GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE
BACKGROUND GUIDE 2013

Written By: María Luisa Ortega, Benjamin Oppermann, Nyla Langford, James Fukazawa
Additional Contributions By: Thecla Prentiss

NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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17 - 21 March - Conference A
24 - 28 March - Conference B
1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed here. Mail papers by 1 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_ConfA_MarsCollege).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.nya@nmun.org or positionpapers.nyb@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

Note: This email should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_ConfA_MarsCollege).

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2013

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OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers | positionpapers.nya@nmun.org |
Secretary-General, Conference A | secgen.nya@nmun.org |
Secretary-General, Conference B | secgen.nyb@nmun.org |
Director(s)-General | dirgen.ny@nmun.org |
NMUN Office | info@nmun.org |
Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2013 National Model United Nations Conference. As part of the volunteer staff for the General Assembly First Committee, we are aiming to facilitate your educational experience at the conference in New York to the best of our ability. This year’s Directors are Maria Luisa Ortega (Conference A), and Benjamin Oppermann (Conference B). Nyla Langford (Conference A) and James Fukazawa (Conference B) will serve as your Assistant Directors. Maria Luisa Ortega graduated from the Universidad San Francisco de Quito with degrees in International Relations, Sociology, and Latin American Studies. She also holds a Master of Arts Degree (M.A.) in International Relations with a focus in Security and Human Rights from Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales. Currently, María Luisa works as an Adviser to the Ecuadorian Minister of Higher Education. This is María Luisa’s fourth year as a NMUN staff member. Benjamin Oppermann is in his fifth year as a Director for NMUN. Benjamin has a M.A. in International Relations. Benjamin is currently working for the European Parliament in Brussels.

Nyla Langford holds a Bachelor degree in English from Texas Christian University and she is currently working for a cancer research organization in Texas. This will be Nyla’s second year in staff. James Fukazawa received his Bachelor’s degree in Political Science with a concentration in political philosophy from California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB); James also has a M.A. in Social and Political Sciences – also from CSUSB. James currently resides in the greater Los Angeles area.

This year’s topics under discussion for the General Assembly First Committee are:

1. Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
2. Regulating Information and Telecommunication Technology in the Context of Security
3. Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects

The General Assembly First Committee is the United Nations’ core body for addressing international matters related to the maintenance of peace and security through the development of a disarmed and safe world. As such, your research will be reflected in the resolutions you will adopt in committee, the position papers you write before the conference, and the working papers you collaborate on during committee sessions.

This background guide will give you an overview of the topics at hand and the work of the committee; nevertheless, it should only serve as an introduction to your research and preparation for the conference. The references listed for each topic provides you a good starting point for your own research, but we highly encourage you to deepen your knowledge further, especially considering your country’s position. Each delegation is requested to submit a position paper, which reflects your research on the topics. Please take note of the NMUN policies on the website and in the delegate preparation guide regarding plagiarism, codes of conduct/dress code/sexual harassment, awards philosophy/evaluation method, etc. Adherence to these guidelines is mandatory.

If you have any questions regarding your preparation for the committee and the Conference itself, please feel free to contact any of the substantive staff of the General Assembly First Committee or the Under-Secretaries-General for the Department of the General Assembly, Kristina Mader (Conference A) and Daniel Leyva Jr. (Conference B). We wish you all the best in your preparation for the Conference and look forward to seeing you in March.

Conference A
Maria Luisa Ortega
Director
Nyla Langford
Assistant Director
Conference B
Benjamin Oppermann
Director
James Fukazawa
Assistant Director

The NCCA-NMUN is a Non-Governmental Organization associated with the United Nations and a 501(c) 3 non-profit organization of the United States.
Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2013 NMUN Conference

For NMUN-New York 2013, each delegation submits one position paper for each assigned committee. A delegate’s role as a Member State, Observer State, Non-Governmental Organization, etc. should affect the way a position paper is written. To understand these differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should review each delegation’s policy regarding the topics of the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country’s position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in entirely original material. The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation’s position papers may be given an award as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below and be of high substantive standard, using adequate language and showing in-depth research. While we encourage innovative proposals, we would like to remind delegates to stay within the mandate of their respective committee and keep a neutral and respectful tone. Similarly to the minus point-policy implemented at the conference to discourage disruptive behavior, position papers that use offensive language may entail negative grading when being considered for awards. Please refer to the sample paper following this message for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are required for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must not exceed two single-sided pages (one double-sided paper, if printed)
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at one inch for the whole paper
- Country/NGO name, school name and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page,
- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers
- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections
To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf format required) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2012. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.

2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue, Conference A: positionpapers nya@nmun.org or Conference B: positionpapers nyb@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2013 (GMT-5)**.

Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_ConfA_Mars College).

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Hannah Birkenkötter, Director-General (Conference A), or Nicholas Warino, Director-General (Conference B), at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee’s mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and it is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location, your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely,

**Conference A**
Hannah Birkenkötter
Director-General
hannah@nmun.org

**Conference B**
Nicholas Warino
Director-General
nick@nmun.org
Delegation from Represented by
The United Mexican States (Name of College)

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion; Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions; as well as The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. The Mexican Delegation first would like to convey its gratitude being elected and pride to serve as vice-president of the current General Assembly Plenary session.

I. The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion

The principles of equal sovereignty of states and non-interference, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, have always been cornerstones of Mexican foreign policy. The legitimate right to interfere by the use of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, is laid down in Article 41 of the UN-charter and reserves the right to the Security Council.

Concerning the violation of this principle by the application of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations, H.E. Ambassador to the United Nations Enrique Berruga Filloy underlined in 2005 that the Mexico strongly rejects “the application of unilateral laws and measures of economic blockade against any State, as well as the implementation of coercive measures without the authorization enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” That is the reason, why the United Mexican States supported – for the 14th consecutive time – Resolution (A/RES/60/12) of 2006 regarding the Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.

In the 1990s, comprehensive economic sanctions found several applications with very mixed results, which made a critical reassessment indispensable. The United Mexican States fully supported and actively participated in the “Stockholm Process” that focused on increasing the effectiveness in the implementation of targeted sanctions. As sanctions and especially economic sanctions, pose a tool for action “between words and war” they must be regarded as a mean of last resort before war and fulfill highest requirements for their legitimate use. The United Mexican States and their partners of the “Group of Friends of the U.N. Reform” have already addressed and formulated recommendations for that take former criticism into account. Regarding the design of economic sanctions it is indispensable for the success to have the constant support by all member states and public opinion, which is to a large degree dependent on the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. Sanctions must be tailor-made, designed to effectively target the government, while sparing to the largest degree possible the civil population. Sanction regimes must be constantly monitored and evaluated to enable the world-community to adjust their actions to the needs of the unforeseeably changing situation. Additionally, the United Mexican States propose to increase communication between the existing sanction committees and thus their effectiveness by convening regular meetings of the chairs of the sanction committees on questions of common interest.

II. Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions

As a founding member of the United Nations, Mexico is highly engaged in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights all over the world, as laid down in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Especially since the democratic transition of Mexico in 2000 it is one of the most urgent topics to stand for Democratization and Human Rights, and Mexico implements this vision on many different fronts.

In the Convoking Group of the intergovernmental Community of Democracies (GC), the United Mexican States uphold an approach that fosters international cooperation to promote democratic values and institution-building at the national and international level. To emphasize the strong interrelation between human rights and the building of democracy and to fortify democratic developments are further challenges Mexico deals with in this committee. A key-factor for the sustainable development of a post-conflict-region is to hold fair and free election and thus creating a democratic system. Being aware of the need of post-conflict countries for support in the preparation of democratic elections, the United Mexican States contribute since 2001 to the work of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an intergovernmental organization operating at international, regional and national level in partnership with a range of institutions. Mexico’s foreign policy regarding human rights is substantially
based on cooperation with international organizations. The Inter American Commission of Human Rights is one of the bodies, Mexico is participating, working on the promotion of Human Rights in the Americas. Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the regional judicial institution for the application and interpretation of the American Convention of Human Rights.

The objectives Mexico pursues are to improve human rights in the country through structural changes and to fortify the legal and institutional frame for the protection of human rights on the international level. Underlining the connection between democracy, development and Human Rights, stresses the importance of cooperation with and the role of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the reform of the Human Rights Commission to a Human rights Council.

Having in mind the diversity of challenges in enforcing democracy and Human Rights, Mexico considers regional and national approaches vital for their endorsement, as Mexico exemplifies with its National Program for Human Rights or the Plan Puebla Panama. On the global level, Mexico is encouraged in working on a greater coordination and interoperability among the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as the development of common strategies and operational policies and the sharing of best practices in civilian crisis management should be encouraged, including clear frameworks for joint operations, when applicable.

### III. The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa

The United Mexican States welcome the leadership role the African Union has taken regarding the security problems of the continent. Our delegation is furthermore convinced that The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) can become the foundation for Africa’s economic, social and democratic development as the basis for sustainable peace. Therefore it deserves the full support of the international community.

The development of the United Mexican States in the last two decades is characterized by the transition to a full democracy, the national and regional promotion of human rights and sustainable, economic growth. Mexico’s development is characterized by free trade and its regional integration in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Having in mind that sustainable development is based not only on economic, but as well on social and environmental development, President Vicente Fox has made sustainable development a guiding principle in the Mexican Development Plan that includes sustainability targets for all major policy areas.

The United Nations Security Council has established not less than seven peace-keeping missions on the African continent, underlining the need for full support by the international community. In post-conflict situations, we regard national reconciliation as a precondition for a peaceful development, which is the reason why Mexico supported such committees, i.e. in the case of Sierra Leone. The United Mexican States are convinced that an other to enhance durable peace in Africa is the institutional reform of the United Nations. We therefore want to reaffirm our full support to both the establishment of the peace-building commission and the Human Rights Council. Both topics are highly interrelated and, having in mind that the breach of peace is most often linked with severest human rights’ abuses, thus need to be seen as two sides of one problem and be approached in this understanding.

As most conflicts have their roots in conflicts about economic resources and development chances, human development and the eradication of poverty must be at the heart of a successful, preventive approach. Lifting people out of poverty must be seen as a precondition not only for peace, but for social development and environmental sustainability.

