



WASHINGTON, DC  
31 October - 2 November 2014  
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## SECURITY COUNCIL BACKGROUND GUIDE 2014

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# NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS



## NMUN•DC Position Papers Guidelines

**Due 1 October 2014**

Each committee topic should be addressed in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned country. You should identify and address international and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action that are relevant to the policy of your country. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. A delegate's role as a Member State, Observer State, or NGO should affect the way a position paper is written. The [Delegate Preparation Guide](#) will provide you with additional information.

A position paper should be submitted for each assigned committee.

- The two page position paper should cover all the topics in the background guide, not a separate paper for each topic.
- Do not submit papers for committees not assigned to your country (see [DC matrix](#)).
- No more than two delegates can represent a single country in a committee. If you assign two delegates to represent a country on a committee, they submit one position paper jointly, not separate position papers from each individual.
- NMUN position papers are not cited as is required for an academic paper. They are written as if they are a policy statement coming from the foreign ministry. While they may reference UN data or past UN Resolutions, like in our samples, formal citations are not used.

Please pay careful attention to the following guidelines when drafting and submitting your position papers. Only those delegations that follow the guidelines and meet the submission deadline will be eligible for [position paper awards](#).

Follow the layout in our [Sample Position Paper](#) using the standards below:

- Length must not exceed two pages
- Margins must be set at 1 inch or 2.54 cm. for the whole paper
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, school name, and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections
- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers
- Convert your paper to pdf format

Please note that position papers must be comprised of entirely original writing. **NMUN will not tolerate plagiarism**, including copying from Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy may result in dismissal from the conference. Although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, we do not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents.

### How to Submit Your Position Papers

- One person, preferably the faculty advisor or head delegate, should submit all papers from your delegation.
- Complete a separate form for each country/assignment.
- Use the committee name and your assignment in the filename (example: GA1\_Cuba).
- Submit all papers as pdf documents.

Use the link on the [DC position paper page](#), following the guidelines above, to submit your position papers. If you have questions or concerns about the position paper submission process, please email the Secretary-General at [secgen.dc@nmun.org](mailto:secgen.dc@nmun.org). Please do not submit position papers to this email account.

If you are requesting an [Embassy Briefing](#), we encourage your delegation to also submit a copy of your position papers to the embassy for the country you've been assigned along with an explanation of the conference.

Many, many papers will be read by the Secretariat. Your patience and cooperation in adhering to the above guidelines is greatly appreciated.



## Official Welcome

On behalf of the staff of the 2014 National Model United Nations Washington D.C. (NMUN•DC) Conference, welcome to this year's Security Council. The committee staff is comprised of Kevin O'Donnell as Director and Leah Schmidt as Assistant Director. Kevin holds a B.A. in International Relations from San Francisco State University. He currently lives in San Francisco and works for a Japanese governmental organization. This will be his sixth time on staff at an NMUN conference and his eighth NMUN conference overall. Leah is completing her undergraduate degree in Honors International Relations and Women's Studies and works as the Coordinator for the Centre for Gender and Sexual Diversity on her university's campus. This will be her third NMUN conference.

The Security Council has the ability and mandate to respond to situations swiftly and rapidly to maintain international peace and security. The decisions of the Security Council are also the only decisions legally binding for all UN Member States, giving the Council solemn responsibility to uphold the *Charter of the United Nations*. The topics facing the Security Council range from urgent situations such as the situation in Syria to thematic discussions such as terrorism and women, peace, and security.

Delegates are strongly encouraged to use this background guide as merely a starting point for further research on the topics, rather than as a comprehensive source. NMUN can be an incredibly rewarding and memorable experience, and we hope that you enjoy it as a delegate as much as we both have.

Please take note of the [NMUN Policies and Codes of Conduct](#) on the website and in the [Delegate Preparation Guide](#) regarding plagiarism, codes of conduct/dress code/sexual harassment, awards philosophy/evaluation method, etc. Adherence to these guidelines is mandatory. Good luck in your preparation for the conference. We look forward to seeing you in October!

The NMUN•DC Staff

## History of the United Nations Security Council

Created after World War II as an attempt to remedy the failures of the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) has existed for the entirety of the UN and is now one of the six major bodies of the organization. As Article 1 of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) states, the first purpose of the UN is "[to] maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats..." It is the primary job of the SC to take substantive action on such issues of peace and security. Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the SC has the full power to investigate any situation that might result in conflict and threaten international peace and security, and take subsequent action.

The UN Charter establishes the main functions of the SC as the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among states, cooperation to solve international disputes, and the promotion of human rights. While the SC operates as a single body, under Article 25 of the UN Charter it has the ability to establish subsidiary committees such as the Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict, the Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Committees, the Sanctions Committees, Peacekeeping Operations, International Tribunals, and various Standing and Ad Hoc committees, which all operate to support the overarching mandate of the SC and are comprised of the current SC member state representation. Through coordination of these bodies, the SC is able to call for ceasefires, request discussions to resolve issues leading to conflict, and launch investigations into disputes or situations that may disrupt international peace.

The SC is made up of five permanent Member States (the P5): France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America; additionally, there are 10 non-permanent rotating Member States that are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The leaders of the victorious Allied countries following World War II hold the P5 seats. The P5 also hold veto power, which means they can prevent any substantive draft resolution from being adopted by the SC with a negative vote. The remaining 10 non-permanent Member States are chosen to represent the diverse geographical regions of the world, and do not hold veto power. Of these 15 Member States, each is granted the Presidency of the SC for a single month, serving on a rotating alphabetical basis. For any procedural change or resolution to pass in the SC, it must garner a total of at

least nine votes. It is also important to recognize that under Article 25 of the UN Charter, the SC is the only committee in the UN that may issue legally binding decisions.

In 2014 alone, the SC has adopted resolutions on conflicts in Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq, Sudan/South Sudan, Iran, Mali, Cyprus, Côte d'Ivoire, Kosovo, the Middle East, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, Libya, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. Aside from focusing on these immediate crises, the SC is also currently studying the long-term goal of global peace by publishing policy reports and resolutions on the thematic debates around terrorism, gender issues in combat, conflict in former colonial states, and general matters of peace and security. This represents a growing evolution of the body to shift focus away from only situational matters, and to also examine and discuss broader and more impactful thematic issues. These thematic approaches are rooted in resolutions proposing preventative measures, increased intelligence, comprehensive reactionary approaches, and usage of cross-body collaboration within the international community.

As one of the most prominent bodies of the UN, the SC is under constant scrutiny from the international community. One of the main criticisms has been the veto power of the P5 because it gives these Member States undue power to veto any resolutions that may conflict with their own interests and foreign policy, misrepresenting the views and needs of the majority. For instance, the recent vetoes from both China and Russia on the SC's resolution to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposing the referral, as well as the U.S.'s legacy of vetoing resolutions addressing the Palestinian question, have been particularly condemned by critics. Similarly, the membership of the P5 has been further critiqued for inaccurately assessing and assisting with the needs of Member States in the global south, as well as under representing Member States in the global south within SC membership itself. The SC's funding has also been a matter of debate, as it is funded independently from the UN budget and therefore may be at higher risk than other central UN bodies for financial bias influencing policies. As a result, the success of certain SC operations has been undermined by criticism of potential bias, and in this criticism, the SC loses some of the credibility it requires to operate and implement policy amongst Member States.

Though the SC is not a perfect institution, it remains indisputably relevant as a powerful force in the international community. With over 15 years of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone having been concluded in March 2014 after regaining peace following the civil wars of the early 1990s, quick responses to poaching threats in central Africa, and its position as the international leader of the ICC's International Criminal Tribunals, the SC continues to make positive substantive impacts on the international community. Furthermore, its increased focus on thematic issues, as well as the movement towards its increased transparency, has ensured that the SC continues to involve itself in the most current state of global affairs. Amidst intense global pressures, cooperation and diplomacy are still of the utmost importance in the SC's dealings and are reflected throughout its work of protecting the world's population in the pursuit of international peace and security.

## **I. Crisis Management in Failed or Fragile Nascent States**

- What steps can the SC take to improve its responsiveness to crises in failed or fragile nascent states?
- What resources are required on the part of the international community and the UN to prevent crises from stalling and becoming full-scale conflicts?
- How can and should the SC adapt to ever-changing circumstances and the uncertainties that failed and fragile nascent states present?

While there is no internationally agreed-upon definition for a failed state, the overall consensus is that such states are often characterized by their inability to impose order or wield legitimate force due to a collapse of government, often resulting in a loss of territory and the creation of an unstable environment. A recent example of a failed state is Somalia prior to 2012. A fragile or fragile nascent state, while not as dysfunctional as a failed state, is nevertheless extremely susceptible to instability and is in constant danger of losing the ability to carry out basic political, security, and economic functions. Internal or regional conflicts, severe poverty, and generally weak institutions usually mire both. Fragile nascent states in particular are usually confronted with these obstacles due to severe political transition into a "new" government. Two current examples of fragile nascent states are South Sudan and Libya. When a state fails or becomes fragile, crises are not confined within its borders. In fact, unlike in situations of political unrest, the borders themselves may begin to grow blurry, as widespread fighting holds the possibility of

transforming into a regional conflict, thereby threatening international peace, security, and stability. When such a situation arises, the United Nations (UN) must manage the crisis as swiftly as possible, using all tools at its disposal.

The situations many of these types of states and their citizens face are dire. Political infighting can result in an outbreak of militant violence or, in more dramatic cases, a coup d'état. Conflict is bred by these political differences in addition to extreme religious intolerance, which forces tens of thousands of citizens to flee their homes, frequently leading to mass migrations into refugee camps in neighboring states. As conflict continues to spread and intensify, these camps become increasingly overcrowded and are even targeted by armed groups involved in the conflicts. Governments are in severe disarray, meaning they cannot effectively protect their citizens from harm, nor can they provide them with basic living needs. The rule of law is often left under- or unenforced, and the crisis continues to worsen. In some cases, such as the current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), transitional governments are set up to try and exercise as much influence and control as possible on its citizens and territory. If such a regime is not installed quickly enough, a chaotic environment is likely to ensue as armed groups and terrorist organizations vie and compete for power, territory, and resources.

Prevention and response are two ways in which the UN can manage crises in failed and fragile states. Development through rebuilding infrastructure and institutions offers a way to prevent against future violence, but it is much harder for administrations to make meaningful progress in this area while in the midst of intense armed conflict, especially with an extremely limited set of resources. Engagement with civil society is also an important component of this process, and often can be the difference between failure and success in crisis management. Crisis management takes many forms at the UN, but the responsibility of responding to crises is mainly tasked to the Security Council (SC), as laid out in Chapter VII of the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945). Through a variety of different departments, agencies, and organizations, the SC coordinates and manages all urgent matters that would threaten international peace and security. Though there are a great many actors when it comes to crisis management in the UN, the SC is the biggest decision-maker, and as a result must weigh many different options at any given time. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) are utilized for peacekeeping and field operations, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) serve as advisory bodies, and various regional offices and organizations are relied upon for their knowledge, expertise, and coordination. In an era when the UN is attempting to be more holistic and coherent as an organization, the job of the SC is made that much more difficult as it strives to incorporate all the necessary components into PKOs for the best possible chance of success. This new age of robust, multidimensional peacekeeping is a direct result of trial and error over the last two decades, and lessons learned are emerging at a rapid pace. The SC, struggling to keep up with this pace, must apply such lessons to their management of crises, military or otherwise. One lesson learned and applied in this way was the realization of the significance of dedicated peacebuilding efforts, which led to the creation of the PBC in 2005. This was part of a major organizational restructuring of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and their administration with the idea that more comprehensive and broad approaches were needed.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding, two of the most significant aspects of crisis management in failed and fragile nascent states, at the UN are constantly being adapted to meet the needs of specific situations. Peacekeeping is one of the first, and most robust, tools employed by the SC as a form of crisis management in failed and fragile states, since it places a neutral force in the midst of conflict with the goal of defusing volatile situations before they intensify further. This is imperative to execute well for a diplomatic peace process to even begin. However, certain reforms are not only relevant but also outright necessary across all PKOs and peacebuilding operations if strides are to be made in facilitating more robust, multidimensional crisis management in these states. Three prominent reforms include engagement with civil society, inter-agency cooperation, and responsiveness. In failed or fragile states, in particular, reforms are even more necessary because terrorist and other organizations often seek to take advantage of the vacuum caused by the lack of a strong government or military presence that would otherwise halt conflict. Rapid and swift responsiveness is therefore the key in such situations, but lack of resources exacerbates and prolongs the problem, often dragging in additional regional and international actors that are forced to handle and confront the issue. The addition of more actors complicates matters further due to each respective interests, internal politics, and limitations, increasing the factors, which need to be considered by all parties involved before making any decisions on how to solve the crisis. All of these reforms and more are a product of reflections on the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s (Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia).

