THE 2006 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2006 National Model United Nations (NMUN). My name is Galen Stocking and I am truly honored to be serving as one of four Directors in the new Security Council (SC) department at the 2006 NMUN Conference. This is my second year on the NMUN staff and my fifth year attending the conference. In my previous staff experience, I was the Assistant Director for the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. I currently hold a MA in National Security Studies and live and work in Washington, DC. Four separate Security Councils will be simulated at the 2006 conference. The Director of Security Council "B" will be Rabia Razaq. She will be introducing herself in the updates that will be available at the beginning of the year. The additional two Directors for Security Council "C" and Security Council "D" will be also introducing themselves at the beginning of the year.

As the executive body of the United Nations, the Security Council handles issues relating to the maintenance of peace and security. Due to the evolving and often sudden nature of security crises, the agenda of the Security Council is not limited to the agenda topics listed below this paragraph. All four Security Councils operate with open agendas. During the conference in April, delegates are encouraged to suggest any additional topics relating to contemporary attempts to achieve peace and security.

The topics before all of the Security Council simulations at the 2006 NMUN Conference are:

1. Security Council Reform;
2. International Instruments to Mitigate the Threat of the use of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorists; and
3. Strengthening UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Since the Security Council simulation will not be limited to these topics, it is imperative that you continuously ensure you are aware of the security situations brewing around the world. To achieve this, it will be helpful to cultivate a broad understanding of the underlying issues that fuel each conflict. Moreover, since this committee simulates an incredibly active body, remember to periodically familiarize yourself with the Council's current agenda. With a dedicated effort from all delegates, I am confident that this will lead to a successful simulation. This guide will aid you in developing a cursory understanding of the topics listed above and give you a starting point for future research.

In addition to their normal duties as a delegate, Security Council members will participate in a crisis simulation during the Saturday morning session of the conference. The topic of the crisis simulation will not be announced until the day of the simulation. Delegates should therefore anticipate a broad range of scenarios and be prepared to authoritatively represent their country on any one of them.

Every participating delegation is required to submit a position paper prior to attending the conference. NMUN will accept position papers via e-mail by March 10, 2006. Please refer to pages 1-2 for a message from your director general explaining the NMUN position paper requirements and restrictions. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is crucial.

The Security Council experience can be daunting, but it will be incredibly rewarding. I wish each of you the best as you prepare for the conference. Please do not hesitate to direct any questions or concerns my way. I look forward to meeting you this April.

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History of the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council was established in June 1945 as one of the original bodies of the United Nations.[1] Chapter V of the *United Nations Charter* charged the Security Council with the "maintenance of international peace and security" and provided several tools to accomplish this task.[2] The Security Council's foremost duty is its mandate to solve disputes peacefully, particularly through "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, [and] judicial settlement."[3] Moreover, the Security Council can refer disputes to the International Court of Justice for further investigation or resolution.[4] If these measures fail, or are deemed insufficient for the situation, the Security Council can move onto more internationally binding measures, namely economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic ties.[5] Finally, the Security Council can call upon Member States to provide military support for peacekeeping operations.[6]

Five Member States – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – hold permanent seats on the Council.[7] Since these states represented the balance of power after World War II, they were granted veto power over any resolution that passed before the Council.[8] Nonetheless, the Permanent Five (P-5) States usually abstain rather than use their veto power in the interest of maintaining cordial diplomatic relations.[9] In addition to these permanent States, several non-permanent members are elected to serve on the Council for two years at a time.[10] Originally, only six non-permanent Member States served at a time; however, facing expanded United Nations membership, Council composition was increased to ten states by *GA/RES/1991A*.[11] These ten states are chosen on a regional basis: five from Africa, five from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and two from Western Europe and other areas.[12] Each State has the opportunity to serve as Council President for one month at a time; this duty rotates upon English alphabetical order.[13]

The Security Council's history has been characterized by three phases: the Cold War, the post-Cold War era of the 1990s, and the post-9/11 period. During the Cold War, most of the Security Council's efforts were geared toward maintaining peace between the two superpowers, and the resolutions and activities of the time reflect this attention.[14] After the fall of the Soviet Union, a wide array of regional conflicts that had heretofore remained relatively innocuous were set ablaze by the new instability.[15] Peacekeeping missions, a hallmark of Security Council activity, had only been utilized 13 times by 1988; since then, the Council has authorized 50 such missions.[16] Much of this activity resulted from a philosophical shift, sparked by Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which recognized the importance of arresting small, local conflicts before they grew into regional disasters.[17] For example, the Security Council created the current mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in order to oversee the

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[1] United Nations. (1945). *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. Chapter 5. San
        Francisco: Author.
[2] *Ibid*, Chapter 5.
[3] *Ibid*, Article 33.
[4] *Ibid*, Article 92.
[5] *Ibid*, Chapter 7.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] United Nations. (2005). *Membership and Presidency of the Security Council in 2005*. New York: NY: Author. Retrieved
        August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_members.html.
[8] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. s*upra*, note 1, Chapter 5.
[9] Malone, David M. (1998). *Decision Making in the UN Security Council*. London: Oxford University Press, p. 13.
[10] *Ibid*.
[11] United Nations General Assembly. (1963). *Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic
        and Social Council.* (A/RES/1991A). New York: Author.
[12] *Ibid*.
[13] United Nations. *Membership and Presidency of the Security Council in 2005, supra,* note 7.
[14] Salla, Michael. (1996). Peace Enforcement vs. Non-Violent Intervention. *Peace Review*, 8, 547-555.
[15] *Ibid*.
[16] No author. (2005). *Timeline of UN Peacekeeping Missions*. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from
        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_UN_peacekeeping_missions.
[17] Salla, *supra* note 14.

implementation of the Lusaka agreement, a peace treaty intended to end a war that had threatened to spill into 5 neighboring states.[18]

After 9/11, the Security Council expanded its focus to include the threat of trans-national terrorism. In 2001, it strengthened two subsidiary bodies, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), in order to help them better assist States in counter-terrorism efforts.[19] The Al Qaeda and Taliban Committee works to ensure that States adhere to sanctions imposed upon Al Qaeda and its subsidiaries.[20] Similarly, the CTC coordinates counter-terrorism efforts between Member States and international institutions such as Interpol.[21] The combined efforts are designed to ensure a uniformity of effective counter-terrorism activities worldwide; accordingly, the mandate of its Monitoring Teams and task forces have been renewed through the end of 2006.[22] Their work is augmented by the 1540 Committee, which seeks to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[23]

The changing world has triggered a variety of calls for reform of the Security Council, mostly designed to ensure that the Council adequately reflects the new balance of power.[24] The consensus for reform is broad, as indicated by its inclusion in the landmark 2000 Millennium Development Goals.[25] Accordingly, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan released a reform package in March 2005 that he called an answer the Security Council's problems with "democratic...representation".[26] The package, entitled "In Larger Freedom," seeks to recast the UN's efforts in the context of freedom: "freedom from want," "freedom from fear," and the "freedom to live in dignity."[27] Annan suggested two models for structural reform.[28] The first, designated Model A, seeks to add six new regionally selected permanent seats (albeit without veto power), and three new rotating seats.[29] Similarly, Model B creates eight new four-year term seats and one new two-year seat.[30] Under each configuration, the Security Council would expand to 24 members, or approximately 13% of UN Member States.[31] The reform package also called for a review of the Council's configuration in 2020.[32] Alternately, the "Group of Four" resolution – sponsored by Japan, Brazil, Germany and India, all of which seek to become permanent members of the Council – and the "United for Consensus" proposal were debated in the General Assembly in June 2005.[33]

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[18] United Nations MONUC. (2005). *MONUC Background*. Retrieved September 1, 2005 from
     http://www.monuc.org/MissionEn.aspx

[19] United Nations Security Council. (2001, September 28). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts*. (SC/RES/1373). New York, NY: Author.

[20] United Nations Security Council. (2003, April 10). *Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267*. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from
     http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf.

[21] United Nations Security Council. (2003). *CTC: About the CTC: Mandate*. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from
     http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/mandate.html.

[22] United Nations Security Council. (2005, July 29). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorism Acts*. (SC/RES/1617). New York, NY: Author.

[23] United Nations Security Council. (2004, April 28). Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (SC/RES/1540). New York, NY: Author.

[24] Weiss, Thomas G. (2003). The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, 26, 147-161.

[25] United Nations General Assembly. (2000, September 8). *United Nations Millennium Declaration* (A/RES/55/2). New York, NY: Author.

[26] Pressing for enlarged Security Council, Annan cites 'democracy deficit.' (2005, July 15). *United Nations News Center*. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15019&Cr=security&Cr1=council.

[27] United Nations. (2005, March 21). *In Larger Freedom: Executive Summary*. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/summary.html.

[28] United Nations. (2005, March 21). *In Larger Freedom – V: Strengthening the United Nations*. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm.

[29] *Ibid*.

[30] *Ibid*.

[31] *Ibid*.

[32] *Ibid*.

[33] General Assembly Opens Debate on 'Group-of-Four'-Sponsored Draft Resolution on Security Council Reform. (2005, July 11). *United Nations Press Release*. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from
     http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10367.doc.htm

The 2006 NMUN Security Council (SC Committee "A"; SC Committee "B"; SC Committee "C"; & SC Committee "D") membership is:

Algeria	Denmark	Romania
Argentina	France	Russian Federation
Benin	Greece	United Kingdom
Brazil	Japan	United Republic of Tanzania
China	Philippines	United States

I. Security Council Reform

"No reform [at the United Nations] would be complete, however, without Security Council reform. The council's present makeup reflects the world of 1945, not that of the twenty-first century. It must be reformed to…represent broadly the current membership of the UN".[34]

In a time of growing international political instability and increased security threats on multiple levels such as increased nuclear proliferation, terrorist activities, and civil conflicts, the need for a coherent and decisive Security Council has never been greater. As Secretary General Kofi Annan has opined, the current Security Council makeup reflects old power realities—realities of the world situation as it existed at the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union, now Russia, emerged as the world's superpowers, with the United Kingdom, China, and France also on the side of the victors, and as such, relations between the US and USSR dominated world affairs. Sixty years later, the dynamics of international power, especially since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, have altered considerably with the United States remaining as the sole economic and military superpower while other countries, such as China, India, and Brazil, are emerging as formidable economic powers in their own right.[35] Yet, "[p]ermanent membership on the Security Council–granted to the Second World War victors…is woefully anachronistic…The permanent five members once spoke for 40 percent of the world's populations; they now account for 29 percent."[36]

Two major changes to the Security Council occurred in 1963. With newly independent states contributing to the rapid growth of UN membership, these new independent states gained enough support for a Charter amendment to increase the number of nonpermanent seats from six to ten and the number of votes needed to pass a resolution from seven to nine.[37] Since that time, there have been no formal changes to the composition of the Council. Change in the Council's membership, the thorniest issue of all, requires revision of the UN Charter, and proposals have come and gone, but no membership plan has yet won the needed support for such a major institutional change.[38]

Avocations to enlarge the SC are not a new phenomenon. In fact, reform arguments began as far back as 1979, "…when Algeria and nine other developing nations placed on the agenda of the General Assembly the item 'Question of equitable representation on and an increase in the membership of the Security Council."[39] While the issue was discussed numerous times, there was little if any progress on the matter.[40] There was significant consideration given in the 1990s to expanding the permanent membership to include Japan and Germany, given their economic power. However, the proposition was met with hostility by those members not included, such as the Italian Ambassador F. Paolo Fulci, who contended that Italy should be given a permanent seat as well if the other two defeated World War II powers will be granted permanent membership.[41] In addition, there was some concern

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[34] Annan, Kofi. (May/June 2005). In larger freedom:' decision time at the UN. *Foreign affairs,* volume 84, p. 73.

[35] Power, Samantha. (September/October 2004). Business as Usual at the UN. *Foreign policy*, issue 144, p. 39.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[38] Paul, James, & Nahory, Céline. (2005, July 13). *Theses toward a democratic reform of the Security Council.* Retrieved August 10, 2005, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713theses.htm

[39] Hoffman, Walter. (1994). *United Nations Security Council reform and restructuring.* The Center for UN Reform Education: Livingston, NJ, p. 40.

[40] *Ibid*, p. 43.

[41] Albright, Madeline K. (September/October 2003). United Nations. *Foreign policy*, issue 138, p. 22.

that "if Japan and Germany were added it would tip the balance on the Council too heavily against the states of the South."[42] This, in turn, leads some scholars to contend that adding Germany and Japan would prompt developing countries to clamor for permanent seats.[43]

There are two main proposals to enlarge the Security Council. Both plans would enlarge the Council from 15 to 24 members, and one plan seeks to expand permanent membership by six seats and create three new nonpermanent seats while the second plan would create nine new nonpermanent seats.[44] Interestingly, "…the [United Nations] Charter contains no provision for changing the number of permanent Council seats or of members generally… [and] the history of formal change in the Security Council membership is short."[45] Alternatively, there are at least four other proposals for enlarging the Council, but with each proposal comes dissent and contention from various Member States.[46] Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, collectively referred to as the "G-4," are setting forth a proposal, and their respective regional rivals, referred to as the "Uniting for Consensus" group, are issuing a proposal of their own for Security Council expansion.[47] In addition, Italy and the African Union submitted their own plans for Council reform.[48] The major issue associated with the expansion of the Security Council revolves around selection criteria for possible new permanent members. At the very least, there is the assertion that the Council should "increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically, specifically in terms of contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates."[49]

The strategy of "informal consultation" has had an impact on the Security Council's operation by including nonmembers into the Council on a *de facto* basis.[50] For example, Japan and Germany, the two leading candidates for inclusion in permanent membership, were frequently consulted by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on most important issues despite being nonmembers, or at least nonpermanent members, of the Council.[51] Another example of informal expansion is the consultation of the Council with Member States that provide peacekeeping personnel or materials, known as "troop-contributing countries" or TCCs, yet this arrangement presented the Council with an unexpected situation of having most of its resources provided on a voluntary basis by States with no representation on the Council.[52] However, at the inception of the Charter and the Council, it was expected that the main TCCs would be from within the Council, not without, and so the Council has had to "adapt itself to a changing international environment, creating institutional links to important nonmembers in order to accommodate circumstances not envisioned at the drafting of the Charter."[53]

Expansion of Permanent Membership versus Nonpermanent Membership

> "*It is clear that the composition of the Security Council no longer reflects the actual distribution of power in the international system…the continuing dynamic of international political and economic development has raised some nonmember states higher than many members, and has eroded the base of capabilities of some permanent members…the relationship between economic and military strength is no longer clear; some suggest the permanent members should reflect more of global diversity…and several other properties of states, ranging from size of population to*

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[42] Hoffman*, supra*, note 39, p. 44.
[43] Williams, Ian. (2005, July 26). *Not-so-musical chairs.* Retrieved August 11, 2005, from
       http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2005/0726musicalchairs.htm.
[44] Annan, *supra*, note 34. p. 73.
[45] Hurd, Ian. (1997). Security Council reform. In Bruce Russert (Ed.), *The once and future Security Council.* p. 142-143.
[46] Laurenti, Jeffrey. (2005, July 19). *A Security Council numbers game: all bets off.* Retrieved August 11, 2005, from
       http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2005/0719betsoff.htm.
[47] Williams, *supra*, note 43.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] United Nations General Assembly. (2005, March 21). *In larger freedom: towards development, security, and human rights
       for all.* New York, NY: Kofi Annan, p. 42.
[50] Hurd, *supra*, note 45, p. 142-143.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 144.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 146
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 146-147.

contributions to peacekeeping to promptness of paying dues, may now qualify as criteria for inclusion."[54]

The foremost question facing Member States with regard to Security Council expansion is whether they want expansion in permanent membership or only in non-permanent membership.[55] The Secretary General endorsed the two proposals made in the Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change but said he was open to "any other viable proposal in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model."[56] Model A and Model B proposed by the Panel both expand the Council to 24 members from 15.[57] Model A accomplishes this by adding six permanent seats; Model B by creating eight new four-year renewable terms for non-permanent members.[58]

The High Level Panel's Report outlined the two major proposals for Security Council reform, labeled Model A and Model B, both of which involve a distribution of seats between four major regional areas identified as Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the Americas.[59] Model A would create six new permanent seats without veto power and three new two-year term non-permanent seats divided among the major regional areas.[60] Each region would then have six seats on the Security Council in any combination of permanent and non-permanent seats.[61] Africa would receive two new permanent seats and four new non-permanent, non-renewable seats, thereby increasing its Council membership to six seats.[62] Asia and Pacific would receive two new permanent seats in addition to its existing permanent seat and three new non-permanent, non-renewable seats.[63] Europe's seats would increase by one new permanent seat in addition to its three continuing permanent seats and two non-permanent seats.[64] The Americas would gain one new permanent seat in addition to its current seat and four new non-permanent seats.[65]

Model B does not create any new permanent seats, but creates two new categories of non-permanent seats.[66] The first category is of renewable seats with four-year terms, and the second category consists of non-renewable seats with two-year seats.[67] Under this arrangement, Africa would obtain two renewable seats and four non-renewable seats, and Asia and the Pacific would receive two renewable seats and three non-renewable seats.[68] Europe and the Americas would be given two renewable seats each and one non-renewable seat and three non-renewable seats, respectively.[69]

In both models, veto power is not granted to new permanent members or to members with renewable term seats nor is there any modification of the Charter's provisions for the Security Council's existing powers.[70] The Panel recognizes the importance of the veto to the original members in acting as a safeguard to their interests, but it also sees no "practical way of changing the existing members' veto powers."[71] As such, the Panel recommends that while the existing permanent members would be able to retain their veto powers and veto power would not be granted to new members, the original five permanent members should refrain from using the veto, especially in situations such as genocide and large-scale human rights abuses.[72]

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[54] *Ibid.*, p. 141-142.
[55] Ariyoruk, Ayca. (2005, June 3). *Players and proposals in the Security Council debate.* Retrieved August 11, 2005, from http://www.centerforunreform.org/pdfs/ReformWatchRevisedJune3.pdf
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. (2004). *A more secure world: our shared responsibility.* New York, NY; p. 4.
[60] *Ibid.*
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] *Ibid*.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] *Ibid.*

Issues and Alternate Proposals

> *"Council reform is a process for the long haul, not a quick fix. It must be based on ideas for a more democratic global future, not outworn concepts from the past like permanency and great power oligarchies. In the midst of the present diplomatic furor, it is time to take a more calm and long-term view. What kind of world do we want and how can we patiently find the way there?"*[73]

In addition to Models A and B presented in the High-Level Panel's Report on Threats, Challenges and Change for Security Council enlargement, two other proposals are also being presented by Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil, collectively referred to as the G-4, and by the African Union.[74] However, regional rivalries between Member States make enlargement or reform of the Council an even more difficult prospect, leading to divisions within coalitions and outright opposition from Member States not directly involved.[75] The United for Consensus group, spearheaded primarily by Mexico, Argentina, Pakistan, Italy and Spain, seeks to challenge the G-4's proposal for Council expansion because these Member States view the G-4's ability to accurately represent regional matters with trepidation.[76] The two most contentious issues in terms of expanding membership of the Council center around fair regional representation and reluctance to extend the veto power to additional countries that may become permanent members of the Council.[77] There are also additional alternative proposals that seek to expand non-permanent membership in an effort to keep with, but it seems that with any proposal to expand membership, veto power will rest with the original permanent members of the Council.[78] Many Member States are concerned that adding more permanent seats to the Council would not comply with democratic principles of equality and view such a move as a step backwards.[79] Secretary-General Annan's efforts to ease the deadlock over how and when to reform and enlarge the Council through presenting Models A and B and urging Member States to come to a decision by December 2005 could very well be in vain if no consensus is reached.[80]

The Group of Four

A coalition group lead by Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil, collectively referred to as the Group of Four (G-4) introduced a draft resolution to expand membership of the Security Council in a plan similar to Model A in the High Level Panel's Report. The resolution calls for adding six permanent and four non-permanent members to the Council, thereby increasing total membership to 25 members.[81] Distribution of the seats in this plan is according to region in the following arrangement. Six new permanent members of the Security Council shall be chosen with two from African States; two from Asian States; one from Latin American and Caribbean States; and one from Western European and Other States. Four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected with one from African States; one from Asian States; one from Eastern European States; and one from Latin American and Caribbean States.[82]

The resolution does not extend veto power immediately to new permanent Member States, but includes a provision that would allow for the consideration of extending the veto upon a 15 year review of the resolution should it be adopted.[83] Accordingly, because the makeup of the Security Council would be altered from the terms specified in the *Charter of the United Nations*, the G-4's draft resolution includes a clause that would amend the *Charter* to reflect the changes in the Council by requiring "the affirmative vote of 14 of 25 members of the Security Council for

[73] Paul & Nahory, *supra*, note 38.
[74] Williams, *supra*, note 43.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] Albright, *supra*, note 41.
[78] Hoffman, *supra* note 39, p. 44.
[79] Ariyoruk, *supra* note 55.
[80] Williams, *supra* note 43; Annan acknowledges delays in UN Council reform. (2005, August 11). *Reuters*. Retrieved August 11, 2005, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2005/0811postpone.htm.
[81] United Nations General Assembly. (2005, July 6). *Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters*. (A/59/L.64). New York: Author.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] *Ibid.*

a decision, and to reflect…the fact that the extension of the right of veto to the new permanent members has not been decided."[84]

United for Consensus

While the G-4 is pushing for a vote on Security Council reform, the United for Consensus group, lead by Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Kenya, Algeria, Italy, Spain, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea, calls for consensus before any decision is reached on the size and form of the Council.[85] The most important difference between the G-4 and United for Consensus proposals is expansion of permanent versus non-permanent membership. The United for Consensus expansion plan would keep the permanent membership intact while creating more non-permanent seats. As such, the group issued two models for reform: the Blue Model and the Green Model.[86]

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[84] *Ibid.*
[85] Ariyoruk, *supra*, note 55.
[86] *Ibid*.

II. International Instruments to Mitigate the Threat of the use of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorists

The end of the Cold War brought with it the end of Mutually Assured Destruction. Nuclear arsenals have been significantly reduced. But proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear ones, is still a major threat. And the threat posed by proliferation to non-state actors such as terrorists presents a new and daunting challenge…Our ability to prevent proliferation is only as strong as the weakest link in the non-proliferation chain.[87]

In 1995, the Japanese cult *Aum Shinrikyo* released Sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system, killing 7 and injuring more than 5000.[88] As devastating as the attacks were, they represented a setback for the cult, which had originally sought to acquire and detonate a nuclear device.[89] Unfortunately, Aum Shinrikyo is not the only example of a non-state actor attempting to achieve mass casualty rates through the use of nuclear weapons: in a 1999 interview, Osama bin Laden alluded to his organization's search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[90] Journalists in Afghanistan after the 2001-2002 war found several notebooks, papers, and plans proving Al Qaeda's attempts to build or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon.[91] These efforts are underscored by the vast amounts of nuclear weapons and fissile material available: at the end of the Cold War, just the former Soviet States possessed 27,000 nuclear weapons and the material to make 60,000 more.[92]

Assorted Nuclear Terrorism Threats

Terrorist experts believe that nuclear terrorism will likely come in one of three forms: a nuclear weapon, a radiological or "dirty" bomb, or an attack on a nuclear power plant.[93] Moreover, as evidenced by their increasingly lethal attacks, terrorist organizations have been trending toward the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) at such a rate that nuclear terrorism becomes a very real threat.[94] In large part, this is due to the rise of religiously-motivated terrorism, which some scholars believe elevates the struggle to cosmic where few restraints remain.[95] The following discussion will focus on threats resulting from nuclear weapons and dirty bombs.

Terrorist groups may either build new nuclear weapons themselves or endeavor to acquire an already existing weapon.[96] Experts believe that the latter is the more probable approach, as building a nuclear weapon from scratch is a complex and costly undertaking.[97] For example, when Aum Shrinkinyo attempted to build a nuclear weapon, they were stymied by regulations that impeded their acquisition of weapons building tools, the inefficiency of their uranium mining program, and the complexity of the task of enriching uranium.[98] Similarly, the Al Qaeda

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[87] Møller, Per S. (2005). *Speech: Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Will Multilateral Diplomacy Work?* Copenhagen, DK: Author. Retrieved September 14, 2005 from http://www.um.dk/en/servicemenu/News/FrontPageNews/NuclearProliferationInThe21stCenturyWillMultilateralDiplomacyWork.htm

[88] Rosenau, William. (2001). Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did It Fail? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.* 24: 289-301.

[89] Cameron, Gavin. (1999). Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaida. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.* 22: 277-309.

[90] Ismail, Jamal. (1999). I Am Not Afraid of Death. *Newsweek*, 133, 154-159.

[91] Albright, David. (2002). Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents. *The Nautilus Institute Foreign Policy Online.* Retrieved September 10, 2005, from http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html

[92] Seward, Amy. (2005). Combating Proliferation: Addressing the Russian Nuclear Threat. *Journal of Public and International Affairs.* 16: 184-205.

[93] Cameron, Gavin. (2005). Nuclear Terrorism: Weapons for Sale or Theft? *Foreign Policy Agenda.* 10: 17-20.

[94] Ellis, Brent. (2003). Countering Complexity: An Analytical Framework to guide Counter-Terrorism Policy Making. *The Electronic Journal of the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute*, 6.

[95] Traditionally, terrorists have been restrained by the negative impact high casualty rates have on public perception. For more information, see Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2000). Terror in the Mind of God. Berkeley: University of California Press.

[96] Cameron, *supra*, note 93.

[97] *Ibid*.

[98] Cameron, *supra*, note 89, p. 11.

documents discovered in Afghanistan pointed to a flawed and superficial understanding of the physics of nuclear weapons and the uranium enrichment process.[99] Alternately, purchasing a weapon allows terrorist organizations to skip that guesswork by simply acquiring the weapon from a trusted source.[100] Moreover, post-Cold War weapons accounting in former Soviet Union states discovered that some nuclear weapons simply could no longer be found.[101] Indeed, two Lithuanians were convicted in US Federal Court of attempting to sell tactical nuclear weapons, pointing to the presence of nuclear arms salesmen in the black market.[102]

On June 10, 2002, American citizen Jose Padilla was arrested for plotting to explode a radioactive device, the so-called "dirty bomb" in a major US city.[103] A dirty bomb is any device that, upon its explosion, releases radioactive isotopes into the air, thereby bombarding nearby individuals with radiation.[104] While not as destructive as nuclear weapons, dirty bombs rely on conventional explosives for their destructive power and can leave a lasting mark on a population by inflicting it with continued health issues, environmental contamination (such as fresh water sources) and a pervading sense of fear of repeat attacks.[105] Moreover, first responders such as police, firefighters, and other emergency services are seldom equipped to effectively deal with a radioactive situation, and emergency response plans often fail to take into account the difficulties of the public's reaction.[106]

Whereas the radiological material in nuclear weapons must be high-grade, enriched uranium, dirty bombs can effectively use any radioactive isotope, though the higher the grade and instability, the higher the lethality.[107] Besides weapons-grade fissile material, radioactive isotopes can be retrieved from a variety of legitimate sources, including nuclear power reactors, research facilities, and hospitals.[108] Often, the material used is difficult to detect by traditional radioactive scanners, thereby allowing for easier movement of fissile materials across borders.[109] Nonetheless, some experts argue that the energy and weight required to disperse radiation effectively over a large area would negate the advantages of a dirty bomb as a small, portable, and deadly weapon.[110]

International Instruments

The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) is the pre-eminent international institution charged with ensuring that the States only use atomic energy for peaceful purposes.[111] To do so, the IAEA provides best practices information on safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities.[112] These practices include regulations regarding the transportation of nuclear materials and facilities, the security of radioactive sources, and the import and export of nuclear materials.[113] Simultaneously, the Agency regularly inspects nuclear facilities to ensure that any byproducts

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[99] Albright, *supra*, note 91.

[100] *Ibid*.

[101] Seward, *supra*, note 92, p. 184.

[102] Agureyev, Aleksey. (1998). Two Lithuanians Sentenced in Missile Plot in USA. *ITAR-TSS*. August 20, 1998.
    Retrieved September 12, 2005, from http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1998/19980530.htm

[103] Branch-Brioso, Karen. (2004, June 3). Details Released about Padilla's Terror Ties. *Knight Ridder/Tribune News
    Service*. Retrieved September 10, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis.

[104] Bunn, G., and Braun, C. (2003). Terrorism potential for research reactors compared with power reactors: Nuclear
    weapons, "dirty bombs," and truck bombs. *American Behavioral Scientist*. 46: 714-727.

[105] Karam, P.A. (2005). Radiological Terrorism. *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment.* 11: 501-523.

[106] Lasker, Roz D. (2004, September 14). Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public.
    New York Academy of Medicine Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health.
    Retrieved September 14, 2005, from http://www.cacsh.org/pdf/RedefiningReadinessStudy.pdf

[107] Karam, *supra*, note 105, 504.

[108] Bunn, *supra*, note 104.

[109] McDonald, Joseph C., Coursey, Bert M., and Carter, Michael. (2004). Detecting Illicit Radioactive Sources.
    Physics Today. 57: 36-41.

[110] Palmore, Julian. (2003). 'Dirty Bombs': An Analysis of Radiological Weapons. *Defense & Security Analysis.* 19,
    69-73.

[111] International Atomic Energy Agency. (1957). *Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.* Vienna: Author.

[112] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2004). Measures to Strengthen International Co-Operation in Nuclear,
    Radiation, and Transportation Safety and Waste Management. (GC(48)/INF/3). Vienna: Author.

[113] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2004). *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*.
    (IAEA/CODEOC/2004). Vienna: Author; International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005). *Guidance on the
    Import and Export of Radioactive Sources*. (IAEA/CODEOC/IMP-EXP/2005). Vienna: Author.

are disposed of properly and not re-used for weapons.[114] The IAEA's inspection efforts are characterized by their experience in Iran, where the agency is working with the United States and the European Union to ensure that Iran does not convert its fissile material into weapons-grade nuclear material.[115] In such scenarios, the IAEA serves merely as a reporter; any violations prosecution must be undertaken by other States.[116] In the middle of the international negotiation and inspection process, Iran decided to re-start its material conversion process.[117] The situation, as well as similar incidents in Iraq and North Korea, raises questions regarding the viability of the current international system for non-proliferation.[118]

Much of the framework for that system was built on the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT), which attempts to limit nuclear weapons to the five States that possessed them in 1968.[119] Additionally, under the NPT, States cannot transfer nuclear material to non-nuclear states.[120] These provisions were placed in the treaty in order to insure that new States do not acquire nuclear materials; the same theory applies to the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists and other non-state actors.[121] In order to clarify and codify this concept, the international community has been meeting since 1998 to draft the *Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*.[122] Opened for signatures on September 14, 2005, the *Convention* calls upon States to develop and prosecute laws against the possession or use of nuclear material for terrorist purposes, share information regarding plots or allegations to do so, and cooperate with other States' investigations through extradition and detainee transfer.[123] Unlike the *NPT*, this new *Convention* makes little mention of international institutions, relying instead on bilateral and multilateral frameworks.[124] Nonetheless, it shows the continuing evolution of international concern regarding terrorism; some States have, in fact, suggested the creation of a comprehensive convention to cover all areas of terrorism.[125]

While the international community was negotiating the final draft language of the *Nuclear Terrorism Convention*, the Security Council created a sub-committee (the 1540 Committee, after the Security Council resolution creating it) to monitor States' implementation of counter-nuclear terrorism measures.[126] Resolution 1540's primary aim was to bind States to enact and enforce legislation to protect nuclear and other materials from proliferation.[127] Accordingly, it required all Member States to provide regular reports on their progress in acting against proliferation.[128] As of writing, the Committee had received reports from 118 countries and was beginning to study them for suggestions, accuracy, and to report back to the Security Council on their findings.[129]

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[114] International Atomic Energy Agency. (1997). Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. (INFCIRC/540). Vienna: Author.

[115] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005). *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.* (GOV/2005/67). Vienna: Author.

[116] International Atomic Energy Agency, *supra*, note 111.

[117] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005). Communication dated 1 August 2005 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency. (INFCIRC/648). Vienna: Author.

[118] Utgoff, Victor. (2000). The Specter of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Proliferation. In Victor Utgoff (Ed.), *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests and World Order.* Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 37-39.

[119] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (opened for signature July 1, 1968).

[120] *Ibid.*

[121] Betts, Richard K. (2000). Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism. In Utgoff, Victor (Ed.), *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests and World Order.* Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 78-79.

[122] United Nations Press Release (1998, November 11). Opening Debate on Draft Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, Sixth Committee Hears Calls for Definition of Terrorism. New York, NY: Author.

[123] Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. (opened for signature September 14, 2005).

[124] Center for Defense Information. (2005, May 17). *Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.* Retrieved September 17, 2005, from http://www.cdi.org/news/law/ntc.cfm

[125] *Ibid.*

[126] United Nations Security Council. (2004, October 8). *Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.* (S/RES/1540). New York, NY: Author.

[127] *Ibid.*

[128] *Ibid.*

[129] Motoc, Mihnea Ioan. (2005, July 5). Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). New York, NY: Author.

Case Study: Pakistan

There are several ways in which lax legislation or enforcement can enable terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials or weapons: non-enforced standards at nuclear facilities or weapons silos, porous borders that allow the transportation of nuclear materials, both direct and clandestine aid to terrorist organizations, undefined import and export controls, and an environment in which weapons or materials sales can transpire.[130] By the late 1990s, Pakistan's new status as a nuclear power, its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and its role in the underground arms network headed by Pakistani scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan made it a prime concern for those worried about proliferation issues.[131]

Pakistan's long-standing conflict with India and its comparative force constraints with its neighbor pushed it into supporting insurgencies and other terrorist activities throughout India, from Punjab to the disputed Kashmir border area.[132] When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan responded by funding *mujahideen*, or freedom fighters throughout the occupied country.[133] This policy continued after the Soviets left, as Pakistan supported the Taliban's consolidation of power across Afghanistan.[134] Pakistani officials believed that a stable Afghanistan could open trade routes for Pakistan into Central Asia and stabilize a long chaotic border region.[135] These ties were not cut until Pakistan threw its support behind the U.S. led coalition to oust the Taliban from power after the September 11, 2001 attacks.[136] Despite the policy shift, however, ties between Pakistani intelligence forces and terrorists fighting India continue to be suspected.[137]

Since at least 1987, Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan has headed an international nuclear materials trade network that included Libya, Iran, North Korea, and other countries.[138] A hero in Pakistan for his role in Pakistan's successful nuclear weapons program, Khan's network was only revealed through examination of Libya's nuclear records.[139] This investigation showed that Khan traded mostly in centrifuges and other equipment that can be used to enrich uranium into weapons-grade material.[140] Khan, who claims he operated independent from the Pakistani government, is currently under house arrest in Pakistan, his network presumably shut down.[141]

The potential for nuclear material to fall into terrorist's hands in such an environment remains high.[142] Pakistan, however, has taken numerous steps to tighten control on fissile materials and their transport.[143] Most prominently, these include new controls on exports, the installation of radioactive material scanners at border crossings, legislation requiring greater security and adherence to IAEA standards at nuclear installations, and changes to the criminal code increasing violation penalties.[144] Nonetheless, reports of these changes have come only from Pakistan itself and have not been systematically evaluated by a third party such as the 1540 Committee.[145]

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[130] *Ibid*.

[131] Lavoy, Peter R., Khan, Feroz H. (2004). Rogue or Responsible Nuclear Power? Making Sense of Pakistan's Nuclear Practices. *Strategic Insights* 3. Retrieved September 19, 2005, from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/feb/lavoyfeb04.asp

[132] Tellis, Ashley J. (2004). U.S. Strategy: Assessing Pakistan's Transformation. *The Washington Quarterly*. 28: 97-116.

[133] Kumar, Sumita. (2001). Pakistan's Jehadi Apparatus: Goals and Methods. *Strategic Analysis*. 24.

[134] Ewans, Martin. (2002). Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics. New York: Harper Collins.

[135] *Ibid*., p. 182-183.

[136] Kronstadt, K. A. (2003). *Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation*. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. (CRS No. RL31624).

[137] Fair, C. Christine and Chalk, Peter. (2004). Domestic Disputes: Pakistani Internal Security. *The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*. 5: 39-47.

[138] Albright, David and Hinderstein, Corey. (2005). Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks. *The Washington Quarterly*. 28:111-128.

[139] Lutes, Charles D. (2005). New Players on the Scene: A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market. *Foreign Policy Agenda* 10.

[140] *Ibid.*, 32.

[141] Albright and Hinderstein, *supra*, note 138, p. 116.

[142] *Ibid*.

[143] United Nations Security Council. (2004). Pakistan's national report on national measures on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540. (S/AC.44.2004/(02)/22).

[144] *Ibid*.

[145] *Ibid*.

Conclusions

Creating a nuclear or radiological weapon, transporting it to its destination and setting it off require a great amount of skill and financial backing. Thus far, these barriers have kept terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda from doing so, although the organization has expressed interest in this area. The international community has been protected by a well-established non-proliferation structure, but Dr. Khan's international nuclear trading network has shown holes in that framework. The 1540 Committee attempts to plug those holes through direct coordination with Member States. This is a long process, however, that involves questions of sovereignty and the right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful means. While conducting research, consider the following questions: Do States have an inherent right to nuclear energy? If so, short of the existing standards and codes, is there anything the international community can do to ensure that nuclear facilities are well protected, and that States' pursuit of nuclear energy remains peaceful? Are there any initiatives that can deter terrorist organizations from acquiring nuclear devices? Or are the requirements for such devices so great that terrorist groups do not have the capacity to work with them?

III. Strengthening SC Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al Qaeda and the Taliban

> *"...terrorism is a threat to all states, to all peoples, which can strike anytime, anywhere. It is a direct attack on the core values the United Nations stands for: the rule of law; the protection of civilians; mutual respect between people of different faiths and cultures; and peaceful resolution of conflicts. So of course the United Nations must be at the forefront in fighting against it, and first of all in proclaiming, loud and clear, that terrorism can never be accepted or justified, in any cause whatsoever."*[146]

The new millennium has witnessed terrorist attacks against more than a dozen Member States on four continents."[147] The most recent terrorist attack (at the time of writing), the July 7, 2005 attack against the London transportation system, reportedly cost only $2000 to plan and execute, yet resulted in 53 deaths, 700 injuries, and more than $45 million in losses to the local economy – emphasizing terrorism's low cost benefit ratio.[148] In the mid 20th century, terrorism was perpetrated primarily by secular groups focused on a specific goal.[149] *Al Qaeda*, on the other hand, represents not a group but a trans-national ideology predicated upon an extremist interpretation of religion.[150] Accordingly, *Al Qaeda*, which emerged from the *mujahideen* fighters trying to repel the Soviets from Afghanistan, is comprised of cells, which often have little direct contact with Usama bin Laden and other members of the *Al Qaeda* leadership, have been discovered in 76 nations since 2001.[151] Nonetheless, the international community has found some success in prosecuting terrorism; in particular, the arrest of Mohamed Khan in Pakistan yielded a plethora of logistic and intelligence information about *Al Qaeda* activities.[152] Although implemented by Member States, many such efforts have been directed by the United Nations Security Council and its subsidiary bodies.

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[146] Annan, Kofi. (2005, 10 March). *Statements made at the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, Madrid, Spain*. Retrieved August 10, 2005, from http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html#transcripcion

[147] United Nations. (2004). *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. Retrieved August 14, 2005, from http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf

[148] United Press International. (2005, July 14). *London attacks cost less than $2000*. Retrieved August 14, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis Academic Database.
Wardell, Jane. (2005, July 11). London Retailers say Terrorist attacks cost millions of pounds in lost sales. *Associated Press*. Retrieved August 14 2005 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Database.
No Author. (2005, July 14). Solving Britain's first suicide bombing; After the London attacks. *The Economist*. Retrieved August 14 2005 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Database.

[149] Schmid, Alex P. (2004). Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 16, 2. 197-222.

[150] Jordan, Javier. (2004). Al-Qaeda and Western Islam. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16, 1, p.1-17.

[151] *Ibid*. p. 3.

[152] United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee Monitoring Group. (2005). *Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team*. New York, NY: Author.

History of Counter-Terrorism and International Law

The international community's first codification of anti-terrorism law was enacted in the League of Nations' 1937 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.[153] Though never entered into effect, it was the precursor to a number of anti-terrorism treaties initiated or recorded by the United Nations, starting with the 1963 *Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention)*.[154] The *Tokyo Convention* elaborated the rights and duties of states and aircraft crews in halting aircraft hijackings and detaining suspects.[155] The *Tokyo Declaration* was expanded by the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention,* 1970*)*, and the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention*, 1971*)*.[156] The *Hague Convention* banned aircraft hijackings whereas the *Montreal Convention* outlawed any violent act against an aircraft, including and especially bombings.[157]

Several other international conventions designed to protect varying locales, situations, and individuals have been initiated in the subsequent years. Most significantly, they include the *International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages* (1979), which criminalized hostage detention; the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (1980), which established standards to ensure "the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport" so as to keep the material out of the hands of terrorists; and the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation* (1988), which extended many of the protections of the *Tokyo, Hague,* and *Montreal Conventions* to seagoing vessels.[158] Further, signatory States established the means to track explosives via embedded markings in the 1991 *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification*.[159] It should be noted, however, that this tracking system applies only to plastic explosives, not the smaller arms and explosives terrorists tend to use.[160]

These efforts culminated in the 1998 *International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing*, a unifying document that criminalizes bombings of a wide range of targets and delineates the duties and jurisdiction of States in cooperation with terrorism investigation and prosecution.[161] The convention, however, dealt primarily with the aftereffects of an attack instead of precursor events, the attackers rather than their entire support network.[162] Consequently, the international community continued their efforts with the 1999 *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109)*.[163] This *Convention* required that signing States enact

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[153] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. (2005). *Terrorism.* Retrieved July 17, 2005, from
   http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism.html

[154] *Ibid.*

[155] Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (opened for signature 14 September 1963).
   Retrieved July 17, 2005, from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft.html.

[156] Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (opened for signatures 16 December 1970). Retrieved July
   17, 2005, from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft_seizure.html See also
   Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (opened for signatures 26
   January 1973). Retrieved July 17, 2005, from
   http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_civil_aviation.html

[157] *Ibid.*

[158] International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (opened for signatures 18 December 1979). Retrieved July 17,
   2005, from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_hostages.html; Convention on the Physical
   Protection of Nuclear Material (opened for signatures 3 March 1980). Retrieved July 17, 2005, from
   http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_nuclear_material.html; Convention for the Suppression of
   Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (opened for signature 10 March 1986). Retrieved July 17,
   2005, from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_maritime_navigation.html

[159] Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification (opened for signatures 1 March 1991).
   Retrieved July 17, 2005, from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_plastic_explosives.html

[160] Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. (2002). *Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Explosives by
   criminals and their use for Criminal Purposes*. New York, NY: Author.

[161] International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (opened for signatures 12 January 1998). Retrieved July
   17, 2005, from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_terrorist_bombing.html

[162] Active and passive support networks comprise the majority of a typical terrorist organization. See White, Jonathon. (2002).
   Terrorism, an Introduction. New York: Wadsworth..

[163] United Nations General Assembly. (1999, December 9). *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
   Terrorism*. (A/RES/54/109). New York: Author.

legal structures "for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing" terrorist acts.[164] The long path the international community traveled trying to create these conventions is indicative of the difficulty in building and implementing a consensus action course.[165] In order to act move more decisively, then, the Security Council moved to create specific action committees – particularly the 1267 Al Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.[166]

The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee

The Security Council created the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the Committee) in 1999 to attempt to bring Usama bin Laden to justice for previous terrorist attacks, specifically those on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.[167] Simultaneously, the Taliban, which allowed *Al Qaeda* to train on its soil, were engaged in a long-standing civil war that had been condemned on numerous occasions by the Security Council for the "serious and rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis" it provoked.[168] Since the Taliban had not been responsive to previous Council efforts, *S/RES/1267* (1999) immediately moved to limited sanctions. This included a ban on all air travel and a freeze on all Taliban controlled funds.[169] These sanctions were later expanded by *S/RES/1333* (2000), which barred states from providing arms and other forms of military or technical assistance and imposed diplomatic sanctions.[170] It also demanded that the Taliban immediately move to close all terrorist camps.[171] Furthermore, *1333* expanded the asset freezing provision to cover funds of all entities associated with Usama bin Laden and *Al Qaeda*.[172] These actions, as well as related resolutions, represented a notable shift for the Security Council: it was the first time the Council had requested Member State compliance in an action not aimed to punish a specific State, but a group of trans-national entities.[173] This implied a willingness on the part of the Security Council to confront this new threat to international peace and security.[174]

In order to ensure Member State compliance with these provisions, *1333* improved on the sanctions process in a number of ways. First, it requested that the Secretary-General create a panel of experts to evaluate the success of the arms embargo and the Taliban's compliance with terrorist camp closures.[175] Second, it urged consultation between Member States and the Committee in order to assist States in their implementation of the sanctions.[176] Third, and longest lasting, it asked the Committee to create a list of all known individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda so as to ensure Member States were freezing funds appropriately and thoroughly.[177]

These general mandates remain with the Committee to this day, though specific committee structures, targets, and goals have expanded. Currently, the Committee maintains the list of individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda, assists Member States in producing compliance reports, considers sanction violations and exemptions, and works with applicable regional and U.N. based organizations, including Interpol and the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee.[178] Concurrently, sanctions were expanded to include an asset freeze, arms embargo, and a control on border movement.[179] Additionally, *S/RES/1526* (2004) and *S/RES/1617* (2005) defined a Monitoring

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[164] *Ibid.*

[165] Bantekas, Ilias. (2003). The International Law of Terrorism Financing. *The American Journal of International Law.* 97, 315-333.

[166] *Ibid.*, p. 316.

[167] United Nations Security Council. (1999, October 15). *On the Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1267). New York: Author.

[168] United Nations Security Council. (1998, December 8). *On the Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1214). New York: Author.

[169] UN Security Council, *supra*, note 167.

[170] United Nations Security Council. (2000, December 19). *On the Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1333). New York: Author.

[171] *Ibid.*

[172] *Ibid.*

[173] Szasz, Paul C. (2002). Security Council Starts Legislating. *The American Journal of International Law.* 96,. 901-906.

[174] *Ibid.*, p. 902.

[175] UN Security Council, *On the Situation in Afghanistan, supra*, note 170.

[176] *Ibid.*

[177] *Ibid.*

[178] United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee. (2003, April 10). *Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Work.* New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 10, 2005, from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf

[179] United Nations Security Council. (2004, January 30). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Attacks.* (S/RES/1526). New York: Author.

Group charged with the task of overseeing these efforts, finding better methods of utilizing international and State resources, and reporting its findings back to the Security Council.[180]

Because the Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda Organization (the List) serves as a clearinghouse for States seeking to comply with the Committee's mandate, it acts as the central instrument of the Committee's strategy.[181] Available online, the List currently contains 144 individuals or entities related to the Taliban and 302 individuals or entities related to Al Qaeda.[182] Entries are added to or removed from the list at the request of Member States by unanimous consent of all Committee members.[183]

While the list has had some success, it has received criticism from a variety of sources, including the Committee itself.[184] First and foremost, the list, with approximately 400 entries, remains far less than an exhaustive compendium of all members of Al Qaeda.[185] Indeed, a similar list maintained by Interpol and the U.S. Department of Treasury is over 200 pages long.[186] There are several reasons for this disparity. The unanimous consent methodology of the Committee sets a high burden of proof for additions.[187] Member States have also neglected to submit names out of concern for secrecy and the negative effect the public List can have on ongoing investigations.[188]

Finally, some States are disinclined to offer names because the list amounts to an extra-judicial indictment of those on it.[189] Two Swedish citizens, for example, were placed on the list and their assets thereby frozen in 2001.[190] Later proven innocent and taken off the list, their assets were nonetheless inaccessible and their names disgraced in the interim.[191] Moreover, these individuals could not ask to be removed themselves; Member States are the only entities with the power to petition the Committee to de-list an entity.[192]

Terrorist financing is a difficult world to penetrate, populated as it is by alternative remittance systems (ARS), charities, crime, cash couriers, and a wide range of front organizations.[193] ARS cover a wide range of activities, most notably *hawala*, a widespread extra-banking system used for transferring money.[194] *Hawala* and similar

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[180] *Ibid.*

United Nations Security Council. (2005, July 29). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Attacks.*
 (S/RES/1617). New York: Author.

[181] Rosand, Eric. (2004, October). The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban
 Sanctions. *The American Journal of International Law.* 98, 745-763.

[182] United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee. (2005, July 29). *The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities
 Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda Organization as Established and Mandated by the 1267
 Committee.* New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 10, 2005, from
 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm

[183] Guidelines, *supra*, note 178, p. 5.

[184] United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee. (2003, December 2). *Second Report of the Monitoring Group.* New
 York: Author.

[185] Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Group, *supra,* note 7, p. 11.

[186] United States Department of Treasury and Interpol. (2005, August 3). *Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.*
 Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved August 12, 2005, from
 http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf

[187] Baali, Abdallah. (2004, January 12). Statement before the Security Council on Threats to International Peace and Security
 Caused by Terrorist Attacks. New York: Author. Retrieved August 13, 2005, from http://www.algeria-
 un.org/default.asp?doc=2039

[188] Second Report of the Monitoring Group, *supra,* note 182, p. 11.

[189] Rosand, *supra,* note 181, p. 751.

[190] Brand, Constant. (2003, October 14). EU High Court hears first case on people wanting to be removed from EU's terrorism
 blacklist. *Associated Press*: Luxembourg. Retrieved August 13, 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.

[191] Tomlinson, Chris. (2003, October 27). Somali banker accused of being Al-Qaida money man in legal limbo two years later.
 Associated Press: Mogadishu. Retrieved August 13, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis.

[192] Guidelines, *supra,* note 178, p. 4.

[193] Raphaeli, Nimrod. (2003). Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods, and Channels. *Terrorism & Political Violence.* 15: 4.
 59-85.

[194] Jost., Patrick M., and Sandhu, Harjit Singh. (2000). The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its role in Money
 Laundering. *United States Department of the Treasury and Interpol.* Retrieved August 14, 2005, from
 http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp

systems use a trusted network of agents to transfer money over great distances, without money changing hands.[195] Instead, the hawala agent initiating the transfer instructs their contact in the recipient's area to immediately pay the beneficiary under the assumption that repayment will be made through goods, services or favors.[196] While prone to abuse, these are usually legitimate systems that exist due to a disparity between the formal rule structure of the international banking system and the informality of local custom.[197] Charities have also been used frequently to fund terrorism; often, these charities combine terrorist financing with work toward stated goals like helping the poor.[198] Since Islam requires its followers to contribute money to charity, the proliferation of such extraneous activities in legitimate organizations becomes particularly problematic.[199] Such activity prompted Saudi Arabia to suspend all overseas charity work until a proper review of their endeavors could be completed and an oversight mechanism created.[200] Finally, the proliferation of cash couriers, who can transport large amounts long distances without the assistance of banking systems, prompted the Security Council to include greater border control examination in the Committee's mandate.[201] The Committee is tasked with assisting States' efforts in monitoring these areas and implementing effective countermeasures.[202]

The Committee recommends that States use the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)'s *40 Recommendations* and *Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing* as guidelines for developing and enforcing terrorism financing legislation.[203] These guidelines, particularly the *Nine Special Recommendations*, provide a comprehensive framework that includes inter-State information exchange, charity monitoring and regulation, and border controls to halt cash couriers.[204] Working with the Committee, the International Monetary Fund, the FATF, and related organizations, over 90 States have created Financial Intelligence Units delegated with the task of enforcing money laundering and terrorist financing laws.[205] Only three States have not included money-laundering legislation in their legal code; however, many States still need to work on both enforcement and extensiveness of existing legislation.[206] Usually, this is due to a lack of resources rather than a lack of will.[207]

Conclusions

The Committee faces an uphill battle whose success is tied to the effectiveness of Member States' implementation of counter-terrorism legislation. For example, the Committee's arms embargo has left *Al Qaeda* with a limited set of arms resources, though what is available remains deadly.[208] In order to effectively marshal resources, the Committee is mandated to maintain a list of individuals and entities known to be affiliated or derived from *Al Qaeda*. The List's credibility relies on the veracity of its contents; nonetheless, the Committee has encountered difficulty convincing States to provide updated lists of names.[209] Similarly, 30% of Member States have yet to

[195] El-Qorchi, Mohammed. (2004). Hawala: Based on Trust, Subject to Abuse. *Economic Perspectives.* 9, 24-28.

[196] Jamwal, N.S. (2002). Hawala-The Invisible Financing System of Terrorism. *Strategic Analysis.* 26, 181-198.

[197] Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Group, *supra,* note 7, p. 25.

[198] Second Report of the Monitoring Group, *supra,* note 184, p. 4

[199] Raphaeli, *supra,* note 193, p. 62.

[200] Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. (2004, March 3). Saudi Arabia Tightens Control on Charity Abroad; New Commission will Allow Overseas Aid to Resume Under Strict Regulation. Retrieved August 14, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis.

[201] United Nations Security Council (2002, January 16). *The Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1390). New York: Author.

[202] United Nations Security Council, *supra,* note 178.

[203] Financial Action Task Force. (2004, October 22). Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. Paris: Author. Retrieved August 14, 2005, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf. See also Financial Action Task Force. (2003, June 20). The Forty Recommendations. Paris: Author. Retrieved August 14, 2005 from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.pdf

[204] *Ibid.*, Nine Special Recommendations, p. 2-3.

[205] Second Report of the Monitoring Group, *supra,* note 184, p. 13.

[206] Financial Action Task Force. (2005, June 10). Annual and Overall Review of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories. Paris: Author. Retrieved August 14 2005 from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/41/26/34988035.pdf

[207] Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Group, *supra,* note 152, p. 11.

[208] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[209] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

submit a report detailing their implementation of *1267* and related sanctions.[210] These shortcomings on the part of the international community needlessly hamper the work of the Committee.

The international community's various anti-terrorism conventions; *S/RES/1373*, which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee; the CTC itself, and the 1267 Committee represent four 'prongs' in the UNSC's counter-terrorism strategy.[211] What can the international community do to prevent further terrorist attacks? The Secretary-General's *Secure World* (2005) report suggested that a "capacity-building trust fund" be established to better empower States lacking the resources to combat terrorism.[212] If created, will this be enough to assist Member States? Are there any ways that the Committee can better enhance its working relationship with the CTC, FATF, Interpol, and other inter-governmental and regional organizations? Finally, while bearing in mind the mandate of similar organizations like the CTC, are there any facets to the struggle against terrorism that the international community is missing and would fit with the mandate of the Committee? The struggle against terrorism is likely to continue as a long-standing threat to international peace and security. Accordingly, the international community's response should remain structured such that it can continue to confront these threats as they emerge and evolve.

Annotated Bibliography

Committee History

General Assembly Opens Debate on 'Group-of-Four'-Sponsored Draft Resolution on Security Council Reform.
    (2005, July 11). *United Nations Press Release*. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from
    http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10367.doc.htm
    The UN reform process has inspired several competing formulas and ideas from a variety of
    sources. The Group of Four, which consists of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, seeks to
    enlarge the Security Council to 25. To do so, they would add 6 new permanent and 4 new non-
    permanent members. Some countries see this resolution as an attempt to gain power, however, as
    the Group of Four would most likely be the States added to the Council.

Malone, David M. (1998). *Decision Making in the UN Security Council*. London: Oxford University Press.
    Malone's text is a case study of UN decision making in the context of the ongoing Haitian crisis.
    Haitian military overthrew the country's president in 1991, and the Security Council employed a
    variety of measures to restore his position. They started with light sanctions and progressively
    moved to harsher measures.

No author. (2005). *Timeline of UN Peacekeeping Missions*. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_UN_peacekeeping_missions
    Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia designed around the idea that if the entire world is able to
    edit an entry, it should be reliable. As such, it is not as rigorous as a peer-reviewed source, but
    can be trusted to be generally reliable. This is an alternate, condensed source for a timeline of
    UN peacekeeping operations.

Pressing for enlarged Security Council, Annan cites 'democracy deficit.' (2005, July 15). *United Nations News*
    Center.   Retrieved August 7, 2005, from
    http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15019&Cr=security&Cr1=council
    Annan characterizes the Security Council as a body lacking democratic representation. Drawing
    upon his In Larger Freedom report, he suggests that the body should be increased to 24 members.
    The UN structure has remained largely unchanged since 1965. Several competing plans have
    been introduced for a September 2005 conference examining them.

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[210] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[211] Rosand, supra, note 181, p. 746.
[212] Secure World, *supra,* note 147, p. 50.

Salla, Michael. (1996). Peace Enforcement vs. Non-Violent Intervention. *Peace Review*, 8, 547-555.
      Salla discusses the problem of enforcing peace without the use of force. He begins with a history
      of peace enforcement, which he suggests began as early as 1000 AD. Continuing, Salla compared
      the role the Security Council played in the Iraq/Kuwait war with the role it played in Somalia.
      Finally, military force is characterized as the final sanction.

United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Chapter 5.
      San Francisco: Author.
      The UN Charter, written in 1945, remains the crucial operating document of the institution.
      Chapter 5 discusses the duties and composition of the Security Council. Composed of 15
      members, including 5 permanent ones, it is charged with the duty of maintaining international
      peace. To do so, it may establish subsidiary bodies that focus better on its work. Finally, this
      chapter goes over some of the Council's basic rules of procedure.

United Nations. (2005, March 21). *In Larger Freedom: Executive Summary*. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved
      August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/summary.html
      Faced with growing criticism of the UN, Secretary General Kofi Annan constituted a high level
      panel to exam reform initiatives. One of its key foci was an overhaul of the Security Council
      within the context of strengthening the institution of the United Nations. At the same time, it seeks
      to help people find freedom from want, fear, and to live in dignity. These ideas have become the
      basis of several competing reform plans.

United Nations. (2005, March 21). *In Larger Freedom – V: Strengthening the United Nations*. New York, NY:
      Author. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm
      The In Larger Freedom reform document suggested two models for Security Council reform. The
      first, Plan A, adds six new states to the Security Council's permanent seats, selected upon a
      regional basis; as well as three new rotating States. Plan B simply adds eight four-year seats and
      two two-year seats. Either plan would be a significant step toward security council reform.

United Nations. (2005). *Membership and Presidency of the Security Council in 2005*. New York: NY: Author.
      Retrieved August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_members.html
      This website simply lists the members of the Security Council. At time of writing, the Philippines is
      Council President. Presidency rotates each month based on alphabetical, English order. Five
      states will end their term at the close of 2005. Their replacements should be listed at this website
      in January 2006.

United Nations General Assembly. (1963). Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the
      Economic and Social Council. (A/RES/1991A). New York: Author.
      By 1963, the United Nations was showing the strains of almost two decades of growth. It had
      expanded dramatically, particularly to include several post-colonial states. A movement to
      expand representation on the Security Council resulted in this resolution. Membership was
      expanded to the current 15 Members via the addition of four new rotating states.

United Nations General Assembly. (2000, September 8). *United Nations Millennium Declaration* (A/RES/55/2).
      New York, NY: Author.
      The Millennium Declaration was crafted with the intention of creating tangible goals to fight
      poverty, environmental degradation, illiteracy, and other global problems. It set a series of goals
      for 2015. Nonetheless, the UN has found motivating donor states and ensuring transparency in
      recipient states to be a daunting task. One of the issues surrounding UN reform is the viability of
      the Millennium Declaration as a lasting blueprint for international development.

United Nations MONUC. (2005). *MONUC Background*. Retrieved September 1, 2005 from
      http://www.monuc.org/MissionEn.aspx
      MONUC, which is a French acronym for the current UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of
      Congo, was begun in 1999. It was chartered to keep the peace after the Lusaka agreement.
      Previous fighting had threatened to draw in nine neighbouring states into the battle. Accordingly,
      the mission is seen as a means to keep the peace in central Africa.

United Nations Security Council. (2001, September 28). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts.* (SC/RES/1373). New York, NY: Author.
Resolution 1333 expanded the sanctions imposed in Resolution 1267 against Al Qaeda and the Taleban. The resolution calls for the extradition of Osama bin Laden and other terrorists residing and training within its borders. To achieve this end, it created the precedent of maintaining a list of those involved in terrorism for sanction purposes. It also created the CTC.

United Nations Security Council. (2003). *CTC: About the CTC: Mandate.* Retrieved August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/mandate.html
The Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was created by the Security Council to oversee States' efforts to fight terrorism. It assists States in crafting new legislation and enforcing existing laws by acting as a clearinghouse for information. In the past year, it has come under criticism for being ineffective. To counter these claims, the Security Council has urged greater compliance and coordination with the 1267 Committee.

United Nations Security Council. (2003, April 10). Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 7, 2005, from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf
This webpage is a summary of the mandates of the 1267 Committee. The majority of the document covers areas relating to the maintenance of the Consolidated List. It also includes information on basic Committee rules, such as voting and composition. Finally, it concludes with a section describing the requirements of the State reports.

United Nations Security Council. (2004, April 28). Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (SC/RES/1540). New York, NY: Author.
Faced with the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a breach of the peace, the Security Council created a committee with this resolution. Dubbed the 1540 Committee, its mandate is to report on States' efforts to ensure that WMD materials do not find their way into the hands of non-state actors. These include compliance with international treaties, physical protection practices, border controls, and effective shipping protection.

United Nations Security Council. (2005, July 29). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorism Acts.* (SC/RES/1617). New York, NY: Author.
Expanding upon the duties of the 1267 Committee, this resolution looks to a new threat: portable air defense systems. Terrorism experts had expressed concern that shoulder launched missiles could attack and down aircraft. It also urges States to enact the guidelines of the Financial Action Task Force.

Weiss, Thomas G. (2003). The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, 26, 147-161.
The war in Iraq, the oil for food scandal, and growing hostility resulting from varying problems with peacekeeping missions have taken their toll on the UN Security Council's credibility. Accordingly, the long-term effectiveness of the Council is contingent upon its ability to reform itself. Nonetheless, Weiss argues that structural changes will not be as crucial as actual behavioral changes. Those, he says, must be driven by the Permanent-5, particularly the United States.

I. On Security Council Reform in All Aspects

Annan acknowledges delays in UN Council reform. (2005, August 11). *Reuters*. Retrieved August 11, 2005 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2005/0811postpone.htm.
The Global Policy Forum is a non-government organization whose mission is to monitor the United Nations and its policymaking. As such, it has a comprehensive collection of information on Security Council reform proposals on its Web site. In a short article updating progress on discussions regarding Security Council reform prior to the September 2005 summit, Secretary General Annan's revised position on Council expansion is outlined in which he recognizes the

difficulties in reaching an agreement regarding reform but emphasizes the dire need for it before the year's end.

Annan, Kofi. (May/June 2005). "'In larger freedom:' decision time at the UN." *Foreign affairs,* volume 84.
    This article in Foreign Affairs *magazine is a summary of Secretary General Annan's more complete report presented to the General Assembly. He emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive collective security system by illustrating the various meanings of the word "threat" to different people. Mr. Annan explains that these differences in perception may be the most significant obstacle in formulating a more cohesive security arrangement, yet it is precisely due to the depth and breadth of international threats that an overhaul of the United Nations is urgently needed.*

Ariyoruk, Ayca. (2005, June 3). *Players and proposals in the Security Council debate.* Retrieved August 11, 2005 from http://www.centerforunreform.org/pdfs/ReformWatchRevisedJune3.pdf.
    The myriad of proposals for Security Council reform and their respective proponents are summarized and explained in this analytic article published by the Center for UN Reform. The details, pros, and cons for each of the major proposals are presented, along with an analysis of competing proposals. The article also explains the differences between permanent and non-permanent membership and their respective benefits and downfalls.

High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. (2004). *A more secure world: our shared responsibility.* New York, NY.
    Secretary General Annan assembled the High Level Panel with a mandate to recommend policy measures to ensure a concerted and effective collective security response to problems and challenges facing the international community. The most widely known and favored models for Security Council reform are presented in this report. The panel also makes recommendations on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; terrorism; inter- and intrastate wars; poverty, disease, and sustainable development; and transnational organized crime.

Hoffman, Walter. (1994). *United Nations Security Council Reform and Restructuring.* The Center for UN Reform Education: Livingston, NJ.
    Although this report is an older document, it is nevertheless useful in evaluating the history of reform proposals throughout the history of the United Nations. Walter Hoffman does an excellent job of detailing reform proposals that were presented and ultimately failed, and he also gives analyses of why United Nations reform was, and still is, a sensitive topic of discussion. Interestingly, Hoffman's work shows that Germany and Japan were historically favored as additions to the permanent membership of the Security Council long before the current round of reform discussions began.

Hurd, Ian. (1997). Security Council reform. In Bruce Russert (Ed.), *The once and future Security Council.*
    Ian Hurd's essay on reform is one of many pieces in a compilation of articles discussing a range of issues regarding the Security Council. Hurd's essay is a careful and detailed analysis of the reasons why the Council should be reformed and why it has not been reformed to date. The essay also makes some suggestions as to selection criteria for new permanent members of the Council should a reform proposal expanding permanent membership be adopted.

Laurenti, Jeffrey. (2005, July 19). *A Security Council numbers game: all bets off.* Retrieved August 11, 2005 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2005/0719betsoff.htm.
    Despite a general push from Member States, most notably by Japan and Germany, to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council, the current permanent members see expansion as counterintuitive to the arrangement of the Council. In this article, Jeffrey Laurenti, a senior fellow in international affairs at the Century Foundation, examines the impact of the United States' retraction of support to Japan in its bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council in addition to scrutinizing the African Union's proposal for Council expansion. However, Laurenti contends that what is needed is not necessarily expansion, but a renewed commitment to responsible power.

Paul, James, & Nahory, Céline. (2005, July 13). *Theses toward a democratic reform of the Security Council.* Retrieved August 10, 2005 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713theses.htm. *This article by two analysts at the Global Policy Forum discusses the need for a reform in the practices of the Council in addition to its membership. James Paul and Céline Nahory assert that rather than bring forth regional rivalries through competing bids for permanent membership, Member States should focus more on ensuring the Council is democratic and transparent. According to the authors, an improvement in the Council's working methods would yield more results than an expansion of membership.*

Power, Samantha. (September/October 2004). "Business as usual at the UN." *Foreign Policy*, issue 144. *Samantha Power is a lecturer in public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. This article outlines some of the many challenges and demands faced by the United Nations and its ability to cope with and accommodate them in its current arrangement. Power concludes that the United Nations is only as strong as its Member States allow it to be, and to adequately address the challenges of the 21st century, the UN can and should be strengthened.*

United Nations General Assembly. (2005, March 21). *In larger freedom: towards development, security, and human rights for all.* New York, NY: Kofi Annan. *This document is a report of the Secretary General for decision by the Heads of State and Government for the September 2005 Summit. The Secretary General organizes the report into four main sections: Freedom from want; Freedom from fear; Freedom to live in dignity; and Strengthening the United Nations. More specifically with regard to the Security Council, the Secretary General emphasizes the need for the Council to be reflective of the realities of power today.*

United Nations General Assembly. (2005, July 6). *Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters.* (A/59/L.64). New York: Author. *This is a draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly by a number of Member States, but most notable of them are the G-4 (Brazil, India, Japan, and Germany). The draft resolution calls for adding six permanent and four non-permanent members through an amendment of the Charter. Greater transparency and inclusiveness are also called for, and the draft resolution also encourages regular consultations of the Council with Member States contributing the most troops and financial resources.*

Williams, Ian. (2005, July 26). *Not-so-musical chairs.* Retrieved August 11, 2005 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2005/0726musicalchairs.htm. *In this short but thorough article, Ian Williams delineates the circumstances surrounding the formation and original configuration of the Security Council and the challenges for reform it faces now. Williams concisely narrates reasons why Council reform could encounter numerous impediments in its progress, primarily due to regional rivalries. The author emphasizes the need to address even more difficult issues facing the international community, such as HIV/AIDS, poverty, and human rights without succumbing to the complexities of Council membership.*

II. International Instruments to Mitigate the Threat of the use of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorists

Albright, David. (2002). Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents. *The Nautilus Institute Foreign Policy Online.* 47. Retrieved September 10, 2005 from http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html *After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, reporters spent months scouring the Afghani cities for clues as to Al Qaeda's intentions. Among the documents they found were plans for nuclear weapons. These plans were of varying quality. Some, in fact, showed that the author had little real understanding of how nuclear weapons function.*

Albright, David and Hinderstein, Corey. (2005). Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks. *The Washington Quarterly*. 28:111-128.
Dr. A.Q. Khan was the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, first tested in the late 1990s to offset the advantages of India's own nuclear tests. While he was developing nuclear weapons, however, he was also planning an international arms network. Khan allegedly sold nuclear centrifuges and know-how to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. He is currently under house arrest.

Agureyev, Aleksey. (1998). Two Lithuanians Sentenced in Missile Plot in USA. ITAR-TSS. August 20, 1998. Retrieved abstract September 12, 2005 from http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1998/19980530.htm
Two Lithuanian arms dealers were sentenced to prison in the United States in 1998 for selling anti-aircraft missiles. Although their possession of and access to nuclear weapons was never proven, they claimed that they could also sell two nuclear weapons to their clients. Their presence on the international arms market underscores the danger of former Soviet nuclear materials on the black market. This is made especially poignant after al Qaeda's stated intention to acquire nuclear weapons.

Betts, Richard K. (2000). Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism. In Utgoff, Victor (Ed.), *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests and World Order*. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 78-79.
In this chapter, Betts examines trends in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and international relations. WMDs, he argues, allow countries with an unstable security arrangement to opportunity to gain an advantage in their situation. The same mode of thinking can be applied to terrorists. Terrorists operate under a numerically disadvantaged vantage; WMDs can assist them in their efforts to overcome that disadvantage.

Branch-Brioso, Karen. (2004, June 3). Details Released about Padilla's Terror Ties. *Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service*. Retrieved September 10, 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.
Jose Padilla was arrested in 2002 for conspiring to detonate a dirty bomb in a major US city. An American citizen and former gang member, Padilla allegedly traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Al Qaeda officials. He was also allegedly involved in plots to blow up apartment buildings in major American cities. Padilla is currently being held by American officials.

Bunn, G., and Braun, C. (2003). Terrorism potential for research reactors compared with power reactors: Nuclear weapons, "dirty bombs," and truck bombs. *American Behavioral Scientist*. 46: 714-727.
This article explores the possibilities of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials and the various places from which they could find them. The authors show that more relaxed security measures at research facilities are generally less secure than energy facilities. Nonetheless, the authors believe that terrorists would only be able to work with highly enriched uranium, not the more garden variety more commonly available at research facilities.

Cameron, Gavin. (1999). Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaida. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 22: 277-309.
In 1995, Aum Shinrinkyo, a Japanese cult, released several vials of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway. This is the only major known example of a terrorist organization attempting to unleash WMDs on the world. Both Aum Shinrinkyo and Al Qaeda have pursued WMDs, and the author posits that they have pursued similar channels in their attempts to acquire them. These have included building weapons themselves, buying or stealing them, and building radiological or other non-nuclear weapons.

Cameron, Gavin. (2005). Nuclear Terrorism: Weapons for Sale or Theft? *Foreign Policy Agenda*. 10: 17-20.
Nuclear terrorism remains among the most disturbing specters facing the world. Cameron separates nuclear terrorism into four categories: use of a nuclear device, use of fissile material for a nuclear weapon, use of fissile material for a radiological weapon or 'dirty' bomb, and the targeting of a nuclear facility. Terrorists will not easily be able to use any of these weapons, however, due to the problems inherent in acquiring, creating, and transporting nuclear materials. Nonetheless, Cameron argues, the world must strive to ensure that all nuclear materials and weapons are accounted for.

Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. (opened for signature September 14, 2005).
After seven years of negotiations, the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was finally opened for signature in September 2005. Under the Convention, participating States must criminalize the illegal possession or use of nuclear materials and strive to ensure that their safety standards are incompliance with international codes. The Convention follows in the footsteps of decades of terrorism and nuclear conventions. Moreover, its passage has led to calls for a comprehensive terrorism convention.

Center for Defense Information. (2005, May 17). *Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.* Retrieved September 17, 2005 from http://www.cdi.org/news/law/ntc.cfm
First proposed by the Russian Federation, the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signature in September 2005. This article discusses its purposes. One of the Convention's most interesting characteristics is the attention it pays to the rights of the accused. Until this time, many detainees lived in a relative state of limbo.

Ellis, Brent. (2003). Countering Complexity: An Analytical Framework to guide Counter-Terrorism Policy Making. *The Electronic Journal of the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute.* 6.
The end of the Cold War has led to a greater number of terrorist organizations. Moreover, these organizations have increasingly resorted to more lethal attacks, from 9/11 to the July 7 attacks in London. This article tries to create an analytical framework for understanding each organization along motivational, methodological, and technological lines. Accordingly, the framework can be used to understand a group's organization structure as it compares to other groups.

Ewans, Martin. (2002). Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics. New York: HarperCollins.
Sir Martin Ewans was an Officer in Britain's Diplomatic Services, serving in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and a variety of other locations. In this book, he offers a history of Afghanistan, from its tribal composition, to its status as a pawn in global politics. Starting with the 'Great Game' and continuing through the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghanistan was often caught up in the larger powers' quest to consolidate power. The text continues with an examination of the Taliban's rise to power.

Fair, C. Christine and Chalk, Peter. (2004). Domestic Disputes: Pakistani Internal Security. *The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.* 5: 39-47.
Before the U.S.-led attack on the Taliban in 2001, Pakistan was one of the Taliban's most critical supporters. Since that time, Pakistani President Musharaf has thrown his support behind international efforts to counter terrorism and assist in the anti-Taliban efforts. Their work has not been without complications, however. Support for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations runs deep in Pakistani intelligence, which has been purged of unsupportive officials multiple times since 2001. This article documents the problems Pakistan has been having.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (1957). *Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.* Vienna: Author.
The International Atomic Energy Agency was formed in 1957 to provide a set of international standards for nuclear facilities. It was also designed to foster international cooperation and information sharing. After the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its role was expanded to include safeguarding the world from nuclear proliferation. The statute has been amended three times since its inception.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2004). Measures to Strengthen International Co-Operation in Nuclear, Radiation, and Transportation Safety and Waste Management. (GC(48)/INF/3). Vienna: Author.
Each year, the IAEA is required to report on the year's developments in the realm of nuclear energy. This is the 2003 report. It outlines the inclusion of several new safety regulations in the international standards and State's efforts to enact those standards. It also reports on the Agency's worldwide energy facility inspection efforts.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2004). *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.* (IAEA/CODEOC/2004). Vienna: Author.
The Code of Conduct is a standard for ensuring that nuclear and other radioactive material remains secure. A long-standing Code, it was updated in 2003 to reflect international concerns regarding nuclear terrorism. For example, the Code was expanded to include enrichment equipment in its security standards. Although not legally binding, several States have expressed their support for the new standards.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005). *Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.* (IAEA/CODEOC/IMP-EXP/2005). Vienna: Author.
Terrorism experts believe that there are several paths terrorists can take toward nuclear or radiological weapons. These include, most prominently, the use of nuclear weapons and the use of radiological or 'dirty' bombs, which do not require the same level of skill in preparation and transportation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA developed these standards to ensure that fissile materials, which are required for radiological weapons, remain secure. These guidelines were developed through consultation with 41 Member States.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (1997). Model Protocol Additional to the Agrrement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. (INFCIRC/540). Vienna: Author.
The relationship between the IAEA and each State it inspects is negotiated on a State by State and case by case basis. Because of sovereignty issues, the IAEA has to request permission and access to nuclear facilities. The Model Protocol is a standard framework for such negotiations. It includes provisions for access at declared sites, undeclared sites, and locations where uranium enrichment could occur.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005). *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.* (GOV/2005/67). Vienna: Author.
The ongoing crisis over nuclear materials in Iran stems from Iran's intention to use byproducts from its nuclear facilities for weapons purposes. Despite initial denials on the part of the Iranian officials, the IAEA was unable to confirm that the State's intentions were entirely innocent. The IAEA's inspections have led the EU and the US to attempt to negotiate with Iran over the use of its enrichment facilities. Nonetheless, Iran re-activated its enrichment process in August, 2005.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005). Communication dated 1 August 2005 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency. (INFCIRC/648). Vienna: Author.
Iran's uranium enrichment programs have sparked concern from the international community that the State is trying to develop nuclear weapons. Iran claims, however, that it is only trying to ensure that it does not have to rely on others for fuel for its reactors; currently, it has to import that fuel from other countries. After several months of negotiations, this letter declares its intentions to restart its enrichment process. The IAEA has voted to refer Iran's case to the Security Council.

Ismail, Jamal. (1999). I Am Not Afraid of Death. *Newsweek*, 133, 154-159.
   In 1998, Newsweek reporter Jamal Ismail became one of the first Western reporters to interview Osama bin Laden. The interview ranged over several areas, including bin Laden's recent fatwas against the United States and other powers. Bin Laden also famously stated that he was not afraid of death. At the time, bin Laden was residing under the auspices of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2000). Terror in the Mind of God. Berkeley: University of California Press.
   In this text, Mark Juergensmeyer examines several religiously oriented terrorist organizations as they developed through the 1990s. He focuses on three main movements: American right-wing militia movements, Aum Shinrinkyo, and Al Qaeda. The latter two, in particular, represent what the author calls 'millennial' terrorist organizations. These groups tend to elevate their conflict to 'cosmic' levels, leaving no room for negotiation and instilling their followers with religious devotion.

Karam, P.A. (2005). Radiological Terrorism. *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment.* 11: 501-523.
   Radiological terrorism is the use of fissile materials to create a 'dirty' bomb, which spreads radioactive isotopes upon explosion. Karam posits that it is very difficult for any such weapon to contaminate an entire city or even most first responders. Nonetheless, most police and ambulance workers have not been trained to deal with such situations. Accordingly, this situation could lead to panic among afflicted populations.

Kronstadt, K. A. (2003). *Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation*. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. (CRS No. RL31624).
   The Congressional Research Service provides non-partisan research reports to the American Congress. This report summarizes Pakistan's efforts to assist the U.S. in its regional anti-terrorism efforts. Pakistan has cracked down on some of the more hard-line elements in its population. That policing, however, have led to renewed levels of anti-Americanism among the Pakistani people.

Kumar, Sumita. (2001). Pakistan's Jehadi Apparatus: Goals and Methods. *Strategic Analysis*. 24.
   Since its founding, Pakistan's security situation has been complicated by the superior numbers of India's military. After several wars, many over the Jammu-Kashmir region, Pakistan began to support several freedom fighter organizations, both in the Indian and Afghani theaters. Doing so adds a force multiplier to Pakistan's strategic situation. This has been coordinated through the Pakistani intelligence services.

Lasker, Roz D. (2004, September 14). Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public.
   New York Academy of Medicine Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health. Retrieved September 14, 2005 from
   http://www.cacsh.org/pdf/RedefiningReadinessStudy.pdf
   When making contingency plans for terrorism and other disaster situations, organizers often do not view the situation from the public's point of view. This report summarizes findings from a broad survey examining public reactions to hypothetical disasters. Public reaction to a dirty bomb explosion is featured prominently in the findings. It found that not all people would trust expert recommendations, instead attempting to assure the safety of their dependents.

Lavoy, Peter R., Khan, Feroz H. (2004). Rogue or Responsible Nuclear Power? Making Sense of Pakistan's Nuclear Practices. *Strategic Insights* 3. Retrieved from
   http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/feb/lavoyfeb04.asp
   This article traces the evolution of Pakistani nuclear policy from the mid-1970s to today. Even at its outset, Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons were opposed by the international community. This opposition was compounded by the revelations of Dr. Khan's clandestine arms sales network. After this embarrassment, however, Pakistan took positive steps by enacting new legislation on export controls.

Lutes, Charles D. (2005). New Players on the Scene: A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market. *Foreign Policy Agenda* 10.
> *Dr. A. Q. Khan's nuclear sales network was not revealed until a German vessel full of centrifuges and other equipment was caught heading toward Libya. The investigation revealed several front companies in United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and South Africa. Equipment was sold to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. This article provides a summary of Khan's network and its ramifications.*

McDonald, Joseph C., Coursey, Bert M., and Carter, Michael. (2004). Detecting Illicit Radioactive Sources. *Physics Today.* 57: 36-41.
> *One of the key challenges in preventing the spread of radioactive materials is ensuring that it does not cross state lines. This is a difficult task, however, because radioactive scanners have traditionally been too cumbersome to effectively scan every shipping container. Drawing on fields as divergent as physics and medicine, specialists are developing more effective scanners. This article summarizes some of this work.*

Møller, Per S. (2005). *Speech: Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Will Multilateral Diplomacy Work?* Copenhagen, DK: Author. Retrieved September 14, 2005 from http://www.um.dk/en/servicemenu/News/FrontPageNews/NuclearProliferationInThe21stCenturyWillMultilateralDiplomacyWork.htm
> *Mr. Moller is Denmark's Minister for Foreign Affairs. Moller gave this speech at a conference held at the Danish Institute of International Studies in August 2005. He stresses the importance of international cooperation in trying to confront nuclear proliferation. He also urged the strengthening of the NPT.*

Motoc, Mihnea Ioan. (2005, July 5). Briefing by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). New York, NY: Author.
> *M.I. Motoc is the Chairman of the 1540 Committee. In this statement, given before the Security Council in July 2005, Motoc reviews the first nine months of the 1540 Committee's efforts. Since forming, the Committee has received 118 reports and has begun to review them. In the statement, he stressed the importance of the reporting process, transparency in the Committee's efforts, and its efforts to coordinate with other international institutions, but did not go into many details on any of these areas.*

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (opened for signature July 1, 1968).
> *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, was written with the intention of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. At the time of signing, only five states were nuclear powers; since that time, they have been joined by India, Pakistan, and possibly Israel and North Korea. While this shows some inadequacies in the framework, it has been effective in stopping some states from developing weapons, most notably South Africa. The NPT undergoes regular reviews, the most recent of which occurred in Summer 2005.*

Palmore, Julian. (2003). 'Dirty Bombs': An Analysis of Radiological Weapons. *Defense & Security Analysis.* 19, 69-73.
> *Dirty bombs combine the destructive power of a regular bomb with the contamination effects of radiological weapons. Adding radiological material to a bomb does not increase its explosive power, however, so dispersing radiological material requires a large bomb. This makes it more difficult for terrorists to transport such weapons, and limits their destructive power. After explaining this, the article discusses the contaminating power of different radioactive isotopes.*

Rosenau, William. (2001). Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did It Fail? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.* 24: 289-301.
> *Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. Since that time, terrorist experts have analyzed their efforts. The gas Aum Shinrikyo released showed a low level of sophistication, and their pursuit of other forms of WMDs before the sarin attacks were ineffective. For example, the cult bought land in Australia for uranium mining, only to be stymied by export controls on equipment used for enriching the uranium.*

Seward, Amy. (2005). Combating Proliferation: Addressing the Russian Nuclear Threat. *Journal of Public and International Affairs*. 16: 184-205.
When the Soviet Union dissolved, its stockpile of nuclear weapons was split between the new States. Though most of these weapons have been accounted for, some discrepancies in accounting remain. Moreover, many of the ones that were accounted for are not adequately secured. With reports of terrorists performing reconnaissance missions on nuclear facilities, this poses a particularly dangerous threat to international security.

Tellis, Ashley J. (2004). U.S. Strategy: Assessing Pakistan's Transformation. *The Washington Quarterly*. 28: 97-116.
In this article, Tellis highlights the attention Pakistan received as a source of international terrorism in the U.S.'s 9/11 investigation. He points to the continuing problems Pakistan has had in cracking down on militants. These efforts have led to a renewed vitality for Islamist parties in Pakistan's political system. Tellis concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at building democratic institutions in the country.

United Nations Press Release (1998, November 11). Opening Debate on Draft Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, Sixth Committee Hears Calls for Definition of Terrorism. New York, NY: Author.
In 1997, the Russian Federation introduced a draft convention aimed at curbing nuclear terrorism. The draft was taken up for debate by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in late 1998. After several years of negotiations, the final Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signatures in September 2005. The Convention calls upon Member States to strengthen criminal penalties for individuals possessing nuclear weapons and to improve cooperation and information sharing practices.

United Nations Security Council. (2004, October 8). *Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*. (S/RES/1540). New York, NY: Author.
Long a concern of terrorism experts, nuclear terrorism was pushed increasingly to the forefront after the 9/11 attacks. In the tradition of the Counter Terrorism Committee and the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, the United Nations Security Council used this resolution to create a committee dedicated to trying to halt nuclear terrorism. The 1540 Committee is currently only collecting reports from Member States and building the Committee's framework. Once that is done, it will focus on providing comprehensive reports to the Security Council.

United Nations Security Council. (2004). Pakistan's national report on national measures on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540. (S/AC.44.2004/(02)/22).
As part of their participation with the 1540 Committee, countries are required to report on their efforts to become compliant with S/RES/1540. 118 countries have submitted reports – a high percentage, but not as high as the Chairman of the committee is seeking. This report highlights Pakistan's actions, which are concerned mostly with export and border controls. When the 1540 Committee completes its analysis, it will report to the Security Council on Pakistan's effectiveness.

Utgoff, Victor. (2000). The Specter of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Proliferation. In Victor Utgoff (Ed.), *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests and World Order*. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 37-39.
Proliferation has been a recurring theme in international relations almost since the United States tested the first nuclear weapons in the 1940s. Since the Cold War ended, those concerns have been extended to include WMDs from countries and non-state actors like terrorists. In this, the opening chapter of a book examining proliferation, Utgoff outlines the challenges WMD pose to security experts. He points particularly to North Korea as a potential threat.

III. Strengthening UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al Qaeda and the Taliban

Annan, Kofi. (2005, 10 March). Statements made at the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, Madrid, Spain. Retrieved August 10, 2005, from http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html#transcripcion
Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave this speech at a gathering of experts seeking to find methods of fighting terrorism within the structures of democracy. Club Madrid, as it is known, is headed by the former President of Brazil and sponsored by the Kingdom of Spain. Its first Summit was held on the one year anniversary of the terrorist bombings of the Madrid subway system.

Baali, Abdallah. (2004, January 12). Statement before the Security Council on Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Attacks. New York: Author. Retrieved August 13, 2005 from http://www.algeria-un.org/default.asp?doc=2039
Abdallah Baali is Algeria's Permanent Representative to the Security Council on matters relating to terrorism. In this statement, given to the Security Council in January 2004, he is lamenting the shortcomings of the 1267 Committee. Specifically, he was concerned that the Consolidated List was in no way comprehensive of Al Qaeda's membership.

Bantekas, Ilias. (2003). The International Law of Terrorism Financing. *The American Journal of International Law*. 97, 315-333.
Bantekas examines the role of international law in combating terrorism financing. He notes that the Security Council adopted a unique new role in combating terrorism after 9/11. This is indicative of the deficiency in dealing with terrorism in the existing international system. To show this, the author discusses a variety of terrorist financing techniques and practices.

Brand, Constant. (2003, October 14). EU High Court hears first case on people wanting to be removed from EU's terrorism blacklist. *Associated Press*: Luxembourg. Retrieved August 13, 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.
Two Swedish Somalis were added to the Consolidated List in 2001 and subsequently had their assets frozen. Almost a year later, their names were taken off the list, but several other names of people who claimed they were innocent were not. Furthermore, these names were added to the lists of several other States, including the EU. This article reports on the status of this case.

Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. (2002). Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Explosives by criminals and their use for Criminal Purposes. New York, NY: Author.
The United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is tasked with reporting on and finding solutions to current crime and criminal justice issues. In this report, the Commission explains the efforts States have taken to combat the proliferation of small arms and explosives. To do so, it reviews the relevant conventions and provides a survey of several States' efforts.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (opened for signatures 26 January 1973). Retrieved 17 July 2005 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_civil_aviation.html
Signed in 1973, this Convention codified the illegality of attacks on airlines. Due to increased interstate travel, this was deemed necessary to ensure that attacks on aircraft over international territory did not end up in legal limbo. It did not, however, cover incidents of aircraft hijacking.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (opened for signatures 10 March 1986). Retrieved 17 July 2005 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_maritime_navigation.html
This Convention attempts to codify the protection of maritime vessels. During the early 1980s, concerns about attacks, crew kidnappings, and explosions on ships prompted the international community to convene a meeting of the International Maritime Organization to forge this Convention. It was later expanded with a protocol regarding offshore platforms.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (opened for signatures 16 December 1970).
Retrieved 17 July 2005 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft_seizure.html
*A precursor to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, this document made the hijacking of an airplane illegal. In the preceding years, several
notable airline hijackings had occurred. It also allows for the extradition of anyone involved in
the hijacking.*

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (opened for signature 14 September
1963). Retrieved 17 July 2005 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft.html.
*Written before the two preceding aircraft Conventions, this convention was crucial to the
development of interstate aircraft trial. It set the precedent for the chain of command on an
aircraft, acceptable behavior, and the plane's jurisdiction. It was not enough to solve the issues
relating to aircraft terrorism, however, and two more related conventions were required.*

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification (opened for signatures 1 March
1991). Retrieved 17 July 2005 from
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_plastic_explosives.html
*The UN Crime Congress has determined that marking plastic explosives can be extraordinarily
beneficial in trying to track down the perpetrators of an attack. This Convention attempts to do
just that. The suppression of plastic explosives, however, has forced bombers to attempt to make
explosives out of materials that are less difficult to track.*

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (opened for signatures 3 March 1980). Retrieved 17 July
2005 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_nuclear_material.html.
*This Convention, signed in 1980, was one of the first international instruments designed to halt the
proliferation of nuclear material. It establishes a structured system for interaction between
Member States and the IAEA. Accordingly, its primary purpose is to ensure that nuclear
materials do not spread to non-nuclear states and non-state actors.*

El-Qorchi, Mohammed. (2004). Hawala: Based on Trust, Subject to Abuse. *Economic Perspectives*. 9, 24-28.
*El-Qorchi is a deputy chief of the International Monetary Fund. In this article, he describes the
basics of hawala systems and how they can be abused by terrorists and terrorist financers.
Hawala is an ancient system for transferring money that is used throughout the world.*

Financial Action Task Force. (2003, June 20). The Forty Recommendations. Paris: Author. Retrieved August 14,
2005 from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.pdf
*The Financial Action Task Force tries to ensure that Member States have effective money
laundering legislation. The Forty Recommendations offer a framework for Member States to
follow as they implement and enforce anti-money laundering laws. They include creating a task
force, enforce due diligence and record keeping and otherwise improve their domestic banking
system.*

Financial Action Task Force. (2004, October 22). Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. Paris:
Author. Retrieved August 14, 2005 from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf
*Like the Forty Recommendations, these nine special recommendations are aimed at States seeking
to improve their domestic money laundering legislation. These recommendations, though much
shorter than the 40, are more specifically designed to combat terrorist financing. They include
freezing terrorist assets, reporting suspicious actions, and engaging in information sharing with
other states. Most recently, the FATF added a recommendation about stopping cash couriers.*

Financial Action Task Force. (2005, June 10). Annual and Overall Review of Non-Cooperative Countries or
Territories. Paris: Author. Retrieved August 14 2005 from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/41/26/34988035.pdf
A crucial aspect of the effort to freeze terrorist funding is ensuring that each State has achieved an
effective standard. The Financial Action Task Force works to ensure that this is the case. Each
year, it surveys the legislation and enforcement capabilities of Member States. This is the most
recent report, finding that most States have made overall progress.

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (opened for signatures 18 December 1979). Retrieved 17
July 2005 from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_hostages.html.
Another in the Conventions relating to terrorism, this Convention codifies international law
relating to the capture of hostages. Its creation was hastened by international backlash over the
taking of American hostages in Iran. This agreement places the duty upon States to ensure that
hostage-takings do not occur within their territory, and, if they do, the perpetrators are taken into
custody.

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (opened for signatures 12 January 1998).
Retrieved 17 July from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_terrorist_bombing.html
This convention bound States to develop and enforce domestic legislation to deal with terrorist
bombings. It establishes jurisdiction over the attack if it occurs within the state or against a State
facility or national. Moreover, it requires that States either extradite any persons responsible for
attacks to countries of jurisdiction or prosecute them.

Jamwal, N.S. (2002). Hawala-The Invisible Financing System of Terrorism. *Strategic Analysis*. 26, 181-198.
Hawala is an ancient system for transferring money. As such, it is a convenient means for
migrants to transfer earnings back home. Unfortunately, it is also used as a means to finance
terrorism. Because it exists outside the confines of the banking system, it is difficult to track. This
article discusses the system.

Jordan, Javier. (2004). Al-Qaeda and Western Islam. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 16, 1. 1-17.
In this article, Jordan attempts to delineate the differences between Al-Qaeda's version of Islam
and its more mainstream counterparts. Moreover, he describes ways in which Al Qaeda can
integrate into Western society. To do so, he offers a few terrorism typologies.

Jost., Patrick M., and Sandhu, Harjit Singh. (2000). The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its role in
Money Laundering. *United States Department of the Treasury and Interpol*. Retrieved August 14, 2005
from http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp
These two experts provide an easy to understand description of the hawala alternative remittance
systems. Hawala is a system to transfer money based on trust. It enables an individual to transfer
money without means of a band and often in a much shorter amount of time. Because the system
is based on trust, few records are kept, making it an attractive form of monetary transmission for
criminals and terrorists.

No Author. (2005, July 14). Solving Britain's first suicide bombing; After the London attacks. *The Economist.*
Retrieved August 14 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.
This article is a summary of the investigation into the July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks in London. It
confirms the number of casualties and the basic information about the attackers. Moreover, it
shows the mindset of the London populace, as polls showed overwhelming majorities sought extra
police protection.

Raphaeli, Nimrod. (2003). Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods, and Channels. *Terrorism & Political*
Violence. 15: 4. 59-85.
Despite the concerted efforts of the international community, only 46 of the 429 suspicious money
transfers reported were investigated. In this article, Raphaeli explores the various ways in which
Al Qaeda funds its operations. He explains the nature of zakat and charities, front organizations,
criminal activities, and some of the paths money takes to terrorist organizations. The article
continues on with several case studies.

Rosand, Eric. (2004, October). The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 98, 4. pp. 745-763.
In this piece, Rosand takes special effort to explain the shortcomings of the Security Council's counter-terrorism efforts. He spends a significant portion of the article discussing the problems with the Consolidated List. Specifically, he cites Member States' complaints about its limited nature and the constraints its structure imposes upon additions. The article continues with a discussion of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. (2004, March 3). Saudi Arabia Tightens Control on Charity Abroad; New Commission will Allow Overseas Aid to Resume Under Strict Regulation. Retrieved August 14, 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.
Saudi Arabian citizens are expected to contribute 2.5% of their salaries to charities. Though many charities are valid, some were found to be diverting funds and resources to terrorist organizations. As a result, Saudi Arabia received a fair amount of criticism. To remedy this, the government banned all overseas charity remittances until a review board could be established.

Schmid, Alex P. (2004). Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 16, 2. 197-222.
Schmid is the Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer in the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime. In this article, he explores the relationship between terrorism and crime, politics, warfare, communication, and religious fundamentalism. He determines that terrorism cannot be viewed except through all of these frameworks.

Szasz, Paul C. (2002). Security Council Starts Legislating. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol. 96, issue 4. pp. 901-906.
The Security Council's response to the September 11 attacks marked a noticeable shift in its practices. Most significantly, this was the first time the Council had requested that States sanction an entity other than another States. Moreover, States were bound by the Council to update their domestic legislation to reflect international counter-terrorism law. Szasz explores the ramifications of this change.

Tomlinson, Chris. (2003, October 27). Somali banker accused of being Al-Qaida money man in legal limbo two years later. *Associated Press*: Mogadishu. Retrieved August 13, 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.
When the Security Council directed the 1267 Committee to create its Consolidated List, several States objected to the relative lack of transparency of its contents. Because the circumstances and evidence for an addition to the list remain secret, these critics claimed that the list amounted to an extra-judicial indictment. Even when they are taken off the List, as a few of the Somali bankers associated with this ring were, their assets are often frozen in other States. This article describes this situation as it applied to some of these bankers.

United Nations. (2004). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 14, 2005 from http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf
After many years of discussion, the United Nations is taking concrete steps toward reform. Sparking the new round of debate is this framework, offered by Secretary-General Annan. It deals with everything from poverty relief to terrorism to Security Council reform.

United Nations General Assembly. (1999, December 9). *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*. (A/RES/54/109). New York: Author.
This resolution sought to undermine the financing of terrorism. It bound States to seize funds and assets supporting terrorism and establish domestic legislation to curb such support. It did not, however, offer any recommendations as to how a State can achieve this goal.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. (2005). *Terrorism.* Retrieved 17 July 2005 from
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism.html.
Setup by the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes, this website gives an overview of UN action against terrorism. It starts with a list of the relevant UN documents, and continues with links to technical assistance. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has acted as one of the key clearinghouses for information relating to counterterrorism.

United Nations Security Council. (1998, December 8). *On the Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1214). New York: Author.
After the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1991, the country devolved into chaos and civil war. The civil war only intensified as time went on. Once the Taliban began winning battles, a new facet to the war emerged, and the level of violence escalated. This resolution urges a cease-fire and peace treaty in the country.

United Nations Security Council. (1999, October 15). *On the Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1267). New York: Author.
Condemnation from the Security Council did not stop the civil war in Afghanistan. As a result, the Security Council imposed limited sanctions on the Taliban and demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden for prosecution of terrorist attacks. This resolution imposed those sanctions and created a committee to oversee their imposition.

United Nations Security Council. (2000, December 19). *On the Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1333). New York: Author.
Resolution 1333 expanded the sanctions imposed in Resolution 1267. It also again calls for the extradition of Osama bin Laden and other terrorists residing and training within its borders. It also created the precedent of maintaining a list of those involved in terrorism for sanction purposes. The list's maintenance fell upon the 1267 committee.

United Nations Security Council. (2002, January 16). *The Situation in Afghanistan.* (S/RES/1390). New York: Author.
This resolution was passed after the US-led war on Afghanistan routed the Taliban from power. Accordingly, it limited sanctions against the state of Taliban and expanded them against Al Qaeda. Furthermore, 1390 required Member States to submit reports on their efforts to limit terrorist financing.

United Nations Security Council. (2004, January 30). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Attacks.* (S/RES/1526). New York: Author.
Resolution 1526 expanded the duties of the 1267 Committee. It re-establishes a Monitoring Committee with an 18-month mandate. Moreover, it recommended closer collaboration with members of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Finally, it requests that states work harder to comply with their reporting mandates.

United Nations Security Council. (2005, July 29). *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Attacks.* (S/RES/1617). New York: Author.
Expanding upon the duties of the 1267 Committee, this resolution looks to a new threat: portable air defense systems. Terrorism experts had expressed concern that shoulder launched missiles could attack and down aircraft. It also urges States to enact the guidelines of the Financial Action Task Force.

United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee. (2003, April 10). *Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Work.* New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 10, 2005 from
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf
This webpage is a summary of the mandates of the 1267 Committee. The majority of the document covers areas relating to the maintenance of the Consolidated List. It also includes information on basic Committee rules, such as voting and composition. Finally, it concludes with a section describing the requirements of the State reports.

United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee. (2003, December 2). *Second Report of the Monitoring Group*.
New York: Author.
Each year, the 1267 Committee's Monitoring Group is required to report to the Security Council
on its efforts. Its duties are far-ranging and deal in-depth with each Member State's efforts to
gain compliance with international terrorism financing legislation. Furthermore, a large part of
the document examines its dealings with the Consolidated List.

United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee. (2005, July 29). *The New Consolidated List of Individuals and*
Entities Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda Organization as Established and
Mandated by the 1267 Committee. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved August 10 2005 from
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm
Under the mandates of the 1267 Committee, it is required to maintain a list of all individuals and
entities associated with terrorism financing. This list has come under criticism from several
quarters for its lack of transparency and the difficulty in removing entries from the list.
Furthermore, it is not as comprehensive as other lists. Nonetheless, it has acted as a
clearinghouse for information about terrorism financiers.

United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee. (2005). *Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions*
Monitoring Team. New York, NY: Author.
The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team is the second iteration of the 1267
Committee's outreach sub-committees. It is required to report back to the main Security Council
each year. This is the 2005 report. Accordingly, it provides a summary of each aspect of the
preceding year's work.

United States Department of Treasury and Interpol. (2005, August 3). *Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked*
Persons. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved August 12 2005 from
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf
This is the U.S. government's list of individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda. At more
than 200 pages, it is fairly comprehensive. Nonetheless, it has received criticism because of the
lack of transparency involved in the process of placing a name on the list. Names on this list often
find their way onto the asset freezing lists of the United Nations, other States, and other inter-
regional organizations.

UPI. (2005, July 14). London attacks cost less than $2000. Retrieved August 14 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.
On July 7, 2005, terrorists attacked the subway and bus systems in London, England. Using light
explosives, they caused an inordinate amount of damage. Moreover, they were able to fund this
attack using only a small amount of funds. This underscores the need for even stricter monetary
controls.

Wardell, Jane. (2005, July 11). London Retailers say Terrorist attacks cost millions of pounds in lost sales.
Associated Press. Retrieved August 14 2005 from Lexis-Nexis.
The July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks, as well as the aborted attempt a few weeks later, required only
very light funding. Nonetheless, they have had an inordinate impact on the local economies. The
attacks prompted a drop in the level of tourism. Subsequently, retailers noticed a perceptible drop
in sales.

White, Jonathon R. (2002). Terrorism, an Introduction. New York: Wadsworth.
White's text is a crucial survey of the various facets of the study of terrorism. It focuses first on
the various typologies of terrorism and the structure of modern terrorist groups. It then continues
with a discussion of ideology and history. Overall, it provides a good background for the
beginner.

United Nations Security Council
Rules of Procedure

INTRODUCTION

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Security Council (hereinafter, referred to as "the Council") and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.

2. For purposes of these rules, the Security Council Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the "Secretariat."

3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her/his or her designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations, and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.

4. For the purposes of these rules, "President" shall refer to the chairperson, or acting chairperson of the Council.

I. MEETINGS

Rule 1
Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time he or she deems necessary.

Rule 2
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Council.

Rule 3
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4
Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held once a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5
Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.
Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

II. AGENDA

Rule 6
The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7

The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9

The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

Rule 10

Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11

The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement on matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting. The provisions of rule 7, paragraph one, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Rule 13

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting which he or she is invited to attend.

Rule 15

The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

Rule 16

Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representatives shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

Rule 17
Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

IV. PRESIDENCY

Rule 18
The Presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19
The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

Rule 20
Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfillment of the responsibilities of the presidency he or she should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he or she shall indicate her/ his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19 or her/his duties under rule 7.

V. SECRETARIAT

Rule 21
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

Rule 22
The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 23
The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24
The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25
The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 26
The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 27
The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 28
The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 29
The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 30
If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 31
Proposed resolutions, amendments, and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

For purposes of this rule, all "proposals" shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 32
Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 33
The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

    1. To suspend the meeting;
    2. To adjourn the meeting;
    3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
    4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
    5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
    6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council's next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.

Rule 34
It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 35
A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

Rule 36
If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 37
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

Rule 38
Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative of the Security Council.

Rule 39
The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

VII. VOTING

Rule 40
Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

VIII. LANGUAGE

Rule 41
English shall be the official and working language of the Security Council.

Rule 42
Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the language of the Security Council. In this case, he or she shall herself/himself provide for interpretation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

Rule 43
Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the language of the Council.

Rule 44
All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the language of the Security Council.

Rule 45

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides be published in any language other than the language of the Council.

IX. PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS, RECORDS

Rule 46

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 47

Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10:00 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

Rule 48

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 49

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 50

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives of the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 51

The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 52

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official language of the Council as soon as possible.

Rule 53

At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a *communiqué* through the Secretary-General.

Rule 54

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 55

The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be

made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

X. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANS

Rule 56

Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority vote.

NMUN RULES OF PROCEDURE - SHORT FORM
LISTED IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE

Motion	Purpose	Debate	Vote
Point of Order	Correct an error in procedure	None	None
Appeal of the Chair	Challenge a decision of the Chair	None	Majority
Suspension of the Meeting	Recess meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of the Meeting	End meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of Debate	End debate without a substantive vote	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Decision of Competence	Declare committee unable to consider issue or resolution	None	Majority
Closure of Debate	Move to immediate vote	2 con	2/3
Declare an Important Question (applicable in GA Plen only)	Require all substantive actions to obtain a 2/3 majority to pass	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Amendments and 1st Vote on Divisions of the Question	Vote on sections separately, prior to voting on the entire resolution	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Roll Call Vote	Vote by roll call, rather than show of placards	None	None
Reconsideration	Re-open debate on an issue	2 con	2/3
Set the Speakers time	Set or change the speakers time limit	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Close the Speakers list (also applies to re-opening list)	No additional speakers added to speakers list on topic	None	Majority
Adoption of the Agenda	Approval of agenda order	None	Majority

DIVISION OF THE QUESTION DIAGRAM

Motion to Divide
Consider clause(s) separately from
the rest of a resolution.

Procedural Vote
Requires simple majority

PASS

FAIL

Clause(s) are separated out and
the committee moves on to a
substantive vote on the division.
(The resolution is now divided into 2 pieces.)

Clause(s) are not separated and
the committee moves on to the
next motion for division.

Substantive Vote
Requires simple majority

PASS

FAIL

Clause(s) are approved by the
committee and become an annex
to the original resolution.

Clause(s) are discarded and
are no longer any part of
the resolution.