The United Mexican States want to express their esteem for the decision taken by the G-8 countries for a complete debt-relief for many African Highly-Indebted-Poor-Countries. Nevertheless, many commitments made by the international community that are crucial for Africa’s sustainable development are unfulfilled. The developed countries agreed in the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development (A/CONF.198/11) to increase their Official Development Aid (ODA) “towards the target of 0,7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries and 0,15 to 0,20 per cent of GNP of developed countries to least developed countries”. Furthermore, the United Mexican States are disappointed by the result of the Hong Kong Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, which once more failed to meet the needs of those, to whom the round was devoted: developing countries and especially African countries, who today, more than ever, are cut off from global trade and prosperity by protectionism.
Committee History

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) came into existence as a result of World War II; however, even prior to its eventual inception, the foundation was laid on January 1, 1942, when 26 countries, all of whom were part of the alliance against Nazi Germany, signed the "Declarations by United Nations", a document that had been negotiated in order to consolidate their efforts and declare their long-term interest for a peaceful world. Following the end of World War II, in June 1945, after a series of consultations among the key victors, the 45 States which had entered the war on the side of Allies were invited to come to San Francisco to sign the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter was meant to be the constitutive instrument of this new world body. Comprised of a total of 111 articles, 19 chapters and a preamble, the Charter sets out the competences and purpose of the United Nations. The preamble was meant to reaffirm "faith in fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of the human person and the equal rights of men and women and of all nations." Importantly, the Charter, through Article 2 (4), defines refraining from the use of force as a principle. As mentioned in the Charter, UN membership is open "to all peace-loving nations that accept the obligations of the Charter." Hence the UN is founded on the idea to overcome war as a legitimate means to solve disputes and instead aims to "speak to the aspirations of humankind."

The General Assembly - "World Parliament"?

Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations determines the General Assembly (GA) as one of the UN's six principal organs, and it is the only main organ that can discuss topics on a universal level. The GA's functions and procedures are outlined throughout Chapter IV. As outlined in Article 18, "each Member of the General Assembly shall have one vote." Thus, all Members, in theory, are equal in the GA. Given its universal membership, the GA is often called a "world parliament" or "democratic organ", even though not all members are democratically legitimized. As provided for by Article 10 of the Charter, the GA may discuss "any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters". It is important to know that each Member can suggest items to the agenda. Thus the so-called "open agenda" is generally long, which has led to some criticism.

Despite its global importance, the GA's decisions are not binding. The GA “may discuss and recommend; it may not decide.” The strength of the GA lies in its universal ideals, as decisions reflect upon the "moral authority of the world community.” However, the GA is in charge of procedural and budget related questions. Furthermore, the GA is in charge of the election of Members to the Security Council, judges to the International Court of Justice, and the Secretary General.

3 United Nations Department of Public Information, Basic Facts about the United Nations, 2011, p. 3.
4 Gareis & Varwick, The United Nations - An Introduction, p. 6.6
9 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Chapter IV.
10 Kolb, An Introduction to the Law of the United Nations, 2010, p. 120.
11 Kolb, An Introduction to the Law of the United Nations, 2010, p. 120.
14 Peterson, The UN General Assembly, 2006, p. 66.
The GA meets every year from mid-September until mid-December in New York. Occasionally, it may also meet for special or emergency sessions. The work of the GA is supported by its six specialized main committees which meet as part of that annual session and report back to the GA plenary. In order to adopt a resolution, a simple majority of the members "present and voting is needed." If a majority of members believe that an item is an "important question", a two-third majority is needed. However, it is relevant to note that since the end of the Cold War about 70% of the resolutions did actually pass by acclamation. Given the large size of the body, as of September 2012, the UN has 193 Member States.

The General Assembly gains special attention in cases where the Security Council is unable to deal with a matter of international relevance. In such a situation, the GA may consider the matter immediately and make a recommendation. A current example of an undecided Security Council can be seen when looking at the situation in Syria. Given repetitive vetoes by China and Russia, the Security Council proved unable to propose an effective solution to the crisis. Hence the GA condemned the ongoing violence on August 3 and stated its "grave concern" about the situation and deplored "the failure of the SC to agree on measures to ensure the compliance of Syrian authorities with its decisions".

The First Committee - Striving for a safer world

The GA First Committee is one of the six specialized committees by the GA. While the UN Security Council is the primary organ for the maintenance of international peace and security, the GA First Committee's work is focused on disarmament and international security issues. The membership of the First Committee and the other main committees is the same as of the GA. The topics on the agenda of the First Committee are decided by the GA at the beginning of its session. Since the early years of the UN, given the importance of disarmament, topics and issues related to disarmament were consigned to a specific committee—the First Committee. Given the political East-West division during the Cold War, the First Committee originally was the venue for very hot committee confrontations. Today, the First Committee, together with the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), is the major global forum for discussion on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. Major work by the First Committee over the past years has been done on the issues of surplus weapons stockpiles, deeper international cooperation in the tracing of black market arms, the need for universal acceptance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT), nuclear-weapons-free zones, the need for international nuclear transparency, the importance of confidence-building measures, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines, etc. When following the debates in the First Committee one understands

Recent Activities in the First Committee

On September 21, 2012, the General Assembly decided on the Agenda for the 67th session of the First Committee. There are 17 items are on the agenda, among them reoccurring items such as Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), as well as agenda items new to the
Committee this year, such as the role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Agenda items which were discussed during the 66th session included: revitalizing multilateral disarmament negotiations, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee, united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. A particular focus was also given to nuclear disarmament and the great danger that nuclear weapons pose to the security of mankind.

**Conclusion**

The First Committee remains one of the key bodies of the UN and is preparing fundamental work when it comes to disarmament and security. However, the General Assembly Plenary, the First Committee, and the UN as a whole are not perfect, and are struggling to adapt to the changes of the globalized 21st century. Former US Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, stated: “The UN continues to be vital to the functioning of the international system, but it needs reform. It needs a lot of support by nations. It needs to really keep revitalizing itself. I am a great believer in the UN, but there have to be some very serious reforms”. One point which occasionally is raised is the long repetitive agenda of the GA and the First Committee. While the agenda might be long it however continues to be full of relevant points, which urgently need to be addressed. Thus, each delegate will have to face the challenge of finding solutions to these issues which have a serious impact on world security.

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37 Reaching Critical Will, UN General Assembly First Committee 2011, 2011.
38 Reaching Critical Will, UN General Assembly First Committee 2011, 2011.
39 Reaching Critical Will, UN General Assembly First Committee 2011, 2011.
Annotated Bibliography


Peterson, M. (2006). The UN General Assembly. New York, NY: Routledge. Peterson's book about the UN General Assembly describes in detail the functions and history of the GA. Next to the detailed description the author also puts forward a critical assessment of the GA, which helps to put the GA into perspectives. By reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the GA the author thus offers an interesting view on the GA.

Reinalda, B. (2009). Routledge History of International Organizations, New York, NY: Routledge. Renalda offers a detailed description of the history of the UN and other international organizations. For example the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, is described in detail. Having a thorough knowledge of the UN's history will help delegates for their preparation of the conference.

United Nations (2012). Secretary-General's remarks to General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on "The Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response". Retrieved on September 13, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6271 The speech by Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon highlights the important role of the GA. Particularly in a situation when the Security Council is unable to come to a decision, the GA comes to play. Reading this speech will give delegates a good insight into the current stalemates at the UN.

United Nations (2011). Basic Facts about the United Nations, New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information. This book offers readers a good insight into the setting-up and working methods of the UN. Given the fact that the UN is quite a complex international organization, this book helps to shed light into the complexities of the UN. This book provides a good background for delegates.

Bibliography


I. Women, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Arms Control

Introduction

In 2011, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee began to recognize what has been increasingly accepted within the international community: the equal participation of both women and men in disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control measures are key for the attainment of sustainable peace and security. The prevention as well as the reduction of armed violence at the local, national and regional levels, within conflict and non-conflict scenarios, calls for the immediate action of UN Member States, regional organizations, international donors, specialized agencies and civil society. Such action may include – among other ways – the promotion of women’s equitable representation in decision-making processes related to disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control as well as the enhancement of women’s participation in diverse forums dealing with such issues.

Addressing conflict-related violence against women and calling into attention the fact that both women and men are differently affected by the proliferation of arms is also essential for adequately addressing the impact of disarmament and arms proliferation on women and girls. Women’s role and their further contribution as stakeholders of disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control initiatives, and the growing responsiveness to existing gender dimensions within developing and developed countries would enhance such processes. In this regard, the nexus between gender and disarmament, and the relationship between women and small arms, weapons of mass destruction, landmines; and women and disarmament, demobilizing and reintegrating (DDR) initiatives contributes in setting the ground for a shared understanding of the topic at hand, and the outlining of potential solutions to its consequences for women.

Key Concepts

Disarmament

The term disarmament is defined as “the collection of small arms, and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone.” Formal disarmament processes usually occur after peace agreements and involve the control and disposal of all weapons including ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of both combatants and civilians. Disarmament also encompasses the development of responsible arms management programs, and the transport of ex-combatants from opposition groups, and government forces or civil defense militias to encampment areas and discharge centers. Thus the term does not only refer to the removal of weapons but also to the means for tackling the militarization of people and societies.

Nonproliferation and arms control

Nonproliferation and arms control are related concepts referring to restrictions on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of all types of weapons, ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to small arms and light weapons (SALW). Nonproliferation also refers to those actions – e.g., diplomacy, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls – undertaken to prevent the proliferation of WMDs by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. Arms control refers to the limitation and restriction on the size, development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, distribution, usage, and armament of weapons by a country or countries. This definition includes small arms, conventional weapons, or WMDs and is usually associated with bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements between different

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48 UNIFEM, Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 2004, p. 2.
51 WILP, Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, 2011, p.5.
52 Kolodkin, What is arms control?, 2012
parties. Therefore, embraces any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement that governs the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems. It also includes arms command, logistics support arrangements, and any arms related intelligence-gathering mechanism. On a national or local level, arms control may also account for programs controlling the access of citizenries to weapons.

**Gender**

Gender refers to “the socially constructed roles as ascribed to women and men, as opposed to biological and physical characteristics.” The term is related to cultural associations of behaviors and characteristics with what it means to be a man and what it means to be a woman. Gender roles vary over time and according to socioeconomic, political, and cultural contexts, and are influenced by other factors, including age, race, class, and ethnicity. Thus, gender roles are learned and are changeable.

**Gender mainstreaming**

The term gender mainstreaming accounts for the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs. It outlines the straightforward link between assessing the implications for women and men of planned action, and developing strategies considering both women’s and men’s needs as an integral dimension of the design and implementation of security policies and programs in all spheres, so that women could benefit equally from them. The results of such an assessment highlights the importance of promoting gender initiatives focused on boosting the security sector’s awareness of, and response to, the different security experiences, needs and roles of men, women, girls and boys.

**International Framework**

A wide range of entities within the UN system manages disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control efforts. The main UN actors that cope with such issues are the General Assembly First Committee, the Security Council, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, among others. Under this framework, in 2001, Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, emphasized the importance of including a gender perspective in UN efforts worldwide, and highlighted the need to connect efforts for peace with those for gender equality.

**UN General Assembly**

The adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/69 in 2010 on “Women, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation” illustrates the first time that the General Assembly formally addressed the links between women and disarmament. This resolution encourages UN Member States and other organizations “to ensure equitable representation of women at all decision-making levels, in particular in the security sector, which may make or influence policy with regard to matters related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.” In October 2012, during the 67th session of the General Assembly, the agenda item was discussed again, with one draft resolution anticipated as the outcome of negotiations. As of November 2012, the General Assembly First

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57 Kolodkin, What is arms control?, 2012
59 Acheson, Gender and Nuclear Weaspons, 2010, p.1
63 Valasek, Security Sector Reform and Gender, 2008, p.4.
64 UNODA, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2012.
65 Heyzer, Gender, Peace and Disarmament, 2003, p.10.
66 WILPF, Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, 2011, p.4.
68 Reaching Critical Will, First Committee Monitor, No. 1, 8 October 2012.
Committee has adopted draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.35/Rev.1 which is now under consideration by the General Assembly Plenary.69

Next to recent action by the General Assembly on the specific issue of women, some of the most important recent disarmament efforts aimed at tracing gender perspectives are the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), the Disarmament Forum, the Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and the Global Reported Arms Trade, amongst others.70

**United Nations Program of Action (PoA)**

The United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) was adopted in 2001.71 The PoA, which is not legally binding, but contains political commitments, encompasses many aspects of gun violence prevention, including recommendations on how to reduce proliferation, trafficking, and misuse of guns and weapons.72 Through the PoA, Member States agreed to report on the implementation of small arms and light weapons’ reduction, and to establish domestic coordination mechanisms to assess and reinforce legislation, procedures, and international cooperation regarding the use and proliferation of small and light weapons.73

However, despite its comprehensive scope, the PoA contains very few references to gender. Thus, in 2010, the UNODA Regional Disarmament Branch established a revised set of Guidelines highlighting the importance of the perspectives of women and girls impacted by the proliferation of small arms.74 The PoA General Gender Guidelines aim to “promote the inclusion of gender and women-specific elements in programming the fight against illicit small arms and light weapons.”75 Furthermore, the Guidelines look to offer clear illustrations on how to mainstream gender for the successful implementation of the PoA, and relocate initiatives grounded on progress made.

**Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)**

In addition to the PoA, Member States began working on the development of a global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2006.76 Such a treaty should serve as a global, legally binding agreement that enhances the control of international transfers of conventional weapons and munitions.77 The latter can be achieved by the insertion of clear and straightforward provisions in the treaty text and by including small arms and light weapons and related ammunition within the scope of the agreement.78 In the lead-up to and during the treaty negotiations process, a wide range of security and human rights organizations, including the International Network on Small Arms (IANSA), the Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom (WILPF), Amnesty International, and the Control Arms Campaign, were active in raising the issue of women’s rights and gender in the context of the ATT.79 During the final negotiations, 75 countries made statements in support of the inclusion of gender in the ATT as compared to less than a dozen in previous years.80 However, in the last draft text released before the conference ended without any final treaty adoption, gender did not feature strongly nor was it part of any compulsory measures laid out in the treaty.81

**Other UN Action**

The UN Security Council has acknowledged the need for strategies to increase women’s participation in all UN enterprises and has insistently called for an upsurge in quality and quantity of peace agreements with specific

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71 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Document A/CONF.192/15), 20 July 2001.

UN regional centers have also undertaken relevant action regarding women, disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control, focusing in particular on training female law enforcement officials and security sector personnel to fight against the traffic and stockpiling of illicit SALW.

**Women and Disarmament**

Realizing women’s needs through the incorporation of a gender perspective in the implementation of international, regional, and local disarmament initiatives reduces the menace of conflict and the feelings of insecurity that increase the demand for weapons. A wide understanding of gender roles within the community level ensures that projects actually meet the needs of both women and men. In this regard, some international donors have engaged in ongoing programs under which every member of the community—men and women—turn in weapons in exchange for a development project. The inclusion of issues and provisions relevant to women’s interests in peace agreements is a vital step towards enabling post-conflict processes, institutions, and mechanisms to respond to women’s needs.

Yet, over the past two decades women have formed less than 8% of the negotiating teams in peace processes. Surveys demonstrated that between 1991 and 2001, only 30% of agreements that ended civil conflicts included provisions relevant to women. Women’s participation—as mediators, negotiators, technical experts, and official observers—in peace negotiations has a direct association with the content of the accords in terms of responsiveness and insertion of issues related to the rights and concerns of women. Although many SC resolutions endorse the need for women’s involvement in peacebuilding processes and call for the mobilization of resources in order to improve gender equality; equal access to education for women and girls in post-conflict societies and the increase of women’s sharing in political and economic decision-making has not yet fully translated into action. The latter clearly undermines their potential for full and equal contribution to international peace and security.

**Women and Nonproliferation**

Within militarized societies, the direct and indirect effects of the proliferation and use of conventional arms have different impacts on women’s lives and survival. Men and boys are killed and wounded by gun violence much more frequently than women and girls. Statistics demonstrate that globally over 90% of homicide victims are men, and that men made up 88% of the people who committed suicide with a gun in 2010. Men also account for the majority of members of police, military and other armed forces, and most owners and users of small arms are men and boys. However, while men and boys make up the majority of the users and direct victims of small arms, women are also impacted by arms proliferation and armed violence in gender-specific ways.

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Small arms can facilitate and exacerbate violence against women and girls whether in conflict or in peace.97 Even if women are not primarily gun wielders, their victimization – through domestic and sexual violence in armed conflict scenarios – is facilitated with the aid of such weapons.98 Several studies have documented how the presence of a firearm can meaningfully increase the likelihoods that domestic violence results in a fatality.99 For example, in the United States, research has shown that if there is a firearm in the house, the probability that violence between intimate partners becomes lethal increases five-fold.100 Such continuum of violence makes the difference between legal and illegal small arms irrelevant since legal small arms are often used in domestic violence.101 A survey of women reporting family violence in Brazil and Portugal revealed that between 68.5% and 25% of women said that her male partner had threatened them with a gun.102 Moreover, a Canadian survey demonstrated the gendered differences between men and women’s sense of fear of armed violence.103 It revealed that 36% of men and 59% of women feared that they or someone in their household would be threatened or injured with a gun.104

From these statistics, it is clear that, “the psychological trauma of small arms, as well as their actual disruption of social cohesion and family safety, often impacts women much more profoundly than men, given their roles in society and in the family and women’s often limited access to policing and justice services.”105 The proliferation of small arms also aggravates sexual violence and threats of sexual violence in conflict situations.106 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, small arms were used as objects to directly perpetrate rape against both men and women.107 Regarding the nonproliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, the very nature of weapons of mass destruction implies an indiscriminate effect on women. In the case of nuclear weapons, for example, there are important consequences of radiation on women’s health, including fetal abnormalities and potential sterility.108

Concerning nuclear proliferation, international advocates and experts have acknowledged the deeply gendered political context in which nuclear weapons are developed and deployed as well as the gendered dimensions of the weapons themselves.109 Such perspectives outlined how armament and disarmament policies and practices are influenced by ideas about masculinity and how the symbolic dimensions of nuclear weapons are gendered, assuring a linkage between nuclear weapons and masculine strength.110 Thus, being aware of the gendered meanings and characterizations within the politics of nuclear weapons helps to confront the traditional significances around this issue and redefines terms such as ‘strength’ and ‘security’ so that they more suitably reflect the needs of women.111

Women have undertaken spearheaded efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Many women’s organizations have campaigned for ending nuclear testing by collecting baby teeth and testing them for levels of Strontium 90, which is dispersed and ingested through milk.112 Until now, such campaigns have successfully helped closing nuclear bases, such as Greenham Common in the United Kingdom.113 Similar efforts have also forced some governments to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones at the municipal level.114 However, women are still almost entirely marginalized in governments’ political and military decisions regarding nuclear weapons.115 Up till today, only 33 women have headed delegations to the six review conferences of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, compared to 660 men in that role.116

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111 Acheson, Gender and Nuclear Weapons, 2010, p.4.
112 Heyzer, Gender, Peace and Disarmament, 2003, p.10.
113 Heyzer, Gender, Peace and Disarmament, 2003, p.10.
114 Heyzer, Gender, Peace and Disarmament, 2003, p.10.
115 Heyzer, Gender, Peace and Disarmament, 2003, p.10.
116 Heyzer, Gender, Peace and Disarmament, 2003, p.10.
Women and Arms Control

Women most often suffer indirect repercussions of weapons proliferation. Recent studies demonstrate that beyond their status of victims resulting from conflict situations, women are increasingly participating in illegal armed forces. Women also have a role as perpetrators of armed violence and owners of guns in both conflict-affected and non-conflicted countries. In many societies, gangs comprised of all women are becoming increasingly common, progressively crossing the traditional gender divide to join the traditional perpetrators of armed violence. Recent surveys demonstrate that although women rarely use handguns to kill in self-defense, they participate as fighters in armed forces, defying stereotypes of the docile female and challenging the association between guns, power, and masculinity. Examples of this can be seen in Nepal, Israel, and the United States. In Nepal, women comprised around 40% of the 19,000 Maoist cadres of the Maoist guerrillas. In Israel, there is mandatory conscription for secular Jewish women, and in the United States, women make up around 14% of the US Army. Research has also shown that in some cases, women account for a great number of members of gangs. National youth review data from the United States and the United Kingdom suggests that girls and women report for 25% to 50% of all gang members correspondingly. Moreover, there is evidence of elevated levels of sexual and gender-based violence against women who partake in certain armed forces. Indeed, women using firearms are frequently abused by the men who command them, presenting women simultaneously as both the perpetrators and victims of violence.

Conclusion

Despite the plethora of international commitments regarding this topic, the results achieved until now do not go far enough and still lack recognition on the specific responsibilities of weapon-producing Member States to reduce not only the repercussions for women of arms proliferation but armed violence worldwide. Arms-producing states are requested to conduct responsible arms trade and pursue a functioning ATT under the commitment of preventing conflict, combating violations of human rights, upholding international humanitarian law, and decreasing the culture and economy of militarism. Moreover, arms-supplier Member States must take a greater role in controlling, limiting, and ensuring that arms transfer to countries in conflict correspond with peace agreements and the individual policies of concerning parties. In this regard, measures should be undertaken dependent on each country’s national context and the existing international framework.

On the other hand, women should also become full-fledged participants of the arms control and disarmament community. Greater efforts from UN Member States are still needed in order to achieve the appropriate level of awareness in decision-makers of the role-played by women in conflict-ridden and arms-affected areas. In spite of the ultimate opportunities presented by the 2012 Review Conference of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms (PoA) and the negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty, the strategic assertion of the pivotal role of women in small arms control and disarmament remains a challenge for the GA First Committee, as the leading UN body covering this topic, as for the international community as a whole.

Member States have multiple options moving forward on this issue which would enable the outcome to be comprehensive, specific and action-oriented. In researching this topic, delegates may consider the various demands

made by NGOs, such as emphasizing “the need for governments to ensure equitable representation of women at all
decisionmaking levels in national institutions and international delegations which may make or influence policy
with regard to matters related to disarmament and arms control.” A set of questions is therefore included for
deleagtes to keep in mind: How to get men involved as agents for change supporting and acknowledging women’s
roles in disarmament initiatives and peace processes? How to address the traditional militarized approach that has
characterized disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control? Are there actual mechanisms in place to
significantly involve and represent women in peace negotiation processes? What actions and strategies have your
country developed in order to successfully implement existing gender-based international instruments at the local
level? How can the work of the committee help combat gendered symbolic dimensions of nuclear weapons and its
proliferation?

133 Reaching Critical Will, First Committee Monitor, No. 1, 8 October 2012.
Annotated Bibliography

This publication brings attention to women as the ones who most often shoulder not only indirect but direct repercussions of war and armed conflict. The paper aims at answering the question asked by one delegate during the negotiations on the contents of the UN General Assembly Resolution 65/69: ‘Why Women?’ Moreover, the publication also addresses the issue of women’s associations and advocates’ contribution to advancing women rights and empowerment within a security context. The paper sheds light on the importance of recognizing and raising awareness of women’s contributions and positions in disarmament and arms limitation undertakings. This publication aims at underlying the need of including women in small arms control and disarmament actions by consolidating information and opinions from experts on gender and security issues. In this regard, the paper will help delegates in their research for background information on women’s participation in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, and on the challenges to women’s participation in use of small, and nuclear weapons. Finally, this publication illustrates the different ways in which weapons are used to directly damage women and girls, and how they are the most affected by the lasting consequences of war: displacement, hunger, diseases, among others.

This handbook is the result of the PeaceWomen’s Security Council Monitor: Resolution Watch initiative, an enterprise aimed at tracking the implementation of S/RES/1325 (2000). The document is of particular importance since it provides delegates with significant evidence that, over the past decade, the SC has undertaken important efforts for progressively integrating women and gender language into country-specific resolutions. The document includes chapters and sections addressing different issues, such as: peacekeeping, conflict prevention, sexual and gender-based violence, reconstruction and peace building, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), beyond others. Finally, the handbook is a helpful source for delegates since it encompasses an exhaustive analysis of the progress, or lack thereof, made by the Council in internalizing women, peace and security visions and insights in official UN produced documents.

This article explores verification as a means of monitoring a counterpart nation’s military activities and whether or not such activities are in compliance with the terms of a negotiated agreement, that should not be considered separately from its broadly arms-controlling function. The author affirms that the verification of compliance with a negotiated arms control agreement, based on information collected through various monitoring schemes, is primarily a task of evaluating whether the goals of the agreement, and not the verification regime itself, are being met. This article surveys a range of arms control options, including those from South Asia and will provide delegates with a straightforward example of a region undergoing nuclear proliferation, its consequences, and further impact on its citizens.

This paper presents and discusses the anti-war feminism tradition, which rejects both the military and the political use of weapons of mass destruction in warfare, and is also critical of the cultural discourses surrounding the framing of a masculinized view of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the paper calls for the emergence of new and different ways of thinking that reveal the complex consequences on societies of developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction. The authors affirm that there is no single feminist position on war, armament and weapons of mass destruction and that while some feminists fight for women’s right to fight and command fighters;
others participate in pacifist initiatives upholding the view that war is not a women issue. The paper will help delegates to acquire an overall perspective on the different feminist traditions and will provide them with a greater sense on women activists opposing war-making as a practice and looking to substitute it with non-violent disputes and reconciliation processes.

Funmi, Olonisakin; Barnes, Karen & Eka Iklepe. (2012). Women, peace and security. London: Zed Books Ltd. This book provides a critical assessment of the impact of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 by observing the outcomes of peacebuilding missions on increasing gender equality within conflict-affected countries. The book evaluates UN Resolution 1325 as a step forward in terms of bringing women's rights and gender equality to bear in the UN Peace and Security agenda. The book draws together the findings from eight countries and four regional contexts to provide guidance on how the impact of Resolution 1325 can be measured, and how peacekeeping operations could improve their capacity to effectively engender security. The text is relevant for delegates as it assesses the practical reality of such resolution as lacking meaning on the ground in societies and regions where women remain disproportionately affected by armed violence and clearly under-represented in disarmament and arm controls efforts. Finally, this book will be of much interest to delegates when researching on peacebuilding and gender studies within the United Nations system and International Relations (IR) in general.

Heyzer, Noeleen. (2003). Gender, Peace and Disarmament. Retrieved August 8, 2012 from: http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1993.pdf This paper discusses the understanding of disarmament and gender equality as global public goods whose benefits need to be inclusive and shared by all. The document presents a view on wars as not solely being fought on battle zones but in homes and communities as well. In this vein, the paper emphasizes on violence against women as a deliberate part of many armed conflicts, and sheds light on the traditional power relationships that perpetuate the roles that define women and men in a particular cultural context. The document is important for delegates since it provides them with an alternative view on the definition of gender, and how such definition renders specific qualities and values nowadays associated to men and women. The paper will also be useful for delegates as it looks at women’s experience of armed conflict focusing particularly on their roles in conflict prevention and disarmament, and the ways in which the United Nations is working to incorporate a gender perspective into its disarmaments and arms control activities.

Krause, Keith & Latham, Andrew. Constructing non-proliferation and arms control: The norms of Western practice. Contemporary Security Policy, 19 (1): 1998: 23-54. This article reviews the attempt by Western states to construct a global wide-ranging non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime since the end of the Cold War as a response to changes in the nature of the international security arena since 1989. The authors asserts that the main threat to the West is no longer posed by communism sponsored by the Soviet Union but from diffuse risks and overall threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and the proliferation of conventional weapons. The document is an important source for delegates as they may identify Western policy regarding disarmament and nonproliferation and the underlying view of such policy as providing a global public good of international peace and security. This will hopefully lead delegates to think out of the box and addresses the topic from different perspectives.

United Nations Development Fund For Women. (2005). Women Building Peace Through Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration – Beijing + 10 Review Conference. Retrieved July 8, 2011 from: http://www.peacewomen.org/portal_resources_resource.php?id=268 This panel was an opportunity to hear the voices of women working in DDR process from four different sectors, specifically the perspective of civil society from Liberia, former combatants from Rwanda, national institutions from Sudan and the international framework standpoints from the UNIDIR. The panel was unusual in that it was a conversation amongst the panelists as much as it was a conversation between the panel and the audience. The Liberian and Rwandese women presented the lessons learned from their experiences and provided guidelines to the Sudanese women who were at the very beginnings of the process, especially throughout highlighting the
relevance of women’s organizing and self-reliance within recovery scenarios. It is important for delegates to acknowledge this panel since it represents an exceptional opportunity for women actually engaging in the processes on the ground to share their priorities with members of the international community. UNIFEM’s support to the NGOs working on the ground and its efforts in the international DDR debates were given high visibility and mentioned and appreciated by each panelist. Moreover, the opinions and inputs from several audience respondents brought up the importance of a stronger UNIFEM presence where peace operations are functioning therefore providing delegates with an overarching awareness of the perception of civil society towards disarmament and arms control.


This document is an outcome of the seminar on “Women, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation”, organized by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom on March 7, 2011. The main objective of the seminar was to bring together international experts, activists, government representatives, and diplomats to examine the nexus between disarmament and the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda, the role of women as actors for disarmament negotiations, and how women’s movements and networks can move such issues forward. The document will be of extreme usefulness for delegates since it includes a comprehensive and detailed explanation on the concept of disarmament not only as the removal of weapons but also as the tackling of militarization of women and societies. The paper will also help delegates understand the importance underlying the inclusion of women and their experiences of armed conflict in all levels of conflict resolution initiatives and peace building enterprises.


This framework was elaborated as part of a collaborative effort of the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network, which accounts for an informal network of bilateral donor countries and multilateral UN agencies engaged in responding to conflict situations and supporting inhabitants of war-torn societies. The CPR Network has established a working group as a focal point for the assembly of analytical frameworks and operational tools developed by contributors to assisting conflict situations before, during and after conflict. The paper aims to provide an overview of best principles and practices promoting gender equality initiatives and peacebuilding efforts. In this overview, the author outlines and examines key challenges analyzes the issue within a wider peacebuilding spectrum. Subsequently, it provides recommendations to experts, donors and practitioners on how development co-operation can be used to support work in enhancing women empowerment in issues such as international disarmament. The framework will serve delegates as guidance for formulating potential new solutions for achieving disarmament and nonproliferation through the lens of past lessons and implemented best practices.

Bibliography


II. Regulating Information and Telecommunications Technology in the Context of Security

“Their transformative properties are not a simple consequence of their material features. Technological systems of communication, transportation, and destruction are a permanent, constitutive part of all international systems.”

Introduction

The twenty-first century’s “Information Revolution” is largely the product of the advent of the first personal computers in the mid-1970s and the Internet in the 1990s. The information revolution has resulted in high-tech global flows with profound transformative effects, experienced most often and most powerfully through the internet, media, and technology. The ubiquity of information and communication technology can go somewhat unnoticed in the contemporary environment. To a civilian, cell phones are alarm clocks, ATMs, calculators, calendars, cameras, computers, hyper-mobile offices, notepads, roadmaps, televisions, and video recorders, all in addition to the “ordinary” functions of a cell phone like talking, texting, and surfing the web. To a soldier (or a member of an armed group), cell phones can be distress beacons, navigational aids, recruitment tools, remote controls, tethering devices, thermal vision gadgets, timers, trackers, and triggers, as well as multiplatform communication devices. Integrated mobile and satellite technology have revolutionized the way soldiers interface with military equipment. Mobile banking has morphed the business landscape in Africa. Twitter helped organize a national revolution. For all its contributions to economic and social development, the information and telecommunications sector has gone on relatively unregulated, enjoying for the most part the benefits of liberalization. Technology, however, is a tool, and one that can be utilized for both positive and negative effect. By about 2005, a majority of states had recognized the need for ICT regulation and governance in the context of security.

History

In September 1998, Boris Yeltsin, Former President of the Russian Federation, and Bill Clinton, Former President of the United States, issued a joint statement titled, Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the 21st Century. In this statement, the two countries emphasized the increasing interdependence of the modern state system and expressed concern over transnational threats, global in scope, that “affect not only [national security]…but also international stability.” Of principle importance was advancing the positive aspects and mitigating the negative elements of the information technology revolution in order to guarantee “future strategic security interests.” On September 23, 1998, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, submitted a letter to the United Nations (UN) Secretary General requesting circulation of a draft resolution on information security. Following negotiations, at its 53rd session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 53/70, entitled Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. The resolution served essentially as an open call for Member States to contribute information (or even craft their positions) on information security, meanwhile requesting a report from the Secretary-General on the topic.

In May 2000, the Russian Federation submitted draft principles aimed at strengthening security for global information and telecommunications systems to the UN Secretariat. In its 55th session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 56/19 entitled Developments in the Field of Information and Communications in the Context of International Security. This resolution and subsequent resolutions sought to examine relevant international
concepts aimed at enhancing global information and telecommunications systems in the context of security, focused on increased collective security in the 21st century. The following year the UN approved the creation of the first Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on information and telecommunications technology in the context of security, to be convened in 2004.146

At its conclusion in 2005, the GGE had not agreed on a substantive report, due in large part to two divisions within the group, which are reflected in the broader conversation on this issue to this day: 1) whether to emphasize and explicitly stress the impact on developments in information and communications technology (ICT) on national security and military affairs, as well as threats posed by State exploitation of military applications of ICT; and, 2) whether the scope of regulation should be limited only to information infrastructure, or be enlarged to include controls over trans-border information content in order to support national security. 147 A resolution at the 66th session of the General Assembly called for a second GGE to undertake the issue. The second GGE was composed of experts from fifteen states, Belarus, Brazil, China, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The 2010 report focused on encouraging interstate dialogue on norms for State use of ICT to protect critical infrastructure and reduce collective risk, multilateral exchange of information on national legislation and ICT security strategies, open exchange of opinions on the use of ICTs in conflict, confidence-building, stability and risk reduction measures, capacity-building, and the concretization or elaboration of terms and definitions pertinent to information security. 148 Further, the report explicitly communicates its concerns over the development of ICTs not only as instruments of warfare and intelligence and politics by governments, but also by individuals, groups, organizations—indepen-dently, or as proxies—for their potential use in sophisticated, scalable operations, whether disruptive, criminal, or terrorist. 149 In 2011, the UN Joint Inspection Unit (UNJIU) called for the creation of a discrete body, complete with a Chief Information Officer (CIO), to centrally coordinate ICT governance issues within the UN system organizations150 Also in 2011, the General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution calling for a third GGE, to be concluded in June 2013.151

In addition to the work of the General Assembly, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the European Union (EU), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the Regional Commonwealth in the field of Communications have all done tremendous work in harmonizing ICT laws with national law, international law, and the global information economy, having produced multiple model laws, Directives, and reform initiatives related to cyber security and ICT governance.152 The Council of Europe (CoE) has also produced the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which distinguishes four categories of offence: offences against the confidentiality and integrity and availability of computer data systems such as illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, systems interference, and misuse of devices; computer related offences such as forgery and fraud; content related offences such as child pornography; and copyright and intellectual property offences. 153 In 2012, the ITU published a report on contemporary trends in ICT regulation, and an ICT regulation toolkit.

**Elements of ICT Governance in the Context of Security**

The power of ICT to dramatically accelerate economic and social development has often resulted in policy makers adopting “technology neutral” and “pro-competitive” regulatory stances, reserving government intervention only for

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“limited and clearly necessary purposes.” Regulation in this basic sense can be thought of as the manipulation of barriers in order to restrict or enlarge flows either in terms of information content or information infrastructure in order to protect public good. Some regulation is meant to limit the free flow of information, through access and content restrictions, while conversely, other forms of regulation are meant to encourage it through technology transfer, capacity building, education and training programs, advancing accessibility through electrification, illiteracy programs, strengthening systems of finance, programs to rectify unstable political conditions, and so on. While ICTs can be used to enhance quality of life and, it can also be used to disrupt and destroy. Within the context of security, the scope of regulation for “clearly necessary purposes” presents opportunities for expansion in regulatory policy. Information security threats can be separated into three categories: threats to information resources and telecommunications systems using ICTs, threats to vital structures, and threats to economic and social systems in order to destabilize society. Cyber attacks can be also classified in three ways: 1) cyber crime, or criminal activity taking place over computer networks; 2) cyber terrorism, where individuals or groups target computer systems to cause real-world harm or disruption; and 3) cyber warfare, where states target computer systems to cause real-world harm or disruption.

Cyber attacks, also referred to as ICT crimes, may take the form of denial of service attacks, viruses and malicious code, and unauthorized access, to name a few. In 2007, a three-week wave of “distributed denial of service cyber-attacks” was executed against Estonia, which is the location for a large portion of ICT focused business and service providers. The attacks disabled the websites of government ministries, political parties, newspapers, banks, and major companies. Many of the attacks came from Internet Protocol (IP) addresses located in Russia, with some traced directly to Russian state institutions. In 2008, continual denial of service attacks that sabotaged the websites of the Georgian president and parliament were executed against the Republic of Georgia just as violent incidents occurred with Russian troops stationed in South Ossetia, a Georgian province, in the midst of an escalating conflict between Georgia and forces striving for the independence of South Ossetia. In order to defend against cyber attacks, States try to use domestic regulation as protection by buffering information and infrastructure against an attack.

Elements of Regulation

In his speech to the World Summit on Information Society in 2012 (WSIS), Dr. Hamadoun Toure, Secretary-General of the International Telecommunications Union, said: “You cannot have freedom or privacy without security. So cyber security is not security against freedom and privacy, but security for freedom and privacy.” Regulation is designed to maximize freedom and privacy in the computer network space by allowing states to effectively manage risk, threats, and vulnerability to cyber attack. The subject of regulation centers around five areas: legal infrastructure, legal certainty, legal security, legal protection, and legal deterrence.

Legal infrastructure refers to regulatory structures and the overall legal and regulatory approaches to ICT issues, such as the abovementioned “technology-neutrality” principle. ICT governance may appear at odds with market liberalization, but regulation can actually create a safer cyberspace that enlarges the operational freedom and privacy of its users. Public regulation (i.e. governance) also confers legitimacy over and against self-regulation.
certainty deals with the legal validity, enforceability, and admissibility of electronic communications, with particular concern for their effect on e-commerce. Legal security is concerned with the idea of the authentication, confidentiality, and integrity of electronic communications. Public administrations are particularly concerned with legal security, because the admissibility, legality, and validity of documents are contingent upon the documents being reliably confidential, secured, and unaltered. Legal protection deals with the idea of intellectual property rights for goods and information transferred across borders, especially via the Internet. Legal deterrents serve to regulate new forms of cyber crime, for example denial of service attacks, malicious code, and authorized access (hacking). Because these crimes are happening essentially through a new media, the Internet, it has become necessary for states and law enforcement to adopt new ways of investigating and prosecuting such crimes, through updated policies and practices for search and seizure, interception of communication, and regulation of cryptographic products.

Case Studies

Content regulation
In the wake of the 11 September 2012 anti-American riots strewn across the Muslim world, thought to be at least partially in response to an inflammatory anti-Islam video trailer, the governments of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia blocked public access to the popular video-sharing website YouTube over security concerns such as the potential provocation of riots. The governments of Bahrain and Yemen denied public access to any video sharing website that hosted the film. Further, Google (which owns YouTube) denied access to the specific video in Egypt, India, Indonesia, Libya, and Malaysia, citing apparent violations of domestic law. The abovementioned examples demonstrate state use of access, application, and content regulation by blocking public access to video sharing websites in order to promote public security. By constricting or relaxing regulation on access, application, and content in the short term, states determined that it may be possible to better manage the spread of violence as one possible reaction to “offensive material” being spread through video-sharing websites such as YouTube.

Long term-China’s Great Firewall
Where some States may call on short term content regulation to deal with particular situations, others rely on state-control over information and communications technologies in the pursuit of long term security or “public good.” China’s Great Firewall is one example of state-controlled ICT infrastructure. China’s Great Firewall is essentially comprised of three independently operating mechanisms: Internet Protocol (IP) blocking, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection cut-off, and uniform resource locator (URL) hijacking. IP blocking describes the process of IP packets destined for controlled sites being corralled to a “dead-end” router through access control list filters and dropped. TCP connection cut-off is the interruption of a logical data connection based on TCP segments built on IP packets, disallowing communication between two computers. URL hijacking refers to routers detecting flagged keywords in domain name service (DNS) queries and issues fake replies that will be used in place of the true DNS reply.

**Next Steps**

In 2010, the GGE drew several conclusions related to ICT governance. The GGE called for increased multilateral dialogue on norms for State use of information and communications technologies, to reduce risk and protect critical infrastructures, confidence-building and risk reduction measures, including discussion of ICTs in conflict, information exchanges on national legislation and national ICT security strategies, policies and technologies, capacity-building in less developed countries, and the elaboration of common terms and definitions on Information Security. In his article on the legal aspects of information security, Streltsov makes several conclusions about regulating ICT in the context of security. First, states must determine the legality of the hostile use of ICTs and determine and harmonize national and international norms regulating operation, support, and usage of the global information infrastructure. Technical regulations in the field of information security and investigative procedures for identifying perpetrators of information attacks must be consolidated, and the use of ICTs to damage critical infrastructure facilities in proportional agreement with existing humanitarian perfidy law forbidden. Finally, a system of cyber identification to classify global information infrastructure and its elements situated in neutral states must be established, in order to develop confidence measures in relation to commercially available software, and extend the prohibition of perfidy to commercial ICT products.

**Conclusion**

Regulation may come in many forms, but most regulation is about exercising control, whether physical controls, access controls, communication controls, or application controls. Ultimately, ICT governance is about maintaining a balance between national security and human security, where the state must protect its vital human, intellectual, and material resources while protecting human life, and enhancing human welfare. One of the major problems with security is that internationally, there is no single, unequivocal definition of security. As an “intellectual and cognitive construct,” security is highly contested and its meaning will change from state to state. Laws themselves are not security, laws are prerequisites to security. Delegates must seek to understand the relationship between laws, regulation, and the exercise of power between citizen and state in order to generate consensus on ICT governance strategies and how to maximize individual and collective security, as well as freedom and privacy.

Delegates may wish to consider several questions during the course of their research. How ought states and the General Assembly frame the question of regulating ICT in the context of security to give credence to subject as a serious threat to domestic and international security vis-à-vis other security threats such as interstate and intrastate conflict, disarmament, small arms and light weapons, etc? What are the desired effects of proposed regulation? To what degree are proposed regulations effective domestically? Internationally? Is a unified international, regional, or even state regulatory policy feasible? How are conflicts in jurisdiction and prosecution resolved internationally?

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188 Thakur, Freedom from Fear: Effective, Efficient, and Equitable Security, from Heinbecker and Goff, Irrelevant or Indispensable, 2005.
Annotated Bibliography


The Joint Statement of the Russian and American Presidents first recognized ICT as a major security challenge on an international level. Although it is mentioned rather briefly, this statement marked the beginning of an ongoing discussion of ICT regulation in the context of security. As a “founding document” of sorts, it should be a good point of reference as well as a contextual cue for delegates as they prepare to discuss the topic.


A team of researchers was assembled to attempt to identify the primary mechanisms involved with China’s Internet blocking activity, colloquially referred to as the Great Firewall. Because the actual infrastructure is necessarily clandestine, researchers have instead used an empirical, technical approach to observe the mechanisms (rather than the infrastructure) by which regulation takes place. This report details three of the major mechanisms that China’s CHINANET is believed to use to implement Internet blocking and regulation.


Nagorski compiled multiple essays representing American, Chinese, Indian, Norwegian and Russian perspectives on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence is closely related with cyber warfare, and is one of the five principle elements of ICT regulation. The essays give a detailed picture of cyber deterrence and examine both strengths and weaknesses. The last essay expresses the need for a cyberspace treaty at the international level through the United Nations. Judge Schjolberg considers a range of extremely critical and compelling issues within cyber regulation.


Rainer and Cegielski offer an alternative introduction to major elements in ICT regulation, particularly in the context of business and industry. The explanations involve very little technical language, and can be extremely useful for developing an understanding of technical concepts in simplistic terms.


Ritzer’s text is a very brief snapshot of the benefits, costs, and challenges associated with globalization. One section is dedicated to technologies critical to a globalized world. As a sociologist, Ritzer is primarily concerned with structural and systemic analysis, for example the effect of technology on global flows, and the inverse effects of global flows on technology.


Shalizi’s article presents a real-world application of content regulation in the context of security. After the September 11, 2002 attacks on U.S. embassies around the world, multiple States began to block access, applications, and content through ICT controls. Delegates may consider whether such regulation is an effective security tool, as well as possible alternatives.


This document catalogs contemporary international dialogue on information security from 1998-2007. Streltsov offers a general history of the security debate on information and communications technology (ICT) and forwards associated concepts and terms. It should serve as a good jumping off point for delegates to familiarize themselves with the topic and some of the major issues in ICT security.

Thakur reexamines security in the context of modernity, where human security is continually balanced against national security. Security, according to Thakur, is an intellectual and cognitive construct, not an objective set of conditions. In the context of ICT, individuals, groups and states are challenged with regulating ICT to simultaneously promote human security and national security, the two of which may not always be in congruence. From this excerpt, delegates can better understand the changing face of security depending on place and space, where conditions can change just as much as cultures and attitudes.


The report from the UNECE is an in-depth look at applied legal principles in the context of information security in Central Asia. The report is divided into five discrete sections that expound on one of five major legal principles: infrastructure, certainty, security, protection, and deterrence.


Chronologically the second report of the Group of Governmental Experts, the 2010 report was the first substantive or conclusive document forwarded by the GGE. The GGE outlines threats, vulnerabilities, and risks, and offers several conclusions. Among the threats and vulnerabilities, the nature of cyber attacks is particularly problematic. The open, accessible nature of ICT dictates that individuals, groups, terrorists, states, and their representatives can execute cyber attacks, making attribution extremely difficult. The GGE implies that there ought to be international standards governing acceptable State use of ICT. Overall, the GGE recommends the propagation of ICT through information sharing, capacity building, and the development of international norms to reduce collective risk. This report should serve as a general guide to the current position of the United Nations on ICT regulation in the context of security.

Bibliography


III. Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects

“Small arms in the wrong hands destroy lives and livelihoods impede peace efforts, hinder humanitarian aid, facilitate the illicit trade in narcotics and obstruct investment and development.” 189

Introduction

Small arms remain one of the biggest challenges to achieving durable peace as of today, while also heavily impacting development. For example, the civil war in Mozambique during the 1980s and 1990s devastated the basic education system, not only by destroying infrastructure, but also by killing and displacing many of the country’s educational staff. 190 Low human development is increasingly being linked with high rates of homicide and armed violence. 191 These challenges, ranging from armed conflict, to organized crime, to development challenges, all share one important characteristic – they are linked to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). The General Assembly (GA) First Committee has long been the primary arena in which illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) are addressed. The body has exercised its mandate to further disarmament and international security by producing resolutions specifically concerning SALW issues since 1995.

Key Definitions

Small arms and light weapons are conventional weapons with a key characteristic of being “man-portable,” comprising firearms that range from handheld revolvers to mortars less than 100 millimeters caliber. 192 The term “SALW” is often used to represent this broad range of firearms, although “small arms” have been loosely defined as operable by individuals, whereas “light weapons” are operable by small crews of up to three people. 193 Weapons are illicit, as defined by the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), if they are manufactured, assembled, or transferred without “authorization by a competent national authority,” if they are not marked appropriately, or if they are transferred in violation of an arms embargo or otherwise violate national or international law. 194 Further, the terms “arms trade,” “arms transfers,” and “arms traffic” are often used interchangeably to refer to the lease, sale, or shipment of weapons, either legal or illegal, since there is no universally accepted definition of which activities should be considered part of the arms trade. 195 Generally, to be considered an “arms transfer,” the goods must cross national borders and change ownership; however, “transits” and “transshipments” form a step of the transfer process during which arms are transported through a state which is neither the exporter nor the final recipient of the goods. 196

Importance of Illicit SALW Eradication

Armed conflict today is known to result in an at least 250,000 deaths each year, and an additional 300,000 people per year die of armed violence outside of conflict. 197 The number of unknown deaths caused by armed violence is probably even higher, and injuries may outnumber deaths as many as 27 to 1. 198 Small arms are central to this problem; the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) describes them as the “weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts.” 199 Such widespread use is evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, where almost half of the Member States have been involved in armed conflicts using SALW in the last decade, some of them, such as Somalia and Sudan, while under a UN arms embargo. 200

189 Ban, Remarks to the thematic debate of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament and World Security, 2010.
192 United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS), International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2012, p. 2.
193 United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS), International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2012, p. 2.
194 United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS), International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2012, p. 3.
195 Holtom and Bromley, The International Arms Trade: Difficult to Define, Measure, and Control, 2010.
196 Holtom and Bromley, The International Arms Trade: Difficult to Define, Measure, and Control, 2010.
Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, the President of the General Assembly, recently stated: “The Assembly has regularly underlined the fact that the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects requires concerted efforts at the national, regional and international levels.” In support of these efforts, the GA has adopted numerous resolutions on recurring SALW themes such as “the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects” and “assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them,” both of which were last revisited in January 2012. In addition, the Security Council (SC) frequently addresses SALW, especially as they pertain to special issues such as volatile conflict zones, child soldiers, and civilian protection.

**Current Situation in Global Arms Trade**

In his 2011 report to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon describes the small arms trade as “the least transparent of all weapons systems.” Although it is impossible to determine the exact number of SALW in circulation globally, the UNODA estimates that the number is around 900 million. The international legal trade in SALW and their ammunition is estimated to be worth $7 billion a year. Additionally, international arms transfers continue to rise. Between 2007 and 2011 there was a 24% increase in the number of transfers over the previous four-year period. The increase in legal arms transfers is pertinent because most illicit arms originate in the legal market and are subsequently diverted for illicit use. Diversion of legally-produced arms can occur in several ways such as: the direct supply of areas under arms embargo, accidental loss or theft from insecure weapons stockpiles, government arsenals, and government or military personnel, sale of weapons by unscrupulous soldiers, theft from civilians, or when domestic purchasing laws are not sufficient to prevent black market trade.

Weapons proliferation, combined with a lack of international standards of assurance to regulate conventional arms transfers, has enabled countless firearms to be traded illegally and supply groups that gain or maintain power through armed conflict and human rights violations. Whether they are obtained legally or illegally, more weapons can lead to less security, as sometimes the mere “presence of arms can be a powerful catalyst in volatile scenarios.” Because many weapons can remain operational for decades and due to small arms’ portability and long lifespan, small arms are “effortlessly recycled from one conflict or violent community to the next.” These secondhand or leftover firearms, sometimes in the form of stockpiles, can enable simmering disputes to reignite as well as facilitate violent crimes, both of which can further spread to surrounding areas.

Women are made particularly vulnerable by SALW proliferation, as sexual violence is a common tool of suppression used in conflict areas. Even in areas of peace, women are subject to high rates of domestic violence, which is five times more likely to be fatal when firearms are readily available. Because women serve a unique role in both families and communities, violence against women contributes to instability within society as a whole;

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however, this role also enables women to be agents of change and drive disarmament initiatives. As the International Action Network on Small Arms explains, “Widows and dependents form a high proportion of the civilian population in conflict environments. This demographic change places a heavy economic burden on women.” In order to meet this economic challenge to support themselves and their dependents amidst armed conflict or violence, many women are forced by necessity to participate in the illicit arms trade. Empowering women in disarmament initiatives could therefore generate dual effects of combating illicit SALW trade while also supporting post-conflict development efforts.

**Existing Framework to Combat Illicit Trade**

Three prominent international agreements pertaining specifically to small arms and light weapons exist, although only one of them is legally binding. The first major commitment made by the international community relating to SALW was in 2001, through the **UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA)**. The PoA calls upon Member States to implement national, regional, and global control measures related to a variety of small arms issues. As a follow-up, **Biennial Meetings of States (BMS)**, established to occur every two years, provide an opportunity for Member States to gather and share best practices in meeting the goals of the PoA. In addition, a review conference replaces the BMS every six years to assess the status of PoA implementation and determine areas for future improvement, with the **Second Review Conference recently completed in September 2012**. At this meeting, Member States reaffirmed commitments to combating illicit SALW, pledged to undertake the suggested policies and infrastructure building that have not yet been enacted, and emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, especially with financial and technological assistance, in achieving these goals.

The second international agreement on SALW emerged as a result of the PoA, which described marking and tracing weapons as an issue the international community should address. In response, the **International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI)** was adopted in 2005. This instrument reinforces the provisions of the PoA regarding marking, record-keeping, and tracing with politically-binding commitments. Finally, the third agreement, which entered into force in 2005, is the **Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition**, otherwise known as the Firearms Protocol, which supplements the **United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime**. This document remains the only legally binding instrument concerning small arms and their illicit trade at the global level. While the PoA specifically foresees a monitoring mechanism, there can be problems with assessing Member State implementation of these instruments because many do not report their progress, and of those who do, not all have enacted the highest possible standards of compliance.

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223 United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS), *International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 2005.  
However, these global agreements are not the only tools for combating the illicit trade in SALW. In addition, several regional instruments exist that are more tailored to the specific needs of the participating Member States. These instruments include, among others, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, which entered into force in 1998; the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, which entered into force in 2006; and the European Union (EU) Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which was adopted in 2008.228

Development of an Arms Trade Treaty

One of the most important steps to combat illicit arms trafficking is to create internationally agreed-upon standards of oversight, as the national systems in place today exhibit varying degrees of control, leaving gaps that can be used to facilitate illicit trade.229 Forming consistent international standards on arms transfers could potentially reduce these adverse effects, since areas that lack law enforcement and governmental or border controls permit organized crime and terrorism to flourish.230 The United Nations has attempted to accomplish this through the negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which would be a legally-binding document to establish minimum standards of regulation for each participating Member State’s arms trade activities. The ATT development process has been ongoing since 2006, when Member States were first invited to submit their opinions to the General Assembly.231 The much anticipated month-long ATT negotiation conference in July 2012 failed to produce consensus on the final draft treaty.232 While there are concerns that momentum to create the ATT may be subdued, further negotiation might also prove to be beneficial, as the draft treaty still contained many loopholes and did not provide the humanitarian focus for which many Member States advocate.233 During the general and thematic debate of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly First Committee, Member States began to call for the convening of a final UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty.234 As of mid-October 2012, a draft resolution (A/C.1/67/11) had been submitted with details regarding such a conference, stating that it would follow the same rules of procedure as the July 2012 conference, the draft text that was left unadopted (A/CONF.217/CRP.1) would be the foundation of the 2013 conference.235

Multifaceted Nature of the International Arms Trade

Licensing

An integral component to arms control is “licensing,” which is the approval or denial of a specified transaction by an authoritative body. As Oxfam International notes, licensing “provides a framework for authorization of the transfer of conventional weapons.”236 Licensing can apply to many types of activities — such as imports, exports, re-exports, and transits or transshipments — and these can sometimes circumvent close inspection.237 In order to minimize the potential for diversion of arms to illicit trade, it is important that standards be set for all parties to an arms transfer.238

An important aspect of licensing, which is often uncontrolled, is end-user assurance with an international import certificate (IIC) or an end-user certificate (EUC).239 Such certificates explain who will ultimately possess the contents of a transfer and for what legal purpose the items will be used.240 Though many Member States report
having requirements for EUCs, few of them confirm that these EUCs are authenticated as advised by the PoA.  

Verifying end-use is a vital component of ensuring the safety of arms transfers because illicit arms trafficking is often made possible by false documentation. Thorough analysis, which is advocated by many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), would help licensing authorities determine if the requested transaction risks perpetuating armed violence.

Criminalization
With enhanced authorization systems also comes a need for enhanced enforcement and disciplinary action should arms trade regulations be broken. Such enforcement is especially needed for the use of invalid or forged transfer documentation, an important tactic to discourage and prevent illicit brokering. Over the first decade since the PoA was created, 74 Member States have reported legislating criminal or administrative penalties for illicit arms possession, but many have yet to criminalize illicit weapons manufacturing, trading, or trafficking. Additionally, very few of these reporting Member States observe detailed procedures for identifying and penalizing parties engaged in illicit SALW trade, and information on domestic regulations of non-reporting Member States remains unknown.

Brokering
One of the primary concerns with the globalization of the arms trade is that private intermediaries known as “brokers” have assumed roles previously dominated by government officials. This complicates oversight by making boundaries between legitimate and illicit actions difficult to identify as well as inhibiting efforts to improve transparency. Arms brokers are intermediaries between arms manufacturers and purchasing parties who, while long involved in the legal arms trade, have become increasingly sought after for illicit trafficking since the end of the Cold War. In comparison to the criminalization figure mentioned above, only 21 Member States have enacted criminal or administrative penalties for illicit arms brokering. A complicated aspect of controlling brokering activities is the question of jurisdiction over brokers who operate in or through a country other than their own in order to take advantage of less stringent trade controls. Many Member States claim that it would be too difficult to monitor extraterritorial citizens and have even raised concerns that doing so would infringe upon the laws of the base country. The Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) has suggested that Member States issue licenses for “third-country” brokering to their nationals. Even in the presence of such licenses, the party responsible for verifying their authenticity would need to be clarified at the international level to prevent brokers from manipulating the legal system.

Marking and Tracing
The ITI defines “marking” as “the systematic tracking of illicit small arms and light weapons found or seized on the territory of a State from the point of manufacture or the point of importation through the lines of supply to the point at which they became illicit.” Consequently, “marking,” which can vary in style between Member States, provides a means of differentiating individual firearms to enable tracing. The ITI calls for Member States to enforce

241 Parker and Green, A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of National Reports, 2012, p. 245.
242 UNIDIR, Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2006, p. 106.
244 Amnesty International, Key elements for implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, 2011, p. 1
245 UNIDIR, Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2006, p. 107.
247 Parker and Green, A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on S: Analysis of National Reports, 2012, p. 245.
251 Acheson, Brokering and implementation of the ATT, 2011, p. 7.
252 Acheson, Brokering and implementation of the ATT, 2011, p. 7.
253 Acheson, Brokering and implementation of the ATT, 2011, p. 7.
255 United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS), International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2005, p. 2.
firearm marking at points of manufacture, import, and transfer from government to civilian ownership; additionally, these marks must adhere to specific visibility and durability criteria. While the provisions of the ITI are only politically-binding, these marking criteria are legally required for Member States parties to the Firearms Protocol.

Consequences of SALW Proliferation on Security and Development

In recent years, the international community has become increasingly aware of how globalization of the arms trade negatively affects peace and security worldwide. In addition to the transparency challenges that globalization presents, the proliferation of SALW plays a role in many aspects of human security, both at the national and international levels, as other illicit activities, such as human trafficking, crime, and the trade in narcotics are made possible primarily through easy access to small arms.

The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, which was adopted on June 7, 2006, highlights the developmental consequences of conflict by stating: “Living free from the threat of armed violence is a basic human need.” In addition to creating a climate of instability and fear, excessive military expenditures undermine development initiatives by decreasing the amount of funds available for infrastructure and social needs such as education and healthcare. Oxfam International has reported that in countries affected by violence, military expenditures are growing at almost twice the rate of development assistance. Furthermore, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report discusses the reciprocal relationship between arms proliferation and developmental stagnation, noting that none of the developing countries engaged in conflict have achieved any of the twelve Millennium Development Goals.

Conclusion

Together, the United Nations Member States have made significant progress toward the eradication of illicit SALW, but much work remains. At the 2012 PoA review conference, a minority of Member States continued to block efforts to include SALW ammunition, parts, and components in the program’s scope. Another critical measure that has yet to garner wide support for inclusion within the PoA or ATT is gender-mainstreaming, which is the “process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action.” Moving forward, these concerns will not only need to be resolved, but Member States must also continue the important tasks of international cooperation and capacity-building to ensure that all Member States are capable of meeting the infrastructure and technological challenges that new policies present. With the meeting of the GA First Committee currently ongoing through the first week of November, it is possible that the committee will discuss these issues and, hopefully, schedule another negotiation conference for the Arms Trade Treaty.

Delegates preparing for conference should consider these questions: Is existing legal framework at the national, regional, or international level capable of preventing illicit diversion of SALW? Why or why not? How can current instruments be strengthened, or what new policies should be given the highest priority within the international community? How can Member States achieve greater transparency in armaments on their own and through multilateral framework? How much emphasis should be placed on human rights when discussing the global arms trade? Should arms exporters assume any amount of responsibility for human rights abuses caused by governments, rebel forces, or other parties to whom they sell? How can the United Nations diminish the disproportional consequences of SALW on women and children in conflict areas? How can Member States best drive development initiatives amidst or post-conflict?

256 United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS), International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2005, p. 3.
257 Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons Meeting of Governmental Experts, Chair-designate’s thematic discussion papers, 2011, p. 2.
259 The Japan Times, Troubling rise in small arms trade, 2012
260 Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2006,
264 IANSA, UN Small Arms Conference Reaches Agreement on Final Afternoon, 2012.
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The International Action Network on Small Arms Women’s Network focuses on connections between armed violence (particularly with small arms), gender, and women’s rights. This report examines the roles that women currently hold in relation to illicit small arms as well as situations in which their potential has not been realized. Because women tend to suffer more from the long-term effects of armed violence than their male counterparts, the empowerment and mobilization of women in the effort to eradicate illicit SALW can have a profound impact. This report recognizes existing programs that provide women with opportunities for such leadership as well as societal norms that enable gun culture, where outreach and development would be beneficial.