Along with engaging with civil society, civilian training and empowerment, delivered with a gender balance appropriate to the situation, engages local populations in not only assisting in rebuilding their governmental institutions, but also bringing about development to combat the underlying issue of poverty. In his 2013 report to the SC on women, and peace and security, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlined several steps needed to achieve gender balanced reform, including the increased assignment of gender experts to all field operations and offices of his special representatives, as well as increasing the proportion of women in the uniformed components of peacekeeping and national security sector institutions. The expectation of such reforms is that a more balanced gender perspective mainstreamed throughout UN coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts will ensure that all citizens involved are represented and everyone's issues are addressed, so that peace is wholly and comprehensively sustainable.

Inter-agency cooperation is especially vital to crisis management in failed and fragile nascent states. Due to its similarity in mission and scope of operations in Africa, one of the UN's natural partners in maintaining international peace and security in that region is the European Union (EU). In 2003, the UN and the European Union signed the *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management*, to mutually enhance each organization's planning, training, communication, and best practices in the areas of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and rapid deployment. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, however, overall EU operational contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have been lacking, with the exceptions of a rapid deployment force (EUFOR DRC) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006 and an ongoing mission (EUFOR République centrafricaine) in CAR since 2007. One major reason for this is the residual distrust of the effectiveness of UN PKOs after the failures of the 1990s. This partnership has not been as effective or constructive over the past decade; however, there are opportunities to explore in this partnership. One general suggestion has been to simply focus the nature of the cooperative relationship to create a more feasible and accomplishable agreement for crisis management. Another optimistic outlook is that the newly established European External Action Service will serve as a more concrete and reliable component in joint operations with the UN, perhaps inspiring the UN to create a similar organ modeled after it in the future. Since there is already a strong financial link in place between the two organizations (with the EU providing over 1/3 of the budget for UN PKOs in 2013), and considering the fact that UN PKOs have become much more comprehensive and robust in recent years, it is likely that UN-EU cooperation in crisis management will continue for the foreseeable future, perhaps even growing closer and more focused. This collaboration remains crucial in the endeavor of improving the responsiveness and efficacy of missions in fragile states.

Responsiveness is another key area for reform in crisis management. Rapid response forces, or troops that are capable of being deployed promptly in the event of an emergency, are a popular idea for how to reform the SC's responsiveness to situations that can change suddenly. These forces are favored over peacekeeping missions due to their ability to respond to crises within days rather than weeks or months. Speed is one of the most important factors in deploying these types of forces to failed or fragile states, as a crisis can become a conflict in a much shorter amount of time than would normally be expected in relatively stable Member States. One current example of a rapid response force, though not yet a fully operational one, is the African Union's (AU) African Standby Force (ASF). While the AU had hoped to achieve full operational capability by 2015, an assessment published by an AU Independent Panel of Experts predicts that major changes would have to take place for this to occur. Challenges include the lack of a framework between the ASF and the regional economic communities in Africa (into which regional standby forces are assigned under the ASF), as well as the severe lack of logistics and regional depots throughout the continent. Such a rapid response force, however, could serve as a model for the SC if it attempts to create a similar organization. Also, with the additional resources of the UN and UN Member States, these forces could potentially garner greater success than the ASF. Through such an idea there is substantial room for UN-AU inter-agency cooperation as many of the PKOs overseen by the SC are deployed in Africa and could largely benefit from assistance and coordination with a fully operational ASF or other form of rapid response force.

This pattern of reform and transformation of PKOs in failed and fragile nascent states still continues and has drastically changed since the failures of the 1990s. The current discussion involving failed or fragile nascent states has very recent roots as a thematic issue in the Security Council. Most recently this topic was brought up as a major discussion point at the annual SC retreat from 21-22 April 2014, and focused primarily on the situations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, and South Sudan. In April 2014, the SC established the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which will take the place of a current, AU-led PKO in September 2014. Mandated to protect civilians from harm while supporting the transitional government, MINUSCA is the latest in a string of multidimensional PKOs created by the SC to either

replace or augment existing forces, or address a sudden crisis which requires a robust and multifaceted response. In the latter situations, these PKOs are created in lieu of a rapid response force, since there currently is not one in place. While these PKOs indeed have begun to improve the gender balance and involve civil society more than in the past, a reliable and feasible UN rapid response force is not yet a reality. The funding of troops and troop contribution to such a force are key issues when discussing its feasibility, and will continue to be relevant in future talks involving crisis management and multidimensional peacekeeping.

The current crisis in the CAR illustrates well the obstacles that the SC faces in managing crisis situations in failed and fragile nascent states. UN PKOs exist in several similar situations with varying resources, partnerships, funding, and mandates, the weakness or lack of which can mean the difference between progress and intractability of a crisis. The SC must continue to renew peacekeeping missions' mandates on their merits and accomplishments, and remain adaptable to the ever-changing situation on the ground. The SC's capacity for crisis management in failed or fragile nascent states is being tested with each new situation. New advances around precise strategies, particularly in relation to civilian engagement, gender balance, and rapid responsiveness will continue to develop in the next several years and must remain at the forefront of the SC's ongoing debate to address challenges more holistically. But as it stands today, the progress on this issue serves as a solid framework for the future of crisis management at the UN, keeping the particularly unique and difficult needs of both failed and fragile nascent states in mind.

## **II. Addressing Security Sector Reform**

- How can the UN involve itself in security sector reform without relinquishing national ownership of the process?
- How can states determine where to focus their resources in the security sector reform process to increase their chances of success?
- What can the SC do to successfully guide reform of state's security sectors throughout the overall peacebuilding process?

While the term "security sector" has been defined in several different ways, the United Nations (UN) considers it to broadly include the "structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security" in any given territory or country. This includes agencies and government branches that relate to defense, law enforcement, intelligence, border control and customs, corrections, and, when appropriate, elements of the judicial system. Security sectors in any state provide the stability on which development, poverty reduction, and the rule of law can be effectively promoted. In the absence of capable security sectors, corruption and terrorism are likely to spread rapidly, increasing the instability of the state and region exponentially. Security institutions exist to keep people safe. When that no longer becomes possible, or when these institutions are not performing as they should, security sector reform (SSR) processes are required. SSR is utilized not just to prevent further unrest and instability but rather to create sustainable peace upon which all other issues can be safely and effectively addressed. To that end, SSR must constantly improve and evolve, while possessing the fundamental elements of the promotion of the rule of law and upholding human rights. SSR aims to help states build accountable, effective, and democratic security sectors that respect human rights in their overall mission of making people's lives safer. This inherently means that SSR is a collaborative process between a government and its people to build sustainable trust and confidence into their future peace and security. The SC is responsible for guiding the policy on which SSR reform is based, which requires learning from past mistakes and looking ahead to future opportunities for improvement.

In 2008, the Secretary-General published his first report, Secretary-General Report A/62/659, on SSR in response to calls from both the General Assembly and the SC. This report emphasized the need for a coherent, system-wide approach to addressing SSR, as well as laying out recommendations such as increasing field capacity, enhancing coordination and delivery of support, designating lead entities, and assessing resource gaps. Since the release of this report, key areas of focus have arisen as a result of increased attention and action on the parts of both the SC and the Secretary-General: democratic governance, national security, gender, and national ownership. Democratic governance of security institutions involves strengthening legal framework, engaging civil society, and supporting oversight mechanisms. This aspect is also commonly referred to as the rule of law. National security policymaking developed with a human rights perspective is another important aspect, which includes strategizing for budgetary and human resources matters. Peace processes involve much negotiation and dialogue between several different actors, dealing with local contexts, and intimate knowledge of the nature of the conflicts at hand. Gender-

responsiveness is a significant overarching component of SSR, which aims to facilitate and enhance participation of women and girls in decision-making processes, as well as planning and oversight mechanisms. This aspect is especially important because it takes advantage of the opening that SSR provides for revamping security sectors with gender-sensitive materials, training, and strategies. Lastly, one of the most important themes in SSR is national ownership. Two important components of this theme are nationally led and nationally focused monitoring and evaluation methods, and commitment of a portion of national resources to SSR. National knowledge and expertise is extremely valuable when conducting SSR, and having a state be financially invested in the process adds to its motivation and chances for success. Because SSR in the context of peacebuilding is the most crucial feature of the SC's approach to SSR, all of these individual aspects of SSR must come together in a vital and harmonious way to have a wholly successful peacebuilding process in a state. Bringing all of these ideas together and forming them into a single, coherent set of reforms for a state requires complex coordination between several different UN actors.

The main actors in SSR at the UN are the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Secretary-General, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and the SC. The DPKO houses two sections that are of particular relevance to SSR, the SSR Unit and the Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (IASSRTF). The SSR Unit's role is to support both technically and logistically the multitude of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) whose missions include an element of SSR. They support national governments in addition to the field missions by assisting in developing SSR strategies, fostering a dialogue on SSR, formulating national legislation, coordinating international SSR efforts, and promoting education and awareness of SSR objectives and best practices. In 2007, the Secretary-General established the IASSRTF to enhance the UN's capacity to deliver effective and efficient support to national governments struggling with SSR. Many such national governments are of Member States already hosting a UN PKO, creating opportunities to swiftly build on stability and peace made possible through peacekeeping. IASSRTF is made up of 14 different UN agencies and is co-chaired by the DPKO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), giving it an unprecedented integrated and holistic perspective from which to assess the problems of states' security sectors. This approach results in a fuller and more comprehensive strategy from the very beginning, so that consistency of objective is maintained throughout the duration of the SSR process. After studying reports and recommendations by the C-34, PBC, IASSRTF, and Secretary-General, the SC creates policies and direction for SSR while working in coordination with the DPKO.

In 2012, the IASSRTF released their landmark report *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (ITGN), the purpose of which is to "foster a 'One United Nations' approach to SSR by providing a common framework for guiding United Nations support to nationally led SSR efforts." The IASSRTF eventually wishes to develop the ITGN into programming and training modules along the same lines as the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) Standards. The five areas covered thus far by the IGTN are: democratic governance of security institutions, national security policy- and strategy-making, peace processes and SSR, gender-responsive SSR, and national ownership of SSR. As the most comprehensive SSR document to date, these five areas designated and covered by the IASSRTF are of paramount significance to all UN actors, including the SC, involved in this process, whether they are engaged in the field or not.

The most recent report (A/67/970) from the Secretary-General on SSR was released in 2013, five years after the initial report. One of the conclusions reached in this report was that additional work needed to be done toward creating a favorable political environment in which SSR can thrive. Without this, any kind of positive transformative process would be impossible, the report says. Additionally, expertise and technical support needs to be linked to broader practice areas to enhance the efficacy of SSR efforts. New recommendations also included expanding and deepening partnerships, encouraging dialogue and knowledge-sharing, and further enhancing inter-agency coherence and coordination. In April 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the SC must do more if there is to be sustainable peace; four priorities in particular were outlined: 1. Recognize links between SSR and broader reform processes such as legal reform and national reconciliation; 2. Encourage national governments to do more to meet immediate security needs and remain free of human rights violations; 3. Pay special attention to the strategic and governance framework of SSR; and 4. Reflect on UN institutional capacities, especially on linkages to the promotion of the rule of law and human rights. Shortly after these comments from the Secretary-General, the SC adopted resolution 2151 on 28 April 2014, its first stand-alone resolution specifically addressing SSR.

SC resolution 2151 on SSR laid out several guiding principles for SSR going forward. The first was the central idea that SSR processes were to be owned nationally, so that they are rooted in the particular needs and environment conducive to that state. States were therefore heavily encouraged to take the lead in this regard, to avoid a situation

where the UN would be imposing reform upon a state and its people. This was a particularly contentious point of discussion, as it brought up the issue of sovereignty, which, although clearly included in the SC's mandate, remains controversial due to its many interpretations. Aside from the controversial element, however, another challenge to state-owned SSR is the severe lack of resources with which to carry out these processes. Partnerships with the UN, loans and programs offered by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as assistance from regional organizations are several options that could be utilized by states lacking the resources to carry out nationally owned SSR initiatives alone. SC resolution 2151 also recognized the need for SSR to be tied to broader political processes, such as reconciliation efforts that engage with all levels of society. The SC stressed that integration of the SSR process into these various levels is vital to its success because it requires a single, coordinated effort to set in motion long-lasting and sustainable reforms.

SSR is essential in order for states to achieve lasting peace in post-conflict situations. Effective, people-oriented, and gender responsive strategies are necessary to accomplish the goals of the state and respect human rights, while state-owned processes set the stage for meaningful developments as a direct result of those strategies. The SC continues to involve itself with SSR through reports and coordination of the various actors included, remaining a relevant actor itself in the peacebuilding process. The holistic and organized approach to SSR led by the SC thus will continue to grow in the coming years to meet the new challenges of reforming security sectors that repeatedly arise.

### III. Sexual Violence in Conflict

- How can the Security Council combat the existing lack of awareness of sexual violence in conflict through UN peacekeeping forces?
- How will current training regimes be modified to aid military personnel in helping survivors of sexual violence?
- Will recent crises in Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan shift Security Council policy regarding sexual violence in conflict?

The recognition of sexual violence in conflict by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) is a recent development. The rights of women and other marginalized groups have historically been seen by the international community as second to peace and security issues. In contrast, the major international bodies have traditionally prioritized military strategy and combat, with the SC having been the leader on the political psychology behind this policy focus. However, the nature of war has recently begun to shift: the crises in Bosnia (1992) and Rwanda (1994) demonstrated that combat, previously viewed as a clash between armies, has begun to revolve around targeting of the enemies' civilians. Noticeably, the form that this combat often takes has been rampant sexual violence, not merely as a product of war but as a deliberate military strategy. The damage this causes to citizens around the world is significant, widespread, and endangers the international peace and security the SC is tasked with preserving.

As a response, the UN recently began moving towards measures that recognize this shift in military strategy. The UN recently created the UNiTE to End Sexual Violence campaign, which unites the work of all major UN bodies to combat sexual violence in conflict. The UN has concluded that sexual violence represents the greatest cause of casualties among women and children in conflict. Additionally, on 11 April 2013, the Group of Eight (G8) adopted the *G8 Declaration on Human Rights on Conflict*, which states, "Sexual violence in armed conflict represents one of the most serious forms of violation or abuse of international humanitarian law and international human rights law." The G8 ministers further pledged through this meeting to aid in ending sexual violence on an international level.

One of the major motivators behind the UN's movement to categorize sexual assault during conflict as a weapon of war has been the monumental sexual violence seen in civil crises of the early 1990s. In 1992, an ethnically and politically fragmented Bosnia began to splinter under Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia's recently elected president, and his aims of ethnically cleansing Eastern Europe. It was to be the most devastating conflict in Europe since WWII, and would result in the first recognition of sexual violence in conflict as "mass rape" or "genocidal rape." Targeting specifically Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims, the sexual assaults occurred on an immense scale, often in what were deemed "rape camps," not only as a method of violence, but as a means of ethnic repression. The human rights abuses of Bosnia motivated the International Criminal Court (ICC), through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to declare that "systemic rape" and "sexual enslavement" in conflict were second only to the war crime of genocide as crimes against humanity. Also facing the UN in the early 1990s, the

gender-targeted crimes of Rwanda in 1994, in which brutal and often lethal rape was used as a tool by the ethnically homogenous Hutu perpetrators to both exhaust and demoralize their opponents, caused the SC to be heavily criticized by the international community for its lack of response. The crimes in Rwanda were significant also because Hutu women were noted as being complicit in the attacks, a fact that while not extensively addressed by either the UN or the SC, brings up issues of sexual violence in conflict as not merely a crime of gender, but as a crime of genocide.

The UN and the SC are in the current position of having learned from these incidences, and are now responding through a large and extensive body of policy. Through the Rome Statute of the ICC, rape, particularly in instances of genocide, has been officially recognized as a crime against humanity. Similarly, there has been a noticeable progression in SC documents to an increased awareness of both the presence and after-effects of sexual violence in conflict. Starting with SC resolution 1325 (2000) on “women, peace, and security,” the SC recognized the need to focus on the specific protection of civilian women and girls from gender-based crimes in conflict, and has called upon female representatives to be included with policy development addressing the “prevention and resolution of conflicts.” In 2009, the SC took another step forward from merely calling upon the protection of women and girls in conflict, by adopting resolution 1888, in which the Secretary-General was asked to appoint a special representative and team of experts to address gender-violence in conflict. Slowly, the field of gender-violence in conflict has been expanded from being simply a call for increased peacekeeping intervention, to a recognized and respected field of policy. This undertaking was reinforced in SC resolution 1960 (2013), which views parties who instigate sexual violence in conflict as legally responsible and also calls for the implementation of post-conflict programming for survivors of sexual violence in conflict. This shift, which has been increasingly emphasized over the past few years, has demonstrated an increased movement towards bottom-up policy approaches. These approaches rely on the personal accounts of individuals affected by the violence when addressing the needs of marginalized groups, as well as the recognition that physical security of women and children in conflict is not sufficient when addressing the entire scope of the impact of sexual violence.

Even with these monumental advances over the last two decades, the SC still has much room to grow in response to sexual violence in conflict. The recent crises of sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan have forced the SC to quickly examine the flaws in its existing policies prior to responding. Publically, the SC has been criticized for the reluctance of several permanent and elected Member States to take substantive action with regards to sexual violence and conflict. Additionally, there exists little or inconsistent legal recourse for instigators of sexual violence in conflict on a national level, and a related lack of international pressure to achieve such. Currently, all forms of legislative consequence for perpetrators occur through the lengthy and expensive criminal process at the ICC. Yet even this may not result in legal recourse, as seen through the recent acquittal of Germain Katanga, former leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri (present day DRC), with regards to sexual offenses. The lack of integration of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict with the SC has also been particularly criticized, particularly the recent issue where she was not aware of the mass rapes in the DRC until 10 days after UN peacekeepers discovered the incidents. Overall, sexual violence has only recently been mentioned in ceasefire mediation or documents, often existing merely as a footnote to other military concerns.

In terms of a purely logistical approach, the UN lacks a historical legacy of reports on the scale and form of sexual violence in conflict. With reports on these issues only recently becoming standard, the UN is aiming to reeducate military personnel on how to properly report and interpret sexual violence data. However, these new areas of training still utilize a top-down approach and tend to ignore the personal accounts of the survivors themselves. Linked to the issue of accurate reporting are the struggles faced by the UN, SC, and ICC in applying medical evidence to these legal inquests in conflict areas to begin prosecuting the perpetrators of these crimes. There has also been increased discussion of resource constraints for, and lack of awareness of the proper treatment of survivors. Finally, all of these reporting techniques are not yet required by UN military personnel, despite Human Rights Council (HRC) recommendations, and there are worries within the SC about the sustainability of holding relevant scenario-based trainings for military personnel with the rapid increase in prevalence that sexual violence in conflict appears to be experiencing.

On a micro-level, UN military personnel have only recently been trained to prioritize the protection of women and children when sexual violence occurs in conflict. Furthermore, this training has only been in terms of protecting the women and children from physical assault, while ignoring the importance of a recovery period and follow-up

support for survivors of sexual violence. This post-conflict supplemental support is generally designated to the human rights bodies within the UN, such as the HRC and UN Women, or is delegated to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while UN military personnel remain relatively uneducated about the terminology and treatment necessary to directly aid sexual violence survivors. Similarly, the noticeably unequal gender balance within peacekeeping forces and the often hidden history of peacekeeping forces themselves engaging in sexual violence translates to UN peacekeepers who still struggle to gain local civilian trust; this is an integral part of meeting the peacekeeping goals for their mission and for general global peace and security. The medical and psychological support for survivors is therefore currently lacking, and while the recent increase in the recognition of the protection of women in conflict has been a positive step forward, other marginalized groups of victims, such as children, sexual minorities, and particularly male victims of sexual violence, lack both awareness and resources.

Moving to look at the issue outside of the logistical developments required to combat it, there exist larger thematic questions inherent within the concern of sexual violence in conflict that need to be substantively addressed by the international community. In general, the treatment of females that have experienced sexual violence in conflict has been based on the perception that they are “victims” in need of protection. Very little has been done by either the SC or even the UN as a whole with regards to preemptive, women-driven measures that empower other women to create policy or protect their own communities. Within the military, sexual violence has also been historically normalized. The addition of cultural components to instances of sexual violence also means that international attitudes around gender and ethnicity must be fundamentally shifted before sexual violence in conflict can truly be combated. These are immense issues that the SC will need to consider in all future policy deliberations, even if it may have reduced influence in these larger thematic areas when compared to its influence in the discussion of logistical advancements.

In conclusion, while the recent recognition by the international community of sexual violence in conflict as a pressing issue is a positive development, there is still significant room for advancement internationally before the issue can be considered stable and no longer a recognizable threat. Recent SC resolutions, from 2000 onwards, have displayed a gradual progression towards both recognizing the importance of the issue and the necessity of involving sexual violence survivors in the policy-creation process. However, this momentum must not be lost or pushed aside in favor of other priorities. If the international community’s fight to protect marginalized populations from violence is to be won, it is of the utmost importance that the SC acts as a united, substantive, and powerful voice against these crimes.

## **Annotated Bibliography**

### ***History of the United Nations Security Council***

United Nations. (26 June 1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. Retrieved 7 May 2014 from: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>

*There is no more comprehensive document to examine the mandates of both the UN and the SC. The Charter establishes the purpose and goals of the SC and states where limits on its power may lie. Articles 1 and 25, as well as Chapter VI, may prove particularly useful to delegates, as these chapters define how the SC implements legislative power in the international community, and they will enable delegates to research the source of the SC’s power and ability to create legally binding resolutions.*

United Nations, Security Council. (2014). *About* [Website]. Retrieved 7 May 2014 from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/>

*The key Website to understanding the work of the SC, this site goes from explaining the basic mechanisms of the SC, including membership and presidency, to examining its overarching Programme of Work. Under the “Documents” section is the entirety of all previous SC resolutions and statements, including letters and press reports, which will prove highly useful to any research on the SC. Delegates should view the information about “Subsidiary Organs” and “Meetings” for the most recent information on the SC’s mandate and actions.*

United Nations, Security Council. (18 June 2014). *Provisional Programme of Work of the Security Council – June 2014*. Retrieved 7 May 2014 from: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow/powmonthly.pdf>

*While short, this document shows the entire program of work and agenda of the SC throughout the month of June 2014. It provides reference to the consultations and briefings that have occurred*

with individual Member States and UN bodies, and also explains which reports will be published on which dates. Furthermore, this report lists the current areas of crisis and thematic debates occurring within the SC at this time. Delegates will find this very useful when studying the most current overall themes, policy developments, and collaborations between the SC and other UN bodies.

### **I. Crisis Management in Failed or Fragile Nascent States**

African Union, Peace and Security Department. (November 2010). *African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study*. Retrieved 17 June 2014 from:

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture.pdf>

*This study essentially can be used as a progress report on the whole of the peace and security framework for the African Union. While the sections on the African Standby Force are especially relevant to this topic, the entire document will be a hugely useful and informative read for delegates in their preparation. Delegates should pay special attention to the challenges and subsequent recommendations outlined in each subsection mentioning the African Standby Force, and reflect on how it can apply to the SC and crisis management. Delegates should also be aware of an assessment report concerning the full operational capability of the African Standby Force in 2015, which will be prepared by an African Union independent panel of experts by July 2014.*

Security Council Report. (May 2014). *Monthly Forecast: May 2014*. Retrieved 27 May 2014 from:

[http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/2014\\_05\\_forecast.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/2014_05_forecast.pdf)

*This Monthly Forecast publication is an extremely valuable resource for delegates to become acquainted with all the proceedings of the SC in one place. Not only does it provide snapshots of current situations that the SC is discussing, it outlines the probable outcomes of all pending resolutions, reports, and decisions. It is clearly organized and labeled, and offers an excellent starting place for research on any one of the topics being considered by the SC.*

Thürer, D. (1999). The “Failed State” and International Law. *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 836.

Retrieved 25 May 2014 from: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq6u.htm>

*This article, while written 15 years ago and not directly from a security perspective, provides a good background of both failed and fragile states. It has solid narratives for the SC’s history with failed states that delegates may find useful to develop their background knowledge on the subject. The references section may also be a suitable location to find other leads on the subject for further study and research.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7153<sup>rd</sup> Meeting. (10 April 2014). *Resolution 2149*. Retrieved 7 May 2014 from:

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149(2014))

*This resolution is the latest action from the SC on the subject of the CAR. Of particular interest are the operatives that detail the new Transitional Government in the CAR, as well as the transition from the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA). Delegates should familiarize themselves with this resolution, as well as its counterparts, Security Council resolution 2158 of 29 May 2014 and Security Council resolution 2132 of 24 December 2013, relating respectively to the missions in Somalia and South Sudan, to be up-to-date on the failed or fragile nascent states in focus in this guide.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7168<sup>th</sup> meeting. (2 May 2014). *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (S/PV.7168)* [Provisional Record]. Retrieved 27 May 2014 from:

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7168](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7168)

*This is a verbatim meeting record of the SC’s consideration of the situation in the Sudan and South Sudan. There is a first-hand report delivered in several speeches to the SC detailing the atrocities being carried out in South Sudan, as well as an in-depth update on the events that transpired at a UN peacekeeping base in the country. Delegates are encouraged to read as much*

of this record as they can, as it provides a different medium of conveying what is happening on the ground in a fragile nascent state.

## **II. Addressing Security Sector Reform**

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2014). *Security Sector Reform* [Website]. Retrieved 25 May 2014 from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml>

*This Website is a section of the UN Peacekeeping Website that gives a brief overview of the UN's involvement with security sector reform. It is a comprehensive introduction to security sectors in general, and is a good starting point before launching into long reports and resolutions on the subject. Particularly, many of the terms used in the field of security sector reform are defined here. Delegates might also find the links at the bottom of the page to be relevant and useful.*

United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force. (2009). *UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force* [Website]. Retrieved 26 May 2014 from: <http://unssr.unlb.org/TaskForceMembers/TaskForce.aspx>

*This is just one of the many great pages from the main UN Website on the topic of security sector reform. This page in particular educates delegates on what the United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (IASSRTF) is, its history, and its membership. IASSRTF is the most important UN body when discussing the issue of security sector reform, so delegates should take care to dedicate research time to its work and how it relates to the SC. This Website is a necessary starting point when researching the IASSRTF, and is full of convenient links and sections pertinent to security sector reform.*

United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force. (2012). *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes*. Retrieved 26 May 2014 from:

<http://unssr.unlb.org/Portals/UNSSR/UN%20Integrated%20Technical%20Guidance%20Notes%20on%20SSR.PDF>

*This is one of the most important sources for delegates to study. It is the most comprehensive security sector reform document compiled by the UN, and is a remarkable document considering the scope of its application extends across all UN peacekeeping operations and development efforts. Delegates will find the annexes beneficial, as they summarize the more complex sections on each of the five Integrated Technical Guidance Notes. Delegates should be familiar with the major ideas in this document, as they form the basis of debate on security sector reform.*

United Nations, Security Council. (13 August 2013). *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/480)*. Retrieved 25 May 2014 from: [undocs.org/S/2013/480](http://undocs.org/S/2013/480)

*As the most recent report by the Secretary-General on security sector reform, it is crucial that delegates understand the main findings and recommendations contained in it. It is also helpful to take note of the specific recollections of the 2008 report by the Secretary-General (A/62/659), as he compares his findings of this report with the 2008 report at several points. Besides the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes prepared by the United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, this report is the most comprehensive document published by the UN on security sector reform.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7161<sup>st</sup> meeting. (28 April 2014). *Resolution 2151*. Retrieved 7 May 2014 from: [undocs.org/S/RES/2151\(2014\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2151(2014))

*This resolution is the only stand-alone SC resolution discussing security sector reform. This is one of the most important sources for delegates to familiarize themselves with, as it is very similar content to what this committee will be simulating. Delegates would benefit from reading the preambulatory clauses in particular and researching the different actors and documents mentioned, as it will help them trace the chronology of security sector reform at the UN.*

## **III. Sexual Violence in Conflict**

United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. (2014). *Stop Rape Now* [Website]. Retrieved 24 May 2014 from: <http://www.stoprapenow.org>

*As the key campaign behind the UN's current approach to sexual violence in conflict, this organization's Website includes not only the crucial documents influencing contemporary policy choices, but also field updates of the results of this policy. The section "Advocacy Resources" is also an extensive database of all documents within the past two decades addressing the issue, as well as all relevant SC resolutions and G8 declarations. There are also links to relevant NGOs, current news, and how civilians can take action on preventing sexual violence in conflict, which will prove useful in research on recent developments against sexual violence in conflict.*

United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. (February 1994). *Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Retrieved 23 May 2014 from:

[http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw25years/content/english/CONCLUDING\\_COMMENTS/Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina/Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina-Special\\_report.pdf](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw25years/content/english/CONCLUDING_COMMENTS/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina-Special_report.pdf)

*This document provides the earliest evidence of modern UN approaches to sexual violence in conflict by examining the failures and successes of peacekeeping deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through remarks by national representatives, these comments demonstrate that sexual violence is not merely a product of war, but a tool of it, which reveals the genocidal motivations of its perpetrators. This document is incredibly useful for research because it provides an early discussion of the post-war support required by survivors of sexual violence, including psychotherapy and reproductive health needs, which will likely be very influential in future policy development.*

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2014). *Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations*. Retrieved 23 May 2014 from: <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/index.shtml>

*While this Website deals specifically with the ramifications of the Rwandan genocide, it is notable for showing the evidence of a successful post-genocide violence in conflict program. Aside from detailed explanations of the program, there are extensive timelines and news updates of current events regarding both the survivors and perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. Delegates should also seek out the site's extensive digital archive of related UN documents, and highly useful downloadable educational material, which should be greatly influential on all policy research.*

United Nations, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict. (2014). *Sexual Violence in Conflict* [Website]. Retrieved 24 May 2014 from:

<http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/>

*This Website provides the most up-to-date information on the current work of Zainab Bangura, the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. On top of her previous statements, it also provides videos and quotes from her current engagements, as well as present news updates. There are also links to related UN bodies that perform work with the Special Representative on sexual violence in combat issues. Delegates will find this site to have the most up-to-date archives on the Special Representative's recent work, as well as the most recent UN joint statements.*

United Nations, Security Council, 6453<sup>rd</sup> meeting. (16 December 2010). *Resolution 1960*. Retrieved 23 May 2014 from: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1960\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1960(2010))

*This is the watershed document behind the UN's current approaches to addressing sexual violence in conflict. The resolution calls for increased documentation of sexual violence in conflict and the related inclusion of recent field action on preventing sexual violence within UN documents. SC resolution 1960 is noted as being the most substantive document to date regarding sexual violence, and will be useful for any research on this topic as it demonstrates the recent evolution of the UN's increased movement towards responsibility of sexual violence in conflict.*

# Rules of Procedure for the United Nations Security Council

## ***Introduction***

1. These rules shall be the only rules that apply to Security Council (hereinafter referred to as “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Deputy Secretary-General or her/his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations (NMUN) and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Commission, which can be any member of the Secretariat or their designate.
5. The practice of striving for consensus in decision-making shall be encouraged. NMUN also acknowledges it may sometimes be necessary for a Member State to abstain or vote against a resolution it cannot support for policy reasons.

## **I. MEETINGS**

### ***Rule 1***

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time he or she deems necessary.

### ***Rule 2***

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any of its members.

### ***Rule 3***

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any questions to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

### ***Rule 4 - Periodic meetings***

Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held at least once a year at such times the Security Council may decide.

*The meeting at NMUN-NY should be considered a periodic meeting*

### ***Rule 5 - Meeting location***

Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.

Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such a place.

## **II. AGENDA**



### **Rule 6**

The Secretary-General, or his or her designate, shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

### **Rule 7**

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

### **Rule 8**

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives of the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

### **Rule 9 - Adoption of the agenda**

The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

*The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, it requires nine votes in favor to pass in accordance with Article 27 (2) of the United Nations Charter. The veto does not apply for procedural votes. All must vote on procedural votes. Should the Council not reach a decision by conclusion of the first night's meeting, the agenda will be automatically set in the order in which it was first communicated.*

### **Rule 10**

Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless otherwise decided, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

### **Rule 11 - Periodic meetings – circulation of the agenda**

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.

*For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item as "urgent" is subject to the discretion of the Members of the Council. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires 9 votes in favor to be placed on the agenda. The votes described in this rule are substantive votes. For purposes of this rule, —the members "present and voting" — means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.*

## **III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS**

### **Rule 12**

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

**Rule 13**

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose.

**IV. PRESIDENCY**

**Rule 14 - Selection of the President**

The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, inter alia, chair the Council for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

**Rule 15 - Replacement of the President**

If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General or her/his designate.

**V. SECRETARIAT**

**Rule 16 - Duties of the Secretary-General**

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

*The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, inter alia, chair the Council for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.*

**Rule 17 - Oral and written statements**

The Secretary-General or her/his designate, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

**Rule 18 - Staff**

The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

**Rule 19 - Notification of meetings**

The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

**Rule 20 - Duties of the Secretariat**

The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

**VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS**

**Rule 21 - Order of speakers**

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

*The President shall indicate the method in which they shall add speakers to a speakers list. One common method is by asking delegates to place their placards vertically to indicate the desire to speak.*

**Rule 22 - Subsidiary entities**

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

**Rule 23**

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

**Rule 24 - Appeal the Chair**

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

**Rule 25 - Closure of debate**

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Council favors the closure of debate, the Council shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

**Rule 26**

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

**Rule 27 - Order of motions**

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. To suspend the meeting;
2. To adjourn the meeting;
3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

*As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council's next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.*

**Rule 28**

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

**Rule 29 - Withdrawal of motions**

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

### **Rule 30 - Order of voting on proposals**

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

### **Rule 31 - Participation by Member States of the United Nations in Council Meetings**

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

*The Secretariat will determine which specific member of a delegation to approach. If the Council considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Council according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Council is no longer required.*

### **Rule 32 - Participation by non-Member States in Council meetings**

The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

*For the purposes of this rule, this, in most cases, invitations will be in line with Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, which state that members whom are particularly affected by a situation under consideration or a party to a dispute under consideration may address the Council as observers. Should this be the case for a delegate, the Secretariat will inform them in line with Rule 31.*

### **Rule 33 - Quorum**

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least nine members of the Council are present. The presence of nine representatives of the Council shall be required for any decision to be taken.

### **Rule 34 - General powers of the President**

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Council, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Council and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. The President may propose to the Council the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the speakers time and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

*Included in these enumerated powers is the power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President (will be referred to as "Chair" at the conference) is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference and is limited to entertaining motions.*

### **Rule 35 - Points of order**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with the rules of procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting. A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

*Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. They should be used exclusively to correct an error in procedure. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, on her/his own accord, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.*

### **Rule 36**

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

### **Rule 37 - Speeches**

No representative may address the Council without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

*In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, the Secretariat will set a time limit for all speeches which may be amended by the Council through a vote if the President, at his or her discretion, decides to allow the Council to decide. In no case shall the speakers time be changed during the first scheduled session of the Council. may be amended by the President at his/her discretion. Consequently, motions to alter the speaker's time will not be entertained by the President. The content of speeches should be pertinent to the agenda as set by the Council.*

### **Rule 38 - List of Speakers**

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate, the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Council declare the list closed. Once the list has been closed, it can be reopened upon by a vote of the Council. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Council

*The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Council. A motion to close the speakers list or reopen (if the list has already been closed) is within the purview of the Council and the President should not act on her/his own motion.*

### **Rule 39 - Right of reply**

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

*For purposes of this rule, a remark that impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Council by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose. The right of reply will not be approved should it impugn the integrity of another State.*

**Rule 40 - Suspension of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. Delegates should not state a purpose for the suspension.

*This motion should be used to suspend the meeting for lunch or at the end of the scheduled Council session time. Delegates should properly phrase this motion as "suspension of the meeting," and provide a length of time when making the motion.*

**Rule 41 - Adjournment of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move to the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Council shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

*As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Committee's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Committee.*

**Rule 42 - Adjournment of debate**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. Two representatives may speak in favor of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule.

**Rule 43 - Closure of debate**

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Council favors the closure of debate, the Council shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item

**Rule 44 - Withdrawal of motions**

A motion may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before voting has commenced, provided that the motion has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any member.

**Rule 45 - Reconsideration of a topic**

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Council, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule.

**VII. VOTING**

**Rule 46 - Majority required**

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

According to Article 27(2) of the Charter, decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Article 27(3) states that all (substantive) decisions shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, which is interpreted as to refer to no vetoes.

#### **Rule 47 - Request for a vote**

A proposal or motion before the Council for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Council may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

*For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote. Adoption by "acclamation" or "without a vote" is in line not only with the educational mission of the conference but also the way in which the United Nations adopts a majority of its proposals.*

#### **Rule 48 - Method of voting**

The Council shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll-call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each member shall be called in any roll-call, and one of its representatives shall reply "yes," "no," "abstention," or "pass."

*Only those members who designate themselves as present or present and voting during the attendance roll-call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying pass must, when requested a second time, respond with either a yes or no vote. A pass cannot be followed by a second pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.*

1. When the Council votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Council shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
2. The vote of each member participating in a roll-call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

#### **Rule 49 - Explanations of vote**

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

*All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends. Only delegates who are sponsors of a draft resolution that has been adopted with an unfriendly amendment, whom subsequently voted against the draft resolution may explain their vote.*

#### **Rule 50 - Conduct during voting**

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

*For purposes of this rule, there shall be no communication among delegates, and if any delegate leaves the Council room during voting procedure, they will not be allowed back into the room until the Council has convened voting procedure. Should a delegate who is also serving as Head Delegate leave the room, they may reenter but they may not retake their seat and participate in the vote.*

### **Rule 51 - Division of proposals and amendments**

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If an objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are approved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

*For purposes of this rule, most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

### **Rule 52 - Amendments**

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal. Permission to speak on the amendment shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against.

*An amendment can add, amend, or delete entire operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect preambular clauses or sub-clauses of operative clauses. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule. These speeches are substantive in nature.*

### **Rule 53 - Voting on amendments**

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

*For purposes of this rule, furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

### **Rule 54 - Order of voting on proposals**

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the committee decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

### **Rule 55 - The President shall not vote**

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

## **VIII. LANGUAGE**

### **Rule 56 - Official and working language**

English shall be the official and working language of the Council during scheduled sessions of the Council.

### **Rule 57 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)**

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

*This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit. The language should be the official language of the country you are representing at NMUN.*