



NMUN • NY

SECURITY COUNCIL BACKGROUND GUIDE 2011

WRITTEN BY: Cara Wagner, Jehan Karim, Michael T. Ahearn and Baiba Kine



NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS
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CONTACT THE NMUN

Please consult the FAQ section of nmun.org for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

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NMUN Secretary-General
Ronny Heintze | secgen@nmun.org

NMUN•NY 2011 Important Dates

IMPORTANT NOTICE: To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at nmun.org and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

SHERATON	MARRIOTT	DESCRIPTION
31 January 2011	31 January 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March) • Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET! (We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)
15 February 2011	15 February 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Committee Updates Posted to www.nmun.org
1 March 2011	1 March 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early! Group Rates on hotel rooms are available on a first come, first served basis until sold out. Group rates, if still available, may not be honored after that date. See hotel reservation form for date final payment is due. • Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to: outreach@nmun.org • Preferred deadline for submission of Chair / Rapp applications to Committee Chairs • All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$125 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$150 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline.
15 March 2011	15 March 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail (See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions).
NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS		The 2011 National Model UN Conference <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 17 - 21 April – Sheraton New York • 19 - 23 April – New York Marriott Marquis The 2012 National Model UN Conference <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 - 5 April – Sheraton New York • 3 - 7 April – New York Marriott Marquis

POSITION PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 15 MARCH 2011

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 15 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active when background guides are available. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment in the subject line (Example: GAPLEN_Greece).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org.

This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba_U_of_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

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for more information

COMMITTEE

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General Assembly First Committee	ga1st.sheraton@nmun.org
General Assembly Second Committee	ga2nd.sheraton@nmun.org
General Assembly Third Committee.....	ga3rd.sheraton@nmun.org
Human Rights Council.....	hrc.sheraton@nmun.org
ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	ccpcj.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women	csw.sheraton@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	escap.sheraton@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	escwa.sheraton@nmun.org
United Nations Environment Programme	unep.sheraton@nmun.org
United Nations Population Fund	unfpa.sheraton@nmun.org
United Nations Children's Fund.....	unicef.sheraton@nmun.org
World Intellectual Property Organization	wipo.sheraton@nmun.org
African Development Bank	afdb.sheraton@nmun.org
Group of 20.....	g20.sheraton@nmun.org
Organization of American States	oas.sheraton@nmun.org
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.....	osce.sheraton@nmun.org
Security Council.....	sc.sheraton@nmun.org
Security Council 2.....	sc2.sheraton@nmun.org
International Court of Justice.....	icj.sheraton@nmun.org
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference	npt.sheraton@nmun.org

COMMITTEE

EMAIL - MARRIOTT

General Assembly First Committee	ga1st.marriott@nmun.org
General Assembly Second Committee	ga2nd.marriott@nmun.org
General Assembly Third Committee.....	ga3rd.marriott@nmun.org
Human Rights Council.....	hrc.marriott@nmun.org
ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.marriott@nmun.org
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	ccpcj.marriott@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women	csw.marriott@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	escap.marriott@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	escwa.marriott@nmun.org
United Nations Environment Programme	unep.marriott@nmun.org
United Nations Population Fund	unfpa.marriott@nmun.org
United Nations Children's Fund.....	unicef.marriott@nmun.org
World Intellectual Property Organization	wipo.marriott@nmun.org
African Development Bank	afdb.marriott@nmun.org
Group of 20.....	g20.marriott@nmun.org
Organization of American States	oas.marriott@nmun.org
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.....	osce.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council.....	sc.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council 2.....	sc2.marriott@nmun.org
International Court of Justice.....	icj.marriott@nmun.org
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference	npt.marriott@nmun.org

OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
(send only to e-mail for your assigned venue).....	positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org
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Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to the 2011 National Model United Nations Conference (NMUN). This year's Security Council Directors are: Michael T. Ahearn, Dr. Jehan Karim, Baiba Kine and Cara Wagner. Michael graduated from Georgia Southern University, with a B.S. in Prelaw Political Science and a minor in International Studies. He is currently applying for law school. This is his sixth year at the conference and fourth year on staff. Dr. Karim, currently received her doctorate from Kings College London Medical School and is living and working London. Cara Wagner attended the University of Colorado at Boulder where she got a B.A. in International Affairs and Certificate in Peace and Conflict Studies. This is her second year on staff and first year as a Director. Currently, she is working towards a master's degree in International Affairs at Northeastern University in Boston. Baiba Kine attended the Riga Stradins University, where she got a degree in International Relations – European Union policy. This is her fourth year on staff and second year as a Director of the Security Council. Currently, she is residing in Washington, DC and working in the Latvian Embassy to the US.

The topics under discussion for the Security Council at the 2011 NMUN are:

- 1) The Situation in Afghanistan
- 2) Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
- 3) Climate Change and International Security

The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is so organized as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be present at all times at United Nations Headquarters. When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement. When a dispute leads to fighting, the Council's first concern is to bring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, the Council has issued cease-fire directives that have been instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. It also sends United Nations peacekeeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keep opposing forces apart and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought. The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action.

Each delegation must submit a position paper. NMUN will accept position papers via e-mail by March 15, 2011. Please refer to the message from your Director-General explaining the NMUN position paper requirements and restrictions. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is crucial.

NMUN can be one of the most rewarding academic experiences of your college career. We hope that this year's conference will not only intrigue you to participate again, but also that you find it as beneficial as we have. If you have any questions regarding preparation, please feel free to contact any of the Security Council substantive staff or the Under-Secretaries General for the Department of Peace and Security

Amanda D'Amico (Sheraton) Alistair Goddard (Marriot).

Good luck in your preparation for the conference. We look forward to seeing you in April!

Directors Marriot Venue

Dr. Jehan Karim

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Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2011 NMUN Conference

At the 2011 NMUN New York Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs or judicial experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. ***The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.*** In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single spaced pages (one double sided paper, if printed)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at 1 inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page; the use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2010. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 15, 2010 (GMT-5) for delegations attending the NMUN conference at either the Sheraton or the Marriott venue.**

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU_Namibia_University of Caprivi)

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Holger Baer, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Brianna Johnston-Hanks, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Sheraton Venue
Holger Baer
Director-General
holger@nmun.org

Marriott Venue
Brianna Johnston-Hanks
Director-General
briannaj@nmun.org

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a *maximum* of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards.

Delegation from
Canada

Represented by
(Name of College)

Position Paper for General Assembly Plenary

The topics before the General Assembly Plenary are: Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict; the Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy; and the Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa. Canada is dedicated to collaborative multilateral approaches to ensuring protection and promotion of human security and advancement of sustainable development.

I. Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict

Canada endorses the Kimberly Process in promoting accountability, transparency, and effective governmental regulation of trade in rough diamonds. We believe the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an essential international regulatory mechanism and encourage all Member States to contribute to market accountability by seeking membership, participation, and compliance with its mandate. Canada urges Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué to strengthen government oversight of rough diamond trading and manufacturing by developing domestic legal frameworks similar to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. We call upon participating States to act in accordance with the KPCS's comprehensive and credible systems of peer review to monitor the continued implementation of the Kimberley Process and ensure full transparency and self-examination of domestic diamond industries. We draw attention to our domestic programs for diamond regulation including Implementing the Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act and urge Member States to consider these programs in developing the type of domestic regulatory frameworks called for in A/RES/55/56. Canada recognizes the crucial role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the review of rough diamond control measures developed through the Kimberly Process and encourages States to include NGOs, such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, in the review processes called for in A/RES/58/290. We urge Member States to act in accordance with A/RES/60/182 to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal and alluvial diamond miners by establishing a coordinating mechanism for financial and technical assistance through the Working Group of the Kimberly Process of Artisanal Alluvial Producers. Canada calls upon States and NGOs to provide basic educational material regarding diamond valuation and market prices for artisanal diggers, as recommended by the Diamond Development Initiative. Canada will continue to adhere to the 2007 Brussels Declaration on Internal Controls of Participants and is dedicated to ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective regulation of the rough diamond trade through the utilization of voluntary peer review systems and the promotion of increased measures of internal control within all diamond producing States.

II. The Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy

Canada is dedicated to integrating alternative energy sources into climate change frameworks by diversifying the energy market while improving competitiveness in a sustainable economy, as exemplified through our Turning Corners Report and Project Green climate strategies. We view the international commitment to the promotion of alternative sources of energy called for in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) as a catalyst to sustainable development and emission reduction. Canada fulfills its obligations to Article 4 of the UNFCCC by continuing to provide development assistance through the Climate Change Development Fund and calls upon Member States to commit substantial financial and technical investment toward the transfer of sustainable energy technologies and clean energy mechanisms to developing States. We emphasize the need for Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2005 Beijing International Renewable Energy Conference to strengthen domestic policy frameworks to promote clean energy technologies. Canada views

dissemination of technology information called for in the 2007 Group of Eight Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy Declaration as a vital step in energy diversification from conventional energy generation. We call upon Member States to integrate clean electricity from renewable sources into their domestic energy sector by employing investment campaigns similar to our \$1.48 billion initiative ecoENERGY for Renewable Power. Canada encourages States to develop domestic policies of energy efficiency, utilizing regulatory and financing frameworks to accelerate the deployment of clean low-emitting technologies. We call upon Member States to provide knowledge-based advisory services for expanding access to energy in order to fulfill their commitments to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Canada urges States to address the concerns of the 2007 Human Development Report by promoting tax incentives, similar to the Capital Cost Allowances and Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses, to encourage private sector development of energy conservation and renewable energy projects. As a member of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Canada is committed to accelerating the development of renewable energy projects, information sharing mechanisms, and energy efficient systems through the voluntary carbon offset system. We are dedicated to leading international efforts toward the development and sharing of best practices on clean energy technologies and highlight our release of the Renewable Energy Technologies Screen software for public and private stakeholders developing projects in energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy. Canada believes the integration of clean energy into State specific strategies called for in A/62/419/Add.9 will strengthen energy diversification, promote the use of cogeneration, and achieve a synergy between promoting alternative energy while allowing for competitiveness in a sustainable economy.

III. Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa

Canada views the full implementation of the treatment and prevention targets of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Especially in Africa, as essential to eradicating malaria and assisting African States to achieve Target 8 of Goal 6 of the MDGs by 2015. We recommend Member States cooperate with the World Health Organization to ensure transparency in the collection of statistical information for Indicators 21 and 22 of the MDGs. Canada reaffirms the targets of the Abuja Declaration Plan of Action stressing regional cooperation in the implementation, monitoring, and management of malaria prevention and treatment initiatives in Africa. To fully implement A/RES/61/228, Canada believes developed States must balance trade and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian objective of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. We continue to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health into our compulsory licensing framework through the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. We urge Member States to support compulsory licensing for essential generic medicines by including anti-malarial vaccines and initiating domestic provisions to permit export-only compulsory licenses to domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, similar to Canada's Access to Medicines Regime. Canada calls upon Member States to establish advanced market commitments on the distribution of pneumococcal vaccines to developing States in cooperation with PATH and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. We emphasize the need for greater membership in the Roll Back Malaria initiative to strengthen malaria control planning, funding, implementation, and evaluation by promoting increased investment in healthcare systems and greater incorporation of malaria control into all relevant multi-sector activities. Canada continues to implement the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) New Agenda for Action on Health to reduce malaria infection rates among marginalized populations in Africa, increase routine immunizations rates, and reduce infection rates of other neglected infections. Canada will achieve the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008-2009 by providing assistance to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We urge Member States to increase donations to intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that support malaria programming in Africa, exemplified by CIDA's contribution of \$26 million to the Canadian Red Cross. We continue our efforts to provide accessible and affordable vector control methods to African States through the Red Cross' Malaria Bed Net Campaign and the African Medical Research Foundation Canada by supplying insecticide-treated mosquito nets and Participatory Malaria Prevention and Treatment tool kits.

History of the Security Council

The Security Council is unique amongst inter-governmental forums. It has the authority to pass binding decisions on Member States of the United Nations (UN), and support these with unparalleled enforcement powers. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in his final speech at the UN: “The Security Council is not just another stage on which to act out national interests. It is the management committee, if you will, of our fledgling collective security system.”¹ Nevertheless, as the academic and special adviser to the Secretary-General, Professor E.C. Luck laments, the Council also regrettably exists as a “depository of ageless dreams and recurring disappointments about the prospects for a more peaceful and cooperative global order.”²

Main Duties and Powers

The Charter of the United Nations gives the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.³ Although traditionally the Council’s work has focused on addressing specific armed conflicts and “hard” security topics such as non-proliferation and terrorism, recently its agenda has broadened to include thematic topics that merge security concerns with issues of human security and development.⁴ Examples include agenda items such as children and armed conflict; the relationship between security and HIV/AIDS; and the effects of war on women.⁵ The Security Council also has responsibility for making recommendations to the General Assembly of new Member States and candidates to be Secretary-General.⁶

Chapter VI of the Charter gives the Council powers to respond to threats to international peace and security diplomatically, without resorting to sanctions or military force.⁷ The Council may investigate potential threats and make recommendations to address them.⁸

Chapter VII gives the Council a number of powers to enforce its decisions.⁹ It may “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, break of the peace, or act of aggression” and “call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.”¹⁰ The Security Council is the only UN body that can pass decisions that are binding on all Member States.¹¹ Under Article 41, the Council may also impose economic sanctions.¹² Current sanction regimes maintained by the Council include those against Iran and DPR Korea related to nuclear materials and technology.¹³

Chapter VII also allows the Council to use military force “by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”¹⁴ Incidents when the Council has authorized force (or not authorized it), such as in Kosovo in 1999 or Iraq in 2003, offer examples of some of the most energetic debates in international diplomacy.¹⁵

The Charter makes no explicit mention of peacekeeping responsibilities, but since 1945 the Council’s powers have evolved to include a range of activities lying somewhere between diplomatic initiatives and the full-blown use of force. One of the UN’s first secretaries-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, once referred to these activities as “Chapter VI

¹ Annan, *In Truman Library Speech, Annan Says UN Remains Best Tool To Achieve Key Goals Of International Relations*, 2006

² Luck, *UN Security Council: Practice and Promise*, 2006, p.3

³ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 24

⁴ Wallensteen & Johansson, *Security Council Decisions in Perspective*, 2004, p.28-29

⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1820*, 2008; United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1261*, 1999; and United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1308*, 2000

⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 4 & 97

⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 33-38

⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 34, 36 & 37

⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 41

¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 39 & 40

¹¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 25

¹² United Nations, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview*

¹³ United Nations, *Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview*

¹⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 42

¹⁵ Luck, *UN Security Council: Practice and Promise*, 2006, p.54-55

½” powers.¹⁶ While peacekeeping has traditionally meant the monitoring of ceasefires between formerly warring factions who approve of the presence of UN forces, more recently a number of other tasks have been included in the mandates of peacekeeping forces.¹⁷ These range from civilian policing and rule of law advice; to mine clearance and the protection of civilian population centers.¹⁸ Currently, there are 124,000 UN peacekeepers deployed to sixteen conflict areas: from the Middle East, where peacekeepers were first deployed in 1948, to Darfur where the latest mission was established in 2007.¹⁹

Voting and Membership

Fifteen members make up the Security Council. Five of these are permanent members (the so-called P5: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and ten are non-permanent elected every two years by the General Assembly.²⁰

As of August 2010, the Council’s current membership is:²¹

Austria	France	Mexico	Uganda
Bosnia Herzegovina	Gabon	Nigeria	United Kingdom
Brazil	Japan	Russian Federation	United States of America
China	Lebanon	Turkey	

More recently, non-Members and non-governmental organizations, have increasingly been involved in the Council’s deliberations, together with the work of its subsidiary organs. The Charter allows participation of other States if their interests are “specially affected” or “party to a dispute under consideration.”²²

Permanent members have the power of “veto”: if they vote against, a resolution automatically fails regardless of the number of other affirmative votes.²³ Otherwise, both procedural and substantive decisions require nine affirmative votes to pass.²⁴

Many commentators are critical of the Council’s membership structure and voting system, and have called for reform. They assert that the Council represents poorly the overall membership of the UN, particularly developing States.²⁵ Analysts also question whether the Council’s membership accurately reflects the balance of economic and military power, and population in the modern world.²⁶ They also identify the veto power as an impediment to timely and effective action by the UN in response to complex emergencies and large-scale human rights abuses.²⁷ Although there is limited agreement in principle on increasing the Council’s membership, there is not yet any consensus amongst Member States on which countries should join as permanent members, or whether or not there should be reform to the veto power.²⁸

The Council can “establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”.²⁹ Such subsidiary organs include the Counter Terrorism Committee, the Resolution 1540 Committee (that addresses

¹⁶ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping*

¹⁷ United Nations, United Nations Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (A/47/277 – S/24111)*, 1992

¹⁸ United Nations, United Nations Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (A/47/277 – S/24111)*, 1992

¹⁹ United Nations Department of Public Information, *United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet (DPI/2429/Rev.7)*, 2010.

²⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 23

²¹ United Nations, *Membership in 2010*, 2010

²² United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 31 & 32

²³ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 27

²⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 27

²⁵ Fassbender, *Pressure for Security Council Reform*, 2004, p.345

²⁶ United Nations, United Nations Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All (A/59/2005)*, 2005

²⁷ Fassbender, *Pressure for Security Council Reform*, 2004, p.351-352

²⁸ Fassbender, *Pressure for Security Council Reform*, 2004, p.342

²⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 29

non-proliferation issues), and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.³⁰

Conclusion

Holding unparalleled powers and a crucial mandate, the Security Council is perhaps the most significant body within the UN System. Despite debate regarding its membership and the power of veto, and its disheartening failures during times of international crisis, when its decisions are backed by collective will and purpose it can fulfil its primary duty to preserve international peace and security. Delegates should bear in mind the Council's strengths, as well as its potential weaknesses, as they consider possible solutions to the challenges presented by the committee's agenda.

I. The Situation in Afghanistan

*"International support and Afghan resolve can bring tangible change into the lives of ordinary Afghans: improved security, better standards of living, and an inclusive intra-Afghan dialogue, stronger regional cooperation can complement domestic results."*³¹

History

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has been in turmoil and conflict for decades.³² In 1973, a coup d'état was staged, ousting President Zahir Shah.³³ Those who perpetrated this coup, however, only held power for five years; the April Revolution of 1978 brought a communist regime to power, led by President Mohammad Taraki.³⁴ In fighting within Taraki's party, however, resulted in Taraki's death and the Soviet Union's decision to establish a military and political presence in Afghanistan.³⁵ Between 1979 and 1989, an estimated one million Afghans died fighting in opposition to Soviet rule and another estimated one million people fled the country.³⁶ Three years after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Soviet-backed government fell.³⁷ Between 1992 and 1994, the Mujahedeen, or Islamic fighters, held power in Afghanistan, and the country grew increasingly unstable.³⁸ In 1994, the Taliban, a group of Islamic fundamentalists, gained prominence in Afghanistan by opposing the Mujahedeen; by 1996, the Taliban controlled the capital, Kabul, and over 90% of the country.³⁹ The Taliban government offered sanctuary to Islamic fundamentalists, including Osama bin Laden.⁴⁰ After the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the Taliban government refused to extradite Osama Bin Laden, who the U.S. blamed for the attacks.⁴¹ On October 7, 2001, American President George Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban government under "Operation Enduring Freedom."⁴² The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1386 which led to the formation of the Afghan Interim Authority under The Bonn Agreement (S/2001/1154) and of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).⁴³ On December 7, 2001, the Taliban surrendered Kandahār, the militia's base of power and the last city under its control.⁴⁴

³⁰ United Nations, *Committees*

³¹ Afghan Mission NY, *Afghanistan Convenes International Conference on Afghanistan*, 2010.

³² BBC News, *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*, 2008.

³³ BBC News, *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*, 2008.

³⁴ BBC News, *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*, 2008.

³⁵ BBC News, *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*, 2008.

³⁶ BBC News, *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*, 2008.

³⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, *Afghanistan*, 2010.

³⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica, *Afghanistan*, 2010.

³⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, *Afghanistan*, 2010.

⁴⁰ BBC News, *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*, 2008.

⁴¹ BBC News, *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*, 2008.

⁴² Martel, *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy*, 2007, p. 223.

⁴³ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1386 (2001)*, 2001.

⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1386 (2001)*, 2001.

The International Security Assistance Force

The ISAF, authorized by the Security Council in accordance with Annex 1 to The Bonn Agreement, was established in December 20, 2001.⁴⁵ The mission of the ISAF is, in part, “to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency.”⁴⁶ The ISAF was initially established for a six-month period to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.”⁴⁷ The ISAF took command and control of existing military forces in Kabul to prevent further instability and help the Afghan interim government establish and train Afghan security and armed forces.⁴⁸ While command of the ISAF was originally limited to six-month terms and rotated among Member States, on August 11, 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of the mission.⁴⁹ In October 2003, the Security Council passed resolution 1510, extending the ISAF mandate, which was originally limited to Kabul and the surrounding areas, to encompass all of Afghanistan.⁵⁰ The mission expanded over several stages within three years, taking command of all international forces on the ground in Afghanistan.⁵¹

Currently 47 nations contribute a combined 119,819 troops and 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to the ISAF.⁵² In addition to overseeing ISAF operations, NATO also performs security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).⁵³ NATO continues to increase the capacity of Afghan Security forces and gradually hand over responsibility to the ANSF, which now has the lead responsibility for security forces in the Kabul Province.⁵⁴

In addition to security operations which are performed in conjunction with the ANSF, the ISAF works to “identify reconstruction needs, such as the rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities, restoring water supplies and providing support for other civil-military projects,” “provide support to the Afghan government and internationally-sanctioned counter-narcotics efforts,” and “support humanitarian assistance operations,” among other goals.⁵⁵ Since 2003, the ISAF has helped construct approximately 4,000 kilometers of new paved roads, and, in 2007 alone, more than 1,080 civil-military cooperation projects were completed.⁵⁶ By the end of 2007, 6.4 million children were in school, including 1.5 million girls.⁵⁷ This is the highest number of students and girls in school in the history of Afghanistan.⁵⁸ Currently over 80% of Afghans have access to medical care, up from only 8% in 2001.⁵⁹ Moreover, the non-opium economy has grown at a rate of over 12% annually since 2001, and, in 2007, 13 provinces became poppy free.⁶⁰ Since 2001, the infant mortality rate has declined 26%, and the mortality rate for children under five years old has decreased by 22%.⁶¹

Additionally, the ISAF has had limited success against increasing violence in the region. “Remotely detonated bombings more than doubled from 783 to 1,677, and armed attacks nearly tripled from 1,557 to 4,542” in 2007.⁶² Moreover, suicide attacks had increased drastically between 2002 and 2007; only one attack occurred in 2002, while 140 occurred in 2007.⁶³ The ISAF’s expanded presence since 2008, however, has increased stability in the country, and several regions are seeing steep declines in violence.⁶⁴ In the spring of 2008, 91% of insurgent activities were

⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1154 (2001)*, 2001.

⁴⁶ International Security Assistance Force, *Mission*, 2010.

⁴⁷ International Security Assistance Force, *ISAF History*, 2010.

⁴⁸ International Security Assistance Force, *ISAF History*, 2010.

⁴⁹ International Security Assistance Force, *ISAF History*, 2010.

⁵⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1510 (2003)*, 2003.

⁵¹ International Security Assistance Force, *ISAF History*, 2010.

⁵² International Security Assistance Force, *International Security Assistance Force Key Facts and Figures*, 2010.

⁵³ International Security Assistance Force, *International Security Assistance Force Key Facts and Figures*, 2010.

⁵⁴ International Security Assistance Force, *International Security Assistance Force Key Facts and Figures*, 2010.

⁵⁵ International Security Assistance Force, *ISAF Mandate*, 2009.

⁵⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁵⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁵⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁵⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁶⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁶¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁶² Jones, *The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad*, 2008, p. 8.

⁶³ Jones, *The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad*, 2008, p. 36.

⁶⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2010.

reported within only 8% of the districts; these districts only contain 6% of the Afghan population.⁶⁵ The Garmsir district experienced a 43% drop in violence between 2007 and 2008 under the expanded operations of the ISAF.⁶⁶ Border check points and political/military agreements with Pakistan have led to a decrease in illegal border-crossing, but such crossings still remain a major concern in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁶⁷ Pakistani forces and the ISAF, in conjunction with the ANFS, began joint missions in 2008 to stop insurgency on both sides of the boarder.⁶⁸

Afghanistan's Drug Crisis

Despite the considerable strides made, Afghanistan remains the world's leading producer of opium and heroin.⁶⁹ On May 28, 2010, the Special Envoy to Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, said, "Without solving the problem of drugs, nothing can be done in Afghanistan. There will be no fight against corruption, no domestic security and no protection for neighboring states."⁷⁰ Drug addiction affects an estimated one million Afghans, which is equivalent to 8% of the population and twice the global average.⁷¹ Afghans have long used opium to relieve pain, and approximately 50% of parents who use opium in the northern and southern regions also give it to their children to ameliorate the effect of hunger.⁷²

Currently there are drug addiction treatment clinics in only 21 of the 34 providences in Afghanistan.⁷³ The capacity of the drug treatment clinics is limited at 10,000 users annually, leaving an estimated 700,000 Afghans without access to treatment.⁷⁴ While invasion forces in 2001 took a hands off approach to poppy cultivation to gain support of the local tribal leaders in the fight against the Taliban, several methods of controlling the drug cultivation and trade have since been used.⁷⁵ After assuming control of security operations in 2006, the ISAF implemented a method of eradication and interdiction by destroying poppy fields and confiscating drugs.⁷⁶ Unsurprisingly, regions which serve as drug routes through Afghanistan also have the highest insurgent activity and are the most difficult to patrol.⁷⁷ The regions of Farah, Nimroz, Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul are the primary routes for the export of opiates and have the largest Taliban presence.⁷⁸ Approximately 80% of the opiates are trafficked via Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran; the total export value of these opiates trafficked through Taliban-controlled border areas is approximately \$10.5 billion.⁷⁹ Ninety-eight percent of all of Afghanistan's opium is grown in the seven provinces in the southwest where there are permanent Taliban settlements.⁸⁰ The Taliban taxes the opiate drug trade and provides protection to farmers and traffickers by preventing interdiction and eradication efforts through bribes and threats to local officials or threat.⁸¹ These actions delegitimize the national government.⁸²

⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2008.

⁶⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2010.

⁶⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2010.

⁶⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Progress in Afghanistan*, 2010.

⁶⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Around 1 Million Afghans Suffer from Drug Addiction*, UNODC reports, 2010.

⁷⁰ Global Security.org, *Afghanistan Drug Market*, 2010.

⁷¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Around 1 Million Afghans Suffer from Drug Addiction*, UNODC reports, 2010.

⁷² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Around 1 Million Afghans Suffer from Drug Addiction*, UNODC reports, 2010.

⁷³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Around 1 Million Afghans Suffer from Drug Addiction*, UNODC reports, 2010.

⁷⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Around 1 Million Afghans Suffer from Drug Addiction*, UNODC reports, 2010.

⁷⁵ Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*, 2010, p. 135.

⁷⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan Opium*, 2009.

⁷⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan Opium*, 2009.

⁷⁸ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan Opium*, 2009.

⁷⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan Opium*, 2009.

⁸⁰ Bajoria, *The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border*, 2009.

⁸¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan Opium*, 2009.

⁸² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan Opium*, 2009.

Corruption

Corruption and poor governance are major causes in the lack of progress in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.⁸³ Afghans paid out \$2.5 billion in bribes in 2009, equivalent to 23% of Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP).⁸⁴ The revenue accrued by the opium trade in 2009 has been estimated at \$2.8 billion; drugs and bribes are the country's biggest income generators; together they are equivalent to over half of the country's licit GDP.⁸⁵ Around 25% of Afghans have paid at least one bribe to the police, and 10% to 20% have paid a bribe to a government official.⁸⁶ This has led to a lack of confidence in the government at a national, local, and regional level, which has resulted in a search for alternative providers of security and welfare.⁸⁷ Non-transparent administrative procedures and low-quality services provided by the administration are seen as a link to corruption.⁸⁸ In 74% of cases reviewed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), public officials requested bribes to speed up administrative procedures or to even complete the procedure.⁸⁹ In rural areas, 60% of the bribes were paid to prosecutors, judges, and police officers, with most of the bribes in the urban areas being paid to police officers.⁹⁰

Currently the UNODC is promoting anti-corruption measures and an accountable justice system under compliance with the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).⁹¹ The UNODC is advising the Afghan government on anti-corruption legislation and implementation of the Code of Ethics – a result of a three-year process led by the Afghan government with assistance from the UNODC and the US.⁹² The Code of Ethics consists of 28 articles that set the standard for a prosecutor's performance in office.⁹³ It also includes an internal disciplinary mechanism for investigation, adjudication, and appeal of complaints against prosecutors by the public and other legal professionals.⁹⁴ The goal of this is to ensure integrity of all prosecutors and promote ethical standards, which will increase public trust in investigations and prosecutions.⁹⁵

The 2009 presidential election had also been plagued with accusations of corruption with voting cards being sold and candidates offering cash for votes.⁹⁶ Polling officials were actively campaigning for their candidates, and there were reports of large sums of money being offered to tribal leaders for their group's votes.⁹⁷ Despite these flaws in voting, the view of many western governments is that a flawed election is better than no vote at all.⁹⁸ In the 2010 parliamentary vote there were more than 3,500 complaints of corruption or cheating, 57% of those being serious enough to affect the outcome of the vote.⁹⁹

Pakistan-Afghanistan Border

Afghanistan shares its borders with six countries; at its south is the 1,600 mile-long border with Pakistan known as the Durand line.¹⁰⁰ Conflicts involving the validity of this border as well as tribal and ethnical rivalries have plagued this region throughout history, but the area has been increasingly unstable since the movement of international troops into Afghanistan in 2001.¹⁰¹ Because of the porous nature of the Durand line, the two established crossings

⁸³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC assists Afghanistan Justice System in Setting up Code of Ethics*, 2010.

⁸⁴ Kemp, *Drain the Swamp of Corruption in Afghanistan, Says UNODC*, 2010.

⁸⁵ Kemp, *Drain the Swamp of Corruption in Afghanistan, Says UNODC*, 2010.

⁸⁶ Kemp, *Drain the Swamp of Corruption in Afghanistan, Says UNODC*, 2010.

⁸⁷ Kemp, *Drain the Swamp of Corruption in Afghanistan, Says UNODC*, 2010.

⁸⁸ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims*, 2010.

⁸⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims*, 2010.

⁹⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims*, 2010.

⁹¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC assists Afghanistan Justice System in Setting up Code of Ethics*, 2010.

⁹² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC assists Afghanistan Justice System in Setting up Code of Ethics*, 2010.

⁹³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC assists Afghanistan Justice System in Setting up Code of Ethics*, 2010.

⁹⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC assists Afghanistan Justice System in Setting up Code of Ethics*, 2010.

⁹⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC assists Afghanistan Justice System in Setting up Code of Ethics*, 2010.

⁹⁶ Pannell, *Corruption fears over Afghan Poll*, 2009.

⁹⁷ Pannell, *Corruption fears over Afghan Poll*, 2009.

⁹⁸ Pannell, *Corruption fears over Afghan Poll*, 2009.

⁹⁹ National Public Radio, *Afghan Election Commissions Calls for Recounts*, 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Bajoria, *The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border*, 2009.

¹⁰¹ Bajoria, *The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border*, 2009.

Jones, *The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad*, 2008, p. 9.

of Torkham and Chaman are often ignored, and the hundreds of unguarded and illegal paths are used to cross between the two states.¹⁰² Moreover, because the Pashtun ethnic group has settled on both sides of the border, the Afghan and Pakistani governments have particular difficulty closing off the boarder.¹⁰³ The Taliban, made up predominantly of Pashtuns, often find safe-havens on both sides of the Durand line.¹⁰⁴ The Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgencies are equally active in Afghanistan and Pakistan but are generally limited to certain provinces within each state.¹⁰⁵

The Helmand province in Afghanistan offers access to Chaghai province in Pakistan and has seen increased Taliban activity.¹⁰⁶ Kandahār, which borders the Helmand province, is both the spiritual center and origin of the Taliban and was the primary headquarters for Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar in 1996.¹⁰⁷ Northeast of Kandahar, Zabul, Afghanistan, faces such a high degree of Taliban activity that government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and members of the media avoid traveling through it.¹⁰⁸

Following the 2001 invasion, members of the Taliban fled to Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi, in Pakistan.¹⁰⁹ Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – specifically Kurram, Orakzai, and Kyber provinces – are currently used by the Taliban to pressure Kabul, which is 56 miles away.¹¹⁰ The FATA have become increasingly violent, as they suffer a large presence of Taliban fighters.¹¹¹ Most recently the ISAF has attempted to counter this extremist contingent in Pakistan with drone attacks; as of October 18, 2010, 25 separate drone attacks have been carried out in the area of North Waziristan, a province which lies within the FATA.¹¹² The Taliban's unmanned drones pose a risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties.¹¹³ This strategy of using civilians as human shields by integrating militant strong holds into civilian populations to prevent such bombings has been recognized and condemned by the Security Council, but remains a reality of the current conflict.¹¹⁴

The Security Council, in Resolution 1883, recognized the importance of the advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, governance, and development in Afghanistan.¹¹⁵ The Member States of the Security Council are concerned about the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups, criminals, and those involved in the narcotics trade. These groups cause increasingly strong links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, including children, national security forces, and international military and civilian personnel.¹¹⁶ The SC also stressed the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector.¹¹⁷ Moreover, it encourages the ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, and empower the Afghan national security forces, in order to create and maintain self-sufficient and ethnically balanced Afghan security forces.¹¹⁸

Considerations for the Future

Most recently, President Hamid Karzai has sought out a new path to peace through the creation of the High Peace Council, a 70-member organization that was established to negotiate with insurgents.¹¹⁹ General David Petraeus,

¹⁰² Johnson & Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 2008, p. 44.

¹⁰³ Fair, *The Educated Militants of Pakistan: Implications for Pakistan's Domestic Security*, 2008, p. 93.

¹⁰⁴ BBC News, *Who are the Taliban*, 2009.

¹⁰⁵ Rubin, and Siddique, *Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate*, 2006.

¹⁰⁶ BBC News, *The Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus*, 2009.

¹⁰⁸ BBC News, *The Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus*, 2009.

¹⁰⁹ Jones, *The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad*, 2008, p. 30.

¹¹⁰ BBC News, *The Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus*, 2009.

¹¹¹ BBC News, *Why Unity is Vital for Pakistan Survival*, 2009.

BBC News, *Taliban growing in strength*, 2009.

¹¹² BBC News, *'Six militants die' in Pakistan drone attack*, 2010.

¹¹³ Rubin and Siddique, *Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate*, 2006.

¹¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1833 (2008)*, 2008.

¹¹⁵ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1833 (2008)*, 2008.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1833 (2008)*, 2008.

¹¹⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1833 (2008)*, 2008.

¹¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1833 (2008)*, 2008.

¹¹⁹ BBC News, *Nato's 'safe passage' for Taliban*, 2010.

commander of the ISAF, has confirmed that Taliban leaders will be granted safe passage across Afghanistan for this purpose.¹²⁰ In addition, international observers have called for non-governmental organizations to begin working with the Taliban, “as the insurgents will play a permanent role in the country’s future.”¹²¹ These statements indicate a substantial change in the international community’s stance on the conflict in Afghanistan and reinforce that this is a pivotal moment in Afghan history. The Security Council must lead the international community in its efforts towards a more stable Afghanistan.

The manner in which the United Nations Security Council will lead these efforts, however, remains to be seen. Bearing in mind that the United States – the single biggest contributor of troops to the ISAF – will begin withdrawing forces in July 2011, how can the ISAF adjust its strategy to more effectively reduce insurgent attacks? How can the United Nations work to reduce the Afghan drug trade, to decrease corruption within the Afghan government, and increase the reach of the government, specifically near the Durand Line? What political steps can be taken by the Member States of the Security Council to increase stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan?

II. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

Introduction

Governments agree to provide a basic level of security and human rights for their citizens, and in exchange, citizens agree to relinquish part of their personal sovereignty.¹²² The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP or RTOP) is a comparatively new concept in international law, resulting in part from tragedies in recent world history, where governments and the international community have failed to protect the people from crimes against humanity, civil unrest, and war. Those tragedies have stimulated discussion on the concept of human security and the protection of a population against threats to life.¹²³ The RtoP concept, a developing norm in international relations, argues that states hold a responsibility to protect their citizens from suffering various crimes against humanity. It also includes a responsibility for the international community to intervene in a when a State is unable to, unwilling or ineffective in protecting its population from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other crimes against humanity.¹²⁴

In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, world leaders recognized RtoP as an international norm in the following words: “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.”¹²⁵ The former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan further emphasized the importance of the principle by stating to the assembled leaders: “You will be pledged to act if another Rwanda looms.”¹²⁶

The concept raises more questions than answers, thus it is essential to understand the concept of sovereignty, the authority of the United Nations (UN) and the UN Security Council (SC), the criteria for intervention, and the role of regional organizations, all of which will be discussed below.

The History and Concept of the responsibility to protect

The principle of sovereign equality of States and the domestic jurisdiction within a State’s territorial borders is an established norm in international law and guaranteed by the UN Charter. However, the concept of sovereignty has been redefined during the last century as different conflicts have occurred, increasing peacekeeping operations and other external implications to maintain peace and social order within a certain State. First, a change in the concept

¹²⁰ BBC News, *Nato’s ‘safe passage’ for Taliban*, 2010.

¹²¹ BBC News, *Nato’s ‘safe passage’ for Taliban*, 2010.

¹²² Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 1689

¹²³ Joffe, *Rethinking the Nation-State: The Many Meanings of Sovereignty*, Foreign Affairs ;

Cohen, *Humanitarian Imperatives are Transforming Sovereignty*, Northwestern Journal of International Affairs, 2008.

¹²⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 2005, p.30

¹²⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 2005, p.30

¹²⁶ Bannon, *The Responsibility to Protect: The UN World Summit and the Questions of Unilateralism*, 2006, Vol.1157

of sovereignty has occurred, bringing about the idea of “contingent sovereignty,” referring to the perception that sovereignty encompasses not only rights within the international community, but also responsibilities.¹²⁷ Giving a Nobel Lecture on December 10, 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted that “the sovereignty of States must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights.”¹²⁸ Furthermore, Francis Deng, Special Advisor of the Secretary-General for the Prevention of Genocide, has emphasized that sovereignty is a responsibility inclusive of obligations to respect basic human rights.¹²⁹

In September 2000, on the instigation of the Canadian government, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was established.¹³⁰ It serves as a forum for researchers and practitioners from different regions of the world to discuss the concept of RtoP. As one of the Commission’s outcomes, the report *The Responsibility to Protect* from December 2001, was one of the first reports on the RtoP concept and paved the way for researchers and policy makers.¹³¹

The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, an initiative derived from the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, also endorsed the recharacterization of sovereignty as responsibility, saying “today it clearly carries with it the obligations of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community.”¹³² The 2004 report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, states that the principle of RtoP applies to four categories – war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.¹³³ Also in *In Larger Freedom*, former Secretary-General Annan endorsed the importance of a collective responsibility to protect: “[I] believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect and, when necessary, we must act on it.”¹³⁴

In another definition of RtoP, according to Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, the concept of the RtoP embraces the responsibility to react, the responsibility to prevent, and the responsibility to rebuild.¹³⁵ Each of these responsibilities are vital, thus it is essential to understand them in nuances. For example, the responsibility to react refers to the proper response, including wide range of sanctions and interventions. The responsibility to prevent is the most important of these three dimensions, as successful actions in preventing conflict can protect from further conflict escalation.¹³⁶ The responsibility to rebuild is crucial for the post-intervention phase when assistance (financial, human resources, specialists, and materials) for recovery, reconciliation and restoration is needed.¹³⁷

According to the paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the concept of RtoP is built upon three pillars, where the first one is the protection responsibilities of the State, second is international assistance and capacity-building and third is timely and decisive response.¹³⁸ A State’s responsibility to protect its people is a legal obligation and an indication of its own sovereignty.¹³⁹ The international community should be able and capable to assist a State in trouble, if needed, if a State is not capable to meet its obligations. Thus, pillar two is essential in prevent further escalation of a conflict.¹⁴⁰ Third pillar – timely and case-by-case specific response

¹²⁷ Claussen and Nichol, *Reconstructing Sovereignty: The Impact of Norms, Practices and Rhetoric*, Bologn Center Journal of International Affairs, Vol.11, Spring 2008

¹²⁸ Annan, *Nobel Lecture*, 2001.

¹²⁹ Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild, Zartman, *Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa*, 1996, p. 154.

¹³⁰ Joffe, *Rethinking the Nation-State: The Many Meanings of Sovereignty*, Foreign Affairs; ICISS, also refers to as the “Evans-Sahnoun Commission” after Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and President of the ICISS from 2000 to 2009 and Mohamed Sahnoun, former UN Special Envoy in Africa

¹³¹ Cohen, *Humanitarian Imp*

eratives are Transforming Sovereignty, 2008.; United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*.

¹³³ United Nations General Assembly, *Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit (A/RES/59/565)*, 2004

¹³⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General (A/RES/59/2005)*, 2005

¹³⁵ Evans and Sahnoun, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Foreign Affairs, 2002, Vol.81, No. 6. p.101.

¹³⁶ Naumann, *The Responsibility to Protect – Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of Military Force*, Canadian Military Journal, Vol.5, No.4, p. 3.

¹³⁷ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.35.

¹³⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General (A/63/677)*, 2009, p.9.

¹³⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 2005, p.30.

¹⁴⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect*, 2009, p.19.

comprise of capacity, political will to take decisive actions and cooperation with respective regional organizations.¹⁴¹

Legal disputes regarding the responsibility to protect

The Charter of the United Nations affirms the organization's faith in fundamental human rights, but Article 2(7) prohibits interventions "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State."¹⁴² Thus there are two opposing camps – one insisting on a right to intervene and the other which declares that "Security Council is prohibited from authorizing actions against sovereign States."¹⁴³

The opposition to these interventions results from fears that the principle of the RtoP will be used to legitimize what some see as neo-colonialist intentions of major powers.¹⁴⁴ In particular, these states have acquired or consolidated their sovereignty only recently, and as a result, they fear any change to their newly-recognized legitimacy in the international arena, especially one brought from outside. These newly independent states are not represented among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and furthermore, there are questions surrounding the possibility that powerful states may act unilaterally to harm their recently gained sovereignty.¹⁴⁵ Finally, there is skepticism regarding the ability of the UN to prevent civil conflicts and other situations where citizens are harmed and the ability of the government to respond is limited, leaving enforceability of the RtoP in question.¹⁴⁶

The United Nations Security Council and the responsibility to protect

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document reaffirmed that "the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security."¹⁴⁷ Heads of State and Government also pledged that: "we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."¹⁴⁸ In other words, the UN Security Council is thus empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter to plan and implement actions to maintain peace and security, and to protect populations against threats to their welfare.¹⁴⁹ UN Security Council *Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* of April 28, 2006, reaffirmed that the international community will take actions through the UN Security Council when States fail or are not willing to protect their citizens.¹⁵⁰

In the event that the UN Security Council fails to authorize a response to a security situation, the UN General Assembly (GA) can hold an emergency session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, for the purpose of making appropriate recommendations for further collective measures to restore the peace.¹⁵¹ This procedure goes back to UN GA A/RES/377 (V) A, *Uniting for peace*, which states that "If the Security Council... fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace ... the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making

¹⁴¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect*, 2009, p.26.

¹⁴² The United Nations, *The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 2 (7)*,

¹⁴³ The High Level Panel, *Excerpt of High Level Panel's report on Threats, Challenges and Change*, 2004,

¹⁴⁴ Ayoob, *Third World Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration*, 2004, p.115.

¹⁴⁵ Brunnee and Toope, *Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility to Protect*, *Journal of International Law and International Relations*, Vol. 2, p. 121-137, 2006.

¹⁴⁶ Feinstein, *UN-divided*, *The National Interests*, Winter 2005,

¹⁴⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 2005.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 2005n

¹⁴⁹ Støre, *Old Recipes in a New World? The Challenges of Multilateralism in the 21st century*, 2006n

¹⁵⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, 2005.; United Nations Security Council, *Protection of civilians in armed conflicts (S/RES/1674)*, 2006.

¹⁵¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Uniting for Peace A/RES/377 (V) A*, 1950

appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.¹⁵² Under this procedure, a decision to intervene must be agreed upon by a two-thirds majority of the GA.¹⁵³

Implementation of the responsibility to protect

Crucial aspects of the RtoP are the preventive actions and the early warning system, as in each case there are the warning signs that a dire humanitarian situation is likely to begin or is in early stages.¹⁵⁴ According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's report *The Responsibility to Protect*, there are instruments that could be effective to halt the crimes against humanity, which could be applied before military intervention. These instruments may be economic (in terms of funding, aid assistance or debt relief), political, diplomatic (for example, sanctions, isolation or embargoes), legal (such as deploying monitors or mediation offers), or in extreme cases, military.¹⁵⁵

Criteria Justifying Intervention

According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report *The Responsibility to Protect*, the six main criteria which must be fulfilled when military intervention is on agenda, are: just cause, right intention, reasonable prospects, last resort, proportional means, and proper authority.¹⁵⁶

First, just cause refers to the grounds of the intervention.¹⁵⁷ The intervention for human protection is justified if genocide, large scale ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity are carried out.¹⁵⁸ Systematic racial discrimination, repression of political opposition, or lack of democracy are not appropriate cases for military intervention. However, preventive measures and sanctions could be applied in these cases.¹⁵⁹ Before authorizing intervention, the UN Security Council and other parties involved must be certain that credible evidence is present.¹⁶⁰ Second, right intention applies to the motives of the State intervening, such as civilian protection.¹⁶¹ The occupations of territory, economic, or strategic interests are not viewed as legitimate justifications for intervention.¹⁶² Third, military intervention as a last resort can be justified only when every diplomatic and/or non-military possibility has been exhausted.¹⁶³ There should be a reasonable ground to believe that lesser or other measures would not halt the ongoing crisis.¹⁶⁴ Fourth, the idea of using proportional means refers to the idea that a military intervention should only be on the scale needed, and only last as long as needed, to halt the existing crisis in order to minimize impact on the intervened upon State.¹⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the rules of international humanitarian law should be observed and should be strictly adhered to by intervening forces in each case.¹⁶⁶ Fifth, reasonable

¹⁵² United Nations General Assembly, *Uniting for Peace A/RES/377 (V) A*, 1950,

¹⁵³ Hamilton, *The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine – But What of Implementation? Recent Development*, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol.19, Spring 2006,

¹⁵⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General (A/63/677)*, 2009.

¹⁵⁵ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect*. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) p.35.

¹⁵⁶ Hinman, *Justice in Action: Just War Theory*, 2010.

¹⁵⁷ Evans and Sahnoun, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Foreign Affairs, 2002, Vol.81, No. 6. p.104.

¹⁵⁸ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.32.

¹⁵⁹ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.34.

¹⁶⁰ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.35.

¹⁶¹ Evans, *Global and Regional Security: Our Shared Responsibility*, 2004.

¹⁶² The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.35-36.

¹⁶³ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.35-36.

¹⁶⁴ Evans and Sahnoun, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Foreign Affairs, 2002, Vol.81, No. 6. p.105.

¹⁶⁵ Evans and Sahnoun, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Foreign Affairs, 2002, Vol.81, No. 6. P.105.

¹⁶⁶ Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, *Civil Defence in International Humanitarian Law*, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001.; The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.37.

prospect refers to the actual protection of population, which must be achieved in order to make intervention justified.¹⁶⁷ Sixth, which is also the most controversial and difficult principle to apply for human protection purposes, is proper authority.¹⁶⁸ Proper authority refers to the body, which authorizes the intervention.¹⁶⁹ The UN has a key role as the legitimate authority to authorize the interventions.¹⁷⁰ Particularly, the UN Security Council has a special role in authorizing any military intervention and use of force prior to the intervention being carried out.¹⁷¹

Case study: The African Union and responsibility to protect

Even if the UN Security Council is fully empowered under the *UN Charter* to intervene to protect populations from dire threats, regional organizations are also capable of being involved in these operations.¹⁷² These organizations gain authorization from the *UN Charter*, Chapter 8, Article 53 (1), which states that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”¹⁷³ In accordance with this section of the Charter, the UN Security Council on January 28, 2010 extended the authorization for African Union to continue and maintain the mission AMISON in Somalia until January 31, 2011.¹⁷⁴

The African Union was established in 2002 “to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.”¹⁷⁵ The involvement of the African Union in conflicts on the continent is with good reason, as the regional conflicts tend to spill over and impact neighboring states, causing concern for the security of the people living in these neighboring states. The African leaders have many times emphasized their responsibility, self-awareness and commitment to the peace of the continent: “as Africans, we believe that whenever and wherever there is a conflict in Africa, we have a special duty and a primary responsibility towards our sisters and brothers when they suffer and when their lives are at risk more so than anyone else and that is why the African Union acted so promptly and so decisively in the case of Darfur.”¹⁷⁶ There have been numerous attempts to improve the capacity of the organization, and to enable the rapid reaction in the crisis situation (including prospects for the African Standby Force), but under-funding has been a serious obstacle.¹⁷⁷

Conclusion and questions for further research

The concept of the responsibility to protect aims to protect people from ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, genocide, and mass killings. This concept is not about security and human rights in a general sense nor is it about protecting individuals from HIV/AIDS, natural disasters, and other tragedies.¹⁷⁸ The RtoP as a concept is narrow, at the same time is it multidimensional, including different tools and means to respond in a decisive manner.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the RtoP utilizes diplomatic, economic, legal, humanitarian, political, and military measures as effective tools in protecting populations. Military intervention is a last resort to protect the population against mass killings, genocide, or ethnic cleansing.¹⁸⁰ The political will and readiness of the international community to respond

¹⁶⁷ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 2001, p.37.

¹⁶⁸ Luck, *The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect*, 2008, p.2

¹⁶⁹ Simons, *Sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect*, January-March, 2003.

¹⁷⁰ Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security. From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*, 2006.

¹⁷¹ Tama, *Supporting Military Interventions to Protect Human Rights*, 2006.

¹⁷² Villani, *The Security Council's Authorization of Enforcement Action by regional Organizations*, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol.6, 2002,

¹⁷³ The United Nations, *The United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 53 (1)*

¹⁷⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1910 (2010) on the situation in Somalia of January 28, 2010*, 2010,

¹⁷⁵ African Union, *The Constitutive Act*, 2000.

¹⁷⁶ *Explanation of vote made by HE Ambassador Abdallah Baali, on behalf of Algeria, Angola and Benin, before the Security Council, after the adoption of the resolution on Darfur*, 2004

¹⁷⁷ Kuperman, *Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect*, Winter/Spring 2009, *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Vol. X, Number 1, p.39.

¹⁷⁸ Evans, *Delivering on the responsibility to Protect: Four Misunderstandings, Three Challenges and How to Overcome Them*, 2007.

¹⁷⁹ Luck, *The Responsibility to Protect as a Joint Duty*,

¹⁸⁰ Evans, *Delivering on the responsibility to Protect: Four Misunderstandings, Three Challenges and How to Overcome Them*, 2007.

in an effective manner is crucial, including the decisions passed in the UN Security Council.¹⁸¹ It is also essential to have the institutional capacity to carry out the preventive actions and to implement certain policies when necessary.¹⁸²

In researching this topic, delegates should consider their role their state has played in responsibility to protect interventions in the past. Also, as acting on this responsibility to protect can be restricted by disputes over the legality of these actions, how might the international community work to forge agreements on when the responsibility to protect might apply to a situation, and when it might not? While the Security Council is generally regarded to be the most legitimate body to authorize actions in support of the responsibility to protect, the African Union also regards RtoP as a duty. Is it legitimate for the African Union—or any other organization—to intervene without a UN mandate?

III. Climate Change and International Security

“Where climate change threats to human well being are expected to be severe, particularly where people are especially vulnerable because of low levels of human development and weak institutions of governance, the security implications are apt to be pronounced, including the possibility of social and political tensions and of armed conflicts.”¹⁸³

Climate change has been a topic of discussion within the United Nations (UN) for decades; in 1992, the UN established the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC).¹⁸⁴ The UNFCCC defines climate change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”¹⁸⁵ Fifteen years passed, however, before the Security Council first addressed the issue of climate change and its implications on international peace and security.¹⁸⁶ While some have questioned whether the Security Council is the proper forum for discussing the consequences, others maintain that because, under the UN Charter, the Security Council is charged with “maintaining international peace and security” the Security Council is an appropriate forum for this debate.¹⁸⁷ Article 36 of the UN Charter states, “The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.”¹⁸⁸ This gives the Security Council the right to discuss, at any stage of its development, an issue that may jeopardize international security. Under resolution S/RES/1625, the Security Council reaffirmed establishing policy that addresses root causes of conflict such as climate change.¹⁸⁹ Having already debated the legality of putting climate change on the agenda, the Security Council now must further the discussion and consider climate change’s implications on international security.¹⁹⁰

Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier

In his 2009 report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon characterized climate change as a “threat multiplier.”¹⁹¹ As

¹⁸¹ Evans, *Delivering on the responsibility to Protect: Four Misunderstandings, Three Challenges and How to Overcome Them*, 2007.

¹⁸² World Federalist movement, *Responsibility to Protect – Engaging Civil Society*, 2004, p.3

¹⁸³ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Convening Document*, 1992.

¹⁸⁵ United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Convening Document*, 1992, Article 1, Point 2.

¹⁸⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Press Release on the First Ever Debate of the Security Council on the Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security (SC/9000)*, 2007.

¹⁸⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Press Release on the First Ever Debate of the Security Council on the Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security (SC/9000)*, 2007.

United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter V, Article 23.

¹⁸⁸ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VI, Article 36.

¹⁸⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1625 (S/RES/1625)*, 2005.

United Nations Security Council, *Press Release on the First Ever Debate of the Security Council on the Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security (SC/9000)*, 2007.

¹⁹⁰ Penny, *Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging ‘Threat to International Peace and Security’*, 2006.

¹⁹¹ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 2.

such, climate change may exacerbate pre-existing environmental, political, socio-economic, and cultural vulnerabilities as well as “overburdening governance capacities.”¹⁹² Developing countries, specifically those on the list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), if struck by conflict or disasters have more difficulty adapting to climate change and its negative effects because of greater weaknesses in governance and infrastructure.¹⁹³ Many have concerns about the effect climate change will have on health, economic growth, and reducing poverty and fear it may trigger new conflicts while also acting as a tipping point in already tense situations.¹⁹⁴ Ban also noted the devastating possibility of climate change slowing and even reversing all progress made in development, which may increase the number of vulnerable states and their populations.¹⁹⁵

Of the threats posed by climate change resource scarcity including lack of available food and water sources, arable land for agriculture and farming, and land to build homes and communities is one of the most critical.¹⁹⁶ As resources decrease, competition for these resources becomes a matter of survival.¹⁹⁷ Food security has already become an issue as evidenced by the 2009 food crisis, which greatly affected many nations, including but not limited to Afghanistan, Haiti, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Yemen.¹⁹⁸ Ban recalled the recent crisis as a small example of what might occur but on a larger scale should food shortages and resulting social unrest go unattended.¹⁹⁹

Likewise, water conflicts can be derived from a number of issues including water allocation, water scarcity, and water quality.²⁰⁰ Shared water sources can increase opportunities for conflict not only through competition over supply but also over water rights, as is often the case in the Nile region.²⁰¹ Both overabundance and water scarcity cause conflict from competition.²⁰² Overabundance of water from increased rainfall or floods often reduces the amount of useable land and increases contaminated water.²⁰³ This forces populations to search for clean water and new territory, leading to competition and migration of peoples.²⁰⁴ Water scarcity similarly forces populations into competition for available clean water sources.²⁰⁵ Moreover, water quality as well as water quantity initiates conflicts.²⁰⁶ The amount of people who are at risk from water stress is estimated to rise to 0.4-1.7 billion by the 2020s and 1.1-3.2 billion by the 2080s.²⁰⁷ As the temperature of the earth’s water rises, so does the spread of disease as water-transmitted diseases thrive better in warm water rather than cold.²⁰⁸ Already, the UN estimates 3 million people a year die from water related diseases.²⁰⁹ An increase in warm water used for human consumption can mean quicker and more widely spread pandemics.²¹⁰ For example, by 2030 water security issues will intensify

¹⁹² Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 2.

¹⁹³ Smith and Vivekananda, *A Climate of Conflict: A Link Between Climate Change, Peace and War*, 2007, p. 21.

¹⁹⁴ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 2.

¹⁹⁵ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 2.

¹⁹⁶ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009.

¹⁹⁷ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009.

¹⁹⁸ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 11.

United Nations, *The UN System Response to the World Food Security Crisis*, 2008, p. 2.

¹⁹⁹ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 11.

²⁰⁰ Carius, Houdret, and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 7.

²⁰¹ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 15.

²⁰² Carius, Houdret, and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 7.

²⁰³ Carius, Houdret, and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 7.

²⁰⁴ Carius, Houdret, and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 7.

²⁰⁵ Carius, Houdret, and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 7.

²⁰⁶ Carius, Houdret, and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 4.

²⁰⁷ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 11.

²⁰⁸ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*, 2007.

²⁰⁹ Carius, Houdret, and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 5.

²¹⁰ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*, 2007.

in Australia and New Zealand, and in Europe increased flash floods with resulting social pandemics are expected.²¹¹

Food security, water scarcity, and loss of land are all common underlying issues of conflict, especially in many large scale, often intractable conflicts, such as the situation in Darfur, Sudan which has been attributed to a fight over lack of water and arable land.²¹² On a list of causes of conflict in Darfur from 1930 to 2000, 33 of the 41 disputes were over resources, specifically land, water, and grazing.²¹³ The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its fourth session concluded that any global average temperature rise above 3 degrees Celsius over a century compared to the 1980 to 1999 levels would result in a decrease in crop production.²¹⁴ For farmers in Ethiopia, this change in climate poses a serious threat to their livelihood.²¹⁵ They rely heavily on good harvests and the populations they serve rely on affordable food prices.²¹⁶ Such loss in crops and increases in food prices can lead to strife, growth in inequalities, and famine, which can lead to violent conflicts between populations in order to secure survival – conflicts which will then be of concern to the Security Council.²¹⁷

Furthermore, some recognize that the threat posed by climate change is not limited solely to developing countries but also affects developed countries.²¹⁸ Some analysts argue that national security is at risk particularly from humanitarian disasters and weakening governments in unstable regions.²¹⁹ A report by the United States Department of Defense stated that climate change will affect food and water scarcity, disease, and mass migrations leaving governments and militaries across the world overburdened.²²⁰ This is particularly crucial to the Middle East.²²¹ As a region already stricken with intractable conflicts, it is at risk for becoming intractably unstable from climate change related security threats.²²² As agricultural productivity decreases and food prices increase, the likelihood of conflict over the control of territory is high because more land is required to produce the necessary amount of food.²²³ In 2007-2008, Syria saw a drop in wheat harvest by one half, and in Jordan the cattle population fell to 600,000 from one million.²²⁴ Countries in the Middle East are also already heavily reliant on Western states like the United States and the European Union for importing agricultural products, such as wheat.²²⁵ The IPCC has associated an increase in climate change volatility with increases in food prices.²²⁶ Should food prices increase, tensions may rise between states in the region in order to obtain the land needed to provide for their respective populations without depending on foreign nations with which there are often hostile relations.²²⁷ Forced migration from climate change and its effects on refugee populations are also a concern in the Middle East.²²⁸

Climate Change and its impact on international migration

²¹¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*, 2007, p. 50.

²¹² Salehyan, *From Climate Change to Conflict: No Consensus Yet*, 2008, p. 316.

²¹³ United Nations Environmental Programme, *Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*, 2007, p. 82.

²¹⁴ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*, 2007, p. 48.

²¹⁵ de Koning, *COP 15: Climate Change and International Security*, 2010, p. 78.

²¹⁶ de Koning, *COP 15: Climate Change and International Security*, 2010, p. 78.

²¹⁷ de Koning, *COP 15: Climate Change and International Security*, 2010, p. 79.

²¹⁸ Busby, *Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action*, 2007.

²¹⁹ Busby, *Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action*, 2007.

²²⁰ United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 2010, p. 85.

²²¹ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009.

²²² Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 2.

²²³ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 23.

²²⁴ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 22.

²²⁵ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 22.

²²⁶ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 23.

²²⁷ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 23.

²²⁸ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) split migration caused by climate concerns into two categories: “*climate processes* such as sea-level rise, salinization of agricultural land, desertification and growing water scarcity” and “*climate events* such as flooding, storms and glacial lake outburst floods.”²²⁹ As situations worsen, populations will begin to migrate in search of survival and better living conditions.²³⁰ When food insecurity, land and water scarcity, rising sea levels and natural disasters exist, the risk of large-scale migration will grow.²³¹ In a study analyzing 38 mass migrations since the 1930s, 19 of them resulted in some form of conflict.²³² Already, spill-over conflict can be seen across the world in states bordering conflict zones; refugees in Chad fleeing conflict in Darfur and refugees leaving Colombia for Ecuador and Venezuela are two examples.²³³ Estimates of involuntary migrants by the year 2050 are between 50 and 350 million people.²³⁴ This migration will have a large effect on the amount of people residing in urban areas, which are already over-populated and underdeveloped.²³⁵ This creates a breeding ground for potential conflict when tensions arise and there is a lack of resources and coping mechanisms.²³⁶ The mayor of Amman, Jordan expects the populations in the city to rise to 6.4 million from 2.5 million by 2025.²³⁷ While it is noted that this may improve education standards, a higher threat of social and political tension leading to conflict and an increase in the amount of people vulnerable to natural disasters from a lack of infrastructure provided by the state may result.²³⁸

In natural disasters, displaced people such as those in Indonesia after the tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or the flood in Pakistan in 2010, are forced to find refuge in new areas of their own nation or often across borders.²³⁹ Natural disasters have the potential to force mass populations into migration and do so without any warning.²⁴⁰ While climate change is not the sole cause of natural disasters, it acts as a multiplier of negative effects; which when applied to devastating events can gravely damage human well being.²⁴¹ In the Northeast region of Syria, it was reported that 160 villages were abandoned after a 2007-2008 drought, with populations increasing in the urban areas.²⁴² Additionally, when international involuntary migration is forced, questions rise as to whether these people should be considered migrants or refugees; each carries different legal repercussions and responsibilities.²⁴³ Yet regardless of their classification, these people cause stress on food supplies, housing, education, health, water supplies, and communities as a whole.²⁴⁴ Relocations already were made in the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.²⁴⁵

Those most likely to be affected by such disasters and forced into such a situation are human settlements on coastlines and small islands.²⁴⁶ Nearly one third of the world’s population is settled on a coast.²⁴⁷ The IPCC expects average global sea levels to rise at least .18 meters if not up to .59 meters by 2090 to 2099 as compared to levels between 1980 to 1999.²⁴⁸ In 2009, a BBC article on the effects of climate change stated, “Rising seas would make

²²⁹ Brown, *Migration and Climate Change*, 2008, p. 9.

²³⁰ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 15.

²³¹ Salehyan, *From Climate Change to Conflict: No Consensus Yet*, 2008, p. 316.

²³² Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 17.

²³³ Salehyan, *From Climate Change to Conflict: No Consensus Yet*, 2008, p. 316.

North, *Darfur’s Refugees in Chad*, 2005.

Refugees International, *Colombia: Crisis Bubbling Over*, 2009.

²³⁴ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 15.

²³⁵ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 16 - 17.

²³⁶ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 16 - 17.

²³⁷ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 26.

²³⁸ Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 26.

²³⁹ Brown, *Migration and Climate Change*, 2008.

²⁴⁰ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009.

²⁴¹ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009.

²⁴² Brown and Crawford, *Rising temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*, 2009, p. 26.

²⁴³ Brown, *Migration and Climate Change*, 2008, p. 13.

²⁴⁴ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 16.

²⁴⁵ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 16.

²⁴⁶ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 16.

²⁴⁷ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 12.

²⁴⁸ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*, 2007, p. 45.

many areas uninhabitable leading to mass migrations and inevitably sparking violent conflict.²⁴⁹ Proper protocol for protecting and aiding such communities needs to be established, particularly for those communities that risk being engulfed completely as climate change causes sea levels to rise.²⁵⁰

One of the largest concerns regarding threats to security by climate change is the uncertainty of adverse effects.²⁵¹ Populations settled on coastlines are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels and natural disasters, but generally lack the capabilities to handle the crises.²⁵² If a state were to become physically uninhabitable, the ability of the government to continue governing and to provide legal rights of citizenship may be impossible.²⁵³ Should these disasters have catastrophic results, surviving populations will inevitably migrate in search of new homes and citizenship, which may be complicated due to a lack of international laws.²⁵⁴ The responsibilities of both the home and host states come into question; left unattended the issues may result in increased conflict.²⁵⁵

Similar to natural disasters, violent conflict can itself induce mass refugee fluctuations.²⁵⁶ It is often suggested that climate change is more likely to create internal rather than large-scale international conflicts.²⁵⁷ However, as populations are forced to migrate because of climate change, internal or otherwise, populations become intertwined thus decreasing resource to population ratios, straining ethnic and political tensions, escalating sovereignty issues relating to refugees, and increasing pure geographical space constraints.²⁵⁸ Climate change has the power to make traditional solutions to these problems unfeasible and create crisis situations simultaneously across the globe.²⁵⁹ Yet international policy on these issues is not clearly defined.²⁶⁰ When multiple conflicts arise and are crossing borders, maintaining and respecting sovereignty becomes increasingly complicated.²⁶¹ Even in intra-state conflicts, governments often decline to accept responsibility stating that environmental issues are not of their concern.²⁶²

Case Studies from Africa

The continent of Africa has one of the most diverse populations, ecological systems, political structures, and set of challenges as well as 67% of states on the list of LDCs.²⁶³ African nations are also among the lowest emitters of greenhouse gases, and yet Africa is most likely to experience the worst and largest amount of adverse climate change effects as they are heavily reliant on climate-supported sectors like rain-fed agriculture.²⁶⁴ Consequently, Africa is likely to suffer the most from climate change related security issues.²⁶⁵ If climate change continues and reaches projected “high warning scenarios,” by 2099 Africa will be faced with a global temperature increase of 4 degrees Celsius.²⁶⁶ Up to a 35% drop in crop production across the continent is projected, and millions of people could be displaced due to extreme weather events with nearly 420 million people subject to flooding.²⁶⁷ Warming may threaten health through increased spread of diseases and the lack of coping abilities will leave the continent unable to respond.²⁶⁸ Moreover, in the south, Africans may experience 50% decline in water availability.²⁶⁹

²⁴⁹ Mcgrath, *Climate Scenarios ‘Being Released’*, 2009.

²⁵⁰ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 16.

²⁵¹ Penny, *Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging ‘Threat to International Peace and Security’*, 2006, p. 41.

²⁵² Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Fourth Assessment Report*, 2007, ch. 19.

²⁵³ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 21.

²⁵⁴ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 21.

²⁵⁵ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 21.

²⁵⁶ Salehyan, *From Climate Change to Conflict: No Consensus Yet*, 2008, p. 316.

²⁵⁷ Raleigh and Urdal, *Climate Change, environmental degradation and armed conflict*, 2007, p. 678.

²⁵⁸ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p.16.

²⁵⁹ Smith and Vivekananda, *A Climate of Conflict: A Link Between Climate Change, Peace and War*, 2007.

²⁶⁰ Smith and Vivekananda, *A Climate of Conflict: A Link Between Climate Change, Peace and War*, 2007.

²⁶¹ Smith and Vivekananda, *A Climate of Conflict: A Link Between Climate Change, Peace and War*, 2007.

²⁶² Salehyan, *From Climate Change to Conflict: No Consensus Yet*, 2008, p. 322.

²⁶³ United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, *List of Least Developed Countries*, n.d.

²⁶⁴ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Fourth Assessment Report*, 2007, ch. 19, p.189.

Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 18.

²⁶⁵ Brown, Hammill, and Mcleman, *Climate change as the ‘new’ security threat: implications for Africa*, 2007.

²⁶⁶ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 25.

²⁶⁷ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 25.

²⁶⁸ Brown, Hammill, and Mcleman, *Climate change as the ‘new’ security threat: implications for Africa*, 2007, p. 1146.

Reduced water availability in savannahs may also increase migrations, leading to escalated tensions and conflict.²⁷⁰ With high pre-existing tensions and low development, climate change in Africa poses one of the most serious threats to security this century.²⁷¹ All such factors combined would create one of the largest mass disasters in the world, especially considering Africa already has 14% of the world's population with an expected rise to 25% by 2050.²⁷²

While other regions will be affected by climate change and be susceptible to related conflict, there is no other region as highly concentrated with pre-existing conflicts as Africa.²⁷³ On the dry lands of East Africa in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya, pastoral farmers make up the population.²⁷⁴ These pastoralists rely on the well being of their livestock for their own survival.²⁷⁵ Although they may have cultural, idiomatic, and geographic similarities, conflict ensues when they are forced to migrate in search of water and land because the land within their territory has ceased being able to sustain them and their livestock due to desertification.²⁷⁶ This migration has already led to disputes over land rights.²⁷⁷ As the amount of viable land decreases from climate change, the amount and intensity of these disputes will only escalate and can be easily fueled by the abundance of small arms in the area and by war-profiteers.²⁷⁸ Nigeria, already on the UN's list of most unstable states, is estimated to lose 3,500 square kilometers of land a year from desertification and forces both herdsman and farmers off the land.²⁷⁹ Nigeria is also dependent on the safety of its coastal lands as they account for 75% of its arable land.²⁸⁰ Swelling of the Niger delta threatens to displace people and risk further destabilization of the country.²⁸¹

Threats of mass migration are more of a reality in Africa than anywhere else in the world – a problem that could lead to the fall of already overburdened governments attempting to cope with over-populated urban centers, lack of jobs, declining economies, and increasing poverty and disease.²⁸² Africa is facing expanding deserts, shrinking savannahs, food insecurity, declining rainfall, and water scarcity, all combined with an unprepared infrastructure.²⁸³ Africa has historically been subject to poor governance, a problem that they still face today and is at the heart of many conflicts on the continent.²⁸⁴ Addressing these weaknesses could mean the difference in crisis and conflict with respect to the consequences of climate change.²⁸⁵

Within the UN, prevention is often discussed in the context of conflict or climate change, but rarely security policy.²⁸⁶ Traditionally, security policy focuses on reacting to and ending conflicts.²⁸⁷ Yet according to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan,

“As we look ahead, we can see real risks that resource depletion, especially freshwater scarcities, as well as severe forms of environmental degradation, may increase social and political tensions in unpredictable but potentially dangerous ways. In short, these new security challenges require us to think creatively, and to adapt our traditional approaches to better meet the needs of our new era. But one time honored precept holds more firmly today than ever: it all begins with prevention.”²⁸⁸

Ten years later Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon echoed Mr. Annan's statement declaring prevention as the true goal

²⁶⁹ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 25.

²⁷⁰ Gleditsch and Nordas, *Climate Change and Conflict*, 2007, p. 630.

²⁷¹ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009.

²⁷² Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 25.

²⁷³ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 10.

²⁷⁴ Leff, *Pastoralist at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region*, 2009, p. 189.

²⁷⁵ Leff, *Pastoralist at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region*, 2009, p. 189.

²⁷⁶ Leff, *Pastoralist at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region*, 2009, p. 189.

²⁷⁷ Leff, *Pastoralist at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region*, 2009, p. 189.

²⁷⁸ Leff, *Pastoralist at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region*, 2009, p. 189.

²⁷⁹ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 13.

²⁸⁰ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 17.

²⁸¹ Solana, *Climate Change and Security: Follow-up Recommendations by European Union High Representative Solana*, 2009.

²⁸² Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p.18.

²⁸³ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009.

²⁸⁴ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 7.

²⁸⁵ Gleditsch and Nordas, *Climate Change and Conflict*, 2007.

²⁸⁶ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 4.

²⁸⁷ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 4.

²⁸⁸ Annan, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, 2000, ch. 3, p. 44.

of the United Nations and, while important, security policy should not merely be aimed at conflict resolution or reactionary policy.²⁸⁹ As the most important and widely under-researched threat to international security, climate change must not be ignored or overlooked by the Security Council.²⁹⁰ Climate change is creating dangerous situations and straining already weak systems globally and has the potential to have disastrous results.²⁹¹ Therefore, it is to the benefit of all nations, both developed and developing, to seriously consider preventive security policy.²⁹² Such policy will require multi-faceted approaches and multi-lateral cooperation on the part of Member States with focuses on developing international strategies for migration, adaption, sharing resources and coping with various insecurities.²⁹³ Considering the potential threat of harm to human well being that climate change poses, the Security Council, Member States, and the international community must remember, “Climate change causes livelihood change, which in turn causes disputes. Social institutions can handle these conflicts and settle them in a non-violent manner—it is mismanagement and militarization that cause war and massacre.”²⁹⁴

²⁸⁹ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 4.

²⁹⁰ Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General: Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*, 2009, p. 4.

²⁹¹ Smith and Vivekananda, *A Climate of Conflict: A Link Between Climate Change, Peace and War*, 2007.

²⁹² de Koning, *COP 15: Climate Change and International Security*, 2010, p. 79.

²⁹³ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 2.

²⁹⁴ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 2009, p. 5.

Annotated Bibliography

Committee History of the Security Council

Annan, K. (2006). In Truman Library Speech, Annan Says UN Remains Best Tool to Achieve Key Goals of International Relations. Retrieved September 10, 2008, from United Nations Web site:

http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_full.asp?statID=40/

Kofi Annan made his final speech as UN Secretary-General at the Truman Library in the United States. He used the opportunity to press for reform to the Security Council's membership. He also urged permanent members of the Council to "accept the special responsibility that comes with their privilege."

Fassbender, B. (2004). Pressure for Security Council Reform. In D. M. Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (pp. 341-356). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Fassbender considers efforts to reform the Security Council since the 1990s. To date there has been little consensus on reform proposals. The chapters in David Malone's book offers a comprehensive account of challenges facing the Council.

Hulton, S. C. (2004). Council Working Methods and Procedure. In D. M. Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (pp. 237-252). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Also appearing in Malone's book on the recent history of the Security Council, Hulton considers how the working methods of the Council have changed. Three changes are identified: enhanced transparency, greater consultation and a strategic approach. She also considers changes in procedure.

Luck, E. C. (2006). *UN Security Council: Practice and Promise*. Global Institutions. New York: Routledge.

Written by the Secretary-General's adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Professor E.C. Luck, the book offers an excellent summary of the Council's history. It overviews the powers and functions of the Council, before considering how the Council has responded to humanitarian emergencies, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and reform. Luck's book offers an authoritative introduction to the Council's work.

United Nations. (n.d.). *Committees*. Retrieved August 17, 2010, from United Nations Security Council Web site:

http://www.un.org/%E2%80%8CDocs/%E2%80%8Csc/%E2%80%8Cunsc_structure.html

The UN website lists subsidiary organs that come under the auspices of the Council. Included in this list are the International Criminal Tribunals and the Counter Terrorism Committee. The Charter allows the Council to create subsidiary organs to implement its decisions.

United Nations. (n.d.). *Membership in 2010*. Retrieved August 17, 2010, from United Nations Security Council Web site: <http://www.un.org/%E2%80%8Csc/%E2%80%8Cmembers.asp>

The UN's website also lists the current membership of the Security Council. These include its five permanent members: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Also listed are the Council's non-permanent members, which are elected every two years by the General Assembly.

United Nations Department of Public Information. (2010). *United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet (DPI/2429/Rev.7)*. Retrieved August 17, 2010, from United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations Web site: <http://www.un.org/%E2%80%8CDepts/%E2%80%8Cdpo/%E2%80%8Cdpo/>

A fact sheet is produced each year by the UN's Department of Public Information, which gives various details about the current deployments of UN "blue helmets." The fact sheet states that there are currently 124,000 UN peacekeepers deployed globally. It also lists sixteen missions currently deploying peacekeeping operations.

United Nations. Secretary-General. (n.d.). *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All (A/59/2005)*. Retrieved August 17, 2010, from

<http://www.un.org/%E2%80%8Clargerfreedom/%E2%80%8Ccontents.htm>

The UN Secretary-General drafted a report on reform of the UN in 2005. It included plans to establish the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. In Larger Freedom offers a summary of current debates regarding Security Council reform.

United Nations. Secretary-General. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (A/47/277 – S/24111)*. Retrieved August 17, 2010, from <http://www.un.org/%E2%80%8CDocs/%E2%80%8CSG/%E2%80%8Cagpeace.html>

An Agenda for Peace was a major report on reform of UN peacekeeping drafted by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. It divided peace operations conducted by the UN into peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. Current conceptions of peacekeeping and peace building are based on the analysis contained within the report.

United Nations. Security Council. (1999). *Resolution 1261 (1999)*.

In recent years, the Security Council's agenda has broadened to include human security themes. Resolution 1261 considered armed conflict's effect on children. It is an example of how such themes have increasingly reached the Council's agenda.

United Nations. Security Council. (2000). *Resolution 1308 (2000)*.

In 2000, the Security Council debated HIV/AIDS and its relation to security. The topic is an example of how such issues have increasingly entered the Council's agenda. A number of thematic topics have been considered by the Council.

United Nations. Security Council. (2008). *Resolution 1820 (2008)*.

The effect of war on women is another human security issue that has reached the Council's agenda. The Council has increasingly addressed such topics over the past decade. During the Cold War, it concerned itself mainly with the settlement of specific armed conflicts.

Wallensteen, P., & Johansson, P. (2004). Security Council Decisions in Perspective. In D. M. Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (D. M. Malone, Ed., pp. 17-36). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

In another chapter from Malone's authoritative edited work on the Security Council, Wallensteen and Johansson consider how the Security Council's agenda and decisions have evolved since the end of the Cold War. They provide a useful summary of the Council's work over the past twenty years.

I. The Situation in Afghanistan

Afghan Mission NY. (2010, July 20). *Afghanistan Convenes International Conference on Afghanistan*. Retrieved September 2, 2010, from <http://www.afghanistan-un.org/tag/ban-ki-moon/>

On July 20, 2010 the first international conference on Afghanistan was held in the Afghan capital, Kabul. "The event was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and brought together representatives of seventy countries, international and regional organizations, and other institutions. The international Kabul conference marks the beginning of the 'Kabul process,' and an increased commitment to a secure, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan." The site links to several important speeches given at the event as well as news related to the event.

Bajoria, J. (2009). *The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border*. Retrieved October 1, 2010 from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html

This is a background publication on the Afghan-Pakistani border. This journal article covers the history of the Afghan-Pakistan border as well as historical policy pertaining to the border by each state. The border has become an epicenter of many of the difficulties in the region as well as growing point of tension between all actors in the international community. Several solutions to the border problems are also explored throughout the article.

BBC News. (2008, November 21). *Afghanistan's Turbulent History*. Retrieved August 10, 2010, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1569826.stm

This is a BBC news article detailing the history of Afghanistan and the several regime changes the country has undergone in the last 30 years. The article gives a broad perspective on the modern history of Afghanistan. The BBC links to other articles on Afghanistan that relate to its history as well as current news stories and regional news.

BBC News. (2009, June 22). *Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus*. Retrieved August 15, 2010, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7601748.stm

This news article is a region by region analysis of the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The article notes why each region is important to the insurgencies and the ISAF as well as the topography and traditional inhabitants. This is a great source to find the causes of conflict in each region as well as the region's history.

BBC News. (2010, October 15). *Nato's 'safe passage' for Taliban*. Retrieved October 18, 2010, from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11553388>

The BBC's analysis of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is shallow, but it provides the reader with some background on the topic. As these developments are in their infancy, this article will be updated as new information becomes available. While this article does not delve into the importance of NATO's role, delegates should evaluate the information in this article against NATO's historical statements on this topic.

BBC News. (2010, October 19). *'Six militants die' in Pakistan drone attack*. Retrieved October 19, 2010, from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11571471>

This brief article outlines a recent incident in the border areas of Pakistan. While this drone attack is itself not of particular importance, it is important that delegates understand the events which pass in this region of Pakistan. Although there is no analysis in this article, this article should raise questions regarding sovereignty and military imperatives.

BBC News. (2009, May 13). *Taliban growing in strength*. Retrieved September 5, 2009, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/2009/05/090513_pakistan_map.shtml

Barbara Plett and other BBC correspondents analyze the expansion of the Taliban. Delegates should utilize this resource but be wary as it was produced in the spring of 2009. Delegates should evaluate these claims in the light of more recent evidence.

BBC News. (2009, June 18). *Who are the Taliban?* Retrieved August 7, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1549285.stm

Fighting between the ISAF and the Taliban has been the major source of conflict in Afghanistan. Delegates must have a firm grasp on the composition and history of the Taliban. This Web site offers this information to delegates, as well as additional information regarding the conflict.

BBC News. (2009, June 20). *Why unity is vital for Pakistan survival*. Retrieved August 4, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8110000/8110562.stm

This article offers an insight into Pakistani extremists, which, if held true for Afghan extremists, will make peace impossible. This article argues that Pakistani extremists seek to increase instability in Pakistan and do not seek to gain political power. While the article concludes that stability is an international concern because of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, delegates should consider Pakistan's importance in relation to the security situation in Afghanistan.

Encyclopedia Britannica. (2010). *Afghanistan*. Retrieved August 5, 2010, from Encyclopedia Britannica Online: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7798/Afghanistan>

Basic information on Afghanistan can be found here. The Encyclopedia Britannica describes the history of the country, as well as major problems facing the country. This is an excellent starting point for research into the topic. The Encyclopedia Britannica links to current events on Afghanistan as well as recommended sources for continued research into a subtopic on the country.

Fair, C. C. (2008, March). The educated militants of Pakistan: Implications for Pakistan's domestic security. *Contemporary South Asia*. Retrieved July 20, 2009, from EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier database.

Fair gives an in-depth, micro-level analysis of Pakistani militants, which yield surprising results. From a sampling of 141 militant households, Fair concludes that militants are better educated than the average Pakistani. This conclusion may prove surprising to many, who suggest that militants are routinely uneducated and impoverished.

Felbab-Brown, V. (2010). *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

This book outlines in detail the history of drugs in Afghanistan as it relates to current problems. Shooting Up is an excellent source to examine the history and policies used to combat drug trafficking and use in Afghanistan. It highlights the power of drugs and drug money in Afghanistan as part of Afghani culture and resistance to policies aimed at policing it.

Global Policy Forum (n.d.). *UN Involvement in Afghanistan*. Retrieved August 7, 2010, from <http://globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/afghanistan.html>

Global Policy Forum outlines the UN's involvement in Afghanistan. The outline cites key documents as well as the history of the UN involvement in Afghanistan. This outline is a great first source for more information about the UN's and Security Council's involvement in Afghanistan.

Global Security.org. (2010). *Afghanistan Drug Market*. Retrieved August 19, 2010, from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/drugs-market.htm>

Global Security has information on the widespread Afghan drug trade as well as links to relevant documents and sources for information on the topic. Most of these sources link to related UN documents, organizations, and resolutions. Global Security has the broadest picture of the drug problem in Afghanistan and should be used as a general resource to begin research.

International Security Assistance Force. (2010, August 6). *International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures*. Retrieved August 19, 2010, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site:

<http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/100804%20Rev%20Placemat.pdf>

The ISAF Web site is frequently updated with current troop levels and positions. This particular report shows which regions troops are focused in, as well as the areas in which current PTRs are being carried out. This will help delegates understand which nations are currently supporting the ISAF with troops.

International Security Assistant Force. (2010). *ISAF History*. Retrieved August 16, 2010, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html>

This Web site is the homepage for the ISAF and has links to the history of the ISAF the current peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. The ISAF also publishes current troop levels and contributing nations. Situation reports that highlight successes and challenges to security can be found here.

International Security Assistance Force. (2009, April 29). *ISAF Mandate*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site: <http://www.nato.int/ISAF/topics/mandate/index.html>

This Web site lists important background information regarding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Not only does this Web site discuss applicable UN Security Council resolutions, but it also discusses the goals of the mission. Moreover, the Web site contains several links for further information on the ISAF and related matters.

International Security Assistance Force. (2010). *Mission*. Retrieved October 17, 2010, from <http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html>

Delegates must be intimately familiar with the details of the International Security Assistance Force in order to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. This Web site lists the ISAF's mission. As

members of the Security Council, delegates must be knowledgeable on the mission of this operation.

Johnson, T. H. & Mason, M. C. (2008, Spring). No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier. *International Security*. Retrieved August 8, 2009, from Project Muse database.

The authors of this article in International Security argue that cultural beliefs are the cause of much of the violence in Afghanistan. Johnson and Mason focus on the Pashtun, which live on both sides of the Durand Line. The authors argue that in order to "restore the traditional balance" to Afghanistan, tribal leaders in Pashtun areas should be strengthened and the central government weakened.

Jones, S. G. (2008, Spring). The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad. *International Security*. Retrieved August 8, 2009, from Project Muse database.

While delegates should be familiar with this report, they should be keenly aware that it was given in 2008. While his analysis is based upon figures which are out-of-date, his conclusions may still hold merit. He concludes that the violence in Afghanistan is caused by two factors: a weak central government and ideology. Delegates should closely consider these factors when evaluating the current situation in Afghanistan.

Kemp, W. (2010, January 19). "Drain the Swamp of Corruption in Afghanistan," Says UNODC. Retrieved August 18, 2010, from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Web site:

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2010/January/drain-the-swamp-of-corruption-in-afghanistan-says-unodc.html>

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) publishes reports on corruption and drug trafficking in various areas of the world. This is an article that summarizes a report on corruption in Afghanistan released in January 2010. The article highlights the current problems with corruption in Afghanistan as told by surveyed Afghans.

Martel, W. (2007). *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Victory in War outlines a shift in US military policy during the invasion of Afghanistan as well as information related to post invasion military policy. This military policy change had a global impact and changed the face of combating terrorism around the world. Martel explores short and long term ramifications of this shift in military policy as well international reaction to this shift.

National Public Radio. (September 26, 2010). *Afghan Election Commissions Calls for Recounts*. Retrieved October 6, 2010, from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130136542&ft=1&f=1001>

This NPR article covers some of the issues related to Afghanistan's most recent election. The election commission had counted for recounts in several districts and received thousands of serious complaints regarding voting corruption. The report also notes the seriousness of the violence that occurred during the voting as well as the downturn in voting.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2008, April 4). *Progress in Afghanistan: 2008*. Retrieved September 3, 2010, from http://www.isaf.nato.int/pdf/progress_afghanistan_2008.pdf

The 2008 Progress in Afghanistan report highlights many non-security accomplishments by the ISAF. The report also explains the ISAF's plan to reduce civilian casualties from Improvised Explosive Devices. It also outlines current challenges face by the ISAF as it continues to grow.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2010). *Progress in Afghanistan: 2009*. Retrieved September 3, 2010, from http://www.isaf.nato.int/pdf/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf

The 2009 Progress in Afghanistan report highlights the decrease in violence as more forces occupy the region. The report also high lights current security threats and plans to combat them. This is the most recent report produced by the ISAF.

Pannell, I. (August 18, 2009). *Corruption fears over Afghan Poll*. Retrieved October 5, 2010, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8206469.stm

This BBC article went undercover in the 2009 Afghan Presidential elections to investigate allegations of election corruption. The article includes a video in which a BBC anchor has several illegally purchased voting cards. The article also documents several other occurrences of corruption as well as an interview with a tribal leader who was offered cash for his support.

Rubin, B. and Siddique, A. (October 2006). *Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate*. Retrieved October 5, 2010, from <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SROct06.pdf>

This is a United States Institute of Peace Special Report covering the Afghan-Pakistan border issues and the underlying historical tensions. The report outlines the historical line border set by the British as well as the split of tribal groups as a result. The report assesses the current situation, as well as possible resolutions to, both current and historical differences.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium*. Retrieved September 6, 2010, from http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Counter_Narcotics/Addiction_Crime_and_Insurgency_The_transnational_threat_of_Afghan_opium.pdf

Afghanistan is the world's leading producer of heroin and opium. This UNODC report details the destination of Afghan-produced opiates. The report also explains how the opiates are leaving the country and where the money is going. This document is the most recent, complete account of drug trafficking in Afghanistan.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010, June 22). *Around 1 million Afghans suffer from drug addiction, UNODC reports*. Retrieved August 18, 2010, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/June/around-one-million-afghans-suffer-from-drug-addiction-unodc-survey-shows.html>

This UNODC report details the problems in modern day Afghanistan with drugs and drug addiction. The report has current facts and figures as well as links to annual reports by the UNODC. This report also offers suggestions for solutions and recommendations to the ISAF to combat the drug addiction problem plaguing Afghanistan.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims*. Retrieved September 8, 2010, from <http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/8515c039#/8515c039/1>

The official UNODC report on corruption in Afghanistan highlights firsthand accounts of bribery. The report outlines the regions where bribery is most prevalent as well as what the bribes are being used for. The report highlights how bribery and corruption are undermining the authority of the government.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010, August 20). *UNODC assists Afghanistan justice system in setting up code of ethics*. Retrieved August 20, 2010, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/August/unodc-assists-afghanistan-justice-system-in-setting-up-code-of-ethics.html?ref=fs1>

This is a UNODC article outlining the UN's plan to help curtail corruption in the justice system. The outline makes notes of several key issues effecting trust in the government. The article details the code of ethics being set up by the UN.

United Nations Security Council. (2001, December 5). *Resolution 1154*. Retrieved September 5, 2010 from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2001/1154>

This is a letter from Kofi A. Annan containing a copy of the Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement creates provisional arrangements in Afghanistan for security and governance. This document outlines the Afghan interim government as well as the initial operating procedures for the funding and creation of the ISAF.

United Nations Security Council. (2001, December 20). *Resolution 1386 (2001)*. Retrieved September 5, 2010, from the United Nations Web site: [http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1386%20\(2001\)](http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1386%20(2001))

This Security Council resolution authorizes the creation of the ISAF in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. The resolution also outlines the Security Council's strong commitment to sovereignty and human rights in Afghanistan. This authorization continues to be built upon and expanded and was recently extended.

United Nations Security Council. (2003, October 12). *Resolution 1510 (2003)*. Retrieved September 5, 2010 from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1510%20%282003%29>

This resolution authorizes the expansion of the mandate of the ISAF to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas Afghanistan outside of Kabul. The document also expands the training and mentoring role of the ISAF with the Afghan National Security Forces. The resolution further determines that the situation in Afghanistan at the time constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

United Nations Security Council. (2008, September 22). *Resolution 1833*. Retrieved September 5, 2010 from the United Nations Web site: [http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/res/1833\(2008\)](http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/res/1833(2008))

This UN resolution recognizes the continued efforts of the ISAF and all those involved. The document also notes the link between increased violence in the region and the drug trade and trafficking. Through this document the Security Council recommends and authorizes the extension of operations of the ISAF.

II. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

African Union. (2000). *The Constitutive Act*. Retrieved on September 14, 2010 from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm#Article3

The Web site of African Union offers solid information and documents on regional cooperation in conflict resolution, which could be useful for further research. The Web site may be useful for delegates looking for an elaborated decision-making process on such conflict resolution.

Ayoob, M. (2004). *Third World Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration*. The Politics of International Administration, Vol.10, Issue 1.

The author lays out the complexity of humanitarian interventions in different spots around the globe. He stresses the importance of the geographic location, history and the role of International Community in conflict prevention. The article also explores the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions and regional cooperation.

Annan, K. (2001). *Nobel Lecture, 2001*. Retrieved on August 28, 2010 from http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2001/annan-lecture.html

Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, stressed the importance in cooperation to prevent conflicts and improve the lives of people. He reiterated the importance of the United Nations as a platform where a number of issues can be fruitfully discussed and resolved.

Bannon, L.A. (2006). *The Responsibility to Protect: The UN World Summit and the Questions of Unilateralism*. The Yale Law Journal, 2006, Vol.1157. Retrieved on September 12, 2010 from <http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/286.pdf>

The author discusses the role of the United Nations Security Council, its role in prevention of genocide and other crimes against humanity. The article offers excellent insight in legal justification of unilateral military interventions. The paper brings out multifaceted side of military intervention as a last resort.

Brunnee, J., Toope, S.J. (2006). *Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility to Protect*, Journal of International Law and International Relations, Vol. 2, p. 121-137. Retrieved on September 19, 2010 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1182882

The article may be useful for delegates wishing to explore the objectives, role and vision of the United Nations Security Council and its' the reform options. The authors specifically analyze the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing the RtoP and encourage further research.

Claussen, K., Nichol, T. (2008). *Reconstructing Sovereignty: The Impact of Norms, Practices and Rhetoric*. Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs. Vol.11, Spring 2008. Retrieved on September 27, 2010 from <http://bcjournal.org/2007/reconstructing-sovereignty>

The authors analyze the multifaceted concept of sovereignty, its evolution through time, and different states' perception of it. Thus the article offers elaborated analysis of the sovereignty concept, including an explanation of RtoP within it.

Deng, F. M., Kimaro, S., Lyons, T., Rothchild, D., Zartman, I. W. (1996). *Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa*. Brookings Institution.

The authors analyze the concept of sovereignty, protection of it, and the legacy of humanitarian interventions. They stress the importance of economics, identity and governance in conflict prevention. The book discusses conflict evolution and crucial factors impacting the course of its development.

Evans, G., Sahnoun, M. (2002). *The Responsibility to Protect*. Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.6, p.99-110.

This article analyzes and elaborates the concept of the RtoP; it lays out the basic principles that should be satisfied to justify intervention. The authors stress the importance of perceiving sovereignty as a responsibility. Furthermore, they accentuate the importance of "the responsibility to protect," which encompasses the "responsibility to prevent," "the responsibility to react," and "the responsibility to rebuild."

Evans, G. (2007). *Delivering on the responsibility to Protect: Four Misunderstandings, Three Challenges and How to Overcome Them*. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech243.html>

The author clarifies the concept of RtoP and analyzes the most common misunderstandings about this concept. The article may be useful for delegates to understand more clearly the principle and definition of the RtoP. The author also stresses the importance of improving the capacity of regional organizations, the United Nations and other relevant institutions.

Evans, G. (2004). *Global and Regional Security: Our Shared Responsibility*. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech112.html>

The author discusses the criterion – the scale of the threat, the proper purpose, the last resort, the proportionality, and the balance of consequences—which should be taken into serious consideration before the Security Council authorizes any military action. Further, though unrelated to this topic, the author discusses pros and cons of the possible reform of the United Nations SC.

Etzioni, A. (2007). *Security first: for a muscular, moral foreign policy*. Yale University Press.

The book provides detailed analysis on the importance of human security. It accentuates the importance of moral culture of security. The author stresses the grounds for intervention and the responsibility to protect as an International Communitarian Principle. Delegates may find this book useful for further research on future prospects on global governance and the United Nations and regional organizations role in it.

Feinstein, L. (2005). *UN-divided*. The National Interests, Winter 2005. Retrieved on September 4, 2010 from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_82/ai_n27864426/pg_1?tag=artBody:col1

In this source, the author explains the concept of conditional sovereignty, discusses United Nations reform and role of various States in it. The author also stresses that the State is responsible for its population while also holding a moral responsibility for the population of other States.

Hamilton, R. J. (2006). *The Responsibility to Protect: from Document to Doctrine – but what of Implementation?* Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol.19. p.289-297.

This article outlines the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and analysis the Rwanda case in the context of this concept. The author focuses on the UN Security Council and its role in humanitarian interventions for the human protection purpose. This article may be useful for

delegates to better understand the major powers and their interest in the concept of the responsibility to protect.

Hinman, M. L. (2008). *Justice in Action: Just War Theory*. Ethics Updates. Retrieved on September 9, 2010 from <http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Presentations/AppliedEthics/JustWar/Justice%20in%20War.ppt>

Just cause, last resort, proper authority, probability of success and other are the main criteria to discuss and take into consideration when all other options have been exhausted. The presentation introduces these criteria in detail, and offers concise explanations for each of them.

Jentleson, W.B. (2007). *A Responsibility to Protect: The Defining Challenge for Global Community*. Ethnic Conflict, Vol.28 (4) – Winter 2007. Retrieved on September 3, 2010 from Harvard International Review <http://www.harvardir.org/articles/print.php?article=1525>

The article introduces delegates to the current debate on the responsibility to protect. The author stresses the importance of the international community's engagement in the conflict resolution process. This article may be useful for delegates in gaining a better understanding of conflict resolution and the actors involved in it.

Joffe, J. (1999). *Rethinking the Nation-State: The Many Meanings of Sovereignty*. Retrieved on August 4, 2010 from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19991101fareviewessay1025/josef-joffe/rethinking-the-nation-state-the-many-meanings-ofsovereignty.html>

This review essay on Stephen D. Krasner's book discusses the multiple dimensions of sovereignty, the evolution of this concept and offers a comprehensive insight in a political philosophy on the issue. The article may encourage delegates to read Krasner's book, which would result in gaining a wealth of information on the discourse surrounding the concept of sovereignty.

Krasner, S. D. (2009). *Who Gets a State, and Why? The Relative Rules of Sovereignty*. Retrieved on August 29, 2010, from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64872/stephen-d-krasner/who-gets-a-state-and-why>

The author discusses the concept of sovereignty and the importance of understanding it. The article compares Kosovo, South Ossetia and Gaza in the context of sovereignty, its challenges and international obstacles.

Kuperman, A. J. (2009). *Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect*. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations. Vol. X, Number 1. Winter/Spring 2009.

The article highlights the necessity and crucial aspect of political will in crisis situations (e.g. Bosnia and Darfur), logistical obstacles and moral hazard that derives from military interventions. The author also analyzes regional initiatives to create rapid reaction mechanisms, mentioning an African Standby Force as one of the very first attempts.

Locke, J. (1689). *Two Treatises of Government*. Retrieved on August 21, 2010 from the Project Gutenberg Web site <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm>

The significant paper on the civil society and on the idea of social contract existing between citizens and government highlights the necessity to cooperate and be aware of the shared responsibility to protect. It offers a historic insight in the evolution of citizen-government relations, which is still often disputed, especially in the developing countries.

Luck, C. E. (2008). *The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect*. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/LuckPAB808.pdf>

The United Nations and the Security Council are devoted to raising awareness of the principle of the RtoP amongst world leaders, political groups and organizations. The paper clarifies the term RtoP and tries to reduce confusion regarding the RtoP concept. Delegates may find this publication to be an excellent source to better understand legal and other disputes around the RtoP.

Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). *Engaging Civil Society*. Retrieved on July 26, 2010 from <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org>

This Web site offers broad and solid collection of information, documents and papers on the concept of RtoP. The website may be useful for further research on RtoP and the situation in different world regions, where humanitarian/military intervention have taken place or is still present. .

Simons, K. (2003). *Sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect*. Peace Magazine. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from <http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v19n1p23.htm>

The article elaborates “just war” and “right authority” criteria when humanitarian intervention is under discussion. It stresses the importance of responsibility to protect and how it relates to the concept of sovereignty.

Støre, J.G. (2006). *Old Recipes in a New World? The Challenges of Multilateralism in the 21st century*. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/about_mfa/minister-of-foreign-affairs-jonas-gahr-s/Speeches-and-articles/2006/Old-Recipes-in-a-New-World-The-Challenges-of-Multilateralism-in-the-21st-century.html?id=420836

In this paper, the former Norwegian Foreign minister discusses the necessity of collective responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities, and stresses the importance of multilateral cooperation within the United Nations. The analysis and conclusions offered here on the challenges the United Nations faces nowadays may be useful for further research.

Tama, J. (2006). *Supporting Military Interventions to Protect Human Rights*. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from <http://blog.psaonline.org/2006/06/20/supporting-military-interventions-to-protect-human-rights/>

The author highlights the 2005 United Nations Summit declaration and the significance of this step in further development of the RtoP concept. The article explores the case of Kosovo and the legitimacy of the NATO military intervention in 1999.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect*. Retrieved on July 30, 2010 from <http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>

The Responsibility to Protect is one of the first papers produced analyzing the principle of RtoP. The report offers a comprehensive insight into the RtoP, which delegates may find useful in better understanding the concept and to motivate them for further research. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has played a significant part in pushing the discussion on RtoP further.

United Nations. General Assembly. (2005). *2005 World Summit Outcome*. Retrieved on August 12, 2010 from <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf>

The 2005 World Summit Outcome document, a consensus the world leaders reached on the responsibility to protect people from genocide and other crimes against humanity, has significantly raised the importance of the principle of the RtoP. This cornerstone concludes that the world leaders should increase involvement in the implementation of the RtoP as an international norm.

United Nations. General Assembly. (2005). *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary-General (A/RES/59/2005)*. Retrieved on August 19, 2010 from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf>

In this report, the United Nations Secretary-General presents the status on the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. In the report Secretary-General emphasizes that the concept of the RtoP has been emerging gradually as a norm in international relations.

United Nations. General Assembly. 5th session. (1950). *Uniting for Peace A/RES/377 (V) A*. Retrieved on September 4, 2010 from <http://www.un-documents.net/a5r377.htm>

Uniting for Peace contains detailed rule of procedure, which may be applied to emergency special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly after the United Nations Security Council fails to improve the security situation in a certain conflict.

United Nations. General Assembly. 63rd session. (2009). *Implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General (A/63/677)*. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from <http://globalRtoP.org/pdf/SGRTOPEng.pdf>
The report of the United Nations Secretary-General offers detailed outlining of the concept of the RTO. The final section of the report consists of useful suggestions and recommendations, which delegates may find of their interest.

Villani, U. *The Security Council's Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional Organizations*, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol.6, 2002. Retrieved on September 11, 2010 from http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/villani_6.pdf

The author emphasizes the importance of regional organizations in maintaining peace, and the need to institutionalize the cooperation between these regional organizations and the United Nations system. The paper offers elaborates case studies on the involvement of regional organizations to stop the crimes against humanity.

III. Climate Change and International Security

Annan, K. (2000). *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*. Retrieved August 30, 2010, from <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm>

We the Peoples is the millennium report by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Discussed in this report includes the centuries successes and failures as well as the challenges facing the next 100 years. Chapter three focuses on climate change and its importance as an imperative challenge in the next century. With the final emphasis remaining on poverty, war, climate change, and increasing the role and influence of the UN in the world, this document serves as a historical reference to today's issues.

Ban, K. (2009). *Report of the Secretary-General on Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications*. Retrieved August 1, 2010, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/64/350>

In this report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlines the impacts of climate change on international security. Environmental security, human security, and sustainable development are discussed. Ultimately, it is concluded by examining the future of international cooperation on the subject and means to combating climate changes and the threat to security. This 2009 report provides a well balanced in detail discussion of the issue and is the best starting point for researching the general issue.

Ban, K. (2010). *Press Release on the Security Council Addressing Broader Challenges (SG/SM/13003)*. Retrieved August 2, 2010, from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsm13003.doc.htm>

On July 7, 2010, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the protection of civilians in armed conflict. He noted the importance of including environmentally induced conflict. The Secretary-General also included the Security Council as a proper means to discuss such broad security challenges. These statements reinforce the Security Council's jurisdiction as a forum for the climate change debate.

Bernauer, T., Kalbhenn, A., Koubi, V., and Ruoff, G. (n.d.). *Climate Change, Economic Growth, and Conflict*. Center for Comparative and International Studies and Institute for Environmental Decisions.

Bernauer, Kalbhenn, Koubi, and Ruoff begin by defining the mechanism that ties climate change to conflict. They theorize that climate change negatively effects economic growth, which increases the risk of conflict; in addition, the postulate the type of political system in place in the country affected by climate change will lessen or intensify the impact on the risk of conflict. In order to empirically prove their theory, they examine data from 1950 to 2004. They find a slight correlation to support their theory. They also find that non-democratic states are at increased risk for heightened conflict when economic growth is slowed; therefore, this piece may be of particular interest to delegates representing these non-democratic states.

Brown, O. (2008). *Migration and Climate Change*. IOM Migration Research Series No. 31. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from the International Organization for Migration's Web site: <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=954>

This report comes from the International Institute of Sustainable Development by request of the International Organization for Migration as a part of a research series. It details specifics of both the causes and effect of migration. Specifically, this section of the series details how climate change causes migration with mass migration listed as a potential threat of climate change. The report warns the international community of handling the dire consequences of mass migrations and displaced peoples without proper adaptive capabilities and infrastructure. To understand the correlation between migration and climate change, this report should be reviewed.

Brown, O. and Crawford, A. (2009). *Climate Change and Security in Africa*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from the International Institute for Sustainable Development's Web site: <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=1093>

Serving as a case study, this paper gives all details necessary to understand the crises that Africa may face if climate change continues. Details from Darfur to Nigeria, to Northern Africa are all examined. Additionally, the links between climate change and its likelihood to start new conflicts and also exacerbate pre-existing tension are established. This report provides a nearly complete picture of the potential threat of climate change in Africa and also of possible strategies that the international community can take in preventing disastrous results.

Brown, O. and Crawford, A. (2009). *Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from the International Institute for Sustainable Development's Web site: <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1130>

Oli Brown and Alec Crawford wrote this paper as a case study of the Middle East and its security risks from climate change. Brown and Crawford highlight six main threats, which include water scarcity, hindered economic growth, and migration. This report is highly detailed and provides a fantastic in depth study of climate change in a real world example.

Brown, O., Hammill, A., and Mcleman, R. (2007). *Climate change as the 'new' security threat: implications for Africa*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=912>

This report specifically examines the security threats posed by climate change to Africa. It details the weaknesses of governance and infrastructure, the risk of natural disasters and rising sea levels, and also it discusses adaptive capabilities. Furthermore it provides background to the subject through discussing both the 'securitization of climate change' and climate change and the Security Council.

Busby, J. (2007). *Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action*. Council Special Report No. 32. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved August 15, 2010, from http://www.cfr.org/publication/14862/climate_change_and_national_security.html

Joseph Busby, of the Council on Foreign Relations, discusses climate change and national security in the United States. His argument explains that not only will climate change affect the United States domestically but internationally. According to Busby, the humanitarian disasters could risk destabilizing whole regions while domestically climate change could overwhelm disaster response systems. Ending his report he outlines his call of action for prevention and adaptation. Such a report gives a good example of potential policy in the developed world.

Carius, A., Houdret, A., and Kramer, A. (2010). *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*. GTZ International Water Policy and Infrastructure Program. Retrieved September 27, 2010, from <http://www2.gtz.de/publikationen/isissearch/publikationen/details.aspx?RecID=BIB-GTZ076468>

This report by the International Water Policy and Infrastructure Program of the GTZ provides specifics on the effects climate change has on water. Also, it details issues relating to water and security specifically looking at water management. It is a good tool for further research on the details of water and climate change as well as water and security issues.

de Koning, P. (2010). *COP 15: Climate Change and International Security*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Journal of International Relations. Retrieved July 31, 2010, from http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/pdf/COP15_11.2.pdf

This article is written by a representative of the Stanford delegation that attended the December 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference. The author details the threats posed by climate change to international security. He concludes with an analysis of the effects for both developed and developing nations if climate change continues on its current course. This article serves as a good basic overview of the issue.

Gleditsch, N.P. and Nordas, R. (2007). Climate Change and Conflict. *Political Geography*, 26 (6), 627-638. *This article attempts to bridge the gap in knowledge of the relationship between climate change and conflict. The authors outline specifics from the UN Security Council's debate on climate change in 2007 and also provide statistics from the assessment reports of the International Panel on Climate Change. Following these broad categories, this report gives great detail on the connection of climate change and conflict and what it means for the international community.*

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2007). *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*. Retrieved August 1, 2010, from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf *This report by the IPCC contains key figures about climate change. As well, it addresses the effects of climate change by ecosystem and by region. It discusses future projections and possible adaptation and mitigation options. This report may be consulted for all scientific specifics regarding current and projected climate change.*

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2007). *Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007 Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*. Retrieved August 1, 2010, from http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm *Specifics of the impact of climate change as well as adaptation and vulnerability are discussed in the Fourth Assessment Report. Water, health, and coastal systems are detailed in this report. Additionally, this section of the Fourth Assessment Report examines the effects of climate change regionally and is a good tool for understanding each region's situation.*

Leff, J. (2009). Pastoralist at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 3 (2), 188-203. Retrieved August 30, 2010, from <http://africacenter.org/2010/06/pastoralists-at-war-violence-and-security-in-the-kenya-sudan-uganda-border-region/> *This report analyzes the situation of pastoralists in East Africa. The consequences and threats which climate change had and will have on their livelihood are presented in depth. Already, disputes have occurred over resource scarcity causing conflict between previously peaceful people who otherwise have minimal differences and in theory little to dispute. This article is an example of a current situation and will allow for connecting the issue from theory to the real world.*

Mcgrath, M. (2009, March 12). *Climate Scenarios 'Being Released'*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7940532.stm> *Serving as a good example of media coverage of climate change, the British Broadcasting Company published this article detailing findings of climate scenarios leading up to the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change. Included in the report is data from the International Panel on Climate Change. Also, information of economic and business effects of climate change is discussed. This article provides an example of the lens that the international media has on the issue.*

North, R. (2005). Darfur's Refugees in Chad. *Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2005_2/22-23.html *As a large provider of international aid, the International Red Cross has provided great support to refugees of the conflict in Darfur, Sudan. This article analyzes the situation in the region and its effects on civilians. Also, it provides insight into refugees crossing international borders through the scope of refugees crossing the borders of Darfur, Sudan into neighboring Chad. As refugees are a potential issue from climate change, understanding current refugee situations is important.*

Penny, C. (2006). *Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging "Threat to International Peace and Security"*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from <http://www.springerlink.com/content/j4857081065920w1/>
Christopher Penny argues the role of the Security Council in the climate change debate in this article. Ultimately, he calls for the adoption of an institutional framework regarding climate change and international security and outlines the details as such. Written to open the debate of climate change and international security, the article provides good background to the legal authority with which the Security Council has the right to debate the subject.

Raleigh, C. and Urdal, H. (2007). Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict. *Political Geography*, 26 (6), 674-694.

Raleigh and Urdal address the issue of political geography in regards to climate change in this 2007 article. This article assesses the impact of environmental degradation and armed conflict. It is argued that past examples are best for analyzing the future. Ultimately the authors conclude that while possibilities of resources scarcity are true, the argument for resulting conflict is weak and that other more traditional factors such as politics and economics more directly cause conflict. The authors present an excellent topical case study that has a more traditional conclusion and an alternative viewpoint than other research on the topic.

Refugees International. (2009). *Colombia: Crisis Bubbling Over*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/colombia-crisis-bubbling-over>

This is an article on the Web site of Refugees International, a Non-Governmental Organization focusing on issues relating to all types of refugees. Specifically this article examines the state of Colombia and the situation of refugees in the conflict. Moreover, it follows refugees' attempts to cross borders internationally into the countries of Venezuela and Ecuador therefore providing a real world example of migration.

Salehyan, I. (2008). From Climate Change to Conflict: No Consensus Yet. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45 (3), 315-326. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/45/3/315.short>

The article from the Journal of Peace Research deters from traditional policy analysis and focuses on underlying issues of conflict. Within the article, the likelihood of climate change becoming a cause of conflict and a conflict stressor is examined. Specific examples include the conflict in Darfur, Sudan and the Asian tsunami of 2004. As climate change is an underlying rather than direct cause of conflict, examining it as such is imperative to establishing a complete understanding of the topic.

Smith, D. & Vivekananda, J. (2007). *A Climate of Conflict: A Link Between Climate Change, Peace and War*. International Alert. Retrieved August 15, 2010, from <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/pub.php?p=322>

The International Alert provided this report on addressing climate change and conflict. Areas focused on are: climate, poverty and governance, countries at risk, adaptation, and peacebuilding. Additionally, 12 specific recommendations for adaptation in unstable states are provided. This report nicely assesses climate change and conflict from a development perspective.

Solana, J. (2009). *Climate Change and Security: Follow-up Recommendations by European Union High Representative Solana*. Retrieved August 2, 2010, from http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8382_en.htm

In March 2008, the High Representative and the European Commission presented a report on climate change and international security to the European Council. This report contains the follow-up recommendations by Javier Solana. He provides insightful analysis of climate change's regional effects on international security. This may be used to establish a basis for specific regional implications of climate change.

United Nations. (1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. Retrieved July 31, 2010, from <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>

This document is the founding document of the United Nations serves as the basis for all UN functions. The UN Charter specially outlines the mandate that the Security Council is charged

with. Chapter V establishes Security Council's role in maintaining peace and security. Chapter VI details further how these functions and powers apply, including the Security Council's ability to investigate any situation that may potentially threaten international peace and security.

United Nations. (2008). *The UN System Response to the World Food Security Crisis*. Retrieved September 29, 2010, from <http://www.un-foodsecurity.org/documents>

This document was established by the United Nations and other international organizations working on the food crisis, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Food Program. This contains the facts of each participatory organization on food security. As a compilation, this document is a go to document for statistics on work that was being done to help the food crisis in 2008.

United Nations Environmental Programme. (2007). *Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from

<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=512&ArticleID=5621&l=en>

Sudan has a long-standing history of civil conflict throughout the country, most recently in the Darfur region. The UNEP pays much attention to the current conflict in Darfur; whose underlying causes have largely been attributed to resource scarcity along with ethnic cleanings. This report analyzes Sudan's history of conflict through an environmental lens providing crucial data and knowledge to the debate of future conflicts arising for environmental reasons.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (1992). *Convening Document*. Retrieved August 30, 2010, from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/conykp/conveng.pdf>

The UNFCCC was created by the United Nations General Assembly, and this is the convening document issued 1992. The establishment of the UNFCCC was landmark in the history of the climate change debate. The work done by the UNFCCC has already provided many vital decisions and information including the influential December 2009 Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change.

United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UNOHRLLS). *List of Least Developed Countries*. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from <http://www.unohrrls.org/en/ldc/related/62/>

This is a list of all currently on the list of Least Developed Countries. Of significance is that 67% of those countries are in Africa. Furthermore, one-third of the countries are small island developing countries and are some of the most at risk states for adverse effects of climate change. The UNOHRLLS serves as the representative of these most at risk countries and is a good start for research on such states and their current conditions.

United Nations Security Council. (2007). *Press Release on the First Ever Debate of the Security Council on the Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security (SC/9000)*. Retrieved July 31, 2010, from

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm>

In this press release, the results of the Security Council's first ever debate on climate change and its implications are outlined. A number of speeches are recalled including many direct quotes from Member States. Speeches include both those in favor and opposed to the use of the Security Council as a forum for debating this topic. This is the only document produced from the Security Council's debate on climate change and international security.

United Nations Security Council. (2005). *Resolution 1625 (S/RES/1625)*. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions05.htm

Resolution 1625 was passed on September 14, 2005 and marked an important decision for the Security Council. Through this resolution the Security Council decided to improve its effectiveness in conflict prevention with specific interest to be focused on Africa. Calling for an emphasis on root causes of conflict, it highlights social and political unrest, good governance, and poverty eradication. Additionally, the importance of increased and improved cooperation between international, regional, and national entities is recognized. This is a vital document to

many Security Council decisions and is important to review for an understanding of the Security Council's work.

United States Department of Defense. (2010). *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Retrieved September 27, 2010, from <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/>

This serves as a good example of climate change and security policy in a developed country. The language in this document is important to remember, as climate change is no longer presented as a possibility but a certainty. To realize the threat presented to developed countries by climate change, both domestically and internationally, this report is a good case study.

Warner, K., Afifi, T., Dun, O., Stal, M. and Schmidl, S. (2008, June 30). *Human Security, Climate Change and Environmentally Induced Migration*. United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security.

This study uses empirical research to reach three chief conclusions: environmental factors currently induce migration, migration is caused after an "environmental tipping point is exceeded," and government responses vary significantly to environmentally-induced migration. The methodology of this research includes interviews and surveys within three case studies: Egypt, Mozambique, and Viet Nam. Delegates should familiarize themselves with the quantifiable evidence in this study and should take note of the policy recommendations the authors put forth.

Rules of Procedure United Nations Security Council

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Security Council (hereinafter, referred to as “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Security Council Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under- Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General are designates and agents of the Secretary- General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her/his or her designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations, and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson, or acting chairperson of the Council.

I. MEETINGS

Rule 1

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time he or she deems necessary.

Rule 2

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Council.

Rule 3

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4

Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held once a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5

Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations. Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

II. AGENDA

Rule 6

The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7

The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9

The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

Rule 10

Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11

The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement on matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting. The provisions of rule 7, paragraph one, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Rule 13

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting, which he or she is invited to attend.

Rule 15

The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

Rule 16

Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representatives shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

Rule 17

Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

IV. PRESIDENCY

Rule 18

The Presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19

The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

Rule 20

Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfillment of the responsibilities of the presidency he or she should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he or she shall indicate her/ his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19 or her/his duties under rule 7.

V. SECRETARIAT

Rule 21

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

Rule 22

The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 23

The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24

The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25

The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 26

The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 27

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 29

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 30

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 31

Proposed resolutions, amendments, and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

For purposes of this rule, all "proposals" shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 32

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 33

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting: 1. To suspend the meeting; 2. To adjourn the meeting; 3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour; 4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur; 5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or 6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council's next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.

Rule 34

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 35

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

Rule 36

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 37

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

If the Council considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Council according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Council is no longer required.

Rule 38

Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative of the Security Council.

Rule 39

The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

VII. VOTING

Rule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

VIII. LANGUAGE

Rule 41

English shall be the official and working language of the Security Council.

Rule 42

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the language of the Security Council. In this case, he or she shall herself/himself provide for interpretation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

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Rule 43

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the language of the Council.

Rule 44

All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the language of the Security Council.

Rule 45

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides be published in any language other than the language of the Council.

IX. PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS, RECORDS

Rule 46

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 47

Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10:00 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

Rule 48

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 49

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 50

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives of the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 51

The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 52

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official language of the Council as soon as possible.

Rule 53

At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a *communiqué* through the Secretary-General.

Rule 54

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 55

The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

X. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANS

Rule 56

Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority vote.