Oxfam International is a group of civil society organizations dedicated to development and combating poverty. This report examines how the illicit arms trade can undermine or negate development efforts, paying special attention to how an Arms Trade Treaty should address these obstacles. The report covers both the economic and human costs of unregulated trade to developing regions.


The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is an autonomous institute based in Geneva, Switzerland, which connects governments with the research community on issues pertaining to armaments, diplomacy, and conflict. A foreword by the Chair of the Open-Ended Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) on the Programme of Action (PoA) describes 2012 as a pivotal year in determining the direction of the Programme. Parker’s report is the first in a series of planned studies to evaluate implementation efforts to date and provides a comprehensive overview of the PoA with a focus on challenges at all levels (national, regional, and global). In addition, Parker also discusses challenges to identifying these implementation challenges, caused by incomplete or vague reporting by States. The final section of the report lists the themes of the PoA with their relevant location, which is helpful for delegates navigating the PoA for the first time.


Unlike the UNIDIR publication mentioned above, which examines implementation at multiple levels of governance, this report focuses solely on national implementation of the PoA. As requested by the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS4) on the PoA, this publication examines national reports collected between 2002 and 2011 and served as input to the PoA Review Conference in August 2012. The report is divided by implementation tactics (e.g., manufacturing, marking, record-keeping, stockpile management, etc.) and sub-divided by region for ease of comparison. Facts and figures from each reporting State on topics such as illicit weapons seized, surplus weapons, and domestic legislation to combat illicit trade are also provided. The analysis of national capacities provided herein is advantageous for delegates who desire a more in-depth look at implementation barriers within each region than can be found in the above-mentioned UNIDIR report, which only digests national reports to identify overarching challenges.

These documents, prepared as guidance for debate at the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) in 2011, cover numerous sub-topics relating to the illicit trade in SALW. These include marking, tracing, record-keeping, regional cooperation, and capacity-building, among others. These thematic papers present stimulating questions that can help delegates frame their delegation’s policies in relation to each sub-topic.


This report, published by a U.S. think tank, examines the intricacies of the illicit arms trade. The author describes the routes that arms can take to the illicit market as well as the actors that are often involved. While some of the statistics are now outdated, the report still provides real life examples of illicit arms deals and fraud. This document will provide delegates who lack familiarity with the arms trade with an understandable overview of its basic building blocks.


The Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS) website to which the above link is directed is a valuable resource for delegates to browse while conducting research. This 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was the birthplace of the PoA and its final report should be the starting place for delegate research into illicit arms sales. The PoA represents the first major commitment by the international community to combat the illicit arms trade, and, until an Arms Trade Treaty may be implemented, it remains the most important guidance document. It is important to examine the pledges contained within the PoA, which discuss national, regional, and global conditions, and evaluate the progress made in respect to their implementation. Delegates should also consider these pledges in relation to their delegation’s policy priorities and development initiatives.


Informally known as “Firearms Protocol,” this is one of three supplemental protocols to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. This protocol, which entered into force in 2005, has been ratified by 95 Member States and is the only legally-binding global instrument concerning small arms. It contains provisions for four areas of small arms regulation: definitions, control measures, substantive criminal law, and information exchange. Delegates are encouraged to research their delegation’s stance on the Firearms Protocol and their compliance (if applicable) with the measures contained therein.


Because men and women each have unique needs, they are also affected by policies and programmes in different ways. “Gender mainstreaming” is a concept that promotes a gender-sensitive approach to new initiatives in order to maximize results. A “gender-sensitive” approach does not simply mean that women must be protected during international initiatives, but that gender-specific capabilities of both men and women should be incorporated into the design, implementation, and evaluation of policies at all levels so that all persons may benefit equally. The first “Guidelines for gender mainstreaming for the effective implementation of the PoA” were written by cooperating NGOs and issued by the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) at the first PoA review conference in 2006. This update to the CASA guidelines, created through a partnership between the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Regional Disarmament
Branch and the International Action Network on Small Arms, identifies the needs and opportunities for gender-inclusive engagement within PoA implementation.


The Security Council has requested that the Secretary-General submit biennial reports addressing the small arms issue. This, the second such report, builds upon the 2008 report which concluded that a wide spectrum of policy measures addressing crime, human rights, development, health—not just arms control—would be required to combat the small arms security issue. In this document, the Secretary-General provides his analysis of recent developments concerning the illicit arms trade and makes recommendations for the Security Council’s deliberation. Emphasis is placed, once again, on the need for integrated policies to combat the illicit trade in SALW, as well as the role of ammunition trade and stockpiles.

Bibliography


Rules of Procedure
General Assembly First Committee (GA 1st)

Introduction
1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the General Assembly First Committee (GA 1st) (hereinafter referred to as "the Committee") and shall be considered adopted by the Committee prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the "Secretariat."
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Committee, which can be any Member of the Secretariat or their designate.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - Dates of convening and adjournment
The Committee shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - Place of sessions
The Committee shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - Provisional agenda
The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Director-General and communicated to the Members of the Committee at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - Adoption of the agenda
The agenda provided by the Director-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those Member States and observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote. Should the Committee not reach a decision by conclusion of the first night’s meeting, the agenda will be automatically set in the order in which it was first communicated.

Rule 5 - Revision of the agenda
During a session, the Committee may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Debate on the inclusion of an item in the agenda shall be limited to three speakers in favor of, and three against, the inclusion. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Committee so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Committee decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a commission has reported on the question concerned.

For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an important and urgent character is subject to the discretion of the Director-General, or his or her designate, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Committee to be placed on the agenda. The votes described in this rule are substantive votes, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting — means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.
Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum
Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Committee.

2. The Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Director-General, shall provide and direct the staff required by the Committee and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat
The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Committee, and shall distribute documents of the Committee to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Committee may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat
The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Committee concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the President
The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, inter alia, chair the Committee for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the President
If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language
English shall be the official and working language of the Committee.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)
Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 – Quorum
The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Committee are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Committee shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, members of the Committee means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night’s meeting.
**Rule 15 - General powers of the President**
In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Committee, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Committee and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Committee the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference and is limited to entertaining motions.

**Rule 16 – Authority of the Committee**
The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Committee.

**Rule 17 – Voting rights on procedural matters**
Unless otherwise stated, all votes pertaining to the conduct of business shall require a majority of the members present and voting in order to pass.

For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this rule is applied. Note that observers may vote on all procedural votes; they may, however, not vote on substantive matters (see Chapter VI). There is no possibility to abstain on procedural votes.

**Rule 18 - Points of order**
During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with the rules of procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting. A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. They should be used exclusively to correct an error in procedure. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

**Rule 19 - Speeches**
No representative may address the Committee without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, the Secretariat will set a time limit for all speeches which may be amended by the President at his/her discretion. Consequently, motions to alter the speaker’s time will not be entertained by the President.

**Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers**
Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate, the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Committee, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Committee.
The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Committee. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Committee and the President should not act on her/his own motion.

**Rule 21 - Right of reply**
If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative’s State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that impugns the integrity of a representative’s State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State’s sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Committee by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

**Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting**
During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

**Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting**
During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move to the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Committee shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Committee’s next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Committee.

**Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate**
During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. Two representatives may speak in favor of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule.

**Rule 25 - Closure of debate**
A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Committee favors the closure of debate, the Committee shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

**Rule 26 - Order of motions**
Subject to rule 18, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

**Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments**
Proposals and amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat. Any proposal or amendment that relates to the substance of any matter under discussion shall require the signature of twenty percent of the members of the Committee [sponsors]. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for
circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Committee unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Committee for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Committee by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution during formal speeches. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Committee. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Committee and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions
A motion may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before voting has commenced, provided that the motion has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any member.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic
When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Committee, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights
Each member of the Committee shall have one vote.

This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Rule 31 - Request for a vote
A proposal or motion before the Committee for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Committee may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 32 - Majority required
1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative States as “present and voting” during the attendance roll call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain
on substantive votes.

**Rule 33 - Method of voting**

1. The Committee shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

   Only those members who designate themselves as present or present and voting during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying pass must, on the second time through, respond with either a yes or no vote. A pass cannot be followed by a second pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Committee votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Committee shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.

3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

**Rule 34 - Explanations of vote**

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

**Rule 35 - Conduct during voting**

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

For purposes of this rule, there shall be no communication amongst delegates, and if any delegate leaves the Committee room during voting procedure, they will not be allowed back into the room until the Committee has convened voting procedure.

**Rule 36 - Division of proposals and amendments**

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are approved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

**Rule 37 - Amendments**

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.
An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect preambulatory clauses.

**Rule 38 - Voting on amendments**
When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

*For purposes of this rule, furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

**Rule 39 - Order of voting on proposals**
If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Committee decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

**Rule 40 - The President shall not vote**
The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

### VII. CREDENTIALS

**Rule 41 - Credentials**
The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General prior to the opening of a session.

**Rule 42 - Authority of the General Assembly**
The Committee shall be bound by the actions of the General Assembly in all credentials matters and shall take no action regarding the credentials of any member.

### VII. PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

**Rule 43 - Participation of non-Member States**
The Committee shall invite any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Committee and any other State, to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
A sub-committee or sessional body of the Committee shall invite any State that is not one of its own members to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State. A State thus invited shall not have the right to vote, but may submit proposals which may be put to the vote on request of any member of the body concerned.

*If the Committee considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation. Delegates invited to the Committee according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Committee is no longer required.*

**Rule 45 - Participation of national liberation movements**
The Committee may invite any national liberation movement recognized by the General Assembly to participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.

**Rule 46 - Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies**
In accordance with the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the specialized agencies shall be entitled: a) To be represented at meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary organs; b) To participate, without the right to vote, through their representatives, in deliberations with respect to items of
concern to them and to submit proposals regarding such items, which may be put to the vote at the request of any member of the Committee or of the subsidiary organ concerned.

**Rule 47 - Participation of non-governmental organization and intergovernmental organizations**

Representatives of non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations accorded consultative observer status by the Economic and Social Council and other non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations designated on an ad hoc or a continuing basis by the Committee on the recommendation of the Bureau, may participate, with the procedural right to vote, but not the substantive right to vote, in the deliberations of the Committee on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations.