



Code: SC/1/1

Committee: Security Council

Topic: Preventing Terrorist Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1 *Affirming* the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1970; the Convention on the Prohibition
2 of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons on their
3 Destruction (BWC) of 1972; the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and
4 Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) of 1993; and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban
5 Treaty (CTBT) of 1996,

6
7 *Recalling* the definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and
8 biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery”, and they constitute a threat to international peace and
9 security,”

10
11 *Recognizing* the United Nations (UN) definition of terrorism from the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on
12 Terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism,
13 the Geneva Conventions and Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious
14 bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
15 a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act,”

16
17 *Emphasizing* the work of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), specifically in regards to the
18 management and regulatory work of nuclear weapons and energy production alluding to SC Resolution 1540 (2004)
19 which establishes regulations over physical control measures, border controls, and measures to deter, detect, and
20 combat illicit trafficking of WMDs and related material,

21
22 *Taking into consideration* the sovereignty of individual states and the importance of respecting international
23 boundaries,

24
25 *Acknowledging* the correlation between unstable regions and the prevalence of established terrorist organizations
26 and how this can increase the ease with which terrorists can access WMDs,

27
28 *Noting* that nuclear facilities which do not meet the IAEA safety standards pose a distinct risk to international
29 security by increasing access to hazardous radioactive material, which have the potential to be used in future
30 weapons, and that bolstered security measures can ensure the protection of confidential information used to produce
31 WMDs will dramatically reduce the likelihood of terrorist organizations accessing these sensitive materials and
32 information,

33
34 *The Security Council,*

- 35
36 1. *Endorses* the further stabilization of areas where the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is easier
37 through:
- 38
39 a. encouraging a regional collaborative effort that strengthens border control policies and security
40 measures in order to stabilize the movement of hazardous waste as well as raw materials
41 associated with the production of WMDs including:
 - 42
43 i. pulling influence from and extrapolating on regional border security measures, similar to
44 that of the collaborative Colombia Border Control System which works to limit the
45 transportation of illegal goods across national boundaries by instituting shared
46 responsibility over unstable border regions;
 - 47
48 ii. identifying the successes of the African Multinational Task Force which seeks to
49 collaborate on cross-border security in both conflict regions and regions combatting

50 terrorism through agreements to allocate resources and information to seek stabilization
51 and the halting the spread of violence by non-state actors;
52
53

- 54 2. *Calls upon* the IAEA’s Department of Nuclear Safety and Security and Department of Safeguards to
55 provide a clear, updated set of guidelines strong enough that, if followed, ensure that effective nuclear
56 security would result, and that shall serve as a reference for Member States as they establish their own
57 safety and security standards for nuclear housing facilities;
58
- 59 3. *Encourages* nuclear states to ensure that weapon and energy facilities are secure and up to date in order to
60 protect against terrorist organizations acquiring weapons or the means to create weapons by:
61
 - 62 a. continuing to participate in optional facility inspections, upon request by individual Member
63 States, courtesy of the IAEA in order to ensure that safety standards are being properly
64 implemented;
65
 - 66 b. emphasizing the importance of proper disposal of nuclear waste in order to inhibit raw materials
67 from becoming a future weapon;
68
- 69 4. *Encourages* Member States to make a concerted effort to improve the implementation of nuclear facilities’
70 security systems by adopting practices inline with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management’s
71 (INMM) “Global Best Practices Common to Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accountability”
72 created for the Special International Workshop on Global Best Practices in Materials Accountability;
73
- 74 5. *Supports* the idea of a strong security culture in which all relevant individuals (mostly those who work in
75 and with nuclear facilities) hold a deeply rooted belief that nuclear security is important and that all manner
76 of threats are credible and possible;
77
- 78 6. *Suggests* the establishment of the International Nuclear Disposal Program (INDP) begin preliminary
79 planning for construction of permanent, sustainable and international nuclear waste disposal sites within the
80 boundary of willing Member States, funded by Member States who plan on participating in disposal at
81 these sites, including:
82
 - 83 a. scouting possible locations given by the World Nuclear Association for such a site to include but
84 are not limited to: South Africa, Argentina, Western China, and Australia;
85
 - 86 b. ensuring sites would address the security interests of the international community by reducing the
87 locations in need of protection;
88
 - 89 c. exploring the possibility of security forces tasked with the protection of this newly established
90 disposal site will be composed of willing Member States’ militaries that work in conjunction with
91 a United Nations force;
92
 - 93 d. leaving the Member States involved in the movement of the nuclear waste to decide the method
94 and logistics of transportation;
95
- 96 7. *Affirms the importance* of international boundaries in order to maintain state sovereignty, while
97 emphasizing that individual states hold a responsibility to prevent terrorist groups within their borders from
98 acquiring WMDs;
99
- 100 8. *Recognizes* that, while there is an established definition for chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons,
101 many more factors are present today which broaden the horizon as to what can be considered a chemical,
102 nuclear, or biological WMD, demonstrating:
103
 - 104 a. the need for a broader foundational definition that goes beyond the current breakdown format;
105

106
107
108
109
110

- b. notes the possibility for this to be addressed by the General Assembly First Committee to work together to form a cohesive and concise definition;
- 9. *Condemns* the use of terrorism against civilian populations and acknowledges the gravity of casualties in regards to terrorist acquisition of WMDs.



Code: SC/1/2

Committee: Security Council

Topic: Preventing Terrorist Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1 *Reaffirming* the responsibility of Member-States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in accordance with the
2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while recognizing the state's rights to use nuclear
3 energy for peaceful purposes,
4

5 *Bearing in Mind* the establishment of the United Nations Regional Commissions with the five Regional
6 Commissions, promoting multilateral dialogue, knowledge sharing and networking at the regional level, and
7 working together to promote intra-regional and inter-regional cooperation, both among themselves and through
8 collaboration with other regional organizations,
9

10 *Recognizes* the vital contributions of civilian sector entities in the field of security operations and information
11 sharing,
12

13 *Recalling* the conclusions from the UN High Level Panel on Counter Terrorism (2014) which acknowledged that
14 "environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism, human rights abuse," and a weak
15 state capacity could make a state subject to terrorist activity,
16

17 *Reaffirms* its belief in respecting Member-States national sovereignty,
18

19 *The Security Council,*
20

- 21 1. *Commends* the Member-States who have engaged in non-proliferation activities and *encourages* other states to:
22
 - 23 a. support movements such as the Peace Uses Initiative (PUI), funded by countries such as the
24 United States of America, which allow projects for peaceful applications of nuclear energy to be
25 utilized;
26
 - 27 2. *Strongly supports* the idea of augmenting the capabilities of the United Nations Regional Commissions to create
28 an open platform of discussion pertaining to terrorist acquisition of weapons while giving all Member-States the
29 opportunity to learn from the successful implementation of programs such as the United Nations committee
30 Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) with regards to:
31
 - 32 a. the Women's Economic Empowerment forum on Strategies and Outlooks from the regions that
33 include all five of the United Nations Regional Commission bodies discussing the increase for the
34 role of women within the decision making field on an international level;
35
 - 36 3. *Encourages* regional Member-States to mirror information bank systems, such as the European Union funded
37 ITrace Weapon Tracking Database, and encourages the expansion of these databases to include radioactive
38 materials, poisonous substances, and bio-hazardous waste; currently the iTrace database tracks weapons
39 manufacturers and exporters, arms trafficking entities and routes;
40
 - 41 4. *Encourages* the creation of a grant system, funded by the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) which
42 incentivizes and provides resources for Member States, specifically those who are currently facing or are in
43 regions which are more historically vulnerable to the influence of violent non-state actors, to increase their
44 education, social, and security capacity, this framework would include:
45
 - 46 a. providing counter-terrorism educational seminars for at risk populations, including but not limited
47 to refugees, women, adolescents, and unemployed youth, sponsored by the CTC:
48
 - 49 i. after these seminars and educational training, the nation would, then, be granted funding
50 for participating nations to increase their educational capacity by building infrastructure

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

such as facilities and roads connecting remote communities and at risk populations, with the input of those communities to further community development, modeled after the Good Neighbors Chad organization which works across central and southern Africa;

- b. encouraging multi-lateral border agreements between states in order to prevent the movement of violent non-state actors across states boundaries, and share common best practices across regions, such as the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which brought together states such as Chad, Niger, Morocco, and Mali with the recent help of US expertise to pacify unstable territories and such efforts would include:
 - i. working closely with participating regional groups' existing programs, such as the African Center for Study and Research in Terrorism (ACSRT), to reward participating states by providing counterterrorism task force training for their local forces which would encompass:
 - 1. technology training and regional information sharing assistance for counter terrorism task forces to be able to recognize and handle cases which involve hazardous materials.



Code: SC/1/3

Committee: Security Council

Topic: Prevention of Terrorist Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1 *Emphasizing* Article 39 of the UN Charter, which states that, “the Security Council shall determine the existence of
2 any threat to the peace, and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken...to maintain or
3 restore international peace and security,”

4
5 *Reaffirming* the Security Council’s previous commitment to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), Security
6 Council Resolution 1673 (2006), Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009), Security Council Resolution 1977
7 (2011) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the committees and authorities created
8 and supported therein,

9
10 *Endorsing* further open and transparent communication between Member States to improve global security,

11
12 *Respecting* each state’s sovereign right to participate in expanding security measures to regulate the transport of
13 illicit and dangerous materials across and within their borders,

14
15 *Recognizing* that nuclear states have substantially decreased the amount of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in
16 their possession,

17
18 *Recognizing* the inherently destructive force of WMD’s, and states’ need for internal and military security, and
19 reaffirming the potential of nuclear energy to be used in a peaceful and productive manner without abuse,

20
21 *Taking into account* the potential for those Member States in the process of further developing their security
22 measures to request regional and international assistance from other Member States and international authorities,

23
24 *Understanding* the need for open dialogue between Member States with expertise in the areas of Chemical,
25 Biological, and Nuclear safeguards and Member States that may need assistance in developing their own protection
26 strategies,

27
28 *Recognizing* the positive and objective contributions of the international scientific community in the advancement of
29 safety and security measures, and the implicit disconnect between the theoretical and practical applications of such
30 technologies related to nuclear power,

31
32 *Highlighting* the success of the INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database (SLTD), which allows for
33 the tracking of missing travel documents which can be used to further the illicit trade of WMD materials and
34 techniques,

35
36 *Cognizant* of the constant threat posed by the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) materials, which when
37 acquired by terrorist organizations, pose an immense threat to the global peace and security of the international
38 community, requiring the attention of the Security Council as per Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations,

39
40 *The Security Council,*

41
42 1. *Calls upon* all Member States to increase communication and cooperation with the committees and authorities
43 on WMDs, listed above for the purpose of strengthening the global capacity to respond to terrorist threats, by:

44
45 a. urging Member States to promote robust multilateral cooperative dialogues, with the goal of
46 combatting potential terrorist acquisition of WMDs, between and among regional blocs and the
47 1540 Committee, including inter alia:

48
49 i. developing appropriate and effective measures to pinpoint and neutralize existing black
50 market networks, such as targeting financial support structures, cyber security measures,

- 51 and ensuring the confidentiality of technical documents;
52
53 ii. extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee for an additional decade, to the year 2031;
54
55 b. encouraging the dissemination of information, in and outside of the committees, regarding any
56 threats to the potential terrorist acquisition of WMDs;
57
- 58 2. *Establishes* a Science and Technology Advancement Research Summit (STARS) to meet every five years, with
59 the overall goal of encouraging strategies to safeguard the international community from terrorist acquisition of
60 WMDs, establish emergency responses to potential WMD attacks and promote technological methods of
61 securing and handling hazardous materials, the first session of which is to be held in Paris, staffed with
62 members of the international scientific community, subject to the approval and endorsement of the origin
63 Member State, under chairmanship of the current president of the 1540 Committee, for the purpose of:
64
- 65 a. implementing recommendations from the international scientific community, from tertiary sources
66 of law such as scholarly works and individuals in scientific fields, by:
67
- 68 i. promoting strategies, similar to the United States of America's Cooperative Threat
69 Reduction Program (CTR), which works alongside nations who ask for assistance in
70 reducing the threat of WMDs, for securing hazardous materials that have the potential to
71 be misused by non-state actors;
72
- 73 ii. providing guidelines on how Member States can use nuclear energy in a safe and
74 productive manner;
75
- 76 b. analyzing 1540 Committee reports from all previous years, including from states that are no longer
77 members of the 1540 Committee, about scientific advancements by:
78
- 79 i. encouraging a discussion of WMD material safeguarding techniques, as well as
80 technologies surrounding topics, such as:
81
- 82 1. nuclear energy;
83
84 2. chemical materials;
85
86 3. biological agents;
87
88 4. any other materials the scientific community finds relevant;
89
- 90 3. *Requests* that key regional organizations, such as members of the Bonn Agreement, the Asia-Pacific Economic
91 Cooperation Council, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community and Common
92 Market, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Helsinki Commission, the Organization of African
93 Unity, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
94 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Regional Cooperation in Scientific Information Exchange
95 in the Western Indian Ocean Region, and the Arab League, assist STARS in spearheading regionally
96 appropriate initiatives that prevent the acquisition of WMDs by non-state actors by:
97
- 98 a. assisting Member States in developing, maintaining, and improving, as appropriate, existing
99 domestic and regional strategies used to identify and record sites where hazardous materials
100 related to the creation of WMDs are stored;
101
- 102 b. assisting in safeguarding against potential weaknesses in the security infrastructure that non-state
103 actors may be able to exploit, as each Member State deems appropriate;
104
- 105 4. *Urges* Member States to continue securing confidential intelligence that threatens the status quo of non-
106 proliferation by:

- 107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
- a. taking note of the suggestions brought forward by regional agencies and the STARS summit;
 - b. avoiding the unintended leakage of such information through the continuous enhancement of communications intelligence channels at national and international levels;
5. *Calls upon* the 1540 Committee, in collaboration with the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, and the World Health Organization to increase transparency in its findings and reporting of NBC data in order to better enable Member States with information needed to:
- a. track the movement of hazardous materials, within and across their own borders;
 - b. prevent the abuse of these hazardous materials by non-state actors;
 - c. definitively establish a multilateral collaborative effort in order to analyze, understand, recognize, and target the economic elements of illicit trafficking in these substances;
6. *Calls upon* the 1540 Committee to collaborate with the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, and the World Health Organization in organizing a unified front that facilitates:
- a. enabling Member States to better track the movement of hazardous materials, within and across Member State borders, by the compilation of comprehensive information regarding the sale, purchase, and widespread trafficking of known hazardous materials;
 - b. preventing the abuse of these hazardous materials by non-state actors by establishing a source of information regarding nuclear, chemical, and biological materials that all Member States have access to;
 - c. promoting a multilateral collaborative effort between the aforementioned scientific bodies in order to analyze, understand, recognize, and target the supply chain of hazardous materials being illicitly trafficked;
7. *Recommends* Member States establish domestic agencies in order to facilitate the safe and secure transit of hazardous materials within and between states, based around the following models which detail the successes of domestic hazardous material transit agencies in preventing terrorists from acquiring hazardous nuclear, biological, and chemical materials during the transit process, including:
- a. the Australian-pioneered Nuclear Material Balances and Tracking (NUMBAT) program, which has successfully replicated and implemented domestic policies of Member States, such as the United States of America and Canada;
 - b. the transportation guidelines set by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, specifically the “Call for Proposals for Transport, Treatment and Disposal of Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Organic and Inorganic Chemicals, Effluents and Related Materials”, which has facilitated successful instances such as the multilateral effort by Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Syria in the transportation and eventual destruction of Syria’s chemical weapon cache upon the request of the Syrian government;
8. *Encourages* Member States to mirror the SLTD database at the domestic and regional levels, to allow for more comprehensive and sovereign tracking of potentially dangerous materials and technology, as well as the actors or individuals who transport them, in order to immediately recognize when these materials and technology have gone unaccounted for, potentially in the hands of terrorists;

- 162 9. *Further invites* capable Member States to aid fellow Member States which request assistance through the
163 existing framework established in Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) for transporting, securing, and
164 destroying hazardous NBC materials that are at risk of acquisition and exploitation by non-state actors;
165
166 10. *Decides* to remain actively seized on the matter.



Code: SC/2/PRST
Committee: Security Council
Topic: Crisis in Europe

1 Statement by the President of the Security Council,
2

3 “The Security Council strongly condemns the bombing in Hungary, especially regarding civilian casualties,
4 and the human rights violations that have occurred as a result of the violence, including those involving rape,
5 tortured killings, xenophobia, and other cruel, inhumane and/or degrading treatment.
6

7 “The Security Council recognizes the importance of state sovereignty and its need to be respected
8 throughout any action taken, bearing in mind the individual policies and practices of Member States.
9

10 “The Security Council reminds Member States and their affiliated regional organizations that Articles 40
11 and 54 of the UN Charter require all Member States and regional authorities to comply with the Security Council by
12 sharing any and all pertinent information as it relates to international crises, issues of violence, and breaches of the
13 peace.
14

15 “The Security Council recommends that Member States uphold Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014) in
16 order to cease any and all attacks on civilian populations and refugees, and calls for the expansion of all forms of
17 humanitarian aid to all populations affected within Syria by the ongoing crisis.
18

19 “The Security Council further reiterates Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009), which calls for the
20 protection of the human rights of women and girls regarding sexual violence in areas of conflict and refugee
21 settlements.
22

23 “The Security Council recalls the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Security Council Resolution 1261
24 (1999), Security Council Resolution 1379 (2001), Security Council Resolution 1617 (2005), UNHCR’s Refugee
25 Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care, and UNICEF’s Humanitarian Action for Children, all of which
26 recognize the importance of addressing and prioritizing children’s rights, as they are disproportionately affected by
27 the lack of stability and security and are more vulnerable to suffering violations of human rights including being
28 denied access to education, physical and mental health services, nutrition, and child development services.
29

30 “The Security Council encourages the UNHCR to establish an assessment group to monitor Hungary and
31 cooperative, surrounding border states and report its findings to the Security Council on the status of refugees and
32 their current living conditions.
33

34 “The Security Council suggests that Member States ratify or adhere to the United Nations Convention
35 against Transnational Organized Crime, specifically the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea,
36 or Air, as well as Human Rights Council Resolution 29/L.3 (2015) on the Protection of Human Rights of Migrants:
37 Migrants in Transit, in regard to refugee trafficking routes.
38

39 “The Security Council recognizes the necessity for the European Union to move for the suspension of the
40 Dublin Regulation, specifically regarding Syrian refugees, for a period of six months in order to effectively address
41 the Syrian refugee crisis, which will help alleviate the strain of burden on entry-point Member States such as
42 Hungary in order to mitigate the rise of anti-refugee extremism.
43

44 “The Security Council applauds the work of non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental
45 organizations, such as the World Health Organization, UNICEF and the International Rescue Committee, who
46 recognize the health of refugees is of paramount importance to both refugee and host country populations, and who
47 work closely with local governments in addressing these concerns.
48

49 “The Security Council mourns the loss of life in Hungary and will actively seek to find solutions that will
50 allow the international community to have full faith in the sanctity of life in Hungary and the preservation of the
51 security of the region.”