

BACKGROUND GUIDE

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NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS | 2017

The World's Largest College Model United Nations

18 - 22 MARCH - SHERATON NEW YORK HOTEL

20 - 24 MARCH - NEW YORK MARRIOTT MARQUIS HOTEL

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB)

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Please consult the FAQ section of www.nmun.org for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

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NMUN IMPORTANT DATES | 2010

IMPORTANT NOTICE: To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at www.nmun.org and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or 18 February - WHICHEVER COMES FIRST. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

31 January 2007

(Wednesday)

- Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March)
- Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET!
(We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights)

15 February 2007

(Thursday)

- Committee Updates Posted to www.nmun.org

22 February 2007

(Thursday)

- Discount Hotel Rates Expire. REGISTER EARLY - REGISTRATION IS FIRST-COME FIRST-SERVED
- Position Papers Due Via E-mail (*see next page for instructions*)

1 March 2007

(Thursday)

- Full Pre-Payment Due to Hotel
- Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to eaton@nmun.org
- All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$100 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$125 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline)

March 2007

The 2007 National Model UN Conference

- 18 - 22 March - Sheraton New York
- 20 - 24 March - New York Marriott Marquis

TWO COPIES OF EACH POSITION PAPER SHOULD BE SENT VIA E-MAIL BY 22 FEBRUARY 2007

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 22 February to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active after 15 November. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. NOTE: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.
- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)
- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted. *Please put the school or delegation's name in the subject line.* If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

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Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers (due 22 February):	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
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THE 2007 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

New York City, 18-22 March (Sheraton) & 20-24 March (Marriott) • www.nmun.org

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November 2006

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of the Directors, Assistant Directors, Senior and Executive Staffs, and the National Collegiate Conference Association, we would like to take this time to welcome officially you to the 2007 National Model United Nations Conference. Our staff has worked most diligently throughout the year to provide you with what we believe are outstanding preparation materials for your participation in this year's conference. It is our sincere hope that these materials serve you well in your preparation for March.

We are also very excited about the dual venues of this year's conference. While the second venue has posed challenges, we believe it will act as an effective method in greater facilitation of delegation and faculty member needs. The addition of Deputy Chiefs of Staff for both venues will also allow us to assist further you during the course of the conference. Should you find that you need assistance of any type throughout the week of your venue participation, please feel free to call on any member of staff, as they are all trained to be of assistance to and best facilitate you, our valued participants. It is important to remember that, although the conference is divided into two venues, the continuity of the conference remains intact for the 2007 conference. No one venue is more important than the other and our staff has been trained to ensure this continuity as well.

This manual has been provided as a resource for your preparation for the 2007 conference. In it you will find answers to many pressing questions delegates and faculty may have about the conference and delegate preparation. To continue further the educational aspect of the conference, we are pleased to announce that we have introduced several new committees this year. In an attempt to place greater emphasis on the promotion of the preservation of our global environment, we have introduced the simulation of the International Hydrological Programme and the United Nations World Tourism Organization, which will focus on environmental issues that take great priority on the United Nations agenda. In addition, we are simulating the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which we believe will be an extremely interesting simulation for delegates at both venues. We are very excited about these variations, as we believe that they will provide very interesting and educational experiences for their participants.

We are also very excited to not only provide more educational materials regarding the environment this year, but also in taking great strides to promote its protection during the course of both venues. Our first effort to this end is only to provide electronic copies of all conference materials, thus greatly reducing the incredible amount of paper the conference uses every year. The background guides that are sent out each year use an incredible amount of paper that could easily be saved. We are also committed to using only recycled paper during the course of the conference, as well as recycling the paper that is used in each committee of both venues. Our conference T-shirts this year will use only environmentally friendly inks and a portion of the proceeds of their sale will go to an environmental charity. It is the firm belief of this year's staff that, in order to promote our sincere goals of further protection of our planet, we must first practice what we preach. We are extremely proud of all efforts we are taking to preserve our planet in any method we can.

Please note that all position papers must be sent, via electronic mail, to two individual addresses this year. One copy of your papers, as a whole, must be sent to your delegations appropriate venue (either positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org). This address will serve as a depository for all papers submitted to each venue. We, the Directors-General, will maintain a database of all submitted papers, which will be crosschecked against the individual submissions. The individual committee papers should be sent to the email addresses included on the front page of your committee background guides. It is very important that all directions for emailing these guides, as outlined in both the background guides and in the Delegate Prep guide, be followed. With the dual venues, we are making every effort possible to ensure that their proper committee Directors receives all papers. We also recommend that delegations carbon copy themselves on all electronic submissions to ensure proper tracking of your position papers. Should any delegation require any assistance in the delivery of their papers, please contact us, as we will be happy to facilitate any problems that may arise in this process.

We sincerely look forward to meeting and working with you at the upcoming conference. We both have worked hard to do what we can to provide you with the materials you need to have an amazing experience in March. Should you find that you have any questions regarding the published materials, parliamentary procedure, delegate preparation, or the rules of the conference, please do not hesitate to contact us. We are happy to be of assistance in any way that we can. Our primary goal is to provide you with an outstanding educational experience.

Sincerely yours,

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History of the African Development Bank (AfDB)

The United Nations (UN), founded in 1945, aimed “to achieve international co-operation to solve problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”¹ Recognizing the need for a regional institution that could meet the needs of the African continent, a conference was convened in Khartoum from July 31 to August 4, 1963 to discuss the establishment of an African Bank.² Although the UN had taken steps toward combating poverty and underdevelopment, it had become apparent that another body was needed to help address the unique problems that plagued Africa. Subsequently, the agreement establishing the African Development Bank (AfDB) was approved and opened for signature by the Conference of Finance Ministers on the Establishment of an AfDB and, in September 1964, representatives of 25 States met and ratified the multinational agreement creating the AfDB.³

The AfDB is a regional bank mandated to contribute to the development of the continent while at the same time preserving Africa’s unique character.⁴ The AfDB has been able to adapt to the changing needs of the region by adopting visionary reforms in key sectors such as agriculture and rural development, promotion of the private sector, good governance, and economic integration and cooperation, while collaborating with other multilateral and bilateral development agencies.⁵

The AfDB was created as a multinational development bank to facilitate the movement of resources, primarily economic aid to promote and enable the development of its Regional Member Countries (RMCs).⁶ RMCs are AfDB Member States within Africa that are eligible for aid and assistance under the original objectives of the AfDB, as stipulated when the Bank was first created. On a macro level the Bank is mandated to “contribute to the economic development and social progress of its regional members – individually and collectively.”⁷ To this end, the AfDB works towards breaking the cycle of poverty that inhibits the development and progression of the region. The AfDB contributes to these goals by providing loans and grants for projects and programs that contribute to growth and development that benefit individual countries and the continent as a whole.⁸

Although the AfDB was founded in 1964, it did not begin operations until 1967 but by 2003 it had approved 885 loans and grants that amounted to US \$48 billion, in addition to credit guarantees and co-financing arrangements that amounted to another US \$70 billion.⁹ The AfDB has three primary financing avenues: the African Development Bank which provides loans at below-market rates; the African Development Fund (ADF) which provides no or low interest loans to the most impoverished members; and the Nigeria Trust Fund which is funded by the Nigerian government and financed by oil revenues to provide loans similar to the ADF.¹⁰ The AfDB has grown drastically since its creation and has expanded its annual lending portfolio to \$2 billion.¹¹ The enhanced lending

¹ United Nations. (1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. San Francisco: United Nations. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

² Conference of Ministers on the Establishment of an African Development Bank. (1964, September 10). *Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank*. Khartoum: United Nations. Retrieved July 15, 2006, from <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterX/treaty6.asp>

³ African Development Bank. (2006). *Evolution of the Group*. Retrieved July 15, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968651&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

⁴ SECO Economic Development Cooperation Division. (2004, May 14). *African Development Bank: Official Visit of the President of the African Development Bank to Switzerland*. Retrieved August 26, 2006, from <http://www.seco-cooperation.ch/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/00033/index.html?lang=en&PHPSESSID=>

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ African Development Bank. (2006). *Group Strategy*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968679&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

⁷ African Forum & Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD). (2006). *The African Development Bank and Civil Society Participation*. Retrieved July 17, 2006, from http://www.afrodad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=60&itemid=54

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Nnedu, I. (2005, January). Regional Development Banks: Stepping Out of the Shadows-The African Development Bank. *Economic Justice News*, 8(1). Retrieved July 30, 2006, from <http://www.50years.org/cms/ejn/story/253>

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Bank Information Center (BIC). (2004, January 10). *Disclosure Policy Review at the African Development Bank*. Retrieved September 5, 2006, from http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/transparency_at_african_development_bank/index.php

ability of the Bank, primarily through increased donations from regional and non-regional countries, has allowed it to be more of an influential player in the development of the region, incorporating African culture into African development.¹²

Despite institutionalized lending, the Bank has had to respond to the ever-changing structure of the world economy. Driving change within the Bank has been the creation of new development paradigms at the dawn of the 21st century. The AfDB has evolved to work within these new frameworks. For instance, the Bank works within the framework of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) to help promote good governance, self-reliance, and partnerships within the continent.¹³ The AfDB is also a signatory to the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* committing to “take action to strengthen ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability” for those participating in development at any level.^{14,15} The hope of the Paris Declaration is to monitor the use of development assistance and assess the progress towards sustainable development based on 12 actionable indicators.¹⁶ The Beijing Platform for Action of 1997 is another important framework for the AfDB’s work, especially in the fight to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).¹⁷ The Beijing Platform has formed 12 critical areas of concern that represent the main obstacles to women’s advancement: poverty, lack of education and training opportunities, health, violence, armed conflict, the economy, decision-making, institutional mechanisms, human rights, media, environment, and a lack of rights for the girl-child.¹⁸

According to the UN, the MDGs are one of the most important platforms for African development. The MDGs address eight major areas of development on the international level: extreme poverty and hunger, education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, environmental sustainability, and a global partnership for development.¹⁹ Recognizing the importance of the MDGs the Board of Governors of the AfDB, in May 1999, adopted the Vision of the African Development Bank – A Re-Invigorated Bank: an Agenda for Moving Forward.²⁰ This Vision was completed with extensive consultations between AfDB’s stakeholders as had been agreed within the Beijing Platform for Action in 1997.²¹ The Vision is the AfDB’s strongest effort to date to address and incorporate the MDGs into its work. Despite these efforts and although 189 Member States of the UN have signed the MDGs, none of the African countries are on course to meet these targets by 2015.^{22,23}

The MDGs also implicitly state the need to include a gender focus in all development initiatives. As a method of addressing gender mainstreaming within institutions and programs of action, the AfDB adopted a Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as a means of assessing and eventually allocating resources based upon country compliance and effectiveness of gender-equalizing programs.²⁴ The CPIA assesses countries based on four clusters:

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Chissano, Joaquim. (2004, September). *Testimonials Celebrating 40 years of the AfDB*. Retrieved July 21, 2006, from www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/ITEM/F6429539ACE18C57E030A8C0668C56C6

¹⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006). Countries and Organizations Adhering to the Paris Declaration. *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*. Retrieved September 2, 2006, from http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_36074966_1_1_1_1,00.html

¹⁵ The World Bank Group. (2002). *Governance and Anti-Corruption: Sources of Governance Indicators*. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/notes.html>

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ African Development Bank. (2000, June). *Statement of the African Development Bank at the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly: Women in the Year 2000*. Retrieved July 16, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5.htm>

¹⁸ Kelson, G. A. (1997). *Monitoring the Beijing Platform for Action: Are Governments Keeping their Commitments to Women?* Retrieved August 11, 2006, from <http://www.angelfire.com/il/iwcp/beijing.html>

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² United Nations. (2006, June). *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2006*. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Retrieved September 27, 2006, from <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2006/MDGReport2006.pdf#search=%22Millennium%20Development%20Goals%20Report%202006%22>

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

economic management and economic policies; structural trade policies, market competition, and environmental sustainability; social equity and broad-based growth; and public sector management and good governance.²⁵

Lending policies of the AfDB have been evolutionary in order to meet the changing needs within the region. Project lending is complex, but there are two primary ways to initiate lending: through a direct request from a Member State outlining the nature of the proposal, as well as the economic, technical and financial viability of the project, or through collaboration with resident representatives.²⁶ After the proposals are submitted to the AfDB, there is an appraisal team that assesses the technical and economic viability of the project.²⁷ According to the Bank, technical viability means that the methods chosen for the project and the project itself are appropriate to the conditions for which they are intended.²⁸

This appraisal process is influenced by both regional and non-regional members that have a voice in the Bank. Since 1982, extra-regional members were allowed into the AfDB based on a twelve to six ratio of executive directors from regional and extra-regional members respectively.²⁹ Ultimately, the Bank realized the potential of collaboration with extra-regional members which would allow the Bank to evolve, strengthen its resolve to crises, and provide greater access to more resources.³⁰ Although the AfDB allowed for extra-regional membership, the Bank was careful to preserve its African character. However, the initiative to include extra-regional members was met with some resistance. To address this controversy, then Vice President Babacar N'Diaye spoke of the conjoining of regional and non-regional members as a partnership of difference to enable a more productive Bank that could better aid in the development of the region.³¹ Once the AfDB allowed extra-regional States to join the financial pool was augmented and actual disbursements increased dramatically.³² Ultimately, the AfDB was able to distribute funding to more sectors. For instance, in 1974 no funds were allocated for the education and health sectors, but by 1984 funding had increased to 8% and 5% respectively.³³

In 2006, President Donald Kaberuka set forth new objectives and stressed the importance of creating policies to reassure the private sector, increase competitiveness, and mitigate perceived risks and barriers to investment in African countries.³⁴ Although Kaberuka emphasized the need to close the infrastructure gap and increase support for regional projects to respond to the needs of investors, Africa's urban and rural poor still lag behind.³⁵ Kaberuka's plan reiterates the action plan for Africa's development as laid out by the G-8, World Bank, and European Investment Bank (EIB). Although bridging the infrastructure gap is important the focus of these projects has tended to move away from the original principles of the AfDB.³⁶ As such, the Bank is trying to carefully consider the way forward that will ensure equitable development for the region.³⁷

The AfDB is also struggling to rectify the lack of transparency within the institution. This is a necessary focus to ensure that the Bank can continue to play an important role in Africa's development.³⁸ In March of 2004, the AfDB released a new disclosure policy that sets some new standards for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) yet fails

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁶ Mingst, K. A. (1990). *Politics and the African Development Bank. The Lending Process*. Kentucky: the University Press of Kentucky.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Gardiner, R. K., & Pickett, J. (1984). *The African Development Bank, 1964-1984: An Experiment in Economic Co-operation and Development*. Abidjan: The African Development Bank.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³¹ Adams, P., & Davis, A. (1996, July/August). On the Rocks: the African Development Bank Struggles to Stay Afloat. *Multinational Monitor*. 17(7, 8). Retrieved September 27, 2006, from <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm0796.09.html>

³² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³³ African Development Bank, African Development Fund, & Board of Governors. (1987, 2006). *Compendium of Statistics (1984, 1987) (2006, pg. 4)* Retrieved September 1, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/AfDB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/STATISTICS/COMPENDIUM_2006_WEB.PDF

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

to meet minimum requirements mandated by institutions such as the World Bank, and does not include recommendations made by the Bank Information Center (BIC).³⁹ The AfDB has allowed transparency on Draft Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), Country Governance Profiles (CGPs), Draft Policy Papers, the Board of Executive Directors' biannual work plan, and the Prospective Project Brief (PPB), all of which are new standards that the AfDB is trying to implement.⁴⁰ Although the AfDB has made unprecedented steps in some areas of transparency there is still much work to be done in order to satisfy outside donors.⁴¹ The AfDB has not allowed access to its archives, an action that, if allowed, would perhaps enhance the effectiveness of current projects and funding mechanisms, building on past failures and successes.

The AfDB is currently comprised of 77 Member States, comprised of regional and non-regional members as follows:

Regional Member Countries

Algeria	Eritrea	Namibia
Angola	Ethiopia	Niger
Benin	Gabon	Nigeria
Botswana	Gambia	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Ghana	Sao Tome e Principe
Burundi	Guinea	Senegal
Cameroon	Guinea Bissau	Seychelles
Cape Verde	Kenya	Sierra Leone
Central African Republic	Lesotho	Somalia
Chad	Liberia	South Africa
Comoros	Libya	Sudan
Congo	Madagascar	Swaziland
Cote d'Ivoire.	Malawi	Tanzania
Democratic Republic of	Mali	Togo
Congo	Mauritania	Tunisia
Djibouti	Mauritius	Uganda
Egypt	Morocco	Zambia
Equatorial Guinea	Mozambique	Zimbabwe

Non-Regional Member Countries

Argentina	France	Norway
Austria	Germany	Portugal
Belgium	India	Saudi Arabia
Brazil	Italy	Spain
Canada	Japan	Sweden
China	Korea	Switzerland
Denmark	Kuwait	United Kingdom
Finland	Netherlands	United States of America ⁴²

I. Challenges of Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in War Affected Economies

*...war is the worst enemy of development, and broad-based development the best form of long-term conflict prevention.*⁴³

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² African Development Bank. (2006). *Current Members of the African Development Bank*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,969002&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

The United Nations (UN) Millennium Declaration, passed by the General Assembly (GA) in September of 2000, proclaims the commitment of signatory States to development and the eradication of poverty.⁴⁴ According to Abdoulie Janneh, UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Africa is not currently projected to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), established by the Declaration, within the prescribed timeframe.⁴⁵ The African Development Bank (AfDB) is committed to assisting African countries in achieving these goals.⁴⁶ The MDGs are the essence of the Strategic Plan of the AfDB for the period 2003-2007.⁴⁷ The current president of the AfDB, Donald Kaberuka, has highlighted the development of infrastructure as an important tenet of the development of African economies and the reduction of poverty set forth by the MDGs.⁴⁸

The reduction of poverty is a fundamental tenant of the MDGs. Infrastructure is a crucial component of the reduction of poverty and the development of human capital.⁴⁹ Citizens need to have access to basic resources in order to improve their standard of living. Basic water, sewage, and sanitation infrastructure is an important component of lowering mortality rates and increasing life expectancy.⁵⁰ The provision of these basic services also reduces health problems, lowering hours of work missed and increasing individual productivity.⁵¹

The countries of Africa have developed several initiatives to address the need for infrastructure development. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was created by African leaders as a common framework for addressing Africa's development challenges.⁵² NEPAD has developed numerous goals and plans for improving the infrastructure of Africa.⁵³ Part of the Action Plan of NEPAD sets forth the goal of "improved infrastructure, such as safe water, sanitation, power, roads, transport, and communications."⁵⁴ The AfDB is committed to assisting NEPAD in the attainment of its development goals, and much of AfDB assistance is guided by NEPAD objectives and needs.⁵⁵

The Negative Impact of War on Infrastructure Development

Infrastructure is a broad term that refers to the provision of basic services, such as water, transportation, energy, and telecommunications by a State to its citizens.⁵⁶ Countries emerging from war, as are many African States, confront

⁴³ United Nations. (2000, December 4). *Secretary-General, at Conference in Africa, Says Breaking Cycle of Deprivation, Conflict is Central to Work of United Nations*. Retrieved October 15, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001204.sgsm7653.doc.html>

⁴⁴ United Nations General Assembly. (2000, September 8). *GA 55/2: United Nations Millennium Declaration*. New York: United Nations. Retrieved September 9, 2006, from <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/millennium.htm>

⁴⁵ Janneh, A. (2006, May 15). *Development of Africa and the ECA: Highlights on Some of the Challenges*. Retrieved September 14, 2006, from African Development Bank Web site: <http://www.uneca.org/speeches.htm>

⁴⁶ African Development Bank. (n.d.). *The Group Strategy*. Retrieved September 14, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968679&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ African Development Bank. (2006, July 4). *Infrastructure and Investment in Africa*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=293,158705&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&focus_item=2874230&focus_lang=us

⁴⁹ Hoeffler, A. (1999). *Challenges of Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in War-Affected Economies*. Retrieved September 9, 2006, from African Development Bank Web site: [http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/AfDB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/ECONOMICsandRESEARCH/ERP-48.PDF](http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/AfDB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/ECONOMICSandRESEARCH/ERP-48.PDF)

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Torero, M., & Chowdhury, S. (2005). *Increasing Access to Infrastructure for Africa's Rural Poor*. Retrieved September 8, 2006, from International Food Policy Research Institute Web site: <http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib32.pdf#search=%22infrastructure%20Africa%22>

⁵² New Partnership for Africa's Development. (n.d.). *A Summary of NEPAD Action Plans*. Retrieved July 9, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/41.pdf>

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ African Development Bank. (n.d.). *NEPAD*. Retrieved October 15, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,970216&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

unique challenges in infrastructure development.⁵⁷ The infrastructure of a State can be heavily targeted and destroyed in times of war.⁵⁸ In most cases, countries suffering from civil war are heavily dependent on commodities for export.⁵⁹ The plundering of such commodities during a conflict intensifies the economic devastation.⁶⁰ In addition to deliberate destruction of infrastructure, war may impact infrastructure in regions of countries that are not directly affected by the conflict, as expenditure on infrastructure is reduced in order to fund the war effort.⁶¹

Furthermore, war can indirectly encumber the infrastructure of regions not involved in the conflict through the creation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁶² The influx of refugees and IDPs into an area strains existing infrastructure in basic sectors, such as water and sanitation.⁶³ The deterioration of basic infrastructure as a result of refugees and IDPs can lead to serious health problems, such as water borne diseases, within both the refugee and IDP populations and the host population.⁶⁴ Poor sanitation and water borne diseases are also a concern in refugee camps.⁶⁵ The hardships faced by refugees and IDPs and the areas that host them further illustrate the negative impact of war on infrastructure.

Infrastructure destruction also negatively impacts the economies of States and the lives of their citizens. Low per capita income and a low Gross National Product are common in war affected countries.⁶⁶ This deters private investment in these countries, as low income reduces the supply of infrastructure reconstruction below the demand.⁶⁷ Thus, many citizens will not have access to basic services, such as safe water and primary education.⁶⁸ This lowers life expectancy and quality of life of the State's most vulnerable citizens.⁶⁹ Thus infrastructure reconstruction in war affected economies is a vital concern in that it is linked to sustainable economic growth, human development, and the reduction of poverty.

However, in war affected economies, more is at stake than economic development and poverty reduction. The United Nations Development Programme highlights infrastructure rehabilitation as an important component of establishing sustainable peace and security in a post conflict society.⁷⁰ The importance of infrastructure development in sustaining peace is indicated by the fact that, between 1997 and 2001, the Post Conflict Fund of the World Bank devoted 69% of its assistance to infrastructure development.⁷¹ Infrastructure promotes peace by fostering connections between citizens and increasing the efficiency of governance.⁷² The development of infrastructure can also facilitate reintegration of former combatants back into society with viable employment opportunities, reducing the gains from resuming fighting.⁷³ Some infrastructure development programs, such as the food for guns program in Liberia, provide former combatants with jobs in the reconstruction effort, simultaneously encouraging sustainable peace and improving infrastructure.⁷⁴ This program illustrates that promoting sustainable peace is often an important aspect of infrastructure development projects.

⁵⁷ Hoefler, *supra* note 49.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Kang, S. (2006). Post-Conflict Economic Development and Sustaining the Peace. In T. D. Mason & J. D. Meernik (Eds.), *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace* (pp. 219-238). London: Routledge.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Hoefler, *supra* note 49.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2000, April 7). *Meeting the Challenge: The Role of UNDP in Crisis, Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations, 2000-2003*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/word/dp00-18ed.doc>

⁷¹ Kang, *supra* note 59.

⁷² United Nations Development Program. (2006, March 8). *Infrastructure Must Work for the Poor, Sen Says*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/march-2006/sen-20060308.en?categoryID=349420&lang=en>

⁷³ Hoefler, *supra* note 49.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Lastly, infrastructure is a precondition for private investment which is necessary to achieve economic growth. However, war represents a risk for investors and thus African countries emerging from war are often cut off from existing foreign investment.⁷⁵ In Foreign Policy Magazine's first annual *Failed States Index*, African countries represented 15 of 20 countries at risk for State failure.⁷⁶ This statistic forecasts a bleak future for stability and investment in Africa. Conflict throughout Africa portrays negative impressions about the stability of the continent as a whole to potential investors.⁷⁷ For example, the current conflicts in the Ivory Coast and Sudan have deterred investment in the entire continent, even though evidence suggests favorable returns from investments in Africa.⁷⁸ One of the challenges that Africa faces is overcoming these negative perceptions. Massive infrastructure development initiatives can be part of the solution to this problem.

Infrastructure: A Prerequisite for Economic Growth

The burden of war on African States is exacerbated by a historical lack of infrastructure development. During the colonial era infrastructure development was limited and designed for an export-driven economy.⁷⁹ For example, the majority of African railways were built to link mines with harbors.⁸⁰ As a result, infrastructure is unevenly distributed throughout the continent.⁸¹ Furthermore, there is no effective regional transportation network to provide linkages between landlocked African countries.⁸² These conditions increase the cost of both regional and international trade, particularly in rural areas.⁸³ Following the end of the colonial period, independent African States were often plagued by political instability, which resulted in loss of private investment and further stalled the growth of infrastructure.⁸⁴

Adequate infrastructure is necessary for the production of goods and services and the expansion of trade, which can ultimately lead to sustainable economic growth.⁸⁵ The 2005 Report of the Commission for Africa (the Blair Report) addresses the crucial need for transportation infrastructure to stimulate economic growth.⁸⁶ According to the Blair Report adequate infrastructure reduces transportation expenses and consequently lowers the overall cost of conducting business.⁸⁷ Conversely, a lack of transportation not only increases the cost of business transactions it can entirely prevent them.⁸⁸ For example, a lack of transportation infrastructure can prevent farmers from delivering their crops to local or international markets.⁸⁹

The impact of transportation infrastructure on development is exemplified by the country of Sudan. The infrastructure of Southern Sudan was destroyed as a result of decades of civil war between northern and southern Sudan.⁹⁰ The lack of transportation infrastructure inhibited relief efforts, as food and humanitarian aid had to be air dropped in order to reach rural populations.⁹¹ In July of 2006, the World Food Programme (WFP), with financing

⁷⁵ Harsch, E. (2005, January). Investors Start to Eye Africa: Hurdles to Productive Foreign Investment Remain High. *Africa Renewal*, 18, 20. Retrieved August 16, 2006, from United Nations Web site: <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol18no4/184invest.htm>

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ BBC News. (2004, November 22). Africa Conflicts Scare Investors: Conflicts in the Ivory Coast and Sudan's Troubled Darfur Region Are Driving Potential Investors out of Africa, the United Nations Says. Retrieved June 26, 2006, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4033459.stm>

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Torero, M., & Chowdhury, S, *supra* note 51.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Hoeffler, *supra* note 49.

⁸⁶ Commission for Africa. (2005, March). *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*. Retrieved July 9, 2006, from http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/thereport/english/11-03-05_cr_report.pdf

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ World Food Programme. (2006, July 5). *Big Sudan Government Donation to WFP Road Project*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from World Food Programme Web site: <http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2157>

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

from the government of Southern Sudan, initiated a massive roads building project.⁹² The new road system immediately eased the transportation of relief aid.⁹³ Furthermore, it opened new markets by linking towns in Sudan to one another and to neighboring countries.⁹⁴ It also lowered public transportation costs and reduced travel time throughout the country.⁹⁵ These developments have paved the way for future development in Sudan.

In addition to transportation infrastructure the development of information communications technologies (ICT) is vital to economic growth. ICT is a critical element in connecting regions of Africa and linking Africa to the world economy.⁹⁶ Government managed telephone lines are notorious for being unreliable and slow to set up.⁹⁷ The proliferation of wireless communications technologies has emerged as an alternative. In post conflict settings, mobile phone technology can be installed quickly on rough terrain, unlike local area network lines.⁹⁸ Immediate installation of mobile ICT technology is beneficial for the work of humanitarian organizations responding in a post conflict environment.⁹⁹ Mobile phones can be a viable substitute for other methods of communication, such as roads, when infrastructure is inadequate or inaccessible.¹⁰⁰ The development of mobile ICT has already contributed to the streamlining of African commerce and is likely to have continued benefits for development.¹⁰¹

Case Study: Republic of Sierra Leone

In 2002, the Republic of Sierra Leone emerged from eleven years of civil war and began the process of reestablishing democratic governance and stability.¹⁰² During the war, combatants systematically destroyed much of the infrastructure of the country.¹⁰³ For example, the public electricity supply system was destroyed during the conflict.¹⁰⁴ In addition to the outright destruction of roughly one-third of the roads, reconstruction efforts that had begun prior to the war were discontinued when rebels destroyed necessary construction equipment.¹⁰⁵ Sierra Leone also confronted public health concerns as a result of the war. As of 1999, only 11% of the population had access to adequate sanitation.¹⁰⁶ In the immediate aftermath of the war, about 75% of Sierra Leone's health care centers were not functional.¹⁰⁷ These challenges were intensified by the displacement of approximately one-third of the population of Sierra Leone as a result of the conflict.¹⁰⁸ In addition to the problem of IDPs, Sierra Leone houses more than 65,000 Liberian refugees, fleeing the impacts of the Liberian civil war and the resulting lack of stability.¹⁰⁹ These conditions have resulted in overall economic hardship for Sierra Leone.¹¹⁰ The annual growth rate in recent years has been as low as -21.1%.¹¹¹

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Less is More: Mobile Phones Can Boost Development in Poor Countries If Governments Let Them. (2005, July). *The Economist*, 376(8434), 11.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Bray, J. (2005, February). Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. *International Companies and Post Conflict Reconstruction: Cross Sectoral Comparisons*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from The World Bank Web site: [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/InternationalCompaniesandPost-ConflictReconstructionCross-SectoralComparissons/\\$FILE/WP22_RevisedWeb.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/InternationalCompaniesandPost-ConflictReconstructionCross-SectoralComparissons/$FILE/WP22_RevisedWeb.pdf)

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Calling Across the Divide. (2005, March). *The Economist*, 374(8417), 74.

¹⁰¹ March of the Mobiles: Is There No Limit to the Potential Market for Mobile Communications? (2004, September). *The Economist*, 372(8394), 15.

¹⁰² CIA. (2006, September 19). *The World Factbook: Sierra Leone*. Retrieved September 28, 2006, from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html>

¹⁰³ African Development Bank. (2006, August 10). *Sierra Leone- Health Services Rehabilitation Project*. Retrieved August 27, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=293,962607&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&thing_id=4388225

¹⁰⁴ African Development Bank. (2004, October 01). *ADF Supports Post-War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone-ADF Grant will Strengthen Public Finance and Energy Sectors*. Retrieved September 28, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/PORTAL.wv_media.show?p_id=154913&p_settingssetid=1&p_settingsiteid=0&p_siteid=273&p_type=basetext&p_textid=155127

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Sierra Leone- Health Services Rehabilitation Project, *supra* note 103.

¹⁰⁸ CIA, *supra* note 102.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

The AfDB has instituted numerous projects to respond to the infrastructure needs in Sierra Leone. In 2004, the African Development Fund (ADF), a division of the AfDB, approved a large grant to Sierra Leone for the purpose of developing and strengthening the institutions that are responsible for infrastructure development and maintenance, including the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Power.¹¹² The grant provided money for training citizens to staff positions within these agencies.¹¹³ In addition, it provided the agencies with technical assistance, in the form of internet connections, equipment, and training.¹¹⁴

The AfDB has also initiated projects to develop the agricultural sector of Sierra Leone. Through the ADF, the AfDB has provided loans and grants to strengthen the public sectors responsible for the construction and maintenance of agricultural infrastructure.¹¹⁵ It has also assisted in the construction of a hydroelectric power plant, which will provide electricity to rural regions of Sierra Leone.¹¹⁶ The goal of these initiatives is to bolster rural incomes and increase food security, important components of the reduction of poverty.¹¹⁷

Finally, the AfDB has attempted to increase access to health care in Sierra Leone. In 2006, it completed the refurbishment of several hospitals and health centers.¹¹⁸ The AfDB hailed this project a success forecasting that it laid the ground work for peace, and mortality and morbidity reduction in Sierra Leone.¹¹⁹ The project was also deemed a success in that it remained consistent with the National Recovery Programme set forth by the government of Sierra Leone.¹²⁰ Through these infrastructure development projects, the AfDB has worked in conjunction with Sierra Leone to help alleviate some of the tragic effects of war on the country.

Conclusion

Africa, as a whole, continues to confront numerous challenges in infrastructure reconstruction and rehabilitation as a result of its history of war. The AfDB has already made immeasurable contributions to the development of infrastructure and has the potential to assist Africa in rising above its challenges. In this capacity, the AfDB has a vital role to play in the reduction of poverty and the improvement of the quality of life of numerous African populations.

War impacts every State in a slightly different manner thus, the AfDB must consider the unique circumstances of each State in order to provide optimal assistance. In determining the position of your delegation it is important to consider the relationship between your State and the AfDB. The perspectives of Regional Member Countries (RMCs) and Non-Regional Member Countries (non-RMCs) are likely to differ significantly.

RMCs may want to research the following questions: How has the infrastructure of your State been impacted by war? What are the most immediate infrastructure needs of your State? What kinds of projects does the AfDB finance in your country? How effective have these projects been? Have any other international financial institutions implemented post-conflict reconstruction projects in your country? What, if any, action is being taken to increase private investment in your State?

Non-RMCs may want to reflect on slightly different questions: To what extent has your State contributed to past and current AfDB projects? How beneficial have these contributions been to African States? How does your State determine what AfDB projects it supports and at what level it will contribute? Are there any specific projects your State is currently financing in conjunction with the AfDB?

¹¹⁰ ADF Supports Post-War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone, *supra* note 104.

¹¹¹ Hoeffler, *supra* note 49.

¹¹² ADF Supports Post-War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone, *supra* note 104.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Sierra Leone- Health Services Rehabilitation Project, *supra* note 103.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

Both RMCs and non-RMCs should ultimately attempt to develop a position on the effectiveness of current AfDB policies and programs and the appropriate role of the AfDB in the future. Delegates may want to consider whether a specialized unit should be created within the AfDB to address the infrastructure needs of war affected economies.

II. Policies for Regional Integration in Africa

There are no islands in the world today, and there are no domestic and international diseases. We live in a global village. We live in a shrinking world. And there are many contacts between us. No one is isolated, no one can be smug and sit in his or her corner and say, "I'm safe because it is somewhere else."¹²¹

Introduction

Africa conducts less than 2 percent of exports and imports in terms of global trade, despite having an extra-regional trade to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio twice the size of Latin America or four times as much as Europe.¹²² Investing in the continent is also 70 percent more costly than investing in East Asia or Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) States, leaving Africa with a loss of 0.44 percent of average economic growth each year.¹²³ With the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991 under the Abuja Treaty, members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) took a critical step in enhancing the economic competitiveness of the continent. The Abuja Treaty set terms for the AEC that included six stages of economic development measures to be implemented gradually over 34 years.¹²⁴ At each stage, African leaders committed to strengthening regional economic communities through measures such as eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties, and internal taxes; improving sectoral integration in areas of trade, agriculture, and finance; establishing a free trade area and a timetable for removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and establishing a Customs Union (CU) with a common external tariff; continued coordination of tariff and non-tariff systems for the CU; establishing an African Common Market (ACM); and a final stage of enhancing the ACM's structure with the eventual goal of an African Monetary Union, single African Central Bank, and creating one currency for Africa.¹²⁵ The target date for a single African currency is 2021, established by the Association of African Central Bank Governors in August of 2003.¹²⁶

In addition to setting economic integration goals, African heads of state pledged to integrate in other ways when the OAU became the African Union (AU) in 2001.¹²⁷ The AU's structure was partially based on that of the European Union (EU) and included creation of a pan-African parliament and a court of justice among other regional integration objectives.¹²⁸ The Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), K.Y. Amoako, discussed factors necessary for both individual States in Africa and the AU to consider:

First, is the need for comprehensive efforts, to foster all levels of enterprise, ranging from the small-scale informal sector to large firms, in our trade and other integration policies. Second, is to assure that integration more reliably produces regional public goods. These include peace, coordinated action in tackling major social issues, such as HIV/AIDS and food insecurities, or fostering first-rate intellectual public goods, including scientific research and public policy

¹²¹ Annan, Kofi. (2006). *Speaking out on the crisis*. Debt Aids Trade Africa. Retrieved October 20, 2006, from <http://www.data.org/pdf/SpeakingOut.pdf>.

¹²² Schneider, G. (2003). Globalization and the poorest of the poor: Global integration and the development process in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 37, 389.

¹²³ Abuka, C. (2005, December). Infrastructure, regional integration and growth in Africa. In *Africa in the world economy- the national, regional and international challenges* (pp. 122-128). The Hague. (Reprinted from *Africa in the world economy - the national, regional and international challenges*). Retrieved July 20, 2006, from <http://www.fondad.org>.

¹²⁴ Information Technology Center for Africa. (2002). *Treaty establishing the African Economic Community*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/abuja.htm>.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Masson, P. and Pattillo, C. (2004, December). A single currency for Africa? *Finance and Development*, p. 9-15.

¹²⁷ Bhalla, N. (2002). Politics-Africa: Long-time dream of unity comes into focus. *Global information network*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Pro Quest Research Library.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

analysis, at both national and regional levels... And finally, there is the need to have broad-based participation, at the national and regional levels, to create long-term support for regionalization.¹²⁹

Role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

A regional economic community (REC) is a group of States “whose aim is the achievement of deep forms of integration such as, for instance, currency and monetary unions.”¹³⁰ The AU’s intent in creating these communities is to facilitate the economic goals for the continent and gradually build stable systems that can support a central African bank.¹³¹ Eight existing RECs are currently recognized by the AU: Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS); Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Southern African Development Community (SADC); Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD); Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC).¹³²

Under Article 28 of the Abuja Treaty, Member States are called upon to improve RECs already in existence and to create additional RECs as needed.¹³³ RECs play an important role in Africa’s economic integration, but scholars debate their effectiveness in achieving the stated purposes under the Treaty.¹³⁴ One of the challenges facing RECs, particularly those in eastern and southern Africa, is that several States have overlapping memberships, creating conflicting and unclear administrative systems both within the State and among the RECs.¹³⁵ African heads of state attending the 7th AU Summit in Banjul, Gambia on July 1-2, 2006 discussed the issue and concluded that no new RECs would be recognized in the hopes of making existing ones more efficient.¹³⁶

Outside the AU, the United States (US), EU, and Japan have been heavily involved with Africa’s global integration.¹³⁷ In 2002, the EU signed an agreement with the SADC in Maputo, Mozambique that included a \$101 million (US) donation to regional integration efforts and a cooperative framework for 2002-2007.¹³⁸ The specific areas targeted in the agreement are “economic integration, trade, transport, communication, and food aid.”¹³⁹ The United States and Africa have also signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) allowing States in Africa to have more access to trade markets in the US.¹⁴⁰ From 2002 to 2003, there was an increase of US\$14 billion in exports from Africa to the US, with 80 percent from petroleum exports and the remaining amount from textiles and apparel, transport and equipment, and agriculture.¹⁴¹ The States receiving the greatest benefits from this trade were Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon, Lesotho, and Kenya and combined, they comprised 93 percent of AGOA trade.¹⁴²

Regional Progress

AU Member States are at varying stages of regional integration, with some RECs closer than others are to the economic goals of the Abuja Treaty. According to an index measuring integration created by the Economic

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Carmignani, F. (2005, October). The road to regional integration in Africa: Macroeconomic convergence and performance in COMESA. *Journal of African Economies*, 15(2), 212-250.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² People’s Daily Online. (2006, July 2). *Roundup: AU Banjul summit closes with decisions on key issues*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from http://english.people.com.cn/200607/03/eng20060703_279464.html.

¹³³ Information Technology Center for Africa, *supra* note 124.

¹³⁴ Gondwe, G. E. (2001). Making globalization work in Africa. *Finance and Development*, 38(4). Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Wilson Web database.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ People’s Daily Online, *supra* note 132.

¹³⁷ Bhalla, *supra* note 127.

¹³⁸ Mucanse, L. (2002). Politics-Southern Africa: EU promotes regional integration. *Global Information Network*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Pro Quest Research Library.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Lee, M. C. (2006, March 30). *The US and EU- Undermining regional economic integration in Africa*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from Nordic Africa Institute Web site: <http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/archives/304lee/>.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

Commission for Africa (ECA), Africa became more integrated by an average of 4.5 percent between 1994-1999.¹⁴³ This index is compiled by measuring economic linkages in the following sectors: “trade, transport, communications, energy, agriculture, manufacturing, money and finance, and human development and labor markets.”¹⁴⁴ A 2004 report of the ECA also describes the African Integration Index as “assess[ing], for example, to what extent countries are removing barriers to trade (such as tariffs) and developing policies that will allow people to move freely between countries and work in countries other than their own.”¹⁴⁵

Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, “The Union has recognized that Africa’s partnership with the rest of the world must be based on solid achievements, and on monitoring of both donor and recipient performance. You know that making development happen relies on a shared sense of responsibility and a reciprocal sense of trust.”¹⁴⁶

One successful example is the EAC, whose membership includes Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.¹⁴⁷ In 2004, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania signed the East African Customs Union Treaty into law and took an important step for East Africa’s economic development and for regional integration.¹⁴⁸ A statement made by the EAC Secretariat described the union as follows: “The main thrust of the union is the realisation of a viable integrated East African market, which will stimulate production, investments, and trade both intra, regional and international. Formation of the EAC Customs Union, now one of the largest trade blocks on the continent, is a necessary step towards translating provisions of the treaty into economic opportunities for the East Africans.”¹⁴⁹ This union is the second attempt at this kind of integration, but the 2004 treaty takes a more gradual approach with Kenya removing all trade barriers and a staggered phase-out of duties for Uganda and Tanzania, allowing the latter economies to strengthen and become more competitive with Kenya.¹⁵⁰ A potential challenge for this customs union is that members are also part of the SADC and COMESA and conflicting regulatory regimes could result.¹⁵¹ If the Union can become a successful trading bloc, free trade in Africa could continue and expand, and the Union would become a model for other RECs.¹⁵² A member of the EAC secretariat said, “Due to multiple membership of the partner states in other regional organisations, the EAC Customs Union could enter into free trade arrangements with other trading blocs, or in the extreme circumstance, merge with them to make a larger trading bloc.”¹⁵³

Three additional regional monetary unions have also been created: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Economic and Monetary Community for Central Africa (CEMAC), and the Common Monetary Area (CMA) which also known as the “rand zone” and includes Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.¹⁵⁴ The WAEMU comprises two zones of the CFA franc zone, is pegged to the Euro, and guaranteed by the French Treasury.¹⁵⁵

There are also plans for two additional EMUs. The SADC is working on creating a single currency with a central bank by 2016.¹⁵⁶ ECOWAS Member States Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone are developing a monetary union and working on creating a currency for the region. The target date for creation of this EMU, called

¹⁴³ Economic Commission for Africa. (2004, August). *Assessing regional integration in Africa*. United Nations. Abstract retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.uneca.org/aria/>.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Masango, D. (2006, July 2). *Annan praises Africa on progress achieved*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from All Africa.com Web site: <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200607030633.html>.

¹⁴⁷ Abdoulahi, M. (2005, December). *Progress report on regional integration efforts in Africa towards the promotion of intra-African trade* (Rep. No. 30). United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved July 27, 2006, from Economic Commission for Africa Web site: <http://www.uneca.org/atpc/Work%20in%20progress/30.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ Ford, Neil. (2004). African Customs Union will spur economic growth. *African Business*. Retrieved July 10, 2006 from Pro Quest Research Library.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Siddiqi, Moin. (2006). A single African currency in our time? *African Business*. Retrieved July 10, 2006 from Pro Quest Research Library.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), is 2009.¹⁵⁷ Inter-governmental committees supervising this process have set four criteria for Member States: “a budget deficit (excluding grants) of not higher than 5% of GDP; central bank financing of budget deficit must not exceed 10% of the previous year’s tax revenue; single-digit inflation; and gross [foreign exchange] reserves of at least three-month imports.”¹⁵⁸

Potential Barriers to Integration

There are several barriers and difficulties as Africa pursues integration. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) identifies the following: “low domestic saving rates, endemic poverty, strong dependence on commodity exports, and continued lack of openness and liberalization in many countries.”¹⁵⁹ The IMF’s position is that by addressing these factors regionally, Africa will be better able to become integrated into the global economy.¹⁶⁰

First, Africa faces social and development challenges that complicate the continent’s ability to achieve economic growth to the extent desired by the Abuja Treaty. In addition to having the highest poverty rates in the world, poor infrastructure, and human capital hinder integration efforts.¹⁶¹ Stable infrastructure is essential for trade between States because it allows goods, services, and people to move around and generate revenue for States.¹⁶² Many of the transportation routes in Africa require travel on unpaved roads and at certain times of the year, the roads are not drivable, severely impairing trade.¹⁶³ Further complicating ground transportation, expensive documentation for customs procedures, frequent checkpoints, and harassment at border points all combine to make transactions more difficult and costly for Member States.¹⁶⁴ The region’s changing, and often severe, weather conditions can pose barriers both to infrastructure and transportation, especially when the conditions contribute to diseases, health standards, and productivity of the essential labor force.¹⁶⁵

Second, Africa must overcome outdated telecommunications systems.¹⁶⁶ RECs in the region lack a means of keeping records on existing products, markets, and trade conditions, which if in existence, could give useful data on “tradable goods and services produced, exported, and/or imported by individual countries within each sub-regional space and on the attendant terms of trade.”¹⁶⁷ RECs have been successful with improving the number of existing fixed-line telephone lines in most of the continent, with the highest connectivity rates in ECOWAS and WAEUMU.¹⁶⁸ Internet connectivity throughout Africa is also expanding and SACU has the highest rate of wireless connectivity.¹⁶⁹

Third, as the EMUs continue to expand, there are a number of difficulties with converging multiple State economies. For example, in the SADC EMU, several State economies greatly differ from each other and are affected in different ways by economic policies adopted by community members.¹⁷⁰ With the exception of South Africa, a majority of SADC Member States have underdeveloped financial systems.¹⁷¹ In West Africa, similar economic variance exists, particularly with Nigeria’s economy centered around oil and the state’s reliance on non-fuel primary commodity exports such as cocoa, cotton, and gold.¹⁷² Additionally, concerns exist about the CFA franc zone once the ECOWAS monetary union is established.¹⁷³

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ Gondwe, *supra* note 134

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Bhalla, *supra* note 127.

¹⁶² Abdoulahi, *supra* note 154.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Drabek, Z. (2005, December). Is Sub-Saharan Africa an optimal currency area? In *Africa in the world economy- the national, regional and international challenges* (pp. 156-166). The Hague. (Reprinted from *Africa in the world economy- the national, regional and international challenges*). Retrieved July 20, 2006, from <http://www.fondad.org>.

¹⁶⁶ Abdoulahi, *supra* note 154.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Siddiqi, *supra* note 154.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

Future Outlook and Benefits of Integration

The IMF cites WAEMU as having made progress towards African regional integration with its free trade area and promotion of the union's currency.¹⁷⁴ WAEMU worked with the IMF and was able to lower external tariffs and eliminate internal tariffs.¹⁷⁵ At the July 1-2, 2006 Ordinary Session of the Assembly of African Heads of State, President Jammeh cited additional benefits:

The results [of integration arrangements] can raise the returns on investments, make larger investments and the exploitation of economies of scale more feasible, as well as reduce economic and political uncertainty. In addition, regional integration could offer the much-needed solution to Africa's perennial development, problems of migration and human trafficking, and can enhance our collective bargaining strategies.¹⁷⁶

As Africa becomes more integrated and forms stronger economic cooperation themes, scholars such as T. Ademola Oyejide at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, argue that Africa can then pursue becoming better integrated with the global economy.¹⁷⁷

The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF), in its Final Review of the program, identifies the following five conditions essential for regional integration:

- Involving civil associations, business groups, professionals and other sectors of society more actively in all integration endeavors;
- Achieving an appropriate balance between public and private economic initiatives;
- Reconciling the sometimes conflicting interests of countries with diverse sizes, natural resources and economic performance;
- Pursuing a pace of integration that is simultaneously ambitious and realistic;
- Rationalizing Africa's many different regional institutions, to reduce overlap and inefficiency.¹⁷⁸

Issues of Consideration

The process of regional integration is complex and requires extensive planning and coordination in order to have a chance of success. Delegates are encouraged to become familiar first with actions taken by their government such as participation in free trade areas, reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, adopting rules of origin, and promoting trade liberalization measures. It is then important to be aware of a State's role within an REC and how it is progressing with the integration goal of that community. For States with multiple memberships, evaluating any conflicting policies or financial obligations between the RECs will provide delegates with an understanding of what challenges exist and how they can best be addressed both for the good of the State and the sub-region.

In addition to information included in this topic, there a number of starting questions for additional research. Which RECs does your State belong to and at what stage of integration is the REC(s)? How can African States increase their share of intra-regional trade and generate trade creation on the continent? What are the barriers to intra-regional trade? What are the existing hurdles to trade liberalization within the REC and Africa as a whole? To what

¹⁷⁴ Gondwe, *supra* note 134.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Manneh, E. J., & Manneh, C. E. B. (2006, July 3). *African leaders discuss integration*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from Daily Observer Newspaper Web site: http://www.observer.gm/enews/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5019&Itemid=33.

¹⁷⁷ Oyejide, T. A. (2000). *Policies for regional integration in Africa* (Rep. No. 62). Cote d'Ivoire: African Development Bank. Retrieved July 27, 2006, from African Development Bank Web site: http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/AfDB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/ECONOMICSandRESEARCH/ERP-62.PDF.

¹⁷⁸ Africa Recovery. (n.d.). Making African regional integration a reality. Retrieved July 13, 2006, from United Nations Web site: <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/integra.htm>.

extent do poor infrastructure and transportation mechanisms hinder trade and growth of viable economic regions? How can these problems be addressed within the RECs and the AU? What should be the Bank's role in infrastructure building?

Considering the importance of a state's informal sector, how can trade between neighboring states be better recorded? Are there trade-recording measures that could serve as models for documenting trade not included in standard trade estimates? What measures need to be taken in order to harmonize trade documentation and policies? How would this coordination affect regional integration and trade throughout the African regions?

What communication technologies are necessary to overcome obstacles posed by a lack of infrastructure? How can these technologies be acquired when financial constraints are factored in? How can the legal and regulatory environment be improved to strengthen and promote regional trade? What legislation is needed and how can Member States hold each other accountable within the RECs if a state fails to comply? How realistic is a single African currency and what steps are necessary both in the region and on the continent as a whole to accomplish this?

III. Promoting Good Governance for Sustainable Human Development

*Good governance and sustainable development are indivisible. That is the lesson of all our efforts and experiences, from Africa to Asia to Latin America. Without good governance--- without the rule of law, predictable administration, legitimate power, and responsive regulation -- no amount of funding, no amount of charity will set us on the path to prosperity.*¹⁷⁹

Introduction

The 2003 United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) *Human Development Report* states that, while the East Asian States were able to reduce by one-half extreme poverty since 1990, it would take the Sub-Saharan African States until 2147 to achieve the same reduction at the current rate.¹⁸⁰ The virtual absence of growth in nearly all Sub-Saharan States means, with some exceptions, no progress in poverty reduction, so that nearly 50% of the population continues to live in extreme poverty.¹⁸¹ The more encompassing human development index (HDI), which includes GDP per capita, life expectancy at birth and education, supports the picture given. Large parts of the developing world are steadily increasing their score by growth in incomes, increased life expectancy, and higher school enrolment rates. Mauritius is the only African country displayed in the upper half of the index and out of 34 States with a "low human development," 30 are African.¹⁸²

While analyzing the relationship between good governance and sustainable human development by scrutinizing the connection between good governance and economic growth; one can see poverty still poses the largest challenge for sustainability in human development, as well as the positive correlation between good governance and human rights. However, one difficulty remains how good governance and sustainable human development can be fostered to further Africa's development as a whole.

The Missing "Good Governance Legacy"

For decades, the importance of democracy and the rule of law for economic and human development have been underestimated in light of the Cold War. During these decades, even Western democracies turned a blind eye on human rights abuses committed by close allies or even intervening in States' democratic procedures if it seemed necessary. An example of this is the assassination of the Congo's first Prime Minister after independence, Patrice Lumumba, in 1961, which was backed by the Belgian government and the United States' Central Intelligence

¹⁷⁹ Annan, K. (1997). *Inaugural address*. Speech held at the International Conference on Governance for Sustainable Growth and Equity, United Nations, New York. Retrieved July 23, 2006, from <http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/speeches/Annan.htm>.

¹⁸⁰ United Nations Development Programme. (2003). Chapter 2: Priority challenges in meeting the Goals. In *United Nations Development Programme human development report 2003 – Millennium development goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 33 ff.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 241ff.

Agency.¹⁸³ Consequently, post-colonial African politics largely ignored “each other’s corruption, human-rights abuses, and coup d’états in obedience to a cardinal rule: sovereignty above all.”¹⁸⁴ African heads of government underestimated the positive effects of good governance, and found that personal trust and loyalty was sometimes more important for the public good than the “inherited colonial values of professionalism, neutrality and objectivity” in order to pursue social and economic development.¹⁸⁵ Due to the shift in the focus of public service from responsibility and professionalism to personal loyalty, large-scale corruption, and mismanagement spread.¹⁸⁶ The meaning of this heritage for today’s Africa is illustrated in Transparency International’s corruption perception index 2003, which “ranked all African countries below the average score of 5, revealing a high level of corruption.”¹⁸⁷ In the corruption perception index for 2005, Botswana was ranked 32nd out of 158 States and was the only African State with a score above five on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means highly corrupt and ten highly clean.¹⁸⁸

Nevertheless, the assumption that Africa’s development problems are solely based on this legacy of personal loyalty is disputed, as Jeffrey Sachs shows that “relatively well governed countries in Africa, such as Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Senegal, failed to prosper, whereas societies in Asia perceived to have extensive corruption, such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, enjoyed rapid economic growth.”¹⁸⁹ Keeping the limited influence of good governance in mind, empirical studies show a strong connection between the quality of governance and per capita incomes worldwide, where “the causality is...from better governance to better development outcomes.”¹⁹⁰ In the end, it will lead to a new culture in the public sphere and better economic development, which is essential for better health, improved education and a higher standard of living.¹⁹¹ Although health and education also contribute to a higher prospective income, the economic growth of a State and its peoples’ personal incomes is central to the alleviation of poverty and provides the financial basis for public services, such as health care and education.

The Institutions Needed For Economic and Human Development

An insightful question to the issue of economic development is why the mechanisms of a market economy in some States lead to prosperity while failing to do so in others.¹⁹² The answer of institutional economists is that institutions, defined as formal as well as informal social rules and norms, in high-income-countries enable market participants to have a higher division of labor and thus efficient production leading to higher per capita incomes. A simple, but very instructive example of how the right institutions can lead to greater welfare and how developing States suffer from a lack of these institutions can be found in Mancur Olson’s *Parable of the Self-Made Entrepreneur*: While a young entrepreneur might have good ideas how to run a successful business, he will often lack the capital to start it. However, there will be investors with capital who lack the ideas of how to use their capital with long-term benefit. In order to bring the two interests together, trust-generating institutions, in this case an enforceable contract, subject to the rule of law and upheld in a court of law, are needed to realize the gains for both parties.¹⁹³

¹⁸³ Sachs, J. (2005). The voiceless dying: Africa and disease. In *The end of poverty*. London: Penguin Books, p. 189.

¹⁸⁴ Herbert, R. (2003). Becoming my brother’s keeper. *eAfrica – The Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/eafricaoct2003.pdf>, p. 6.

¹⁸⁵ Dwivedi, O. (2002). On common good and good governance: An alternative approach. In Dele Olowu & Soumana Sako (Eds.) *Better governance and public policy: Capacity building for democratic renewal in Africa*. Bloomfield, Illinois: Kumarian Press, p. 35 - 51.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 40 f.

¹⁸⁷ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2005). *Striving for good governance in Africa*. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from <http://www.uneca.org/agr/agren.pdf>, p. 17.

¹⁸⁸ Transparency International. (2005). *2005 corruption perceptions index*. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from http://www1.transparency.org/cpi/2005/cpi2005_infocus.html.

¹⁸⁹ Sachs, *supra* note 183, p. 191.

¹⁹⁰ Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. (2006). Governance matters IV: New data, new challenges. In *Global corruption report 2006*. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from http://www.transparency.org/content/download/5025/29497/file/GC2006_00_part1_2_3.pdf, p. 305.

¹⁹¹ United Nations Development Programme *supra* note 180, p. 341.

¹⁹² Olson, M. (2000). The kinds of markets needed for prosperity. In *Power and prosperity – Outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships* (pp. 173-199). New York: Basic Books.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 183 f.

Olson further argues that the lack of prosperity and economic growth in parts of Africa also cannot be explained by such factors as overpopulation, population density, migration, or the simple lack of capital.¹⁹⁴ Although these factors might influence the actual progress of development of an economy, no empirical evidence can be found that they are decisive. Rather, the conclusion from these findings is that the ability of markets to breed prosperity is linked to the degree to which a State's institutions guarantee individual rights and the absence of predation either by the State through confiscation or by private actors refusing to uphold contractual liabilities.¹⁹⁵ Thus, the State's task to provide good governance means setting up a trust-generating framework of institutions that promote individual rights, the rule of law, discourages corruption and fraud and gives incentives to people to cooperate and gain from the division of labor and trade. The absence of a set of institutions that impartially enforces contracts means for the economic sphere that people will trade only with people they know and trust.¹⁹⁶ The right institutions in place will "facilitate economic growth by reducing opportunism in transactions among people largely unknown to one another and providing a multilateral reputation mechanism supported by frameworks of credible commitment, enforcement, and coordination."¹⁹⁷

Nevertheless, a blueprint for development does not exist, and the reform of the formal institutional framework will not come to life if it does not take into account the existing African impediments.¹⁹⁸ As this is true for the governance of the economic sector, the same applies to the political sphere. Good governance in this field should be built on "the four pillars of legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and morality/ spirituality" and guarantee for basic human rights, pluralism, democratic processes in political decision-making, public participation therein, and the rule of law.¹⁹⁹

The Link between Good Governance and Human Rights

Although African rulers officially supported the idea of human rights and civil liberties in the past, many of them, e.g., Ghana's Jerry Rawlings, Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi or Malawi's Kamuzu Banda, are accused for having suppressed those rights by stifling opposition, detaining dissidents and restricting the freedom of the press.²⁰⁰ The Organization of African Unity – the African Union's (AU) predecessor – was not able to address effectively these problems, and by upholding the principles of non-interference and State sovereignty, it deprived itself of the ability to hold violators of human rights and democratic rules accountable.²⁰¹ The development of the AU represents both a change in the institutional framework and the willingness to renew political culture in which the principle of non-interference is weighted against good governance and the guarantee of human rights as exemplified "in the removal from office and exiling of the corrupt warlord President Charles Taylor from Liberia in 2003."²⁰² Although this must be regarded as an important step ahead towards this new political culture, many scholars criticize the unwillingness of African governments to discuss the charges of other human rights violations, for example by the Zimbabwean government.²⁰³

Human rights and good governance are interdependent, and the ability of citizens to exercise these rights is a necessity for "the existence of strong, viable, and assertive civil society" that controls government and strengthens

¹⁹⁴ Olson, M. (1996). Big bills left on the sidewalk: Why some nations are rich, and others poor. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10(2), p. 22.

¹⁹⁵ Olson, *supra* note 192, p. 197.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Bardhan, P. (2000). The nature of institutional impediments to economic development. In Mancur Olson, Satu Kähkönen (Eds.). *A not-so-dismal science: A broader view of economies and societies*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 247.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹⁹⁹ Dwivedi, *supra* note 185, p. 38 f.

²⁰⁰ Akokpari, J. (2004). The AU, NEPAD and the promotion of good governance in Africa. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*. 13(3), p. 245.

²⁰¹ Herbert, *supra* note 184, p. 6.

²⁰² Hope, K.R. (2005). Toward good governance and sustainable development: The African peer review mechanism. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 18(2), p. 283 - 31.

²⁰³ Cilliers, J. (2003). Peace and security through good governance - A guide to the NEPAD African peer review mechanism. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, 70. Retrieved July 9, 2006, from <http://www.iss.org.za/Pubs/Papers/paper70.pdf>; Herbert, *supra* note 184, p. 8.

democratic rule.²⁰⁴ The enjoyment of human rights will thus lead to a pluralistic debate on public policies, which will in turn produce better and more sustainable policies as they reflect the opinions of a larger share of the population. Furthermore, these rights enable citizens to control their representatives in government and administration and to demand responsiveness and accountability, and it is crucial to embody these values in the institutions of the State.²⁰⁵ With regard to policy formulation, the use of political rights enables the public to participate in the process via political parties or civil society organizations, which, as examples have shown, “improves the chances of success of public policies and programs.”²⁰⁶

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development and its African Peer Review Mechanism

The conviction that the lack of transparency, accountability, and public participation in policymaking hampers Africa’s development has led to several approaches to promote good governance in the last twenty years.²⁰⁷ The most prominent and encouraging project is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The plan outlines a new development initiative by the African Union (AU) heads of state, which is designed to achieve sustainable development in and global integration of Africa into the world community in both economic and political terms. The framework document also recognizes that “development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace, and good governance.”²⁰⁸ Based on this clear commitment by a myriad of African leaders, the initiative pursues these goals, as South-African President Thabo Mbeki put it, “not because we seek to improve our relations with the rest of the world, critically important as this is, but to end political and economic mismanagement on our continent, and the consequential violent conflicts, instability, denial of democracy and human rights, deepening poverty and global marginalization.”²⁰⁹

Comparing elements of good governance, as defined by the African Development Bank (AfDB) – accountability, transparency, combating corruption, stakeholder participation, legal and judicial framework – and the NEPAD framework declaration, the similarities are striking.²¹⁰ Both the political and economic spheres are subjected to accountability, transparency, and the fight against corruption in order to promote a broader participation in politics and to increase the importance of the private sector in the economy. Besides these goals, the initiative addresses a number of issues on how to foster economic and human development, ranging from the improvement of infrastructure to the development of human resources.²¹¹ While originally being warmly welcomed by the international community, a dispute between one of the “fathers” of NEPAD, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki and the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien over the inclusion of political and governance review in NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism, destroyed much of the “trust and optimism that had previously existed.”²¹² African civil society was, and to some degree still is, critical of the top-down approach of NEPAD, and the fact that even those governments who strongly support NEPAD did not enact public discussions or held referendums to give more democratic legitimacy to the initiative did not help.²¹³

The central element of NEPAD, which is its African Peer Review Mechanism, makes it more promising than other approaches. The APRM is a voluntary self-review mechanism to which so far 25 AU Member States have acceded

²⁰⁴ Augie, A. (2004). *Human rights and good governance: A critical nexus expanding human rights*. Presentation held at the African Development Forum IV. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from www.uneca.org/ADF/documents/speeches_and_presentations/amina.htm.

²⁰⁵ Dwivedi, *supra* note 185, p. 43 f.

²⁰⁶ Aye, J. (2002). Governance, institutional reforms, and policy outcomes in Ghana. In Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako (Eds.). *Better governance and public policy: Capacity building for democratic renewal in Africa*. Bloomfield, Illinois: Kumarian Press, p. 191.

²⁰⁷ NEPAD. (2001). *The New Partnership for Africa’s Development*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/inbrief.pdf>, p. 9 ff.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²⁰⁹ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2003). *The UNECA and good governance in Africa*. Presentation held at the Harvard International Development Conference 2003. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from www.uneca.org/dpmd/Hope_Harvard.doc, p. 6.

²¹⁰ African Development Bank. (1999). *Bank group policy on good governance*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/ITEM/F56CEEF92AAC6A37E030A8C0668C4E3F>.

²¹¹ NEPAD, *supra* note 207.

²¹² Cilliers, *supra* note 203, p. 1.

²¹³ Akokpari, *supra* note 200, p. 248.

to by signing a Memorandum of Understanding. Although being called peer review by its design “as a tool for assessing government performance and helping fellow leaders identify and apply best solutions,” it should rather be seen as “peer learning.”²¹⁴ The framework document of the APRM defines its purpose as “foster[ing] the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building.”²¹⁵

While the APRM provides for four different kinds of reviews, all Member States are still undergoing their base review.²¹⁶ The base review is designed as a five-stage-process that involves national governments, civil society organizations, and international partner institutions, such as the AfDB, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).²¹⁷ The reviews are conducted in four areas: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development, which are reviewed against African and international standards.²¹⁸ While the framework prescribes key features, for example the inclusion of civil society in the review process, the government of the State under review designs and implements the domestic process.²¹⁹ National reviews serve as a basis for the national plan of action by the national government that shall effectively address the problems identified in the four key areas. The process concludes with the discussion of the national plan of action in the forum of the heads of states of the APRM Member States and the publication of the country report. The best practices are identified, the more governments will be willing to exchange experiences and learn from each other, which is the central idea of peer learning. Governments will be able to gain knowledge of their past mistakes and address criticism through reforms or by adopting best practices from other States.²²⁰ Finally, governments will be influenced by peer pressure through the public discussion of the country’s shortcomings and thus a change of perception in the national public and their representatives in government.²²¹

As of July 2006, only Ghana, Rwanda, and Kenya have fully completed the process, making it too early to judge the APRM as a whole. However, several findings exist. First, the APRM Secretariat is chronically lacking funds, with the costs for a properly conducted review amounting to roughly four times the amount of contributions for that purpose by each APRM Member State.²²² Second, civil society representatives have criticized national governments in the review processes in Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa for not inviting independent representatives to participate in the process on the national level, the lack of public access to information on how to engage in the process and the actual findings of the review.²²³ Both parliamentarians and civil society organizations further disapprove that the steering of the review process is housed within the executive branch of government, thus further limiting the chances for the people to own the process.²²⁴

Case Study: Ghana’s Path towards Better Governance

The reasons for analyzing Ghana’s development in the field of good governance are manifold: the State enacted institutional reforms to promote good governance long before NEPAD’s creation; it was the first to finalize the APRM-process; and, it has done so in a successful and exemplary way. The Ghanaian government set up a ministry in charge of NEPAD and the APRM; and its “National APRM Governing Council” was formed by representatives of civil society and the review process in the four investigated areas was spearheaded by four independent think

²¹⁴ Herbert, *supra* note 184, p. 7.

²¹⁵ NEPAD. (2003). *The African Peer Review Mechanism*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf>, p. 2.

²¹⁶ Hope, *supra* note 201, p. 294f.

²¹⁷ Kajee, A. (2004). *Nepad’s APRM: A progress report, practical limitations, and challenges*. *SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2003/04*. Retrieved, July 23, from www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000954/P1073-Kajee-2004_NEPADs_APRM.pdf, p. 246.

²¹⁸ Cilliers, *supra* note 203.

²¹⁹ NEPAD, *supra* note 207.

²²⁰ AllAfrica. (2006). *Kenya: Africa’s peer review faults country over corruption, tribalism and governance*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200607110074.html>.

²²¹ Kanbur, R. (2004). *The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): An assessment of concept and design*. Retrieved August, 20, 2006 from <http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/sk145>.

²²² Herbert, *supra* note 184, p. 10.

²²³ Kajee, *supra* note 217, p. 254.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

tanks.²²⁵ Finally, the Ghanaian example shows that good performance in governance reviews, such as the APRM or the *African Governance Report*, cannot be built within a short period, but is a long-term process.

Ghana's reforms started in the 1980s when economic policies were enacted to promote the development of the private sector and public participation in politics enhanced by the decentralization of government tasks.²²⁶ Its 1994 National Institutional Renewal Program put pressure on the State's agencies to increase the quality of public services, while political reforms led to a higher participation of political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks.²²⁷ Thus, the debate on public policies intensified, as alternate views to the government arose and were reinforced by the parliamentary opposition, improving the quality of legislation, as in the case of human rights by periodic inquiries.²²⁸ Another important and encouraging conclusion from Ghanaian politics is that "the relationship between policy processes and outcomes is conditioned by the level of consultations and stakeholder participation," meaning that the higher the public participation, the more likely it is that legislation will be successful.²²⁹ Ayee cites the example of the value-added tax, in which the government introduced the tax in 1995, despite broad criticism, with no or only limited debate with the parliamentary opposition or civil society representatives. The resulting demonstrations' outcome was first the withdrawal of the tax, followed by an open forum debating the issue, and concluding with a compromise that was reintroduced and unanimously adopted.²³⁰ Although there is also much disapproval of Jerry Rawlings' both presidential terms, the examples given for working democratic procedures underline that Ghana has become a stable democracy, which is confirmed by the country's overall above-average ratings in the African Governance Report.²³¹ The latest findings in Ghana's APRM *Country Review Report* allow the country to be named "an oasis of peace and tranquility in a sub-region perpetually in turmoil."²³² However, the document identifies the country's shortcomings in inner-party democracy and gender disparities in politics, the economy's "weak internal capacity in economic management," the government's inability to finance development through domestic resources, the persistent corruption, the low school enrolment rates and poor health services, so Ghana still has much work ahead to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.²³³ The country's contribution to the continent-wide APR process lies in the professional manner, in which it has conducted the review, and the identified strengths and best practices, namely its successful and stable political framework and the open dialogue between stakeholders that it can share with its peers to improve this aspect of governance among its peers.

Conclusion

African development over the last decades has shown the failure of policies that paid too little attention to good governance, which has contributed to the conviction that "development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace, and good governance."²³⁴ Some African States that set foot on this long road show overall improvement in economic, political and socio-economic indicators while a large group of States witnessed a fall in the human development of their population. International donors, such as the United States of America and the European Union, have declared their willingness to contribute financially to Sub-Saharan African States to support their efforts to better governance and rule of law.²³⁵ The chances for a successful reform towards

²²⁵ Grimm, S., & Mashele, P. (2006). The African peer review mechanism – How far so far? *German Development Institute Briefing Paper 02/2006*. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from [http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/178fa4b8b8dc06fcc12570fb002ca2a2/\\$FILE/Internet-Fassung-BP-2-Grimm-Prince.pdf](http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/178fa4b8b8dc06fcc12570fb002ca2a2/$FILE/Internet-Fassung-BP-2-Grimm-Prince.pdf).

²²⁶ Ayee, *supra* note 206, p. 173.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 173 f.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

²³¹ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *supra* note 187, p. 51.

²³² African Peer Review Mechanism. (2005). Executive summary. In *African peer review mechanism: Country review report of the Republic of Ghana*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/APRMGhanareport.pdf>, p. xii.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. xiii f.

²³⁴ NEPAD, *supra* note 203, p. 17.

²³⁵ European Union & United States of America. (2005). *EU-US Declaration on Working Together to Promote Peace, Stability, Prosperity, and Good Governance in Africa*. Retrieved August 20, 2006 from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050620-3.html>.

good governance and higher human development are still largely determined by the degree of openness of political debate and the willingness of governments to cooperate with civil society and critically assess their policies. Whether NEPAD and the APRM are able to introduce a new political culture of good governance that will lead to higher human development will depend on the readiness of African heads of states and governments to open up the APR processes for public participation and their willingness to engage in “peer learning”: to share and adopt best practices and thus spur development.

Questions for Consideration

As you approach the topic, you should thoroughly examine your State’s position towards and record on good governance. Is your State taking part in the APR process and what are the reasons for this? Has your country been reviewed in the African Governance Report and how are the results addressed? Should the APRM-framework provide the possibility for punitive measures against errant governments?²³⁶ How strong are representatives of civil society involved in the national debate on good governance? Should there be an institutional arrangement to foster the dissemination of lessons learned? As more States will reach the final stage of review in the APR process, it will also be useful to follow the coming meetings of the APR Forum and to scrutinize the outcome reports.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the African Development Bank

Adams, P., & Davis, A. (1996, July/August). On the Rocks: the African Development Bank Struggles to Stay Afloat. *Multinational Monitor*. 17(7, 8). Retrieved September 27, 2006, from <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm0796.09.html>

This article is an excellent resource that explains the fundamental ideologies behind the establishment of the African Development Bank and the ensuing problems and controversies. The article addresses how certain problems, such as the introduction of non-regional member countries, were alleviated with the visionary leadership of then-president Ndiaye. Delegates will find that this article is an excellent source for an overview of the initial struggles of the AfDB.

African Development Bank. (2006). *Current Members of the African Development Bank*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,969002&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

The AfDB Web site lists regional members, non-regional members, and African Development Fund, AfDB, and Nigerian Trust Fund beneficiary countries. There are links to pages highlighting what has been done for that country which includes any press releases and updated information in regards to that country. The individual country links also provide prospective projects and appraisals.

African Development Bank. (2006). *Evolution of the Group*. Retrieved July 15, 2006, from

http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968651&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
The African Development Bank Web site provides information about the history of the AfDB, current issues affecting the AfDB, past issues, and future endeavors. This is a great place for delegates to start their research and to find information about the work of the AfDB since its inception.

African Development Bank. (2006). *Group Strategy*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from

http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968679&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
The group strategy section of the African Development Bank Web site contains information pertaining to the importance of the group dynamic to creating more sustainable development. The page discusses why the AfDB felt the group strategy would be most effective. An imperative piece of data on the page is the country listings. There is a list of country membership, broken down into regional and non-regional members, with information about members who are eligible for

²³⁶ Kajee, *supra* note 217, p. 256.

specific types of assistance. There are links on the page to locate other information such as which projects have been completed for which countries, what the development assistance level is for each country, and links to the history of the Bank.

African Development Bank. (2000, June). *Statement of the African Development Bank at the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly: Women in the Year 2000*. Retrieved July 16, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5.htm>

This statement on gender mainstreaming is a landmark document to come out of the AfDB. Beginning in 2000, development agendas began to distinguish between gender roles realizing that women and men experience development differently. This statement by the AfDB highlights actions that have been taken and new co-operative efforts that will benefit the African continent when analyzing the role of gender in development. Furthermore, the UN Web site on women is dedicated to monitoring developments in addressing the women of the world and provides education and research opportunities to learn about the latest steps in gender mainstreaming in aid and development assistance projects.

African Development Bank. African Development Fund, & Board of Governors. (1987, 2006). *Compendium of Statistics (1984, 1987) (2006, pg. 4)* Retrieved September 1, 2006, from African Development Bank. http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/AfDB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/STATISTICS/COMPENDIUM_2006_WEB.PDF

This source is a published set of statistics and information to enable prospective investors and donors to view the progress and status of the countries asking for aid. The data collection was done over a number of years from 1984 to 1987, allowing for evaluation of improvement and development within each country, the 2006 statistics provide a view of what the numbers are like now, with different areas being allocated more funding in order to more effectively address development issues. The statistics are important for determining the level of assistance countries will be willing to contribute. This is an excellent resource for delving deeper into understanding why projects were approved or rejected.

African Forum & Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD). (2006). *The African Development Bank and Civil Society Participation*. Retrieved July 17, 2006, from http://www.afrodad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=60&itemid=54

The AFRODAD report on the AfDB and civil society participation looks at both the beginnings of the AfDB, the problems that arose, and the necessity of reforming the AfDB. It explains that the purpose of the study is to enhance African civil societies' understanding of the role of the AfDB in the development process and provide information on the Bank. This is an excellent resource for gaining an African view of the AfDB outside the realm of international critique.

Bank Information Center (BIC). (2004, January 10). *Disclosure Policy Review at the African Development Bank*. Retrieved September 5, 2006, from

http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/transparency_at_african_development_bank/index.php
This Web site has the most in-depth analysis of multilateral banks throughout the world, with a focus on democratic reform. The BIC takes this data and uses it to assist multilateral banks to enhance information-sharing, transparency in order to streamline banking procedures. This Web site is useful in examining the steps the AfDB and other multilateral banks need to take to be more effective in future endeavors. The BIC collects data from multilateral banks as a forum for smaller, less developed banks (like the AfDB) to see what has been beneficial for larger banks in order to move toward these practices. The future of the AfDB lies within the framework of successful banking practices elsewhere.

Chissano, Joaquim. (2004, September). *Testimonials Celebrating 40 years of the AfDB*. Retrieved July 21, 2006, from www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/ITEM/F6429539ACE18C57E030A8C0668C56C6

This is a statement made by the former President of the Republic of Mozambique and former Chairperson of the African Union (AU) to AU representatives in 2004. The speech discusses the responsibility of Africa to find homegrown solutions to African problems. The speech reviewed the progress of the Bank at its 40th anniversary. It provides information about what the Bank has

accomplished and the projects still in progress. Former Chairperson Chissano also discussed the integral steps that are needed to develop the African continent.

Conference of Ministers on the Establishment of an African Development Bank. (1964, September 10). *Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank*. Khartoum: United Nations. Retrieved July 15, 2006, from <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterX/treaty6.asp>

The Treaty establishing the African Development Bank is a very important tool in researching and streamlining the future of the AfDB. The AfDB establishment treaty breaks down the purposes, goals, and projections of the AfDB and its impact on development in Africa. The Treaty defines how monies can be received and allocated for development assistance, who is eligible for those monies, and who is involved in both donating and voting on assistance programs. Since its establishment the AfDB has changed, the largest change being the introduction of non-regional member countries, in order to more effectively address, assist and promote the development of Africa. However, the basic establishing principles are important in understanding what the AfDB is capable of and why it is such an integral institution.

Gardiner, R. K., & Pickett, J. (1984). *The African Development Bank, 1964-1984: An Experiment in Economic Co-operation and Development*. Abidjan: The African Development Bank.

This book is an excellent evaluation of the beginnings of the AfDB and its institutionalization of African development. The book sees the AfDB as the forerunner institution in combining economic and development goals for the African continent. This book is also excellent for understanding the initial stages of the AfDB and what the greatest obstacles were.

Kelson, G. A. (1997). *Monitoring the Beijing Platform for Action: Are Governments Keeping their Commitments to Women?* Retrieved August 11, 2006, from <http://www.angelfire.com/il/iwcp/beijing.html>

This is an informative resource for understanding the Beijing Platform and its stipulations for each country. This Web site overviews the history of the Conference platform, the commitments of each country, and the recommendations and conclusions to come out of the Conference. This is a great source for finding background information on progress to date in relation to the AfDB and MDGs. It also discusses the different frameworks pertaining to women and development.

Mingst, K. A. (1990). *Politics and the African Development Bank. The Lending Process*. Kentucky: the University Press of Kentucky.

This is an exceptional resource for understanding the complexities of the AfDB. This book gives a breakdown of all aspects of the AfDB and its areas of involvement. There is an excellent breakdown of the lending process, one of the most vital sectors of the AfDB, which explains in detail the steps for a country to gain money and financial assistance from the AfDB. There is also an excellent section on how the AfDB coordinates with other international entities: the World Bank, borrowing states, the International Monetary Fund, the UN Development Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and other UN agencies involved in development. This book provides an explanation of the most basic breakdown of the AfDB's goals, processes, and purposes.

Nnedu, I. (2005, January). *Regional Development Banks: Stepping Out of the Shadows-The African Development Bank*. *Economic Justice News*, 8(1). Retrieved July 30, 2006, from <http://www.50years.org/cms/ejn/story/253>

A primary focus of the Justice News economic coverage is the World Bank and IMF. An article was written to shed light on regional development banks that make decisions that affect the daily lives of people. The article suggests that the AfDB is a fundamental part of the development equation for the African continent. The article also explains the history of the AfDB, and it discusses the struggles, recent changes, and future prospects for the Bank's role in developing Africa into a region that can be a meaningful actor on the world stage.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006). *Countries and Organizations Adhering to the*

Paris Declaration. *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*. Retrieved September 2, 2006, from

http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_36074966_1_1_1_1,00.html

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Web site is a useful resource as it provides a list of countries, international organizations, and civil society organizations adhering to the Paris Declaration. There are also links to the text of the Declaration, and analysis of its effectiveness, indicators of progress, and the adherence procedure. This is an outstanding source for understanding the depth of the Paris Declaration and all that it encompasses. This site can be used to explain the importance of the Paris Declaration as a mechanism for focusing the development agenda.

SECO Economic Development Cooperation Division. (2004, May 14). *African Development Bank: Official Visit of the President of the African Development Bank to Switzerland*. Retrieved August 26, 2006, from

<http://www.seco-cooperation.ch/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/00033/index.html?lang=en&PHPSESSID=>

Coming out of Switzerland, the SECO Web site is an excellent source that analyses the economic and development affairs of Africa. The SECO article and Web site provide information that is not biased by countries unhappy with the outcome of their assistance. The Web site also has links and information on partners, countries and projects.

United Nations. (1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. San Francisco: United Nations. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from

<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

Within the Charter, Article 1 states the primary purpose of the UN. Article 2 states the principles surrounding the actions of UN Member States if they desire to maintain membership. All members of the UN are obligated to ratify this Charter and uphold the principles of the UN. The UN Charter is the single most important document to the work of all committees, as it outlines and structures the procedures to address global issues. Understanding the Charter and recognizing the major abilities and powers vested within different agencies of the UN will make the work of individual committees more universal and successful. The UN Web site has useful information on the fundamental missions of the UN and actions taken in their pursuit, and has an educational section that further helps the researcher understand the connection between the work of the body and the Charter's framework.

United Nations. (2006, June). *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2006*. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Retrieved September 27, 2006, from

<http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2006/MDGReport2006.pdf#search=%22Millennium%20Development%20Goals%20Report%202006%22>

The Millennium Development Goals Report for 2006 is a vital piece of information for the international community. It is an update of the progress toward achieving the MDGs. The foreword mentions the second goal of achieving universal primary education as being "within our grasp" yet follows that other goals are very far off. The report breaks down each goal by regional achievements, regional problems, and the breakdown of steps within each goal. An excellent resource to finding the most up-to-date levels of achievement and possible success within the timeline laid out at the Millennium Summit for achieving of the MDGs.

The World Bank Group. (2002). *Governance and Anti-Corruption: Sources of Governance Indicators*. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/notes.html>

The World Bank is the primary source for country lending in the world and thus has a comprehensive Web site. The AfDB follows many of the World Bank's principles so understanding how the World Bank functions is vital to enhancing and promoting a more effective AfDB. This Web site breaks down the 20 governance indicators and their origins and provides interactive maps of socio-economic factors. The governance indicators and socio-economic factors provide a framework for projects and thus a better understanding of the future direction of the AfDB and its role in African development.

Additional Sources

Second Extraordinary Assembly of Organization of African Unity Heads of State and Government Devoted to Economic Matters. (1980, April 28-29). *Towards a United Africa*. Lagos: Organization of African Unity. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/riefforts/ref/other2.htm>

As African development is a complicated matter, the Lagos Plan for Economic Development of Africa is an essential step in unifying the efforts by various organizations and institutions. The Lagos document is a strategy for achieving the necessary steps to providing Africa with successful development. Although slightly outdated since the Millennium Declaration, the Lagos Plan lays out the framework for the work done prior to the MDGs. The Lagos Plan is an excellent resource to gain insight into where African development spawned from, and the fundamental theories about how it should proceed.

Ravenhill, J. (1986). Africa in Economic Crisis. In *Africa's Continuing Crises* (pp. 1-43). New York: Columbia University Press.

This is an outstanding guide for understanding the factors prior to 1986 that inhibited the development of Africa, primarily economic factors. This book delves deeper into the economic situations that hinder sustainable development in Africa. Whilst the AfDB used the Lagos Plan as a framework, Ravenhill discusses half a decade later about the shortcomings of the Lagos Plan when implemented in Africa. This is a great book to gain insight into the existing economic constraints that need to be addressed in future policy. This source suggests where to go next, what the problems were with the Lagos Plan and why African development is continually elusive.

United Nations Department of Public Information. (2005). *United Nations Millennium Development Goals*. Retrieved August 5, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

This Web site provides information pertaining to the eventual creation of the MDGs in the background and documents section, archiving past paperwork, findings and proceedings on the establishment of the MDGs. The MDG Web site has links to other important research relating to the MDGs. There are links that cover poverty reduction, universal education, HIV/AIDS reduction, and subcategories within each goal.

United Nations Economic and Social Council. (2005). *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council*. New York City: United Nations. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/index.html>

The records of the Economic and Social Council provide the history of all committee, NGO, and IGO proceedings, and agencies that report to it. The records predating the establishment of the AfDB enable a further understanding of why the AfDB was truly necessary. The documents also provide a basis for the reasons why initiatives have not been successful in the past. By looking at the history of the region and the various development struggles the AfDB work becomes more relevant, although some initiatives may seem ineffective. The AfDB is not the forerunner in African development, but it has struggled to build its foundation from what had already been attempted by the international community as a means of addressing, promoting, and assisting in the process of African Development.

I. Challenges of Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in War Affected Economies

African Development Bank. (2004, October 01). *ADF Supports Post-War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone-ADF Grant will Strengthen Public Finance and Energy Sectors*. Retrieved September 28, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/PORAL.www_media.show?p_id=154913&p_settingssetid=1&p_settingssiteid=0&p_siteid=273&p_type=basetext&p_textid=155127

The AfDB Web site contains articles on AfDB action in specific countries. For example, this article describes the challenges Sierra Leone is currently confronting following the end of its civil war and briefly discusses AfDB projects in the country. This type of information could be useful in determining the relationship between a particular State and the AfDB.

African Development Bank. (n.d.). *The Group Strategy*. Retrieved September 14, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968679&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

The current strategy of the African Development Bank provides a context for current AfDB projects. The strategy identifies the MGDs as a framework for AfDB action. It is important for delegates to be familiar with the current strategy of the AfDB, as it is a factor that guides AfDB development initiatives.

African Development Bank. (2006, July 4). *Infrastructure and Investment in Africa*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=293,158705&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&focus_item=2874230&focus_lang=us

The president of the AfDB, Donald Kuberuka, emphasized the importance of infrastructure development during an official visit to Senegal in July of 2006. During the visit, Kuberuka and Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade discussed strategies for improving infrastructure throughout Africa. They focused particularly on the importance of roads and transportation infrastructure. This press release provides a good example of the work of the AfDB on infrastructure reconstruction.

African Development Bank. (n.d.). *NEPAD*. Retrieved October 15, 2006, from

http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,970216&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

The African Development Bank Web site contains a section specifically detailing its interaction with NEPAD. The AfDB seeks to function as a partner to NEPAD as it works towards its development goals. NEPAD often seeks financing and advice from the AfDB for its projects, and the AfDB attempts to provide assistance.

African Development Bank. (2006, August 10). *Sierra Leone- Health Services Rehabilitation Project*. Retrieved August 27, 2006, from

http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=293,962607&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&thing_id=4388225

One of the numerous AfDB infrastructure development projects in Sierra Leone is the Health Services Rehabilitation Project. Through this project the AfDB has refurbished hospitals in Sierra Leone and provided training to staff. The hope is that the refurbishment of hospitals will increase the ability of Sierra Leone to provide basic services to its citizens.

BBC News. (2004, November 22). *Africa Conflicts Scare Investors: Conflicts in the Ivory Coast and Sudan's Troubled Darfur Region Are Driving Potential Investors out of Africa, the United Nations Says*. Retrieved June 26, 2006, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4033459.stm>

This article discusses the impact of conflict in Africa on investment. It highlights the fact that conflict in certain regions affects the opinion of investors about the security of the entire continent. It concludes on the positive note that investors have reported satisfaction with returns on investments in Africa.

Bray, J. (2005, February). *Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. International Companies and Post Conflict Reconstruction: Cross Sectoral Comparisons*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from The World Bank Web site:

[http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/InternationalCompaniesandPost-ConflictReconstructionCross-SectoralComparisons/\\$FILE/WP22_RevisedWeb.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/InternationalCompaniesandPost-ConflictReconstructionCross-SectoralComparisons/$FILE/WP22_RevisedWeb.pdf)

Bray discusses the impact of development in four different sectors, extractive industries, mobile phones, construction, and commercial banks on several countries emerging from war. He illustrates the challenges of developing each of these sectors as well as the returns that can be achieved from development. He asserts that mobile communications technologies are relatively low-risk to companies and can result in immediate returns. They also positively impact the country in which they are installed. This paper contains a substantial amount of general information about development in post-conflict societies, as well as specific information about several different countries.

CIA. (2006, September 19). *The World Factbook: Sierra Leone*. Retrieved September 28, 2006, from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html>

The CIA World Factbook is a good source of basic information about individual countries. The page for each country contains population information, economic data, information about recent conflicts, and statistics of refugees and IDPs. The World Factbook page for Sierra Leone gives a brief overview of the recent civil war and the challenges facing Sierra Leone as a result.

Calling Across the Divide. (2005, March). *The Economist*, 374(8417), 74.

This article focuses on the impact of mobile phone technology on the economy of developing countries. It contains evidence from specific countries illustrating the positive impact of mobile phones on economic performance. It asserts that mobile phones can be an effective substitute when other forms of communications technology are lacking.

Commission for Africa. (2005, March). *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*. Retrieved July 9, 2006, from http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/thereport/english/11-03-05_cr_report.pdf

The report of the Commission for Africa contains a wealth of information on the precise needs for sustainable development in Africa and what the donor community should do to make it happen. This lengthy document consists of several sections covering different topics. Delegates may find it helpful to review sections 4, 7, and 8 in depth.

Harsch, E. (2005, January). Investors Start to Eye Africa: Hurdles to Productive Foreign Investment Remain High. *Africa Renewal*, 18, 20. Retrieved August 16, 2006, from United Nations Web site:

<http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol18no4/184invest.htm>

Harsch suggests that there is a potential for high return on investment in Africa; however, foreign investors remain hesitant for a variety of reasons. Harsch highlights infrastructure as a necessity for enhancing domestic markets as well as for attracting foreign investment. He suggests that African governments should try to take an active role in infrastructure development to bring investment to other sectors of the economy, as opposed to trying to get foreign investors to develop infrastructure.

Hoeffler, A. (1999). *Challenges of Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in War-Affected Economies*. Retrieved September 9, 2006, from African Development Bank Web site:

http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/AfDB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/ECONOMICSANDRESE_ARCH/ERP-48.PDF

Hoeffler gives an excellent overview of some of the infrastructure challenges confronting twelve war-affected African States. He discusses infrastructure development as a crucial component of economic growth, human development, and poverty reduction. This document is a good starting point for research on this topic.

Janneh, A. (2006, May 15). *Development of Africa and the ECA: Highlights on Some of the Challenges*. Retrieved September 14, 2006, from African Development Bank Web site: <http://www.uneca.org/speeches.htm>

In this speech, Janneh asserts that Africa is not projected to meet the development standards set forth by the MDGs under the established timeframe. He discusses the current strategy of the ECA for advancing the realization of these objectives. He mentions that the ECA consulted with crucial African institutions, including the AfDB, in the planning of this strategy. Janneh concludes that the ECA's goal of meeting Africa's special needs and challenges can best be attained by working toward the development objectives set forth by NEPAD. Several of these development objectives relate to infrastructure. This speech highlights some of the concerns related to development in Africa and current action that is being taken on this issue. It also provides a context for understanding the partnerships between the AfDB, the ECA, and NEPAD.

Kang, S. (2006). Post-Conflict Economic Development and Sustaining the Peace. In T. D. Mason & J. D. Meernik (Eds.), *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace* (pp. 219-238). London: Routledge.

Kang emphasizes the importance of infrastructure in maintaining the peace in post-conflict societies. This document is a good source for background information about the relationship between war and infrastructure. It may also be helpful in developing a position about the infrastructure projects that would be most critical in a post-conflict society.

Less is More: Mobile Phones Can Boost Development in Poor Countries If Governments Let Them. (2005, July). *The Economist*, 376(8434), 11.

This article is a good example of the impact of communications technology on development. It describes how mobile phone technology has reduced communications problems that were once common in post conflict societies. It also discusses the potential of this technology to increase African commerce.

New Partnership for Africa's Development. (n.d.). *A Summary of NEPAD Action Plans*. Retrieved July 9, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/41.pdf>

The summary of NEPAD action plans details development problems confronting Africa and describes the current NEPAD strategies for development. One action plan specifically addresses the problems caused by a lack of basic infrastructure.

March of the Mobiles: Is There No Limit to the Potential Market for Mobile Communications? (2004, September). *The Economist*, 372(8394), 15.

This article suggests that many countries could benefit from mobile communications technology. It asserts that mobile ICT has already had a positive impact on African commerce. It predicts that mobile ICT has the potential to further benefit Africa in the future.

Torero, M., & Chowdhury, S. (2005). *Increasing Access to Infrastructure for Africa's Rural Poor*. Retrieved September 8, 2006, from International Food Policy Research Institute Web site: <http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib32.pdf#search=%22infrastructure%20Africa%22>

Torero and Chowdhury give an excellent overview of some of the infrastructure challenges currently confronting Africa. They focus on problems such as uneven infrastructure development and low investment and explain their impact on economic performance and poverty. They discuss a variety of strategies for infrastructure development, including private investment, public intervention, and public-private partnerships. This source is good background for considering the merits of potential AfDB initiatives.

United Nations. (2000, December 4). *Secretary-General, at Conference in Africa, Says Breaking Cycle of Deprivation, Conflict is Central to Work of United Nations*. Retrieved October 15, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001204.sgsm7653.doc.html>

In this United Nations press release the Secretary-General discusses some of the development challenges confronting Africa. He emphasizes the correlation between development and democratic governance. He stresses the need for development in all sectors.

United Nations Development Program. (2006, March 8). *Infrastructure Must Work for the Poor, Sen Says*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/march-2006/sen-20060308.en?categoryID=349420&lang=en>

This article provides a summary of a speech by Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen in which he discussed the relationship between infrastructure and poverty. Sen emphasized that poverty is often the result of a lack of infrastructure. He also suggested that infrastructure can improve governance. He advocated small-scale, local infrastructure-building projects as having a positive impact on many sectors. This article could be useful in developing a position on future AfDB infrastructure reconstruction projects.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2000, April 7). *Meeting the Challenge: The Role of UNDP in Crisis, Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations, 2000-2003*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from <http://www.undp.org/excebrd/word/dp00-18ed.doc>

This statement by the UNDP discusses some of the tragic consequences of underdevelopment, as a result of war and other factors, on African populations. It details much of the work of the UNDP in infrastructure development. It also highlights the connection between economic development and the preservation of peace in post-conflict societies.

United Nations General Assembly. (2000, September 8). *GA 55/2: United Nations Millennium Declaration*. New York: United Nations. Retrieved September 9, 2006, from <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/millennium.htm>

The Millennium Declaration sets forth development objectives for the world community in the new millennium. It also establishes the Millennium Development Goals, specific indicators of progress, to be achieved under a certain timeframe. One of the Millennium Development Goals is development and the reduction of poverty. African countries are struggling to achieve this goal.

World Food Programme. (2006, July 5). *Big Sudan Government Donation to WFP Road Project*. Retrieved July 29, 2006, from World Food Programme Web site:

<http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2157>

This press release describes the roads building project in Sudan. It discusses the immediate impact of the project on economic recovery and growth. This story exemplifies the importance of transportation infrastructure in development. The World Food Programme Web site also has country specific information that could be useful for delegates when researching their assigned country.

II. Policies for Regional Integration in Africa

Abdoulahi, M. (2005, December). *Progress report on regional integration efforts in Africa towards the promotion of intra-African trade* (Rep. No. 30). United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved July 27, 2006, from Economic Commission for Africa Web site:

<http://www.uneca.org/atpc/Work%20in%20progress/30.pdf>

This report should be the starting place for delegates commencing their research on regional integration in Africa. While the document is listed as a work in progress, Abdoulahi provides a comprehensive description of all relevant aspects of integration. His main chapters include trade liberalization, analyzing progress of implementing liberalization measures, the impact of trade liberalization on intra-regional trade, obstacles to intra-regional trade, and recommendations for future efforts in Africa.

Abuka, C. (2005, December). *Infrastructure, regional integration and growth in Africa*. In *Africa in the world economy- the national, regional and international challenges* (pp. 122-128). The Hague. (Reprinted from *Africa in the world economy - the national, regional and international challenges*). Retrieved July 20, 2006, from <http://www.fondad.org>.

One of the main challenges facing regional integration in Africa is poor infrastructure, which significantly affects trade between states and therefore slows down economic growth on the continent. Abuka identifies the most critical infrastructure areas to strengthen, the competitive benefits that would result, and relates infrastructure problems to integration efforts. It is a useful article for understanding limitations unique to Africa's regional integration process and how improvements to infrastructure would enhance the continent's economic competitiveness.

Africa Recovery. (n.d.). *Making African regional integration a reality*. Retrieved July 13, 2006, from United Nations Web site: <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sreport/integra.htm>.

This article includes information contained in a larger report done by the UN. It gives a basic description of regional integration, necessary factors for success, future steps that must be taken, and existing obstacles. The role of the African Development Bank and other international financial institutions are also discussed. Delegates should read this summary and go to the Web site containing the complete report as well.

Bhalla, N. (2002, March 13). *Politics-Africa: Long-time dream of unity comes into focus*. *Global information network*, p. 1. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Pro Quest database.

Bhalla talks about African integration attempts in light of the transition from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union. Key economic trends, existing regional barriers, and future goals for African leaders are discussed. This article was printed four months before the AU came into official existence and it is helpful for delegates to understand the regional body's original state and purpose.

Carmignani, F. (2005, October). *The road to regional integration in Africa: Macroeconomic convergence and performance in*

COMESA. *Journal of African Economies*, 15(2), 212-250.

COMESA is one of the more successful regional economic communities in Africa and this article highlights the region's progress towards regional integration and macroeconomic policies Member States have implemented. It details the region's steps toward creating a currency union by the target date of 2025 and evaluates the convergence of monetary policies of COMESA members. Economic models are included using time-series and panel econometrics methods.

Drabek, Z. (2005, December). Is Sub-Saharan Africa an optimal currency area? In *Africa in the world economy- the national, regional and International challenges* (pp. 156-166). The Hague. (Reprinted from *Africa in the world economy- the national, regional and international challenges*). Retrieved July 20, 2006, from <http://www.fondad.org>.

In this article, Drabek analyzes an article written by Mothae Marupig on progress made by sub-Saharan Africa towards regional integration. He summarizes Drabek's arguments and then goes into his own assessment of sub-Saharan Africa as a potential region for a single currency. This article is helpful because it summarizes current regional integration efforts, details challenges of macro-economic convergence in the region, and concludes with an evaluation of conditions necessary for this convergence to occur in the region.

Economic Commission for Africa. (2004, August). *Assessing regional integration in Africa*. United Nations.

Abstract retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.uneca.org/aria/>.

This 2005 Economic Commission for Africa provides background on how regional development blocs were developed, key factors in integrating the region, and then provides six chapters of sectoral analysis with statistical tables. This abstract mentions the African Integration Index, created by the ECA, and how it can be used to measure the continent's progress towards regional integration. The ECA gives a brief summary of RECs making the most progress, but delegates should consult the full report for additional details.

Ford, N. (2004, June). African customs union will spur economic growth. *African Business*, (299), 30-31. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Pro Quest database.

This article discusses the East African Customs Union Treaty, which became law in March of 2004. Statements of the EAC Secretariat are included and will be helpful in providing the context of the CU within the East African Federation. Ford also describes how the EACU compares to other regional economic communities and what the customs union must do in the future to be well integrated.

Gondwe, G. E. (2001). Making globalization work in Africa. *Finance and Development*, 38(4). Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Wilson Web database.

Gondwe describes how globalization directly affects Africa from the International Monetary Fund point of view. He describes the IMF view on regional integration and necessary conditions Africa must satisfy in order to become a more competitive economic region of the world. Gondwe's article is helpful for understanding globalization in Africa, how regional integration can succeed, and the role the IMF plays.

Information Technology Center for Africa. (2002). *Treaty establishing the African Economic Community*. Retrieved July 14, 2006 from <http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/abuja.htm>.

This link takes delegates directly to the treaty for the AEC and provides additional resources on economic integration on the continent. It is important to be familiar with the main provisions of the treaty and how it is implemented. This site also includes links to relevant documents such as the OAU charter, Lagos Plan of Action, and regional integration sources from other regions in the world. It is a very comprehensive resource for any information necessary on African regional integration.

Lee, M. C. (2006, March 30). *The US and EU- Undermining regional economic integration in Africa*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from Nordic Africa Institute Web site: <http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/archives/304lee/>.

Lee writes a brief commentary on free trade agreements between the United States and European Union and the potential impact of these agreements on Africa's trade agreements. She begins the article by discussing the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and its effect on the SACU, and then moves to a discussion on Western states forming similar free trade agreements with Africa. This article is helpful for understanding free trade agreements (both reciprocal and non-reciprocal) with leading partners (United States and European Union).

- Manneh, E. J., & Manneh, C. E. B. (2006, July 3). *African leaders discuss integration*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from Daily Observer Newspaper Web site: http://www.observer.gm/enews/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5019&Itemid=33. This article provides a comprehensive summary of the July 1-2, 2006 AU meeting in The Gambia including information on regional integration, the Pan-African Communications Satellite System, and creation of regional economic communities. The summit's theme was "Regional Integration and the Rationalisation of Regional Economies and attended by African Heads of State. Gambian President Jammeh describes his view of Africa's integration and the article is helpful for understanding both past integration efforts and past necessary actions for future integration initiatives.
- Masango, D. (2006, July 2). *Annan praises Africa on progress achieved*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from All Africa.com Web site: <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200607030633.html>. Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented on the African Union's (AU) regional integration efforts at the recent AU summit in The Gambia and noted the progress made and changes still needed. Annan evaluated changes experienced in Africa over the last fifty years such as decolonization, apartheid, and a period of civil wars and one-party rule systems. He also highlights accomplishments made such as the MDGs and NEPAD. This article is helpful for gaining a general sense of Annan's perspective on the continent's state.
- Masson, P., & Pattillo, C. (2004, December). A single currency for Africa? *Finance and Development*, 9-15. Beginning with the mandate of the African Union in 2001, establishing a single currency and a common central bank became the main economic goal for the region. Masson and Pattillo critique the likelihood of this goal with a target date of 2021 set by the Association of African Central Bank Governors in 2003, provide a brief history of monetary integration in Africa, and highlight a model of this kind of currency development. There are also several helpful graphs that list existing monetary unions (including those with overlapping memberships), gainers and losers with each kind of monetary union, and finally a similar chart for a who would profit from a single African currency and who could suffer financial losses.
- Mucanse, L. (2002, November 11). Politics-Southern Africa: EU promotes regional integration. *Global information network*, p. 1. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Pro Quest database. In 2002, the EU donated to the SADC for purposes of supporting regional integration efforts. The money was targeted towards programs of economic integration, trade, transportation, communications, and food aid. This program is a good example of economic cooperation between regions and illustrates both benefits and challenges posed by such agreements. It is important to know how other regional bodies are supporting African initiatives and this article highlights a few such efforts.
- Oyejide, T. A. (2000). *Policies for regional integration in Africa* (Rep. No. 62). Cote d'Ivoire: African Development Bank. Retrieved July 27, 2006, from African Development Bank Web site: http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/AfDB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/ECONOMICSSANDRESE_ARCH/ERP-62.PDF. This is an older report, but useful for understanding Africa's previous attempts at regional integration and the economic models used to promote trade and economic growth. There is a significant amount of economic theory and geometry modeling in the report, but Oyejide also provides analysis on economic cooperation arrangements, the importance of a stable macroeconomic policy environment, and possible regional coordination structures. One of the unique aspects of this report is the discussion about African States working more with the World Trade Organization and the potential benefits that could result.
- People's Daily Online. (2006, July 2). *Roundup: AU Banjul Summit closes with decisions on key issues*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from http://english.people.com.cn/200607/03/eng20060703_279464.html. The 7th African Union summit concluded on Sunday July 3, 2006 and this article describes a few of the important decisions made by the 33 heads of state present at the summit. The main point of discussion was reducing the number of RECs from eight to five and launching the African Court on Human and People's Rights. The summit also adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in Africa, which was a key item on the AU's agenda.
- Schneider, G. (2003). Globalization and the poorest of the poor: Global integration and the development process in

Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 37, p. 389.

Schneider provides a fundamental definition of globalization and then applies his view of the process to economic integration in Sub-Saharan Africa. He describes unique aspects of trade with Africa and the continent's role in global trade. Schneider includes a historical perspective and then moves on to current factors in the continent's financial situation, such as the damage of structural adjustment programs and the flow of foreign investment.

Siddiqi, M. (2006, May). A single African currency in our time? *African Business*, (320), 28-31. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from Pro Quest database.

In 2003, the African Union established a target date of 2021 for creation of a single currency for Africa. This currency was part of a series of regional integration efforts and arguably one of the most difficult initiatives. This article summarizes previous integrative efforts and evaluates the likelihood of an African currency.

III. Promoting Good Governance for Sustainable Human Development

African Development Bank. (1999). *Bank group policy on good governance*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/ITEM/F56CEEF92AAC6A37E030A8C0668C4E3F>.

The paper gives a definition of good governance and its components. It shows the linkages between good governance, democracy, and development perspectives and outlines the concept's operationalization in the Bank's activities.

African Peer Review Mechanism. (2005). Executive summary. In *African peer review mechanism: Country review report of the Republic of Ghana*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from

<http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/APRMGhanareport.pdf>.

The executive summary of the report presents Ghana's approach to the implementation of the APRM-process and its findings in the four key areas of review. While praising the results in the field of democracy and good political governance, the report also the country's shortcomings with regard to its large and ineffective bureaucratic apparatus.

Akokpari, J. (2004). The AU, NEPAD, and the promotion of good governance in Africa. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 13(3), 243-263.

Akokpari gives the reader an understanding of the shortcomings of the Organization of African Unity regarding good governance and its subsequently following transformation in the African Union. He falsifies the common understanding as of NEPAD being the African Unions baby and explains the difficult institutional relationship between the organizations. He gives a critical account of the shortages of NEPAD's broad and ambitious agenda, which he compares with the EC's/ EU's step-by-step development. Finally, in analyzing the internal and external problems that will affect NEPAD's success or failure, the author gives a rather skeptical outlook on its future.

AllAfrica. (2006). *Kenya: Africa's peer review faults country over corruption, tribalism and governance*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200607110074.html>.

The article discusses the outcome of Kenya's first peer review. It explicitly names corruption and the need for a constitutional reform as shortcomings, but praises the government for its economic record and its efforts to support regional peacekeeping. The government furthermore impressed by its willingness to accept criticism and to deal with the identified problems. Finally, the article points to Ghana's and Uganda's interest in Kenya's achievements, giving some evidence that the hoped-for best practice sharing among states might actually work.

Annan, K. (1997). *Inaugural Address*. Speech held at the International Conference on Governance for Sustainable Growth and Equity. United Nations, New York. Retrieved July 23, 2006, from

<http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/speeches/Annan.htm>.

In this speech, given already in 1997, Kofi Annan calls for a change in the role of the state from being the source of growth to an institution that mediates public interests and thus contributes to development. The Secretary-General underlines that good governance and sustainable development cannot be separated and

that both goals cannot be achieved easily, but require long-term and stable engagement to realize improvements in these areas.

Augie, A. (2004). *Human rights and good governance: A critical nexus expanding human Rights*. Presentation held at the African Development Forum IV. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from www.uneca.org/ADF/documents/speeches_and_presentations/amina.htm.

The author focuses in his presentation on the close connection between good governance and human rights.

He argues that human rights, which exist largely in Africa only on paper, provide the basis for public participation in politics and thus a vibrant, living democracy. He gives examples, how civil society in Africa has proved its relevance in the past, and that it needs to be strengthened further and to become an influential power in policymaking.

Ayee, J. (2002). Governance, institutional reforms, and policy outcomes in Ghana. In Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako (Eds.) *Better governance and public policy: Capacity building for democratic renewal in Africa*. Bloomfield, Illinois: Kumarian Press, p. 172-191.

The paper analyzes Ghana's reforms towards good governance under the government of Jerry Rawlings. Ayee examines the reform of formal institutions, as well as the formal and informal settings in which public policy-making actually took place. Of special relevance are the examples on how civil society participation in policy-making can lead to better outcomes of the political process.

Bardhan, P. (2000). The nature of institutional impediments to economic development. In Mancur Olson & Satu Kähkönen (Eds.), *A not-so-dismal science – A broader view of economies and societies* (pp. 245-267). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bardhan tries in his article to refine the idea of underdevelopment as an institutional failure. Besides the formal institutions, he argues, traditional customs exist that affect, and often impede, development. Deriving from these institutional impediments to development, he calls for a distinct theory of a developmental state.

Cilliers, J. (2003). Peace and security through good governance - A guide to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism. *Institute for Security Studies Papers, 70*. Retrieved July 9th, 2006, from <http://www.iss.org.za/Pubs/Papers/paper70.pdf>.

The authors give an extensive overview on NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism. He presents its legal base, development and dissemination, the four different types of review and its relation to the institutional structures of the African Union.

Dwivedi, O. (2002). On common good and good governance: An alternative approach. In Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako (Eds.), *Better governance and public policy: Capacity building for democratic renewal in Africa* (pp. 35-51). Bloomfield, Illinois: Kumarian Press.

The author provides a theoretical analysis of the concept of good governance, which he associates with the common good and identifies essential components. Laying his on the morality of government, he gives an explanation for the rise of bad governance in post-colonial Africa and gives perspectives for the development of a culture of more accountable governance.

Ellis, S. (September/October 2005). How to rebuild Africa. *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 137 – 148.

Ellis focuses in his article on Africa's most fragile states, which he identifies as dysfunctional states. One reason for bad governance in Africa, he argues, is the lack of experience in governance, while traditional structures remain existent outside the formal institutional framework.

European Union & United States of America. (2005). *EU-US Declaration on Working Together to Promote Peace, Stability, Prosperity, and Good Governance in Africa*. Retrieved August 20th, 2006 from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050620-3.html>.

The focus on the declaration lies on the African security architecture and the continents efforts to promote better governance and the APRM in particular. While openly criticizing the Zimbabwean government for human rights violations, the authors offer in their role as donors to increase significantly their financial assistance to Sub-Saharan States in return for improved governance.

- Grimm, S. and P. Mashele. (2006). The African peer review mechanism – How far so far? *German Development Institute Briefing Paper 02/2006*. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from [http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/178fa4b8b8dc06fcc12570fb002ca2a2/\\$FILE/Internet-Fassung-BP-2-Grimm-Prince.pdf](http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/178fa4b8b8dc06fcc12570fb002ca2a2/$FILE/Internet-Fassung-BP-2-Grimm-Prince.pdf).
The authors argue that NEPAD and APRM represent a significant change towards a new political culture. They analyze the Ghanaian and Rwandan designs of the APR process and draw some preliminary conclusions for the APRM in general.
- Harsch, E. (2004 October). Civil society engages in African plan. *Africa Renewal* 18(3), 10. Retrieved July 9, 2006, from http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol18no3/183nepad_civil.htm.
The article outlines reasons for criticism of many NGOs and the lack of public debate on NEPAD. Harsch further shows the growing engagement of civil society actors in the NEPAD debate in order to seek influence on African leaders and thus NEPAD.
- Herbert, R. (2003). Becoming my brother's keeper. *eAfrica – The Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation* 1(1), 6 - 10. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/eafricaoct2003.pdf>.
The article explains the design of the African Peer Review Mechanism, its instruments discusses the lack of openness, the voluntary nature of the process and problems that might occur, as, for example, the lack of funds, time and staff. He argues that the APRM needs their participants to act in good faith, which he views as, for some states, a "clearly false" assumption. He underlines NEPAD's crucial need for legitimacy and gives recommendations on how to gain it and thus support the APR process.
- Hope, K.R. (2005). Toward good governance and sustainable development: The African peer review mechanism. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 18(2), 283-311.
The article offers comprehensive definitions of good and bad governance and identifies three reasons, why good governance contributes to sustainable development. In a thorough analysis of the APRM's institutional, design it lists the key objectives for each of the four inspected areas of the APRM. In addition, six possible benefits of the peer review mechanism, namely greater transparency, improved public accountability, greater policy coherence, enhanced international partnerships, increased private sector led growth, and capacity building, are given and explained.
- Kajee, A. (2004). Nepad's APRM: A progress report, practical limitations, and challenges. *SA Yearbook of International Affairs*, 2003/04. Retrieved, July 23, 2006 from www.sarprn.org.za/documents/d0000954/PI073-Kajee-2004_NEPADs_APRM.pdf.
The article gives an overview of the design of the APRM-process, including its elements and stages. Kajee shows the different approaches of several states towards the review process. In addition, the author provides a broad analysis of existing shortcomings of the process.
- Kanbur, R. (2004). *The African peer review mechanism (APRM): An assessment of concept and design*. Retrieved August 20, 2006 from <http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/sk145>.
Kanbur compares the design of the African peer review with the OECD's peer reviews, as with the IMF article IV consultations. He identifies competence of the reviewers, their independence, and competition among reviews as the relevant criteria of their success. In his conclusion, he proposes to limit the APRM's scope on democracy and political governance and underlines the need for an intensive exchange between government and civil society in the review process.
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. (2006). Governance matters IV: New data, new challenges. In *Global corruption report 2006*. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from http://www.transparency.org/content/download/5025/29497/file/GC2006_00_part1_2_3.pdf.
The article presents a study on the relationship between the quality of governance and development, covering 209 states in the timeframe from 1996 – 2004. The authors state that there is a clearly positive correlation between better governance and higher development and argue that the former must be seen as the causal effect in this relation. African states' ratings are stagnant with examples for positive, by name Sierra Leone and Ghana, and negative development, by name Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, in the

timeframe of the study.

- Melber, H. (2006). Shared responsibility – or rhetoric. *Development + Cooperation*, 04/2006.
The author investigates the question whether NEPAD has already led to a new political culture of shared responsibility. Although he acknowledges substantial progress in this question, he also identifies loopholes in the design of the APRM that might undermine its success.
- NEPAD. (2001). *Declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf>.
The Declaration contains a pledge by African leaders to a multitude of goals that work as the basis of NEPAD. These goals comprise the eradication of poverty, Africa's integration into the global society in both economic and political terms, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law and many more. The commitments in the declaration serve as the reference against which the performance of reviewed states is measured in the APRM.
- NEPAD. (2001). *The New Partnership for Africa's Development*. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/inbrief.pdf>.
The basic document of NEPAD was adopted by the African Union summit in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa and outlines a new commitment by African leaders to a reform of nearly all sectors of public life in order to foster human development, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Furthermore, it gives direction to various sector-specific initiatives.
- NEPAD. (2003). *The African Peer Review Mechanism*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf>.
This is the framework document for NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism. It details the mechanism's mandate, purpose, structure of principles, and stages of the review process.
- Olson, M. (1996). Big bills left on the sidewalk: Why some nations are rich, and others poor. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10(2), 3 - 24.
Starting from the assumption that the obvious differences in human welfare must derive from either an unequal distribution of productive factors or the policies and institutions within a political entity, he scrutinizes, which of these factors determine an economies ability to produce welfare. He identifies the institutions shaping human life as the most important factor determining the capacity to engage in advantageous trade, which raises human productivity and thus the standard of living.
- Olson, M. (2000). The kinds of markets needed for prosperity. In *Power and prosperity – Outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships* (pp. 173-199). New York: Basic Books.
Olson poses the question why markets manage to produce wealth in some states, while others remain mostly poor. The explanation lies in the quality of norms and rules that guide human behavior and allows people to interact with each other, to trade and thus gain from their different specializations. The central conclusion is that there are only two conditions for economic development: the existence of individual rights and the absence of predation.
- Oyugi, W. (2004). The role of NGOs in fostering development and good governance at the local level with a focus on Kenya. *Africa Development*, 24(4), 19 - 55.
The article covers the history, development, and the broad field of activities, in which NGOs are currently active in Africa. The difficult relationship and lack of trust between the governments and NGOs is seen in the fact that are working side by side on the same issues rather than joining their forces. Empirical examples for NGO work and its influence is given for Kenya.
- Sachs, J. (2005). The voiceless dying: Africa and disease. In *The end of poverty* (pp. 188-209). London: Penguin Books.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Special Advisor for the Millennium Development Goals, Jeffrey Sachs argues in his chapter on Sub-Saharan Africa for the need of a differential diagnosis of the existing obstacles to development. He criticizes western governments for their interventions in African politics and support for authoritarian regimes in the past, which has contributed to the legacy of "bad governance" in

some African states. Good governance should not be seen as a panacea for its problem, as those are also grounded in the unfavorable ecological settings and the wide dissemination of AIDS and malaria.

Transparency International. (2005). *2005 corruption perceptions index*. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2005/cpi2005_infocus.html.
The index displays the results of a global survey on the people's corruption perception. According to Transparency International, corruption significantly slows development, posing besides poverty, especially for least-developed states, a second burden. The single results for African countries are discouraging, as only Botswana managed to reach the scale's mean value of five, while all other African states receive lower ratings and by definition are associated with a high level of corruption.

Transparency International. (2005). Report on the Transparency International global corruption barometer 2005. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from [http://www.transparency.org/ru/doc/Global_Corruption_Barometer_2005_\(full_report\)_01000_171.pdf](http://www.transparency.org/ru/doc/Global_Corruption_Barometer_2005_(full_report)_01000_171.pdf).
The report presents an overview, which forms "corruption" takes in different states and to which degree different fields of public life are perceived as affected by it. The central findings for the participating African countries - which are Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Togo - are that the police is identified as the most dishonest group and that the people in the reviewed countries are generally optimistic that corruption will not increase, while Kenya's population shows broad satisfaction with corruption reduction in the last years.

Transparency International. (2006). *Global corruption report 2006*. Retrieved August 9, 2006, from http://www.transparency.org/content/download/5025/29497/file/GC2006_00_part1_2_3.pdf
Although the focus of the report is on corruption in health services, it also provides country reports on corruption for seven African states, namely Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa, and Uganda.

United Nations Development Programme. (2003). Chapter 2: Priority challenges in meeting the goals. In *United Nations Development Program: Human development report 2003 - Millennium Development Goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The chapter summarizes the international community's position on the Millennium Development Goals, the regional differences and in particular, that Sub-Saharan Africa is performing, in comparison to the other regions of the world, worst in achieving the goals. Furthermore, it gives evidence to the robust correlation between economic growth and poverty reduction.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2003). *The UNECA and good governance in Africa*. Presentation held at the Harvard International Development Conference 2003. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from www.uneca.org/dpmd/Hope_Harvard.doc.
The presentation deals with both the crucial importance of good governance for development and Africa's record of governance. It articulates the need for a tool to measure progress in good governance and outlines UNECA's approach to the project, which will later be published as the African Governance Report.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2005). *Striving for good governance in Africa*. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from <http://www.uneca.org/agr/agren.pdf>.
This paper is a synopsis of the 2005 African Governance Report enacted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa as a tool to measure and assesses progress in the field of good governance. While being conceived to support NEPAD and the APRM, the report reviews also states that are not APRM-member states. The report describes the current situation in 28 African states and gives recommendations on how to build the capable and accountable African state.

Additional Sources

United Nations. General Assembly. 60th Session. (2006, March 22). *Resolution 222. New Partnership for Africa's Development: progress in implementation and international support*. Retrieved July 16, 2006 from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r60.htm>.

The resolution shows full support for NEPAD and its approaches towards good governance. It touches upon many related issues in the development process, as well as the role of the international community. Insightful is the call for a better coordination of the multitude of activities by the involved institutions, especially UN programs, through simplification and harmonization of procedures.

United Nations. General Assembly. 58th Session. (2003, November 21). *Resolution 4. United Nations Convention against Corruption*. Retrieved August 20, 2006 from

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r58.htm>,

The convention addresses both the national and international aspects of corruption laying a focus on preventive measures that address some forms of corruption not addressed by national laws, such as the trading of influence. It furthermore requires its convention parties to cooperate in the fields of prevention, investigation and the prosecution of cases addressed by it. The convention was adopted in 2003 and went into force on December 14, 2005. Currently it has 140 signatories, of whom 60 have ratified the convention.

Message from the Director General Regarding Position Papers for the 2006 NMUN Conference

Position papers are submitted for each committee in which a State/NGO participates at the NMUN Conference. Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's foreign policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State/NGO should be identified and addressed. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim recreation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the committee background guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

An important component of the awards consideration process is the format of the position papers. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the background guides
- Length must **not** exceed one double-sided page (two single-sided pages is **not** acceptable)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee email address. Each address is also listed in individual background guides which will be posted by November 15, 2006. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should send one set of all position papers to: *positionpapers@nmun.org*. This set (held by the Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. *NOTE: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position*

papers.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **February 22, 2007**. *E-mailed files should be in Microsoft Word (.doc), Rich Text (.rtf), or Adobe (.pdf) formats.*

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COUNTRY & COMMITTEE.

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check by March 1, 2007. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Jacob Schanzenbach, Director-General, Sheraton venue or Tracy Kingsley, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org.

Additionally, each delegation should submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 1,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a maximum of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards. Visit the download section at www.nmun.org to find an example of an award-winning position paper. When using these sources, please be mindful of the NMUN policy against plagiarism.

Delegation from _____ Represented by The State of State University
Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Racism and Racial Discrimination, and A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The State of Tranquility a proud member of the Regional Alliance of Peaceful Countries and a fully supports other regional groups in their efforts to coordinated a regional plan for sustained and sustainable development. In that regard, the State of Tranquility recognizes the necessity of ensuring the full realization of the Right to Development as declared in the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Final Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development. Tranquility fully supports the implementation of national development plans with the cooperation of regional organizations, the United Nations, and the international community. Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing the underlying factors.

I. The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa

The State of Tranquility believes that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic security lend themselves to the pacific settlement of disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. The lack of development in the region constitutes the root cause of political instability and conflict. The report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Recommendations*, if implemented, could enhance the work of the Organization in its efforts to bring about sustainable development in Africa. Tranquility also believes that the use of preventive development in Africa could ensure that conflicts such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be avoided before they erupt. While obstacles to be

overcome are many, international support for effective national programs to ensure the relief to rehabilitation to development continuum through post-conflict peace-building, can enable Sub-Saharan Africa and the entire developing world to achieve the sustainable development which alone will guarantee regional peace and stability. The State of Tranquility fully supports the increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in all aspects of dispute settlement and peace-keeping. Increased support for such regional efforts, when combined with measures to eliminate the root causes of regional conflict, serves to further enhance the prospects for lasting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the entire international community.

II. Racism and Racial Discrimination

The State of Tranquility believes that the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance offers the global community an opportunity to establish an updated plan of action to completely eradicate racism and racial discrimination throughout the world. The necessity for all Member States to sign, accede to and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is an integral part of this plan, as policies and practices based on racism and racial discrimination remain devastating to regional social, economic and infrastructure development. Tranquility encourages all States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to provide assistance to those affected by such practices. The lack of financial resources that prevented the international community from realizing its objectives in the three previous United Nations Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination must not continue to hinder the international community in guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all peoples.

III. A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The State of Tranquility remains firmly committed in support of the continued role of the United Nations Security Council as the primary agent for the maintenance of international peace and security, as mandated under Chapters IV and V of the UN Charter. We strongly recommend the authorization, determination, composition and financing of peacekeeping operations should be determined by the Council, as authorized by Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Charter and in conjunction with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the State of Tranquility endorses the current role of the Secretary-General as administrator of the Operations established by the Council. The State of Tranquility remains a central contributor for both financial and logistical support of the United Nations Peacekeeping forces and will continue to contribute to the United Nations Peacekeeping Budget throughout the duration of the current year. The State of Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing all threats to international peace and security through regional arrangements and multilateral forums. The international community must address the underlying causes of these conflicts and the destabilizing effects of such conflicts on entire regions. Tranquility is convinced that increased utilization of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms can enhance the ability of peacekeeping missions to take into account historical, social, and cultural values and traditions within areas of conflict. As operation costs continue to escalate, however, our nation strongly urges all Member States and the Secretary-General to devote greater attention to the monetary and management aspects of peacekeeping operations and provide serious consideration for the establishment of operation termination dates. The State of Tranquility further supports the proposal endorsed within A/Res/44/49, calling for Member States to develop and maintain an inventory of supplies and equipment to be made available for Operations on short-notice. In addition, the State of Tranquility calls upon Member States to recognize the need to maintain voluntary contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to reduce the continuing problems incurred by funding deficits.

Resolution Writing and Report Writing at the NMUN Conference

The substantive output of committees at the NMUN conference generally takes the form of either resolutions or reports. At the 2007 NMUN Conference, the ICTY will adopt a variation on these forms. The ICTY will create judgments. Please refer to the chart below which designates whether delegates will be writing resolutions or reports in the committee they are participating in at the 2007 NMUN Conference:

Resolution Writing Committees

- GA Plenary, GA 4th, CD, SC

- CCPCJ, ECOSOC Plenary, CND
- AfDB, ARF, CoE, OAS
- WFP, WHO

Report Writing Committees

- CEIRPP
- ICTY, IHP, UNWTO
- ECLAC, ESCWA, OPEC-IEA

A resolution is the most appropriate means of applying political pressure on Member States, expressing an opinion on an important issue, or recommending action to be taken by the United Nations or some other agency. Most UN resolutions are not binding “law”; the only body which may produce resolutions that are binding upon the Member States of the United Nations is the Security Council. Under UN rules of procedure, unlike other more generalized rules of procedure, the topic on the floor is debated in its entirety. This means that during debate, delegates should discuss the whole issue and all of the resolutions regarding that issue. When debate is exhausted, or is ended, the body then votes on each resolution and amendment and the issue are considered closed. The National Model United Nations does not allow pre-written resolutions on any agenda topic. The NMUN process of writing resolutions during committee sessions is designed to teach delegates the concepts of negotiation and concession; pre-written resolutions hinder that learning process.

The goal of formal debate and caucusing is to persuade enough countries in the committee to support a particular solution to the topic under discussion. Resolutions formally state the agreed-upon solution by outlining the relevant precedents and describing the proposed actions. The committee is not limited to one resolution per topic; often the committee will pass multiple resolutions dealing with different aspects of a topic.

Report Writing

Some committees at the conference will draft reports during the course of negotiations, instead of resolutions. These reports represent the full work of the committee in question. These reports should not be confused with the summary reports of a committee’s work which are presented at the Saturday Plenary Sessions of either the General Assembly or ECOSOC. Directors of report writing committees will elaborate on the process used in reporting writing committees on opening night. Prior to the NMUN Conference in March 2007, a handout with a lengthier sample report for delegates to use as a model will be posted on the NMUN Conference website at www.nmun.org.

Reports are similar in nature to resolutions, with only a few key differences. Reports represent the formal recommendation and/or decision of the committee on the agenda topics at hand, in the same manner as resolutions, but in the form of one document. Committees that write resolutions typically produce a number of draft resolutions for each topic, and each one is subject to a substantive vote by the body. In a similar manner, committees that write reports produce several draft report segments and then vote on each one. The final report of these committees will combine the adopted draft reports into one comprehensive report at the end of the simulation.

Another key difference is the format of reports. While resolutions consist of one long sentence, reports are a series of complete sentences. Thus, where the clauses of a resolution each contain one whole concept, a report is composed of paragraphs, each constituted by a sentence or a few sentences which contain one whole concept.

What to Expect at the Simulation of Your Committee

Opening session: After a brief introduction of the dais and some announcements, delegates will discuss the order in which the committee will address agenda topics while in formal and caucus sessions. The committee will then vote on a motion from the floor to set the agenda in a proposed order, and will continue to vote on such motions until one passes by a majority vote. If the committee fails to reach agreement on the agenda order by the conclusion of the first evening, the director and assistant director reserve the right to set the agenda. After the agenda has been set, the chair will entertain motions for the opening of the speakers’ list to address the first agenda topic.

It should be noted due to the special procedures used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY] a variation of this process will be used. Delegates participating in the ICTY should carefully follow the delegate preparation section of the Background Guide of the ICTY.

Rules of Procedure

The simulation is conducted through the use of the committee rules of procedure, which are included in this background guide. The rules of procedure for this committee, located in the middle of this background guide, are the rules of procedure that are only accepted during the simulation of this committee. Interpretation of these rules is left to the sole discretion of the Directors-General or her/his designate. It is extremely important to develop a thorough working knowledge of the rules, including when they should be introduced, and in what capacity. The rules of procedure are enforced to facilitate the efficient workings of the committee, not to hinder them. Therefore, the Director, Assistant Director and chair (with the approval of the Director) reserve the right to rule motions out of order which may be considered dilatory or disruptive to the committee proceedings. In this respect, one of the quickest ways for a delegate to alienate him/herself within a committee is to be labeled as someone who attempts to disrupt committee proceedings with the introduction of redundant, inappropriate or time-consuming motions.

Decorum

Decorum is a *de facto* rule throughout the week of the simulation. In both large and small committees, the ability to conduct normal business while in formal session is an arduous task when decorum is not maintained. Delegates will be asked for their assistance in this endeavor. Please see the Delegate Preparation Manual for a specific discussion of delegate decorum in committee and also, delegate behavior while at the Conference.

Caucusing

Caucusing is an important and logistically difficult component of the United Nations simulation. These informal meetings between voting blocs, as well as between States with positions that are diametrically opposed, often produce compromises acceptable to all parties. However, delegates are required to address issues within a week's time which, in many cases, the international community has failed resolve after years of debate and negotiation.

As a result, the bulk of informal negotiation and the construction of working papers will occur within, or in the close proximity of, the committee chambers. In consideration for the other Conference participants, delegates are asked to respect the formal proceedings occurring both within and between all committees participating at the Conference. Finally, given the importance of decorum within committee chambers, all caucusing should occur outside of the committee chambers while committee is in session.

Chairs and Rapporteurs

Delegates should also take note that the Director and Assistant Director (with the approval of the Directors-General) will select a committee chair and rapporteur (committee administrative assistant) following the conclusion of interviews on the first evening of the Conference. For those interested in the opportunity to serve the committee as a chairperson or rapporteur, an application will be available online at www.nmun.org after January 1, 2007. The application should be completed and submitted to the Director no later than the opening night of the Conference. The successful candidate for chair will demonstrate an excellent working knowledge of the rules of procedure through a series of situations presented to her or him and exhibit qualities of leadership, patience and humility. The rapporteur will assist the chair, the Director and the Assistant Director with the abundance of paperwork and record keeping required in the efficient workings of the committee, as well as provide logistical support for the chair while in voting procedures. Multiple years of attendance at the NMUN Conference is preferred in candidates for the committee chair and rapporteur, but it is not the only defining characteristic used by the Directors and Assistant Directors to select chairs and rapporteur for committees.

Delegates selected to serve in these positions must forfeit their rights to participate in substantive debate within the committee. Although the chair and rapporteur continue to serve as representatives of their assigned State, their primary duty is to assist the director and assistant director in facilitating the professional operation of the committee.

Additionally, delegates selected as committee chairs and rapporteurs do retain an equal eligibility for awards consideration. All delegates are encouraged to apply for these challenging and rewarding positions. Many individuals who serve as chairs and rapporteurs have in later years served as members of the NMUN Volunteer Staff.

Attire

In keeping with the spirit of the simulation, delegates are *required* to wear professional business attire. Further, national symbols of any kind are forbidden in committee chambers, in accordance with practices of the UN. Symbols associated specifically with the United Nations (e.g., the seal of the UN) are allowed in committee chambers.

Your Role as a Delegate at the 2006 NMUN Conference

Taking on the Role of a Diplomat

The most important aspect of participating as a delegate to the NMUN is your assumption of the role of a foreign diplomat. In this role, you are acting as a representative of the government and the peoples of the Member State or NGO to which you have been assigned. The only exception is those delegates who are serving as justices on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In their capacities, those delegates serving as justices are serving as independent technical experts. While in preparation for and throughout the duration of the Conference, you may find personal disagreement with the foreign policy of the country you are representing or with the policy of the NGO you are representing. Your personal opinions are entirely inapplicable during the course of the simulation. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance for all delegates to arrive well-versed in the dynamics of their State's foreign policy or in that of their NGO, and anticipate possible obstacles their State or NGO may encounter during the simulation. The simulation's quality depends on the collective preparation of its participants.

As a delegate, you should be able to demonstrate thorough knowledge of your assigned country's policies, specific issues to be discussed, and the procedures, activities, and history of your committee. Delegates should also exhibit the ability to negotiate and compromise, demonstrate leadership, and the ability to influence by gaining the professional respect of fellow delegates. States and NGOs maintain specific and adaptive foreign policy methods and goals to allow delegates to function in the negotiation process. As a representative of the NGO or State to which you have been assigned, you will be expected to work within the historical confines of your NGO or country's foreign policy at the UN. Even though many Member States and Observer States do not assume strong leadership roles in the UN, the reality of the NMUN is that each delegation will be judged on its ability to provide leadership to other delegates throughout the Conference.

Delegates are reminded that professional diplomats conduct themselves, and regard one another, with the utmost dignity and respect, regardless of foreign policy affiliation or personal feelings. Even States and NGOs who observe severely conflicting ideological perspectives will work closely together within the UN on diplomatic matters of mutual concern. Likewise many delegates are forced to work together despite personal conflicts.

The Preparation and Introduction of Resolutions and Reports

Resolutions and reports adopted within respective committees represent Member States' decisions and recommended courses of action with respect to the topics under discussion. Clauses within the preamble of resolutions should provide a brief outline of historical and current perspectives and endeavors regarding the issues to be addressed within the operative clauses of the document. The operative clauses of resolutions provide the objectives and potential actions that Members designed to address the issues outlined within the preamble. More simply, the preamble states the problems before the committee in relation to the topic under deliberation and operative clauses outline the decisions of the committee for the solution of these problems.

Although delegates are encouraged to develop resolution and report writing skills, both in classroom scenarios and at regional MUN simulations, the NMUN will not accept any pre-written resolutions or reports, and which have not been developed by a plurality of the committee. This determination is at the sole discretion of the Secretariat. Due to the goal of creating an environment where the skill of compromise and conflict resolution skills can be learned,

delegates may be asked to merge working documents with other individuals working on the same issue in a committee. In addition, *any delegates found to be submitting plagiarized material within resolutions will be subject to dismissal from further participation within the Conference*. Although UN documents are within the public domain, the verbatim exploitation of these documents *will not be permitted* at the Conference.

Resolutions and reports are developed in three stages. In the initial stage, a resolution or report is referred to as a working paper (in resolution writing committees) or a working draft report segment (in report writing committees). It is generally developed by States or experts that share common perspectives on the issues to be addressed. The working paper/working draft report segment is shared with other delegates in the committee for their input and support. Once the working paper/working draft report segment gathers the required signatories, it is to be submitted to the committee director for approval. On the approval of the Director, the working paper/working draft report segment will be copied by Conference Services and introduced by the chair to the committee as a draft resolution or report.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been approved by the committee Director, it will be copied by a member of the dais. Delegates in the committee are not required to copy approved working paper/working draft report. Yet, a working paper/working draft report which has not been approved by the committee Director will not be copied by the dais. It is the responsibility of the delegates to copy their own working paper/working draft report if they choose to share copies of the document which has not been submitted for approval. Any questions concerning this issue should be directed to the committee director or the assistant director. Also, questions concerning this rule can be directed to members of the NMUN Conference Service Staff.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been introduced as a draft resolution or draft report segment, it becomes the property of the committee and all references to sponsorship, with the exception of identifying the status of amendments while in voting procedure, are formally removed. The central contributors to the contents of the draft resolution or report will continue to enlist the advice and support of as many States or experts as possible to expand upon the substance of the draft and, thereby, gain as much input and support as possible prior to the closure of debate. Once the committee moves to closure on a given topic, all draft resolutions and draft report segment will be voted upon and when adopted, it will thereafter be recognized as formal resolutions or reports. Adopted resolutions and reports represent recommendations for States and the international community.

It is highly recommended that delegates introduce their ideas to the committee in the form of working papers/working draft report segments as soon as possible in order to contribute to the potential development and adoption of resolutions and reports which characterize the united representative strength and will of regional blocs or, ultimately, the committee as a whole. Typically, a number of working papers/working draft segments before any committee will overlap in content, style, and substance. In this event, the Director will request delegates to integrate their individual endeavors into a single and, thus, more comprehensive and internationally representative document.

The Executive Bureau, the General Committee and Plenary Sessions

By the conclusion of the first night session, the Economic and Social Council Plenary will select four vice presidents to assist the president (chair) as members of the Council Executive Bureau. Likewise, the General Assembly will select 21 of its Members to the General Committee by the conclusion of the first evening meeting. The members of the Bureau and the General Committee are to be selected with regard for equitable geographic representation from: African States, Asian and Pacific States, Eastern European States, Latin American States and Western European and other States. The Bureau will meet on the evening prior to the Plenary session, following the conclusion of the regular session. The General Committee will be composed somewhat differently than the Bureau. It will be comprised of each committee chair from the General Assembly department. They will also meet at the end of regular sessions on the same evening.

The night before the Plenary session,, the Bureau and General Committee will be briefed by a representative from each relevant committee regarding the work accomplished by their body throughout the week. After reviewing the reports and resolutions submitted by the committee representatives, the Bureau and General Committee will set the agenda for the Plenary sessions to deliberate upon each committee's recommendations to the Plenary.

ECOSOC Executive Bureau

The ECOSOC Plenary Session will deliberate upon the work of all the committees within the ECOSOC Department, as well as other relevant bodies, including most of the specialized agencies. During the prior evening's meeting, the Bureau will set an agenda order for the review of these reports for deliberation and potential adoption during Plenary sessions. Additionally, the ECOSOC Plenary session will deliberate upon a fourth topic to be prepared and introduced by the Director and Assistant Director.

This topic will encompass a broad theme that relates, as much as is possible, to issues discussed by each of the committees within ECOSOC and the Specialized Agencies.

GA General Committee

The General Assembly Plenary will deliberate upon the work submitted by each of the committees in the GA and Security Council department, as well as relevant non-governmental organizations and other bodies. Following the conclusion of regular sessions on the last evening of session, the General Committee will set the agenda order for the review of these reports and resolutions and for their potential adoption during the Plenary sessions.

Plenary Sessions

On the final day of the Conference, the ECOSOC Plenary, General Assembly Plenary, and Security Council will convene at United Nations Headquarters. Plenary deliberations will encompass the work of all Conference committees. All delegates are advised to participate in these sessions in order to assist Plenary representatives with their broad scope of work. Minimally, Member State representatives to the Plenary should be briefed in regard to the work of the committees that report to their respective departments. Ideally, the representatives of the committee whose work is being considered will sit with Plenary representatives as expert advisors to the State. The agenda for these sessions will be made available to all delegates.

The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in the Simulation

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are recognized in Article 71 of the *UN Charter* as consultative bodies in relationship to ECOSOC. These organizations also maintain a close working relationship with almost all ECOSOC funds and programs, Specialized Agencies, General Assembly committees, and regional organizations. In this role, NGOs are an invaluable resource to the UN system because they provide information on political, economic, social, humanitarian, and cultural developments in all parts of the world. Their recommendations may address potential solutions to global problems, speak to specific country or regional needs, or call attention to an emerging crisis. NGOs are a crucial link between policy-makers and the individuals directly affected by those policies. They represent civil society and its impact on the UN system. There are two primary advantages NGOs have over the UN in terms of information gathering and program implementation. First, NGOs are often locally based and have better knowledge of regional conditions, needs, and constraints. Second, NGOs may find it easier to gain the acceptance, trust and cooperation of the communities in which they work because they are more aware of the indigenous cultural climate than many intergovernmental organizations.

NGOs at the National Model United Nations Conference

Over the past several years, the NMUN has integrated the presence of NGOs into committees at the conference. This process improves the educational quality of the simulation and mirrors developments in the UN itself, where NGOs are gaining both visibility and respect as a resource for program design and implementation. A large number of delegates will take on the challenging task of representing NGO delegations this year.

NGO delegations maintain all of the privileges accorded to traditional country delegations, and are required to exhibit the same level of preparedness. NGO delegations are eligible for awards, based on the same criteria as country delegations, and may select head delegates to attend the Head Delegate Meetings. NGO representatives are also required to submit position papers reflecting the perspectives and priorities of their assigned NGO on the agenda topics at hand.

All delegates should take the role of NGOs very seriously. NGO representatives must be prepared to fully participate in all committee activities, including formal debate, caucusing and drafting working papers. In turn, Member State delegates must be prepared to engage NGO delegates in these activities. Mutual recognition and respect between NGO and country delegates is necessary to a successful conference experience.

NGO delegates maintain the following privileges in each committee to which they are assigned:

1. the right to make any procedural motion;
2. the right to vote on all procedural motions;
3. the right to speak before all assigned committees; and
4. the right to act as a signatory on working papers.

NGO delegates do not have substantive voting rights, and may not sponsor working papers. In order to ensure a positive educational experience for all delegates, these rights and privileges may not exactly reflect those granted by ECOSOC. Any alterations made by the Directors-General gave due consideration to existing realities and the need to provide a learning environment that encourages active participation.

Country delegates are fully expected to work with NGO delegates in the spirit of collaboration upon which the UN was founded. The exclusion of NGOs from committee work simply because they do not have substantive voting rights is both unrealistic and unprofessional. In almost all cases, actions denigrating the participation of NGOs will be considered extraordinarily out of character and be noted in awards consideration. NGOs are expert organizations in their respective fields that possess specialized knowledge of the subject matter at hand. The recommendations of NGO delegates maintain the same validity as those of Member States, and it is incumbent upon country delegates to ensure that those perspectives are recognized.

How to Prepare as an NGO Delegation

As an NGO delegation, your preparation should be structured in the same way as a typical country delegation. The most basic pieces of this process include fundamental knowledge of the organization and of the agenda topics. Based on your research, you will decide how your assigned NGO will approach each topic, and the recommendations you will make for potential solutions. This includes identifying blocs of countries and other NGOs that may share the same perspectives and priorities and collaborate with you in committee sessions.

Doing Research

A large portion of your research will likely rely on Internet resources. Because most NGOs do not have expansive budgets that allow for the widespread reproduction and dissemination of their written materials and reports, they choose to publish such documents on their Web sites. If you have difficulty obtaining materials from these electronic sources, please contact your Director, Assistant Director, departmental USG, or the Directors-General for assistance. The UN Web site, as well as the sites for many of the Specialized Agencies, also contains valuable information about NGO activity. Finally, do not exclude traditional resources from your preparations. Newspapers, scholarly journals, and academic books will provide differing perspectives on your agenda topics, and may give interesting insight into the evolving role of NGOs. In particular, there is an increasing amount of sources on the issue of civil society and its role in the UN. It is recommended that this literature be consulted as needed for your preparation.

Position Papers

NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

The most critical part of a successful NGO delegate experience at the NMUN Conference is active participation in committee sessions. This includes utilizing the rules of procedure, speaking in formal debate and contributing during caucus sessions. Although you may not sponsor working papers or vote on draft resolutions/draft report segments, you have both the right and the obligation to participate in their composition and refinement. You may act as a signatory to any working paper on the floor of your committee if you wish to illustrate your support for continued

development of the document. Getting involved in the simulation is the best way to enhance your own educational experience and that of your fellow delegates.

The Roles of State Delegates, Technical Experts & Independent Technical Experts at the 2006 National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference


The Variety of Roles That Delegates Simulate at the NMUN Conference

At the National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference, delegates assume one of three roles when they participate in committee proceedings. They serve as a delegate representing the national interest of their state (state delegate), a technical expert, or an independent technical expert. At the 2007 NMUN Conference, only the justices of the International Court of Justice will serve in this capacity. Due to independent technical experts only serving in the ICTY, this role will specifically be addressed in the ICTY Background Guide. The United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, is essentially a political organization. However, there is also a significant role within the system for technical experts in many areas. Because the UN, its subsidiary bodies, related programs, and affiliated organizations speak to such a broad range of issues, experts are often needed to properly address complex problems and make informed recommendations to the General Assembly and Member States. Several ECOSOC committees and almost all of the Specialized Agencies consist of technical experts in the field, as opposed to political representatives. It is critical that delegates representing technical experts understand the complex nature of the expert role.

**APPENDIX : NMUN RULES OF PROCEDURE - SHORT FORM
LISTED IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE**

Motion	Purpose	Debate	Vote
Point of Order	Correct an error in procedure	None	None
Appeal of the Chair	Challenge a decision of the Chair	None	Majority
Suspension of the Meeting	Recess meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of the Meeting	End meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of Debate	End debate without a substantive vote	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Decision of Competence	Declare committee unable to consider issue or resolution	None	Majority
Closure of Debate	Move to immediate vote	2 con	2/3
Declare an Important Question (applicable in GA Plen only)	Require all substantive actions to obtain a 2/3 majority to pass	2 pro / 2 Con	Majority
Amendments and 1 st Vote on Divisions of the Question	Vote on sections separately, prior to voting on the entire resolution	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Roll Call Vote	Vote by roll call, rather than show of placards	None	None
Reconsideration	Re-open debate on an issue	2 con	2/3
Set the Speakers time	Set or change the speakers time limit	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Close the Speakers list (also applies to re-opening list)	No additional speakers added to speakers list on topic	None	Majority
Adoption of the Agenda	Approval of agenda order	None	Majority

APPENDIX: DIVISION OF THE QUESTION DIAGRAM



Supplemental Conference Information

Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2007 NMUN Conference

Position papers are submitted for each committee in which a State/NGO participates at the NMUN Conference. Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's foreign policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State/NGO should be identified and addressed. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim recreation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the committee background guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

An important component of the awards consideration process is the format of the position papers. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the background guides
- Length must **not** exceed one double-sided page (two single-sided pages is **not** acceptable)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. A file of the position paper (.doc, .pdf or .rtf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the appropriate committee email address for the appropriate venue in which you are participating. Each address is also listed in individual background guides, which will be posted by November 15, 2006. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should send one set of all position papers to: *positionpapers@nmun.org*. This set (held by the Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. *NOTE: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.*

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **February 22, 2007**. *E-mailed files should be in Microsoft Word (.doc), Rich Text (.rtf), or Adobe (.pdf) formats.*

PLEASE NOTE IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF THE E-MAIL/DOCUMENT THE NAME OF THE COUNTRY & COMMITTEE.

*A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check by March 1, 2007. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact **Jacob Schanzenbach**, Director-General, Sheraton venue or **Tracy Kingsley**, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org.*

Additionally, each delegation should submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 1,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a maximum of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards. Visit the download section at www.nmun.org to find an example of an award-winning position paper. When using these sources, please be mindful of the NMUN policy against plagiarism.

Delegation from (*Insert Member State/NGO Name*)

Represented by (*Insert Delegation Name Here*)

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Racism and Racial Discrimination, and A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The State of Tranquility a proud member of the Regional Alliance of Peaceful Countries and a fully supports other regional groups in their efforts to coordinated a regional plan for sustained and sustainable development. In that regard, the State of Tranquility recognizes the necessity of ensuring the full realization of the Right to Development as declared in the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Final Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development. Tranquility fully supports the implementation of national development plans with the cooperation of regional organizations, the United Nations, and the international community. Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing the underlying factors.

I. The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa

The State of Tranquility believes that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic security lend themselves to the pacific settlement of disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. The lack of development in the region constitutes the root cause of political instability and conflict. The report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Recommendations*, if implemented, could enhance the work of the Organization in its efforts to bring about sustainable development in Africa. Tranquility also believes that the use of preventive development in Africa could ensure that conflicts such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be avoided before they erupt. While obstacles to be overcome are many, international support for effective national programs to ensure the relief to rehabilitation to development continuum through post-conflict peace-building, can enable Sub-Saharan Africa and the entire developing world to achieve the sustainable development which alone will guarantee regional peace and stability. The State of Tranquility fully supports the increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in all aspects of dispute settlement and peace-keeping. Increased support for such regional efforts, when combined with measures to eliminate the root causes of regional conflict, serves to further enhance the prospects for lasting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the entire international community.

II. Racism and Racial Discrimination

The State of Tranquility believes that the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance offers the global community an opportunity to establish an updated plan of action to completely eradicate racism and racial discrimination throughout the world. The necessity for all Member States to sign, accede to and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is

an integral part of this plan, as policies and practices based on racism and racial discrimination remain devastating to regional social, economic and infrastructure development. Tranquility encourage all States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to provide assistance to those affected by such practices. The lack of financial resources that prevented the international community from realizing its objectives in the three previous United Nations Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination must not continue to hinder the international community in guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all peoples.

III. A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The State of Tranquility remains firmly committed in support of the continued role of the United Nations Security Council as the primary agent for the maintenance of international peace and security, as mandated under Chapters IV and V of the UN Charter. We strongly recommend the authorization, determination, composition and financing of peacekeeping operations should be determined by the Council, as authorized by Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Charter and in conjunction with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the State of Tranquility endorses the current role of the Secretary-General as administrator of the Operations established by the Council. The State of Tranquility remains a central contributor for both financial and logistical support of the United Nations Peacekeeping forces and will continue to contribute to the United Nations Peacekeeping Budget throughout the duration of the current year. The State of Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing all threats to international peace and security through regional arrangements and multilateral forums. The international community must address the underlying causes of these conflicts and the destabilizing effects of such conflicts on entire regions. Tranquility is convinced that increased utilization of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms can enhance the ability of peacekeeping missions to take into account historical, social, and cultural values and traditions within areas of conflict. As operation costs continue to escalate, however, our nation strongly urges all Member States and the Secretary-General to devote greater attention to the monetary and management aspects of peacekeeping operations and provide serious consideration for the establishment of operation termination dates. The State of Tranquility further supports the proposal endorsed within A/Res/44/49, calling for Member States to develop and maintain an inventory of supplies and equipment to be made available for Operations on short-notice. In addition, the State of Tranquility calls upon Member States to recognize the need to maintain voluntary contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to reduce the continuing problems incurred by funding deficits.

Resolution Writing and Report Writing at the NMUN Conference

Please refer to the Delegate Preparation Manual available at www.nmun.org for a detailed instruction on resolution and report writing.

The substantive work of committees at the NMUN conference generally takes the form of either resolutions or reports. At the 2007 NMUN Conference, the ICTY will adopt a variation on these forms. The ICTY will create judgments. Please refer to the chart below which designates whether delegates will be writing resolutions or reports in the committee they are participating in at the 2007 NMUN Conference:

Resolution Writing Committees

- GA Plenary, GA 4th, CD, SC
- CCPCJ, ECOSOC Plenary, CND
- ADB, ARF, CoE, OAS
- WFP, WHO

Report (or variation thereof) Writing Committees

- CEIRPP
- ICTY, IHP, UNWTO
- ECLAC, ESCWA, OPEC-IEA

Resolutions

A resolution is the most appropriate means of applying political pressure on Member States, expressing an opinion on an important issue, or recommending action to be taken by the United Nations or some other agency. Most UN resolutions are not binding “law”; the only body which may produce resolutions that are binding upon the Member States of the United Nations is the Security Council. Under UN rules of procedure, unlike other more generalized rules of procedure, the topic on the floor is debated in its entirety. This means that during debate, delegates should discuss the whole issue and all of the resolutions regarding that issue. When debate is exhausted, or is ended, the body then votes on each resolution and amendment and the issue are considered closed. The National Model United Nations does not allow pre-written resolutions on any agenda topic. The NMUN process of writing resolutions during committee sessions is designed to teach delegates the concepts of negotiation and concession; pre-written resolutions hinder that learning process.

The goal of formal debate and caucusing is to persuade enough countries in the committee to support a particular solution to the topic under discussion. Resolutions formally state the agreed-upon solution by outlining the relevant precedents and describing the proposed actions. The committee is not limited to one resolution per topic; often the committee will pass multiple resolutions dealing with different aspects of a topic.

Please reference the Delegate Preparation Manual available at <http://www.nmun.org> for an example of the style used at NMUN, as well as other helpful information necessary to draft appropriately a resolution.

Report Writing

Some committees at the conference will draft reports during the course of negotiations, instead of resolutions. These reports represent the full work of the committee in question. These reports should not be confused with the summary reports of a committee’s work which are presented at the Saturday Plenary Sessions of either the General Assembly or ECOSOC. Directors of report writing committees will elaborate on the process used in reporting writing committees on opening night. Prior to the NMUN Conference in March 2007, a handout with a lengthier sample report for delegates, to use as a model will be posted on the NMUN Conference website at www.nmun.org.

Reports are similar in nature to resolutions, with only a few key differences. Reports represent the formal recommendation and/or decision of the committee on the agenda topics at hand, in the same manner as resolutions, but in the form of one document. Committees that write resolutions typically produce a number of draft resolutions for each topic, and each one is subject to a substantive vote by the body. In a similar manner, committees that write reports produce several draft report segments and then vote on each one. The final report of these committees will combine the adopted draft reports into one comprehensive report at the end of the simulation.

Another key difference is the format of reports. While resolutions consist of one long sentence, reports are a series of complete sentences. Thus, where the clauses of a resolution each contain one whole concept, a report is composed of paragraphs, each constituted by a sentence or a few sentences which contain one whole concept.

Please also reference the Delegate Preparation Manual available at <http://www.nmun.org> for an example of the style used at NMUN, as well as other helpful information necessary to draft appropriately a report.

What to Expect at the Simulation of Your Committee

Opening session: After a brief introduction of the dais and some announcements, delegates will discuss the order in which the committee will address agenda topics while in formal and caucus sessions. The committee will then vote on a motion from the floor to set the agenda in a proposed order, and will continue to vote on such motions until one passes by a majority vote. If the committee fails to reach agreement on the agenda order by the conclusion of the first evening, the director and assistant director reserve the right to set the agenda. After the agenda has been set, the chair will entertain motions for the opening of the speakers’ list to address the first agenda topic.

It should be noted due to the special procedures used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY] a variation of this process will be used. Delegates participating in the ICTY should carefully follow the delegate preparation manual for the ICTY, the various sections of the Background Guide of the ICTY, and refer to the ICTY portion of the NMUN website for a separate copy for perpetration.

Rules of Procedure

The simulation is conducted through the use of the committee rules of procedure, which are included in this background guide. The rules of procedure for this committee, located in the middle of this background guide, are the rules of procedure that are only accepted during the simulation of this committee. Interpretation of these rules is left to the sole discretion of the Directors-General or her/his designate. It is extremely important to develop a thorough working knowledge of the rules, including when they should be introduced, and in what capacity. The rules of procedure are enforced to facilitate the efficient workings of the committee, not to hinder them. Therefore, the Director, Assistant Director and chair (with the approval of the Director) reserve the right to rule motions out of order which may be considered dilatory or disruptive to the committee proceedings. In this respect, one of the quickest ways for a delegate to alienate him/herself within a committee is to be labeled as someone who attempts to disrupt committee proceedings with the introduction of redundant, inappropriate, or time-consuming motions.

Decorum

Decorum is a *de facto* rule throughout the week of the simulation. In both large and small committees, the ability to conduct normal business while in formal session is an arduous task when decorum is not maintained. Delegates will be asked for their assistance in this endeavor. Please see the Delegate Preparation Manual for a specific discussion of delegate decorum in committee and also, delegate behavior while at the Conference.

Caucusing

Caucusing is an important and logistically difficult component of the United Nations simulation. These informal meetings between voting blocs, as well as between States with positions that are diametrically opposed, often produce compromises acceptable to all parties. However, delegates are required to address issues within a week's time which, in many cases, the international community has failed resolve after years of debate and negotiation.

As a result, the bulk of informal negotiation and the construction of working papers will occur within, or in the close proximity of, the committee chambers. In consideration for the other Conference participants, delegates are asked to respect the formal proceedings occurring both within and between all committees participating at the Conference. Finally, given the importance of decorum within committee chambers, all caucusing should occur outside of the committee chambers while committee is in session.

Chairs and Rapporteurs

Delegates should also take note that the Director and Assistant Director (with the approval of the Directors-General) will select a committee chair and rapporteur (committee administrative assistant) following the conclusion of interviews on the first evening of the Conference. For those interested in the opportunity to serve the committee as a chairperson or rapporteur, an application will be available online at www.nmun.org after January 1, 2007. The application should be completed and submitted to the Director no later than the opening night of the Conference. The successful candidate for chair will demonstrate an excellent working knowledge of the rules of procedure through a series of situations presented to her or him and exhibit qualities of leadership, patience and humility. The rapporteur will assist the chair, the Director and the Assistant Director with the abundance of paperwork and record keeping required in the efficient workings of the committee, as well as provide logistical support for the chair while in voting procedures. Multiple years of attendance at the NMUN Conference is preferred in candidates for the committee chair and rapporteur, but it is not the only defining characteristic used by the Directors and Assistant Directors to select chairs and rapporteur for committees.

Delegates selected to serve in these positions must forfeit their rights to participate in substantive debate within the committee. Although the chair and rapporteur continue to serve as representatives of their assigned State, their primary duty is to assist the director and assistant director in facilitating the professional operation of the committee.

Additionally, delegates selected as committee chairs and rapporteurs do retain an equal eligibility for awards consideration. All delegates are encouraged to apply for these challenging and rewarding positions. Many individuals who serve as chairs and rapporteurs have in later years served as members of the NMUN Volunteer Staff.

Attire

In keeping with the spirit of the simulation, delegates are *required* to wear professional business attire. Further, national symbols of any kind are forbidden in committee chambers, in accordance with practices of the UN. Symbols associated specifically with the United Nations (e.g., the seal of the UN) are allowed in committee chambers.

Your Role as a Delegate at the 2007 NMUN Conference

Taking on the Role of a Diplomat

The most important aspect of participating as a delegate to the NMUN is your assumption of the role of a foreign diplomat. In this role, you are acting as a representative of the government and the peoples of the Member State or NGO to which you have been assigned. The only exception is those delegates who are serving as justices on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In their capacities, those delegates serving as justices are serving as independent technical experts. While in preparation for and throughout the duration of the Conference, you may find personal disagreement with the foreign policy of the country you are representing or with the policy of the NGO you are representing. Your personal opinions are entirely inapplicable during the course of the simulation. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance for all delegates to arrive well-versed in the dynamics of their State's foreign policy or in that of their NGO, and anticipate possible obstacles their State or NGO may encounter during the simulation. The simulation's quality depends on the collective preparation of its participants.

As a delegate, you should be able to demonstrate thorough knowledge of your assigned country's policies, specific issues to be discussed, and the procedures, activities, and history of your committee. Delegates should also exhibit the ability to negotiate and compromise, demonstrate leadership, and the ability to influence by gaining the professional respect of fellow delegates. States and NGOs maintain specific and adaptive foreign policy methods and goals to allow delegates to function in the negotiation process. As a representative of the NGO or State to which you have been assigned, you will be expected to work within the historical confines of your NGO or country's foreign policy at the UN. Even though many Member States and Observer States do not assume strong leadership roles in the UN, the reality of the NMUN is that each delegation will be judged on its ability to provide leadership to other delegates throughout the Conference.

Delegates are reminded that professional diplomats conduct themselves, and regard one another, with the utmost dignity and respect, regardless of foreign policy affiliation or personal feelings. Even States and NGOs who observe severely conflicting ideological perspectives will work closely together within the UN on diplomatic matters of mutual concern. Likewise many delegates are forced to work together despite personal conflicts.

The Preparation and Introduction of Resolutions and Reports

Resolutions and reports adopted within respective committees represent Member States' decisions and recommended courses of action with respect to the topics under discussion. Clauses within the preamble of resolutions should provide a brief outline of historical and current perspectives and endeavors regarding the issues to be addressed within the operative clauses of the document. The operative clauses of resolutions provide the objectives and potential actions that Members designed to address the issues outlined within the preamble. More simply, the preamble states the problems before the committee in relation to the topic under deliberation and operative clauses outline the decisions of the committee for the solution of these problems.

Although delegates are encouraged to develop resolution and report writing skills, both in classroom scenarios and at regional MUN simulations, the NMUN will not accept any pre-written resolutions or reports, and which have not been developed by a plurality of the committee. This determination is at the sole discretion of the Secretariat. Due to the goal of creating an environment where the skill of compromise and conflict resolution skills can be learned,

delegates may be asked to merge working documents with other individuals working on the same issue in a committee. In addition, *any delegates found to be submitting plagiarized material within resolutions will be subject to dismissal from further participation within the Conference*. Although UN documents are within the public domain, the verbatim exploitation of these documents *will not be permitted* at the Conference.

Resolutions and reports are developed in three stages. In the initial stage, a resolution or report is referred to as a working paper (in resolution writing committees) or a working draft report segment (in report writing committees). It is generally developed by States or experts that share common perspectives on the issues to be addressed. The working paper/working draft report segment is shared with other delegates in the committee for their input and support. Once the working paper/working draft report segment gathers the required signatories, it is to be submitted to the committee director for approval. On the approval of the Director, the working paper/working draft report segment will be copied by Conference Services and introduced by the chair to the committee as a draft resolution or report.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been approved by the committee Director, it will be copied by a member of the dais. Delegates in the committee are not required to copy approved working paper/working draft report. Yet, a working paper/working draft report which has not been approved by the committee Director will not be copied by the dais. It is the responsibility of the delegates to copy their own working paper/working draft report if they choose to share copies of the document which has not been submitted for approval. Any questions concerning this issue should be directed to the committee director or the assistant director. Also, questions concerning this rule can be directed to members of the NMUN Conference Service Staff.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been introduced as a draft resolution or draft report segment, it becomes the property of the committee and all references to sponsorship, with the exception of identifying the status of amendments while in voting procedure, are formally removed. The central contributors to the contents of the draft resolution or report will continue to enlist the advice and support of as many States or experts as possible to expand upon the substance of the draft and, thereby, gain as much input and support as possible prior to the closure of debate. Once the committee moves to closure on a given topic, all draft resolutions and draft report segment will be voted upon and when adopted, it will thereafter be recognized as formal resolutions or reports. Adopted resolutions and reports represent recommendations for States and the international community.

It is highly recommended that delegates introduce their ideas to the committee in the form of working papers/working draft report segments as soon as possible in order to contribute to the potential development and adoption of resolutions and reports which characterize the united representative strength and will of regional blocs or, ultimately, the committee as a whole. Typically, a number of working papers/working draft segments before any committee will overlap in content, style, and substance. In this event, the Director will request delegates to integrate their individual endeavors into a single and, thus, more comprehensive and internationally representative document.

The Executive Bureau, the General Committee and Plenary Sessions

By the conclusion of the first night session, the Economic and Social Council Plenary will select four vice presidents to assist the president (chair) as members of the Council Executive Bureau. Likewise, the General Assembly will select 21 of its Members to the General Committee by the conclusion of the first evening meeting. The members of the Bureau and the General Committee are to be selected with regard for equitable geographic representation from: African States, Asian and Pacific States, Eastern European States, Latin American States and Western European and other States. The Bureau will meet on the evening prior to the Plenary session, following the conclusion of the regular session. The General Committee will be composed somewhat differently than the Bureau. It will be comprised of each committee chair from the General Assembly department. They will also meet at the end of regular sessions on the same evening.

The night before the Plenary session,, the Bureau and General Committee will be briefed by a representative from each relevant committee regarding the work accomplished by their body throughout the week. After reviewing the reports and resolutions submitted by the committee representatives, the Bureau and General Committee will set the agenda for the Plenary sessions to deliberate upon each committee's recommendations to the Plenary.

ECOSOC Executive Bureau

The ECOSOC Plenary Session will deliberate upon the work of all the committees within the ECOSOC Department, as well as other relevant bodies, including most of the specialized agencies. During the prior evening's meeting, the Bureau will set an agenda order for the review of these reports for deliberation and potential adoption during Plenary sessions. Additionally, the ECOSOC Plenary session will deliberate upon a fourth topic to be prepared and introduced by the Director and Assistant Director.

This topic will encompass a broad theme that relates, as much as is possible, to issues discussed by each of the committees within ECOSOC and the Specialized Agencies.

GA General Committee

The General Assembly Plenary will deliberate upon the work submitted by each of the committees in the GA and Security Council department, as well as relevant non-governmental organizations and other bodies. Following the conclusion of regular sessions on the last evening of session, the General Committee will set the agenda order for the review of these reports and resolutions and for their potential adoption during the Plenary sessions.

Plenary Sessions

On the final day of the Conference, the ECOSOC Plenary, General Assembly Plenary, and Security Council will convene at United Nations Headquarters. Plenary deliberations will encompass the work of all Conference committees. All delegates are advised to participate in these sessions in order to assist Plenary representatives with their broad scope of work. Minimally, Member State representatives to the Plenary should be briefed in regard to the work of the committees that report to their respective departments. Ideally, the representatives of the committee whose work is being considered will sit with Plenary representatives as expert advisors to the State. The agenda for these sessions will be made available to all delegates.

The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in the Simulation

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are recognized in Article 71 of the *UN Charter* as consultative bodies in relationship to ECOSOC. These organizations also maintain a close working relationship with almost all ECOSOC funds and programs, Specialized Agencies, General Assembly committees, and regional organizations. In this role, NGOs are an invaluable resource to the UN system because they provide information on political, economic, social, humanitarian, and cultural developments in all parts of the world. Their recommendations may address potential solutions to global problems, speak to specific country or regional needs, or call attention to an emerging crisis. NGOs are a crucial link between policy-makers and the individuals directly affected by those policies. They represent civil society and its impact on the UN system. There are two primary advantages NGOs have over the UN in terms of information gathering and program implementation. First, NGOs are often locally based and have better knowledge of regional conditions, needs, and constraints. Second, NGOs may find it easier to gain the acceptance, trust and cooperation of the communities in which they work because they are more aware of the indigenous cultural climate than many intergovernmental organizations.

NGOs at the National Model United Nations Conference

Over the past several years, the NMUN has integrated the presence of NGOs into committees at the conference. This process improves the educational quality of the simulation and mirrors developments in the UN itself, where NGOs are gaining both visibility and respect as a resource for program design and implementation. A large number of delegates will take on the challenging task of representing NGO delegations this year.

NGO delegations maintain all of the privileges accorded to traditional country delegations, and are required to exhibit the same level of preparedness. NGO delegations are eligible for awards, based on the same criteria as country delegations, and may select head delegates to attend the Head Delegate Meetings. NGO representatives are also required to submit position papers reflecting the perspectives and priorities of their assigned NGO on the agenda topics at hand.

All delegates should take the role of NGOs very seriously. NGO representatives must be prepared to fully participate in all committee activities, including formal debate, caucusing and drafting working papers. In turn, Member State delegates must be prepared to engage NGO delegates in these activities. Mutual recognition and respect between NGO and country delegates is necessary to a successful conference experience.

NGO delegates maintain the following privileges in each committee to which they are assigned:

1. the right to make any procedural motion;
2. the right to vote on all procedural motions;
3. the right to speak before all assigned committees; and
4. the right to act as a signatory on working papers.

NGO delegates do not have substantive voting rights, and may not sponsor working papers. In order to ensure a positive educational experience for all delegates, these rights and privileges may not exactly reflect those granted by ECOSOC. Any alterations made by the Directors-General gave due consideration to existing realities and the need to provide a learning environment that encourages active participation.

Country delegates are fully expected to work with NGO delegates in the spirit of collaboration upon which the UN was founded. The exclusion of NGOs from committee work simply because they do not have substantive voting rights is both unrealistic and unprofessional. In almost all cases, actions denigrating the participation of NGOs will be considered extraordinarily out of character and be noted in awards consideration. NGOs are expert organizations in their respective fields that possess specialized knowledge of the subject matter at hand. The recommendations of NGO delegates maintain the same validity as those of Member States, and it is incumbent upon country delegates to ensure that those perspectives are recognized.

How to Prepare as an NGO Delegation

As an NGO delegation, your preparation should be structured in the same way as a typical country delegation. The most basic pieces of this process include fundamental knowledge of the organization and of the agenda topics. Based on your research, you will decide how your assigned NGO will approach each topic, and the recommendations you will make for potential solutions. This includes identifying blocs of countries and other NGOs that may share the same perspectives and priorities and collaborate with you in committee sessions.

Doing Research

A large portion of your research will likely rely on Internet resources. Because most NGOs do not have expansive budgets that allow for the widespread reproduction and dissemination of their written materials and reports, they choose to publish such documents on their Web sites. If you have difficulty obtaining materials from these electronic sources, please contact your Director, Assistant Director, departmental USG, or the Directors-General for assistance. The UN Web site, as well as the sites for many of the Specialized Agencies, also contains valuable information about NGO activity. Finally, do not exclude traditional resources from your preparations. Newspapers, scholarly journals, and academic books will provide differing perspectives on your agenda topics, and may give interesting insight into the evolving role of NGOs. In particular, there is an increasing amount of sources on the issue of civil society and its role in the UN. It is recommended that this literature be consulted as needed for your preparation.

Position Papers

NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

The most critical part of a successful NGO delegate experience at the NMUN Conference is active participation in committee sessions. This includes utilizing the rules of procedure, speaking in formal debate and contributing during caucus sessions. Although you may not sponsor working papers or vote on draft resolutions/draft report segments, you have both the right and the obligation to participate in their composition and refinement. You may act as a signatory to any working paper on the floor of your committee if you wish to illustrate your support for continued

development of the document. Getting involved in the simulation is the best way to enhance your own educational experience and that of your fellow delegates.

The Roles of State Delegates, Technical Experts, and Independent Technical Experts at the 2007 National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference

The Variety of Roles That Delegates Simulate at the NMUN Conference


At the National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference, delegates assume one of three roles when they participate in committee proceedings. They serve as a delegate representing the national interest of their state (state delegate), a technical expert, or an independent technical expert. At the 2007 NMUN Conference, only the justices of the International Court of Justice will serve in this capacity. Due to independent technical experts only serving in the ICTY, this role will specifically be addressed in the ICTY Background Guide. The United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, is essentially a political organization. However, there is also a significant role within the system for technical experts in many areas. Because the UN, its subsidiary bodies, related programs, and affiliated organizations speak to such a broad range of issues, experts are often needed to properly address complex problems and make informed recommendations to the General Assembly and Member States. Several ECOSOC committees and almost all of the Specialized Agencies consist of technical experts in the field, as opposed to political representatives. It is critical that delegates representing technical experts understand the complex nature of the expert role.

**NMUN RULES OF PROCEDURE - SHORT FORM
LISTED IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE**

Please Note: This form is only for assistance in your preparation at the NMNU Conference. It however is not an exhaustive list of rules, nor is it the official list for your committee. The official rules are located at the end of the individual Committee Background Guide.

Motion	Purpose	Debate	Vote
Point of Order	Correct an error in procedure	None	None
Appeal of the Chair	Challenge a decision of the Chair	None	Majority
Suspension of the Meeting	Recess meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of the Meeting	End meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of Debate	End debate without a substantive vote	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Decision of Competence	Declare committee unable to consider issue or resolution	None	Majority
Closure of Debate	Move to immediate vote	2 con	2/3
Declare an Important Question (applicable in GA Plen only)	Require all substantive actions to obtain a 2/3 majority to pass	2 pro / 2 Con	Majority
Amendments and 1 st Vote on Divisions of the Question	Vote on sections separately, prior to voting on the entire resolution	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Roll Call Vote	Vote by roll call, rather than show of placards	None	None
Reconsideration	Re-open debate on an issue	2 con	2/3
Set the Speakers time	Set or change the speakers time limit	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Close the Speakers list (also applies to re-opening list)	No additional speakers added to speakers list on topic	None	Majority
Adoption of the Agenda	Approval of agenda order	None	Majority

DIVISION OF THE QUESTION DIAGRAM



Committee Rules of Procedure

Rules of Procedure African Development Bank (AfDB)

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules, which apply to the African Development Bank (AfDB) (hereinafter referred to as “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Council.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - Dates of convening and adjournment

The Council shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - Place of sessions

The Council shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - Provisional agenda

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the United Nations at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - Adoption of the agenda

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Council by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, “those present and voting” means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.

Rule 5 - Revision of the agenda

During a session, the Council may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Council so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the General Council decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule - Duties of the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Council.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Council and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Council, and shall distribute documents of the Council to the Members of the United Nations, and generally perform all other work which the Council may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Council concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the President

The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Council for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the President

If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language

English shall be the official and working language of the Council.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)

Any representative wishing to address any United Nations organ or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 - Quorum

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Council are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Council shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, "members of the Council" means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the Tuesday night meeting.

Rule 15 - General powers of the President

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Council, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Council and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Council the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to "propose to the Council" entails her/his power to "entertain" motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.

Rule 16

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Council.

Rule 17 - Points of order

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, "the members present and voting" mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 18

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Rule 19 - Speeches

1. No one may address the Council without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Council, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Council may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Council in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.

Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Council, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Council.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Council. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Council and the President should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 21 - Right of reply

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time

limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that “impugns the integrity of a representative’s State” is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State’s sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Council by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Council shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council’s next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.

Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Rule 25 - Closure of debate

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Council favors the closure of debate, the Council shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 26 - Order of motions

Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Council who would like the Council to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Council unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Council for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all “proposals” shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Council, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

For purposes of this rule, “those present and voting” means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights

Each member of the Council shall have one vote.

This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to “member(s)” do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Rule 31 - Request for a vote

A proposal or motion before the Council for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Council may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, “proposal” means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 32 - Majority required

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative States as “present and voting” during the attendance role call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.

Rule 33 – Omitted

Rule 34 - Method of voting

1. The Council shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

Only those members who designate themselves as “present” or “present and voting” during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying “pass,” must, on the second time through, respond with either “yes” or “no.” A “pass” cannot be followed by a second “pass” for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Council votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Council shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 35 - Explanations of vote

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 36 - Conduct during voting

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Rule 37 - Division of proposals and amendments

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, “most radical division” means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is “most radical” is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 38 - Amendments

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.

Rule 39 - Order of voting on amendments

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, “furthest removed in substance” means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is “furthest removed in substance” is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 40 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Council decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 41 - The President shall not vote

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VII. CREDENTIALS

Rule 42 - Submission of credentials

The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General prior to the opening of a session.

Rule 43 - Credentials Committee

A Credentials Committee, consisting of nine members, shall be appointed by the Secretary-General at the beginning of each session. It shall examine the credentials of representatives and report without delay. The Main Committees shall be bound by the actions of the Plenary in all matters relating to credentials and shall take no action regarding the credentials of any Member State.

Rule 44 - Provisional admission to a session

Any representative to whose admission a member has made objection shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives until the Credentials Committee has reported and the Council has given its decision.

VIII. Ommitted

Rule 45 through Rule 48 - Ommitted

IX. MINUTE OF SILENT PRAYER OR MEDITATION

Rule 49 - Invitation to silent prayer or meditation

Immediately after the opening of the first plenary meeting of the Council, representatives may request to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation. This is the only time this motion will be entertained and its approval is at the discretion of the Secretariat.

X. SESSIONAL BODIES AND SUBSIDIARY ORGANS

Rule 50 - Establishment

The Council may establish and define the composition and the terms of reference of:

- a) Functional commissions and regional commissions;
- b) Sessional committees of the whole and other sessional bodies;
- c) Standing and ad hoc committees.

Rule 51 - Discussion of reports of sessional committees of the whole

Discussion of a report of a sessional committee of the whole in a plenary meeting of the Council shall take place if at least one third of the members present and voting at the plenary meeting consider such discussion to be necessary. A motion to this effect shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately.

XII. PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

Rule 52 - Participation of non-Member States

1. The Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Council and any other State, to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
2. A committee or sessional body of the Council shall invite any State that is not one of its own members to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
 - a) A State thus invited shall not have the right to vote, but may submit proposals which may be put to the vote on request of any member of the body concerned.

Rule 53 - Participation of national liberation movements

The Council may invite any national liberation movement recognized by the General Assembly to participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.

Rule 54 - Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies

With the approval of the Council or its committees, the specialized agencies shall be entitled to participate, without the right to vote, in deliberations with respect to items of concern to them and to submit proposals regarding such items which may be put to the vote at the request of any members of the Council or of the committee concerned.

Rule 55 - Participation of non-governmental organization and intergovernmental organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations accorded consultative observer status by the General Assembly and other non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations designated on an *ad hoc* or a continuing basis by the Council on the recommendation of the Bureau, may participate, with the procedural right to vote, but not the substantive right to vote, in the deliberations of the Council on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations.