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Conference B

General Assembly First Committee (GA1)

Committee Staff

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Agenda

- I. Global Nuclear Disarmament
- II. The Role of Science and Technology in International Security and Disarmament
- III. Increasing Women's Role in Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Resolutions adopted by the Committee

Code	Торіс	Vote
GA1/1/1	Global Nuclear Disarmament	113 votes in favor, 12 votes against, 17 abstentions
GA1/1/2	Global Nuclear Disarmament	114 votes in favor, 11 votes against, 18 abstentions
GA1/1/3	Global Nuclear Disarmament	120 votes in favor, 5 votes against, 17 abstentions
GA1/1/4	Global Nuclear Disarmament	119 votes in favor, 8 votes against, 22 abstentions
GA1/1/5	Global Nuclear Disarmament	120 votes in favor, 16 votes against, 15 abstentions

Summary Report

The General Assembly First Committee held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

- I. The Role of Science and Technology in International Security and Disarmament
- II. Global Nuclear Disarmament
- III. Increasing Women's Role in Disarmament and Nonproliferation

The session was attended by representatives of 147 Member States and 1 Observer.

On Sunday, the committee adopted the agenda of II, I, III, beginning discussion on the topic of "Global Nuclear Disarmament." By Tuesday, the Dais had received a total of 16 proposals covering a wide range of sub-topics, including Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs), Regional Disarmament, improving the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), discouraging the transport of nuclear material, supplementary dialogue to the on-going nuclear ban treaty negotiations, sharing best practices, and increasing political will on nuclear disarmament. The debate was concrete and substantive, with significant technical understandings of the topics. Delegates showed an unparalleled willingness to engage in multilateral negotiations through extensive cooperation and a strong commitment to diplomacy. Through intensive dialogue, delegates built five concrete papers that proposed creative solutions to the topic at hand, and were supported by the vast majority of the body.

On Wednesday, 5 draft resolutions were approved by the Dais, 1 of which had 1 friendly amendment. The committee adopted 5 resolutions following a majority placard vote. Delegates utilized both suspensions and formal speeches to present diverse viewpoints on the topic, and to facilitate greater consensus. The resolutions addressed a wide range of issues, including non-state actors acquiring nuclear capacity, remediation of nuclear weapon material, creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and progress towards a global nuclear zero world. The concluding papers were both innovative and within mandate.



Code: GA1/1/1 **Committee:** General Assembly First Committee **Topic:** Global Nuclear Disarmament

1 The General Assembly First Committee, 2 3 Cognizant of Article 1.1 of the Charter of the United Nations, and its goal of maintaining international peace and 4 security. 5 6 *Recognizing* the actions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Disarmament 7 Commission (UNDC), the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and other organizations in 8 promoting disarmament, 9 10 Recognizing the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Network of Regulatory Bodies on 11 Atomic Energy in the development of peaceful nuclear energy in the ASEAN zone by ensuring more regional 12 cooperation. 13 14 Aware of the critical role played by the International Monitoring System in providing checks on, possession of 15 nuclear weapons as set forth by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 16 17 *Noting* with regret the possible dangers inherent in the development of nuclear devices by non-state actors, 18 19 Remembering the damage and humanitarian impact of the Fukushima power plant and the Chernobyl disaster, 20 21 Alarmed by the dangers that decommissioned power plants and the misuse of nuclear material pose to the wellbeing 22 of society through environmental catastrophe and societal damage, 23 24 *Reaffirming* the request from the resolution 71/259 (2016) towards a treaty banning the production of fissile material 25 for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, 26 27 *Emphasizing* the further collaboration of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Office 28 for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) with 29 Member States to decrease the amount of nuclear weapons in order to secure that weapons-grade fissile materials are 30 used for non-militarized purposes like medical appliances, 31 32 Believing in the peaceful implementation of demilitarized nuclear technology, 33 34 Alarmed by the amount of radiation emitted by nuclear waste and the risk it poses to the environment and humanity, 35 36 Further reaffirms a physical presence such as UN security at the decommissioned power plants to ensure that the 37 dangerous material that may be present are not acquired by non-state actors, 38 Guided by the safety standards and protocols in detecting non-peaceful nuclear usage instituted by the International 39 40 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in constructing nuclear facilities, 41 42 Emphasizes the mandates set forth by the UNIDIR, reevaluating the network security standards for nuclear facilities, 43 and encourages Member States to follow its recommendations and improve and inspect their nuclear facilities, 44 45 *Promoting* the conversion of nuclear waste into usable and beneficial energy, 46 47 Emphasizing the need for gradual disarmament in order to attain Global Zero as well as working towards meeting 48 the Sustainable Development Goals, 49

50 *Recognizing* the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as it serves as an opportunity to 51 educate the general public and Member States about economic and social ramifications of nuclear weapons, 52 53 Noting the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) in its objective to set 54 guidelines pertaining to dealing with actors with malicious usage of nuclear technology, and clearly defining 55 treatment of such actors in accordance with such behavior, 56 57 Emphasizing the importance of multilateral diplomacy between nuclear and non-nuclear states for the purpose of 58 negative security assurances as specified in General Assembly resolution 70/258 (2016), and striving to foster open 59 dialogue to prevent asymmetrical warfare, 60 61 Deeply concerned by the lack of concrete measures for addressing the operationalization, production, storage, stockpiling, possession, sale, or development of illicit arms and technologies that jeopardize security and social, 62 63 economic, and humanitarian development in post-conflict areas, 64 65 Appreciating the past work of the International Campaign for Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and the United 66 Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute and Centers for education for their 67 efforts in informing people from all around the world, 68 69 Bearing in mind of the continued possession of a limited amount of nuclear weapons in proportion to other nuclear 70 weapon states (NWS) to sustain state sovereignty, 71 72 Recognizing the current Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) states as leading members of the 73 committee. 74 75 Believing that equal status as NWS is essential for reaching nuclear erradication and disarmament of non-NPT 76 states. 77 78 Recalling Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), General Assembly resolution 69/61 (2014), and Disarmament, 79 Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) processes relating to promoting women's role in disarmament discussion, 80 decision making on post-conflict processes, and peace building in short and long terms, which elaborated on the 81 importance of women's role in disarmament procedures, 82 83 Fully believing that the advancement of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes is imperative to the global 84 nuclear disarmament movement. 85 86 1. Asks all willing and able Member States who have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty on the 87 Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to address the 88 root cause of nuclear proliferation; 89 90 2. *Calls for* increased cooperation between the General Assembly and the IAEA by: 91 92 a. Inviting Member States to provide further regular budget funding for the Office of Nuclear Security 93 and to the IAEA, and more specifically states having existing nuclear power program to assist 94 disarmament programs and the world equal energetic development; 95 96 b. Encouraging all Member States and Observers to be members of the agency and in consequences to 97 reallocate funds to agency; 98 99 c. Acquiring the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to assist the IAEA in financing 100 nuclear technology programs towards peaceful usage and in providing technical support and expertise; 101 102 d. Suggesting for Member States to develop the capability to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes through the IAEA, such as: 103 104

105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114		 i. Guided nuclear safety and energy aid program for Member States, especially those without nuclear resources, that will improve their general knowledge base and awareness regarding nuclear energy and the various ways it can be utilized for the betterment of the international community, and act as an incentive for agreeing to conform to the principles of the observation committee; ii. Providing further access to think tanks, that could formulate research for nuclear energy and focus greater efforts on developing initiatives for eventual disarmament; iii. Recommending facility specialists to work with regional authorities for the creation of nuclear power plants, to help formulate more detailed protocols for nuclear disarmament, and helping to convert nuclear weapons to usable nuclear energy material;
115		
116 117	3.	<i>Accepts</i> the need for gradual disarmament by implementing a long-term plan that must be fulfilled alongside the mission of peace and prosperity set forward in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 3, 6, 7, 13, 14, and 15:
118 119 120 121 122		a. Further recommends a five to ten percent reduction in the number of nuclear weapons each year in order to achieve the Action Plan established by Global Zero Plan, which also coincides with the completion of the SDGs;
122 123 124 125		b. Requests that the United Nations Security Council's 1540 committee monitor global nuclear disarmament and enforce gradual reduction goals;
125 126 127 128		c. Endorses the use of reprocessed and demilitarized nuclear energy for the fulfillment of the Sustainable Development Goals;
129 130 131 132	4.	<i>Respectfully requests</i> that the UNODA, in accordance with reports submitted to the General Assembly, to cooperate in emergency meetings of the United Nations Security Council to address pressing issues and recommend sanctions in case of emergencies, such as a breach of a treaty and withdrawals of treaties to quickly open multilateral discussions for diplomatic resolutions;
133 134 135 136	5.	<i>Supports</i> regional efforts to develop transparency and confidence building measure through reports submitted via regional bodies in relations to nuclear disarmament to further sustainable development along with economic incentives collaboration, such as free trade, with the council of ECOSOC;
137 138 139	6.	<i>Urges</i> Member States located on the borders of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones that have not yet joined a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) to:
140 141 142 143		a. Sign and ratify one of the existing treaties establishing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in Asia, that are the Treaty of Bangkok, the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, and Treaty of Tlatelolco;
144 145		b. Follow the example of their neighboring countries to form new NWFZ in places like Europe and the Middle East;
146 147 148		c. Sign and ratify protocols protecting existing NWFZ, especially if they are bordering them;
149 150 151 152		d. Participate in an open international summit with NWFZ countries organized in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament aimed to promote the benefits of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones with the aforementioned topics being discussed therein;
152 153 154 155 156 157	7.	<i>Encourages</i> Member States to work with the Office of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to facilitate responses to issues relating to cyber security threats, engage with the private sector, and promote international cooperation in order to prevent outside tampering of nuclear sites to ensure a safe and secure disposal of nuclear software to avoid the nuclear material from being hacked and proliferated;
157 158 159 160	8.	<i>Recommends</i> the implementation and development of regional networks to provide assistance to countries launching nuclear dismantling and nuclear technology programs towards peaceful usage while dealing with the challenges they are facing:

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162		a. Enable them to meet the international standards by offering them more regular contact with countries
163		facing similar issues;
164		
165		b. Enhancing state's growth of knowledge and resources by facilitating the information exchange and
166		cooperation to ensure the safety, security, and safeguards of peaceful nuclear energy applications;
167		
168		c. Ensuring more cooperation and collaboration between different actors in terms of capacity-building
169		and technical assistance, and in terms of outreach in nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control
170		issues, furthering in the sharing of information by creating and participating in dialogue of sharing of
171 172		short and long term strategies;
172	9.	Encourages Member States that are in possession of uranium enrichment facilities to transition their usage
173	9.	towards peaceful purposes, promoting the usage of clean nuclear energy which can be used for water
174		desalinating in developing nations;
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177	10	Calls upon standardized and efficient methods for the decommission of aging power plants and the safe
178	10.	transportation of the radioactive materials within them;
179		
180	11.	Requests the modification to the Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Survey of Verification Mechanisms
181		Section 3.3.6 of the IAEA Safeguards set forth by the IAEA to include a grading system to determine the
182		feasibility of a nuclear power plant by:
183		
184		a. Conducting agreed, non-informed, bi-annual safety inspections of the facilities to ensure maximum
185		efficiency while meeting IAEA safety standards;
186		
187		b. Grading of A-B includes a power plant that has passed IAEA inspections but also contributes to the
188		development of nuclear energy and nuclear waste conversion into usable energy, all machinery is up to
189		date and efficient, this nuclear power plant does not pose any threat to society;
190		
191		c. Grading of C-D includes a power plant that has passed IAEA inspections but has out of date and
192		inefficient machineries, does not take part in nuclear waste conversion into usable energy, this poses a
193 194		potential threat to society and should be considered for decommission within a 6-12 month time period if they are unable to improve and comply with IAEA safety standards;
194		If they are unable to improve and compry with IAEA safety standards,
196		d. Grading of F includes a power plant that has not passed IAEA inspections and has out of date and
197		inefficient machineries, and does not take part in nuclear waste conversion into usable energy, this
198		poses an immediate threat to society and should be decommissioned as soon as possible;
199		poses un mineatate aneat to society and should be decommissioned as soon as possible,
200	12.	Recommends the use of Integral Fast Reactors (IFR) in order to have technology that converts nuclear waste
201		into usable energy through the use of pre-existing nuclear waste as well as other nuclear chemicals from
202		weapons;
203		
204	13.	Further proclaims that the storage of nuclear waste underground is counterproductive and should be instead
205		converted into usable energy;
206		
207	14.	Promotes a security presence on site during removal and decontamination of remaining materials after the
208		abandonment of the facility and before the transportation of nuclear energy to avoid non-state actors from
209		acquiring the materials by:
210		
211		a. Joining in the removal process as confidence and peace building measures;
212		b Encouraging Member States to actively pursue endequers partaining to percentil uses of muclear
213 214		b. Encouraging Member States to actively pursue endeavors pertaining to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, working alongside the IAEA and supporting non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
214		working alongside the IADA and supporting non-governmental organizations (NOOS),
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216 217 218	15.	. <i>Recommends</i> that during the transportation of the nuclear materials, IAEA technical support is present to ensure safe travel and successful delivery of all materials to the intended destination;		
218 219 220 221	16.	<i>Encourages</i> the implementation of background checks through the IAEA on the facilities and staff members that are receiving the material transported before being received:		
222 222 223 224 225		a. Considers expanding on funding of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) to include funding initiatives for Member States located on the border of NWFZ to convert nuclear weapons stores into sustainable development technologies;		
226 227 228		b. The High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development should investigate any request for development to determine whether the nation can afford otherwise;		
229 230	17.	Promotes public-private partnerships in cooperation with the United Nations Global Compact to:		
231 232 233		a. Propose the creation or development of national agencies, in order to bring the UN resolutions closer to Member States and to possible non-state partners;		
234 235 236 237		 Endorsing the implementation of global, regional and national campaigns towards the IAEA role in countries energetic development and nuclear disarmament, to raise awareness and funds for the agency programs; 		
238 239 240 241	18.	<i>Requests</i> the Secretary General to expand the scope of the NPT Review Conference to include an international dialogue between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states regarding negative security assurances;		
242 243 244 245	19.	<i>Recommends</i> utilizing the newly expanded NPT Review Conference as a platform to discuss strategies for educating citizens and leaders about the ramifications of nuclear weapons and the progress towards global nuclear disarmament, while calling upon member states to increase funding for programs that promotes the role of all genders, especially women in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation;		
246 247 248 249	20.	<i>Utilizing</i> the Panel of Experts established by General Assembly 71/L.41 adopted in 2016 reviewing nuclear stockpile maintenance and stewardship programs;		
250 251 252 253	21.	<i>Calls upon</i> the Secretary-General to institute a forum designed to discuss peaceful nuclear technology transfer and address the inadequacies of national and regional assessments of nuclear weapons monitoring measures by the NPT, CTBT, Outer Space Treaty (OST), and Arms Trade Treaty (ATT);		
255 254 255 256	22.	<i>Calls for</i> biannual reports on weapons and nuclear equipment, technical document, munitions, fissile material, non-military grade nuclear material through:		
257 258 259 260 261		 Timely reporting to the Security Council from collected data taken by the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs and the IAEA through series of sub-offices in regional zones based upon Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) including North American, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and East Asian zones; 		
262 263 264 265		b. Member States will submit fully transparent biannual reports along with initial reports made one year after signing the treaty on unconventional weapons transfers, actions taken on transgression of the treaty will be determined by the Security Council;		
265 266 267 268 269		c. Member States will engage in facilitation of tracking on unconventional weapons, placement of radio frequency identification tags on unconventional arms, equipment, fissile material, and non-military grade nuclear material:		
209 270 271		i. Establish RFID tracking through the satellite navigation systems using GPS and global navigation system along with emerging satellite navigation systems;		

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273		ii. Reaffirms the need to establish 10-year limitation on weapons tracking once they leave home
274		state to the recipient state – the RFID can be deactivated at the end of 10-year limit with
275		permission from IAEA or UNODA officials, but must remain active if weapons are to be
276		transferred from recipient state to another state;
277		1
278	23.	Encourages the inclusion of women in nuclear disarmament and policy making in the direction of global
279		nuclear disarmament as to diversify gender perspectives in global nuclear disarmament by:
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281		a. Encouraging Member States to integrate gender perspectives in the implementation of international
282		instruments on nuclear weapons;
282		instruments on nuclear weapons,
285		b. Organizing gender awareness campaigns with regards to nuclear disarmament efforts in order to call
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		attention to the benefits of new perspectives on the matter;
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287		c. Supporting missions with a greater involvement of women to empower multiple voices and fresh
288		perspectives;
289		
290		d. Calling upon the extension of the UN Women Program "Open Days on Women and Peace and
291		Security", which is currently organized annually, and organize the meetings between women and
292		senior UN leaders the entire year;
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294		e. Implementing former armed servicewomen in Member States' disarmament efforts to help in the effort
295		of global nuclear disarmament;
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297	24.	Suggests reaching populations with limited and/or inadequate access to information about nuclear disarmament
298		and non-proliferation in areas involving every part of decision-making and discussion of nuclear disarmament
299		by:
300		a. Suggesting a series of conferences discussing the topic of disarmament and targeting younger and
301		older generations;
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303		b. Creating informative and credible social media networks that focus on the importance of citizens' roles
304		and involvement in global nuclear disarmament;
305		and involvement in groour nuclear distribution,
306		c. Implementing and renewing series of UN-sponsored documentaries regarding nuclear disarmament
307		and non-proliferation and the effects on the environment and humanity;
307		and non-promeration and the effects on the environment and numanity,
	25	Sum and the implementation of the Terrets on Presention of the Pleasance of Weeners in Octor Successed of
309	23.	Supports the implementation of the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of
310		the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT):
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312		a. Ceasing development and dismantling of weapons that use space as a medium in the conduct of both
313		conventional (orbital bombardment systems, and emerging technologies) and unconventional
314		(chemical, biological, nuclear, kinetic energy weapons, and emerging technologies) weapon systems;
315		
316		b. Promoting the equal usage of space for peaceful purposes for all non-nuclear Member States and
317		nuclear Member States to eliminate the militarization of space and promote accountability upon all
318		states;
319		
320	26.	Endorses the Supplementation of a Multilateral implementation of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
321		START) to achieve proportional dismantling of delivery systems such as nuclear bomber aircraft, submarines,
322		and ICBMs, to expedite transparent measures that maintains equal power sharing amongst NWSs including
323		both NPT and non NPT members;
324		
325	27.	Requests dismantling and ceasing development and maintenance of long range missiles, and limited dismantling
326		of short to medium range ICBM, to initiate disarmament of all Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and
327		Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs);

327 Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs);

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329 330	28.	<i>B. Designates</i> a 15-year time table for the dismantling of long range ICBMs, and limitations on short to medium range ICBMs, including following mechanisms:		
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332 333		a. Decreasing flight ceiling to under 85 km altitude at maximum for the military use missiles and rockets;		
334 335		b. Ceasing development of long-range anti-missile batteries;		
336		c. Limiting counter missile batteries to counter only short to medium range missiles 300-3500 km;		
337 338		d. Dismantling of all MIRVs;		
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340 341	29.	<i>Encourages</i> limiting the size of nuclear warheads to no more than 350 kilotons and no less than 100 kilotons to prevent miniaturization and maximization of warheads on delivery systems including:		
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343 344		a. Discontinuing development of miniaturization programs of nuclear weapons to maintain the threshold of using nuclear devices;		
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346 347		b. Dismantled delivery systems will include their payloads to be converted to peaceful civilian use;		
348 349 350	30.	<i>Endorses</i> ceasing of discrimination of non-NPT states by NPT Member States to become equals in the power sharing of nuclear capability prior to the eventual signing of the NPT and complete disarmament;		
351 352 353	31.	<i>Further requests</i> a revision and clarification to the NPT that states nuclear weapon states (NWS) parties have the justification not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack by a non-NWS that is aligned with a NWS by:		
354 355 356		a. Revision to the pretext that states non-NWS allied with a NWS is sufficient cause for nuclear retaliation against non-NWS;		
357 358 359 360		b. Revision of Article X of the NPT to restrict each party from subjecting national sovereignty as the sole pretexts to leave the treaty;		
361 362		c. Extension of time for the notice of withdrawal from three months to six months in advance;		
363 364 365	32.	<i>Expresses its hope</i> in consequent inclusion of all NWS to the Security Council on both rotational short-term basis as well as long-term permanent positions with the recognition of all current NWS as legitimate parties and equal members of nuclear power sharing.		



Code: GA1/1/2 **Committee:** General Assembly First Committee **Topic:** Global Nuclear Disarmament

1 The General Assembly First Committee, 2 3 Bearing in mind Article 1.1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which envisages the establishment and the 4 maintenance of international peace and security, with the least diversion of the world's economic and human 5 resources, and recognizing the importance of previously established nuclear weapons treaties in upholding such 6 commitment, 7 8 Recognizing the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as an international cornerstone to the 9 nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance of the inalienable right of Member States to use nuclear 10 technology for peaceful purposes, 11 12 Affirming resolution 1540 adopted in 2004 which promotes appropriate and effective action against threats to 13 international peace and security caused by the illicit trade of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their 14 means of delivery by non-state actors, 15 16 *Recalling* resolution 71/29 adopted in 2016 which reiterates the growing sentiments of the international community 17 of the need to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) within the Middle East in order to prevent the 18 proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, 19 20 Having examined the Conference on Disarmament (CD) resolution Conference on Disarmament report 1299 21 adopted in 1995, as well the recommendations expressed in resolution 71/259 adopted in 2017, in regards to the 22 proposals expressed with the drafting and establishment of a Fissile Material Cut-of Treaty (FMCT), 23 24 *Recalling* resolution 69/45 adopted in 2014 which highlights the need to advance disarmament efforts through 25 regional cooperation and transparency, so as to further the agenda of global nuclear disarmament, 26 27 *Emphasizing* resolution 70/301 adopted in 2016, which stresses the important use of environmentally clean and 28 affordable nuclear energy, the need for increased access to clean water and sanitation for all, as well as efforts made 29 by nations to repurpose weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for peaceful uses such as fuel for civil nuclear 30 reactors. 31 32 *Recalling* resolution 32/50 adopted in 1977, which underscores the importance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy 33 for all Member States and stresses the need for cooperation between developed and developing countries with 34 regards to peaceful use and research of nuclear energy, 35 36 Reaffirming resolution 71/28 adopted in 2016 and the importance of modernizing ICT protocols in protecting 37 institutions against cyberterrorism, 38 39 Recognizing the work of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) for providing research and innovative strategies such as 40 the peaceful use of nuclear energy to promote nuclear disarmament, 41 42 Emphasizing the goals set forth by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and encouraging 43 Member States to meet their goals and obligations regarding disarmament through increasing transparency and 44 strengthening monitoring measures, 45 46 Bearing in mind that one of the principal challenges to disarmament is a lack of regional trust and transparency as 47 noted in General Assembly resolution 69/45 and therefore encouraging the need for verification mechanisms to 48 ensure compliance with nonproliferation treaties and the eventual goal of global nuclear disarmament as 49 demonstrated within agreements like the UK-Norway Initiative,

51 Commending the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in establishing the Technical Cooperation Fund 52 (TCF), which is sustained through Member States' annual voluntary contributions, as well as the IAEA's Global 53 Nuclear and Safety Network, which is aimed at achieving a high level of nuclear security and secure monitoring 54 systems among Member States interacting with Non-State Actors, 55 56 *Recognizing* the strides made by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) in 57 advancing technologies, techniques, and methods pertaining to disarmament verification, but seeing a need to better 58 monitor and detect small quantities of nuclear material, 59 60 Convinced of the benefit that Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) systems have when implemented on nuclear armaments in regard to their tracking and stockpiling, 61 62 63 Bearing in mind that global cooperation is paramount to ensure successful distribution of information regarding the 64 tracking of nuclear capable technologies by NSAs, as seen with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 65 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 66 67 Recalling General Assembly resolution 913 adopted in 1955, which establishes the United Nations Scientific 68 Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and its mandate for assessing and reporting levels and 69 effects of exposure to radiation, 70 71 Commending the progress made within Member States, which have sign and implemented the Comprehensive 72 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which outlaws all nuclear detonations and established regional based monitoring 73 systems. 74 75 *Noting* the benefits of the use of Liquid Thorium as an alternative energy for reactors that use solely uranium-based 76 nuclear technology which would utilize a safe isotope of uranium mixed with thorium, creating a liquid fuel which 77 cannot be enriched to be weaponized, is chemically stable, produces much less waste, and is more cost efficient, 78 79 Noting with appreciation the ongoing success of desalination plants implemented and operating worldwide in 80 providing clean and accessible water as desalination is paramount in the effort to prevent and reduce conflict in water scarce regions, 81 82 83 Emphasizing to Member States the necessity of abiding by the safety guidelines and requirements regarding the safe 84 use of nuclear reactors established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 85 86 Recalling the IAEA's Technical Co-operation Strategy Report (GOV/INF/824) (1997), which encourages nuclear 87 technology sharing amongst Member States to facilitate collaboration in nuclear disarmament through the use of 88 civil and peaceful technologies, 89 90 *Recalling* resolution 71/29 adopted in 2016 which reiterates the growing sentiments of the international community 91 of the need to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) within the Middle East in order to prevent the 92 proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, 93 94 *Recognizing* the need for a swift response to the environmental danger of nuclear weapons testing as seen in Somalia 95 as per Security Council resolution 1910 adopted in 2010, 96 97 *Recalling* the Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the 21st Century (1999), which recommends that states 98 redirect domestic funding from military expenditures to infrastructure and economic programs that will develop 99 Member States energy resources and strengthen their economies, 100 101 *Recognizing* General Assembly resolution 71/54 adopted in 2016, which highlights needs to take all necessary steps 102 to implement regional disarmament commitments, including but not limited to, nuclear-weapon-free zones 103 (NWFZs), 104

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- 105 *Reaffirming* in the spirit of resolution General Assembly resolution 71/49 adopted in 2016 on United action with 106 renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the importance of trust building activities 107 among nuclear weapon states and their peers,
- Encourages Member States to adhere to previously established treaties, agreements, and resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), calling upon all member states with a special emphasis on Annex 2 states, to take substantive action in working towards the common goals of the CTBT and engaging in good faith with the operating activities of the CTBT preparatory commission;
- *Calling upon* all member states to take substantive action in working towards the common goals of the CTBT and engaging in good faith with the operating activities of the CTBTO preparatory commission;
- *Encourages* further Member States to adopt National Implementation Action Plans for the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 adopted in 2004;
- 4. *Requests* the CD to begin regional engagement in discussion of parallel peace and disarmament negotiations, in coordination with the Department of Political Affairs in the establishment of a prevention and mediation mission within the Middle East and to incorporate aspects of conflict analysis, the planning and support work of peace envoys, and preventative diplomacy, so as to build a base of good relations and diplomacy within the region for further negotiating a NWFZ within the Middle East;
- 5. *Strongly urges* all Member State to make substantive efforts to move forward with the CD and its agreed upon programme of work, in order to finalize the drafting of the proposed FMCT as well as include provisions of banning current fissile material stockpiles to accommodate Member States whom may feel that agreeing to such a treaty would place them in into a disadvantageous national security position relative to other Member States current stockpiles;
- *Urges* all Member States to note the effectiveness of regional NWFZs, such as the South Pacific Nuclear-Free
 Zone, with emphasis on nuclear testing, in order to build confidence among nations and halt the proliferation of
 non-peaceful uses of nuclear technology into new regions, so as to further the advancement of regional and
 global nuclear disarmament through such NWFZs;
- Affirms the potential and usefulness of peaceful nuclear technology as an incentive for nuclear disarmament,
 specifically to provide clean and sustainable energy and encourages the peaceful use of nuclear energy
 programs through the reallocation of Member State funds and nuclear material previously used in their nuclear
 arsenals in such areas as health and medicine and alternative source of energy;
- *Recommends* that the 1540 Group of Governmental Experts research vulnerabilities within the realm of cyber
 security as it pertains to nuclear infrastructure including but not limited to nuclear power plants, launch codes
 and protocols, early warning detection systems, and international verification and monitoring systems;
- 9. *Recommends* individual member states to accept all safety standards and norms specified by the IAEA to
 safeguard nuclear power plants, technology and parts, from falling into the possession of non-state actors, as
 well as encourage the IAEA to work with Member States in the establishment of more advanced verification
 mechanisms that can include but are not limited to commercial satellite imagery; computer aided modeling and
 meta data;
- 10. *Calls on* Member States in possession of advanced nuclear technologies to share resources and technological
 innovations and best practices with developing Member States, so as to spur the growth of peaceful uses of
 nuclear technology;
- 157 11. Strongly encourages Member States to cooperate with IAEA for the implementation of infrastructure allowing
 158 for the monitoring of nuclear materials through:
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160 161		a.	The skills training of Member States' government officials by following the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (NRSC) to aid States in their implementation of nuclear and radiation safety measures;
162 163 164 165 166 167		b.	The utilization of software applications such as the Advanced Regulatory Information System (ARIS) and the Nuclear Materials Database for Safeguards (NUCMAT) developed and actualized by the NRSC to assist States, Regulatory Bodies, and facilities in the tracing and accounting of nuclear materials;
168 169	12.		the overall increase in verification and monitoring of nuclear material stockpiles to reduce the potential iferation of nuclear material to Non-state actors through:
170 171 172		a.	Encouraging cooperation between Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Nuclear Weapons states on the technical verification of disarmament and reduction of nuclear stockpiles;
173 174 175 176		b.	Creating a tracking system for the implementation of a transparent registry of arms, utilizing technology such as Radio Frequency Identification for tracking nuclear armaments and materials;
177 178 179 180	13.	that Me	g transparent compliance by providing incentive for participation in the program through assurances mber States would have the option to apply for funding for security increases and training against by non-State Actors by:
180 181 182		a.	Recommending to the IAEA the expansion of the mandate of the Peaceful Use Initiative (PUI);
183 184 185		b.	Expanding the guidelines pertaining to which entities are capable of engaging with the PUI for funding requests to include Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs);
186 187 188	14.		<i>bon</i> the UN Global Compact in conjunction with the World Bank to consider offering protected loans to investors through looking to invest in outlets for peaceful use, taking into consideration:
189 190		a.	Requesting an investment guarantee from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency;
191 192 193 194		b.	Using the IAEA Peaceful Use Fund as a guarantee of initial capitalization based off of an allocation from the fund upon the next budgetary allocation cycle;
194 195 196 197		c.	Guiding their loans based off of profitability, ROI for the PUI, and the ability of the investment to meet the SDGs;
198 199 200	15.		<i>ages</i> the further establishment of regional monitoring systems for the detection of nuclear testing the CTBTO and the Preparatory Commission;
201 202 203	16.		s the convening of a permanent working group which would meet every year to measure and monitor ctiveness of private capital investment activities related to disarmament;
204 205 206 207 208	17.	provide reutiliza	<i>es</i> any willing and able Member States to contribute additional financial resources to the TCF, so as to the necessary financial resources in the establishment of an IAEA programme that specializes in tion of nuclear material, tools, and facilities for peaceful application, thus preventing their potential ttainment and use in non-peaceful ways;
209 210 211 212 213 214	18.	regional weapon the Cau	as the Conference on Disarmament to create and facilitate an annual regional conference where relevant I specific Member States address root causes of the issue pertaining to the failure to establish nuclear -free zones (NWFZs) in their respective regions, specifically such regions include but are not limited to casus, the Mediterranean, the Arctic, the Pacific, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, with the final focus of achieving global nuclear disarmament via regional NWFZ approaches by the means of:

215		a.	Providing funding from all willing and able interested parties including but not limited to Member
216			States, NGOs, or regional organizations;
217			
218		b.	Allowing all interested Member States, as well as relevant UN experts and regional organizations to
219			participate in the discussion of the root causes;
220	10		
221	19.		ges the simultaneous creation of a working group, funded as an accessory to and by the Conference on
222			ment, holding annual meetings including nuclear weapon states, Member States, and civil society
223			ations with relevant expertise pertaining to the topic of nuclear disarmament, with the aim of fostering
224		construc	tive and intensive dialogue between nuclear weapon states to further nuclear disarmament efforts;
225	20	F	and the IATA to much in coordination with maximal encouring tions such as the African Union and
226 227	20.		<i>iges</i> the IAEA to work in coordination with regional organizations such as the African Union and n Union in order to expand its current Nuclear Law Institute initiative, with a special emphasis on the
228			entation IAEA's protection standards, so as to provide regional scale legislative training seminars for
228			governmental capacity, and thus ensuring that those in positions of national legislative power, are better
230			I on protection measures to secure national peaceful nuclear technology infrastructure;
230		cuucatee	t on protection measures to secure national peaceful nuclear technology infrastructure,
232	21	Request	s that the Secretary-General make an annual report to the General Assembly on NSAs seeking access to
232	21.		technology, information and weaponry, through a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM)
234			l after the Children and Armed Conflict MRM established in resolution 1539, for the purpose of
235			ing information and intelligence of the illicit trade and information sharing of nuclear technology,
236			s and weaponry to NSAs, including:
237			
238		a.	Information on emerging threats to the security of nuclear stockpiles, such as cyber attacks;
239			
240		b.	Recommendations on possible measures to ensure conflict zones remain free of nuclear weaponry;
241			
242		c.	A list of NSAs suspected or confirmed of seeking nuclear technology, information and weaponry, as
243			well as all relevant intelligence and evidence, to be updated annually;
244 245	^		Member States in personal of advanced nuclear technologies to share recourses and technologies
245	22.		Member States in possession of advanced nuclear technologies to share resources and technological ons and best practices with developing Member States, so as to spur the growth of peaceful uses of
240			technology;
248		nucical	cennology,
249	23	Draws a	ttention to the need to enhance existing disarmament verification methods pertaining to the production
250	_0.		e material and warheads, as well as stockpiles, the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and disposition of
251			material from dismantling processes:
252			
253		a.	Maintaining and expanding upon verification methods including data exchanges, on-site inspections,
254			containment and surveillance equipment, and environmental sampling;
255			
256		b.	Furthering research on technologies, techniques, and methods to allow for the detection of micro-
257			quantities of nuclear materials;
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259	24.		s the creation of repurposing programs for the transition of nuclear materials from weaponized purposes
260		to fuel s	upply to reallocate nuclear material as an incentive for nuclear disarmament in addition to:
261			The United Distance Officer of Distance (Afficient (IDIODA) (c. C.
262		a.	The United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to facilitate a sustainable, long-term
263 264			program acquiring aging nuclear weapons for peaceful applications (with respect to state sovereignty) such as for water desalination and electricity;
265			such as for water desamilation and electricity,
265		b.	A study to be conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) into the
267		0.	viability of nuclear desalination plants erected in areas of water crises to incentivize nuclear
268			disarmament of regional nuclear states by addressing water scarcity, and to address in a report to the
269			GA:
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271 272 273 274		 i. The scalability of the various types of nuclear desalination plants according to regional capacity; ii. The infrastructure requirements that pertain to the various different type of nuclear desalination technology;
275 276 277 278 279	25.	<i>Calls on</i> Member States in possession of advanced nuclear technologies to share resources and technological innovations and best practices with developing Member States, so as to spur the growth of peaceful uses of nuclear technology;
279 280 281 282 283 284	26.	<i>Requests</i> that the Secretary-General make an annual report to the General Assembly on NSAs seeking access to nuclear technology, information and weaponry, for the purpose of centralizing information and intelligence of the illicit trade and information sharing of nuclear technology, materials and weaponry to NSAs. The information gathering may be done through a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) modeled after the Children and Armed Conflict MRM established in resolution 1539. This report shall include:
285 286 287		a. Information on emerging threats to the security of nuclear stockpiles, such as cyber attacks;
288		b. Recommendations on possible measures to ensure conflict zones remain free of nuclear weaponry;
289 290 291 292		c. A list of NSAs suspected or confirmed of seeking nuclear technology, information and weaponry, as well as all relevant intelligence and evidence, to be updated annually;
292 293 294 295	27.	<i>Endorses</i> the collaboration between the IAEA and the Conference on Disarmament on compiling relevant data and information via IAEA publications and reports during multilateral disarmament negotiations by means of:
296 297 298		 Electing one representative from each the UN region to compile relevant such publications, including national action plans on States nuclear programmes, in order to provide regional needs and perspectives and in doing so;
299 300 301 302		b. Permitting each respective representative to attend any occurring multilateral disarmament negotiations;
303 304 305	28.	<i>Encourages</i> further research and development of Liquid Thorium as an alternative energy for reactors and collaboration with the Thorium Energy Alliance (TEA) to safeguard against offenses on nuclear facilities or the weaponization of nuclear materials;
306 307	29.	Remains committed to working towards a world free of nuclear weapons and eventual universal disarmament.



Code: GA1/1/3 **Committee:** General Assembly First Committee **Topic:** Global Nuclear Disarmament

1	The General Assembly First Committee,
2	Affirming Article 1 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which delegated issues involving international security and
3 4	disarmament to the General Assembly First Committee specifically the "maintenance of international peace and
5 6	security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,"
7	Understanding that it is not feasible to expect immediate and total nuclear disarmament,
8	Chaerstanding that it is not reasible to expect inimediate and total indereal disarmament,
9	Having considered the possibilities of reaching compromises for means of communication equitable to all Member
10	States, for the purpose of reducing tensions and furthering the disarmament regime,
11	states, for the purpose of reducing tensions and furthering the disarmament regime,
12	Supporting fully the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16 that
13	promotes effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels in order to reduce all forms of violence,
14	
15	Desiring to facilitate communication and transparency among Member States, seeking to promote world peace and
16	nuclear disarmament, as called for by General Assembly resolution 14/1378 adopted in 1959,
17	
18	Recalling the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), specifically Article VI, which serves as
19	the reminder of the disarmament regime, as an effort done for peace,
20	
21	Believing that in order for the Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT) to come into effect, a framework for non-committal
22	Communication—open to all—must be established,
23	
24	Opposing the discrimination of nuclear possessing states, both NPT and non-NPT members, seeing that such
25	behavior by Member States limits the potential progress for disarmament,
26	
27	Acknowledging both the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) as one of the first international frameworks to
28	address the use of nuclear weapons and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, which aimed to
29	effectively ban all intentional nuclear explosions,
30	
31	Noting further the results of the Geneva Graduate Institute's Broadening Participation in Track One Peace
32	Negotiations Project, and Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,
33	
34	Recognizing the efforts done by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) through the
35	promotion of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and the establishment of the Weapon of Mass Destruction
36	Branch and the Regional Disarmament Branch, in providing structural and substantial support for the disarmament
37	regime,
38	
39	Desiring that the international community cooperate more closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency
40	(IAEA) and its safeguards regarding all nuclear matters, such as non-intrusive verification methods through
41	monitoring and evaluations,
42	
43	Bearing in mind that one of the principal challenges to disarmament is a lack of trust and transparency, therefore
44	encouraging the need for verification mechanisms with both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States to ensure
45 46	compliance with nonproliferation treaties and the eventual goal of disarmament as demonstrated,
46 47	Deaffirming the mandate of the UN Institute for Disarmon and Descent (UNIDID) which are not second for a l
47 19	<i>Reaffirming</i> the mandate of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which reports research focused on potential solutions for the challenges of disarmament and non-proliferation,
48 49	on potential solutions for the chancinges of disarmament and non-promeration,
オン	

50 Further commending the efforts of the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) and the Policy 51 and Mediation Division (PMD) in the specific settlement of disputes and the promotion of multilateral nuclear

52 disarmament dialogues,

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54 Viewing with appreciation the work done by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on nuclear disarmament, including 55 the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the Women's International League for 56 Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the Burundian Women's Organization, the Israeli Disarmament Movement, and the 57 Arab Institute for Security Studies, as well as the participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in 58 nuclear disarmament talks such as the Acronym Institute whose partnership with organizations such as International 59 Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and their valuable research regarding negotiations and verification 60 of weapons and all related treaties and agreements, as well as the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and their 61 focus on non-proliferation issues, 62 Recalling General Assembly resolution 69/30 adopted in 2014 on The Conclusion of Effective International

63

- 64 Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,
- 65 General Assembly resolution 70/70 adopted in 2015 on The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East, and
- 66 resolution 71/30 adopted in 2016 on The Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-
- 67 Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which underline the threats of the 68 misuse of nuclear weapons,
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70 *Recognizing* the threat of Non-State Actors possessing nuclear weaponry as stated by Security Council resolution 1540 adopted in 2004 and Security Council resolution 2325 adopted in 2016 on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of

71 72 Mass Destruction, and the passage of Security Council resolution 1887 adopted in 2009, which reaffirms the

73 Security Council's continued commitment to the realization of global nuclear disarmament," 74

75 Noting with approval the success of regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) established under the Treaty of 76 Tlatelolco adopted in 1967, the Treaty of Raratonga adopted in 1985, the Treaty of Bangkok adopted in 1997, the 77 Treaty of Pelindaba adopted in 1996, and the Treaty on Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia adopted in 78 2006, and that Member States central to the robust protection of these NWFZs have invaluable experience and 79 recommendations to those exploring expansion of these zones, 80

81 Noting that Member States central to the robust protection of these NWFZs have invaluable experience and 82 recommendations to those exploring expansion of these zones,

83

84 Acknowledging the well-established Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, 85 and Latin America and the Caribbean, and reiterating that for establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance 86 to resolution 71/29 adopted in 2016 on The Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the 87 Middle East, the creation of regional centers for peace and disarmament are a crucial cornerstone towards this goal 88 and can contribute considerably to the comprehension and collaboration among Member States in each particular 89 region in the fields of peace and disarmament,

90 91 Guided by the effectiveness of earlier international agreements, such as SALT I and SALT II, which decreased 92 tensions and allowed for further disarmament efforts,

93

94 Fully aware of Economic and Social Council resolution 2016/2 adopted in 2016 and General Assembly resolution 95 65/69 (2011), which underlines the importance of gender mainstreaming and the involvement of women into all 96 peace and disarmament negotiations,

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98 Recognizing the Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 99 which highlights a strong positive correlation between women's involvement in peace negotiation processes and

- 100 higher chances of achieving consensus between parties,
- 101
- 102 Noting further the results of the Geneva Graduate Institute's Broadening Participation in Track One Peace
- Negotiations Project, and Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, 103
- 104

105	1.	Request	s the formation of an ad-hoc committee, supervised by General Assembly First, under the name
106		Associa	tion for Middle East Nuclear Disarmament (AMEND) with the purpose of establishing a NWFZ in the
107			Eastern Region which will:
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100		a.	Encourage the formation of a partnership between the AMEND committee, the UNODA Weapons of
		a.	
110			Mass Destruction Branch, the UNODA Regional Disarmament Branch, NGOs such as the Acronym
111			Institute and the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, and all interested Civil Society Organizations
112			previously approved the committee;
113			
114		b.	Be based on the guidelines and principles for the establishment of the NWFZ set forth by the UN
115			Disarmament Commission Report of 30 April 1999;
116			
117		0	Consist of Member States of the Middle Eastern Region, liaison and observer states with experience in
		c.	
118			disarmament, and observers form the NGO and CSO communities invited by members of the
119			committee that may provide expert input and that these be called Tiers 1, 2, and 3, respectively;
120			
121		d.	Establish forums on specific bilateral and multilateral negotiations which will:
122			
123			i. Address the lack of adherence and political will regarding the crucial topic of disarmament
124			through the provision of incentives such as the facilitation of trade and capacity building
125			programs;
126			ii. Be impaneled by request of Tier 1 Member States;
127			iii. Be moderated by the NGLS and the PMD;
128			
129		e.	Encourage openness and technology sharing through systems such as the Sustainable Development
130			Knowledge Platform between nuclear-capable Member States and the international community in
131			order to increase the abilities of developing and developed states to respond to emerging concerns in
132			civil nuclear material usage such as the rising threat of climate change;
132			erri naerear materiar asage such as the rising threat of enhance enange,
134		f.	Request the collaboration of Member States in the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) jointly with the
		1.	
135			Radio-Frequency Identification Systems to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMDs by:
136			
137			i. Increasing transparency among partners and promoting capacity-building among Member
138			States' science communities;
139			ii. Assure peaceful use of dual-use goods;
140			iii. Employ national research institutes on nuclear materials to work toward the Global Nuclear
141			Policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, share expertize and encourage capacity-
142			building programmes focused on reducing reliance on nuclear weapons;
142			building programmes rocused on reducing renance on nuclear weapons,
		~	Discuss a scilitizio de limit de scilite de scin e serve de service sedeme e francises de service s
144		g.	Discuss possibilities to limit the ability to gain access to carrier systems of nuclear weapons focusing
145			specially on middle range ballistic missiles, that are widely spread in the Middle Eastern Region, with
146			the goal of eliminating potential nuclear capabilities of Non-State actors;
147			
148		h.	Suggests that the ad hoc committee AMEND begin preparations for the drafting of a treaty that
149			establishes a NWFZ in the Middle East alongside Civil Society Organizations such as IALANA which
150			will have performed thorough evaluation of current treaties which facilitated the creation of current
151			NWFZs as well as the NPT, the CTBT, and existing resolutions on NWFZs;
152			1 with 25 us well us the MTT, the CTDT, and existing resolutions on twith 25,
153		i.	Ensures that all members of the AMEND committee have equal standing;
154			
155		j.	Be effective as of 26 September 2017 in its first meeting in the United Arab Emirates as a role model
156			for the peaceful usage of nuclear energy in the Middle East and the financial supporter of the
157			committee and thereafter to be hosted biannually alternating between the UN Headquarters in New
158			York City and members of AMEND which will be selected by the end of each meeting;
159			<i>y</i>

160 161		k.	Set 2030 as the planned year for the completion of the work of AMEND in creation of a regionally accepted plan to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East;
162 163 164 165		1.	Act as a potential model, following the completion of the work of AMEND, for negotiations around establishing a NWFZ in other regions, such as the Indian subcontinent;
165 166 167 168		m.	Request funding from UNODA, UNIDR, and the GA Fifth Committee as well as all willing and able Member States;
169 170 171 172 173	2.	<i>Pelinda</i> on the p	Member States who have had success in establishing NWFZs, such as <i>Treaty of Tlatelolco</i> and <i>Treaty of ba</i> , to engage and collaborate with regional actors by attending meetings and providing detailed reports rocess of implementing necessary frameworks with the purpose of drafting a treaty establishing the in the Middle East;
174 175	3.		<i>nends</i> that the General Assembly work toward the foundation of the United Nations Regional Center for nd Disarmament in the Middle East (UNMEC) which will:
176 177 178 179		a.	Operate within the framework of the General Assembly First Committee as forum for debates and negotiations in order to guarantee national security of the Member States further;
179 180 181		b.	Be the base for regional cooperation of Middle Eastern countries;
181 182 183 184		c.	Advance effective measures in accordance with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements that establish control and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear material;
184 185 186 187		d.	Report on the progress of the implementation of national action plans that support the development and implementation of practical nuclear disarmament measures;
188 189		e.	Promote and enhance international efforts towards global nuclear disarmament and international peace and security;
190 191 192 193 194	4.	program	<i>bon</i> Member States and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to introduce and enhance as to promote the inclusion of regional and international CSOs in high-level multilateral nuclear ment negotiations, including but not limited to:
195 196		a.	Providing for the discovery and inclusion of nuclear- and disarmament-focused CSOs by utilizing the integrated CSO system managed by the ECOSOC;
197 198 199 200 201		b.	Recalling the significance of resolution 71/450 adopted in 2016, reporting on the progress of general and complete disarmament, and the recent follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament reported in resolution 71/131 adopted in 2016;
202 203 204 205		c.	Recognizing the effectiveness of CSOs in multilateral negotiations by collaborating with Member States and coalitions to frame the issue in a meaningful and productive manner, pressuring Member States to increase accountability and transparency, and representing marginalized groups such as women and indigenous groups;
206 207 208 209 210		d.	Inviting UNODA to create a summit to facilitate high-level discussions and negotiations between Member States and CSOs on the topic of global nuclear disarmament to be called the CSO Inclusion Summit;
210 211 212 213		e.	Expanding the 2016 Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations into 2017 to include more regionally focused CSOs;
213 214 215	5.		s expanding the UNODA's Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education Partnership Initiatives to more women:

216			
217		a.	Using the network of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom to find and organize
218			women qualified to join nuclear disarmament negotiations;
219			
220		b.	Recommending that States build on existing national models of effective National Action Plans for
221			including women in disarmament negotiations;
222			
223		c.	Encouraging the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to find new ways to introduce women
224			into the Women in Nuclear initiative;
225			
226		d.	Encouraging the implementation of Security Council (SC) resolution 1325 adopted in 2000 policies in
227			regards to women's role in disarmament by inviting Member States to adopt Key Recommendations of
228			the Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
229			(2000), which encourages Member States to make quantifiable, time-sensitive commitments to ensure
230			women's direct and meaningful participation in the disarmament negotiation process, by encouraging
231			the Secretary-General to implement the plan outlined in GA resolution 49/587 adopted in 1994, and by
232			urging the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys in the
233			disarmament framework;
234			
235	6.	Noting t	hat the inclusion of regional and international CSOs and women in multilateral nuclear disarmament
236			ions will lead to meaningful and consensus-based discussions surrounding the First Committee's
237			s towards a "Global Zero" world:
238		1 0	
239		a.	Drawing attention to the Geneva Graduate Institute's Broadening Participation in Track One Peace
240			Negotiations Project's findings regarding the 35% increased likelihood of parties to peace negotiations
241			in reaching consensus when women are involved in negotiations;
242			
243		b.	Recognizing the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance as per Why Civil Resistance Works: The
244			Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict;
245			
246	7.	Calls up	on the General Assembly First Committee to establish the Arms Transparency Agreement (ATA) as a
247			of promoting cooperation in the efforts of attaining nuclear disarmament:
248			
249		a.	Emphasizes that under the agreement, states agree to begin negotiating, in good faith, Strategic
250			Multilateral Arm Limitation Agreements (SMALAs), such that:
251			
252			i. The SMALAs act as agreements between Member States on the processes for disarmament
253			with consideration to security and sovereignty concerns;
254			ii. Participation in SMALAs is not limited to Member States that are members of the NPT, but it
255			encourages all Member States to participate and raise concern for disarmament;
256			iii. Member States are encouraged to establish multi-national agreements, with the support and
257			counsel of neutral Member States under the ATA;
258			
259		b.	Establishes an annual Arms Transparency Conference (ATC), pursuant to article VI of the NPT,
260			involving:
261			
262			i. An annual Ad-Hoc committee which shall be established by voluntary Member States to
263			provide structural and substantive support for the conference, including securing venues and
264			funds;
265			ii. The Conference will be co-chaired by one nuclear weapon-possessing state (NPS) and one
266			non-nuclear weapon possessing state, rotating annually, in order to confirm a balanced
267			perspective on the issues, in addition, to provide encouragement to all Member States;
268			regardless of position, to voice their concerns on the issues at hand;
269			iii. Welcoming Member States currently apart of any SMALAs to participate in the ATC,
270			although not mandatory to do so;

271 272	iv.	The active encouragement of all participating Member States in open dialogue to express their
		position on the issue of nuclear disarmament;
273	v.	The willingness of all participating Member States to work towards processes for
274		implementations of current SMALAs on a global scale through the cooperation of nations at
275		the ATC;
276	vi.	The encouragement of participating Member States to further design new SMALA's to meet
277		the needs and concerns introduced at the current conference;
278	vii.	Working towards solutions for further disarmament efforts that are equitable to all parties
279		positions;
280	viii.	The ultimate goal of the ATC is to ease the transition of states into the ratification of the NBT
281		in due time;
282	ix.	A suggestion that the ATA be reconsidered after 25 years, and is eligible for a renewal and
283		updates if deemed necessary or successful to the disarmament effort by Member States.



Code: GA1/1/4 **Committee:** General Assembly First Committee **Topic:** Global Nuclear Disarmament

1 The General Assembly First Committee, 2 3 Stressing the importance of respecting national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Member States as 4 enshrined in the *Charter of the United Nations*, particularly as it relates to nuclear disarmament and the maintenance 5 of international peace and security, 6 7 Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) adopted 12 June 1968 which contains the Treaty on the 8 Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as Article II and X of the NPT, condemning the possession of 9 nuclear warheads except for in the interest of self-defense during periods of exceptional duress, 10 11 Reemphasizing previous documents signed by the UN on the importance of nuclear disarmament such as the Partial 12 Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 13 14 Recalling the General Assembly resolution 71/258 adopted in 2016, which recommends that additional efforts can and should be pursued to develop concrete, effective legal measures, legal provisions, and norms that will need to be 15 16 concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, 17 18 *Recognizing* the efforts in preventing the possession of nuclear armaments by non-state actors through the 19 Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in the International Convention (2007), the Nuclear Threat Initiative 20 (NTI), and the Sixteenth Meeting of Heads of States or Government of the Non Aligned Movement, 21 22 Noting Security Council resolution 1325 adopted in 2004 and the important role of women in disarmament 23 processes, as well as the success of national action plans models such as the Czech Republic's Defense Ministry 24 Action Plan in effectively including women in disarmament negotiations, 25 26 Acknowledging the rights to national security and sovereignty of nuclear-weapons-States and have maintained their 27 nuclear weapons programs, as well as concerns by nuclear-weapons-States to ensure the safety of their peoples, 28 29 Taking note of the imperative to have sufficient deterrence against nuclear attacks until a realistic opportunity of 30 achieving universal nuclear disarmament is available, as identified in the NATO nuclear deterrence policy, 31 32 *Recognizing* that the costs of disarmament are significantly lower than the costs of maintaining nuclear arms, as 33 highlighted in Secretary General report 70/174 (2015) entitled Group of Governmental Experts on Development in 34 the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. 35 36 1. *Calls upon* all Member States who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the NPT so as to work towards the 37 goal of global nuclear disarmament as defined by Article VI of the *Treaty*; 38 39 2. Proposes that procedural amendments focus on improving the effectiveness of NPT implementation to be added 40 to the agenda of the 2020 Review Conference on the NPT, including: 41 Increasing the frequency of review conferences to annual meetings, in order to allow all Member 42 а 43 States and, particularly developing countries to engage in full and effective discussions on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament; 44 45 46 b. Further discussing the ongoing multilateral nuclear ban treaty negotiations with the Conference on 47 Disarmament (CD); 48

49 50		c.	Encouraging Member States to sign, ratify, and fully implement the NPT as to commit to trustworthy collaboration and intention for global nuclear disarmament;
51 52 53	3.		ts that, in the interest of global equity, the 2020 NPT Review Conference create guidelines for Member possessing nuclear weapons prioritize reducing existing arsenals of nuclear warheads by:
54 55 56 57		a.	Reducing existing nuclear warhead stockpiles by a suggested 2% of the total-at the time of the 15th of September 2017 every year, with the end of goal of complete disarmament to be achieved by 2067;
58 59 60 61		b.	Allowing recognized nuclear-capable Member States to maintain one nuclear warhead until the end of the 25 years' period at which these warheads will be simultaneously dismantled, under supervision of the United Nations, with the technical support from the IAEA, UNODA, and the UN Secretariat;
62 63 64 65		c.	Providing financial, technical, and logistical disarmament resources to States who supply adequate evidence that they are fulfilling the aforementioned obligations, to be arranged by the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and UNODA;
66 67 68 69		d.	Providing technical and logistical disarmament resources to States who supply adequate evidence that they are fulfilling the aforementioned obligations, to be arranged by the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and UNODA;
70 71 72		e.	Continuing to follow the 13 Practical Steps towards Disarmament, as outlined in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference;
72 73 74 75 76	4.		<i>mends</i> the creation of an international database through the UNODA, to be modeled after the IAEA's EUS Database and the UN Register on Conventional Arms to track all nuclear warheads, which should
77 78 79		a.	Consistent updating of the database, at least once annually after IAEA inspections, following any changes in holdings, purchases, or developments related to nuclear material and armaments;
80 81 82		b.	Placing the operations of the database in the UNODA Office in Geneva, Switzerland for the purpose of maintaining information neutrality and security in a streamlined manner;
83 84 85		c.	Inclusive membership to all government officials, academics, scientists, and researchers of all Member States, to be limited to those who request access via the UNODA Office in Geneva;
86 87 88 89	5.	Membe	ages the IAEA's Research Contracts Administration Section to prioritize the training of experts within r States to construct and implement sustainable and innovative nuclear engineering practices for the of safe and efficient nuclear disarmament;
90 91	6.		the IAEA to utilize technology and further coordination for the support of its Safety Standards tions by improving its system of safety fundamentals and requirements, to be guided by:
92 93 94 95 96		a.	Increasing financial, technical, and logistical assistance to the IAEA's Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology (MOSAIC) initiative, in order to increase the security of nuclear materials in research facilities and nuclear reactors;
97 98 99 100		b.	Determining an assessment and examination process, to be voluntarily initiated by the State who utilizes nuclear energy on all currently operating open fuel cycle power plants, as to the viability of conversion to closed fuel cycle technologies in order to prolong the use of any given amount of fuel, addressed specifically by experts named by the IAEA Board of Governors;
101 102 103 104		c.	Enhancing regional agreements on transparency in transfer of dual-use goods akin to the Regional Disarmament Branch of the UNODA;

- Asks Member States to increase efforts to encourage multilateral action including the coordination of nuclear
 weapons free zones (NWFZ) toward nuclear disarmament, such as in the Middle East and the Korean
 Peninsula;
- *Renews its appeal* for the achievement of bilateral peace agreements and prioritizing non-aggression policies *rather than unilateral foreign intervention, with the intent to maximize resources, support current efforts and*
- 111 treaties to ban proliferation and possession, while recognizing the responsibility to guarantee their own national 112 sovereignty and security in line with the 1996 *Advisory Opinion*.



Code: GA1/1/5 **Committee:** General Assembly First Committee **Topic:** Global Nuclear Disarmament

1 The General Assembly First Committee, 2 3 Alarmed by the existence of nuclear weapons and materials that continue to pose a dangerous threat to the existence 4 of a peaceful international community and the failure to implement and enforce the Treaty on the Nonproliferation 5 of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 6 7 Reminding Member States of resolution 70/57 adopted in 2013, which seeks to achieve global disarmament of 8 nuclear weapons in the most rational and efficient way possible, 9 10 Having examined the outcomes of the 2013 High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament that will be reiterated in 11 2018 and having expressed concerns by the political sphere on the time frame in which the global nuclear 12 disarmament could be completed, 13 14 Deeply appreciative of the initiative by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) that was formed in 1957 in 15 the context of a global peace movement, 16 17 Viewing with appreciation initiatives taken on by various Member States to promote renewable and clean energy as 18 a result of nuclear disarmament, specifically highlighting tax incentives implemented in Denmark as a model to 19 encourage the growth of the renewable energy industry, 20 21 Bearing in mind Article VII of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) of the IAEA which focuses on the 22 verification of the presence of nuclear facilities in accordance with the NPT, 23 24 *Recognizing* that not every Member State party to the IAEA and the NPT possesses nuclear capabilities and that 25 their participation is vital for the cause, 26 27 *Recalling* resolution 70/57 adopted in 2013 that called for the banning of fissile material and established the group 28 of governmental experts (GGE) to report on nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives 29 30 Recognizing the efforts of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in engaging nuclear 31 treaty negotiations that serve as a legally binding instrument that pushes for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, their 32 participation is vital for the cause 33 34 *Realizing* that the recent increase in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) pose a great threat to international 35 peace and security 36 37 *Keeping in mind* that not all nuclear and potentially nuclear states have the same nuclear capacities, 38 39 Striving towards reliable verification of nuclear disarmament agreements to ensure accountability to the formulated 40 commitments, 41 42 Bearing in mind the mandate of the General Assembly First Committee to seek out solutions to challenges of 43 international security including disarmament and to provide recommendations for direct action to the Security 44 Council, 45 46 Guided by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 16 and 17, in which we actively seek partnerships and 47 cooperation with other states to effectively prevent Non-State Actors from obtaining nuclear weapons and material, 48

- *Affirming* Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which stipulates that Member States must refrain from providing any form of support to Non-State Actors that seek to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons for the purpose of illicit activities,
- Affirming the creation and implementation of Security Council resolution 2055 (2012), which increases the number
 of experts that monitor the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004),

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Recalling Security Council resolution 1673 (2006) that called upon all States to intensify their effort to promote the
 full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004),

Recognizing the implementation of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011), which obligates all states to establish controls preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as the need to strengthen preventative measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of transportation at a national, regional and sub-regional level,

- *Acknowledging* Security Council resolution 2325 (2016) in calling for a framework to prevent Non-State Actors
 from obtaining nuclear weapons,
- *Fully aware* that developing nations often do not have the capacity nor resources to enact the necessary legislation
 and enforcement measures to establish the framework for resolution 1540 (2004),
- *Emphasizing* the legal instrument of the *IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (CPPNM)
 where it recognizes the imperative need for the physical protection of nuclear material and it is the responsibility of
 states to criminalize acts that go against it,
- *Supporting* steps such as the CTBT, START, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) and other measures to reduce nuclear arsenals and control fissile materials and nuclear technologies,
- *Emphasizing* the importance of the legally binding provision of the *Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition* where the scope and focus surround the
 facilitation and strengthening cooperation among States Parties to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit
 manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms,
- *Recognizing* the use and effectiveness of Implementation Support Units under the *Biological Weapons Convention* (BWC),
- *Encourages* the elimination of nuclear weapons through an educational framework that encourage the recycling
 of aging nuclear armaments for peaceful applications in the renewable armaments for peaceful applications in
 the renewable energy sector, including:
 - a. Proposing the United Nations International Library For Peaceful Nuclear Applications and Security (UNILPNAS);
 - b. Structuring the UNILPNAS to promote the research and sharing of information, focusing on the safekeeping and tracking of nuclear materials for the use and peaceful applications of proven systems such as RFID technology, streamlining the process of collaboration that will serve the entire organ of the Member States who have nuclear energy aspirations;
 - c. Suggesting that the publishing of a yearly report by the GA First discussing trends in association with the UNILPNAS in nuclear material transfers and security methods used by States and curated by the IAEA, and it should include:
 - i. Information on the amount of nuclear material exported and imported, the amount of nuclear material that did not reach its destination, and the amount of material projected to be produced within the year;

104 105 106			ii.	Transparency and disclosure regarding nuclear material transfers alongside the security methods;
100 107 108 109 110 111		d.	between Univers	aging the spread and accessibility of research programs within all nations through a partnership n the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the World Nuclear sity for a worldwide network of nuclear education and research institutions through the offering ing courses for future leaders on nuclear energy by:
1112 112 113 114 115 116 117			i. ii.	Establishing a scholarship program in partnership with the Women's Scholarship for Peace Program funded by UNODA that prioritizes women from developing countries in an effort to make attendance at the World Nuclear University more accessible; Emphasizing the accessibility of already-existing online courses through crowd-funded web servers, such as but not limited to, Skype and EdX;
117 118 119 120 121	2.	commit	ments by	ition to the Conference on Disarmament agenda to include a discussion on developing potential r nuclear Member States who have not pledged to set a percentage of weaponized nuclear ceful purposes that will:
121 122 123 124		a.		age all nuclear weapon states to set specific percentages of the nuclear materials and technology allocated, unanimously approved by the members of the convention;
125 126 127		b.		e multilateral cooperation and commitment from all Member States for simultaneous action eginning the nuclear reallocation process;
128 129 130		c.		s the potential for nuclear Member States for expand their nuclear stockpile in order to meet the entioned quotas;
131 132 133		d.	Recogn interest	ize the sovereignty of members within this convention to protect their national security s;
134 135 136 137 138 139		e.	high lev Model the issu	sh a week-long training conference for collegiate-level students beginning on 26 September for vel discussions on nuclear disarmament, following the organizational framework and motives of United Nations, in order to properly instruct the next generation of world leaders to deal with the of disarmament in a more conscious and qualified way, with particular inclusion of women zens from developing countries;
140 141 142 143		f.		annual thematic seminars focused on the connection between disarmament and the ment, as well as the positive uses of nuclear energy in areas such as agriculture and medical
143 144 145 146 147 148	3.	Disarma promote	ament Re e unified	mber States to cooperate with the IAEA, UNODA and United Nations Institute for esearch (UNIDIR) to open a platform of discussion between nuclear capable member states, to political will on safe global nuclear disarmament and incentivizing the use of nuclear materials f green energy by:
149 150 151 152		a.		zing an annual high-level forum in which representatives from nuclear capable states propose ves tailored specifically to their individual countries in order to emphasize cooperation on a level;
152 153 154 155 156		b.	assure 1	ng a safe process regarding the dismantling of nuclear arms by implementing frameworks to nuclear capable member states that their decommissioned nuclear material will not fall into the of non-state actors;
156 157 158 159		c.		osing precious metals and other resources utilized within nuclear arms for applications such as anels and other green energy resources;

160 161		d.	Recommending adopting tax incentives based on previous models for Member States investing in renewable energy as an alternative to nuclear energy;
162			
163		e.	Establishing a special initiative program under the UNODA providing monetary grant and loan
164			funding for development projects that use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only, in which:
165			Tanang for development projects that use nuclear technology for percent purposes only, in which.
166			i. Member States submit proposals regarding the purely peaceful use of nuclear technology for
167			purposes including but not limited to medicine, agriculture, and clean energy;
168			ii. There will be an emphasis on the loss of said grants and loans if there is any concern from
169			IAEA regulators that the technology is being used for potentially harmful purposes;
170			iii. There will be a requirement for those interested in submitting grant proposals to first attend
171			the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and making sure to invite those
172			Member States who have not yet ratified the NPT to attend this conference as observer states
173			for a discussion on, "Steps to Achieve Universal Ratification of the NPT," in order to allow
174			said Member States to express their concerns regarding the NPT and possible ways to support
175			disarmament and nonproliferation while also including opportunities for those Member States
176			who have already ratified the NPT Treaty and follow IAEA regulations;
177			
178	4.	Recomn	<i>nends</i> for the IAEA to establish an amendment to Article VII of the CSA mandate to create a normative
179		period c	of the inspection and evaluation of nuclear facilities to be conducted such that:
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181		a.	The period of time for inspection and evaluation must be specified with regards to the discretion of the
182		ч.	organizations and their nuclear capacities;
183			organizations and then nuclear equations,
		1.	The distance CM and a Guada and a large state and a share of the second state of the second state of the
184		b.	The division of Member States on the inspection and evaluation must be specified with regards to the
185			discretion of the Agency based on each Member States' existing nuclear facilities and their respective
186			locations;
187			
188		c.	Every regional group would have specified annual time schedules with regards to the inspection and
189			evaluation of their nuclear facilities to avoid overlaps of inspections and evaluation within each region;
190			
191		d.	The inspection and evaluation process would encompass two main stages: the preliminary
192			investigation to be conducted by an expert inspector; and other succeeding investigations, over the next
192			years, to be conducted via satellite, compared and contrasted to the investigation of the inspector;
193			years, to be conducted via saterine, compared and contrasted to the investigation of the inspector,
195		e.	The data obtained from these inspections and evaluations to be controlled and monitored solely by the
196			IAEA, however Member States may voluntarily share their respective data for transparency purposes;
197			
198		f.	The IAEA inform the UNODA should a Member State refuse to have their nuclear facilities inspected
199			and evaluated and recommend sanctions;
200			
201	5.	Recomn	nends that the General Assembly work in conjunction with the Security Council in the creation of
202			entation and Outreach Units (IOUs) to be directed by the 1540 committee to aid in the full application of
203			on 1540, and which recommends that the IOUs serve to:
203		10501411	
204		0	Aid in the implementation of 1540 for those States who have not had the resources to do so yet by
		a.	
206			providing recommendations on how Member States may effectively implement key provisions of the
207			resolution 1540;
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209		b.	Actively engage with those States that have not implemented the resolution, and;
210			
211		с.	Work closely with the 1540 Committee to ensure continuing compliance with Security Council
212			resolution 1540 adopted in 2014 and resolution 2325 adopted in 2016;
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214 215 216		d.	Evaluate Member States capacity to implement and uphold the appropriate effective measures to establish domestic controls within each respective country in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-state actors;
217			nuoreal weapons among non state actors,
218		e.	Operate on a regional basis to address the individual needs of different regions regarding
219			implementation;
220			
221		f.	Request that IOUs implement a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Tag system to maintain
222			accurate knowledge of nuclear material exchanged and amounts lost through transit between States or
223			private companies;
224			
225		g.	Encourage the IOU to facilitate private sector activity regarding nuclear material transfers as well as
226			that of national governments;
227			
228		h.	Ensure that IOUs will provide reporting on the amount of nuclear and fissile material lost in transit and
229			maintain a more accurate idea of amounts of fissile material transferred between states;
230			
231		i.	Request that the IOU Implement a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Tag system to maintain
232			accurate knowledge of nuclear material exchanged and amounts lost through transit between nations or
233			private companies;
234			
235		j.	Propose that the IOU design security frameworks and standards for nations maintaining nuclear
236		· ·	material stockpiles, nuclear reactors, or other sensitive nuclear facilities to prevent access from
237			unauthorized non-state actors;
238			
239		k.	State that face a higher level of non-state actor activity within their borders would have the opportunity
240			to apply for individualized security programs created by the IOU to more effectively protect their
241			nuclear material and facilities within their nation; a fund to be created to support the IOU program
242			supplemented by donations from Member States, the IAEA, and the Security Council;
243			
244		1.	Suggest that a fund to be created to support the IOU program supplemented by donations from
245			Member States, the IAEA, and the Security Council, such that:
246			
247			i. Member States can request monetary aid from the fund at any point in their process the enable
248			the full implementation of the program;
249			ii. The IAEA is implored to provide funding under the Nuclear Safety and Security section of the
250			budget in direct correlation with IAEA safeguards aimed at deterring the spread of nuclear
251			weapons and detecting the misuse of nuclear materials and technologies;
252			iii. The Security Council is encouraged to draw upon the Trust Fund for Global and Regional
253			Disarmament Activities administered by UNODA under resolution 1540 adopted in 2004,
254			encompassing funds from Member States;
255			
256	6.		nends that both Member States and the IAEA work together to engage in technical cooperation programs
257		to streng	gthen the capacity of save, peaceful and secure usage of nuclear technology by:
258			
259		a.	Promoting the expansion of technical cooperation division within the Middle East;
260			
261		b.	Encouraging the allocation of funds to Member States in order to ensure the highest level of capacity
262			building and technical assistance;
263			
264		c.	Requesting that the Director General of each region as well as within each Member State to submit an
265			annual extensive report detailing the exchange of nuclear materials across State lines any losses in
266			nuclear material and development in nuclear technologies;
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268		d.	Acknowledging the significance of transparency regarding the status of each Member State's nuclear
269			facilities and capabilities;

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270		Description destingues of destingues described and a starting of the destingues of a starting
271 272		e. Recognizing the importance of the investigation and evaluation of nuclear facilities and voluntarily
272		seek expert inspections and evaluations;
273		f. Strongly encouraging all Member States recognize the trigger list provided by the Nuclear Suppliers
275		Group (NSG) as potential gateways to nuclear non-proliferation, comply with safeguards and
276		guidelines provided by the IAEA and NSG, and adhere to recommendations provided by the IAEA and
277		NSG in regards to monitoring the transfer and retransfer of nuclear materials;
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279	7.	<i>Invites</i> regional organizations such as, but not limited to, the Latin American Network for Education in Nuclear
280		Technology (LANENT), the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology (ANENT), and the African
281		Network for Education in Science and Technology (AFRA-NEST) to develop sub-programmes, that will be
282		focused on providing technical guidance, oversight, safeguards, and counsel to Member States seeking peaceful
283		nuclear energy development, whose role would be to allocate funding to the relevant regional programs to cover
284		the cost of creating the aforementioned region sub-programmes through:
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286		a. Facilitating better communication within regional groups;
287		
288		b. Enforcement of record-keeping and inspections;
289 290		a Transmorter in the devialenment of nuclear energy infrastructures
290 291		c. Transparency in the development of nuclear energy infrastructure;
291		d. Information sharing between experts on how to best use fissile materials and enriched uranium,
293		preferably funded by The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
294		(UNESCO), The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), The United Nations Development
295		Program (UNDP);
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297	8.	Encourages Member States to further invest resources and efforts towards the creation of dual-use technologies,
298		in relation to the elimination and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and nuclear weapons, such as,
299		but not limited to, the:
300		
301		a. Development of surveillance techniques to monitor illegal transit of tools, components, or materials
302 303		used in the manufacturing of Weapons of Mass Destruction and nuclear weapons by non-state actors;
303 304		b. Expansion of oversight carried out by the numerous control regimes including the Missile Treaty
305		Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group, Zangger Committee and others;
306		Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group, Zangger Committee and outers,
307		c. Monitoring mechanisms in Nuclear-Capable Member States to maintain and regulate peaceful uses of
308		such technology and energy;
309		
310		d. Inclusion of new legal models that prohibit the destructive effects of dual-use technology in the
311		nuclear ban treaty negotiations of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN),
312		including the following:
313		
314		i. Creation of a legal instrument that prohibits dual-use technology utilized for Weapons of
315 316		Mass Destruction (WMDs);ii. Issuance of permits and legal documents that would check on the transfer of and utilization of
317		ii. Issuance of permits and legal documents that would check on the transfer of and utilization of dual-use technology;
317		iii. Imposing legal violations for non-observation of formal rules on the proper use of dual-use
319		technology;
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321	9.	<i>Encourages</i> Member States to introduce an all encompassing campaign called the Prevention of Environmental
322		and Apocalyptic Crises and Emergencies (PEACE) targeted at the global civil society, within the United
323		Nations framework, identifying the costs as well as the risks created by nuclear weapons in order to change
324		normative values within this civil society that would pressure the political sphere with the help of several Non-
325		Governmental as well as Civil Society Organizations such as and through:

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326		
327	a.	The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), that is active in a multitude of
328		countries, and attempts to influence the debate on nuclear disarmament as well as national initiatives
329		such as Campaign For Nuclear Disarmament (CND) which exemplifies the capability of civil society
330		in affecting decision-making processes, the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and
331		Disarmament (PNND), a non-partisan forum which connects members of parliament all over the globe
332		for the purpose of information sharing and cooperative policy development and finally the Vienna
333		Group of 10, an informal group that convenes before every NPT review conference to discuss
334		constructive solutions and potential future measures to push for further implementation of the NPT;
335		
336	b.	The assessment of the total financial cost of disasters such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as the
337		study of the financial, economic and material impact of the nuclear development programmes that have
338		been conducted worldwide through the synthesis of the analyses conducted by multiple non-state
339		actors on the non-financial costs related to the use of nuclear weapons that have affected human lives,
340		the environment, wildlife, as well as the cultural heritage of countries;
341		
342	10 Recomm	nends to the IAEA the reclassification of uranium as hazardous material under the IAEA Categorization
343		oactive Material since it is potentially fissile material and may be utilized in the production of nuclear
344	weapon	
345	weapon	
346	11 Propos	es the creation of the Organization of Uranium Exporting Countries (OUEC), whose role would be to:
347	11. 110pos	to the election of the organization of oralinant Exporting countries (00220), whose fore would be to.
348	a.	Regulate the sale of Uranium on the international level with the preferred approval or advice of the
349	u.	OUEC working under the mandate and supervision of the General Assembly and the UNODA;
350		oble working under the mandate and supervision of the General Assembly and the OrtoDA,
351	b.	Coordinate and unify the uranium extraction policies of the member countries, and deter a shortage of
352	0.	uranium as well as an provide an adequate market for approved sellers and buyers;
353		araman as wen as an provide an adequate market for approved seners and buyers,
354	с.	Establish the central headquarter in New York City as well as regional branches in Vienna, Austria,
355	C.	Nairobi, Kenya, and Bangkok, Thailand to facilitate communication;
355		Nanool, Kenya, and Dangkok, Thanand to facilitate communication,
357	d.	Promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, and global nuclear disarmament through
358	u.	educational and awareness campaign in collaboration with the IAEA;
358		educational and awareness campaign in conaboration with the IAEA,
360	e.	Promote the inclusion of all Member States that deal with the sale of uranium to the organization;
361	C.	romote the metasion of an Memoer States that dear with the safe of dramatin to the organization,
362	f.	Most at his annual summits in order to share information and technologies related to uranium
363	1.	Meet at bi-annual summits in order to share information and technologies related to uranium
		extraction, ensure a proper coordination between member states, and, if necessary, update the
364		regulations;
365		Tetallich mennen de later den la Commencial des cale de TATA de sur au de mense Cl. C. C. C. de de sur
366	g.	Establish recommended standards of approval through the IAEA to ensure the peaceful facilitation of
367		potential nuclear materials, to be applied to Member States, private institutions, research facilities, and
368		universities, which would be verified by the OUEC to verify recommended clients for states to enter
369		into transactions with;
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371	h.	Create a IAEA- and Member-approved list of sellers and buyers to ensure the uranium is not used for
372		any wrongful purposes to be decided by the members;
373		
374	i.	Operate with the expressed purpose of creating better access for developing nations to uranium for
375		peaceful energy and research uses in conjunction with the IAEA, Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the
376		Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) and the UNILPNAS;
377		
378	j.	Review the export of uranium in joint consultation with the IAEA to those States that make use of DU
379		weapons;
380		

381 382 383		k.	Hold a summit on 29 August two years after the adoption of this resolution, to further discuss the rules and regulations of the organization;
384 385 386	12.	in order	<i>ages</i> Member States to shift systems dependent on Highly Enriched Uranium to Low Enriched Uranium to lower the risk of HEU being obtained by Non-State Actors and/or Member States not privy to the l utilization of uranium;
387 388 389	13.		r the creation of Strategic Technological Advancement and Nuclear Disarmament Committees D), which will:
390 391 392 393		a.	Provide voluntary regional forums to discuss ways to incentive nuclear armament-possessing Member States to work towards realizing the goals laid out in Article IV of the NPT;
394 395 396		b.	Streamline the processes of disarmament by bridging the gap between Member States and the resources of the United Nations, specifically those offered by the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA);
397 398 399 400		c.	Respect national sovereignty by being regional committees as to respect historic and cultural differences between regions;
401 402 403		d.	Divide participating Member States into five separate committees, based upon the five regions as outlined under the 2014 list of Member States;
404 405 406		e.	Be overseen by the United Nations Disarmament Committee, allowing for greater transparency and accountability;
407 408 409		f.	Be led by a sole Member State for two-year periods who is elected by a simple majority by its respective Member State group's regional delegate body;
410 411 412 413		g.	Act as an international body to support incentivizing nuclear armament possessing Member States to abide by existing global frameworks, especially the NPT, with the goal of reducing the world's nuclear armament stockpile to 15,000 (33%) by 2050;
413 414 415 416 417 418		h.	Provide opportunities for subsidization of infrastructural programs for nuclear possessing Member States or their respective lesser developed global partners, in exchange for compliance with the NPT as outlined under these national plans of action, furthering Member States' international influence and cooperation with lesser developed nations;
419 420 421 422 423 424 425		i.	Act as a platform for Member States to create and submit their own national plans of action regarding disarmament to these STAND Committees which will have time-bound goals created by each respective Member State, provide the UNDC with verifiable time-bound goals regarding disarmament, warrant no penalty for failure to meet this time-specific goals, upon completion and verification of time-bound goals submitted to the UNDC and provide funding and subsidization possibilities for either nuclear armament possessing Member States or can be redirected to their lesser developed global partners;
426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433		j.	Provide funding and subsidization opportunities through the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) which will serve as an incentive mechanism for nuclear armament possessing states to comply with Article IV of the NPT, provide funding to nuclear armament possessing Member States in exchange for meeting these time-bound goals to finance infrastructure programs, including safe nuclear energy and to be available for redirection by UNDC from nuclear armament possessing Member States to their respective international foreign aid programs, upon request by the respective Member State;
434 435 436		k.	Submit annual reports to the General Assembly detailing the progress that Member States have made on reaching these time-bound goals as submitted by nuclear armament possessing Member States to

437 438		the General Assembly First Committee, as a portion of a stipulation for funding possibilities through UNDC;
439		
440 441		all member states to commence, between 2020-2025, multilateral negotiations on the enforcement of the and the FMCT that must address and work towards:
441	CIDI	and the FINCT that must address and work towards.
443	a.	The prohibition on the enrichment of uranium-235 and plutonium-239 to levels higher than 80% for
444	u.	the purposes of nuclear weapons and nuclear devices;
445		the pulposes of nuclear weapons and nuclear devices,
446	b.	Reports of both military and civilian fissile missiles materials declared excess by nuclear weapons
447		states, submitted to the UNODA to guarantee transparency;
448		
449	c.	Disposing of said excess materials excess by managing their transfer and retransfer through voluntary
450		offer programs to non-nuclear nations seeking materials for nuclear energy;
451		
452	d.	Encourages all Member States file biennial reports on measures to implement the NPT, CTBT and
453		FMCT, ensuring that if a Member State does not meet conditions of the aforementioned treaties - their
454		report must provide reasons, allowing the UNDC to assess and assist Member States in their meeting
455		required conditions;
456		
457	e.	
458		materials and technology, a public global database to access such information, and a permanent system
459		of gradual reduction of excess materials over 5 year intervals to be agreed upon following
460		implementation of the CTBT and the FMCT;
461	C	The first day this state and a faile in the second state of a state of the state of the state of the state of the
462	f.	
463 464		production of nuclear materials from weaponry to energy;
465	15 Recon	<i>mends</i> that all Member States that currently possess nuclear weapons reduce the quantity of nuclear
465 466		<i>imends</i> that all Member States that currently possess nuclear weapons reduce the quantity of nuclear up they possess by a recommended 7 69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they
466	weapo	ons they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they
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466 467	weapo	ons they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they as when the resolution goes into effect, such that:
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466 467 468 469 470 471	weapo	ons they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they so when the resolution goes into effect, such that: The adherence to this policy will lead to Global Nuclear Zero by the year 2030 for the SDGs; The disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons stockpiles by 7.69% annually does not prohibit
466 467 468 469 470 471 472	weapo posses a.	ons they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they as when the resolution goes into effect, such that: The adherence to this policy will lead to Global Nuclear Zero by the year 2030 for the SDGs;
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466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475	weapo posses a. b.	 ons they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they as when the resolution goes into effect, such that: The adherence to this policy will lead to Global Nuclear Zero by the year 2030 for the SDGs; The disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons stockpiles by 7.69% annually does not prohibit states from developing and advancing their nuclear stockpiles;
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466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479	weapc posses a. b. c.	 ons they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they so when the resolution goes into effect, such that: The adherence to this policy will lead to Global Nuclear Zero by the year 2030 for the SDGs; The disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons stockpiles by 7.69% annually does not prohibit states from developing and advancing their nuclear stockpiles; There will be the creation of a global ban on the development of nuclear weapons after the world's nuclear weapons states have begun to disarm; The United Nations General Assembly First Committee of 2029 will utilize the circumstantial
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466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482	weapc posses a. b. c.	 bins they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they as when the resolution goes into effect, such that: The adherence to this policy will lead to Global Nuclear Zero by the year 2030 for the SDGs; The disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons stockpiles by 7.69% annually does not prohibit states from developing and advancing their nuclear stockpiles; There will be the creation of a global ban on the development of nuclear weapons after the world's nuclear weapons states have begun to disarm; The United Nations General Assembly First Committee of 2029 will utilize the circumstantial information of the time to address any apprehension of complete deconstruction nuclear weapons, including: i. Knowing that the future holds unexpected events and opportunities, it will be necessary that a future General Assembly First Committee address this final stage in global disarmament;
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466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484	weapc posses a. b. c.	 bins they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they as when the resolution goes into effect, such that: The adherence to this policy will lead to Global Nuclear Zero by the year 2030 for the SDGs; The disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons stockpiles by 7.69% annually does not prohibit states from developing and advancing their nuclear stockpiles; There will be the creation of a global ban on the development of nuclear weapons after the world's nuclear weapons states have begun to disarm; The United Nations General Assembly First Committee of 2029 will utilize the circumstantial information of the time to address any apprehension of complete deconstruction nuclear weapons, including: i. Knowing that the future holds unexpected events and opportunities, it will be necessary that a future General Assembly First Committee address this final stage in global disarmament; ii. If states' nuclear arsenal cannot be reduced by exactly 7.69% annually, the remaining amount
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466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489	weapc posses a. b. c.	 Ins they possess by a recommended 7.69% annually based upon the number of nuclear weapons they as when the resolution goes into effect, such that: The adherence to this policy will lead to Global Nuclear Zero by the year 2030 for the SDGs; The disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons stockpiles by 7.69% annually does not prohibit states from developing and advancing their nuclear stockpiles; There will be the creation of a global ban on the development of nuclear weapons after the world's nuclear weapons states have begun to disarm; The United Nations General Assembly First Committee of 2029 will utilize the circumstantial information of the time to address any apprehension of complete deconstruction nuclear weapons, including: Knowing that the future holds unexpected events and opportunities, it will be necessary that a future General Assembly First Committee address this final stage in global disarmament; If states' nuclear arsenal cannot be reduced by exactly 7.69% annually, the remaining amount of the new whole number of nuclear weapons will be added to the next year's required quantity; An example of this would be if a state needed to reduce their nuclear arsenal by 64.6 nuclear weapons systems, they would deconstruct 64 nuclear weapons and the remaining point six would be added to the balance of the next year;
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492 493 494	16.		<i>bon</i> Member States to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to ensure the non-diversion of nuclear ogies through the universalization of an additional protocol which would seek to:
495 496		a.	Improve multilateral cooperation among Member States for peaceful use of nuclear technology;
497 498 499		b.	Revitalize multinational negotiating bodies for the improvement and enhancement of cooperation between Member States;
500 501 502		c.	Encourage Member States to expand access to civilian nuclear facilities as well as nuclear facilities with direct national security significance;
502 503 504 505 506 507	17.	Disarma promote	ages Member States to cooperate with the IAEA, UNODA and United Nations Institute for ament Research (UNIDIR) to open a platform of discussion between nuclear capable member states, to e unified political will on safe global nuclear disarmament and incentivizing the use of nuclear materials ources of green energy, including:
508 509 510 511		a.	Organizing an annual high level forum in which representatives from nuclear capable states propose incentives tailored specifically to their individual countries in order to emphasize cooperation on a global level;
512 513 514 515		b.	Assuring a safe process regarding the dismantling of nuclear arms by implementing frameworks to assure nuclear capable member states that their decommissioned nuclear material will not fall into the hands of non-state actors;
516 517 518		c.	Repurposing precious metals and other resources utilized within nuclear arms for applications such as solar panels and other green energy resources;
519 520 521		d.	Recommending adopting tax incentives based on previous models for Member States investing in renewable energy as an alternative to nuclear energy;
522 522 523 524	18.		<i>nends</i> for the IAEA to establish an amendment to Article VII of the CSA mandate to create a normative of the inspection and evaluation of nuclear facilities to be conducted such that:
525 526 527		a.	The period of time for inspection and evaluation must be specified with regards to the discretion of the organizations and their nuclear capacities;
528 529 530 531		b.	The division of Member States on the inspection and evaluation must be specified with regards to the discretion of the Agency based on each Member States' existing nuclear facilities and their respective locations;
532 533 534 535		c.	That every regional group would have specified annual time schedules with regards to the inspection and evaluation of their nuclear facilities to avoid overlaps of inspections and evaluation within each region;
536 537 538 539		d.	The inspection and evaluation process would encompass two main stages: the preliminary investigation to be conducted by an expert inspector; and other succeeding investigations, over the next years, to be conducted via satellite, compared and contrasted to the investigation of the inspector;
540 541 542 543		e.	That the data obtained from these inspections and evaluations to be controlled and monitored solely by the IAEA, however Member States may voluntarily share their respective data for transparency purposes;
545 545		f.	That the IAEA inform the UNODA should a Member State refuse to have their nuclear facilities inspected and evaluated and recommend sanctions.