



SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BACKGROUND GUIDE 2013

Written By: Andrea Wong, Eva Helena Hernik,
Stephen Carnes, Kevin O'Donnell



NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS



nmun.org

17 - 21 March - Conference A
24 - 28 March - Conference B

POSITION PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2013

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed here. Mail papers by 1 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_ConfA_MarsCollege).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.nya@nmun.org or positionpapers.nyb@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_Conf A_Mars College).

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Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	ccpcj.nya@nmun.org
Economic Commission for Africa	eca.nya@nmun.org
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International Atomic Energy Agency	iaea.nyb@nmun.org
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations	c34.nyb@nmun.org

OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers	positionpapers.nya@nmun.org
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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2013 National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference! We are very pleased to be serving as the Directors and Assistant Directors for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), and we would like to introduce ourselves. Andrea Wong, Director at Conference A, holds a BA in English and political science from the University of Ottawa. She is presently completing joint degrees in law and English at the University of Toronto. Her Assistant Director, Stephen M. Carnes, earned his BA in Political Science: International Relations at the University of Montana. He has special interest in studying Mandarin, and is currently scheduled to teach English in Hangzhou, China this winter. Eva Helena Hernik, Director for Conference B, earned her BA in International Criminal Justice, MA in Criminal Justice, and Graduate Certificate in Terrorism Studies at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and is near completion of her MA in International Relations at City College of New York. Her Assistant Director, Kevin O'Donnell, is in his final semester of pursuing a Bachelor's degree in International Relations at San Francisco State University. He is currently writing his undergraduate thesis on the topic of World War II reparations in the context of international reconciliation.

This year, C34 will consider the following topics:

1. Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts
2. Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements
3. Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has undergone an extraordinary transformation since its inception in 1948. Once limited solely to observer missions, peacekeeping operations have expanded greatly in scope and are now essential to the maintenance of international peace and security. By virtue of its unique mandate to examine and evaluate peacekeeping operations in their entirety, C34 is instrumental to the ongoing evolution of UN peacekeeping. As delegates, you will address issues with broad implications for the future of peacekeeping operations around the world.

The following guide will provide merely an introduction to the topics. It is meant to serve as a starting point for your own research, and by no means should it be considered exhaustive on the presented topics. Thorough familiarity with your country's policies in the context of C34 and UN peacekeeping as a whole, in conjunction with maintaining exemplary diplomatic behavior at all times, will be essential to your effective participation in the conference. To this end, every delegation should submit a position paper via email by March 1, 2013. Please refer carefully to the provided guidelines for position papers, and take note of the NMUN policies on the [website](#) and in the [delegate preparation guide](#) regarding [plagiarism](#), [codes of conduct/dress code/sexual harassment](#), [awards philosophy/evaluation method](#), etc. Adherence to these guidelines is mandatory.

We are confident that you will find NMUN to be one of the most rewarding experiences of your academic career. Please do not hesitate to direct any questions or concerns that you may have toward your respective committee staff — we are your primary contacts and we will be happy to assist you as you prepare for the conference. You may also contact Kristina Mader, Under-Secretary-General of the Department of the General Assembly at Conference A, or Katharina Weinert, Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peace and Security at Conference B. We wish you the best of luck in your preparation, and we earnestly look forward to meeting you in New York.

Sincerely yours,

Conference A
Andrea Wong
Director

Stephen M. Carnes
Assistant Director

Conference B
Eva Helena Hernik
Director

Kevin O'Donnell
Assistant Director



Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2013 NMUN Conference

For NMUN-New York 2013, each delegation submits one position paper for each assigned committee. A delegate's role as a Member State, Observer State, Non-Governmental Organization, etc. should affect the way a position paper is written. To understand these differences, please refer to the [Delegate Preparation Guide](#).

Position papers should review each delegation's policy regarding the topics of the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in entirely original material. ***The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.*** In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers may be given an award as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below and be of high substantive standard, using adequate language and showing in-depth research. While we encourage innovative proposals, we would like to remind delegates to stay within the mandate of their respective committee and keep a neutral and respectful tone. Similarly to the minus point-policy implemented at the conference to discourage disruptive behavior, position papers that use offensive language may entail negative grading when being considered for awards. Please refer to the sample paper following this message for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single-sided pages (one double-sided paper, if printed)
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at one inch for the whole paper
- Country/NGO name, school name and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page,
- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers
- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf format required) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2012. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue, Conference A: positionpapers.nya@nmun.org or Conference B: positionpapers.nyb@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2013 (GMT-5)**.

Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_ConfA_Mars College).

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Hannah Birkenkötter, Director-General (Conference A), or Nicholas Warino, Director-General (Conference B), at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and it is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location, your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Conference A
Hannah Birkenkötter
Director-General
hannah@nmun.org

Conference B
Nicholas Warino
Director-General
nick@nmun.org

**Delegation from
The United Mexican States**

**Represented by
(Name of College)**

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion; Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions; as well as The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. The Mexican Delegation first would like to convey its gratitude being elected and pride to serve as vice-president of the current General Assembly Plenary session.

I. The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion

The principles of equal sovereignty of states and non-interference, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, have always been cornerstones of Mexican foreign policy. The legitimate right to interfere by the use of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, is laid down in Article 41 of the UN-charter and reserves the right to the Security Council.

Concerning the violation of this principle by the application of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations, H.E. Ambassador to the United Nations Enrique Berruga Filloy underlined in 2005 that the Mexico strongly rejects “the application of unilateral laws and measures of economic blockade against any State, as well as the implementation of coercive measures without the authorization enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” That is the reason, why the United Mexican States supported – for the 14th consecutive time – Resolution (A/RES/60/12) of 2006 regarding the *Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba*.

In the 1990s, comprehensive economic sanctions found several applications with very mixed results, which made a critical reassessment indispensable. The United Mexican States fully supported and actively participated in the “Stockholm Process” that focused on increasing the effectiveness in the implementation of targeted sanctions. As sanctions and especially economic sanctions, pose a tool for action “between words and war” they must be regarded as a mean of last resort before war and fulfill highest requirements for their legitimate use. The United Mexican States and their partners of the “Group of Friends of the U.N. Reform” have already addressed and formulated recommendations for that take former criticism into account. Regarding the design of economic sanctions it is indispensable for the success to have the constant support by all member states and public opinion, which is to a large degree dependent on the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. Sanctions must be tailor-made, designed to effectively target the government, while sparing to the largest degree possible the civil population. Sanction regimes must be constantly monitored and evaluated to enable the world-community to adjust their actions to the needs of the unforeseeably changing situation. Additionally, the United Mexican States propose to increase communication between the existing sanction committees and thus their effectiveness by convening regular meetings of the chairs of the sanction committees on questions of common interest.

II. Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions

As a founding member of the United Nations, Mexico is highly engaged in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights all over the world, as laid down in the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)* in 1948. Especially since the democratic transition of Mexico in 2000 it is one of the most urgent topics to stand for Democratization and Human Rights, and Mexico implements this vision on many different fronts.

In the Convoking Group of the intergovernmental Community of Democracies (GC), the United Mexican States uphold an approach that fosters international cooperation to promote democratic values and institution-building at the national and international level. To emphasize the strong interrelation between human rights and the building of democracy and to fortify democratic developments are further challenges Mexico deals with in this committee. A key-factor for the sustainable development of a post-conflict-region is to hold free and fair election and thus creating a democratic system. Being aware of the need of post-conflict countries for support in the preparation of democratic elections, the United Mexican States contribute since 2001 to the work of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an intergovernmental organization operating at international, regional and national level in partnership with a range of institutions. Mexico’s foreign policy regarding human rights is substantially

based on cooperation with international organizations. The Inter American Commission of Human Rights is one of the bodies, Mexico is participating, working on the promotion of Human Rights in the Americas. Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the regional judicial institution for the application and interpretation of the *American Convention of Human Rights*.

The objectives Mexico pursues are to improve human rights in the country through structural changes and to fortify the legal and institutional frame for the protection of human rights on the international level. Underlining the connection between democracy, development and Human Rights, stresses the importance of cooperation with and the role of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the reform of the Human Rights Commission to a Human rights Council.

Having in mind the diversity of challenges in enforcing democracy and Human Rights, Mexico considers regional and national approaches vital for their endorsement, as Mexico exemplifies with its *National Program for Human Rights* or the *Plan Puebla Panama*. On the global level, Mexico is encouraged in working on a greater coordination and interoperability among the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as the development of common strategies and operational policies and the sharing of best practices in civilian crisis management should be encouraged, including clear frameworks for joint operations, when applicable.

III. The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa

The United Mexican States welcome the leadership role the African Union has taken regarding the security problems of the continent. Our delegation is furthermore convinced that The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) can become the foundation for Africa's economic, social and democratic development as the basis for sustainable peace. Therefore it deserves the full support of the international community.

The development of the United Mexican States in the last two decades is characterized by the transition to a full democracy, the national and regional promotion of human rights and sustainable, economic growth. Mexico's development is characterized by free trade and its regional integration in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Having in mind that sustainable development is based not only on economic, but as well on social and environmental development, President Vicente Fox has made sustainable development a guiding principle in the Mexican Development Plan that includes sustainability targets for all major policy areas.

The United Nations Security Council has established not less than seven peace-keeping missions on the African continent, underlining the need for full support by the international community. In post-conflict situations, we regard national reconciliation as a precondition for a peaceful development, which is the reason why Mexico supported such committees, i.e. in the case of Sierra Leone. The United Mexican States are convinced that an other to enhance durable peace in Africa is the institutional reform of the United Nations. We therefore want to reaffirm our full support to both the establishment of the peace-building commission and the Human Rights Council. Both topics are highly interrelated and, having in mind that the breach of peace is most often linked with severest human rights' abuses, thus need to be seen as two sides of one problem and be approached in this understanding.

As most conflicts have their roots in conflicts about economic resources and development chances, human development and the eradication of poverty must be at the heart of a successful, preventive approach. Lifting people out of poverty must be seen as a precondition not only for peace, but for social development and environmental sustainability.

The United Mexican States want to express their esteem for the decision taken by the G-8 countries for a complete debt-relief for many African Highly-Indebted-Poor-Countries. Nevertheless, many commitments made by the international community that are crucial for Africa's sustainable development are unfulfilled. The developed countries agreed in the *Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development* (A/CONF.198/11) to increase their Official Development Aid (ODA) "towards the target of 0,7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries and 0,15 to 0,20 per cent of GNP of developed countries to least developed countries". Furthermore, the United Mexican States are disappointed by the result of the Hong Kong Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, which once more failed to meet the needs of those, to whom the round was devoted: developing countries and especially African countries, who today, more than ever, are cut off from global trade and prosperity by protectionism.

Committee History

Introduction

The history of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping began in June 1948 with the first Security Council-mandated mission to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East.¹ This mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was formed as a result of Security Council Resolution 50 (1948), which called upon the United Nations Mediator in Palestine to monitor and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Jews and Arabs, as well as granted the Mediator military observers to aid him in this endeavor.² Even though peacekeeping operations are not mentioned in the *Charter of the United Nations*, it was the UN Security Council's mandate over matters of peace and security that allowed for the initiation of such peacekeeping activities.³ Despite the Security Council's primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, when the Suez Canal Crisis erupted in November 1956, it was the UN General Assembly that passed Resolution 998, which authorized the creation of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities' along the Suez Canal."⁴ This was in large part due to the frustration over the stalemate in the Security Council, where France and the United Kingdom were vetoing all attempts to pass resolutions, which demanded a halt to the attacks on the Egyptian Suez Canal.⁵ The basis for the action of the General Assembly was resolution 377 (V) titled Uniting for Peace in which it granted itself the power to deal with threats to the peace if the Security Council failed to act after a veto by a permanent member; this however did not affect the primary role of the Security Council on matters concerning international peace and security.⁶

The 19th session of the General Assembly, from 1964-1965, was largely identified by the question of whether or not peacekeeping expenses constituted "expenses of the Organization," referred to in Article 17 in the *Charter of the United Nations* and debated in the International Court of Justice case *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*.⁷ The subsequent ruling from the International Court of Justice that peacekeeping operations in fact did fall under Article 17 of the *Charter* prompted a discussion in the General Assembly as to how to reevaluate and reassess peacekeeping.⁸ This was the beginning of modern peacekeeping; it was the first time the UN had taken the necessary steps to ensure that peacekeeping both existed as an activity of the UN, and that those activities were to be funded by the budget of the UN.⁹ In order to explore this question of how to reevaluate peacekeeping activities, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2006 (XIX) at their 19th session on 18 February 1965, thereby creating the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.¹⁰

Responsibilities and Mandate

The Committee's main purpose is the "comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects," as well as update and advise the General Assembly on all peacekeeping operations.¹¹ This includes creating methods that attempt to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to conduct such operations, and submitting these recommendations in its annual report to the General Assembly Fourth Committee (Special Political

¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *History of Peacekeeping*.

