN-related activities that concern security objectives exclusively. Additionally, our aim is to ensure that recently stabilized and emerging nations are able to retain high levels of sovereignty in observance of the cornerstone principles of the UN.

117. The Special Committee recommends involvement of all relevant stakeholders to guarantee that peacebuilding be governed by a consistent framework and implemented with a clear timeline in order to promote national ownership and greater cooperation among the UN, host countries and regional partners.

118. The Special Committee reaffirms the importance of a cost-effective investment in stability and a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping. It further encourages regional and sub-
regional organizations to continue opening spaces for multilateral institutions, as well as public and private efforts developed in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

G. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL STANDBY PEACE BUILDING TEAMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

119. The Special Committee recommends that regional organizations establish standby peacebuilding teams to educate civilians, military, and police in post-conflict zones.

120. The Special Committee recalls articles 52 and 54 set on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and stresses the need for cooperation between the UN and regional partners.

121. The Special Committee also suggests that the UN take into consideration the different aspects in order to ensure the continuous operational readiness and mobility of the peacebuilding teams.

122. The Special Committee underlines the paramount importance of protecting civilians and securing the legal framework in order to avoid the reoccurrence of conflict. The protection of civilians must continue to be the international community’s highest call of duty and essential mandate. To achieve this end the establishment of an open dialogue between all parties involved in the conflict zone is recommendable. This must extend not only to governmental organizations but local population through a grassroots effort.

123. In the light of the recent Security Council Resolution 2086 stressing the need for a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping, it is necessary to have expert teams responding to the specific fields of difficulties in installing a stable peace situation in the aftermath of a conflict. The Special Committee considers that a more autonomous recruitment will increase the efficiency of the post conflict stabilization efforts. To this end, the Special Committee recommends that a standardized recruitment of civilians experts should be conducted by a UN specific body such as the DPKO, which formulates a comprehensive staffing strategy.

124. The Special Committee emphasizes the need for post-conflict nations to become self-sustaining and responsive towards urgent crisis situations. To this end, peacekeeping operations must prioritize the achievement of conditions to help countries through the transition from conflict to peace and development.

125. The Special Committee seeks to incorporate infrastructure into the peacebuilding process. Currently the peace and security forces are comprised of military, police, and civilian personnel, but infrastructure has not yet been addressed in these areas. In this, a new standard will be set for the peacebuilding process. The suggested four components of the new infrastructure initiative are transportation, communication, energy, and sanitation and water supply. This renewed focus on infrastructure provides an opportunity for civilian education essential to economic growth and recovery, and the promotion of self-sustainment at the grass root level.
126. The Special Committee acknowledges a need to give more control to the regional organizations for peacekeeping initiatives. Regional organizations can supply an imperative understanding of culture and customs that a global organization simply cannot. Furthermore, full transparency and intensified communication between the operational personnel, the troops, local and national authorities, local experts, as well as the public, are recommended. An open dialogue between these parties will help the mission to be successful. Direct contact with the local population facilitates the legitimization of the operation as well as the ability of the personnel and troops to respect local needs and interests. To further enhance the effectiveness in this matter, personnel and troops should consist of local civilians and soldiers from the host country.

127. The Special Committee urges the General Assembly to assign the Senior Advisory Committee to the oversight of the regional bodies with respect to financial and humanitarian aspects, in addition to ensuring transparency. Simultaneously ensuring accountability and sovereignty for the regional bodies is critical to the successful implementation of the peacebuilding teams. Unlike SHIRBRIG, the peacebuilding teams would operate at the regional level, thus avoiding prior mistakes. If a regional organization does not have the capacity to develop a full team, then the regional organizations that have that capacity to do so would act as a voluntary pool for those that do not. As well, if a particular team is less equipped than others, either financially or otherwise, it is recommended that a donation process be put in place to ensure said team is adequately equipped for their mission.

H. STRUCTURAL AND ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES WITHIN DPKO AND DFS

128. The Special Committee recognizes a near dire situation that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) face in the capacity of carrying out their mandates. The Special Committee therefore advises the General Assembly to undertake a general overview of these departments in two aspects. Firstly, that both the general structures and infrastructure these departments have at their disposal is sufficient in carrying out their mandates. Secondly, that the overview addresses the concerns in regards to the lack of resources, particularly in terms of staffing and personnel, is sufficient in effectively carrying out mandates. These offices are indispensable in ensuring a mission’s success, especially within the evolving nature of peacekeeping. In essence, strain within these departments will directly translate into ineffective and incomplete missions that risk conflict relapse and destabilization in post-conflict states. If peacekeeping is to continue expanding in both the amount of missions and breadth of mandates, the underlying bureaucratic organizations that organize peacekeeping must reflect this evolving nature as well.

129. The Special Committee advises the need for increased accountability standards for individual entities involved in the UN peacekeeping operations. The Special Committee also advises increased accountability for participants in post-conflict stabilization efforts through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question (ACABQ) as well as the development of a new accountability and transparency mechanism for inter-agency involvement between the DPKO, DFS, peacekeeping missions and other related bodies. To ensure the continued involvement and contributions of Member States in UN peacekeeping, proper financial and asset-management is essential.
I. STRUCTURE OF RESOURCES CONTRIBUTION

130. The Special Committee supports any and all cooperation efforts by the DPKO, Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and Political Affairs (DPA) with the national government while preparing. This can be especially implemented by, but not limited to the invitation of country representatives of states in a post-conflict stage to the responsible integrated operational teams (IOTs) of the DPKO and throughout the entire process of peacekeeping efforts. The goal being to accelerate the abilities and capacities of the national government in the long term to independently secure a peaceful state and the rule of law in its country.

131. The Special Committee recognizes the need to cooperate closely with the national government and regional arrangements in order to coordinate a need-based adaptation of post-conflict stabilization efforts on a case-by-case basis.

132. A national government is the ultimate expert on the situation of the conflict in its country and the cultural circumstances and can therefore be an enriching parameter in ensuring transition from conflict. Representatives from national governments and national governments serving as experts to the circumstances on the field can greatly enhance preparation work while still remaining in a timely effective time frame.

133. The Special Committee suggests enhancing the information management of peacekeeping resources in order to augment the rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces, for example through an increased emphasis on pre-deployment resource data gathering information on the extent and content of contribution capacities, countries are willing to provide to a given situation that requires the establishment or enlargement of peacekeeping operations. Member States would voluntarily outline resources they have available for specific peace keeping operations. By sharing information on available resources it will speed deployment timelines, increase efficiency, and overcome asymmetries of information. Countries should not be unduly strained by contributing resources to missions in which they have a scarcity.

134. Information management should be located in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and, if necessary, is to be treated discreetly. Having a coherent and well-structured document management system in place from the very start will also aid the consistent and cumulative build-up of knowledge and “organizational memory” for a continuing and ongoing lessons learned process.

135. This database gives an overview of the possible resources which can be regressed by the DPKO in their preparation for planning peacekeeping operations after having been mandated by the Security Council. The information in this database is given voluntarily and has the overall intention to support preparation efforts carried out by the DPKO.

J. STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN A MULTINATIONAL NETWORK
136. The Special Committee notes a current lack of standardization and multinational cooperation of peacekeeping training. Improvement is necessary in the areas of training center networking on a multinational level, information sharing, and training modules, including but not limited to sanitation, sexual violence, cultural sensitivity and mediation, in mission training, as well as the use of special technology.

137. The Special Committee welcomes recent efforts to address standardization of training modules and equipment by implementing the 12-scenario based training exercises, prepared by the Secretariat, including a module on conflict related sexual violence.

138. The Special Committee recommends to all Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC and PCC) to implement domestic peacekeeping training programs modeled after the International Association of Peacekeeping Centers. Further it promotes best practice sharing between well-established peacekeeping training centers and newly established ones. Further the Committee emphasizes the need for more training facilities especially for police units and civilian personnel, such as but not limited to, the Center for Excellence in Police Stability Units.

139. The Special Committee urges troop and police contributing countries to hold more joint training efforts also before the mission to create common standards in training, and especially in logistical support for missions. A network structure of peacekeeping centers in countries among regional organizations, as well as world wide, should serve as a basis by creating joint capacities.

140. The Special Committee recommends Member States to better orient their training modules to inform peacekeepers on the cultural differences to the region, that they are being send to by utilizing experts who are preferably from the region in question and by incorporating testimony from past peacekeepers and other UN official from the region in question into the training process. The Special Committee is convinced that this effort will be reflected thoroughly by the strategic framework of UN peacekeeping training that addresses the language, religion and tradition, gender roles, and history of the area that they are being deployed to in order to maintain the integrity of the nation and its people.

141. The Special Committee recommends that the training module that concerns sanitation and hygiene, which peacekeepers undergo, is reformed and intensified in order to better educate peacekeepers and mitigate the risk of the transmission of communicable diseases.

K. TRAINING ON HIGH-TECH USAGE

142. The Special Committee promotes cooperative monitoring principles to enhance core peacekeeping functions. Further the Committee is of the opinion that monitoring technologies improve a mission ability to observe, access, report and respond to events demonstrating the credibility and impartiality of UN peacekeeping and bolstering local acceptance of the mission. Strengthening the effectiveness of operations, monitoring technologies also enhance the safety of UN personnel and civilians. The usage of High-technology equipment of UN peacekeeping missions allows monitoring larger territories while reducing the costs of peacekeeping operations.
143. The Special Committee recommends the full implementation of Global Positioning Systems for all operating peacekeepers, including those in post conflict environments, in order to better implement their mandate the fullest extent by providing safety for peacekeepers, civilian populations, and commerce.

144. The Special Committee further recommends, especially for mission regarding post conflict stabilization in areas that require additional security, the implementation of other forms of technology such as but not limited to alarmed fences, personal entry identifiers, metal/chemical detectors, and portable x-ray machines in concert with additional border security.

145. The Special Committee suggests implementing various forms of ground based sensors in order to help peacekeepers monitor border areas that, under normal conditions, personnel only visits during infrequent patrols.

146. The Special Committee notes that sensors mounted in aircrafts and unmanned aerial vehicles should supplement the ground monitoring in areas such as post-conflict regions with extremely large, inaccessible or dangerous objects.

147. The Special Committee recommends the escalation in the use of aerial imagery such as visual photography, infrared, radar imagery, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. These would be used to improve the quality of aerial monitoring at night even through cloud or vegetation. Additionally, thermal images on an aerial platform can help to detect and identify groups of people.

148. The Special Committee finds that it is necessary for general dissemination information to connect fiber optic cables and increase Internet capabilities inside of post conflict zones.

149. The Special Committee urges peacekeepers to consider the adoption of adhesive barcodes, particle/reflective tags, and secure Internet websites. This should be done when safe, practical, and readily available in order to fully catalog the inventory records of weapons storage sites.

150. The Special Committee urges countries that are more technically developed to share their knowledge, concerning high-tech as well as basic technology and to consider training capacities when applicable. This should be in conjunction with efforts to improve international cooperation by a multinational network of Peacekeeping Centers.

151. The Special Committee suggests that in conjunction with the World Trade Organization, as program should be established aimed to eliminate import and export tariffs, and import quotas specifically targeted towards technology associated with stabilizing areas of post-conflict focusing on technology associated with security. This would include but is not limited to: GPS, metal detectors, x-ray imagery, radar, radios, etc. This would essentially lower the price of any countries associated within the zone. Lower prices would not only propagate the proposed technology, but would also make it more accessible through creating a larger market for technology associated with this free trade zone.

L. STRENGTHENING LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
152. The Special Committee expects future reviews to reflect the reality of regional diversity and takes into account the complexity of current peacekeeping operations. In order to ensure progress in peacekeeping operations, the Special Committee is also convinced that comprehensive evaluation, including pragmatic benchmarks, of the work of peacekeeping personnel is completed. Seeing strengthening local security forces as a promising approach towards the goal of creating international communicational lines and cooperation among Member States. This is to be understood as a long-term measure. The strengthening of the communicational lines between local forces, regional actors and their capacities and the UN is crucial for the success and adaptability of peacekeeping missions. The Special Committee stresses the importance of maintaining peace and security as the primary responsibility, thereby recommending that there always is an intact communication between all parties involved.

153. The Special Committee affirms that during the process of strengthening local and national ownership of peacekeeping operations regional particularities have to be kept in mind. The establishment of Lesson Learned Unit has been proven to be a successful tool in reviewing and assessing best practices.

154. Therefore, the Special Committee recommends the following to be taken under consideration by the UN:

a. Improving the cooperation between UN peacekeeping forces and advisors with local authorities and civil society by establishing a more efficient communication, including increasing transparency concerning chain of command and responsibility of carrying out a mission.

b. Increasing transparency and efficiency of communication between local authorities and responsibility holders at UN through establishing more regular contacts and enhancing formal reporting of information.

c. Strengthening local security forces through improving already existing networks of training and education, standardizing regional arrangements’ capacities and intensifying international military, police and civilian peacekeeping exercises, at the same time cooperating closely with local leaders and the community.

d. Taking measures to expand these facilities for training and education of police and military forces of the regarding regions in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, creating incentives for possible supporters.

M. TRAINING PEACEKEEPERS IN REGARDS TO MEDIATION AND CULTURAL SENSITIVITY

155. The Special Committee emphasizes the importance of the inclusion of mediation skills into training and stresses paragraph 11 of the Brahimi Report, underlining the importance of mediation in peacemaking and reiterates S/PRST/2010/1 stating the Security Council’s commitment to mediation to settle conflicts peacefully, therefore encouraging further
cooperation of Member States on this topic. The Special Committee underlines paragraph 13 of
the UN Secretary-General’s reports A/65/680 (2011) and clauses No. 5 and No. 48 of A/67/632
(2012), appreciating the efforts of several states in the mediation process in Darfur. The outcome
document of this process – the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) – is a proof of
mediation and reconciliation being integral to achieve peace, security and post-conflict
stabilization, methods that should thus be more emphasized in peacekeeping efforts. Besides, the
Special Committee stresses S/RES/2063 (2012) recognizing the DDPD and its implementation to
be the basis for lasting peace and security in Darfur, which can be seen as a model for resolving
other conflict situations. Additionally, the Special Committee highlights operative clause 2 and
clause 8, lit. (c) of S/RES/2086 (2013) stressing the importance of peacekeeping to enhance post-
conflict peacekeeping, that can be accomplished by improving mediation skills.

156. The Special Committee also asserts that mediation is a successful tool in the stabilization
process of post-conflict regions, and it affirms that mediation should be utilized more frequently
in all post-conflict areas to create cohesion among all parties involved.

157. The Special Committee strongly recommends to the UN and its Member States to support
mediation programs for post-conflict regions and collaborate further on this issue in order to
open communication lines and enhance understanding.

158. The Special Committee suggests to the General Assembly to incorporate more mediation
and dispute settlement mechanisms in peacekeeping operations. Mediation efforts have proven to
support diplomatic discussions and reconciliation, for example in the Doha Document for Peace
in Darfur (DDPD).

159. Leading officials as well as peacekeeping troops and advisors deployed should thus be
trained more profoundly in mediation and conflict resolution. To that end, the Special Committee
recommends the establishment of training programs for the aforementioned troops to be taught in
basic skills to settle small disputes between conflicting parties and to supervise ceasefires,
thereby allowing peacekeeping troops to be seen as advisors and enhancing personal safety.

a. The Special Committee encourages UN Member States that have gained
experience in mediation in conflict and post-conflict situations to share
information, expertise and best practices on these issues with other UN Member
States. To that end, useful means of communication and information-sharing
should be established among UN Member States.

b. As a further measure for troop mediation capacity on an ad hoc basis in case of
urgent need, principle guidelines of mediation should be resumed and immediately
accessible at any time in areas, where peacekeeping troops are deployed in order to
prevent reemerging conflicts.

160. The Special Committee understands cultural sensitivity for UN peacekeeping operations as
one of the most crucial aspects during the phases of political reforming, security sector reform
and economic recovery. The Special Committee highly suggests bringing forward a
comprehensive plan that adapted to the local environment for each mission and following
through the detail to achieve greater efficiency. The issue of cultural sensitivity has not been comprehensively addressed as needed. Optimal outcomes are contingent on acceptance of the peacekeepers by the peoples. The Special Committee is concerned that peacekeeping forces are not being trained to be culturally sensitive in many post-conflict regions, which in turn impedes the stabilization process. As a cause can be seen the current ad hoc structure that newly formed peacekeeping operations have at this stage.

161. To better address the need of post-conflict region, the Special Committee encourages a higher proportion of civilian specialists, police and local voluntary members among the peacekeeping personnel especially during post-conflict stabilization operations.

162. The Special Committee requests the Secretariat to inform the troop-contributing countries (TCC) as well as other resource-contributing Member States of any changes to the training of peacekeepers, thereby standardizing the training process as well as keeping all peacekeepers up-to-date on any changes in information that would assist them in their tasks.

N. CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION IN PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS

163. The Special Committee reinforces the importance of inward development in the stabilization of post-conflict territories. The Committee underscores the need for the education and skill-building of national civilians in the country involved to implement self-sustainment and eventually providing a national contribution to peace-building efforts within UN peacekeeping missions to divide responsibility more evenly between UN forces, regional arrangements and the nations themselves. Such measures not only allow a faster transition away from reliance on international aid, but also provide a method for nations to retain sovereignty throughout the peacekeeping process.

164. The Special Committee suggests the implementation of educational programs for national civilians. Such programs would ideally go hand in hand with peacekeeping missions to prepare the nation for the departure of UN forces and ease transition from international assistance to national independence. UN experts should focus on reducing direct financial and operative support and opening the path for national civilians to facilitate the nation-rebuilding process. Educational programs should concentrate on skill-building and should be regionally and culturally appropriate.

165. Educational programs in peace building should be seen as a collaborative effort between national civilians and regional, governmental and peacekeeping forces to build practical skills necessary for economic stabilization and subsistence. Within this skill-building, the Special Committee recommends a specific focus on the inclusion of women and youth to further strengthen peace-building efforts.

166. Educational programs may also foster regional and local cooperation through skill-based education that promotes capacity building. Such cooperation improves communal sentiment, which is critical to post-conflict nation-building and the reformation of national identity.
167. Various states with highly selective civilian personnel systems are informed by their past experiences in peacekeeping and as a result are among the most organized and efficient of peacekeepers. The Special Committee recommends the sharing of best practices between countries with differing expertise. In the case of post-conflict peacekeeping, the Special Committee encourages collaboration between nations with civilian personnel expertise and those without.

168. The Special Committee additionally recommends the implementation of concentrated information and documentation centers that are nationally run in conjunction with regional experts to improve the access of information to the population. The centers would be responsible for informing the people on previous conflicts and post conflict strategies through multi-media, documentaries and interactive measures. These centers would contribute to the growing awareness of the causes of conflict and how to handle similar situations in the future.

O. ACCORDANCE OF LAW INCORPORATING CIVILIAN NEED

169. The Special Committee suggests the promotion of the adherence to the law with the development of standardized procedures to safeguard citizens in post-conflict. To achieve this, it is necessary to establish provisional judicial structures, implement concrete measures to ensure transparency and judicial independence, and maintain an appropriate ratio of the number police and law enforcement personnel to the number of citizens, according to international standards. The involvement of preventive personnel to investigate international and local crimes is critical to upholding the rule of law as is the incorporation of former participants of war into the peace building process, ensuring that post-conflict strife does not reoccur.

170. Reform processes in the areas of democracy and the rule of law foster close collaboration between citizens and their national government, with the aim of guaranteeing equitable participation of the entire population in the development process, especially for women.

171. The Special Committee emphasizes the need for special protection of former participants of war by monitoring their vulnerable state. A victim-of-post-conflict disability program to reintegrate the victims of the conflict with physical and mental injuries through the cooperation of the peacekeeping operation and the national government should be developed. Inclusion of former war-participants in the peace-building process is critical to ensuring their reintegration and participation within society. Furthermore, the Special Committee recommends the inclusion of experts dealing with such struggles within the peacekeeping operations personnel.