

# BACKGROUND GUIDE

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## NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS | 2017

The World's Largest College Model United Nations

18 - 22 MARCH - SHERATON NEW YORK HOTEL

20 - 24 MARCH - NEW YORK MARRIOTT MARQUIS HOTEL

## SECURITY COUNCIL

WRITTEN BY:  
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Please consult the FAQ section of [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

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## NMUN IMPORTANT DATES | 2017

**IMPORTANT NOTICE:** To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or 18 February - WHICHEVER COMES FIRST. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

31 January 2007

*(Wednesday)*

- Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March)
- Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET!  
(We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights)

15 February 2007

*(Thursday)*

- Committee Updates Posted to [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org)

22 February 2007

*(Thursday)*

- Discount Hotel Rates Expire. REGISTER EARLY - REGISTRATION IS FIRST-COME FIRST-SERVED
- Position Papers Due Via E-mail *(see next page for instructions)*

1 March 2007

*(Thursday)*

- Full Pre-Payment Due to Hotel
- Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to [eaton@nmun.org](mailto:eaton@nmun.org)
- All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$100 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$125 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline)

March 2007

The 2007 National Model UN Conference

- 18 - 22 March - Sheraton New York
- 20 - 24 March - New York Marriott Marquis

## TWO COPIES OF EACH POSITION PAPER SHOULD BE SENT VIA E-MAIL BY 22 FEBRUARY 2007

## 1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 22 February to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active after 15 November. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.

## 2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. NOTE: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.
- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)
- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted. *Please put the school or delegation's name in the subject line.* If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

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## OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS:

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers (due 22 February):	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
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# THE 2007 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

New York City, 18-22 March (Sheraton) & 20-24 March (Marriott) • [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org)

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November 2006

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of the Directors, Assistant Directors, Senior and Executive Staffs, and the National Collegiate Conference Association, we would like to take this time to welcome officially you to the 2007 National Model United Nations Conference. Our staff has worked most diligently throughout the year to provide you with what we believe are outstanding preparation materials for your participation in this year's conference. It is our sincere hope that these materials serve you well in your preparation for March.

We are also very excited about the dual venues of this year's conference. While the second venue has posed challenges, we believe it will act as an effective method in greater facilitation of delegation and faculty member needs. The addition of Deputy Chiefs of Staff for both venues will also allow us to assist further you during the course of the conference. Should you find that you need assistance of any type throughout the week of your venue participation, please feel free to call on any member of staff, as they are all trained to be of assistance to and best facilitate you, our valued participants. It is important to remember that, although the conference is divided into two venues, the continuity of the conference remains intact for the 2007 conference. No one venue is more important than the other and our staff has been trained to ensure this continuity as well.

This manual has been provided as a resource for your preparation for the 2007 conference. In it you will find answers to many pressing questions delegates and faculty may have about the conference and delegate preparation. To continue further the educational aspect of the conference, we are pleased to announce that we have introduced several new committees this year. In an attempt to place greater emphasis on the promotion of the preservation of our global environment, we have introduced the simulation of the International Hydrological Programme and the United Nations World Tourism Organization, which will focus on environmental issues that take great priority on the United Nations agenda. In addition, we are simulating the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which we believe will be an extremely interesting simulation for delegates at both venues. We are very excited about these variations, as we believe that they will provide very interesting and educational experiences for their participants.

We are also very excited to not only provide more educational materials regarding the environment this year, but also in taking great strides to promote its protection during the course of both venues. Our first effort to this end is only to provide electronic copies of all conference materials, thus greatly reducing the incredible amount of paper the conference uses every year. The background guides that are sent out each year use an incredible amount of paper that could easily be saved. We are also committed to using only recycled paper during the course of the conference, as well as recycling the paper that is used in each committee of both venues. Our conference T-shirts this year will use only environmentally friendly inks and a portion of the proceeds of their sale will go to an environmental charity. It is the firm belief of this year's staff that, in order to promote our sincere goals of further protection of our planet, we must first practice what we preach. We are extremely proud of all efforts we are taking to preserve our planet in any method we can.

Please note that all position papers must be sent, via electronic mail, to two individual addresses this year. One copy of your papers, as a whole, must be sent to your delegations appropriate venue (either [positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org) or [positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org)). This address will serve as a depository for all papers submitted to each venue. We, the Directors-General, will maintain a database of all submitted papers, which will be crosschecked against the individual submissions. The individual committee papers should be sent to the email addresses included on the front page of your committee background guides. It is very important that all directions for emailing these guides, as outlined in both the background guides and in the Delegate Prep guide, be followed. With the dual venues, we are making every effort possible to ensure that their proper committee Directors receives all papers. We also recommend that delegations carbon copy themselves on all electronic submissions to ensure proper tracking of your position papers. Should any delegation require any assistance in the delivery of their papers, please contact us, as we will be happy to facilitate any problems that may arise in this process.

We sincerely look forward to meeting and working with you at the upcoming conference. We both have worked hard to do what we can to provide you with the materials you need to have an amazing experience in March. Should you find that you have any questions regarding the published materials, parliamentary procedure, delegate preparation, or the rules of the conference, please do not hesitate to contact us. We are happy to be of assistance in any way that we can. Our primary goal is to provide you with an outstanding educational experience.

Sincerely yours,

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# History of the United Nations Security Council

## Introduction

The Security Council (SC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN).<sup>1</sup> It was established in June 1945 under Article 7 of the *Charter of the United Nations*.<sup>2</sup> According to Chapter V of the *UN Charter*, the Security Council is the UN's body responsible for "the maintenance of international peace and security."<sup>3</sup> In order to be able to respond quickly to threats to peace and security, all UN Member States grant the Security Council the power to act in their place in a representative manner.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to the other organs that have a solely recommending role, the Security Council is the only body that can issue binding decisions that have to be adhered to by all Member States.<sup>5</sup>

The Security Council can rely on a variety of instruments. First, the SC is meant to rely on peaceful measures when settling disputes, such as "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, [and] arbitration."<sup>6</sup> For the purpose of peaceful conflict settlement, the council can also refer cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its powers regarding the settlement of legal disputes.<sup>7</sup> In a further step, the SC can recommend sanctions against Member States; that is "apply measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."<sup>8</sup> Those measures include trade embargoes, travel bans, financial restrictions, or the severance of diplomatic relations.<sup>9</sup> One recent example are the sanctions imposed in the context of the conflict in the Darfur region in Somalia by *S/RES/1591* of 2005, which included an arms embargo as well as travel bans and a freeze of assets for a number of individuals.<sup>10</sup> In order to monitor the implementation of these sanctions, a specialized committee was created.<sup>11</sup> As a last resort, the Security Council can authorize the use of force to restore international peace and security and can call upon Member States to contribute armed forces to peacekeeping missions.<sup>12</sup>

The Security Council is currently composed of fifteen members.<sup>13</sup> Five of them – China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (USA) – have permanent seats, with the remaining ten seats being rotating.<sup>14</sup> Rotating members are elected by the UN General Assembly for a period of two years.<sup>15</sup> While each member has one vote, the permanent members can furthermore decide to cast a veto on all non-procedural questions, allowing them to annul decisions of the SC.<sup>16</sup> In addition to the veto rule, all decisions need at least a total of nine votes to be approved.<sup>17</sup> All members, permanent as well as non-permanent, have the possibility to take over the Presidency of the Security Council.<sup>18</sup> Presidency rotates on a monthly basis following English alphabetical order.<sup>19</sup>

## History

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<sup>1</sup> Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, art. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, art. 7; chapter V.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, art. 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, art. 25; Membership in 2006. (n.d.). *UN Security Council*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.un.org//.asp>

<sup>6</sup> Charter of the United Nations, *supra* note 1, art. 33.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, art. 36.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, art. 41; Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (2006, January). *Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/News/oss/sanction.htm>

<sup>9</sup> Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview. (n.d.). *Security Council Sanctions Committees*. Retrieved August 25, 2006, from <http://www.un.org////.htm>

<sup>10</sup> United Nations. Security Council. 5342<sup>nd</sup> Meeting. (2005, December 21). *Resolution 1651: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan*. Retrieved August 25, 2006, from [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_resolutions05.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm)

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Charter of the United Nations, *supra* note 1, art. 42.

<sup>13</sup> Membership in 2006, *UN Security Council*, *supra* note 5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Charter of the United Nations, *supra* note 1, art. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Membership in 2006, *UN Security Council*, *supra* note 5.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

In the course of its history, the structure of the Security Council has changed on various occasions. Before an expansion was decided upon in 1963, the council only comprised six non-permanent members in addition to the five veto powers.<sup>20</sup> Under the procedure that has been in place since then, the rotating members are determined on the basis of a regional pattern that accords five seats to Africa and Asia, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America, and two to Western Europe and other States.<sup>21</sup> Following this regional distribution, the Security Council at NMUN 2007 consists of the following Member States:<sup>22</sup>

Argentina	Ghana	Russian Federation
China	Greece	Slovakia
Congo (Republic of the)	Japan	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Denmark	Peru	United Republic of Tanzania
France	Qatar	United States of America

In addition to the expansion described above, the Security Council has also undergone changes regarding its permanent members. In 1971, the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) as one of the five non-rotating Member States.<sup>23</sup> Twenty years later, the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) ceased to exist and the Russian Federation obtained its seat.<sup>24</sup>

Besides these changes concerning the structure of the body, the Security Council has undergone several important developments in the interpretation of its role and the exercise of its power. After the end of World War II and during the Cold War, the council often saw itself confronted with a veto by one of the five permanent members: out of the total 258 vetoes that were cast in the SC so far, 241 were exercised before 1991.<sup>25</sup> Following these three and a half decades of superpowers blocking each other, the Security Council shifted to a more active role after the end of the Cold War.<sup>26</sup> Reflecting this atmosphere of improved diplomatic relations, the permanent members of the SC nowadays rather use the possibility of abstaining, as opposed to a veto, to express their disagreement with a decision of the body.<sup>27</sup> With the veto powers adapting a "culture of accommodation," the Security Council dealt with crises that it would not have been able to address during the period of the Cold War.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the 1990s saw a significant increase in the use of sanctions and the conduction of peacekeeping missions.<sup>29</sup> Today, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for fifteen peacekeeping missions and three additional political missions.<sup>30</sup> Current peacekeeping missions include the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS),

<sup>20</sup> United Nations. General Assembly. 18th Session. (1963, December 17). *Resolution 1991: Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council*. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/18/ares18.htm>

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Membership in 2006, *UN Security Council*, *supra* note 5.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations. General Assembly. 26th Session. (1971, October 25). *Resolution 2758: Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations*. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/26/ares26.htm>

<sup>24</sup> Blum, Y. Z. (1992). Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union's Seat at the United Nations. *European Journal of International Law*, 3(2), 354-361. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol3/No2/art8.html>

<sup>25</sup> Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council. (n.d.). *Global Policy Forum*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/vetotab.htm>; Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes. (n.d.). *Global Policy Forum*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto/vetosubj.htm>

<sup>26</sup> Malone, D. M. (2003). The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: A Study in the Creative Interpretation of the U.N. Charter. *International Law and Politics*, 35(487), 487-517. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.geocities.com//.pdf>, p. 488.

<sup>27</sup> Koerner, B. I. (2003, March 12). *Can You Bypass a U.N. Security Council Veto?* Retrieved September 3, 2006, from <http://www.slate.com/id/2080036/>

<sup>28</sup> Malone, *supra* note 26, p. 489.

<sup>29</sup> Malone, *supra* note 26, p. 493; Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, *Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General*, *supra* note 8; The Surge in UN Peacekeeping. (2006). *United Nations Peacekeeping*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/////>

<sup>30</sup> The Surge in UN Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping Today. (2006). *United Nations Peacekeeping*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/////htm>

which was established in March 2005.<sup>31</sup> One example for a political mission is the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL).<sup>32</sup>

### ***Recent and Future Challenges***

Despite this growing visibility, the Security Council faced a crisis when its efficiency was questioned in the context of the war on Iraq that started in 2003.<sup>33</sup> With the Member States not being able to reach a consensus regarding a military intervention in Iraq, a U.S. led coalition took unilateral action that was classified as not conform to the *UN Charter* by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.<sup>34</sup> Parallel to these recent events, the SC constantly enlarged its scope by broadening the definition of “threats to peace and security,” including topics such as Africa’s food crisis or HIV/AIDS in its agenda.<sup>35</sup> Increasing efforts are also dedicated to anti-terrorism measures.<sup>36</sup> In 2001, pursuant to *S/RES/1371*, the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee was set up in order to coordinate and foster cooperation among Member States and monitor the implementation of anti-terrorism actions.<sup>37</sup>

Currently, the Security Council is facing one of the biggest challenges in its history about its own structure. With some Member States of the United Nations arguing that the Security Council does not adequately represent today’s political world order, the council faces an increasing demand for structural reform.<sup>38</sup> In March 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan included the question of Security Council reform in his report *In Larger Freedom*, which outlined his priorities for the 2005 World Summit in New York.<sup>39</sup> In this report, Annan made two proposals for the future shape of the Security Council, both based on a total of twenty-four seats.<sup>40</sup> Although the Secretary-General had called upon Member States to decide on the issue of Security Council reform before the September 2005 World Summit, no consensus has been found so far.<sup>41</sup> The four main driving forces amongst the Member States – Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan – are facing considerable opposition in their efforts for reform and their wish to obtain permanent seats for themselves.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> United Nations Mission in the Sudan. (2005). *United Nations Peacekeeping*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/>

<sup>32</sup> United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. (2006). *United Nations Office in Timor-Leste*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.unmiset.org/>

<sup>33</sup> Mandel, M. (2003, March 10). The U.N.’s Crucial Role. *Toronto Star*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.commondreams.org/>.htm

<sup>34</sup> Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan. (2004, September 16). *BBC News*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/east/040916\\_1\\_1.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/east/040916_1_1.stm)

<sup>35</sup> United Nations. General Assembly. 60<sup>th</sup> Session. (2005). *Report of the Security Council (A/60/2)*. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/a602.pdf>, p. 179; United Nations. Security Council. 4172nd meeting. (2000, July 17). *Resolution 1308: On the Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: HIV/AIDS and International Peacekeeping Operations*. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>

<sup>36</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Security Council*, *supra* note 35, p. 1, 19.

<sup>37</sup> The Committee’s Mandate. (n.d.). *Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee*. Retrieved August 25, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/mandate.shtml>

<sup>38</sup> Security Council Reform: Where it Stands. (2005, June 18). *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from <http://www.dw-world.de//,1564,1618479,00.html>

<sup>39</sup> United Nations. General Assembly. 59<sup>th</sup> Session. (2005, March 21). *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General. Executive Summary*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf>, p. 5

<sup>40</sup> United Nations. General Assembly. 59<sup>th</sup> Session. (2005, March 21). *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General*. Retrieved on July 10, 2006 from [http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.2005\\_En.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.2005_En.pdf), V.

<sup>41</sup> United Nations, *In Larger Freedom*, *supra* note 39, p. 5; United Nations. General Assembly. (2005, August 5). *Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General Assembly (Future document No. A//P. 1/2)*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from [http://www.un.org//\\_rev.2.pdf](http://www.un.org//_rev.2.pdf), p. 31.

<sup>42</sup> Member States Prove Again That Reshaping Security Council is Most Divisive UN Reform Issue. (2006, July 21).. *Global Policy Forum*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/>.htm

In the light of these internal challenges surrounding structural reform, the measures taken by the SC in order to maintain peace and security will be examined even more closely by the international community. Every failure will trigger new debate on the efficiency of the body and will threaten its authority. NMUN delegates to the Security Council will face the responsibility to demonstrate that the council can be a strong and powerful actor when it comes to dealing with controversial crises in the area of international politics.

## I. Protecting Human Rights after the Darfur Peace Agreement

*Sometimes we must interfere. When human lives are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national borders and sensitivities become irrelevant. Whenever men or women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, that place must- at that moment- become the center of the universe.<sup>43</sup>*

### **Background: Conflict in Darfur**

The African Republic of the Sudan is located in Northern Africa bordering the Red Sea, Egypt, and Eritrea, and is the largest of all African States.<sup>44</sup> Darfur is located in the western region of Sudan and has endured violent tension over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic Arabs and the Massalit, Jebel, Aranga, Zaghawa, and Fur farmers since the end of the 1960s.<sup>45</sup> The conflict began in the arid and impoverished region early in 2003 when a group of rebels attacked government targets, alleging the Sudanese government in the capitol of Khartoum was neglecting problems in the region.<sup>46</sup> The rebels have gone on to claim that the government has enacted policies which favor the nomadic Arabs and oppress the black farmers, many of whom have joined up with the opposition in response.<sup>47</sup> There are three main rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), a rival faction of the SLA.<sup>48</sup> The attacking rebels are Arab militiamen, known as Janjaweed, many of whom have been employed by the Sudanese government as a form of counterinsurgency, and used alongside of or instead of the military.<sup>49</sup> In exchange for their services, the government has granted the militiamen the right to steal goods and land from the non-Arab tribes.<sup>50</sup>

The current conflict has now claimed the entire region, as there has been a large influx of refugees into Chad and other neighboring States.<sup>51</sup> According to a 2005 *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General*, there have been over 1.65 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur have settled in IDP camps in Chad.<sup>52</sup> The report also found that there have been violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws by Government forces and the Janjaweed, including, but not limited to, large-scale destruction of villages, killing of civilians, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and enforced disappearances.<sup>53</sup> The vast majority of victims were from the non-Arab tribes.<sup>54</sup> As these acts were conducted in a systematic and widespread basis, they constituted crimes against humanity.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> McDoom, O. (2006, September 13). Sudan Bombing Civilians in Darfur- EU Envoy. *Reuters International*. Retrieved September 13, 2006, from [http://za.today.reuters.com/.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-09-13T064049Z\\_01\\_BAN324058\\_RTRIDST\\_0\\_OZATP-SUDAN-DARFUR-20060913.XML](http://za.today.reuters.com/.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-09-13T064049Z_01_BAN324058_RTRIDST_0_OZATP-SUDAN-DARFUR-20060913.XML)

<sup>44</sup> CIA Factbook. *Sudan*. Retrieved August 27, 2006, from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/su.html>

<sup>45</sup> Sudan's Darfur Conflict. (2006, May 7). *BBC News*. Retrieved August 27, 2006, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/5111111.stm>

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Janjaweed Militia's Leader Denies Stirring Darfur's Torment. (2006, June 14). *Sudan Tribune*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from [http://www.sudantribune.com/\\_impr.php3?id\\_article=16190](http://www.sudantribune.com/_impr.php3?id_article=16190)

<sup>52</sup> United Nations Security Council (2005, January) *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to S/RES/1564*. Retrieved September 19, 2006, from [http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com\\_inq\\_darfur.pdf](http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf)

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*



The Janjaweed are at the core of this increasingly out of control situation.<sup>56</sup> Employed by the government as non-commissioned paramilitary fighters, their role in the conflict and their responsibility to demobilize are still not fully recognized by Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir.<sup>57</sup> Sudan's government denies being in control of the Janjaweed and President al-Bashir has publicly called them "thieves and gangsters".<sup>58</sup> Musa Hilal, the Arab tribal chief widely thought to be the power broker between the government and the militias, has been accused by some States and a range of human rights organizations of being responsible for much of the conflict in the region, through his role as de-facto chief of the Janjaweed.<sup>59</sup> In response to these accusations, Hilal insists he has no control over the militias, yet he has been documented in letters and speeches stating the opposite.<sup>60</sup>

This kind of inconsistency is endemic to the situation. While the African Union (AU) asserts the Janjaweed are the biggest threat to peace and the *Darfur Peace Agreement* (DPA), Hilal, the ostensible organizer of the militia group, dismisses the existence of tension between Arabs and non-Arabs, while continuing to make reference to waging *jihad*, or a Holy War.<sup>61</sup> Even as the targeted persecution and killing of the non-Arab people continues, Hilal denies the existence of the militias he is widely believed to command.<sup>62</sup> In chorus with this denial, the Sudanese Government, also eager to distance itself from responsibility for the conflict, is disguising scores of Janjaweed by admitting them into formal security services, such as the Popular Defense Forces, the Border Intelligence Units, and the Central Reserve Police.<sup>63</sup>

Presently, the Janjaweed continue to wage their campaign of terror across Darfur, even as half of their ranks are absorbed into legitimate operations.<sup>64</sup> The question of whether all Janjaweed will eventually be absorbed into the government's and military's ranks is a legitimate one, yet Hilal, the leader of these rebel fighters, appears to have no interest in working to stop the violence, nor even admit it occurs in the first place.<sup>65</sup> Alarming, he asserts his allegiance lies with Darfur, and not the government in Khartoum, and efforts to maintain the fragile peace have failed.<sup>66</sup>

### ***Background: the Darfur Peace Agreement***

The DPA was signed on May 5, 2006, by the Sudanese government and the largest rebel group, the SLA, led by Minni Menawi.<sup>67</sup> At the very foundation of the DPA is an urgent call for the Janjaweed, widely viewed as the main driver of conflict in the region, to be demobilized, disbanded, and absorbed into security forces.<sup>68</sup> The peace agreement is the result of two years of painstaking negotiations mediated by the AU and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and covers power sharing, wealth sharing, security and ceasefire arrangements, and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).<sup>69</sup>

Tolerance in regard to religious beliefs, traditions, and customs, free and fair elections, transparency, good governance, rule of law, and a need for inclusion of women in governmental decision making are called for in the power sharing section of the agreement.<sup>70</sup> Although the JEM and SLM did not sign the DPA, they are allowed representation in the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which is the principle body responsible for the

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<sup>56</sup> Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement. (20 June 2006). Africa Briefing No. 39. Nairobi/Brussels: *International Crisis Group*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4179&l=1>

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> Sudan's Darfur Conflict, *supra* note 45.

<sup>59</sup> Janjaweed Militia's Leader Denies Stirring Darfur's Torment, *supra* note 51

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement, *supra* note 56.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Janjaweed Militia's Leader Denies Stirring Darfur's Torment, *supra* note 51.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Darfur Peace Agreement* (opened for signature on May 5, 2006).

<sup>68</sup> Janjaweed Militia's Leader Denies Stirring Darfur's Torment, *supra* note 51.

<sup>69</sup> *Darfur Peace Agreement*, *supra* note 67.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

implementation of the DPA.<sup>71</sup> As the only rebel leader who signed the DPA, Minni Minawi received the fourth highest job in the national government in Khartoum, thus further freezing out representatives from other factions. While Minawi represents the largest rebel group, he also represents a comparatively small tribe and his acceptance of the DPA and rise to power has alienated many Darfurians from his group.<sup>72</sup>

The wealth sharing section calls for the wealth of Sudan to be shared equitably to all Sudanese people and throughout all regions.<sup>73</sup> It further gives special economic attention to the war torn region of Darfur, with reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts aimed at the needs of those IDPs returning to their homes.<sup>74</sup> The DPA also calls for a nationwide poverty eradication strategy in compliance with the *Millennium Development Goals*.<sup>75</sup> While the provisions outlined in the wealth sharing section are vital to rebuilding the region and allowing compensation for those whose homes and property have been destroyed, the government and international agencies have been unable to comply with many of the stipulations until security can be fully restored<sup>76</sup>

Of all the sections of the DPA, the security section is arguably the most important, and according to the *August 2006 Security Council Report on Darfur/Sudan*, the security situation in Darfur is worsening.<sup>77</sup> There is a call for a comprehensive ceasefire aimed at ensuring the safety of all civilians, specifically ensuring women and children are not subjected to further gender-based violence.<sup>78</sup> This section further calls upon all factions and rebels to cooperate with AMIS and other monitoring bodies to verify the removal of arms from rebel forces, and prohibits groups from intervening in the actions and movements of humanitarian organizations.<sup>79</sup> The DPA created monitoring groups within AMIS, as well as civilian police forces deployed to IDP camps, and the Government of Sudan was instructed to present a comprehensive plan to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed.<sup>80</sup> The government of Sudan has provided the AU with a disarmament plan, yet excluding the staged disarmament of 174 people, very few rebel groups have been neutralized and *Refugee International* reports that Khartoum is building up its armed forces in northern Darfur in an effort to pursue a major military offensive.<sup>81</sup> Due to the still unstable security situation in the region, the DDDC has yet to be established.

The DPA very clearly and carefully defines the conflict in Darfur and its resolution as an African problem and does not define a role for the UN.<sup>82</sup> Many in the international community fear the consequences of a complete withdrawal of international peacekeepers.<sup>83</sup> As AMIS becomes overstretched and exhausted, and the need for UN troop intervention becomes more evident, the lack of a takeover clause becomes increasingly problematic.<sup>84</sup>

### ***The Current Situation in Darfur***

In late 2004, rebel groups JEM and SLA withdrew from peace negotiations citing renewed army offensives conducted by the government forces and the Janjaweed.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, it was found in December of 2004 that Sudanese air forces attacked and destroyed three villages in Southern Darfur, killing at least 25 civilians and displacing nearly

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> Bancon, K., & Fowler, M. (n.d.). Sudan: Saving the Darfur Peace Agreement. *Refugees International*. Retrieved August 28, 2006, from <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/PHPSESSID=3fc64258eda9d44c2>

<sup>73</sup> *Darfur Peace Agreement*, *supra* note 67.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> Bancon, *supra* note 72.

<sup>77</sup> United Nations Security Council (2005, January) *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to S/RES/1564*, *supra* note 52.

<sup>78</sup> Janjaweed Militia's Leader Denies Stirring Darfur's Torment, *supra* note 66.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Bancon, *supra* note 72.

<sup>82</sup> Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement, *supra* note 56.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Economic and Social Council (2005, March 4) Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the World. (E/CN.4/2005/NGO/173) New York: Author

1,500 indigenous persons.<sup>86</sup> The Economic and Social Council (ECOSCO) reported an increase of Janjaweed activities, including attacks on civilians, forced removal of Fur, Massaleet, and Zaghawa communities, and targeting of camps for IDPs.<sup>87</sup> Government forces have also increased arbitrary arrests and detentions without charge, harassment, and widespread use of torture has been reported.<sup>88</sup> Women and children are most vulnerable to attack and they are increasingly vulnerable to forms of sexual violence and rape.<sup>89</sup>

Although direct government participation in human rights abuses in Darfur has subsided, the Janjaweed remains active in Darfur and Eastern Chad, despite the negotiated DPA.<sup>90</sup> Civilians are increasingly in danger from inter-rebel fighting caused by deep divisions among the rebel groups concerning the DPA.<sup>91</sup> It is still unclear as to how much control the government has over Janjaweed militias.<sup>92</sup> Some groups, such as Human Rights Watch, claim to have documents supporting the assertions that the government of Sudan has rewarded members of the Janjaweed with government posts, told lower level officials to ignore the actions of the militias, and mobilized the Janjaweed into specific regions.<sup>93</sup>

In the Korma region of northern Darfur, 72 people were killed over the course of five days in early July 2006.<sup>94</sup> Their attackers were members of the Minni Minawi faction of the SLA.<sup>95</sup> AMIS troops did not answer the victims' cries for help, nor did AMIS investigate the killings, saying the villagers attacked were associated with a group that had not signed the DPA.<sup>96</sup> The newest rounds of government aerial bombings have been targeted as those groups that have not signed the peace agreement, groups that Khartoum has justified as claiming to be 'terrorists.'<sup>97</sup> The current bombings are indiscriminate and have resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties.<sup>98</sup>

In a statement made to the Security Council in August 2006, Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, reported on the state of affairs in Darfur.<sup>99</sup> "Insecurity is at its highest [level](#) since 2004, access at its lowest levels since that [date](#) and we may well be on the brink of a return to all-out war...Our entire humanitarian operation in Darfur - the only lifeline for more than three million people - is presently at [risk](#)."<sup>100</sup> The World Health Organization has reported that 40% of the population in the northern region of Darfur is not receiving health care, and according to the World Food Program, 470,000 people across Darfur did not receive their monthly food rations for July 2006.<sup>101</sup>

This is no longer a problem solely facing the Sudan. IDP camps in Chad have repeatedly come under attack and people living within the camps are frequently harassed and forcibly recruited into rebel groups.<sup>102</sup> A major attack on civilians took place in eastern Chad on April 13, 2006, when Sudanese Janjaweed militias and local Chadian rebels attacked a cluster of Chadian villages, inhabited by the Dajo ethnic group.<sup>103</sup> Seventy-five people were reported to have been killed within just a few hours, only 70 kilometers from the Sudanese border.<sup>104</sup> In May 2006, Janjaweed forces raided a village just 80 kilometers from the Sudanese border resulting in four dead and 1,000 head of cattle

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> Sudan: Human Rights Concerns. (n.d.). *Amnesty International USA*. Retrieved August 29, 2006, from <http://www.amnestyusa.org//.do>

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> Darfur Documents Confirm Policy of Militia Support. (2004, July 20). *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved August 30, 2006, from <http://hrw.org/////htm>

<sup>94</sup> Sudan: Human Rights Concerns, *supra* note 90.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> McDoom, *supra* note 43.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. (2006, August 29) *Sudan: Risk of Humanitarian Disaster in Darfur* – UN Official Retrieved August 29, 2006, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200608290384.html>

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> Abuses by Sudanese "Janjaweed" and Chadian Militiamen. (n.d.). *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved August 30, 2006, from <http://www.hrw.org/////htm>

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

stolen.<sup>105</sup> Cattle theft is widely presumed to be motive for initial attacks on Chad.<sup>106</sup> Reports have surfaced of Janjaweed boasting to protect anyone who signs with them and opposes the SLA.<sup>107</sup> In August 2006, two IDPs were shot by gunmen within the camp and in the following nights the compounds of two NGOs were robbed and the watchman killed.<sup>108</sup> Previous attacks have included attempts to steal food caches and water pumping machines.<sup>109</sup> What can be seen as even more alarming are reports from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recounting increased radicalism of the youth from within camps who are turning to rebel groups out of frustration and despair at the lack of improvement of their situations.<sup>110</sup>

According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), women are often abducted from IDP camps and raped and beaten repeatedly before being allowed to return.<sup>111</sup> Women leave the safety of the camps to collect firewood and water in the inhospitable region and sometimes have to travel five to ten miles on foot to find adequate firewood in order to cook.<sup>112</sup> Janjaweed horsemen repeatedly ride near the camps to prey on such groups of women.<sup>113</sup> Due to cultural taboos and mandatory reporting rules, many of these women do not seek help from doctors or nurses as they fear the shame the rape may bring to her and her family.<sup>114</sup> When asked why the men from the camp do not get the wood, or at least accompany them, one woman replies: "If we let the men go, they will be killed. It is better for us to be raped than for our husbands to be killed."<sup>115</sup>

The UN has yet to classify the situation in Darfur as genocide, which would demand action under the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, although individual States and organizations have made such classifications.<sup>116</sup> Further, the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, certain crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes, has yet to assume a role in the conflict.<sup>117</sup> With the AMIS mandate set to expire at the end of September 2006, the Security Council is currently calling for a transition from the 7,700 AU security forces to a UN protection force of approximately 20,000, with an additional 3,300 civilian police in the Darfur region.<sup>118</sup> The transition, however, cannot legally take place until given permission to do so by the government of the Sudan.<sup>119</sup> Sudan has proposed sending 10,500 new government troops into the region, however, that would be in direct violation of the ceasefire agreement in the DPA.<sup>120</sup> Sudanese President Omer Al-Bashir has called on the Security Council to "be patient" in resolving the conflict in Darfur and indicated, in a letter to the Council President on Monday August 28, 2006, that resolutions for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur were unacceptable to Khartoum.<sup>121</sup> President Bashir has "repeatedly rejected a UN troop deployment in Darfur," and for the UN to enter a peacekeeping operation without that permission would be in direct violation of the international principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty.<sup>122</sup>

### ***The Security Council's Role in Darfur***

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (2006, July 4) *Sudan: Violence Worsens in Darfur IDP Camps*. IRINnews.org. Retrieved August 30, 2006 from <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=54373>

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> Sexual Violence in Sudan Camps Often Preventable, Insists UNFPA (2004, August 4). *United Nations Population Fund*. Retrieved August 30, 2006, from <http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=485>

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (entry into force January 12, 1951)

<sup>117</sup> SLA-Minawi Optimistic on Peace Deal despite Setbacks. (2006, July 9). *Sudan Tribune*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from [http://www.sudantribune.com/\\_impr.php3?id\\_article=16577](http://www.sudantribune.com/_impr.php3?id_article=16577)

<sup>118</sup> Human Rights News: UN Rejects Sudan's Darfur Plan. (2006, August 18). *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved August 30, 2006, from <http://www.hrw.org/////htm>

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> UN Integrated Regional Networks. (2006, August 24) *Sudan: Government Asks Security Council to Be Patient on Darfur*. Retrieved August 29, 2006, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200608250011.html>

<sup>122</sup> SLA-Minawi Optimistic on Peace Deal despite Setbacks, *supra* note 117.

According to the *Charter of the United Nations*, the UN's primary role is to maintain international peace and security.<sup>123</sup> Article 42 of the Charter specifically gives the Security Council the ability to take "action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."<sup>124</sup> In modern times the UN is no longer concerned solely with peace as an exclusively an external threat, meaning peace between States, but also with peace within States.<sup>125</sup> While the Charter gives the Council the ability to intervene when necessary, questions of sovereignty arise whenever debating international intervention.<sup>126</sup> The major tenet of international law is non-interference in internal State affairs, yet there have been repeated outcries for action from the Council when humanitarian crises occur.<sup>127</sup>

The UN currently has 10,000 troops in the southern region of Sudan to monitor a peace agreement signed in January of 2005, ending a 21 year long civil war in the region.<sup>128</sup> The *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* between the Khartoum government and the southern Sudanese People's Liberation has enjoyed limited success in power and wealth sharing, although specific tenets such as election planning and dividing oil revenues have yet to be accomplished.<sup>129</sup> One of the major impediments to peace is the lack of funding.<sup>130</sup> Of the \$2.6 billion pledged to the region for reconstruction, only \$430 million has been contributed by donors.<sup>131</sup> UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has claimed that durable peace in the south cannot be fully reached until the crisis in the western region of Darfur has been resolved, as the conflicts both continue to escalate.<sup>132</sup>

Although the Council has called for the AMIS mandate in Darfur to be relinquished to the UN, the Sudanese government has been unwilling to mandate a UN peacekeeping presence in Darfur.<sup>133</sup> While there is a UN Mission in southern Sudan, its mandate ends at the borders to the Darfur region.<sup>134</sup> The DPA gives the task of running the DDDC and implementing numerous other measures to the AU, which admittedly lacks both the staff and resources to organize such an undertaking.<sup>135</sup> Although some believe the government of Sudan must be involved, others believe its participation in the violence should bar it from taking a leadership role.<sup>136</sup>

## Conclusion

The situation in Darfur is the world's largest humanitarian operation, with over 14,000 aid workers try to feed and shelter more than three million war victims.<sup>137</sup> With the passage of the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, the international community came together to say 'Never Again' would the world stand idle and let genocide take place. Yet we have continued to see ethnic tensions erupt into killings, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide in places such as the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. What lessons can we learn from Rwanda and Bosnia? What is your country policy in the Sudanese region? How does your State view the role of the Security Council in international conflict intervention and protecting human rights? What has your State done to assist refugees in Darfur? What steps have been taken in the past to solve internal State conflicts? What should be the role of the African Union in maintaining peace? Should the Sudanese government be allowed to participate in the peacekeeping operations given their alleged involvement? What is the role of the ICC and other international bodies? How can we continue to protect NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in war torn regions? Does the

<sup>123</sup> United Nations. (1945) Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. San Francisco: Author

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 42.

<sup>125</sup> Juan, S. (2005). *The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the UN Security Council: Ensuring the Security of People* (J. P. Muldoon, J. F. Aviel, R. Reitano, & E. Sullivan, Eds., 2nd Ed.). Multilateral diplomacy and the United Nations today. Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> Evelyn, L. (2006, September 13). UN Says Southern Sudan Peace Agreement in Trouble. Washington Post. Retrieved September 13, 2006, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/dyn/////html>

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> UN Integrated Regional Networks, *supra* note 120.

<sup>134</sup> Chol, A. (2006, July 5). What Makes Blue Helmet Presence in Darfur Different. *Sudan Tribune*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from [http://www.sudantribune.com/article\\_impr.php3?id\\_article=16539](http://www.sudantribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=16539)

<sup>135</sup> Bancon, *supra* note 72.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> McDoom, *supra* note 43.

Council need to wait for permission by the Sudanese government before entering Darfur? How can the Council protect persons living in IDP camps? What steps can be taken to return IDPs to their homes? What steps still need to be taken to ensure compliance with the DPA? Most importantly, how can we prevent these types of conflicts from occurring?

## II. The Situation in Iran

*The UN Security Council has been set up for the world security. Is the UN Security Council a mere tool in their hands to use at their will... Our understanding is that the UN Security Council belongs to all nations and is not a tool for a few countries. Why do they use it for their own purpose?*<sup>138</sup>

Since the time of the Shah, when Iran first purchased a nuclear research reactor from the United States of America (USA) in 1959, it has made its interests in pursuing nuclear power clear.<sup>139</sup> While the revolution in 1979 and the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war significantly dampened these ambitions, Iran is once again pursuing its goals of acquiring nuclear energy.<sup>140</sup> However, the Islamic Republic of Iran is persistent in its argument that they “consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal, and against [its] basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.”<sup>141</sup> Iran instead insists on its right under the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)* to develop peaceful uses of nuclear technology.<sup>142</sup> It maintains that nuclear energy is needed to satisfy the rising domestic consumption rates; while oil and gas must be used to create foreign investment.<sup>143</sup> Iran has nonetheless placed the international community on a standstill with its nuclear drive.

### *International Concern*

Although Iran is years away from producing weapon-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, and in fact its laboratory scale capabilities should not be compared to industrial scale capability, it has nevertheless created concern over a potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.<sup>144</sup> This is particularly true of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which have significantly progressed, creating what some believe to be a threat to its neighbors.<sup>145</sup> In December 2002, suspicion arose regarding Iran’s nuclear program when it confirmed allegations of building facilities at Arak and Natanz, which could be used to produce materials for a nuclear weapon.<sup>146</sup> Further suspicions were raised throughout 2003, as Iran refused to sign the *Additional Protocol* to the 1968 *NPT*, which would allow for supplementary inspections in the country.<sup>147</sup> After finding highly enriched uranium at two sites, Natanz and the Kalaye Electrical Company, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took more aggressive action on 12 September 2003, setting a deadline until the end of October 2003 for Iran to provide additional information, proving nuclear allegations as false.<sup>148</sup> Iran further admitted to “bench scale” uranium conversion experiments, which are required to be reported to the IAEA.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>138</sup> Iran's President - His Own Words. (2006, January 16). *BBC News*. Retrieved September 1, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4616336.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4616336.stm)

<sup>139</sup> Spector, L.S. (1990). *Nuclear Ambitions: Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> Khoshroo, G.A. (2003, April 29). *Statement*. Statement presented at Second Session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review, Geneva.

<sup>142</sup> United Nations. General Assembly First Committee. 59th General Assembly. (2004, November 10). *Middle East Nuclear Proliferation Highlighted, as Disarmament Committee Continues General Debate*. Retrieved July 10, 2006 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/gadis3276.doc.htm>

<sup>143</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 109-RS 21592, at 6 (2006).

<sup>144</sup> Sahimi, Muhammad. (2005). Forced to Fuel: Iran's Nuclear Energy Program. *Harvard International Review*, 26.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> Jahanpour, F. (n.d.). Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Program. In *Global Security*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/programmes/globalsecurity/iranchronology.htm>

<sup>147</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency. (1997, September). *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infircs/1998/infirc540corrected.pdf#search=%22Model%20Protocol%20Additional%20to%20the%20Agreement\(s\)%20Between%20State\(s\)%20and%20the%20International%20Atomic%20Energy%20Agency%20for%20the%20Application%20of%20Safeguards.%20%22](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infircs/1998/infirc540corrected.pdf#search=%22Model%20Protocol%20Additional%20to%20the%20Agreement(s)%20Between%20State(s)%20and%20the%20International%20Atomic%20Energy%20Agency%20for%20the%20Application%20of%20Safeguards.%20%22)

<sup>148</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency. (2003, September 12). *Resolution: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved July 11, 2006

### *Efforts by the EU-3, IAEA, and Security Council*

European diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue began in 2003 with France, Germany, and Great Britain – the so-called European “troika” or EU-3.<sup>150</sup> By October 2003, through the European efforts, Iran produced a file to the IAEA, detailing its nuclear activities.<sup>151</sup> By December of the same year, Iran signed the *Additional Protocol*.<sup>152</sup> However, in its November 2003 and February 2004 reports, the IAEA outlined violations committed by Iran despite its agreements.<sup>153</sup> These included the enrichment of unreported uranium, the failure to report designs of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges, as well as finding traces at two sites in Iran of both highly enriched and low-enriched uranium.<sup>154</sup> Further, IAEA reports from May 2004 have accused Iran of continuing to make materials that may be used in a nuclear weapon.<sup>155</sup>

By its November 2004 meeting, the IAEA adopted a resolution calling for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and clarify unresolved issues.<sup>156</sup> Iran’s failure to adhere to the European initiative or the calls of the IAEA, has led to the USA to recommend the case to be referred to the United Nations Security Council (SC) for the consideration of international sanctions due to the lack of compliance on nuclear issues.<sup>157</sup> This can place limitations on purchases of Iranian goods and oil; authorize a decline in diplomatic relations and flight travel; as well as decreasing lending by international financial institutions.<sup>158</sup> As such, the possibility of Security Council sanctions led Iran to agree to suspend its activities until further talks are held as well as adhering to the IAEA *Additional Protocol*.<sup>159</sup> Iran even agreed to implement the *Additional Protocol* before its ratification by parliament.<sup>160</sup> Since implementing the *Additional Protocol*, and until April of 2006, Iran has agreed to voluntary inspections by the IAEA and has agreed to conduct its activities within the scope of the agencies supervision.<sup>161</sup> In doing so, the *Additional Protocol* has been implemented by providing the requisite declarations and access to locations in a timely manner.<sup>162</sup> However, the additional agreement and Iran’s cooperation have merely been a temporary suspension of its activities, as opposed to a decision to abandon completely its nuclear program.

In February of 2006, Iran resumed its enrichment related activities, which has included testing a 10-centrifuge cascade with uranium hexafluoride gas, also known as UF<sub>6</sub>.<sup>163</sup> On March 29, the SC released a unanimous presidential statement giving Iran thirty days to suspend all of its uranium enrichment activities and resume its cooperation with the IAEA.<sup>164</sup> However, by April 11, 2006, it was announced by Iranian officials, "Iran has joined

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<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf#search=%22iran%2C%20september%2012%2C%202003%2C%20october%2C%20natanz%22>

<sup>149</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 109-RS 21592, *supra* note 143.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>151</sup> *Timeline: Iran*. (2006, May 3). BBC News. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/806268.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/806268.stm)

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> Murphy, Francois. (2004, February 25). U.N. Watchdog Accuses Iran of Unanswered Questions. *Reuters*.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> Albright, D., & Hinderstein, C. (2004, November/December). Iran: Countdown to Showdown. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 60(6), 67-72.

<sup>156</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 109-RL32048, at 47 (2006).

<sup>157</sup> Einhorn, R.J. (2004, March). Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East. *Arms Control Today*, 34, 12-13.

<sup>158</sup> Phillips, J., Hulsman, J.C., & Carafano, J.J. (2005, December 14). Countering Iran’s Nuclear Challenge. *Backgrounder*, 1903, 1-8. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/Iraq/bg1903.cfm>

<sup>159</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. (2004). *Iran: Time for a New Approach*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> News Update on IAEA & Iran. Chronology of Key Events (January – June 2006). (2006, June). *International Atomic Energy Agency*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran/iran\\_timeline3.shtml](http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran/iran_timeline3.shtml)

<sup>162</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006, June 8). *Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf#search=%22Implementation%20of%20the%20NPT%20Safeguards%20Agreement%20in%20the%20Islamic%20Republic%20of%20Iran%2C%20june%208%2C%202006%22>

<sup>163</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 109-RL32048, *supra* note 143.

<sup>164</sup> United Nations. Security Council. 5500<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (2006, July 31). *Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm>

the group of those countries, which have nuclear technology" and that enrichment had increased to 3.5 percent U-235 in a cascade of 164 centrifuge machines.<sup>165</sup> The increase in enrichment is not a significant amount that can be used in the production of nuclear weapons, but rather used to make fuel for reactors to generate electricity.<sup>166</sup> The problem with Iran's enrichment, though at a low percentage, is the fact that it had not been reported to the United Nations (UN) or the IAEA.<sup>167</sup>

### ***Arguments for Nuclear Power***

The Islamic Republic continues to assert its nuclear aspirations as peaceful, intended to be used for energy and therefore insisting that its suspension of enrichment be characterized in a narrow manner.<sup>168</sup> Despite having the world's second largest proven oil reserves after Saudi Arabia and the second largest gas reserves after Russia, Iran is limited in taking full advantage of its energy resources, especially since the 1979 revolution.<sup>169</sup> This is mainly indicated by the fact that Iran's oil revenues only account for twenty percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).<sup>170</sup> Such sources of energy have also created a dangerously high amount of pollutants in the region due to the lack of fuel-efficient methods.<sup>171</sup> Nuclear power is thus an alternative form of energy that is much more economical for a poor region such as the Middle East and an inalienable right protected in Article IV of the *NPT*.<sup>172</sup> With a booming population, which has more than doubled since the revolution, and its rapid industrialization, the country finds itself regularly importing gasoline and electricity.<sup>173</sup> With depletion fears of its oil fields, Iran further argues the need for nuclear energy, where oil can be used for high-value products and nuclear energy as a source for electricity generation.<sup>174</sup> In this manner, nuclear power can be used to meet its domestic energy needs, whilst allowing it to focus more on oil exports and foreign currency revenue.<sup>175</sup>

The costs of using nuclear energy are also a fraction of those used for oil, where further expansion of Iran's oil industry is needed.<sup>176</sup> Many of the reasoning behind Iran's inefficiency in its oil and gas sector can be associated with underinvestment in its fuel industry.<sup>177</sup> Since the 1979 revolution, sanctions invoked by the USA have kept both American companies and other foreign investors out of the country due to the threat of secondary sanctions.<sup>178</sup> In fact, with its considerable network of pipelines, Iran should be a favored contender in the regions pipeline projects.<sup>179</sup> However, the continued disparities between the U.S. government and that of Iran have ensured that new projects bypass the Islamic Republic. As such, Iran continues to argue that Western opposition to its nuclear program is primarily motivated by politics.<sup>180</sup> This is further supported by the fact that prior to 1979 and the ousting of the Shah; Iran did in fact receive Western support for its Bushehr nuclear power plant project.<sup>181</sup> The Islamic Republic and President Ahmadinejad have continuously spoken out against the perceived monopoly of nuclear energy by the West. Iran asserts that "access cannot be restricted to a few, depriving most nations and by

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<sup>165</sup> Ahmadinejad, M. (n.d.). News Headlines in Tue 11 April 2006. In *Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from <http://www.president.ir/eng/ahmadinejad/cronicnews/1385/01/22/index-e.htm>; Aqazadeh, G.-R.. (2006, April 11). Nuclear Energy Facilitates Sustainable Development. *Islamic Republic News Agency*.

<sup>166</sup> Diplomats: New Traces of Highly Enriched Uranium Found in Iran. (2006, May 13). *USA Today*.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup> Shuster, M. (2006). Iran Enriches Uranium, Plans New Expansion In *All Things Considered*. Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio.

<sup>169</sup> Iran: Energy Overview. (2006, February 15). *BBC News*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4688984.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4688984.stm)

<sup>170</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 109-RL32048, *supra* note 143.

<sup>171</sup> Sahimi, *Forced to Fuel: Iran's Nuclear Energy Program*, *supra* note 144.

<sup>172</sup> United Nations General Assembly First Committee, *Middle East Nuclear Proliferation Highlighted, as Disarmament Committee Continues General Debate*, *supra* note 142.

<sup>173</sup> Sahimi, M. (2003, October 3). Iran's Nuclear Program. Part II: Are Nuclear Reactors Necessary? *Peyvand*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1022.html>

<sup>174</sup> Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to United Nations in New York. (2005, November 18). *An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight About Iran's Nuclear Program* [advertisement]. *New York Times*.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>177</sup> Iran: Energy Overview, *BBC News*, *supra* note 169.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>180</sup> Jahanpour, Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Program, *supra* note 146.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*



establishing economic monopolies, use them as an instrument to expand their domination [...] Some powerful States practice a discriminatory approach against access of *Non-Proliferation Treaty* members to material, equipment, and peaceful nuclear technology, and by doing so intend to impose a nuclear apartheid. We are concerned that once certain powerful States completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other States and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community.”<sup>182</sup>

Some argue that Iran should completely give up its nuclear aspirations in exchange for a multilateral agreement that will allow it to buy reactor fuel for any civilian nuclear power reactor.<sup>183</sup> Such guarantees would need to come from the developed nations of Europe and the USA.<sup>184</sup> However, Iran argues that this type of dependency would hold its investment in power plants hostage to the political whims of suppliers in a tightly controlled market.<sup>185</sup> This is further supported by the argument that such plans would become obsolete in case of denial of fuel, therefore prohibiting the capacity to produce it domestically.<sup>186</sup>

Many argue that Iran has multiple reasons for wanting to pursue nuclear power. In a world where power and prestige is often associated with one's military capabilities, nuclear capabilities seems to be the answer to achieving ranks with nations of higher power.<sup>187</sup> This, along with the close proximity of Israel, Pakistan and India's nuclear technology, coupled with what many politicians feel as pressure toward regime change from Western powers, is enough incentive to seek nuclear power.<sup>188</sup> With U.S. troops beyond the borders in Iraq, as well as inside Afghanistan, and the constant threat Iran feels from Israel, Iran is under constant pressure to provide a means of protection for itself.<sup>189</sup> Yet, Iran has bluntly expressed that a “costly nuclear-weapon option would reduce Iran's regional influence and increase its global vulnerabilities without providing any credible deterrence.”<sup>190</sup> It should further be noted that Iran does recognize the need for a WMD Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, as it was the first to propose such in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (GA) in 1974.<sup>191</sup> Yet, to accomplish such a feat, a fundamental improvement in relations must be accomplished to gain a certain amount of trust to be able to further talks on a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.

### ***NPT Compliance***

The *Non-Proliferation Treaty* is in essence compliance with safeguard agreements between Member States of the *NPT* and the IAEA. However, the difficult part of assessing fulfillment of the *NPT* is that there are countless opportunities for technical incongruities that do not classify as noncompliance.<sup>192</sup> The line between black and white further blurs by a State's willingness to take the initiative in corrective action.<sup>193</sup> In Iran's case, its willingness to sign the *Additional Protocol* and agree to voluntary suspension of enrichments and reprocessing-related activities, as acquiesced within the Paris Agreement in November 2004, have been viewed as significant concessions by the international community.<sup>194</sup> The IAEA Board of Governors has even recognized that suspension of enrichment activity is not a legally binding obligation; rather it is a voluntary measure of confidence building.<sup>195</sup> The signing of

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<sup>182</sup> Mahmoud, A. (2005, September 17). *Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. Address presented at United Nations Sixtieth Session, New York.

<sup>183</sup> Einhorn, *Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East*, *supra* note 157.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to United Nations in New York, *An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight About Iran's Nuclear Program* [advertisement], *supra* note 175.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>187</sup> Einhorn, *Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East*, *supra* note 157.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>189</sup> Sahimi, *Forced to Fuel: Iran's Nuclear Energy Program*, *supra* note 144.

<sup>190</sup> Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to United Nations in New York, *An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight About Iran's Nuclear Program* [advertisement], *supra* note 175.

<sup>191</sup> United Nations Information Services. (2005, April 28). *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference at UN 2-27 May, as Tense Global Events Prompt Warning of Agreement's Erosion*. New York: Author.

<sup>192</sup> *Iran Responds to UN Demands* [Radio broadcast]. (2006, August 22). Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> Nuclear Report on Iran: Excerpts. (2006, April 29). *BBC News*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4956882.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4956882.stm)

the *Additional Protocol* is also a voluntary act on Iran's part, in that it is not a legal requirement under the *NPT*.<sup>196</sup> As such, without the lack of substantive proof that Iran is in fact aiming to create nuclear weapons, as opposed to nuclear technology for peaceful uses, the IAEA and the Security Council are limited in their statutory power in enforcing demands of suspension of enrichment or imposing ramifications as consequence of it.<sup>197</sup> The question remains whether Iran, feeling international pressure despite perceiving itself to fulfill its *NPT* obligations, will resort to Article X of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*. Article X of the treaty, as used by North Korea, allows for Member States of the *NPT* to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that "the supreme interests of its country" are being jeopardized.<sup>198</sup>

Within the context of the *Charter of the United Nations*, under Chapter VII, Article 39, the Security Council may "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken [...] to maintain or restore international peace and security."<sup>199</sup> Deficiency in evidence and lack of political will among Member States on the SC, create major questions on to what extent the Security Council can and will take action against Iran.<sup>200</sup>

### *UN Obligations versus NPT Privileges*

Iran maintains two legal arguments in asserting its nuclear policy. The first entails its voluntary and non-obligatory actions; the second argument involves Article IV of the *NPT*. Iran argues that though they are a signatory of the *NPT*, "nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy," thus providing legal protection to continue with its activities.<sup>201</sup> However, Iran also holds obligations as a member of the United Nations. Adopted on July 31, 2006 by the Security Council, *RES/SC/1696* demands that Iran halt all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.<sup>202</sup> The resolution has thus created a legally binding accord for Iran to follow as a signatory of the *UN Charter*.<sup>203</sup> Under Article 25 of the *UN Charter*, "members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."<sup>204</sup> Resolution 1696 also supersedes the privileges allocated under the *NPT* as Article 103 states that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."<sup>205</sup>

### *Solutions?*

The preferred solution, as endorsed by many nations, is to facilitate confidence building through a complete ban of enrichment activities by Iran.<sup>206</sup> The negotiation track initiated by the EU-3 in 2003 has also made significant headway. In the November 2004 Paris Agreement between the EU-3 and Iran, it was agreed that Iran will "continue

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<sup>196</sup> Krieger, D. (2006, February). Iran, International Law and Nuclear Disarmament. In *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from [http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2006/02/00\\_krieger\\_iran-law-disarmament.htm](http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2006/02/00_krieger_iran-law-disarmament.htm)

<sup>197</sup> Joyner, D. (2006, March 1). The Iran Nuclear Standoff: Legal Issues. Message posted to <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03/iran-nuclear-standoff-legal-issues.php>

<sup>198</sup> Krieger, Iran, International Law and Nuclear Disarmament, *supra* note 196.

<sup>199</sup> Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.

<sup>200</sup> Joyner, The Iran Nuclear Standoff: Legal Issues, *supra* note 197.

<sup>201</sup> Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, June 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161

<sup>202</sup> United Nations. Security Council. 5500<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (2006, July 31). *Resolution 1696: Non-Proliferation*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/69928.pdf#search=%22resolution%201696%2C%20un%20security%20council%22>

<sup>203</sup> Reed, A. (2006, August 21). UN Resolution 1696 Moots Iranian Legal Claims. In *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved August 23, 2006, from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/69928.pdf#search=%22resolution%201696%2C%20un%20security%20council%22>

<sup>204</sup> Charter of the United Nations, *supra* note 199.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>206</sup> United Nations. Security Council. 5403<sup>rd</sup> Meeting. (2006, March 29). *Security Council, in Presidential Statement Underlines Importance of Iran's Re-Establishing Full, Sustained Suspension of Uranium-Enrichment Activities*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm>

and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities.”<sup>207</sup> However, by 2005 the lack of progress in negotiations resulted in the start up of Iran’s uranium conversion plant in August of that same year.<sup>208</sup> Iran’s ambiguous status of fulfilling the *NPT* requirements was categorized as noncompliant in September 2005 according to the IAEA’s resolution *GOV/2005/77*, finding it uncooperative with its safeguard agreement.<sup>209</sup>

Iran also discussed the possibility of accepting an offer that would allow uranium enrichment on territory of the Russian Federation as an alternative form of production.<sup>210</sup> Nevertheless, further transparency was lost by Iran’s announcement that it will abandon its voluntary enrichment suspension, as well as negotiations and applications of the *Additional Protocol*.<sup>211</sup> By February 2006, the IAEA Board voted to report Iran to the SC, though lacking a consensus in its final decision.<sup>212</sup> Announcing its intend to continue with its research, in July Iran was offered a package of incentives by European powers and the United States and was further called upon under *RES/SC/1696* to suspend enrichment and carry out confidence building measures by August 31, 2006.<sup>213</sup> Despite this, Iran has remained defiant against the international community’s calls and announced that though it is willing to have serious talks on the issue, an end to its enrichment activities is out of the question.<sup>214</sup> While military action has been mentioned within discussions of dealing with the Iran situation, it seems highly unlikely at the current stage of negotiations.<sup>215</sup> Sanctions have also been mentioned as a tool to curve Iran’s nuclear ambitions; yet the lack of support from some permanent SC members makes this a highly unlikely outcome.<sup>216</sup> If sanctions were to be imposed, they could include a ban on Iranian oil, trade, or international investment. Further bans on arms sales and limited travel by Iranian officials could also be imposed.

Is Iran conducting illegal activities in pursuing nuclear technology within the context of the *United Nations Charter* and its rights and obligations within the *NPT*? What incentives can be offered to bring Iran and the West, particularly the United States, to the discussion table? What steps can be taken toward confidence building? Taking into consideration similar position of other nations (i.e. Brazil) what can be done to eliminate feelings of double standards? Is a nuclear free zone in the Middle East a possibility? In addition, could a move toward this eliminate skepticism and fear toward Iran’s incentives?

### III. Timor Leste: Post-Withdrawal Analysis

*The essence of independence has been to think and act according to standards from within, not without. Inevitably anyone with an independent mind must become "one who resists or opposes authority or established conventions": a rebel. If enough people come to agree with, and follow, the Rebel, we now have a Devil. Until, of course, still more people agree. And then, finally, we have --- Greatness.*<sup>217</sup>

#### **Brief History of Timor-Leste**

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<sup>207</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency. (2004, November 26). *Communication Dated 26 November 2004 Received From the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom Concerning the Agreement Signed in Paris on 15 November 2004*. Retrieved July 13, 2006 from IAEA Database (IAEA Documents & Conventions GOV/2006/15).

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>209</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005, September 24). *Resolution: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf#search=%22GOV%2F2005%2F77%22>

<sup>210</sup> Jahanpour, F. (2006, July). Iran’s Nuclear Threat: Exploring the Politics. *Oxford Research Group*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/IransNuclearThreat.htm>

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>213</sup> United Nations, *Resolution 1696: Non-Proliferation*, *supra* note 202.

<sup>214</sup> *Iran Responds to UN Demands* [Radio broadcast]. (2006, August 22). Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio.

<sup>215</sup> Rogers, P. (2006, February). Iran: Consequences of a War. *Oxford Research Group*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/IranConsequences.htm>

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>217</sup> The Quotations Page. (n.d.). *Quotation #35500 from Classic Quotes*. Retrieved October 24, 2006, from <http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/35500.html>

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is located in Southeast Asia on the eastern half of the island of Timor and has a population of approximately one million.<sup>218</sup> The Portuguese colonized the area in the early 1500's and continued to export sandalwood, sugar cane, and cotton from the island well into the twentieth century.<sup>219</sup> Although underdeveloped and lacking electricity and water supply, Timor-Leste was seen as a strategic buffer zone during the buildup to WWII.<sup>220</sup> Despite Portuguese protests, the Australians and Dutch landed in the capital city of Dili and the Japanese used their presence as justification for invasion in February of 1942.<sup>221</sup> When the Japanese left in September of 1945 and the war ended, the island was left in ruins, with close to 50,000 Timorese having died as a result of the occupation.<sup>222</sup> During the 1960's, the Portuguese government tried to help the Timorese recover, but with an annual growth rate of only 2% per year, the attempts were largely unsuccessful.<sup>223</sup> With Portugal transitioning to democracy in 1974, the government changed policy in regards to Timor-Leste and gave the Timorese freedom to form independent political parties.<sup>224</sup> On November 28, 1975, Timor-Leste declared independence from Portugal leaving a vacuum of leadership.<sup>225</sup> During a coup attempt by the conservative factions in Timor-Leste, violence erupted between the left and right wing groups resulting in over 2,000 deaths.<sup>226</sup> As a result, merely ten days after declaring independence on December 7, 1975, Indonesian troops invaded and took control of the area.<sup>227</sup>

Although the United Nations (UN) disapproved of Indonesia's actions and over 200,000 Timorese died as a direct result of Indonesian occupation, large sums of money were invested in Timor-Leste, which resulted in an average annual growth rate of 6% between the years of 1983 and 1997.<sup>228</sup> The Timorese did not approve of the strong and direct government rule of the Indonesians.<sup>229</sup> In 1991, thousands of Timorese marched towards a cemetery to mourn the murder of a young student named Sebastião Gomes, who was killed by the Indonesian military while protesting the government.<sup>230</sup> The Indonesian military opened fire on the mourners and massacred over 200 people.<sup>231</sup> This was seen as a turning point, as images of the murders were displayed by international human rights groups throughout the world.<sup>232</sup>

In October of 1996, Indonesian occupation was further thrown in the international spotlight when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two Timorese leaders advancing independence.<sup>233</sup> Soon after, Indonesia suffered economic difficulties and the government started to reconsider the costly occupation of Timor-Leste.<sup>234</sup> In 1999, Indonesia's government allowed a referendum for the East-Timorese to choose between local autonomy and independence.<sup>235</sup> On August 30, 1999, 98% of registered voters in Timor-Leste went to the polls and voted in strong favor of independence by a margin of 21.5% to 78.5%.<sup>236</sup>

### ***UN Intervention***

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<sup>218</sup> CIA Factbook. (n.d.). *East Timor*. Retrieved on October 12, 2006 from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tt.html>

<sup>219</sup> Brief History of Timor-Leste: A History. (n.d.). *Timor-Leste.gov*. Retrieved October 12, 2006, from The Official Web Gateway to the Government of Timor-Leste Web site: <http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl//.htm>

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> CIA Factbook, *supra* note 218.

<sup>226</sup> Brief History of Timor-Leste: A History, *supra* note 219.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>236</sup> East Timor - UNMISSET Background. (n.d.). *United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor*. Retrieved October 24, 2006, from United Nations Web site: <http://www.un.org/////html>

The United Nations played a large role in the transition from occupation to independence. Once talks had started proposing a resolution allowing the Timorese to decide their independence, Indonesia and Portugal signed a set of agreements entrusting the Secretary-General of the UN with providing assistance throughout the transition.<sup>237</sup> On June 11, 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in *S/RES/1246*.<sup>238</sup> UNAMET helped to register close to half a million voters, as well as undertaking efforts to facilitate humanitarian efforts.<sup>239</sup> Large scale airdrops of food and other provisions were organized and relief workers and shelters were supplied by UNAMET.<sup>240</sup> Also during this time, the UN was busy helping some 250,000 East Timorese voluntarily repatriate from West Timor and other areas in the region.<sup>241</sup> Directly after the referendum declaring independence in 1999, the UN established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to take over for the UNAMET forces.<sup>242</sup>

UNTAET was created by Security Council *Resolution 1272* (1999), and was established to assist in the creation of an effective administration, provide security and help to maintain law, assist in the development of social and civil services, and support capacity building for self-governance.<sup>243</sup> It was appropriated with a budget of \$476.8 million dollars and a staff of 10,169 people, the majority being international uniformed personnel.<sup>244</sup> On August 30, 2001, elections were held establishing an 88 member Constituent Assembly, whose task was to draft and adopt a new constitution.<sup>245</sup> The Constituent Assembly accepted and signed the States first constitution in March of 2002, and in April the general public elected Mr. Xanana Gusmão as President of Timor-Leste.<sup>246</sup> The Constituent Assembly was transformed into Parliament the following May after the election of President.<sup>247</sup> UNTAET was dissolved on May 20, 2002 and a new organization, known as the United Nations Mission of Support in East-Timor (UNMISSET), was created to ensure the sustainability and security of the newly established State.<sup>248</sup>

The original mandate of UNMISSET was sanctioned in Security Council *Resolution 1410*, and was created to “provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor; provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service; and contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor.”<sup>249</sup>

In the following two years after the establishment of the organization, UNMISSET gradually passed on its executive authority on internal and external security to Gusmão and the Timorese government.<sup>250</sup> UNMISSET’s main priorities were assisting in the development of police services, maintaining rule of law, external security, and providing educational and training opportunities to the Timorese responsible for governing the country.<sup>251</sup> Most importantly, UNMISSET focused on ensuring sustainability and developing the infrastructure necessary for self-governance.<sup>252</sup>

In May 2003, the Security Council extended the mandate for a second year, citing successes in the State.<sup>253</sup> This action was repeated again in 2004, when Security Council *Resolution 1480* passed extending the original mandate for another year.<sup>254</sup> This extension was continued yet again in 2005 with Security Council *Resolution 1543* and *Resolution 1573* extend the mission for an extra six months in each resolution.<sup>255</sup> Interspersed between Security

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<sup>237</sup> East Timor - UNTAET Background. (n.d.). *United Nations*. Retrieved October 20, 2006, from <http://www.un.org///.htm>

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>242</sup> East Timor - UNMISSET Background, *supra* note 236.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>253</sup> East Timor - UNTAET Background, *supra* note 237.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*

Council Resolutions, there have been numerous Secretary General Reports asking the mission to continue to provide “support for the public administration and justice system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes; support to the development of law enforcement in Timor-Leste; and support for the security and stability of Timor-Leste.”<sup>256</sup>

The last part of the UN mission was to keep the UN’s new office in East Timor, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) open from May 2005 until May 2006, as a follow-up mission.<sup>257</sup> Their purpose was to “support the development of critical state institutions by providing up to 45 civilian advisers; support further development of the police through the provision of up to 40 police advisers, and bolster the development of the Border Patrol Unit by providing up to 35 additional advisers, 10 of whom may be military advisers; provide training in observance of democratic governance and human rights by providing up to 10 rights officers; and review progress on those fronts.”<sup>258</sup>

The mandate of UNOTIL was scheduled to end in May of 2006, but increased violence and humanitarian need have caused the Security Council to prolong UNOTIL’s mandate, and in August of 2006 they launched a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which continues to work as a peacekeeping force in the State.<sup>259</sup>

### ***The Current Situation in Timor-Leste***

In May of 2006 East Timor celebrated its four year anniversary of independence, only to ask for an increase in an international peacekeepers presence four days later amidst ethnic tensions, corruption, and government mismanagement.<sup>260</sup> Former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and President Gusmão have been divided on an abundance of political issues, which has been the catalyst for the current conflict.<sup>261</sup> Gusmão wanted a Presidential system, which would have given him, as President, a large amount of power, whereas Alkatiri and his Fretilin Party favored a Parliamentary system, rendering the President a ceremonial figure and allowing Alkatiri to control the majority of the government.<sup>262</sup> Gusmão has given support to the opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party, as a way of countering Alkatiri’s power.<sup>263</sup> Further acerbating the problem is Alkatiri’s alienation of the Catholic Church and other powerful groups.<sup>264</sup> Alkatiri is an Arab Muslim, and although Timor-Leste is 90% Catholic and compulsory Christian education was popular, he mandated such compulsory religious education voluntary.<sup>265</sup> These political tensions have begun to fuel ethnic conflicts in the State. In January 2006, 159 soldiers in the defense forces petitioned the President claiming ethnic discrimination.<sup>266</sup> Soldiers claimed those from the eastern part of the State, the *Lorosae*, were unfairly receiving promotions and discriminating against their western counterparts, the *Loromonu*.<sup>267</sup> It is important to note that many scholars claim such ethnic differences were not a social factor prior to this latest conflict.<sup>268</sup> Marriage demographics and social history show the differences between those in the east and west have been recently exaggerated for political gain.<sup>269</sup>

Street gangs in Timor-Leste have been flourishing, with unemployment as high as 70% in some major cities, including the capital city Dili.<sup>270</sup> After news broke of the soldiers’ petitions calling for Prime Minister Alkatiri’s

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<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup> East Timor - UNMISSET Background, supra note 236.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>260</sup> Trouble Returns to East Timor. (2006, June 29). *Power and Interest News Report*. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from [http://www.pinr.com/.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=519&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/.php?ac=view_report&report_id=519&language_id=1)

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>266</sup> Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis: Executive Summary and Recommendations. (2006, October 10). *International Crisis Group*. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from <http://www.crisisgroup.org//.cfm?id=4438&l=1>

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>268</sup> Tanter, R. (2006, June 9). Ten Questions About East Timor for Which We Need Answers. *Znet*. Retrieved October 27, 2006, from The Nautilus Institute Web site: <http://www.zmag.org//.cfm?ItemID=10391>

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*

removal, the government dismissed nearly half of all its soldiers.<sup>271</sup> The soldiers, along with street gangs and criminals, took to the streets looting and inciting large scale riots causing arson damage and deaths.<sup>272</sup> The soldiers took the city capital and in the absence of security, street gangs invaded the western region of the island began to inflict terror in the eastern *Loromonu* peoples.<sup>273</sup> Many citizens have been forcibly removed from their homes or have fled in fear for their lives in Dili and the surrounding area.<sup>274</sup> Gang violence and fighting between the disgruntled soldiers and those who remain in employment by the government have increased, taking scarce resources from the nascent State.<sup>275</sup> These accusations of discrimination are continuing to be used by the government and street gang leaders for recruitment purposes.<sup>276</sup>

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) released a report on October 17, 2006, laying much of blame for the country's current crisis on former Prime Minister Alkatiri.<sup>277</sup> In the report they also find President Gusmão at fault for mishandling the crisis, although no recommendations for prosecution of either man have been made.<sup>278</sup> While both men played a contributing role in the escalations, UNHCHR finds the majority of problems arose from underlying factors including lack of rule of law and weak State institutions.<sup>279</sup> Problems worsened when close to 95% of army and police weapons went missing, with later investigations revealing that they were distributed to civilians, and as a result the country's economics system has come to a halt as violence recently caused the airport in Dili to close.<sup>280</sup>

### ***What the Future Holds?***

Multiple States, Non-Governmental Organizations, and other organizations have supplied the international community and the UN with recommendations for assisting in the stability of East Asia's poorest State. Most agree that measures need to be taken, but conflicting plans of action have emerged. Some criticize the UN for being too involved with Timor-Leste's State-building, while others claim the UN did not take a strong enough role. With the current situation in Iraq, what can we learn about quelling ethnic conflicts used for political purposes? How can the UN bring stability to nascent States? What future role, if any, should international bodies and other Member States play in burgeoning independence? Should UNMIT continue to play a role as a peacekeeping force?

It is imperative to not only make recommendations about future intervention in Timor-Leste, but to analyze the effectiveness of UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMIT, and UNTOIL. In what areas should different actions have been taken? Should there be only one organization within a State with an evolving mandate instead of multiple organizations with different mandates? How does your State view the role of the UN in nation-building? What lessons can be applied to Iraq and Palestine as newly formed governments?

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*After the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the Russian Federation legally succeeded its place in the international community. With the approval of the other successor States, the Russian Federation also*

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<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>276</sup> Trouble Returns to East Timor, *supra* note 260.

<sup>277</sup> *Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste*. (2006, October 2). Geneva: United Nations. Retrieved October 17, 2006, from <http://www.ohchr.org//English.pdf>

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*

*replaced the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the Security Council. This paper provides a legal analysis of the various aspects related to this transmission.*

Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council. (n.d.). *Global Policy Forum*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.globalpolicy.org//.htm>

*The use of vetoes in the Security Council has varied significantly over time. While the Soviet Union was the most active veto power until 1965, the United States of America took over this place thereafter. This table provides a compact summary of the number of vetoes cast over time by the different members.*

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*The Gulf Crisis in 1991 is often regarded as one of the most important examples for military action by the international community in the 1990s. This article deals with the question if those actions should be considered as enforcement policy or "collective self-defense." Another section discusses if action by the Security Council can suspend the right of self-defense.*

Trevelyan, L. (2006, May 19). The Search for Annan's Successor. In *BBC News*. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk///\\_depth/.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk///_depth/.stm)  
*UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan finishes his second term at the end of 2006. The choice of the new Secretary-General was an important challenge for the Security Council. This article presents the most promising candidates at the time the article was published, including Ban Ki Moon, who was later named to succeed Kofi Annan as the new UN Secretary-General.*

The UN Millennium Development Goals. (2005). *United Nations*. Retrieved August 19, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/s/>  
*The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/and providing universal primary education. The target date is 2015. This website provides further information, documentation, and news on the MDGs.*

Weiss, T.G. (2005, June 23). Security Council Reform: Problems and Prospects in September 2005. *UNA-USA Policy Brief*, (9). Retrieved July 12, 2006, from <http://www.unausa.org//.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=851597>  
*This policy brief outlines structural challenges to the Security Council. After an overview of the historical context, procedural and political obstacles (most notably veto power and membership questions) are examined. The articles then depicts the role of the only remaining super power and provides proposals for further evolution of the body.*

Welcome to the Website of the French Presidency of the Security Council. (2006, July). *French Presidency of the Security Council (July 2006)*. Retrieved July 12, 2006, from [http://www.franceonu.org/.php3?id\\_rubrique=552](http://www.franceonu.org/.php3?id_rubrique=552)





*annexes: Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 08/04/2004; Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur of 08/04/2004; Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the Deployment of Observers of 28/05/2004; Protocol on The Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur of 09/11/2004; Protocol on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur of 09/11/04; and the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur of 05/07/2005. There is also a list of abbreviations and a guide to implementation modalities and timelines.*

Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement. (20 June 2006). Africa Briefing No. 39. Nairobi/Brussels: *International Crisis Group*. Retrieved July 5, 2006, from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4179&l=1>  
*The International Crisis Group's policy briefing provides both high-level and technical breakdowns of the history of the Darfur conflict and of the DPA itself. The briefing is essential reading for gaining a broader understanding of the specific clauses and details of the DPA from an NGO's perspective. The document includes a map of the region, a chronological listing of events, and special sections on power sharing, regional security, and transition from active conflict to a situation wholly manageable by a UN peacekeeping force.*

Economic and Social Council (2005, March 4) *Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the World*. (E/CN.4/2005/NGO/173). New York: Author.  
*In a statement provided to the Economic and Social Council, the International Federation for Human Rights and the Sudan Organization against Torture urges the UN Commission on Human Rights to develop and adopt a resolution on the worsening human rights situation in Darfur, citing the numerous human rights violations in the region and the participation of rebel groups and the Sudanese governments inability to stop the violence. They express their disappointment with the rebel groups' withdrawal from negotiations and ask for UN peacekeeping troops in the region. In this document, the government of Sudan is urged to bring forth all those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.*

Evelyn, L. (2006, September 13). UN Says Southern Sudan Peace Agreement in Trouble. *Washington Post*. Retrieved September 13, 2006, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/dyn/////html>  
*There is currently a UN mandate of nearly 10,000 troops in the southern region of Sudan maintaining a peace agreement to end the civil war. This article outlines the United Nations' involvement in that peace agreement. It also discusses the status and various violations of the agreement, as well as its implications on the conflict in Darfur.*

Human Rights News: UN Rejects Sudan's Darfur Plan. (2006, August 18). *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved August 30, 2006, from <http://www.hrw.org/////htm>  
*Human Rights Watch calls for the UN to reject the plan proposed by the Sudanese government in Khartoum for the implantation of Sudanese troops in Darfur. They instead propose a peace keeping force comprised of UN troops to protect those persons currently in danger and those who face further persecution when the AU troops are removed. They claim an international force is the only acceptable solution.*

Janjaweed Militia's Leader Denies Stirring Darfur's Torment. (2006, June 14). *Sudan Tribune*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from [http://www.sudantribune.com/impr.php3?id\\_article=16190](http://www.sudantribune.com/impr.php3?id_article=16190)  
*Speaking with Musa Hilal, the Sudan Tribune interviews the man many hold responsible for the command of the Janjaweed militia. While Hilal denies command of the armed group, many in the international community are calling for him to be brought to justice. He denies the existence of a problem with violence in Darfur and claims no need for outside assistance.*

Juan, S. (2005). *The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the UN Security Council: Ensuring the Security of People* (J. P. Muldoon, J. F. Aviel, R. Reitano, & E. Sullivan, Eds., 2nd ed.). Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today. Colorado: Westview Press.  
*James P. Muldoon Jr., Joann Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan have edited a resource tackling international economic diplomacy, NGOs, and multilateral diplomacy. In this specific section, Somavia deals with the role of the Security Council in preventing and punishing those responsible for*

humanitarian disasters. He tackles issues such as the protection of humanitarian aid workers and making sanctions more humane and effective.

- McDoom, O. (2006, September 13). Sudan Bombing Civilians in Darfur- EU Envoy. *Reuters International*. Retrieved September 13, 2006, from [http://za.today.reuters.com//.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-09-13T064049Z\\_01\\_BAN324058\\_RTRIDST\\_0\\_OZATP-SUDAN-DARFUR-20060913.XML](http://za.today.reuters.com//.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-09-13T064049Z_01_BAN324058_RTRIDST_0_OZATP-SUDAN-DARFUR-20060913.XML)  
*With the Sudanese government in Khartoum restarting its bombing campaigns of the Darfur region, Reuters has been documenting the numerous human rights violations in the region. The newest campaign is supposedly aimed at removing the 'terrorist threat' posed by those groups that have not signed the DPA. As a result of these bombings, aid workers and civilians have continually been targets of violence and have lost their lives.*
- Sexual Violence in Sudan Camps Often Preventable, Insists UNFPA (2004, August 4). *United Nations Population Fund*. Retrieved on August 30, 2006, from <http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=485>  
*The UNFPA is seeking funds to treat women who have been sexually assaulted in displacement camps and asks for increased aid to ensure the security for all displaced persons. They discuss some of the problems in treating women who have been assaulted, giving reference to cultural taboos. Many women face stigmas in their community if they report the rape and would rather risk rape if captured than allow the men in the community to risk death upon capture.*
- SLA-Minawi Optimistic on Peace Deal Despite Setbacks. (2006, July 9). *Sudan Tribune*. Retrieved July 10, 2006, from [http://www.sudantribune.com/\\_impr.php3?id\\_article=16577](http://www.sudantribune.com/_impr.php3?id_article=16577)  
*The Sudan Tribune interviewed Mahout Hussein of the SLA and rebel group spokesman who was a member of a team sent to Khartoum to implement the May 5<sup>th</sup> peace agreement. He discusses the prospects for future peace and goals his group has in the future. He continues to down play the extent of the violence and stresses the need for the issue to be handled internally.*
- Sudan: Human Rights Concerns. (n.d.). *Amnesty International USA*. Retrieved August 29, 2006, from <http://www.amnestyusa.org//.do>  
*Amnesty International is devoted to improving human rights around the world. Their dedicated contributors campaign various governments and international bodies to illicit policy changes. This piece is documentation of human rights abuses in Sudan, citing relevant statistics and other information.*
- Sudan's Darfur Conflict. (2006, May 7). *BBC News*. Retrieved August 27, 2006, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk//.stm>  
*The British Broadcasting Group provides a question and answer session discussing the major highlights of the conflict in the Sudan. They address the role of the Sudanese government in the conflict and the safety of civilians. What is currently being done by the UN and the AU and actions taken by other States are noted. While this is a brief overview of the situation, it is a good starting place for those unfamiliar with the conflict.*
- UN Integrated Regional Networks (2006, August 24) *Sudan: Government Asks Security Council to Be Patient on Darfur* Retrieved August 29, 2006, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200608250011.html>  
*Having been written before the passing of a resolution calling for a UN peacekeeping force in the Sudan, this article addresses the possible outcomes of such a resolution. It contains an interview with Sudanese Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Omar Bashir Manis, on Sudanese policy in regard to UN troops within the border. The Sudanese government continues to insist they are capable of handling the situation without international assistance although evidence of increasing violence would implicate otherwise.*
- UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. (2006, August 29). *Sudan: Risk of Humanitarian Disaster in Darfur – UN Official* Retrieved on August 29, 2006 from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200608290384.html>  
*Jan Egeland, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations reported to the Security Council of the imminent humanitarian disaster in Darfur, unless immediate actions are taken. This document also discusses the humanitarian needs reported by the World Health Organization and the World Food Program. Written before the passing of a resolution*

*calling for UN troops in the region, it discusses the proposed draft resolution written by the United States and the United Kingdom.*

- United Nations. (1945) Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. San Francisco: Author  
*In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. Since then, a total of 191 States have ratified the Charter in order to join the United Nations. It is the fundamental tenet of the UN as it contains the mandate of the UN, including provisions defining the role of the Security Council and other bodies.*
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs. (2006, July 4). *Sudan: Violence Worsens in Darfur IDP Camps*. IRINnews.org Retrieved August 30, 2006, from <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=54373>  
*Documented incidents of violence in displacement camps are increasing, as reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs. A spokesperson for the AU discusses the possible effects the civilian police force will have on the Darfur population and problems in implementing such a force. Included are interviews with refugees in the camps and the daily struggles they experience.*
- United Nations Security Council (2005, January) *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to S/RES/1564*. Retrieved September 19, 2006, from [http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com\\_inq\\_darfur.pdf](http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf)  
*In compliance with Article VII of the Charter of the UN, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur calls upon the Security Council to establish an inquiry as to the human rights violations in the region. Its objectives were to investigate the allegations of human rights abuses and to determine whether genocide was occurring. The Commission's mandate also included identifying the perpetrators of violence, proposing ways in which to bring those found responsible to justice, and engaging in dialogue with the interested parties.*
- Wiesel, E. (1999, April 12). *The Perils of Indifference*. Speech presented at Millennium Lecture Series, White House.  
*Having famously proclaimed "Never Again" in reference to the world standing idle in the face of genocide, Elie Wiesel spoke at the White House in Washington D.C. regarding the danger of States not acting at the instances of ethnic violence. Throughout the 1990s Wiesel continued to bring to light atrocities committed during Nazi Germany as well as violence in Rwanda and Bosnia. His speeches continue to call international attention to ethnic violence around the world.*
- Additional Sources**
- Boutros Boutros-Ghali. (1992, June 17). *An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General*. A/47/277-S/241. Retrieved August 27, 2006, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>  
*The former UN Secretary-General's discussion of various ways of making and keeping peace (peace-building, peace-making, peace-keeping etc) has proven highly influential in many aspects of development theory and practice. It includes explanations of development under the ideals of collective security and expounds upon the processes and challenges involved in attaining and maintaining peace in the aftermath of conflict. This is critical background reading for anyone with an interest in peace and security issues as they relate to development.*
- Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2000). *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd ed.). Dilemmas in World Politics. Colorado: Westview Press.  
*Margaret Karns is a professor at the University of Dayton and Karen Mignst is a professor at the University of Kentucky. They both specialize in international institutions and the role of the UN. In the book The United Nations in the Post Cold War Era they discuss issues arising in the role of the UN in the modern world. Especially important is their discussion of the role of the Security Council.*
- Love, M. C. (2007). *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda* (3rd ed.). California: Thompson-Wadsworth.

*Love is an associate professor of politics at the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C., and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In her book she discusses the role of globalization, open economies, open technologies, and open societies on State sovereignty. Love addresses the question, as the world gets smaller, how can States address global issues while still respecting the sovereignty of their neighbors? Also included is the role of NGOs and Inter-Governmental Organizations in assisting in international dilemmas.*

Sudan: Darfur Needs a UN Peacekeeping Force that Can Provide Security for Civilians. (2006, August 17).

*Amnesty International. Retrieved August 29, 2006, from <http://news.amnesty.org/>*

*In this report, Amnesty International criticizes the UN as failing the people of Darfur. They claim the situation in Darfur is worsening and call upon the UN to act. This work discusses the role of the African Mission in Sudan, noting a lack of adequate resources to handle the worsening crisis. They also include interviews with refugees in displacement camps and note the conditions of safety within the camps.*

The Dying Darfur Peace Agreement. (2006, June 29). *ISN Security Watch. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from*

*<http://www.isn.ethz.ch///.cfm?ID=16305>*

*This document, put together by International Relations and Security Network, offers a compelling portrait of a region collapsing even further into conflict and chaos, despite the recent signing of the DPA. The report provides a brief recent history of the conflict and the DPA itself, and offers suggestions as to why the situation is unraveling so quickly. ISN Security Watch alleges that the Sudanese government may no longer have the control required to effectively disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed militias it created. Supported by eyewitness accounts, the authors assert that the AU is no match for the Janjaweed, and that, within the Darfur region, conflict is unlikely to end until the Janjaweed are neutralized. Implicitly, this will be when the UN Mission in Sudan gains a mandate to enter Darfur.*

United Nations. (2004, July 30). *Press Release SC/8160: Security Council Demands Sudan Disarm Militias in Darfur.*

*This UN Press Release is from the Security Council's 5015<sup>th</sup> meeting. It includes a synopsis of the issues discussed at the said meeting, and also includes the full text of Resolution 1556 (2004), which was adopted in this session by a vote of 13-0-2. Resolution 1556, sponsored by Chile, France, German, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States, calls on the Government of Sudan to fulfill all of the commitments it made in the 3 July Communiqué. The final operative clause of Resolution 1556 is to remain seized of the matter. The final section of the Press Release consists of a statement before the vote, an action, and statement(s) after the vote.*

United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Report August 2006 Darfur/Sudan. Retrieved August 29, 2006, from*

*[http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.1982457/k.164F/August\\_2006BRDarfurSudan.htm](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.1982457/k.164F/August_2006BRDarfurSudan.htm)*

*The Security Council outlines recent developments, key issues, and underlying dilemmas in the region of Sudan, as well as possible Security Council actions and impediments. They discuss possible actions, including freezing assets against those blocking the implementation of the peace agreement and imposing travel bans. In this document, the Council members are asked to consider sending troops into the region without consent of the Sudanese government.*

Uwazie, E. E. (Ed.). (2003). *Conflict Resolution and Peace Education in Africa.* Oxford: Lexington Books.

*This book examines post-conflict development in various African States. It focuses on individual country experiences, successes and failures and includes in its scope a wide range of UN and NGO actions in these States. This source is especially useful in terms of learning more about failed States. Given the date of publication, much of the book's topical content is now dated, but the thematic and technical content still recommend this source to any discussion on conflict and human rights in an African context.*

## **II. The Situation in Iran**



Ahmadinejad, M. (n.d.). News Headlines in Tue 11 April 2006. In *Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from <http://www.president.ir/eng/ahmadinejad/cronicnews/1385/01/22/index-e.htm>

*The president's site provides speeches made by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, providing his stance on the Iran nuclear issue. This particular list of speeches was made on the day that it was announced that Iran had joined the nations with nuclear power.*

Albright, D., & Hinderstein, C. (2004, November/December). Iran: Countdown to Showdown. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 60(6), 67-72.

*The goal of the bulletin is to educate citizens about global security issues, including the continuing dangers posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and the appropriate roles of nuclear technology. The article provides an overview of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with Iran up to the point of the article's publication. It outlines remaining safeguard issues, weaponization issues, a timetable, and further suggests solutions in dealing with Iran.*

Aqazadeh, G.-R. (2006, April 11). Nuclear Energy Facilitates Sustainable Development. *Islamic Republic News Agency*.

*This article outlines the Islamic Republic of Iran's goals in achieving domestic, civil power sources. It further explains how they plan on doing this through the development of their nuclear energy sector within light of the announcement that the nation has achieved the scientific and engineering know how to enrich the nuclear material to the required purities.*

Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.

*The United Nations Charter, signed in 1945, remains the crucial operating document of the institution. Chapter V discusses the duties and composition of the Security Council. Composed of fifteen members, including five permanent ones, it is charged with the duty of maintaining international peace. To do so, it may establish subsidiary bodies that focus better on its work. The United Nations Charter can be found at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.*

Einhorn, R.J. (2004, March). Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East. *Arms Control Today*, 34, 12-13.

*Einhorn presents a few different possible ideas as to why 2003 was a good year in terms of nonproliferation. In the article, he outlines why he believes that the nations of Libya and Iran took steps in heading down the road of nonproliferation and states why other groups believe so as well.*

Diplomats: New Traces of Highly Enriched Uranium Found in Iran. (2006, May 13). *USA Today*.

*The article discusses the discovery of newly found highly enriched uranium in Iran. The story further covers the ongoing efforts of the European powers and the United States of America (USA) in dealing with Iran. It also outlines the level of enrichment needed for nuclear weapons capability as opposed to the current level of enrichment that Iran has obtained.*

H.R. Rep. No. 109-RL32048, at 47 (2006).

*Kenneth Katzman is a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs. In his report, he outlines Iran's political history, including its current state of affairs. He also provides information on Iran's weapons capabilities, including its nuclear abilities. He concludes by including suggestions of action to be taken in dealing with Iran.*

H.R. Rep. No. 195-RS 21592, at 6 (2006).

*Sharon Squassoni is a specialist in issues related to national defense, foreign affairs, defense, and trade. In this report provided to the United States Congress, she outlines the history and progress of the nuclear situation in Iran. She discusses the various progresses of Iran's program and the steps taken by the international community to discourage Iran's nuclear ambitions.*

International Atomic Energy Agency. (1997, September). *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf#search=%22Model%2>

[0Protocol%20Additional%20to%20the%20Agreement\(s\)%20Between%20State\(s\)%20and%20the%20International%20Atomic%20Energy%20Agency%20for%20the%20Application%20of%20Safeguards.%20%22](#)

*This document is the model Additional Protocol designed for implementing safeguards agreements with the IAEA. This model was used to implement the Additional Protocols for Iran to remain cooperative with the goals of the agency. The document calls for greater efforts in implementing the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by providing further detailed information about a Member State's nuclear activities.*

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2003, September 12). *Resolution: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved July 11, 2006 from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf#search=%22iran%2C%20september%2012%2C%202003%2C%20october%2C%20natanz%22>  
*The IAEA resolution was drafted after the discovery of highly enriched uranium at two sites in Iran. The document requests that Iran halt its activities and to cooperate with the agency. As such, it sets deadlines for October 2003 for Iran to follow the requests of the agency as outlined within the resolution.*

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2004, November 26). *Communication Dated 26 November 2004 Received From the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom Concerning the Agreement Signed in Paris on 15 November 2004*. Retrieved July 13, 2006 from IAEA Database (IAEA Documents & Conventions GOV/2006/15).  
*This source is part of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by European nations with the aim to ease tensions with Iran. Delegates should familiarize themselves with this and similar documents in order to comprehend some of the arguments in the debate.*

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005, September 24). *Resolution: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf#search=%22GOV%2F2005%2F77%22>  
*The IAEA document urges Iran to take measures to better comply with its obligations as a member of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In doing so, Iran must provide better transparency and act in accordance to the Addition Protocol. It also requests that Iran maintains its commitment to the negotiations to continue the progress of work in dealing with the nuclear issue.*

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006, June 8). *Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf#search=%22Implementation%20of%20the%20NPT%20Safeguards%20Agreement%20in%20the%20Islamic%20Republic%20of%20Iran%2C%20june%208%2C%202006%22>  
*This is a report from the IAEA Board of Governors discussing the applications of safeguards within Iran. It was primarily drawn up after Iran had announced its intentions of continuing its activities relating to enrichment in its nuclear research. It provides information on the position of the IAEA and various actions taken on by the agency.*

Iran: Energy Overview. (2006, February 15). *BBC News*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4688984.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4688984.stm)  
*This BBC profile lists the different aspects of Iran's energy sector. It provides different points regarding each topic, such as oil revenues, nuclear energy, and renewable energy, and a brief overview of what the nation is doing in each area. It also includes international issues, such as the territorial claims in reference to the Caspian Sea.*

Iran's President - His Own Words. (2006, January 16). *BBC News*. Retrieved September 1, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4616336.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4616336.stm)  
*This BBC article provides a series of quotes from Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The quotes cover leading issues before the Iranian government, such as nuclear proliferation, Israel, human rights,*

*and many other issues. It provides a brief insight into the president's policies and where he aims to lead the country.*

- Iran Responds to UN Demands* [Radio broadcast]. (2006, August 22). Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio. "To the Point" is hosted by Warren Olney. It is a one-hour daily national program that focuses on the hot-button issues of the day, co-produced by KCRW and Public Radio International. The program includes four guests specializing in the field that present different views on the current situation in dealing with Iran.
- Jahanpour, F. (n.d.). Chronology of Iran's nuclear program. In *Global Security*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/programmes/globalsecurity/iranchronology.htm>  
*Dr. Farhang Jahanpour provides a detailed chronology of Iran's nuclear program from 1957 to August 2006, including Iran's final answer to the European Union regarding its package deal. The chronology includes Iran's activities pre, post revolution, and reveals a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Iran's nuclear program. The timeline also provides a simplified breakdown of Iran's relationship with the IAEA and the SC within the past two years.*
- Jahanpour, F. (2006, July). Iran's nuclear threat: Exploring the politics. *Oxford Research Group*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/IransNuclearThreat.htm>  
*In the third of a series of occasional Oxford research group briefing papers from key international commentators and experts, Farhang Jahanpour explores the rhetoric of aggression developing between Iran and the USA and Israel, and asks if war is really inevitable. He provides various solutions to the problem and emphasizes the need for a diplomatic approach in dealing with Iran as opposed to military action.*
- Joyner, D. (2006, March 1). The Iran Nuclear Standoff: Legal Issues. Message posted to <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03/iran-nuclear-standoff-legal-issues.php>  
*Daniel Joyner is a lecturer in law at the University of Warwick School of Law in the United Kingdom. His research focuses in the area of proliferation studies. In this piece, he presents the Iranian situation from the perspective of international law and the binding United Nations (UN) documents.*
- Krieger, D. (2006, February). Iran, International Law and Nuclear Disarmament. In *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from [http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2006/02/00\\_krieger\\_iran-law-disarmament.htm](http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2006/02/00_krieger_iran-law-disarmament.htm)  
*David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and is the author of many studies of peace in the nuclear age, including Nuclear Weapons and the World Court. Krieger provides analysis of various synopsis of what action Iran would take in various circumstances, such as dealing with UN sanctions. The author also provides suggestions in engaging Iran in constructive dialogue.*
- Khoshroo, G.A. (2003, April 29). *Statement*. Statement presented at Second Session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review, Geneva.  
*The second session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held from April 28 to May 9, 2003 in Geneva. Issues discussed included North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, concerns over Iranian noncompliance, security assurances, export controls, and strengthened physical protection of nuclear material.*
- Mahmoud, A. (2005, September 17). *Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Before the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. Address presented at United Nations Sixtieth Session, New York  
*President Ahmadinejad outlines Iran's policies and views toward nuclear proliferation while outlining the country's goals in aspiring to become a nuclear power. He touches upon issues relating to double standards in the international world, threats Iran faces, and other concerns he feels are being overlooked by the international community. The speech provides excellent insight on what Iran's position is regarding its nuclear program.*

- Murphy, Francois. (2004, February 25). U.N. Watchdog Accuses Iran of Unanswered Questions. *Reuters*. *The article covers Iran's announcement that it intends to begin its nuclear enrichment program. It covers the IAEA's reaction to the news and suggested actions to be taken by the agency. It also addresses the issue of unexplained uranium found at various sites within Iran.*
- News Update on IAEA & Iran. Chronology of Key Events (January – June 2006). (2006, June). *International Atomic Energy Agency*. Retrieved September 10, 2006, from [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran\\_timeline3.shtml](http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline3.shtml)  
*On this website, the IAEA publishes a chronology of key events regarding its action in Iran in the year 2006 (currently up to August 2006). Every important event is depicted shortly and linked to press releases, statements, reports or other additional documentation. This also provides the various positions and actions taken by the IAEA.*
- Nuclear Report on Iran: Excerpts. (2006, April 29). *BBC News*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4956882.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4956882.stm)  
*The head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, issued a report regarding Iran's nuclear program to the United Nations Security Council on Friday, 28 April, 2006. This report has not been published, but the BBC website provides some excerpts, including the conclusion that now, the agency cannot make a judgment about, or reach a conclusion on, future compliance or intentions.*
- Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to United Nations in New York. (2005, November 18). An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight About Iran's Nuclear Program [advertisement]. *New York Times*.  
*The Iranian government took out an ad in the New York Times to express their stance on nuclear proliferation and the right to nuclear power for the use of energy. The article answer's many question on the Islamic Republic's position on various issues, including acquiring nuclear technology for the purpose of security versus its use for economic independence by gaining control of its own energy supply.*
- Phillips, J., Hulsman, J.C., & Carafano, J.J. (2005, December 14). Countering Iran's Nuclear Challenge. *Backgrounder*, 1903, 1-8. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/Iraq/bg1903.cfm>  
*The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of, amongst others, traditional American values, and a strong national defense. The article outlines actions taken by the international community up to the point of this article's publication. The spirit of the article, however, gears more towards recommendations for U.S. action regarding Iran's nuclear program.*
- Reed, A. (2006, August 21). UN Resolution 1696 Moots Iranian Legal Claims. In *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved August 23, 2006, from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18636>  
*This article discusses UN Security Council resolution 1696. It reflects on some of the viewpoints of the Islamic Republic of Iran and briefly touches on the legal obligations created by 1696 as opposed to the rights of the NPT. The source also provides a link to resolution 1696.*
- Rogers, P. (2006, February). Iran: Consequences of a War. *Oxford Research Group*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/IranConsequences.htm>  
*This paper examines the consequences of military attacks in the Middle East related to the Iranian nuclear program. It concludes that a military operation against Iran would not be a short-term matter but would set in motion a complex and long-lasting confrontation. It follows that military action should be firmly ruled out and alternative strategies developed.*
- Sahimi, M. (2003, October 3). Iran's Nuclear Program. Part II: Are Nuclear Reactors Necessary? *Peyvand*. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1022.html>  
*Mohammad Sahimi is professor and chairperson of chemical and petroleum engineering at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. In this three-part coverage, Sahimi discusses the history and*

*current situation of Iran's nuclear activities. The last of the three articles address whether or not Iran truly needs nuclear energy and if its intentions are truly genuine.*

Shuster, M. (2006). Iran Enriches Uranium, Plans New Expansion In *All Things Considered*. Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio.

*The news coverage discusses Iran's announcement that it has enriched uranium, announcing that it has joined the group of countries possessing nuclear technology. The report also provides reactions from the USA, European powers, the IAEA, and the United Nations.*

Spector, L. S. (1990). *Nuclear Ambitions: Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. Colorado: Westview Press.

*Mr. Leonard S. Spector is Deputy Director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and leads the Center's Washington D.C. Office. Spector assess the increasing threat of nuclear conflict in the Third World and analyses key long-term trends. This includes the growing impact of chemical weapons and ballistic missile proliferation on the strategic balance in the Middle East.*

Timeline: Iran. (2006, May 3). *BBC News*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/806268.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/806268.stm)

*This website provides a compact timeline of key events in Iran from 1907 onwards. Most recently, the focus lies on the conservative resurgence and, most notably, the nuclear crisis. The chronology proved a quick overview of Iran's history with the West, particularly the United States of America and provides a better understanding of the current nuclear standstill.*

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, June 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.

*The treaty is a landmark document that was meant to halt the advance of nuclear power throughout the world. Under the treaty, however, signatories are permitted to engage in nuclear activity for energy and peaceful uses. It is on this basis that Iran insists that its activities are legal and therefore a right as a member of the treaty. The NPT can be found at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcirc/Infcirc140.pdf>*

United Nations. General Assembly First Committee. 59th General Assembly. (2004, November 10). *Middle East Nuclear Proliferation Highlighted, as Disarmament Committee Continues General Debate*. Retrieved July 10, 2006 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/gadis3276.doc.htm>

*The press release outlines the general debate regarding nuclear proliferation in the Middle East by the General Assembly (GA) First Committee. The arguments center on Israel, Iran, and the lack of cooperation by either country. There are also excerpts from various members of the GA that aid in understanding the split in arguments regarding the issue of nuclear proliferation.*

United Nations. Security Council. 5500<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (2006, July 31). *Resolution 1696: Non-Proliferation*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/69928.pdf#search=%22resolution%201696%2C%20un%20security%20council%22>

*The resolution passed by the Security Council demands that Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development. The resolution gives Iran one month to adhere to the demands of the document or face the possibility of economic and diplomatic sanctions.*

United Nations. Security Council. 5500<sup>th</sup> Meeting. (2006, July 31). *Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm>

*The press release outlines the UN's disappointment with Iran in continuing to defy its commitment to international negotiations. It provides a draft of draft resolution S/2006/589, which demands that Iran halt its enrichment activity. It also provides statements by various Member State representatives on the issue.*

United Nations. Security Council. 5403<sup>rd</sup> Meeting. (2006, March 29). *Security Council, in Presidential Statement Underlines Importance of Iran's Re-Establishing Full, Sustained Suspension of Uranium-Enrichment Activities*. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm>



*This press release provides the full text of the presidential statement issued in March 2006. It calls upon Iran to adhere to previous UN and IAEA resolutions regarding its enrichment activities. It further encourages the IAEA to continue with its work on Iran in preventing it from achieving nuclear technology for the purpose of nuclear weaponry.*

### **Additional Sources**

Ahmadinejad, M. (2006, May 9). *Full Text Letter of Islamic Republic of Iran President to American President*. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.president.ir/eng/ahmadinejad/cronicnews/1385/02/19/index-e.htm#b3>  
*The English version of the famous letter of the Iranian President Ahmadinejad to U.S. President Bush; published in May 2006. In this rather wide-ranging letter, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at times challenges and concedes as he directs question after question to Bush.*

Iran's Nuclear Program. (2005, January). *The American Journal of International Law*, 99, 270-271.  
*This is an article regarding legal aspects of Iran's nuclear program. It describes guidelines and safeguards laid down by the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and briefly discuss the position of the IAEA.*

Iran Press Service. (n.d.). Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.iran-press-service.com/>  
*The Iran Press Service is a fully independent and private news gathering and disseminating service based in Paris, France. It claims to be the oldest post-revolution English language Iranian publication outside Iran. Press articles regarding different political topics can be retrieved from this site. Older articles can be found in the archive.*

Online Library on Human Rights in Iran. (2006). Amnesty International. Retrieved July 7, 2006, from <http://www.amnesty.org/results/is/eng>  
*This website provides an online documentation archive of articles regarding human rights issues in Iran. Information is divided into news, reports, and urgent actions. This is a good source in that it provides non-biased reporting on Iran's human rights conditions, which outline some of the concerns behind Iran having nuclear weapons capabilities.*

### **III. Timor Leste: Post-Withdrawal Analysis**

Brief History of Timor-Leste: A History. (n.d.). *Timor-Leste.gov*. Retrieved October 12, 2006, from The Official Web Gateway to the Government of Timor-Leste Web site: <http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl//.htm>  
*This is the official web site of the Timorese government. This particular page provides information regarding the history of East Timor and its struggles for independence. Also included is facts about Portuguese and Indonesian occupation. Other information can be found about the government and culture from various links found on this web page.*

CIAFactbook. (n.d.). *East Timor*. Retrieved on October 12, 2006 from <https://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/tt.html>  
*The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the foremost collectors of demographic information, which it publishes in the CIA Factbook. Statistics including State population, economic statistics, social demographic information, and other relevant facts are included. Information on East Timor's government, military and population are some of the pertinent information used for the completion of this background guide.*

East Timor - UNMISET Background. (n.d.). *United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor*. Retrieved October 24, 2006, from United Nations Web site: <http://www.un.org/////html>  
*The UN gives detailed information on all of the various interventions in East Timor since 1960, when it placed Timor-Leste on its lists of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Various links include the UNMISET mandate, budgetary information, and other relevant UN documents. All appropriate Security Council Resolutions are discussed and their role in the peacekeeping.*

East Timor - UNTAET Background. (n.d.). *United Nations*. Retrieved October 20, 2006, from <http://www.un.org//.htm>

*UNTAET was mandated in S//follow UNAMET and precede UNMISSET. This document gives background information on the creation of this organization and its implications. Background information on the transition to independence is provided, as well as a link to the UNAMET website.*

*Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste*. (2006, October 2). Geneva: United Nations. Retrieved October 17, 2006, from <http://www.ohchr.org//English.pdf>

*Established under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, this report establishes incidents that took place in April and May of 2006. These are activities that contributed to the current crisis and breakdown of the military and political system. The Report also establishes responsibility for specific actions, and makes recommendations for future actions.*

Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis: Executive Summary and Recommendations. (2006, October 10). *International Crisis Group*. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from <http://www.crisisgroup.org//.cfm?id=4438&l=1>

*The International Crisis Group is an international non-profit organization working with a field research approach. They work with governments, other NGOs, and IGOs to provide policy recommendations. This document is the group's recommendations to the Timorese government, the UN Secretary General, and UNMIT regarding the impoverished country's current condition.*

Tanter, R. (2006, June 9). Ten Questions About East Timor for Which We Need Answers. *Znet*. Retrieved October 27, 2006, from The Nautilus Institute Web site: <http://www.zmag.org//.cfm?ItemID=10391>

*Tanter takes information from Human Rights Watch and the 2006 Human Development Report for Timor Leste from the United Nations Development Program and sets out to ask and answer ten pertinent questions about the conflict in Timor-Leste. These questions are more in depth than basic factual inquiries and deliver interesting analysis of the situation. His endnotes provide a variety of news sources regarding East Timor.*

The Quotations Page. (n.d.). *Quotation #35500 from Classic Quotes*. Retrieved October 24, 2006, from <http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/35500.html>

*Aleister Crowley was a turn-of-the-century English occultist. His writings offer a distinct approach to politics and religion, among other topics. This Web site provides a detailed history of Aleister Crowley as well as other quotations of his and many other quotations, which are sorted by topic.*

Trouble Returns to East Timor. (2006, June 29). *Power and Interest News Report*. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from [http://www.pinr.com/.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=519&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/.php?ac=view_report&report_id=519&language_id=1)

*The President of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, praised the economic and structural stability of East Timor weeks before the country nearly imploded. This article discusses the internal conflicts plaguing the State and the political divides in the government. International opinions and reactions are included, concluding with an assertion of future UN actions.*

### **Additional Sources**

Dee, Moreen & Smith, Michale G. (2003). *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers

*While slightly outdated, this book provides a more in depth analysis of the conflict and the events leading up to it. The authors specifically address the UN's intervention in the crisis and UNTAET's mandate. The book concludes with a thought provoking chapter on future lessons learned, not just for Timor-Leste, but for all future peacekeeping endeavors.*

Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2000). *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd ed.). Dilemmas in World Politics. Colorado: Westview Press.

*Margaret Karns is a professor at the University of Dayton and Karen Mignst is a professor at the University of Kentucky. They both specialize in international institutions and the role of the UN. In the book *The United Nations in the Post Cold War Era* they discuss issues arising in the role of the UN in the modern world. Especially important is their discussion of the role of the Security Council.*

Moore, John Allphin & Pubantz, Jerry (2006). *The New United Nations: International Organization in the Twenty-First Century*. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.

*Moore writes of the birth and development of the United Nations. While some of the information may be rudimentary for informed delegates, it is interesting to note the differences in ideology from when the UN was first established to today. Moore also includes the role of the UN in peacekeeping and nation-building.*

Paris, Roland (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

*This is an excellent source for anyone interested in international efforts at resolving intra-state conflicts. While East Timor is discussed, Paris also touches on lessons learned from Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Nicaragua, among others. Peacebuilding is very relevant to today's political climate and many of Paris' viewpoints can be applied to Iraq and Palestine today.*



# Supplemental Conference Information

## Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2007 NMUN Conference

Position papers are submitted for each committee in which a State/NGO participates at the NMUN Conference. Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's foreign policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State/NGO should be identified and addressed. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim recreation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the committee background guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

An important component of the awards consideration process is the format of the position papers. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the background guides
- Length must **not** exceed one double-sided page (two single-sided pages is **not** acceptable)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. A file of the position paper (.doc, .pdf or .rtf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the appropriate committee email address for the appropriate venue in which you are participating. Each address is also listed in individual background guides, which will be posted by November 15, 2006. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should send one set of all position papers to: *positionpapers@nmun.org*. This set (held by the Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. *NOTE: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.*

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **February 22, 2007**. *E-mailed files should be in Microsoft Word (.doc), Rich Text (.rtf), or Adobe (.pdf) formats.*

### PLEASE NOTE IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF THE E-MAIL/DOCUMENT THE NAME OF THE COUNTRY & COMMITTEE.

*A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check by March 1, 2007. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact **Jacob Schanzenbach**, Director-General, Sheraton venue or **Tracy Kingsley**, Director-General, Marriott venue at [dirgen@nmun.org](mailto:dirgen@nmun.org).*

Additionally, each delegation should submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 1,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

## **Sample Position Paper**

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a maximum of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards. Visit the download section at [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) to find an example of an award-winning position paper. When using these sources, please be mindful of the NMUN policy against plagiarism.

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**Delegation from** (*Insert Member State/NGO Name*)

**Represented by** (*Insert Delegation Name Here*)

### ***Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary***

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Racism and Racial Discrimination, and A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The State of Tranquility a proud member of the Regional Alliance of Peaceful Countries and a fully supports other regional groups in their efforts to coordinated a regional plan for sustained and sustainable development. In that regard, the State of Tranquility recognizes the necessity of ensuring the full realization of the Right to Development as declared in the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Final Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development. Tranquility fully supports the implementation of national development plans with the cooperation of regional organizations, the United Nations, and the international community. Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing the underlying factors.

#### **I. The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa**

The State of Tranquility believes that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic security lend themselves to the pacific settlement of disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. The lack of development in the region constitutes the root cause of political instability and conflict. The report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Recommendations*, if implemented, could enhance the work of the Organization in its efforts to bring about sustainable development in Africa. Tranquility also believes that the use of preventive development in Africa could ensure that conflicts such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be avoided before they erupt. While obstacles to be overcome are many, international support for effective national programs to ensure the relief to rehabilitation to development continuum through post-conflict peace-building, can enable Sub-Saharan Africa and the entire developing world to achieve the sustainable development which alone will guarantee regional peace and stability. The State of Tranquility fully supports the increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in all aspects of dispute settlement and peace-keeping. Increased support for such regional efforts, when combined with measures to eliminate the root causes of regional conflict, serves to further enhance the prospects for lasting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the entire international community.

#### **II. Racism and Racial Discrimination**

The State of Tranquility believes that the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance offers the global community an opportunity to establish an updated plan of action to completely eradicate racism and racial discrimination throughout the world. The necessity for all Member States to sign, accede to and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is

an integral part of this plan, as policies and practices based on racism and racial discrimination remain devastating to regional social, economic and infrastructure development. Tranquility encourage all States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to provide assistance to those affected by such practices. The lack of financial resources that prevented the international community from realizing its objectives in the three previous United Nations Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination must not continue to hinder the international community in guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all peoples.

### **III. A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**

The State of Tranquility remains firmly committed in support of the continued role of the United Nations Security Council as the primary agent for the maintenance of international peace and security, as mandated under Chapters IV and V of the UN Charter. We strongly recommend the authorization, determination, composition and financing of peacekeeping operations should be determined by the Council, as authorized by Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Charter and in conjunction with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the State of Tranquility endorses the current role of the Secretary-General as administrator of the Operations established by the Council. The State of Tranquility remains a central contributor for both financial and logistical support of the United Nations Peacekeeping forces and will continue to contribute to the United Nations Peacekeeping Budget throughout the duration of the current year. The State of Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing all threats to international peace and security through regional arrangements and multilateral forums. The international community must address the underlying causes of these conflicts and the destabilizing effects of such conflicts on entire regions. Tranquility is convinced that increased utilization of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms can enhance the ability of peacekeeping missions to take into account historical, social, and cultural values and traditions within areas of conflict. As operation costs continue to escalate, however, our nation strongly urges all Member States and the Secretary-General to devote greater attention to the monetary and management aspects of peacekeeping operations and provide serious consideration for the establishment of operation termination dates. The State of Tranquility further supports the proposal endorsed within A/Res/44/49, calling for Member States to develop and maintain an inventory of supplies and equipment to be made available for Operations on short-notice. In addition, the State of Tranquility calls upon Member States to recognize the need to maintain voluntary contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to reduce the continuing problems incurred by funding deficits.

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## **Resolution Writing and Report Writing at the NMUN Conference**

Please refer to the Delegate Preparation Manual available at [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) for a detailed instruction on resolution and report writing.

The substantive work of committees at the NMUN conference generally takes the form of either resolutions or reports. At the 2007 NMUN Conference, the ICTY will adopt a variation on these forms. The ICTY will create judgments. Please refer to the chart below which designates whether delegates will be writing resolutions or reports in the committee they are participating in at the 2007 NMUN Conference:

#### ***Resolution Writing Committees***

- GA Plenary, GA 4<sup>th</sup>, CD, SC
- CCPCJ, ECOSOC Plenary, CND
- ADB, ARF, CoE, OAS
- WFP, WHO

#### ***Report (or variation thereof) Writing Committees***

- CEIRPP
- ICTY, IHP, UNWTO
- ECLAC, ESCWA, OPEC-IEA

## ***Resolutions***

A resolution is the most appropriate means of applying political pressure on Member States, expressing an opinion on an important issue, or recommending action to be taken by the United Nations or some other agency. Most UN resolutions are not binding “law”; the only body which may produce resolutions that are binding upon the Member States of the United Nations is the Security Council. Under UN rules of procedure, unlike other more generalized rules of procedure, the topic on the floor is debated in its entirety. This means that during debate, delegates should discuss the whole issue and all of the resolutions regarding that issue. When debate is exhausted, or is ended, the body then votes on each resolution and amendment and the issue are considered closed. The National Model United Nations does not allow pre-written resolutions on any agenda topic. The NMUN process of writing resolutions during committee sessions is designed to teach delegates the concepts of negotiation and concession; pre-written resolutions hinder that learning process.

The goal of formal debate and caucusing is to persuade enough countries in the committee to support a particular solution to the topic under discussion. Resolutions formally state the agreed-upon solution by outlining the relevant precedents and describing the proposed actions. The committee is not limited to one resolution per topic; often the committee will pass multiple resolutions dealing with different aspects of a topic.

Please reference the Delegate Preparation Manual available at <http://www.nmun.org> for an example of the style used at NMUN, as well as other helpful information necessary to draft appropriately a resolution.

## ***Report Writing***

Some committees at the conference will draft reports during the course of negotiations, instead of resolutions. These reports represent the full work of the committee in question. These reports should not be confused with the summary reports of a committee’s work which are presented at the Saturday Plenary Sessions of either the General Assembly or ECOSOC. Directors of report writing committees will elaborate on the process used in reporting writing committees on opening night. Prior to the NMUN Conference in March 2007, a handout with a lengthier sample report for delegates, to use as a model will be posted on the NMUN Conference website at [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org).

Reports are similar in nature to resolutions, with only a few key differences. Reports represent the formal recommendation and/or decision of the committee on the agenda topics at hand, in the same manner as resolutions, but in the form of one document. Committees that write resolutions typically produce a number of draft resolutions for each topic, and each one is subject to a substantive vote by the body. In a similar manner, committees that write reports produce several draft report segments and then vote on each one. The final report of these committees will combine the adopted draft reports into one comprehensive report at the end of the simulation.

Another key difference is the format of reports. While resolutions consist of one long sentence, reports are a series of complete sentences. Thus, where the clauses of a resolution each contain one whole concept, a report is composed of paragraphs, each constituted by a sentence or a few sentences which contain one whole concept.

Please also reference the Delegate Preparation Manual available at <http://www.nmun.org> for an example of the style used at NMUN, as well as other helpful information necessary to draft appropriately a report.

## **What to Expect at the Simulation of Your Committee**

**Opening session:** After a brief introduction of the dais and some announcements, delegates will discuss the order in which the committee will address agenda topics while in formal and caucus sessions. The committee will then vote on a motion from the floor to set the agenda in a proposed order, and will continue to vote on such motions until one passes by a majority vote. If the committee fails to reach agreement on the agenda order by the conclusion of the first evening, the director and assistant director reserve the right to set the agenda. After the agenda has been set, the chair will entertain motions for the opening of the speakers’ list to address the first agenda topic.

*It should be noted due to the special procedures used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY] a variation of this process will be used. Delegates participating in the ICTY should carefully follow the delegate preparation manual for the ICTY, the various sections of the Background Guide of the ICTY, and refer to the ICTY portion of the NMUN website for a separate copy for perpetration.*

### ***Rules of Procedure***

The simulation is conducted through the use of the committee rules of procedure, which are included in this background guide. The rules of procedure for this committee, located in the middle of this background guide, are the rules of procedure that are only accepted during the simulation of this committee. Interpretation of these rules is left to the sole discretion of the Directors-General or her/his designate. It is extremely important to develop a thorough working knowledge of the rules, including when they should be introduced, and in what capacity. The rules of procedure are enforced to facilitate the efficient workings of the committee, not to hinder them. Therefore, the Director, Assistant Director and chair (with the approval of the Director) reserve the right to rule motions out of order which may be considered dilatory or disruptive to the committee proceedings. In this respect, one of the quickest ways for a delegate to alienate him/herself within a committee is to be labeled as someone who attempts to disrupt committee proceedings with the introduction of redundant, inappropriate, or time-consuming motions.

### ***Decorum***

Decorum is a *de facto* rule throughout the week of the simulation. In both large and small committees, the ability to conduct normal business while in formal session is an arduous task when decorum is not maintained. Delegates will be asked for their assistance in this endeavor. Please see the Delegate Preparation Manual for a specific discussion of delegate decorum in committee and also, delegate behavior while at the Conference.

### ***Caucusing***

Caucusing is an important and logistically difficult component of the United Nations simulation. These informal meetings between voting blocs, as well as between States with positions that are diametrically opposed, often produce compromises acceptable to all parties. However, delegates are required to address issues within a week's time which, in many cases, the international community has failed resolve after years of debate and negotiation.

As a result, the bulk of informal negotiation and the construction of working papers will occur within, or in the close proximity of, the committee chambers. In consideration for the other Conference participants, delegates are asked to respect the formal proceedings occurring both within and between all committees participating at the Conference. Finally, given the importance of decorum within committee chambers, all caucusing should occur outside of the committee chambers while committee is in session.

### ***Chairs and Rapporteurs***

Delegates should also take note that the Director and Assistant Director (with the approval of the Directors-General) will select a committee chair and rapporteur (committee administrative assistant) following the conclusion of interviews on the first evening of the Conference. For those interested in the opportunity to serve the committee as a chairperson or rapporteur, an application will be available online at [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) after January 1, 2007. The application should be completed and submitted to the Director no later than the opening night of the Conference. The successful candidate for chair will demonstrate an excellent working knowledge of the rules of procedure through a series of situations presented to her or him and exhibit qualities of leadership, patience and humility. The rapporteur will assist the chair, the Director and the Assistant Director with the abundance of paperwork and record keeping required in the efficient workings of the committee, as well as provide logistical support for the chair while in voting procedures. Multiple years of attendance at the NMUN Conference is preferred in candidates for the committee chair and rapporteur, but it is not the only defining characteristic used by the Directors and Assistant Directors to select chairs and rapporteur for committees.

Delegates selected to serve in these positions must forfeit their rights to participate in substantive debate within the committee. Although the chair and rapporteur continue to serve as representatives of their assigned State, their primary duty is to assist the director and assistant director in facilitating the professional operation of the committee.

Additionally, delegates selected as committee chairs and rapporteurs do retain an equal eligibility for awards consideration. All delegates are encouraged to apply for these challenging and rewarding positions. Many individuals who serve as chairs and rapporteurs have in later years served as members of the NMUN Volunteer Staff.

### ***Attire***

In keeping with the spirit of the simulation, delegates are *required* to wear professional business attire. Further, national symbols of any kind are forbidden in committee chambers, in accordance with practices of the UN. Symbols associated specifically with the United Nations (e.g., the seal of the UN) are allowed in committee chambers.

## **Your Role as a Delegate at the 2007 NMUN Conference**

### ***Taking on the Role of a Diplomat***

The most important aspect of participating as a delegate to the NMUN is your assumption of the role of a foreign diplomat. In this role, you are acting as a representative of the government and the peoples of the Member State or NGO to which you have been assigned. The only exception is those delegates who are serving as justices on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In their capacities, those delegates serving as justices are serving as independent technical experts. While in preparation for and throughout the duration of the Conference, you may find personal disagreement with the foreign policy of the country you are representing or with the policy of the NGO you are representing. Your personal opinions are entirely inapplicable during the course of the simulation. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance for all delegates to arrive well-versed in the dynamics of their State's foreign policy or in that of their NGO, and anticipate possible obstacles their State or NGO may encounter during the simulation. The simulation's quality depends on the collective preparation of its participants.

As a delegate, you should be able to demonstrate thorough knowledge of your assigned country's policies, specific issues to be discussed, and the procedures, activities, and history of your committee. Delegates should also exhibit the ability to negotiate and compromise, demonstrate leadership, and the ability to influence by gaining the professional respect of fellow delegates. States and NGOs maintain specific and adaptive foreign policy methods and goals to allow delegates to function in the negotiation process. As a representative of the NGO or State to which you have been assigned, you will be expected to work within the historical confines of your NGO or country's foreign policy at the UN. Even though many Member States and Observer States do not assume strong leadership roles in the UN, the reality of the NMUN is that each delegation will be judged on its ability to provide leadership to other delegates throughout the Conference.

Delegates are reminded that professional diplomats conduct themselves, and regard one another, with the utmost dignity and respect, regardless of foreign policy affiliation or personal feelings. Even States and NGOs who observe severely conflicting ideological perspectives will work closely together within the UN on diplomatic matters of mutual concern. Likewise many delegates are forced to work together despite personal conflicts.

### ***The Preparation and Introduction of Resolutions and Reports***

Resolutions and reports adopted within respective committees represent Member States' decisions and recommended courses of action with respect to the topics under discussion. Clauses within the preamble of resolutions should provide a brief outline of historical and current perspectives and endeavors regarding the issues to be addressed within the operative clauses of the document. The operative clauses of resolutions provide the objectives and potential actions that Members designed to address the issues outlined within the preamble. More simply, the preamble states the problems before the committee in relation to the topic under deliberation and operative clauses outline the decisions of the committee for the solution of these problems.

Although delegates are encouraged to develop resolution and report writing skills, both in classroom scenarios and at regional MUN simulations, the NMUN will not accept any pre-written resolutions or reports, and which have not been developed by a plurality of the committee. This determination is at the sole discretion of the Secretariat. Due to the goal of creating an environment where the skill of compromise and conflict resolution skills can be learned,

delegates may be asked to merge working documents with other individuals working on the same issue in a committee. In addition, *any delegates found to be submitting plagiarized material within resolutions will be subject to dismissal from further participation within the Conference*. Although UN documents are within the public domain, the verbatim exploitation of these documents *will not be permitted* at the Conference.

Resolutions and reports are developed in three stages. In the initial stage, a resolution or report is referred to as a working paper (in resolution writing committees) or a working draft report segment (in report writing committees). It is generally developed by States or experts that share common perspectives on the issues to be addressed. The working paper/working draft report segment is shared with other delegates in the committee for their input and support. Once the working paper/working draft report segment gathers the required signatories, it is to be submitted to the committee director for approval. On the approval of the Director, the working paper/working draft report segment will be copied by Conference Services and introduced by the chair to the committee as a draft resolution or report.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been approved by the committee Director, it will be copied by a member of the dais. Delegates in the committee are not required to copy approved working paper/working draft report. Yet, a working paper/working draft report which has not been approved by the committee Director will not be copied by the dais. It is the responsibility of the delegates to copy their own working paper/working draft report if they choose to share copies of the document which has not been submitted for approval. Any questions concerning this issue should be directed to the committee director or the assistant director. Also, questions concerning this rule can be directed to members of the NMUN Conference Service Staff.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been introduced as a draft resolution or draft report segment, it becomes the property of the committee and all references to sponsorship, with the exception of identifying the status of amendments while in voting procedure, are formally removed. The central contributors to the contents of the draft resolution or report will continue to enlist the advice and support of as many States or experts as possible to expand upon the substance of the draft and, thereby, gain as much input and support as possible prior to the closure of debate. Once the committee moves to closure on a given topic, all draft resolutions and draft report segment will be voted upon and when adopted, it will thereafter be recognized as formal resolutions or reports. Adopted resolutions and reports represent recommendations for States and the international community.

It is highly recommended that delegates introduce their ideas to the committee in the form of working papers/working draft report segments as soon as possible in order to contribute to the potential development and adoption of resolutions and reports which characterize the united representative strength and will of regional blocs or, ultimately, the committee as a whole. Typically, a number of working papers/working draft segments before any committee will overlap in content, style, and substance. In this event, the Director will request delegates to integrate their individual endeavors into a single and, thus, more comprehensive and internationally representative document.

### ***The Executive Bureau, the General Committee and Plenary Sessions***

By the conclusion of the first night session, the Economic and Social Council Plenary will select four vice presidents to assist the president (chair) as members of the Council Executive Bureau. Likewise, the General Assembly will select 21 of its Members to the General Committee by the conclusion of the first evening meeting. The members of the Bureau and the General Committee are to be selected with regard for equitable geographic representation from: African States, Asian and Pacific States, Eastern European States, Latin American States and Western European and other States. The Bureau will meet on the evening prior to the Plenary session, following the conclusion of the regular session. The General Committee will be composed somewhat differently than the Bureau. It will be comprised of each committee chair from the General Assembly department. They will also meet at the end of regular sessions on the same evening.

The night before the Plenary session,, the Bureau and General Committee will be briefed by a representative from each relevant committee regarding the work accomplished by their body throughout the week. After reviewing the reports and resolutions submitted by the committee representatives, the Bureau and General Committee will set the agenda for the Plenary sessions to deliberate upon each committee's recommendations to the Plenary.

### ***ECOSOC Executive Bureau***



The ECOSOC Plenary Session will deliberate upon the work of all the committees within the ECOSOC Department, as well as other relevant bodies, including most of the specialized agencies. During the prior evening's meeting, the Bureau will set an agenda order for the review of these reports for deliberation and potential adoption during Plenary sessions. Additionally, the ECOSOC Plenary session will deliberate upon a fourth topic to be prepared and introduced by the Director and Assistant Director.

This topic will encompass a broad theme that relates, as much as is possible, to issues discussed by each of the committees within ECOSOC and the Specialized Agencies.

### ***GA General Committee***

The General Assembly Plenary will deliberate upon the work submitted by each of the committees in the GA and Security Council department, as well as relevant non-governmental organizations and other bodies. Following the conclusion of regular sessions on the last evening of session, the General Committee will set the agenda order for the review of these reports and resolutions and for their potential adoption during the Plenary sessions.

### ***Plenary Sessions***

On the final day of the Conference, the ECOSOC Plenary, General Assembly Plenary, and Security Council will convene at United Nations Headquarters. Plenary deliberations will encompass the work of all Conference committees. All delegates are advised to participate in these sessions in order to assist Plenary representatives with their broad scope of work. Minimally, Member State representatives to the Plenary should be briefed in regard to the work of the committees that report to their respective departments. Ideally, the representatives of the committee whose work is being considered will sit with Plenary representatives as expert advisors to the State. The agenda for these sessions will be made available to all delegates.

## **The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in the Simulation**

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are recognized in Article 71 of the *UN Charter* as consultative bodies in relationship to ECOSOC. These organizations also maintain a close working relationship with almost all ECOSOC funds and programs, Specialized Agencies, General Assembly committees, and regional organizations. In this role, NGOs are an invaluable resource to the UN system because they provide information on political, economic, social, humanitarian, and cultural developments in all parts of the world. Their recommendations may address potential solutions to global problems, speak to specific country or regional needs, or call attention to an emerging crisis. NGOs are a crucial link between policy-makers and the individuals directly affected by those policies. They represent civil society and its impact on the UN system. There are two primary advantages NGOs have over the UN in terms of information gathering and program implementation. First, NGOs are often locally based and have better knowledge of regional conditions, needs, and constraints. Second, NGOs may find it easier to gain the acceptance, trust and cooperation of the communities in which they work because they are more aware of the indigenous cultural climate than many intergovernmental organizations.

### ***NGOs at the National Model United Nations Conference***

Over the past several years, the NMUN has integrated the presence of NGOs into committees at the conference. This process improves the educational quality of the simulation and mirrors developments in the UN itself, where NGOs are gaining both visibility and respect as a resource for program design and implementation. A large number of delegates will take on the challenging task of representing NGO delegations this year.

NGO delegations maintain all of the privileges accorded to traditional country delegations, and are required to exhibit the same level of preparedness. NGO delegations are eligible for awards, based on the same criteria as country delegations, and may select head delegates to attend the Head Delegate Meetings. NGO representatives are also required to submit position papers reflecting the perspectives and priorities of their assigned NGO on the agenda topics at hand.

All delegates should take the role of NGOs very seriously. NGO representatives must be prepared to fully participate in all committee activities, including formal debate, caucusing and drafting working papers. In turn, Member State delegates must be prepared to engage NGO delegates in these activities. Mutual recognition and respect between NGO and country delegates is necessary to a successful conference experience.

NGO delegates maintain the following privileges in each committee to which they are assigned:

1. the right to make any procedural motion;
2. the right to vote on all procedural motions;
3. the right to speak before all assigned committees; and
4. the right to act as a signatory on working papers.

NGO delegates do not have substantive voting rights, and may not sponsor working papers. In order to ensure a positive educational experience for all delegates, these rights and privileges may not exactly reflect those granted by ECOSOC. Any alterations made by the Directors-General gave due consideration to existing realities and the need to provide a learning environment that encourages active participation.

Country delegates are fully expected to work with NGO delegates in the spirit of collaboration upon which the UN was founded. The exclusion of NGOs from committee work simply because they do not have substantive voting rights is both unrealistic and unprofessional. In almost all cases, actions denigrating the participation of NGOs will be considered extraordinarily out of character and be noted in awards consideration. NGOs are expert organizations in their respective fields that possess specialized knowledge of the subject matter at hand. The recommendations of NGO delegates maintain the same validity as those of Member States, and it is incumbent upon country delegates to ensure that those perspectives are recognized.

### ***How to Prepare as an NGO Delegation***

As an NGO delegation, your preparation should be structured in the same way as a typical country delegation. The most basic pieces of this process include fundamental knowledge of the organization and of the agenda topics. Based on your research, you will decide how your assigned NGO will approach each topic, and the recommendations you will make for potential solutions. This includes identifying blocs of countries and other NGOs that may share the same perspectives and priorities and collaborate with you in committee sessions.

### ***Doing Research***

A large portion of your research will likely rely on Internet resources. Because most NGOs do not have expansive budgets that allow for the widespread reproduction and dissemination of their written materials and reports, they choose to publish such documents on their Web sites. If you have difficulty obtaining materials from these electronic sources, please contact your Director, Assistant Director, departmental USG, or the Directors-General for assistance. The UN Web site, as well as the sites for many of the Specialized Agencies, also contains valuable information about NGO activity. Finally, do not exclude traditional resources from your preparations. Newspapers, scholarly journals, and academic books will provide differing perspectives on your agenda topics, and may give interesting insight into the evolving role of NGOs. In particular, there is an increasing amount of sources on the issue of civil society and its role in the UN. It is recommended that this literature be consulted as needed for your preparation.

### ***Position Papers***

NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

The most critical part of a successful NGO delegate experience at the NMUN Conference is active participation in committee sessions. This includes utilizing the rules of procedure, speaking in formal debate and contributing during caucus sessions. Although you may not sponsor working papers or vote on draft resolutions/draft report segments, you have both the right and the obligation to participate in their composition and refinement. You may act as a signatory to any working paper on the floor of your committee if you wish to illustrate your support for continued

development of the document. Getting involved in the simulation is the best way to enhance your own educational experience and that of your fellow delegates.

## **The Roles of State Delegates, Technical Experts, and Independent Technical Experts at the 2007 National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference**

### *The Variety of Roles That Delegates Simulate at the NMUN Conference*

At the National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference, delegates assume one of three roles when they participate in committee proceedings. They serve as a delegate representing the national interest of their state (state delegate), a technical expert, or an independent technical expert. At the 2007 NMUN Conference, only the justices of the International Court of Justice will serve in this capacity. Due to independent technical experts only serving in the ICTY, this role will specifically be addressed in the ICTY Background Guide. The United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, is essentially a political organization. However, there is also a significant role within the system for technical experts in many areas. Because the UN, its subsidiary bodies, related programs, and affiliated organizations speak to such a broad range of issues, experts are often needed to properly address complex problems and make informed recommendations to the General Assembly and Member States. Several ECOSOC committees and almost all of the Specialized Agencies consist of technical experts in the field, as opposed to political representatives. It is critical that delegates representing technical experts understand the complex nature of the expert role.


**NMUN RULES OF PROCEDURE - SHORT FORM  
LISTED IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE**

Please Note: This form is only for assistance in your preparation at the NMNU Conference. It however is not an exhaustive list of rules, nor is it the official list for your committee. The official rules are located at the end of the individual Committee Background Guide.

<b>Motion</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Debate</b>	<b>Vote</b>
Point of Order	Correct an error in procedure	None	None
Appeal of the Chair	Challenge a decision of the Chair	None	Majority
Suspension of the Meeting	Recess meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of the Meeting	End meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of Debate	End debate without a substantive vote	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Decision of Competence	Declare committee unable to consider issue or resolution	None	Majority
Closure of Debate	Move to immediate vote	2 con	2/3
Declare an Important Question (applicable in GA Plen only)	Require all substantive actions to obtain a 2/3 majority to pass	2 pro / 2 Con	Majority
Amendments and 1 <sup>st</sup> Vote on Divisions of the Question	Vote on sections separately, prior to voting on the entire resolution	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Roll Call Vote	Vote by roll call, rather than show of placards	None	None
Reconsideration	Re-open debate on an issue	2 con	2/3
Set the Speakers time	Set or change the speakers time limit	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Close the Speakers list (also applies to re-opening list)	No additional speakers added to speakers list on topic	None	Majority
Adoption of the Agenda	Approval of agenda order	None	Majority

## DIVISION OF THE QUESTION DIAGRAM

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# Committee Rules of Procedure

# United Nations Security Council

## Rules of Procedure

### *Introduction*

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Security Council (hereinafter, referred to as “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Security Council Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her/his or her designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations, and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson, or acting chairperson of the Council.

### I. MEETINGS

#### *Rule 1*

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time he or she deems necessary.

#### *Rule 2*

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Council.

#### *Rule 3*

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

#### *Rule 4*

Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held once a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

#### *Rule 5*

Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.

Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

### II. AGENDA

#### *Rule 6*

The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

#### *Rule 7*

The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

#### *Rule 8*

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

***Rule 9***

The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

***Rule 10***

Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

***Rule 11***

The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement on matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

***Rule 12***

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting. The provisions of rule 7, paragraph one, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

### III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

***Rule 13***

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

***Rule 14***

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting, which he or she is invited to attend.

***Rule 15***

The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

***Rule 16***

Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representatives shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

***Rule 17***

Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

### IV. PRESIDENCY

***Rule 18***

The Presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English



alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

***Rule 19***

The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

***Rule 20***

Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfillment of the responsibilities of the presidency he or she should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he or she shall indicate her/ his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19 or her/his duties under rule 7.

V. SECRETARIAT

***Rule 21***

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

***Rule 22***

The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

***Rule 23***

The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

***Rule 24***

The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

***Rule 25***

The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

***Rule 26***

The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

***Rule 27***

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

***Rule 28***

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

***Rule 29***

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

***Rule 30***

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

**Rule 31**

Proposed resolutions, amendments, and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

*For purposes of this rule, all “proposals” shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.*

**Rule 32**

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

**Rule 33**

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. To suspend the meeting;
2. To adjourn the meeting;
3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

*As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council’s next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.*

**Rule 34**

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

**Rule 35**

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

**Rule 36**

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

**Rule 37**

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

**Rule 38**

Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative of the Security Council.

**Rule 39**

The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

## VII. VOTING

**Rule 40**

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

## VIII. LANGUAGE

**Rule 41**

English shall be the official and working language of the Security Council.

**Rule 42**

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the language of the Security Council. In this case, he or she shall herself/himself provide for interpretation into English.

*This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.*

**Rule 43**

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the language of the Council.

**Rule 44**

All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the language of the Security Council.

**Rule 45**

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides be published in any language other than the language of the Council.

## IX. PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS, RECORDS

**Rule 46**

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

**Rule 47**

Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10:00 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

**Rule 48**

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

**Rule 49**

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

**Rule 50**

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives of the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

**Rule 51**

The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

**Rule 52**

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official language of the Council as soon as possible.

**Rule 53**

At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a *communiqué* through the Secretary-General.

**Rule 54**

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

**Rule 55**

The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

## X. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANS

**Rule 56**

Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority vote.