² United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, *UNTSO Background*, 2012; United Nations Security Council, *Resolution of 29 May 1948*, 1948.

³ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 73; Shimura, H., The Role of the UN Secretariat. In: Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, 2001, p. 48, 56.

⁴ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 74-75.

⁵ Krasno, J. E., *The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society*, 2004, p. 229.

⁶ Tomuschat, C., *Uniting for Peace*, 2008.

⁷ Tandon, Y., Consensus and Authority Behind United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *International Organization*, 1967, p. 254-255; International Court of Justice, *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, 1962.

⁸ Tandon, Y., Consensus and Authority Behind United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *International Organization*, 1967, p. 254-255.

⁹ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 75.

¹⁰ Tandon, Y., Consensus and Authority Behind United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *International Organization*, 1967, p. 254-255; United Nations General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*, 1965.

¹¹ PeaceWomen Project, *About C-34*.

and Decolonization).¹² In response to the Committee's annual reports, the Secretary-General's office releases their own annual report detailing progress made in implementing the recommendations and proposals of the Committee, as well as progress in the area of "improving arrangements for the planning, management, and oversight of missions."¹³

In the decades since the end of the Cold War, the Committee's work has picked up significantly, with peacekeeping coming to be viewed as an attractive tool for dealing with the increasing number of intra-state conflicts.¹⁴ Since 1988 alone, there have been 54 (out of a total of 67) different peacekeeping operations undertaken by UN Peacekeeping Forces all around the world, with the highest concentration taking place in Africa (28 separate peacekeeping missions).¹⁵ In 1989, the Committee became known as the C-34 (Committee of 34), since there were 34 Member States that made up the Committee at that time.¹⁶ Although the current membership of the Committee is at 144 Member States, the name "C-34" has remained with it.¹⁷ All members of the C-34 are either current or former contributors of peacekeeping operations.¹⁸ Any Member State can request membership in the C-34, as long as they have either contributed personnel to peacekeeping operations, or act as observers in the C-34 for at least three consecutive years.¹⁹ Additionally, there are 13 other Member States and international organizations that act as observers, among them the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the European Community.²⁰ The C-34 works very closely with other United Nations peacekeeping organs, especially the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Peacebuilding Commission, whose work relies heavily on the effectiveness and quality of the C-34's work.²¹ The DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) often work directly with the C-34 on establishing good practice and assessing lessons learned.²²

Typical C-34 meetings generally last for one month and consist of three parts: general debate session, briefings from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and finally, a Working Group, as well as informal thematic groups based on various themes.²³ The general debate section is held for two days, where senior military advisors address the Committee on their Member States' peacekeeping priorities.²⁴ The DPKO briefing section involves DPKO officials making presentations on topics that are requested by C-34 members.²⁵ The Working Group of the Special Committee occupies most of the meetings, since it is where members draft the annual report of the C-34, much of which is done within the smaller, informal groups based on various themes related to peacekeeping.²⁶

Issues discussed by the C-34 in the past decade include HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping, the safety and security of United Nations personnel, cooperation with regional arrangements, children and peacekeeping, and rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations.²⁷ The C-34's most recent 2011 report builds on former issues, but has overall expanded the sections concerning cooperation with troop-contributing countries, gender and peacekeeping,

¹² United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2003; United Nations General Assembly, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*.

¹³ PeaceWomen Project, *About C-34*; United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011.

¹⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Post Cold-War Surge*.

¹⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping, *History of Peacekeeping*; United Nations Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Operations*.

¹⁶ Dorn, A.M., *Tools of the Trade? Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007, p. 5.

¹⁷ Dorn, A.M., *Tools of the Trade? Monitoring and Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping*, 2007, p. 5; United Nations General Assembly, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*; United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011.

¹⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*.

¹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*, 1997.

²⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*.

²¹ PeaceWomen Project, *Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011.; United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifth session*, 2012.

²² United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 2009.

²³ PeaceWomen Project, *About C-34*.

²⁴ PeaceWomen Project, *About C-34*.

²⁵ PeaceWomen Project, *About C-34*.

²⁶ PeaceWomen Project, *About C-34*.

²⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2003.

enhancement of African peacekeeping capacities, reform and restructuring of peacekeeping, and conduct and discipline of United Nations personnel.²⁸ The February 2012 meeting of the C-34 in New York included opening remarks from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, two of the C-34's closest partners in all its peacekeeping activities. Each of them updated the Committee on recent accomplishments and collaborations in various peacekeeping missions, but also addressed the immediate challenges of the present and near future, particularly the peacekeeping situations in Sudan and South Sudan.²⁹ The General Assembly Fourth Committee's draft resolution from September 10, 2012 states the intent of that committee to approve the proposals, recommendations, and conclusions of latest report by the C-34.³⁰

Recent changes and current challenges

The post-Cold War era was marked by a large shift from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.³¹ This forced the UN to take a second look at the whole idea of and approach to peacekeeping operations.³² On January 31, 1992, the UN Security Council approved a paper submitted by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, called *An Agenda for Peace*.³³ This paper outlined a new direction for the UN to take regarding peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era, and was categorized into four phases: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding.³⁴ That same year, the UN created the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in order to coordinate the increasingly complex UN peacekeeping activities, replacing the loose body that had overseen peacekeeping affairs before, the UN Office for Special Political Affairs.³⁵

In 2000, the *Brahimi Report* was released, detailing 20 recommendations for the UN to take in order to reform peacekeeping activities.³⁶ The recommendations included restructuring the DPKO, increased usage of information technology, the creation of a task force to support operations from the very beginning, and the creation of an "information and strategic analysis unit" to aid all UN agencies involved with peacekeeping.³⁷ These recommendations were backed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who then sought out largely increased funds for the plans from individual Member States.³⁸ This is in addition to the normal annual peacekeeping budget, which is prepared by the Secretary-General and their Secretariat, based on the Security Council's mandate, and ultimately approved by the General Assembly.³⁹ In 2006, in an attempt to reform peacekeeping operations according to the *Brahimi Report*, the General Assembly created the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which provides recommendations concerning peacebuilding matters to any and all relevant bodies inside or outside the UN.⁴⁰ As the 10th anniversary of the *Brahimi Report* drew nearer, an unofficial non-paper was jointly released in 2009 by the DPKO and the DFS called the *New Horizon* process.⁴¹ This document called for another reassessment of peacekeeping strategies and policies, as well as emphasizes the immensely important role of global partnerships and

²⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011.

²⁹ United Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, *All Stakeholders Have 'Common Duty' To Identify Peacekeeping Components Needing Improvement, Undersecretary-General Tells Special Committee*, 2012.

³⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*, 2012.

³¹ Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst, *Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the United Nations: Four Dilemmas*. In: Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, 2001, p. 216.

³² Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst, *Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the United Nations: Four Dilemmas*. In: Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, 2001, p. 216.

³³ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 81.

³⁴ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 81.

³⁵ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 82; United Nations Archives, *United Nations Office for Special Political Affairs fonds 1946-1991*.

³⁶ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 87-88.

³⁷ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 88.

³⁸ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 87-88.

³⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Financing Peacekeeping*.

⁴⁰ Hahnmäki, J. M., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2008, p. 89-90; United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, *Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission*.

⁴¹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 2009.

understanding between peacekeeping bodies.⁴² Proposals of this document have since been included in the Secretary-General's annual report to the C-34.⁴³

Conclusion

C-34 is a unique UN body that brings together troop contributors and other organizations involved in peacekeeping activities. It provides a forum for Member States to discuss thematic issues such as gender and peacekeeping as well as operational questions such as the protection of UN personnel. The increase in peacekeeping missions and shift towards more intrastate conflicts in the 1990s forced all stakeholders to take a different look at the composition of peacekeeping operations. How and if these concepts still apply to peacekeeping missions today is debated within C-34. The C-34's 2012 report is now under consideration at the 66th session of the General Assembly in New York.⁴⁴ The dates and agendas of the meetings in 2013 have yet to be determined, but are expected to include many of the topics discussed by the C-34 in recent years.⁴⁵

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This is the latest of an annual report released by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, outlining and providing updates on various subjects related to peacekeeping efforts, as well as the committee's membership. It is essential for delegates to familiarize themselves with this report, not only because it is the most recently released report, but because it is the principal document summarizing the Special Committee's activities and findings each year.

United Nations General Assembly. (N.D.). *General Assembly and Peacekeeping*. Retrieved August 13, 2012 from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/CTTEE.htm>

This page provides a short background on both the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. More importantly, it contains links to numerous annual reports released by the Special Committee, as well as several corresponding reports released by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee.

United Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division. (2012). All Stakeholders Have 'Common Duty' To Identify Peacekeeping Components Needing Improvement, Undersecretary-General Tells Special Committee. Retrieved August 14, 2012 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gapk209.doc.htm>

This release is extremely useful in learning how a typical session of the Special Committee proceeds. It is very detailed in its recording, laying out the background of the session, opening remarks by the Chair and the Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and statements from a large number of Special Committee members. It mentions many reports from different branches and bodies of the UN, which can provide delegates with a better understanding of how the Special Committee operates within the larger UN system, particularly the peacekeeping bodies.

⁴² United Nations Peacekeeping, *The "New Horizon" Process*.

⁴³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report #1*, 2010.

⁴⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*, 2012.

⁴⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*, 2012.

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I. Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts

“UN peacekeeping operations are now increasingly complex and multi-dimensional, going beyond monitoring a ceasefire to actually bringing failed States back to life, often after decades of conflict. The blue helmets and their civilian colleagues work together to organize elections, enact police and judicial reform, promote and protect human rights, conduct mine clearance, advance gender equality, achieve the voluntary disarmament of former combatants, and support the return of refugees and displaced people to their home.”⁴⁶

Introduction

With the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the world collectively committed to preventing and ending conflict, upholding human rights, and establishing justice and respect for international law.⁴⁷ Shortly thereafter, the UN also became a pioneer in the field of peacekeeping as well as triggering the international community’s involvement in peacekeeping operations with the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in 1948, which was directed to oversee peace negotiations in the Middle East.⁴⁸ Until the 1980s, peacekeeping was managed by the UN Office of Special Political Affairs, however in 1992, the UN Secretary-General established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which since that time has been traditionally tasked with missions of an observational capacity dealing with inter-state conflicts.⁴⁹ In total, the UN has conducted 67 peacekeeping operations, of which 57 have taken place since 1988.⁵⁰ Over 120 Member States have contributed to operations that have brought together military personnel, UN police and civilians from around the world in an effort to promote peace and security in post-conflict zones.⁵¹

Periodically, critical reforms to peacekeeping operations in an evolving and modernizing world have expanded the complex role of UN peacekeeping forces.⁵² The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) reviews peacekeeping operations and provides reform recommendations; since 2007, the Department of Field Support (DFS) has assisted C-34 and DPKO in providing operational and post-conflict support.⁵³ In 2000, the *Brahimi Report* introduced a renewed vision for UN peacekeeping that would assist in making peacekeeping forces stronger, more effective, and more cost-efficient.⁵⁴ The *Brahimi Report* elaborated essential reforms that expanded the role of peacekeeping forces, challenged Member States to adequately maintain personnel and resources for peacekeeping missions, and addressed the vital contribution that women bring to peacekeeping operations.⁵⁵ In 2009, building on the comprehensive overview of the *Brahimi Report* and the need to further reevaluate peacekeeping operations, specifically in strengthening post-conflict stabilization efforts, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support issued *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping Operations*, stating:

“United Nations peacekeeping is now at a crossroads. The scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are straining its personnel, administrative and support machinery. New political, military and financial challenges threaten to erode the unity of vision and purpose of the global peacekeeping partnership. A renewed partnership and a shared agenda are essential to ensuring that UN peacekeeping can meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.”⁵⁶

⁴⁶ Annan, *UN Secretary-General Statement on International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers*, 2006.

⁴⁷ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Preamble.

⁴⁸ United Nations Department of Public Information. *United Nations Today*, 2008, p. 77.

⁴⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

⁵⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping, *History of peacekeeping*. 2012.

⁵¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

⁵² UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 21 August 2000, p. 2.

⁵³ United Nations Department of Public Information. *United Nations Today*, 2007, p. 29.

⁵⁴ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 21 August 2000, p. 2.

⁵⁵ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 21 August 2000, p. 2.

⁵⁶ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Services, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 2009, p. ii.

Internal Aspects

As an essential mechanism of the UN, peacekeeping operations are an *ad hoc* coalition of contributions from willing Member States.⁵⁷ Peacekeeping operations do not receive their funding from the regular UN budget; much of the funding for operations is provided from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.⁵⁸ The Reserve Fund was established in 1993 under the authority of the Secretary-General as a means of obtaining immediate financial support for rapid-response deployment of forces.⁵⁹ The working group that established the reserve sought to use these funds as start-up costs for authorized operations.⁶⁰ Additionally, funds have been allocated for expanding mission timelines as deemed appropriate by the Security Council for the successful completion of operations.⁶¹ Also, since the UN has not adopted a standing force of rapid deployment, peacekeeping forces are assembled on a case-by-case basis as determined by the Security Council.⁶² Operations conducted by the UN can range from small reconnaissance missions to large military engagements. In post-conflict zones, peacekeeping operations can take on additional responsibilities, such as enforcing rule of law, human rights monitoring or helping to establish reliable institutions of governance.⁶³

To ensure their success, peacekeeping forces require adequate financing, training, equipment, and logistical support prior to and during their engagement in post-conflict stabilization efforts.⁶⁴ However, financial restraints have hindered the UN's ability to support peacekeeping operations fully.⁶⁵ The ability to sustain peace in the aftermath of conflict requires full financial support and political backing of all Member States.⁶⁶ In recent years, the financial framework for the expansion of peacekeeping missions has brought renewed confidence with access of up to \$100 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, though the access to these funds is limited.⁶⁷ Limitations have resulted from substantial, unpaid debts owed by contributing Member States to the regular budget; however, outstanding balances have priority once funds have been secured.⁶⁸ Additionally, alterations to the reimbursement process have the potential to profoundly accelerate deployment of valuable resources needed for the maintenance of peacekeeping forces.⁶⁹ The UN-approved resources budget for the period of July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013 is projected at US\$7.23 billion with overdue contributions to peacekeeping, as of June 30, 2012, at approximately US\$3.02 billion.⁷⁰ However, the overall financial situation of the UN has become precarious, primarily due to many Member States making partial and late payments to their assessed contributions.⁷¹ Though the UN continues to operate, it has done so primarily due to Member States voluntarily providing advanced funds to the Working Capital Fund, along with borrowing funds already allotted to peacekeeping operations.⁷²

The dispersal of allocated funds depends heavily on whether the UN believes the funds will be used appropriately.⁷³ Since the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping forces have been stationed in Haiti to address ongoing political unrest.⁷⁴ After the devastating earthquake in 2010, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2012, which dedicated troop support through October 15, 2012.⁷⁵ Although it remains undetermined whether mandates will continue beyond

⁵⁷ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Services, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 2009, p. 12.

⁵⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Establishment of a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (A/RES/47/214)*, 23 December 1992.

⁵⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Establishment of a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (A/RES/47/214)*, 23 December 1992.

⁶⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Establishment of a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (A/RES/47/214)*, 23 December 1992.

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⁶² United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Services, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 2009, p. 12.

⁶³ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

⁶⁴ Peacekeeping Resource Hub, *Peacekeeping Training*, 2007.

⁶⁵ Peacekeeping Resource Hub, *Peacekeeping Training*, 2007.

⁶⁶ Peacekeeping Resource Hub, *Peacekeeping Training*, 2007.

⁶⁷ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 21 August 2000, p. 3.

⁶⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Establishment of a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (A/RES/50/976)*, 14 June 1996, p.2.

⁶⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Fact Sheet*, 2012.

⁷⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Fact Sheet*, 2012.

⁷¹ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations Today*, 2008, p. 20.

⁷² United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations Today*, 2008, p. 20.

⁷³ Better World Campaign, *The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, 2012.

⁷⁴ Better World Campaign, *The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, 2012.

⁷⁵ Better World Campaign, *The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, 2012.

2012, the international community has pledged to provide US\$ 9.9 billion over the next ten years.⁷⁶ Yet, the dispersal of these funds has thus far been hindered due to fear of manipulation and misuse by the Haitian government.⁷⁷ To better strengthen post-conflict stabilization efforts from an internal aspect, it is vital to establish a balanced approach that ensures the efficient distribution of allocated funds to peacekeeping forces.⁷⁸

As indicated by the UN, personnel conduct and discipline are of utmost importance; thus, pre-deployment and operational readiness training should be mandatory for all civilian, police and military peacekeeping personnel prior to deployment.⁷⁹ Peacekeeping forces are currently assembled from military and police personnel provided voluntarily by 118 Member States, in addition to civilian staff support.⁸⁰ The current addition of the Policy Evaluation and Training Division provides a crucial framework needed for establishing the standard operating procedures required of peacekeeping forces to safely and respectfully conduct operations in post-conflict zones.⁸¹ The two essential sections operating under the guidance of this division, the Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS) and the Integrated Training Service (ITS), provide a comprehensive approach to the development and dissemination of policies.⁸² Their primary goal is to enhance and deliver standardized training, mission evaluation, and strategic mission frameworks to be utilized in cooperation with Member States.⁸³

The furtherance of these programs establishes common practices for all contributing Member States and acts as a blueprint for policy adherence, guidance in training programs, and evaluation of the success and failure of stated practices.⁸⁴ Developing a culture of civic involvement among UN volunteers will encourage global collaboration for both supporting and receiving countries in devising curricula and training methods that deliver positive results in a post-conflict area.⁸⁵ The implementation of technologically advanced “training, equipment, logistical support and other resources [...] enable[s] peacekeepers from all regions to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation or to set up regional peacekeeping operations” that promote conflict resolution and reconciliation within the sphere of post-conflict stabilization.⁸⁶

External Aspects

While the preceding preparation of peacekeeping operations within the internal mechanism plays a crucial role in whether an operation is successfully funded and trained, the actual deployment and demeanor of peacekeeping forces in post-conflict arenas may hold the greatest chances for mission accomplishment.⁸⁷ The DPKO stresses the importance of gathering appropriate information for decision support of peacekeeping missions, and allowing field officers freedom from “micro-management of the field missions and provid[ing] them with authority and flexibility [...] to maintain mission credibility and effectiveness, while at the same time holding them accountable.”⁸⁸ While taking into account the need for flexibility, operational mandates must also incorporate a degree of specificity, particularly when it comes to rules of engagement that exceed traditional self-defense initiatives.⁸⁹ Rules of engagement dictate how peacekeeping forces are to interact with both hostile and civilian parties in a post-conflict capacity.⁹⁰ Without stated directives from the chain of command, forces are limited to self-defense to disarm a militant threat, deliver humanitarian aid, and provide protection to civilians.⁹¹

⁷⁶ Better World Campaign, *The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, 2012.

⁷⁷ Better World Campaign, *The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, 2012.

⁷⁸ Treki, *Statement at the Thematic Debate of the General Assembly “UN Peacekeeping: Looking into the Future”*, 2010.

⁷⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

⁸⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

⁸¹ Peacekeeping Resource Hub, *Peacekeeping Training*, 2007.

⁸² Peacekeeping Resource Hub, *Peacekeeping Training*, 2007.

⁸³ Peacekeeping Resource Hub, *Peacekeeping Training*, 2007.

⁸⁴ Peacekeeping Resource Hub, *Peacekeeping Training*, 2007.

⁸⁵ Ban, *Remarks to the Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, 2012.

⁸⁶ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 21 August 2000, p. 10.

⁸⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Fact Sheet*, 2012.

⁸⁸ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Services, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 2009, p. 15.

⁸⁹ Mingst & Karns, *The United Nations in the 21st Century*, 2007, p. 122.

⁹⁰ Mingst & Karns, *The United Nations in the 21st Century*, 2007, p. 123.

⁹¹ Mingst & Karns, *The United Nations in the 21st Century*, 2007, p. 123.

Over the past decade, limitations and constraints of previous reforms and established structures have exposed the weaknesses of peacekeeping operations, showing the need for more rapid deployment, professionalism, and adaptability.⁹² In recent years, the traditional formats for deployment and execution of post-conflict operations have presented concerns to departmental agencies that presently oversee peacekeeping forces.⁹³ As a result, the DFS has sought to ensure more effective, coherent, and responsive logistical support to post-conflict stabilization missions.⁹⁴ In 1996, several Member States undertook the responsibility to establish a readiness force that could be deployed on a moment's notice to conduct peacekeeping operations once deemed necessary by the Security Council.⁹⁵ Becoming operational in 2000, the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was a pre-pledged and pre-earmarked standby peacekeeping force, acting not as a replacement, but rather as an alternative to the traditional *ad hoc* mission-to-mission forces.⁹⁶ SHIRBRIG was formed by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Poland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, and was widely considered by UN officials to be a long-awaited instrument for swift, rapid and efficient deployment of peacekeeping forces.⁹⁷ Over a span of nine years, SHIRBRIG conducted several operations throughout Africa under the guidance of Canadian-Dutch military leadership.⁹⁸ Most notably, SHIRBRIG was deployed on operations in Ethiopia and Eritrea, where personnel served as the stabilizing and coordinating force for tertiary operating units.⁹⁹ SHIRBRIG was decommissioned in 2009 due to decision-making processes that proved precarious because of conflicting political support.¹⁰⁰ Many Member States disregarded the established SHIRBRIG personnel and logistical framework, which undermined the original intent of maintaining a standing peacekeeping force.¹⁰¹ Additionally, SHIRBRIG suffered from a lack of adequate resources and a continuous breakdown in the lines of communication between policy makers, military leadership and on the ground troops.¹⁰² C-34 now has the opportunity to address SHIRBRIG's shortcomings and assess the possibility of establishing a new standby force that could contribute effectively to post-conflict stabilization efforts.

Peacekeeping forces often exhibit "a lack of common operating procedures and differing interpretations of key elements of command and control and of mission's rules of engagement, and may have differing expectations about mission requirements for the use of force."¹⁰³ Confusion over enforcement of rule of law and adherence to rules of engagement has become a detrimental and life-threatening aspect to forces inserted into unstable zones.¹⁰⁴ Cultural and regional barriers are contributing factors as well and must be assessed prior to deployment of peacekeeping troops; military presence alone will not prevent a crisis during peace negotiations.¹⁰⁵ Inclusive measures taken by the Department of Political Affairs in establishing open communication lines with on-the-ground UN military commanders during the strengthening of bilateral and regional dialogue with post-conflict parties will likely assist in alleviating the aggressions of all parties involved.¹⁰⁶

Military leadership, Member State commitments and host country cooperation are essential to ensuring that conflicting parties remain willing to accept and cooperate with UN peacekeepers.¹⁰⁷ Clear lines of communication must be established and enforced as doctrine for long-term success of both *ad hoc* coalition forces and any future permanent standby force similar to SHIRBRIG.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, dissemination of information and intelligence should be routed through channels of official liaisons and structured troop changeover debriefings.¹⁰⁹ Constructing

⁹² United Nations General Assembly, *Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Condemns Killings of United Nations Peacekeepers*, 2011.

⁹³ United Nations General Assembly, *Women in Development (A/RES/66/216)*, 2012.

⁹⁴ United Nations Department of Public Information, *United Nations Today*, 2008, pp. 28-29.

⁹⁵ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, p. 3.

⁹⁶ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, p. 7.

⁹⁷ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, p. 8.

⁹⁸ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, p. 8.

⁹⁹ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁰ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰¹ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, p. 11.

¹⁰² SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, p. 4.

¹⁰³ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 21 August 2000, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Services, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 2009, p. 24.

¹⁰⁵ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹⁰⁷ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹⁰⁸ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, p. 12-14.

¹⁰⁹ SHIRBRIG Planning Element, *SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report*, 2009, pp. 11-14.

free-flowing lines of communication both up and down the chain of command, along with maintaining open dialogue with host country leadership during post-conflict processes, will allow peacekeeping troops the ability to obtain legitimacy with the parties involved in an effort to “[e]xtend a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert [further] conflict or to end violence” by “giv[ing] the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights.”¹¹⁰

Challenges of Reform: Gender Equality and Equal Opportunity

Among the many challenges involved in the continued evolution of peacekeeping reform is the incorporation of a gender perspective into current operations and command structure.¹¹¹ Security Council Resolution 1325 reinforced the UN assertion that “gender mainstreaming, recruitment, and training trigger positive changes for women within conflict and post-conflict situations, such as increased physical security, employment related benefits [...] and increased awareness of women’s rights.”¹¹² The inclusion of women highlights specific attributes of post-conflict stabilization that require an understanding of gender-based issues.¹¹³ Women provide peacekeeping forces the ability to connect and respond appropriately to the unique ways in which women are affected when exposed to armed conflict and the aftermath of war.¹¹⁴ Importantly, the UN sees a gender perspective as a key to peacekeeping’s future successes:

“Without a gender perspective, it is almost impossible to adequately create an inclusive security, which forms the basis of promoting sustainable and durable peace [...] positive [women] role models and examples of women’s leadership have a positive effect on the environment and contribution to the success of peacekeeping missions. Only a gendered approach to keeping peace can adequately respond to the differing needs of women.”¹¹⁵

A growing success in gender advancement in peacekeeping operations is taking place in Liberia, where women peacekeepers are dramatically influencing the reconstruction and rebuilding of the country and its people.¹¹⁶ Women peacekeepers deployed in Liberia are serving as role models throughout communities, not only promoting the UN’s gender perspective, but also promoting equality and equal opportunity within the culture.¹¹⁷ In a post-conflict Liberia, women are beginning to have a voice, and although that voice still faces challenges and tension from the people of Liberia, women comprised 49% of the registered voters during the November 2011 elections. Furthermore, Liberian women are beginning to develop a presence within the Liberian police force.¹¹⁸ This is not to imply that gender-based violence has declined within Liberia, as many challenges remain.¹¹⁹ Rape remains the most common crime reported to the Liberian National Police (LNP), with the majority of victims ranging from 10 to 19 years of age.¹²⁰ However, the LNP and women UN peacekeepers have collaborated to establish goals to drastically reduce rape, violence, and other gender-based crimes.¹²¹ The presence of women peacekeepers is raising awareness about gender-based issues and highlighting the special role women peacekeepers play in maintaining stability in a post-conflict area.¹²²

In the current peacekeeping structure, women comprise 2% of military personnel.¹²³ The Security Council and the DPKO have established a benchmark of increasing the proportion of women serving as UN peacekeepers to 20% by 2014.¹²⁴ Assisting the UN in realizing this goal, the DPKO draws from the directive *Policy on Gender Equality in*

¹¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Women in Development (A/RES/66/216)*, 2012.

¹¹¹ Peace Women: Women for Peace and Peace for Women, Gender Training, 2012.

¹¹² Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹¹³ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹¹⁴ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹¹⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Gender Statistics*, 2012.

¹¹⁶ Better World Campaign, *The UN Mission in Liberia*, 2012.

¹¹⁷ Better World Campaign, *The UN Mission in Liberia*, 2012.

¹¹⁸ Better World Campaign, *The UN Mission in Liberia*, 2012.

¹¹⁹ Better World Campaign, *The UN Mission in Liberia*, 2012.

¹²⁰ Better World Campaign, *The UN Mission in Liberia*, 2012.

¹²¹ Better World Campaign, *The UN Mission in Liberia*, 2012.

¹²² Better World Campaign, *The UN Mission in Liberia*, 2012.

¹²³ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Gender Statistics*, 2012.

¹²⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Gender Statistics*, 2012.

Peacekeeping Operations.¹²⁵ This directive is a comprehensive framework, which promotes and puts into practice strategies aimed at advancing gender equality and justice in post-conflict areas.¹²⁶ The policy is oriented towards the infusion of women in all categories of peacekeeping missions including both civilian and uniformed capacities.¹²⁷

Conclusion

There is a multitude of elements involved in ensuring that peacekeeping forces remain operationally ready – from financial sustainability, to rapid deployment of forces, to the inclusion of gender-based perspectives – all of which continue to rapidly evolve in a quickly changing and violent world.¹²⁸ Which should take precedence when addressing reform: internal or external aspects? How can the UN and DPKO ensure that troops are well trained and adequately cared for when deployed on post-conflict stabilization operations? How can the UN and the DPKO ensure that there will be consistent and well appropriated funds for any global crisis that may arise? The UN has occasionally flirted with the notion of establishing a standing UN military or UN police force. Is it time the UN addressed this topic on a serious note or should the current *ad hoc* system remain in place? What recommendations need to be addressed to ensure that peacekeeping forces inserted into unstable and often hostile ceasefire zones are able to retain legitimacy in the eyes of conflicting parties, to deploy rapid response teams, and to keep both civilians and troops out of danger throughout the duration of peacekeeping operations? Finally, how can the Security Council and the DPKO maintain a vigilant route to achieving the goal of raising the proportion of women in operational capacities to 20% by 2014? How can the UN ensure that women receive the same level of professionalism and respect that their male counterparts receive while deployed in post-conflict areas? How will a gender perspective improve the realization of short-term and long-term goals in countries suffering from the aftermath of conflict?

The operational capacity of peacekeeping operations grows with continued post-conflict stabilization efforts in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Sudan and Liberia, and efforts to continuously evolve and redefine the peacekeeping operations remain active.¹²⁹ Cultural and regional tensions continue to proliferate around the world: 2012 alone brought high levels of political unrest throughout the Middle East and North Africa.¹³⁰ Today, maintaining highly trained, well funded, and efficient peacekeepers remains a central hallmark of the UN.¹³¹ The international community will continue to request UN peacekeeping operations “to undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, [...] to demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.”¹³² It is vital that past and current suggestions for peacekeeping reform be handled with vigilance in an effort to meet the growing needs of the world.¹³³

¹²⁵ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹²⁶ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹²⁷ Butler, Mader & Kean, *Women, Peace and Security Handbook*, 2010, p. 13.

¹²⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305 – S/2000/809)*, 21 August 2000, p. 2.

¹²⁹ UN General Assembly, *Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Condemns Killings of United Nations Peacekeepers*, 2011.

¹³⁰ U Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

¹³¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

¹³² United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

¹³³ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping*, 2012.

Annotated Bibliography

Ban, K. (2012, June 25). *Remarks to the Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Retrieved September 4, 2012 from <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/>

Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon gave this speech at the Security Council open forum regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Ban emphasizes the continued efforts and successes of peacekeeping operations. He also touches on the need for greater contribution and commitment from all Member States to ensure that peacekeeping operations remain a vital champion of the ideals for which the United Nations stands.

Lauren, P. (2003). *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

The Evolution of International Human Rights provides a great starting point for delegates to begin understanding the scope of this topic in terms of how they can use the bodies of the United Nations to further reform or halt the progress of reform. Throughout various chapters delegates will be able to understand the connection of international law and UN Charter that dictate the parameters of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, this book goes over a detailed explanation of sovereignty and humanitarian action.

Butler, M., K. Mader & R. Kean. (2010). *Women, Peace and Security Handbook: Compilation and Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution Language 2000-2010*. Retrieved October 10, 2012 from: http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/peacewomen_schandbook_2010.pdf

The PeaceWomen website is a great place for delegates to begin in their research of the Security Council proposed "gender perspective" and the underlying challenges involved with meeting the established goal of rising female participation to 20% by 2014. It is also an excellent source for narrowed statistics and accomplishments that have come from the inclusion of female peacekeepers.

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (2010, March 19). *2010 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/64/19)*. Retrieved August 5, 2012 from: [www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/64/19\(SUPP\)](http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/64/19(SUPP))

The 2010 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations evaluates the internal mechanism within peacekeeping operations, specifically addressing conduct and discipline adherence by peacekeeping troops. The report also details that troop-contributing countries have the primary responsibility for contributing to the training and equipping of forces. It also reaffirms the need to ensure that all categories of United Nations personnel operated in such a manner as to preserve the Organization's image, credibility, impartiality and integrity, emphasizing that misconduct is unacceptable.

United Nations. (1945). *Charter of the United Nations (Chapter VII)*. Retrieved August 7, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>

Chapter 7 in the Charter of the United Nations is titled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression" and details to what extent the bodies within the United Nations are able or not able to reform the actions undertaken by peacekeeping forces. Being able to interpret and understand Articles 39-51, in connection to current international law and sovereignty, will be extremely important for delegates as they research not only peacekeeping operations but also the respective policies of their nations. Chapter 7 is an essential aspect of the UN Charter, because the decision of establishing a standing military or police force is an open-ended interpretation for the Security Council to decide on.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Service. (2009, July). *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009)*. Retrieved September 6, 2012 from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>

A New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping gives reevaluates the goals set forth by the Brahimi Report, helping delegates compare the failures and successes. The report mentions that the United

Nations has not yet found a sustainable approach to maintaining adequate funding for peacekeeping operations and elaborates on potential answers to funding. The report further notes that there is inconsistency within peacekeeping forces to properly gather, process, and analyze information, and to maintain suitable personnel.

United Nations General Assembly. (2012, May 15). *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/RES/66/255)*. Retrieved August 6, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/66/255>

This resolution reviews the capacity of civilians in post-conflict zones, in an effort to utilize civilian expertise in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The document suggests that civilian interaction and experience may further contribute to the successful transition away from: conflict. It further notes that women used in a mobilizing capacity are vital to the success of UN peacebuilding endeavors.

United Nations General Assembly. (2011, August 26). *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects (A/RES/65/310)*. Retrieved August 6, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/65/310>

Every year the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations conducts an annual meeting to go over successes and failures of the previous year. The annual meeting is also held to assess whether previous proposals are being met and update new proposals that are meant to further the capacity of the United Nations in an attempt to accomplish responsibilities in the field of Peacekeeping. Delegates should review the annual reports to remain current on peacekeeping progress and changes.

United Nations General Assembly. (2000, September 18). *United Nations Millennium Declaration (A/RES/55/2)*. Retrieved September 3, 2012 from <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf>

The Millennium Declaration is a good starting point, since many of the past reforms within peacekeeping operations have paralleled the goals set forth by the Millennium Declaration. The goals within the resolution can also serve as a template of proposals that will further legitimate reform within the DPKO. .

United Nations Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. (2000, August 21). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/RES/55/305)*. Retrieved August 2, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf

As it is more commonly known, the Brahimi Report gives delegates the realistic goals set forth in an effort to reform peacekeeping operations, making them more efficient and legitimate from 2000. The report mentions that the UN has yet to establish a standing UN Army or Police force as originally outlined in the UN Charter. The report further notes that there is inconsistency within peacekeeping forces to properly gather, process, and analyze information, and to maintain suitable personnel.

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II. Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements

International Legal Framework

Even though the backbone of the United Nations (UN) is nearly all states, developments in regional integration resulted in the emergence of new forms of governance and new entities with unified voices, which both cooperate with and are represented within the UN system.¹³⁴ According to Article 24 of the UN Charter, it is "the Security Council's primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security."¹³⁵ However, the UN Charter also provides a role for regional organizations and arrangements in operations pertaining to maintenance of peace and security in their prospective regions, which is governed by Chapter VI.¹³⁶ Article 52(1) clarifies that "the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action" is not only allowed, but also welcome.¹³⁷ It goes on to invite Member States entering into such arrangements or dispute settlement mechanisms through such regional arrangements or constituting such agencies as to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."¹³⁸ Chapter VIII, Article 53(1), provides that the Security Council should utilize regional arrangements where appropriate, however it reserves authorization for any enforcement actions. Additionally, Article 54 provides that the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or those planned under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹³⁹

An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and Peace-Making

As the Cold War subsided, the need for effective regional peace and security arrangements became even more pressing. The issue of UN-regional cooperation in peacekeeping was discussed first in 1992 within Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and Peace-making* and it became one of the key documents on the topic.¹⁴⁰ This report, as well as the wider international community, increasingly was recognizing the prominent role of regional organizations in resolving threats to the regional and global order, not only through early identification initiatives, as well as the initial peacekeeping, and diplomatic response, but also by identification of the root-causes of conflict for the most accurate response and effective peace building.¹⁴¹ The report further recognized the fact that "consultations between relevant stakeholders, namely the UN and regional organizations, had the potential to facilitate international consensus on some of the most challenging issues and generate solutions grounded in regional and country specific expertise."¹⁴² It was believed that the participation of regional organizations in joint undertakings with the UN would encourage support from States outside the region.¹⁴³

Seeing the benefits of regional cooperation, the report entitled *Supplement to Agenda for Peace* followed in 1995, with more support for the issue, as well as some guidelines for improvement.¹⁴⁴ The document recommends several principles to enhance cooperation, namely: consultations, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint-operations.¹⁴⁵ It stresses that "cooperation should be based on comparative advantages the UN and relevant regional, sub-regional organizations and arrangements possess, leading to complementarity of efforts and

¹³⁴ Langenhove, L, Felicio, T; Anass, A. *The UN and Regional Organizations for Peace: Tracking a Slippery Partnership*. 2012. p. 91

¹³⁵ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.

¹³⁶ United Nations, *Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment*, 1999.

¹³⁷ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.

¹³⁸ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.

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¹⁴³ United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and Peace-making*, 1992.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and Peace-making*, 1992.

¹⁴⁵ UNDPKO, *Cooperation Between UN and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Envoy: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms*, 1999.

elimination of duplication and competition” between the UN and regional organizations.¹⁴⁶ Further, it outlines recommended instruments to enhance cooperation, such as establishment of permanent communication channels, uniform definitions and mandates descriptions, joint planning and information sharing center, as well as common training, rules of conduct, and protection of the peacekeepers.¹⁴⁷

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, at its 1998 session on the topic of “Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment,” stressed that cooperation between the UN and relevant regional arrangements and agencies in the context of peacekeeping must abide by the letter and spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.¹⁴⁸

The Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations in its Presidential Statement of January 13, 2010, and expressed its intention to consider further steps to promote closer and operational arrangements, as well as commitment towards coherence, synergy, and collective effectiveness of the efforts.¹⁴⁹

Rhetoric v. Practice

In international relations theory there is a new, developing theory called inter-organizationalism, which is inspired by the ambivalent consequences of globalization and interdependence.¹⁵⁰ Overlap in functions of international organizations may stimulate cooperation, but it may also instigate competition for mandates and overall relative relevance.¹⁵¹ Overall, UN and regional organizations, especially those relevant to international peace and security, operate on continuously developing and improving framework agreements outlining the scope and channels of collaboration.¹⁵²

Cooperation between the UN and regional organizations has been the subject of debates at the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Security Council since the early 1990s, addressing issues such as the strengths of the respective organizations and the principles of cooperation.¹⁵³ However, it is crucial to distinguish between operational collaboration (ad-hoc) and institutional collaboration (long-term institutional partnership).¹⁵⁴ Relationship between the UN and regional organizations may take the form of subcontracting or partnering – the former concept referring to a UN operation delegated to a regional organ that is authorized, monitored and directed by the Security Council, the latter being a “more horizontal relationship wherein the UN and regional peacekeeping bodies form a partnership network with interconnected capacities.”¹⁵⁵ In other words, cooperation may range from consultations, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, to fully joint operations.¹⁵⁶

Cooperation with regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and NATO or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is intended to serve as a means for both beneficial burden sharing and as an outlet for mutual reinforcement.¹⁵⁷ Due to factors such as geographic proximity, practicality, burden-sharing, as well as current engagements in operations already in place, the Security Council’s partnership with regional and sub-regional organizations on peace operations predicted to not only continue, but also expand.¹⁵⁸

¹⁴⁶ UNDPKO, *Cooperation Between UN and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a peacekeeping Envoy: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms*, 1999.

¹⁴⁷ UNDPKO, *Cooperation Between UN and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a peacekeeping Envoy: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms*, 1999.

¹⁴⁸ UNDPKO, *Cooperation Between UN and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a peacekeeping Envoy: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms*, 1999.

¹⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council. S/PRST/2010/1

¹⁵⁰ Biermann, R., *Inter-organizationalism in Theory and Practice*, 2009, p.7.

¹⁵¹ Biermann, R., *Inter-organizationalism in Theory and Practice*, 2009, p.9.

¹⁵² Biermann, R., *Inter-organizationalism in Theory and Practice*, 2009, p.9.

¹⁵³ Yamashita, H., *Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Cooperation*, 2012, p. 167

¹⁵⁴ Yamashita, H., *Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Cooperation*, 2012, p. 167

¹⁵⁵ Yamashita, H., *Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Cooperation*, 2012, p. 170

¹⁵⁶ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*,

¹⁵⁷ Koops, J.A. *Peace Operations Partnership: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms between Secretariats*, 2012, p.1

¹⁵⁸ Artiñano, M. *Peace Operations Partnership: The UN Security Council and (Sub-) Regional Organizations*, 2012, p. 1.

Based on the abundant academic literature it is apparent that UN-regional organizations cooperation is beneficial for the most accurate and effective addressing of threats to international peace and security. Analysis of the developments on the topic from both the UN and regional organization strongly suggests that academia and practitioners are in agreement on the importance cooperation and joint capacity building.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Cooperation

With the escalation of regional conflicts and crises, neither the operational framework nor the resources of the UN were sufficient enough for devoting its full attention to peacekeeping – it therefore became undeniable that developing cooperation with regional organization in that realm was beneficial.¹⁵⁹ Regional organizations involved in maintaining peace and security unquestionably vary in their capacities.¹⁶⁰ Paradoxically, organizations “more regional in nature, with more clear mandates and legitimacy to act in their own region, are the ones with less capacity to do so.”¹⁶¹ What is rather clear is that in order to be most effective, both the regional organizations and the UN need to mutually exchange support – logistics, domestic political and popular support from regional organizations, and co-deployment, operational and budgetary support, etc.¹⁶²

Among the biggest advantages of regional organizations involvement in peacekeeping operations are: a clear perspective and historical clarity on the political intricacies of the local conflicts, no reserves for undertaking necessary peace enforcement duties, legitimacy and credibility, and most importantly the honest desire for reestablishing regional peace and stability.¹⁶³ Further, factors such as preventive diplomacy - especially with the involvement of regional leaders, early warning systems of potential flash points and immediate deployment, balanced response and cultural sensitivity are critical.¹⁶⁴ Employment of peacekeeping troops local to the region also ensures a wider information and intelligence base, more successful interoperability, and effective facilitation of post conflict reconstruction.¹⁶⁵

Cooperation with regional organizations in peacekeeping missions may also have very serious disadvantages, which may in effect not only jeopardize success of an operation, but further destabilize the region. Among the cons are: lack of political motivation, conflicting interests, hidden agenda or pressure from regional powers, single-state dominance, or a rise of regional hegemonic powers, or even the possibility of marginalization of the UN, as well as reducing the UN’s credibility.¹⁶⁶ Technical disadvantages comprise mostly of lack of the military capacity on the part of the regional actor, lack of expertise and equipment, as well as potential problems with command and control between the UN and regional organization.¹⁶⁷

Challenges to Successful Collaboration

In the light of many possible shortcomings of regional cooperation, concerted collaborative operations are unquestionably a challenging undertaking. Choosing the right regional body, establishing a clear and infallible decision-making mechanism, as well as being able to prevent interference from undesired actors are the key to success.¹⁶⁸ Ensuring participation of the big regional powers, creating regional initiatives, and upholding regional awareness are also very important.¹⁶⁹

In his *Report on the Field Strategy*, the Secretary-General outlined the plan to change towards more concerted and more effective peacekeeping partnership – it revolves around delivery of timely high-quality integrated services to missions.¹⁷⁰ That will allow for quicker deployment, increased safety and protection of civilians, and the military

¹⁵⁹ Jetley, V.K. *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*. 2010.

¹⁶⁰ Langenhove, L, Felicio, T; Anass, A. *The UN and Regional Organizations for Peace: Tracking a Slippery Partnership*. 2012.

¹⁶¹ Langenhove, L, Felicio, T; Anass, A. *The UN and Regional Organizations for Peace: Tracking a Slippery Partnership*. 2012.

¹⁶² Daniel, C.F.D., Taft, P. Wiharta, S. (Eds.), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, 2008.

¹⁶³ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*, p. 29.

¹⁶⁴ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*, p. 30.

¹⁶⁵ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*, pp. 30-31.

¹⁶⁶ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁷ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*, p. 32.

¹⁶⁸ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁶⁹ Jetley, V., *Peacekeeping by Regional Organizations*, p. 33.

¹⁷⁰ United Nations General Assmebly, A/64/633, p.10.

personnel, improved quality of life for staff while on mission, as well as reduced environmental impact while utilizing fully local and regional capacities.¹⁷¹

On the list of possible collaboration spoilers are also financial matters. Due to the significant number of peacekeeping operations, as well as other financially demanding undertakings of the United Nations, peacekeeping funds coming from Member States contributions are currently insufficient.¹⁷²

Regional Organizations with Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping Capacity

During the last decade, partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations has been increasingly growing in both institutional and operational realms.¹⁷³ Multiple regional organizations, as well as the UN made continuous effort to advance from ad-hoc cooperation to a permanent and strategically structured apparatus that reflects integration of the different approaches and administrative practices.¹⁷⁴ Progressively such relations are regulated by cooperation agreements, such as the *UN-EU Joint Declaration 2007* and the 2006 Declaration between the UN and AU, which recognize the primary responsibility of the maintenance of international peace and security as inherent to the UN Security Council, but also recognize previous successful cooperation, and outlines future developments.¹⁷⁵

Currently there are eight regional organizations with effective conflict resolution capacity building: European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).¹⁷⁶ In spite of a high number of regional actors – African Union (AU), ECOWAS, SADC, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - Africa remains having a disproportionately high number of active conflict-affected situations on the agenda of the Security Council, compared to other regions.¹⁷⁷

In 2012, regional organizations participating in peace operations under a specific Security Council mandate include NATO and the European Union (EU) in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the African Union (AU) in Darfur and Somalia, and NATO in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁸

Case Study: United-Nations – African Union Cooperation

Africa by far exceeds any other region on the scale of country situations currently on the agenda of the UN Security Council.¹⁷⁹ The AU has increasingly not only recognized a wide scope of internal challenges to peace and security on a broader level, but also is able to react to them in practice.¹⁸⁰ In order to address conflicts, in 2004, the Peace and Security Council was established as an organ of the AU, with 15 members, and by the power assigned to it by article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, to intervention in crisis situations.¹⁸¹ It has responded to situations such as coup d'états, civil war, atrocities committed by former heads of state, as well as threats to democratic electoral processes, and threats to peace and security stemming from changes in local governments.¹⁸² Even though the AU's Peace and Security Council responded to violent conflicts such as the ones in Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Burundi or Chad, it has not done so without a major collaboration with the UN, and with the

¹⁷¹ United Nations General Assembly, A/64/633, p.10.

¹⁷² United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011. United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing Peacekeeping, 2012.

¹⁷³ Koops, J.A. *Peace Operations Partnership: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms between Secretariats*, 2012, p.1

¹⁷⁴ Koops, J.A., *Peace Operations Partnership: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms between Secretariats*, 2012, p.1

¹⁷⁵ Koops, J.A., *Peace Operations Partnership: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms between Secretariats*, 2012, p.1

¹⁷⁶ United Nations, *Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in Peacekeeping Environment – Suggested Principles and Mechanisms*, 1999, p. 11.

¹⁷⁷ Langenhove, L, Felicio, T; Anass, A. *The UN and Regional Organizations for Peace: Tracking a Slippery Partnership*. 2012. P. 102

¹⁷⁸ Artiñano, M. *Peace Operations Partnership: The UN Security Council and (Sub-) Regional Organizations*. 2012. p.1

¹⁷⁹ Haacke, J., Williams, P.D., *Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comprehensive Analysis*, 2009, p.13

¹⁸⁰ Haacke, J., Williams, P.D., *Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comprehensive Analysis*, 2009, p.12

¹⁸¹ Murithi, T., *The African Union's Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in Darfur*, 2009, p.4

¹⁸² Haacke, J., Williams, P.D., *Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comprehensive Analysis*, 2009, p.12

contribution of external donors.¹⁸³ The importance of collaboration between the AU and the UN can be very well illustrated by the analysis of interventions in Darfur region of Sudan. A central focal point for the collaboration between the UN and the AU is the UN Office to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It opened in February 2011 and combines the activities of the three previous offices, namely the UN Liaison Office, the African Union Support Team and the UN Planning Team for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).¹⁸⁴

The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) commenced in April 2004 in the context of the civil war between the government of Sudan, and the opposing rebel forces.¹⁸⁵ With 7500 peacekeepers from South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, Zambia, Senegal, Gambia and Nigeria, AMIS was to improve the general security in Sudan, assist with humanitarian relief and return of refugees, help to protect civilian population, as well as monitor compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N'Djamena on April 8, 2004, and assist with the general confidence building in the political process.¹⁸⁶ Due to the limited resources, increasing violence in the region and a parallel United Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) AMIS's mandate concluded on December 31, 2007, and was replaced by a joint UN-AU operation.¹⁸⁷

In 2007, Security Council resolution 1769 (2007), creating the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), an unprecedented hybrid operation that was aimed at combining the strengths of both organizations situation in west Sudan, specifically in Darfur.¹⁸⁸ UNAMID cove mandate is the protection of civilians, "but is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)."¹⁸⁹ Learning from the first few months of its operations, the Security Council approved resolution 1809 (2008), in which it encouraged greater engagement between the AU and the UN, additionally calling for the involvement of the UN Secretariat in developing a check list of capacities and commendations necessary for further development of its military, technical, logistic and administrative capabilities.¹⁹⁰ Further, in 2010, UN-AU Joint Task-Force on Peace and Security (JTF) was commenced, with the objectives of continued and advanced improving strategic cooperation between the two parties.¹⁹¹

As per Security Council's resolution 2063 (2012) UNAMID is in force until July 31, 2013.¹⁹² Its total appropriation for the period from July 1, 2012 until June 30, 2012 is \$1,511,892,200.¹⁹³ There are currently 21, 510 total uniformed personnel, 1,098 international civilian personnel, 2,918 local civilian staff and 449 United Nations Volunteers that compile UNAMID.¹⁹⁴ Especially representatives from the African Union highlight the potential for capacity building and knowledge transfer in hybrid missions such as UNAMID.¹⁹⁵

Conclusion

This chapter should serve as a starting point for researching the works of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, as well as the UN-regional organizations cooperation. Students are strongly encouraged to conduct further research not only on regional arrangements already in existence, but also familiarize themselves with the most recent developments and discussions on the matter. In their position papers, delegates need to not only show the stance of their assigned country on the regional cooperation, but also present a thorough knowledge of the most recent debate on the future of regional cooperation. Is your represented country a part of a regional peacekeeping arrangement? Is it contributing to the UN Peacekeeping operations? If yes, how? What were the advantages and

¹⁸³ Haacke, J., Williams, P.D., *Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comprehensive Analysis*, 2009, p. 13

¹⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council, Head of United Nations Office to African Union briefs Security Council, 2011.

¹⁸⁵ European Commission, *Development and Cooperation – Euroaid*, 2012.

¹⁸⁶ European Commission, *Development and Cooperation – Euroaid*, 2012.

¹⁸⁷ European Commission, *Development and Cooperation – Euroaid*, 2012.

¹⁸⁸ United Nations Security Council. S/RES/1769

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, *UNAMID – African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 2012.

¹⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council. S/RES/1809

¹⁹¹ Koops, J.A. *Peace Operations Partnership: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms between Secretariats*, 2012, P.1

¹⁹² United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2063

¹⁹³ United Nations General Assembly, A/C.5/661/17, 2012.

¹⁹⁴ United Nations, *UNAMID – African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, 2012.

¹⁹⁵ Gelot, L., *Joint peace operations in Africa – the way forward for resolving conflicts on the African continent?*, 2012.

disadvantages of such participation from your country's perspective? Were there any adverse effects on the general population? If so, how? Delegates are further encouraged to propose well-grounded and innovative recommendations for further development of practices on the topic. Should regional cooperation arrangements be changed? If yes, how? If no, why? During the NMUN simulation delegates are expected to not only be able to display their knowledge and engage in effective debate, but also to be familiar with the C-34's rules of procedure. It is also mandatory for the delegates to the NMUN 2012 C-34 committee to conduct themselves to the highest diplomatic standards at all times.

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Biermann, R. (2009). *Inter-organizationalism in Theory and Practice*. Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXII, No. 3. Retrieved on September 28, 2012 from http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/gowan_decline_studia3.pdf

Theoretical background is often the backbone of all studies. Biermann provides a brief yet a very informative article explaining the academic concept of inter-organizationalism. He answers critical questions that are crucial for successful and critical research on the topic of UN-regional organizations cooperation.

Haacke, J., Williams, P.D. (2009). *Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: A Comprehensive Analysis*. Working Paper No.52 – Regional and Global Axes of Conflict. Crisis States Research Centre and Georgetown Washington University. Retrieved on September 20, 2012 from <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24696/>

Haacke and Williams provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of why is it important or beneficial for regional arrangement handling their own security challenges. They explore and evaluate differences between regional mechanisms in place, and their preparedness for dealing with intrastate, as well as interstate conflicts. The article draws on experiences of the AU, ASEAN, and the SCO.

Holt, V. (2010). *African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*. The Henry L. Stimson Center. Retrieved August 2, 2012 from

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/27672/1/African%20Capacity-Building%20for%20Peace%20Operations%20-%20UN%20Collaboration%20with%20the%20African%20Union%20and%20ECOWAS.pdf?1>

The article brings forward four major recommendations for the enhancement of peacekeeping capacity building in Africa: 1) The necessity of AU and ECOWAS receiving financial, logistical, legal and technical support; The need for a UN-sponsored regional and sub-regional support mechanism; requisite of coordination of bilateral aid to African organizations; and road-map for multi-staged UN assistance to African organizations for all aspects of peace operations.

Miller, B. (June, 2005). *When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace*. *International Studies Review* Vol. 7, No. 2 (pp. 229-267)

The article offers a theoretical framework for regional and international perspectives on regional peace. It provides analysis of diverse mechanisms that can be utilized in restoring regional peace. It differentiates between levels of peace and discussed three potential theoretical pathways to peace its attainment. The author argues that the cause of regional war propensity is the imbedded in the state-to-nation imbalance in a region, and that peacemaking strategies produce different levels of peace based on their treatment of the state-to-nation problem. He further draws distinction between the effects of different approaches to peacemaking and the conditions for their success.

Murithi, T. (2009). *The African Union's Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in Darfur*. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*. Issue 14.

Murithi presents an excellent analysis of the African Union's peacekeeping mechanism and its capacity. He provides two thoroughly discussed cases of sole AU's intervention, their advantages, as well as the shortcomings. Further, he presents a case of an AU-UN hybrid mission, and illustrates both pros and cons of such collaboration. Even though he states his opinion rather clearly, Murithi offers room for own evaluation, as well as multiple sources for further research.

Security Council Report. (October, 2010). *UN Support for Regional Peacekeeping*. Retrieved August 2, 2012 from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6280855/k.711D/October_2010brUN_Support_for_Regional_Peacekeeping.htm

The source provides an excellent access point to abundant information ranging from key issues of regional peacekeeping, background and key recent developments, Security Council dynamics, and its expected actions. It also features links to pertinent UN documents such as Presidential Statements and General Assembly resolutions, as well as reports the NGO's own reports on cooperation with Regional Organizations.

United Nations. Peacekeeping Resource Hub. Retrieved August 2, 2012 from <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx>

Peacekeeping Resource Hub “provides an integrated capacity to develop and disseminate policy and doctrine; develop, coordinate and deliver standardized training; evaluate mission progress towards mandate implementation; and develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.” It further offers insight and information on two programs, namely the Policy and Best Practice Service (PBPS), and the Integrated Training Service (ITS). This source is crucial in acquiring more practical views on the current developments in peacekeeping. Additionally, it features directory of organizations organized by regions, types, and topics, as well as insight into Peacekeeping Training resources.

United Nations Peacekeeping. United Nations: New York. Retrieved August 1, 2012 from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>

This United Nations' web page is an excellent starting point for conducting research on peacekeeping. It not only provides the explanations of basic terms and functions of peacekeeping, but also features lists of both current and past operations of peacekeeping operations that are further complimented with abundance of documents and articles. Among other data, it offers an itemized list of issues inherent to peacekeeping – such as, military assistance, police training, rule of law, or civil affairs - also supported by many useful resources. Additionally, it is a great source of news relevant to the topic.

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2033. S/RES/2033 (2012). Retrieved August 1, 2012 from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/206/23/PDF/N1220623.pdf?OpenElement>

Resolution 2033 is one of the latest documents reflecting the Security Council's commitment towards enhancing cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations – here, with specific emphasis on African Union. The resolution outlines a number of ways to strengthen the bilateral relations, among them consultations, information sharing, communication, and coordination. It also calls for regular interactions between the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council.

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III. Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations

*“[W]e must focus our efforts on enhancing protection where and for whom it matters most – on the ground, in the midst of conflict and for the hundreds of thousands of civilians who are, on a daily basis, at risk of, or fall victim to, serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.... While our efforts to protect civilians on the ground have not kept pace with developments at the normative level, we cannot afford to be dismissive of their impact. As the daily work of countless humanitarian and human rights workers, peacekeepers and political negotiators demonstrates, protection can be done. We need, however, to make it a priority for our actions, operationally and politically, thereby reflecting the very spirit of the United Nations and its Charter.”*¹⁹⁶

Introduction

In spite of diverse efforts to ensure their protection, civilians presently comprise “the vast majority of casualties in situations of armed conflict, including as a result of deliberate targeting, indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks and sexual and gender-based violence.”¹⁹⁷ The twentieth century alone witnessed 43 million to 54 million civilian casualties, which constituted between 50% and 62% of all war-related deaths.¹⁹⁸ The international community has consequently come to rely upon United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations as a principal means of ensuring civilian protection in conflict zones.¹⁹⁹ Over the past two decades, UN peacekeeping mandates have correspondingly evolved to feature civilian protection as an operational priority.²⁰⁰ Yet it is evident that the rhetoric of protection mandates has not consistently lead to success in practice.²⁰¹ Further, “there is no consensus about what protection entails, how civilians are best protected, or who is primarily responsible for protection.”²⁰² The characteristics of modern warfare, which has progressively obscured the traditional distinction between civilian and combatant, suggest that the proportion of civilian casualties during war will continue to rise.²⁰³ As civilians around the world remain vulnerable to “unacceptable levels of risk,” the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) must consider how protection mandates may be improved and more effectively implemented in the field.²⁰⁴

Legal and Theoretical Frameworks

Civilian protection is a legal concept upheld by international humanitarian law, which first took shape in the nineteenth century to regulate the effects of armed conflict.²⁰⁵ Though it existed as a norm in the practices of civilizations throughout ancient history, the principle of distinction between civilian and combatant was not formalized until the twentieth century.²⁰⁶ The 1949 *Geneva Conventions*, drafted in the catastrophic wake of World War II, aim to mitigate the effects of war by extending protection to all non-combatants.²⁰⁷ While the first three *Geneva Conventions* apply to former combatants, including ill, wounded, shipwrecked, or captured soldiers, the fourth *Geneva Convention* provides expressly for civilians in recognition of the changing nature of warfare.²⁰⁸ It requires parties to conflict to take active responsibility for the protection of all “civilians – aliens, the general population, vulnerable groups such as children and women, and internees – not only in occupied territories, but also in all territories of the parties to the conflict.”²⁰⁹ In 1977, two Additional Protocols were adopted to supplement the *Geneva Conventions*.²¹⁰ Article 48 of *Protocol I*, which concentrates on international conflicts, codifies the principle of distinction by providing that parties to conflict “shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and

¹⁹⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, *2010 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2010/579)*, 2010, p. 21-22.

¹⁹⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2010/25)*, 2010, p. 2.

¹⁹⁸ Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*, 2008, p. 3.

¹⁹⁹ Holt, Taylor & Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 2009, p. 2.

²⁰⁰ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 66.

²⁰¹ Holt, Taylor & Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 2009, p. iii.

²⁰² Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, p. 358.

²⁰³ Kinsella, *The Image before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction between Combatant and Civilian*, 2011, p. 3.

²⁰⁴ United Nations Secretary-General, *2010 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2010/579)*, 2010, p. 1.

²⁰⁵ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 88.

²⁰⁶ Van Engeland, *Civilian or Combatant? A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century*, 2011, p. 15.

²⁰⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols*, 2010.

²⁰⁸ *Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949*.

²⁰⁹ Meron, *The Making of International Criminal Justice: A View from the Bench*, 2011, pp. 21-22.

²¹⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols*, 2010.

combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”²¹¹ *Protocol II* importantly guarantees the applicability of international humanitarian law to non-international conflicts, which occur with more frequency and often pose greater threats to civilians.²¹² The principle of distinction also supplies the foundation for conventions banning inherently indiscriminate weapons, such as poison or weaponized gas, which by nature cannot be deployed in a manner that distinguishes between military and civilian targets.²¹³

Civilians additionally benefit from international human rights law, which remains in effect during conflict situations.²¹⁴ In its advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, the International Court of Justice established “that the protection of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* does not cease in time of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.”²¹⁵ More generally, as the Court later confirmed in its advisory opinion on the *Construction of a Wall*, “the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict”, stating that international humanitarian law, while being applicable in the first place, did not entirely abrogate general human rights law.²¹⁶ Regional human rights courts, UN human rights bodies, and the International Committee of the Red Cross have all endorsed a similar perspective.²¹⁷ Civilians in conflict zones therefore retain entitlement to the rights enshrined in such key international instruments as the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights*, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*.²¹⁸ Of particular relevance to civilian protection are the principle of human dignity; the principle of non-discrimination; the right to life, liberty and security of person; the prohibition of slavery or servitude; and the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.²¹⁹

The principle of distinction is further reinforced through refugee law, occupation law, and international criminal law, and thus enjoys wide recognition.²²⁰ Regardless, the legal framework for civilian protection remains subject to disparate interpretations, as what protection actually constitutes and how peacekeepers can contribute to its achievement are contentious issues.²²¹ Civilian protection is commonly conceptualized in one of three ways: protection as rights, which attempts to fulfill rights guaranteed by international humanitarian and human rights law; humanitarian protection, which focuses solely on needs essential to physical survival; and military protection, which seeks to defend civilians against physical attack.²²² The resultant difficulty lies in “clarify[ing] how the different types of protection work can be harmonized” and identifying the best approach to take in a given situation.²²³

The Evolution of Protection Mandates

Peacekeeping was originally founded on “consciously non-interventionist principles” that emphasized impartiality and consent.²²⁴ Peacekeeping forces were to be deployed only with the permission of the states in conflict, and their activities were limited by strict commitments to neutrality and the primacy of state sovereignty.²²⁵ To avoid the appearance of taking sides in a conflict, peacekeeping mandates could not include the provisions required to protect civilians.²²⁶ However, since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has markedly transformed peacekeeping

²¹¹ *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)*, 1977, art. 48.

²¹² International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols*, 2010.

²¹³ Hampson, *The Principle of Proportionality in the Law of Armed Conflict*, 2010, p. 62.

²¹⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict*, 2011, p. 6.

²¹⁵ International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons*, 1996, para. 25.

²¹⁶ International Court of Justice, *Construction of a Wall*, 2003, para. 106.

²¹⁷ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 168.

²¹⁸ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, p. 344.

²¹⁹ Månsson, *Implementing the Concept of Protection of Civilians*, 2008, p. 573.

²²⁰ Deschamp, *Victims of Violence*, 2010, p. 7.

²²¹ Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda*, 2009, p. 19.

²²² Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 344-47.

²²³ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 48.

²²⁴ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 1.

²²⁵ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 337.

²²⁶ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 9.

operations through the introduction of political, humanitarian, and development goals – including civilian protection – into their mandates.²²⁷

Following the UN's failure to prevent genocide and other crimes against humanity throughout the 1990s, Canada urged the Security Council to adopt a presidential statement requesting a report from the Secretary-General on civilian protection.²²⁸ In 1999, the Security Council consequently committed to periodic reviews and biannual open debates on civilian protection as a thematic issue.²²⁹ Shortly thereafter, resolution 1265 (1999) expressed the Security Council's "willingness to consider how peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of armed conflict on civilians."²³⁰ Similarly, resolution 1296 (1999) affirmed the Security Council's "intention to ensure, where appropriate and feasible, that peacekeeping missions are given suitable mandates and adequate resources to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger."²³¹ The first peacekeeping operation explicitly mandated to protect civilians was the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was authorized in 1999 to "take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."²³² In 2000, the *Brahimi Report* asserted that civilian protection is an implied component of all peacekeeping mandates: "peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles."²³³

In 2002, the Security Council adopted the first *Aide Memoire* on civilian protection, which was included as an annex to a presidential statement.²³⁴ Intended to guide further debate on civilian protection, the *Aide Memoire* supplied primary objectives and issues for consideration under categorical headings: access to vulnerable populations; separation of civilians and armed elements; justice and reconciliation; security, law and order; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation; small arms and mine action; training of security and peacekeeping forces; effects on women; effects on children; safety and security of humanitarian and associated personnel; media and information; natural resources and armed conflict; and humanitarian impact of sanctions.²³⁵ The fourth edition of the *Aide Memoire* was released in 2011 and continues to assist the Security Council with civilian protection.²³⁶

The Security Council's increased attention to civilian protection has elicited the sustained interest of other UN bodies.²³⁷ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have formulated an operational concept that classifies the present actions taken by UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians into three tiers: protection through political process, providing protection from physical violence, and establishing a protective environment.²³⁸ In 2009, C-34 began regularly evaluating the role of peacekeeping operations in civilian protection.²³⁹ As "the only United Nations forum mandated to review comprehensively the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects," C-34 is uniquely situated to assess and refine the normative framework for civilian protection initiatives.²⁴⁰ Its 2012 report "stress[ed] the importance of mission-specific benchmarks against which peacekeeping missions should report" on the implementation of protection mandates.²⁴¹

²²⁷ Holt, Taylor & Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 2009, p. 63.

²²⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/1999/6)*, 1999, p. 3.

²²⁹ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 338.

²³⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1265 (1999)*, 1999, p. 3.

²³¹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1296 (2000)*, 2000, p. 3.

²³² United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1270 (1999)*, 1999, p. 3.

²³³ United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*, 2000, para. 62.

²³⁴ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 339.

²³⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2002/6)*, 2002, pp. 2-8.

²³⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (4th ed.), 2011, p. 1.

²³⁷ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 338.

²³⁸ Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 2012, p. 54.

²³⁹ Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, *2009 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group*, 2009, p. 24.

²⁴⁰ Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, *2012 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group*, 2012, p. 6.

²⁴¹ Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, *2012 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group*, 2012, p. 40.

Currently, the majority of peacekeeping operations have mandates with provisions for civilian protection.²⁴² Generally, peacekeepers focus on “coercive protection,” which entails the strategic positioning of military forces to create a barrier between civilians and potential threats.²⁴³ In addition, peacekeeping forces may also be tasked with a variety of specific duties, including securing safe corridors and the passage of convoys, establishing safe havens, military observation and surveillance, supporting police presence and patrols, crowd control, preventing mob violence, ensuring freedom of movement, seizing arms caches, facilitating humanitarian access to conflict areas, enforcing curfews, handling detainees, and training local security forces.²⁴⁴

Contemporary Challenges

In light of legal, theoretical, and practical developments, UN peacekeeping operations now face heightened expectations to play a pivotal role in civilian protection.²⁴⁵ The 2009 *Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* noted that one of the five core challenges to civilian protection was “enhancing protection through more effective and better resourced United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions,” indicating the centrality of peacekeeping operations to civilian protection within the wider context of the UN as a whole.²⁴⁶ Nevertheless, peacekeeping mandates still suffer from a myriad of weaknesses that must be addressed to enhance the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians on the ground.²⁴⁷

Peacekeeping forces “may have limited or unclear authority to act, even in situations of mass killing and genocide.”²⁴⁸ Although the existence of a general obligation to protect civilians may be uncontested, it is occasionally uncertain how and to what extent such an obligation should be executed.²⁴⁹ The language of mandates may be insufficient or indeterminate, preventing peacekeeping forces from taking action, and not all peacekeeping missions have been permitted to use “all means necessary” to protect civilians.²⁵⁰ The Security Council has gradually increased the number of peacekeeping missions that have been deployed under Chapter VII and are authorized to use force for civilian protection.²⁵¹ Yet even if mandates unequivocally state that force may be used to protect civilians, a lack of clarity regarding the rules of engagement may dissuade peacekeepers from resorting to use force.²⁵² Further, it may be necessary to adopt a more robust approach to the use of force in order for it to be effective: civilian protection may require pre-emptive or preventive actions that are not sanctioned by mandates providing only for the use of responsive force.²⁵³

Peacekeeping operations may not have the capacity required to act.²⁵⁴ While it has extensively integrated civilian protection into peacekeeping mandates, the Security Council has often neglected to procure the resources needed “to actualize it, choosing instead to limit the geographic scope of civilian protection.”²⁵⁵ Strong mandate language alone will not secure the requisite “size, equipment, mobility, funding, and coordination” for an operation that will effectively protect civilians.²⁵⁶ A relevant concern is a shortage of personnel: some states may not be willing to contribute peacekeepers to operations that have been sanctioned to use force for civilian protection, viewing such deployment as unnecessary endangerment.²⁵⁷

²⁴² Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 344.

²⁴³ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 349.

²⁴⁴ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, p. 350.

²⁴⁵ Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda*, 2009, p. 20.

²⁴⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, *2009 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2009/277)*, 2009, p. 6.

²⁴⁷ United Nations Secretary-General, *2009 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2009/277)*, 2009, p. 10.

²⁴⁸ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 6.

²⁴⁹ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 86.

²⁵⁰ Oxfam, *Protection of Civilians in 2010: Facts, Figures, and the UN Security Council's Response*, 2011, p. 28.

²⁵¹ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 91.

²⁵² Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, pp. 91-92.

²⁵³ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 53.

²⁵⁴ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 8.

²⁵⁵ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 160.

²⁵⁶ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 8.

²⁵⁷ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 6.

As the characteristics of war continue to evolve, peacekeeping forces must be provided with sufficient guidance and training to handle new challenges to civilian protection, some of which concern the most vulnerable segments of civilian populations.²⁵⁸ Sexual violence against women and children in conflict zones has recently “underlined the need to better understand the threats and vulnerabilities that confront civilians” and that must be addressed through more inclusive protection strategies.²⁵⁹ Peacekeeping operations can “better serve the entire population [through a greater] presence of female personnel,” in combination with “gender training and capacity-building for all peacekeepers.”²⁶⁰ Special measures should be taken to protect children, who ordinarily face recruitment into slavery or by armed groups.²⁶¹ A response must be formulated to tackle violence perpetrated by peacekeepers.²⁶² Protection mandates will require flexibility to contend with the changing realities of conflict by closing the “gaps remain[ing] in both the theory and practice of civilian protection.”²⁶³

Case Study: Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-2005)

On July 10, 1999, the *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* ended the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and called for a UN peacekeeping force to bring stability to the region and track down armed groups.²⁶⁴ In November 1999, the Security Council formally established the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was initially mandated:

- “(a) To establish contacts with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement at their headquarters levels, as well as in the capitals of the States signatories;
- (b) To liaise with the [Joint Military Commission (JMC)] and provide technical assistance in the implementation of its functions under the Ceasefire Agreement, including in the investigation of ceasefire violations;
- (c) To provide information on security conditions in all areas of its operation, with emphasis on local conditions affecting future decisions on the introduction of United Nations personnel;
- (d) To plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces;
- (e) To maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees, children, and other affected persons, and assist in the protection of human rights, including the rights of children.”²⁶⁵

Three months later, the Security Council expanded MONUC’s mandate and, “[a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decid[e]d that MONUC [could] take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deem[ed] it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”²⁶⁶ Yet in spite of the inclusion of civilian protection in its mandate, “MONUC initially behaved more like a Chapter VI observer mission, using force only in self defense and doing little to physically protect civilians.”²⁶⁷ MONUC forces routinely expressed confusion regarding the rules of engagement and the extent to which they were to use force in order to protect civilians.²⁶⁸ In May 2002, rebel soldiers massacred at least 103 civilians in Kisangani in response to an attempted mutiny.²⁶⁹ Several kilometers away, a camp of 1,000 MONUC soldiers took no action to prevent the killings.²⁷⁰

²⁵⁸ Oxfam, *Protection of Civilians in 2010: Facts, Figures, and the UN Security Council’s Response*, 2011, pp. 11-20.

²⁵⁹ United Nations Secretary-General, *2012 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2012/376)*, 2010, p. 12.

²⁶⁰ UNIFEM, DPKO & UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2010, p. 43.

²⁶¹ Oxfam, *Protection of Civilians in 2010: Facts, Figures, and the UN Security Council’s Response*, 2011, p. 14.

²⁶² Redekop, *Restorative Responses to Human Rights Violations by Peacekeepers: Enhancing Human Security?*, 2011, p. 83.

²⁶³ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, pp. 351.

²⁶⁴ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 158.

²⁶⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1279 (1999)*, 1999, p. 3.

²⁶⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1291 (2000)*, 2000, p. 4.

²⁶⁷ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 159.

²⁶⁸ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 94.

²⁶⁹ Holt, Taylor & Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 2009, p. 248.

²⁷⁰ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 57.

Operation Artemis, which would eventually include 1,800 troops from a coalition of nine states, represented one of MONUC's first concrete efforts to enhance civilian protection.²⁷¹ Its mission was to protect civilians in the town of Bunia from June to September 2003, at which point it would be relieved by another force.²⁷² On arrival, Operation Artemis forces were able to secure Bunia and protect civilians within its borders.²⁷³ However, Operation Artemis ultimately made only a "minimal" contribution to civilian welfare in the Ituri province.²⁷⁴ With a mandate limited by both time and location, it was unable to combat armed groups who simply retreated from Bunia and proceeded with their "abusive behavior" outside of Operation Artemis' reach.²⁷⁵ In May 2004, severely outnumbered MONUC troops were similarly unable to counter the takeover of Bukavu by rebel forces.²⁷⁶

Largely in response to international pressure, the Security Council finally authorized MONUC to use "all necessary means" to protect civilians in October 2004.²⁷⁷ Resolution 1565 tripled the number of UN military personnel in the DRC and sanctioned the use of force without limitations for civilian protection.²⁷⁸ In 2005, the Security Council "encourage[d] MONUC ... to continue to make full use of its mandate" and reemphasized the authorization of all necessary means.²⁷⁹ It was only at this time that MONUC demonstrated greater conceptual awareness of civilian protection, finally adopting multiple strategies that would "address civilian vulnerability across the board, from human rights monitoring and reporting, to the provision of humanitarian space, to coercive physical protection."²⁸⁰ Today, the mandate of the newly designated UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) notably has as its first priority to "ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict."²⁸¹

MONUC's experience illustrates the disastrous consequences that may emerge when the protection mandate of a peacekeeping operation is not clearly articulated or supported by adequate resources.²⁸² Even in MONUC's infancy, the Secretary-General had already reported to the Security Council that the operation would lack the capacity to defend civilians and respond to human rights violations.²⁸³ The suggested number of troops for civilian protection is "between two and ten troops ... for every 1,000 inhabitants within the crisis zone" – a calculation resulting in a suggested number of 10,000 to 50,000 troops for the DRC.²⁸⁴ While the original request had been for between 15,000 and 20,000 troops, the Security Council initially sanctioned the deployment of only 5,537 military personnel.²⁸⁵ Most MONUC troops further lacked the requisite training, equipment, and organization for effective civilian protection.²⁸⁶

Conclusion

The dramatic evolution of peacekeeping mandates to include civilian protection indicates that the preservation of "human security is [now] an integral aspect of the UN's role in the maintenance of international peace and security."²⁸⁷ States are no longer "the only and ultimate referent of security"; rather, the individual newly enjoys a prominent position on the international stage, and peacekeeping operations have grown to reflect this dynamic.²⁸⁸ The ongoing plight of civilians in conflict zones emphasizes the paramount importance of the trend towards human security: humanitarian principles must not be lost to an "increasingly militarized reading of the *Geneva Conventions*

²⁷¹ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, p. 351.

²⁷² Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts*, 2011, p. 83.

²⁷³ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 162.

²⁷⁴ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, p. 351.

²⁷⁵ Bellamy & Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, p. 351.

²⁷⁶ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 58.

²⁷⁷ Arimatsu, *The Democratic Republic of the Congo 1993-2010*, 2012, p. 191.

²⁷⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1565 (2004)*, 2004, p. 3.

²⁷⁹ Arimatsu, *The Democratic Republic of the Congo 1993-2010*, 2012, p. 191.

²⁸⁰ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 177.

²⁸¹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1925 (2010)*, 2010, pp. 4-5.

²⁸² Williams, *Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa*, 2010, p. 21.

²⁸³ United Nations Secretary-General, *2000 Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/30)*, 2000.

²⁸⁴ Williams, *Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa*, 2010, p. 21.

²⁸⁵ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 159.

²⁸⁶ Holt & Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 2006, p. 170.

²⁸⁷ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 284.

²⁸⁸ Benedek, Kettemann & Möstl, *Introduction*, 2011, p. 1.

and other documents.”²⁸⁹ As mentioned previously, there are numerous opportunities for delegegate’s to make an impact and take concrete action on this topic, such as through identifying good practice and strengthening existing policies which will enhance “compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law;” ensure for “more consistent and effective engagement with non-state armed groups in order to improve their compliance with the law;” and improve humanitarian access;” and enhance accountability.”²⁹⁰ In this regard, C-34 now has a landmark opportunity to contribute to civilian protection – not only through strengthening the protection mandates of peacekeeping operations, but also through “significant[ly] rethinking ... the purposes and principles of peacekeeping” to account for the human nature of conflict.²⁹¹

²⁸⁹ Van Engeland, *Civilian or Combatant? A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century*, 2011, p. xiv.

²⁹⁰ Security Council Report, *Cross-Cutting Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, 31 May 2012.

²⁹¹ Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*, 2009, p. 285.

Annotated Bibliography

Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2010). *Understanding Peacekeeping* (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. *Bellamy and Williams provide a thorough overview of modern peacekeeping operations. The text begins with a historical perspective that ranges from the nineteenth century to the modern day, followed by a thematic perspective that examines types of peace operations in greater detail. Part IV of the text describes contemporary challenges, the third of which is civilian protection.*

Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support. (2009). *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. Retrieved August 10, 2012, from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>

Published by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, this paper summarizes the current approach and direction of United Nations peacekeeping. Intended as a contribution to a dialogue surrounding peacekeeping reform, the paper will be particularly useful for delegates who wish to develop greater familiarity with United Nations peacekeeping in general. The role of civilian protection in peacekeeping mandates is discussed in Section III.

Holt, V. K. & Berkman, T. C. (2006). *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.

While the international community has accepted the need for civilian protection in theory, there remain significant challenges to practical implementation of protection mandates. Holt and Berkman investigate how civilian protection mandates can be better achieved. The book includes a useful annex reviewing Security Council resolutions relevant to civilian protection in the context of missions led by the United Nations, multinational forces, or individual countries.

Holt, V., Taylor, G. & Kelly, M. (2009). *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*. Retrieved August 10, 2012, from:

<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=1014>

In 2009, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs jointly commissioned a study on civilian protection in the context of peacekeeping missions. The result was a comprehensive report that will prove invaluable for delegates in the course of their research. Holt, Taylor, and Kelly provide a detailed overview of the evolution of civilian protection mandates in peacekeeping operations since 1999. Chapter 5 of the report discusses essential findings and recommendations for overcoming relevant challenges.

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2010, October 29). *The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols*. Retrieved September 2, 2012, from: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm>

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 constitute the core of international humanitarian law, which seeks to regulate the conduct of warring parties and place limits on warfare to protect both combatants and non-combatants. Of note is the Fourth Geneva Convention, which establishes protection specifically for civilians. The International Committee of the Red Cross, often seen as the guardian of the Geneva Conventions, maintains a Web site that introduces these key international instruments.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2011). *Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (4th ed.). Retrieved August 23, 2012, from:

<http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Aide%20Memoire%20on%20the%20Protection%20of%20Civilians%202010.pdf>

The most recent Aide Memoire on civilian protection remains an important tool for the Security Council in its analysis and discussion of relevant issues. The Aide Memoire itself is divided into three sections that address conflict-affected civilians generally, children affected by armed conflict, and women affected by armed conflict. The addendum presents a selection of agreed language from previous resolutions and presidential statements on civilian protection.

Security Council Report. (2012, May 31). *Cross-Cutting Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Retrieved August 10, 2012, from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/XCutting%20POC%202012.pdf>

The Security Council Report's Cross-Cutting Reports detail the involvement of the Security Council in the various thematic issues with which it is engaged. The fifth such report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict provides an overview of key developments at both the thematic and country-specific levels, as well as a case study on recent events in Syria. The report also includes a brief history of the Security Council's consideration of civilian protection that highlights significant resolutions and statements.

United Nations General Assembly. (2000, August 21). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305)*. Retrieved August 10, 2012, from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/55/305>

The Brahimi Report was heralded as a remarkable contribution to peacekeeping in 2000. Importantly, it argued that United Nations peacekeepers had a presumed responsibility to protect civilians under threat. Security Council resolutions in following years included greater provisions for civilian protection in direct response to the concerns raised in this report.

United Nations Secretary-General. (2012, May 22). *2012 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2012/376)*. Retrieved September 1, 2012, from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2012/376>

Since 1999, the Security Council has regularly requested reports from the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Each report provides an update on the state of civilian protection, identifying progress and areas requiring improvement. The 2012 report describes the current state of civilian protection as generally "abysmal." It presents recommendations for action to address five core challenges to ensuring civilian protection that were originally elaborated in the 2009 and 2010 reports.

Wills, S. (2009). *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. *Wills' seminal work begins with an historical overview of civilian protection by UN peacekeepers, from the initial development of peacekeeping to the present day. Subsequent chapters discuss the framework established by international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and occupation law with respect to civilian protection. Delegates will find this a useful introduction to the basic issues that arise when peacekeeping forces assume responsibility for civilian protection.*

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Rules of Procedure Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules, which apply to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”) and shall be considered adopted by the Board prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Director, the Assistant Director, the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “Chair” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Committee.
5. The final report as adopted by the Committee shall be communicated to the General Assembly Plenary Session for review.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - Dates of convening and adjournment

The Committee shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - Place of sessions

The Committee shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - Provisional agenda

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Director-General and communicated to the Members of the Committee at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - Adoption of the agenda

The agenda provided by the Director-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those Member States and observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote. Should the Committee not reach a decision by conclusion of the first night's meeting, the agenda will be automatically set in the order in which it was first communicated.

Rule 5 - Revision of the agenda

During a session, the Committee may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Debate on the inclusion of an item in the agenda shall be limited to three speakers in favor of, and three against, the inclusion. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Committee so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Committee decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an important and urgent character is subject to the discretion of the Director-General, or his or her designate, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Committee to be placed on the agenda. The votes described in this rule are substantive votes, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For

purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting — means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Committee.
2. The Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Director-General, shall provide and direct the staff required by the Committee and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and any other decisions of the Committee, and shall distribute documents of the Committee to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Committee may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Committee concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the Chair

The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a Chair who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Committee for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the Chair

If the Chair is unable to perform her/his functions, a new Chair shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language

English shall be the official and working language of the Committee.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 - Quorum

The Chair may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Committee are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Committee shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, members of the Committee means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.

Rule 15 - General powers of the Chair

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the Chair shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Committee, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The Chair, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Committee and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Committee the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the Chair's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the Chair is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference and is limited to entertaining motions.

Rule 16 – Authority of the Committee

The Chair, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Committee.

Rule 17 – Voting rights on procedural matters

Unless otherwise stated, all votes pertaining to the conduct of business shall require a majority of the members present and voting in order to pass.

For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this rule is applied. Note that observers may vote on all procedural votes; they may, however, not vote on substantive matters (see Chapter VI). There is no possibility to abstain on procedural votes.

Rule 18 - Points of order

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the Chair in accordance with the rules of procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the Chair. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the Chair's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting. A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. They should be used exclusively to correct an error in procedure. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the Chair, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 19 - Speeches

No representative may address the Committee without having previously obtained the permission of the Chair. The Chair shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The Chair may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, the Secretariat will set a time limit for all speeches which may be amended by the Chair at his/her discretion. Consequently, motions to alter the speaker's time will not be entertained by the Chair.

Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate, the Chair may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Committee, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the Chair shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Committee.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the Chair and should not be the subject of a

motion by the Committee. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Committee and the Chair should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 21 - Right of reply

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the Chair may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Committee by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move to the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Committee shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Committee's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the Chair will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Committee.

Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. Two representatives may speak in favor of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. The Chair may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule.

Rule 25 - Closure of debate

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Committee favors the closure of debate, the Committee shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 26 - Order of motions

Subject to rule 18, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments

Proposals and amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat. Any proposal or amendment that relates to the substance of any matter under discussion shall require the signature of twenty percent of the members of the Committee [sponsors]. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Committee unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The Chair may, however, permit the

discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Committee for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Committee by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft report segment during formal speeches. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft report segment and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Committee. These draft report segments are the collective property of the Committee and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions

A motion may be withdrawn by its proposer at any time before voting has commenced, provided that the motion has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any member.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Committee, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights

Each member of the Committee shall have one vote.

This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft report segments, and portions of draft report segments divided out by motion. As such, all references to member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Rule 31 - Request for a vote

A proposal or motion before the Committee for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Committee may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft report segment, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft report segment divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the Chair may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 32 - Majority required

1. The practice of striving for consensus in decision-making shall be encouraged.
2. In the case of a vote, decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting, unless specified otherwise in these rules.
3. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative States as “present and voting” during the attendance roll call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain on substantive votes.

Rule 33 - Method of voting

1. The Committee shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the Chair. The name of each member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

Only those members who designate themselves as present or present and voting during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the Chair and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying pass must, on the second time through, respond with either a yes or no vote. A pass cannot be followed by a second pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Committee votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Committee shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 34 - Explanations of vote

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the Chair in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the Chair in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 35 - Conduct during voting

After the Chair has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

For purposes of this rule, there shall be no communication amongst delegates, and if any delegate leaves the Committee room during voting procedure, they will not be allowed back into the room until the Committee has convened voting procedure.

Rule 36 - Division of proposals and amendments

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the Chair where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are approved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft report segment, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 37 - Amendments

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete parts of the part relating to conclusions and recommendations of any draft report segment, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect the introduction.

Rule 38 - Voting on amendments

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft report segment. The determination of which amendment is furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 39 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Committee decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 40 - The Chair shall not vote

The Chair shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VII. CREDENTIALS

Rule 41 - Credentials

The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General prior to the opening of a session.

Rule 42 - Authority of the General Assembly

The Committee shall be bound by the actions of the General Assembly in all credentials matters and shall take no action regarding the credentials of any member.

VII. PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Rule 43 - Participation of non-Member States

The Committee shall invite any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Committee and any other State, to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.

A sub-committee or sessional body of the Committee shall invite any State that is not one of its own members to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State. A State thus invited shall not have the right to vote, but may submit proposals which may be put to the vote on request of any member of the body concerned.

If the Committee considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation. Delegates invited to the Committee according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Committee is no longer required.

Rule 45 - Participation of national liberation movements

The Committee may invite any national liberation movement recognized by the General Assembly to participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.

Rule 46 - Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies

In accordance with the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the specialized agencies shall be entitled: a) To be represented at meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary organs; b) To participate, without the right to vote, through their representatives, in deliberations with respect to items of concern to them and to submit proposals regarding such items, which may be put to the vote at the request of any member of the Committee or of the subsidiary organ concerned.

Rule 47 - Participation of non-governmental organization and intergovernmental organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations accorded consultative observer status by the Economic and Social Council and other non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations designated on an ad hoc or a continuing basis by the Committee on the recommendation of the Bureau, may participate, with the procedural right to vote, but not the substantive right to vote, in the deliberations of the Committee on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations.