



NMUN • NY

NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION
BACKGROUND GUIDE 2010



www.nmun.org



NATIONAL MODEL
UNITED NATIONS

28 March - 1 April 2010 - Sheraton
30 March - 3 April 2010 - Marriott

WRITTEN BY: Roger H. Tseng, Nicholas Warino

CONTACT THE NMUN

Please consult the FAQ section of www.nmun.org for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

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NMUN•NY 2010 Important Dates

IMPORTANT NOTICE: To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at www.nmun.org and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

31 January 2010	31 January 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March) • Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET! (We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)
15 February 2010	15 February 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Committee Updates Posted to www.nmun.org
1 March 2010	1 March 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early! Group Rates on hotel rooms are available on a first come, first served basis until sold out. Group rates, if still available, may not be honored after that date. See hotel reservation form for date final payment is due. • Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to: karen@nmun.org • Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail (See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions). • Preferred deadline for submission of Chair / Rapp applications to Committee Chairs
1 March 2010	1 March 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$125 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$150 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline.
NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS		<p>The 2010 National Model UN Conference</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 28 March - 1 April – Sheraton New York • 30 March - 3 April – New York Marriott Marquis

POSITION PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2010

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 1 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active when background guides are available. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment in the subject line (Example: GAPLEN_Greece).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba_U_of_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

www.nmun.org
for more information

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General Assembly Third Committee	ga3rd.sheraton@nmun.org
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SC Working Group: Children and Armed Conflict	caac.sheraton@nmun.org
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Committee for Development Policy	cdp.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission for Sustainable Development	csustd.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women	csw.sheraton@nmun.org
Econ. Commission for Latin America & the Caribbean	eclac.sheraton@nmun.org
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World Food Programme	wfp.sheraton@nmun.org
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization	nato.sheraton@nmun.org
Organisation of The Islamic Conference	oic.sheraton@nmun.org

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Security Council 2	sc2.marriott@nmun.org
SC Working Group: Children and Armed Conflict	caac.marriott@nmun.org
International Court of Justice	icj.marriott@nmun.org
ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.marriott@nmun.org
Committee for Development Policy	cdp.marriott@nmun.org
Commission for Sustainable Development	csustd.marriott@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women	csw.marriott@nmun.org
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United Nations Children's Fund	unicef.marriott@nmun.org
World Food Programme	wfp.marriott@nmun.org
African Union	au.marriott@nmun.org
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	asean.marriott@nmun.org
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	nato.marriott@nmun.org
Organisation of The Islamic Conference	oic.marriott@nmun.org

OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
(send only to e-mail for your assigned venue)	positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org
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Dear delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to the 2010 National Model United Nations (NMUN). This year's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) staff is: Nicholas Warino as the Director at the Sheraton venue and Roger Tseng as the Director at the Marriott venue. Nicholas graduated from the University of California, Berkeley with a degree in Political Science. He is currently working at a law firm in the San Francisco Bay Area. This is his sixth year with NMUN and third year on staff. Roger graduated from the University of Ottawa with a degree in International Studies and Modern Languages. He is currently pursuing his Masters degree in Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, as well as working in the Canadian airline industry. This is his fourth year at NMUN and second year on staff.

The topics under discussion for NATO at the 2010 NMUN are:

1. Reassessing NATO's Role in State Building
2. NATO's Role in Afghanistan
3. NATO's Engagement with Other International Organizations

NATO is currently the largest and most significant military alliance. It was originally established to ensure the peace and security of Europe and North America and to counter the imminent threats from the Warsaw Pact. The tasks and responsibilities of NATO have expanded in scope and reach since the end of the Cold War, with operations in Afghanistan as the most extensive. With this in mind, the operational challenges of the alliance include a more defined status in the international community. As such, you will be researching and writing resolutions that have a direct impact in the future of NATO.

This background guide will serve as an introduction to the three topics listed above. Accordingly, it is not meant to be an inclusive analysis but as the starting point for your own research. You may consult scholarly materials, news media, the NATO website, and the governmental websites of your Member State.

Each delegation must submit a position paper. NMUN will accept position papers via e-mail by March 1st, 2010. Please refer the message from the Directors General for the requirements and restrictions on NMUN position papers. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is crucial. NMUN can be one of the most rewarding academic experiences of your college career. We hope that this year's conference will not only intrigue you to participate again, but also that you find it as beneficial as we have. If you have further questions regarding participation, please do not hesitate to contact any of the NATO substantive staff or the Under-Secretaries General for the Department of Intergovernmental Organizations.

Sheraton Venue
Nicholas Warino
Director

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Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2010 NMUN Conference

At the 2010 NMUN New York Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs or judicial experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. ***The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.*** In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single spaced pages (one double sided paper, if printed)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at 1 inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page; the use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2009. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2010 for Delegations attending the NMUN conference at either the Sheraton or the Marriott venue.**

**PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE,
ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU_Namibia_University of Caprivi)**

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Amanda Williams, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Ronny Heintze, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Sheraton Venue
Amanda Williams, LCSW
Director-General

Marriott Venue
Ronny Heintze
Director-General

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Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a *maximum* of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards.

*Delegation from
Canada*

*Represented by
(Name of College)*

Position Paper for General Assembly Plenary

The topics before the General Assembly Plenary are: Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict; the Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy; and the Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa. Canada is dedicated to collaborative multilateral approaches to ensuring protection and promotion of human security and advancement of sustainable development.

I. Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict

Canada endorses the Kimberly Process in promoting accountability, transparency, and effective governmental regulation of trade in rough diamonds. We believe the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an essential international regulatory mechanism and encourage all Member States to contribute to market accountability by seeking membership, participation, and compliance with its mandate. Canada urges Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué to strengthen government oversight of rough diamond trading and manufacturing by developing domestic legal frameworks similar to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. We call upon participating States to act in accordance with the KPCS's comprehensive and credible systems of peer review to monitor the continued implementation of the Kimberley Process and ensure full transparency and self-examination of domestic diamond industries. We draw attention to our domestic programs for diamond regulation including Implementing the Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act and urge Member States to consider these programs in developing the type of domestic regulatory frameworks called for in A/RES/55/56. Canada recognizes the crucial role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the review of rough diamond control measures developed through the Kimberly Process and encourages States to include NGOs, such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, in the review processes called for in A/RES/58/290. We urge Member States to act in accordance with A/RES/60/182 to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal and alluvial diamond miners by establishing a coordinating mechanism for financial and technical assistance through the Working Group of the Kimberly Process of Artisanal Alluvial Producers. Canada calls upon States and NGOs to provide basic educational material regarding diamond valuation and market prices for artisanal diggers, as recommended by the Diamond Development Initiative. Canada will continue to adhere to the 2007 Brussels Declaration on Internal Controls of Participants and is dedicated to ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective regulation of the rough diamond trade through the utilization of voluntary peer review systems and the promotion of increased measures of internal control within all diamond producing States.

II. The Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy

Canada is dedicated to integrating alternative energy sources into climate change frameworks by diversifying the energy market while improving competitiveness in a sustainable economy, as exemplified through our Turning Corners Report and Project Green climate strategies. We view the international commitment to the promotion of alternative sources of energy called for in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) as a catalyst to sustainable development and emission reduction. Canada fulfills its obligations to Article 4 of the UNFCCC by continuing to provide development assistance through the Climate Change Development Fund and calls upon Member States to commit substantial financial and technical investment toward the transfer of sustainable energy technologies and clean energy mechanisms to developing States. We emphasize the need for Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2005 Beijing International Renewable

Energy Conference to strengthen domestic policy frameworks to promote clean energy technologies. Canada views dissemination of technology information called for in the 2007 Group of Eight Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy Declaration as a vital step in energy diversification from conventional energy generation. We call upon Member States to integrate clean electricity from renewable sources into their domestic energy sector by employing investment campaigns similar to our \$1.48 billion initiative ecoENERGY for Renewable Power. Canada encourages States to develop domestic policies of energy efficiency, utilizing regulatory and financing frameworks to accelerate the deployment of clean low-emitting technologies. We call upon Member States to provide knowledge-based advisory services for expanding access to energy in order to fulfill their commitments to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Canada urges States to address the concerns of the 2007 Human Development Report by promoting tax incentives, similar to the Capital Cost Allowances and Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses, to encourage private sector development of energy conservation and renewable energy projects. As a member of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Canada is committed to accelerating the development of renewable energy projects, information sharing mechanisms, and energy efficient systems through the voluntary carbon offset system. We are dedicated to leading international efforts toward the development and sharing of best practices on clean energy technologies and highlight our release of the Renewable Energy Technologies Screen software for public and private stakeholders developing projects in energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy. Canada believes the integration of clean energy into State specific strategies called for in A/62/419/Add.9 will strengthen energy diversification, promote the use of cogeneration, and achieve a synergy between promoting alternative energy while allowing for competitiveness in a sustainable economy.

III. Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa

Canada views the full implementation of the treatment and prevention targets of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Especially in Africa, as essential to eradicating malaria and assisting African States to achieve Target 8 of Goal 6 of the MDGs by 2015. We recommend Member States cooperate with the World Health Organization to ensure transparency in the collection of statistical information for Indicators 21 and 22 of the MDGs. Canada reaffirms the targets of the Abuja Declaration Plan of Action stressing regional cooperation in the implementation, monitoring, and management of malaria prevention and treatment initiatives in Africa. To fully implement A/RES/61/228, Canada believes developed States must balance trade and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian objective of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. We continue to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health into our compulsory licensing framework through the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. We urge Member States to support compulsory licensing for essential generic medicines by including anti-malarial vaccines and initiating domestic provisions to permit export-only compulsory licenses to domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, similar to Canada's Access to Medicines Regime. Canada calls upon Member States to establish advanced market commitments on the distribution of pneumococcal vaccines to developing States in cooperation with PATH and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. We emphasize the need for greater membership in the Roll Back Malaria initiative to strengthen malaria control planning, funding, implementation, and evaluation by promoting increased investment in healthcare systems and greater incorporation of malaria control into all relevant multi-sector activities. Canada continues to implement the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) New Agenda for Action on Health to reduce malaria infection rates among marginalized populations in Africa, increase routine immunizations rates, and reduce infection rates of other neglected infections. Canada will achieve the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008-2009 by providing assistance to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We urge Member States to increase donations to intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that support malaria programming in Africa, exemplified by CIDA's contribution of \$26 million to the Canadian Red Cross. We continue our efforts to provide accessible and affordable vector control methods to African States through the Red Cross' Malaria Bed Net Campaign and the African Medical Research Foundation Canada by supplying insecticide-treated mosquito nets and Participatory Malaria Prevention and Treatment tool kits.

History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Foundation

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), based in Brussels, Belgium, is a military alliance of countries in North America and Europe, was established based on the principle that the security of each region is inextricably linked to the other's.¹ Towards the end of the Second World War, Allied countries were also occupied with establishing a security regime to ensure the peace and prosperity of North America and Europe.² In August 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom met to sign the Atlantic Charter.³ The Atlantic Charter pledged its signatories to uphold the principles of self-determination, free trade, and non-aggression, amongst other democratic ideals.⁴ European Allied countries also began to grow weary of the threat from the Soviet Union, who was part of the Allied powers during the war.⁵ The 1948 Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade of the same year were signs of such Soviet aggression.⁶ Citing fears of German resurgence and Soviet invasion, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, creating the basis of the military alliance.⁷ The Atlantic Charter and the Treaty of Brussels would come together in 1949, when Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Benelux countries convened in Washington DC to sign the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.⁸

The North Atlantic Treaty is anchored in the principles of collective security and containment.⁹ Article V of the treaty affirms that “an armed attack against one or more [Member State] shall be considered an attack against them all” and as such Member States of NATO can choose to react individually or collectively under NATO.¹⁰ The treaty further commits Member States to place the alliance in the highest priority and not engage in other international commitments, which might contradict the spirit of the alliance.¹¹ The practice of collective security thus compliments the principle of containment.¹² As mentioned previously, Western Europe and North America were weary of Soviet advances in continental Europe.¹³ Containment, as prescribed by American diplomat, George Kennan, seeks to “confront the Russians... where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.”¹⁴ As such, during the first round of expansion, NATO admitted Greece and Turkey, both of which were fragile democracies, to halt Soviet expansionism.¹⁵

Events During the Cold War

Pursuing the principle of containment, NATO expanded strategically during the Cold War. In 1952, Greece and Turkey ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the alliance's southern flank.¹⁶ West Germany soon followed in 1955, immediately after the conclusion of its status as an occupied country.¹⁷ The last expansion of NATO during the Cold War took place in 1982, with Spain joining the alliance.¹⁸

¹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 30.

² Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

³ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁴ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁵ Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2002, p. 7.

⁶ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 29.

⁷ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁸ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁹ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 4.

¹⁰ NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949.

¹¹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 30.

¹² Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 4.

¹³ Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2002, p. 7.

¹⁴ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 4.

¹⁵ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 5.

¹⁶ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

¹⁷ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

¹⁸ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

In October 1957, France and the United Kingdom, along with Israel, sought to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt; this prompted the United States to publicly condemn her European allies and to propose in the United Nations an immediate withdrawal of European troops from the Suez Canal.¹⁹ In fact, France, under President de Gaulle, had been pursuing a more independent stance towards NATO; as the United States and the Soviet Union had split Europe into two competing alliances, France attempted to assert itself as a third force.²⁰ The withdrawal of the French military from the integrated command began in February 1966, when French forces in Germany, except those stationed in West Berlin, were withdrawn.²¹ By March 1966, France had completely withdrawn from the integrated command, followed by the expulsion of foreign military personnel and equipment from France by April 1967.²²

Transformation and Recent Developments

The conclusion of the Cold War, as well as the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, had profound changes to NATO, as the alliance's foremost adversary no longer existed.²³ In 1991, for the first time since its inception, NATO renewed its Strategic Concept.²⁴ The 1991 Strategic Concept reaffirmed that the "threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts" has effectively disappeared", and that new sources of conflict, such as ethnic tensions and political instability, will become the focus of the alliance.²⁵ At the 1994 Brussels Summit, Member States of NATO officially invited former Warsaw Pact countries to join the alliance under its Partnership for Peace program.²⁶ Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became the first three countries to join the alliance after the Cold War.²⁷ The lack of an easily identifiable adversary also led to operational changes to NATO. In 1992, NATO announced that it would support, to the fullest extent possible, peacekeeping activities of the Organization for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on matters concerning the former Yugoslavia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).²⁸

While the global political climate experienced a dramatic shift, the foundations of NATO, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty, remain unchanged. Upon the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the alliance's Member States convened and invoked Article V for the first and only time.²⁹ In the short term the invocation of Article V proved to the world that NATO was still a relevant player in international politics, but such invocation also transformed the alliance's long-term political and military operations.³⁰ While the United States and the United Kingdom led the initial military operations in Afghanistan, other NATO Member States provided extensive support individually or under the NATO umbrella.³¹ NATO further streamlined or created processes related to its crisis management and military command and engaged in geographical expansion.³²

NATO's relations with Russia have been uneven since the end of the Cold War. In the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO identified Russia as a key partner in securing transatlantic peace.³³ The alliance and Russia founded the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 as a means of cooperation in areas such as terrorism, counternarcotics, missile defense, and environmental security.³⁴ Activities in the NRC were suspended from August 2008 to March 2009 as a result of Russia's military actions towards Georgia and Russia's diplomatic recognition of breakaway territories of Georgia.³⁵

¹⁹ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 7.

²⁰ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 7.

²¹ Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2001, p.165.

²² Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2001, p. 165.

²³ NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 2009.

²⁴ NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 2009.

²⁵ NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 2009.

²⁶ NATO, *Partnership for Peace; Invitation*, 2000.

²⁷ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 64.

²⁸ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 107.

²⁹ Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 93.

³⁰ Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 95.

³¹ Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 95.

³² Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 95.

³³ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 1999.

³⁴ NATO, *NATO's relations with Russia*, 2009.

³⁵ NATO, *NATO's relations with Russia*, 2009.

Structure

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the only governing body which the treaty explicitly created (Article IX), and thus has “effective political authority and powers of decision” over the alliance.³⁶ The Permanent Representatives of the Member States to NATO meet on a weekly basis to discuss political, military and strategic matters of the alliance.³⁷ Throughout the year, cabinet ministers of the Member States will also convene at the NAC.³⁸ Meetings of the NAC are presided by the Secretary-General, currently Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark.³⁹ Following the spirit of collective security, all decisions made at NATO, regardless of importance or committee level, are unanimous.⁴⁰ Thus, there is no “voting” in the NAC, and discussions will take place until all Member States come to an agreement, representing to collective will of the alliance.⁴¹ Two other important bodies of NATO are the Defense Planning Committee, which whose responsibility is the planning of collective defense, and the Nuclear Planning Group, during which Member States “discuss specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces.”⁴²

Membership Expansion and the Alliance’s Partners

As mentioned previously, Germany, Greece, Spain and Turkey became Member States of the alliance during the Cold War. There have been three waves of enlargement after the Cold War. The first wave included the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.⁴³ The second wave, which is also the single largest expansion in NATO’s history, saw Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia becoming Member States in 2004.⁴⁴ During the most recent expansion in 2009, Albania and Croatia joined the alliance.⁴⁵ The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia now remains as the only country on track towards being a Member State, having signed a Membership Action Plan with NATO in 1999.⁴⁶

NATO has created numerous opportunities for non-member countries to engage with the alliance. For Example, NATO at the 1994 Brussels Summit initiated the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.⁴⁷ NATO and each Partner country work to secure political stability, peace and security for the Partner country, and consequently the security throughout Europe.⁴⁸ The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 in order to engage in political discussions with participating countries and to allow such countries to receive training at NATO institutes in Europe.⁴⁹ Lastly, NATO has numerous engagements with Russia. Russia joined the PfP in 1994 and three years later, established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PCJ) with the alliance “to build confidence, overcome misperceptions, and develop a pattern of regular consultations and cooperation.”⁵⁰ The PCJ has been replaced by the aforementioned NRC to conduct all matters between NATO and Russia, but activities have been suspended.⁵¹

Looking Ahead

In 2009, at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, NATO announced the decision to formulate a new Strategic Concept for the alliance.⁵² As the previous Strategic Concept was written in 1999 under the auspices of nineteen Member States, there is clearly a need to introduce a new strategy for the alliance that encompasses the 28 Member States, new

³⁶ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 149.

³⁷ NATO, *The North Atlantic Council*, 2007.

³⁸ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 149.

³⁹ NATO, *The NATO Secretary General*, 2009.

⁴⁰ NATO, *Consensus decision-making at NATO*, 2007.

⁴¹ NATO, *Consensus decision-making at NATO*, 2007.

⁴² NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 151.

⁴³ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

⁴⁴ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

⁴⁵ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

⁴⁶ NATO, *NATO’s relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, 2009.

⁴⁷ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 67.

⁴⁸ NATO, *The Partnership for Peace*, 2009.

⁴⁹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 91.

⁵⁰ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 91.

⁵¹ NATO, *NATO’s relations with Russia*, 2009.

⁵² NATO, *What is NATO’s new Strategic Concept?*, 2009.

emphases on weapon proliferation, failed states, and terrorism, and an outlook that surpasses the borders of Europe.⁵³ As well, despite the initial withdrawal from the integrated command, France had been working towards closer cooperation, an example of which is the placements of French officers within the integrated military command in 2004 by former President Chirac.⁵⁴ President Nicholas Sarkozy has announced the reintegration of French forces into NATO command.⁵⁵ For European peace and security to progress, NATO must also reengage with Russia. These are but three important forces that will keep the alliance on a path of transformation and reinvention to remain relevant as it tackles problems in an ever-changing world.

Must Reads

Göncz, K. (March 1, 2009). The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 31(2). 90-99.

This short article traces the development of NATO as an organization since its beginning. Emphasis is placed on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and how, despite a drastically different international political environment, collective security is still very much relevant. The principle of collective security and NATO's role as a defense institution, argues Göncz, will continue to be important without much necessity to reform.

Hodge, C. C. (2005). *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

This book provides an in-depth look at the Alliance from its inception to contemporary political climate. Since the beginning, NATO allies have had a difficult time coexisting in such an intimate military relationship (such as France's departure from the military command to the reluctance of certain Member States to participate in the Iraqi War). Hodge concludes the book by asserting that NATO will be required to be much more reflective of its status on the international stage and to reconcile its raison d'être with contemporary situations.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2001). *NATO Handbook*. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press.

The NATO Handbook describes every subsidiary body, process, activity, and policy of the Alliance. As both a political and military organization, NATO has several layers of bureaucracy to efficiently serve both purposes. Delegates should familiarize themselves with the NATO structure the truly appreciate the intricacies of the alliance's tasks. After the publication of the Handbook, NATO has revised its international staff structure, information of which can be found at <http://www.nato.int/cv/is/index.html>.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *The North Atlantic Treaty*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>.

The North Atlantic Treaty is the founding document of the alliance. Signed in 1949, its content has not been amended since the foundation and continued to play a relevant role in the contemporary security regime of North America and Europe. Article V is considered the most important clause in the treaty, as it authorizes collective action should any Member State be the target of an attack.

⁵³ NATO, *What is NATO's new Strategic Concept?*, 2009.

⁵⁴ Ambassade de France, *Discours du Président Sarkozy sur la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au 21^{ème} siècle [Speech by President Sarkozy on France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century]*, 2009.

⁵⁵ France Diplomatie, *Colloque « la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au XXI^{ème} siècle » – Intervention de Bernard Kouchner [“France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century” Symposium – Speech by Bernard Kouchner]*, 2009.

I. Reassessing NATO's Role in State Building

Introduction

The principle of state sovereignty serves as the basis of international relations and the maintenance of peace and security.⁵⁶ Traditionally, sovereignty implies that the state has a fundamental right to self-determination, free of interference from other states.⁵⁷ Furthermore, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter clearly indicates that the organization cannot meddle in the domestic affairs of a Member State.⁵⁸ However, the nature of conflicts and the international order in general is not static; unlike the Cold War, the contemporary enemy – terrorism or genocide – permeates national borders and cannot be easily identified.⁵⁹ Thus, the concept of “humanitarian intervention” is gaining steam in the contemporary setting of interstate relations.

Recently, scholars, diplomats, and politicians have begun to see a state's sovereignty as a responsibility, not a right.⁶⁰ What this implies is that the state must serve to the welfare of its people, and that individuals have inalienable rights that come above the policies of the state.⁶¹ If the state is unable to uniformly secure the welfare of its people, the international community then inherits the rights and duties to intervene in the name of human rights.⁶² In the aftermath of such interventions, parties responsible for the intervention must also seek to rebuild the state it brought down.⁶³

What is State Building?

State building is the result of a shift in policy and attitude towards post-conflict peace at the turn of the century.⁶⁴ The emphasis placed by state building is on strengthening legitimate governmental institutions as a means to achieve peace and security.⁶⁵ It must be noted that state-building itself cannot replace all of the post-conflict reconstruction processes; while state-building focuses on rebuilding governmental institutions, it is only a subset of the broader peace-building process, which includes the establishment of ceasefire and reconciliation conditions.⁶⁶ It is also not synonymous with nation building, which only seeks to secure a common identity and plays no part in formal governance.⁶⁷

There are two schools of thought concerning the state-building process. As cited by Bellamy, traditional United Nations-established transitional authorities, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor, were concerned with the day-to-day management of state activities.⁶⁸ However, social pandemics that these interventions sought to prevent – ethnic tension, economic collapse and government incompetence – continued to exist under the auspices of the United Nations.⁶⁹ In fact, the liberal peace theory, used in the aforementioned cases to quickly democratize the government and pursue market economics as the means to achieve stability, will only contribute towards such fragility.⁷⁰

The institutional school of thought shares similar sentiments with the *Responsibility to Protect* report, explained in further detail in the next section, in that the state, whether occupied or free, has the utmost responsibility to protect

⁵⁶ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background*, 2001, p. 5.

⁵⁷ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 15.

⁵⁸ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 7.

⁵⁹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 3.

⁶⁰ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 19.

⁶¹ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 19.

⁶² Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 20.

⁶³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 39.

⁶⁴ Paris and Sisk, *Understanding the contradictions of postwar statebuilding*, 2009, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Paris and Sisk, *Understanding the contradictions of postwar statebuilding*, 2009, p. 1-2.

⁶⁶ Paris and Sisk, *Understanding the contradictions of postwar statebuilding*, 2009, p. 14-15.

⁶⁷ Paris and Sisk, *Understanding the contradictions of postwar statebuilding*, 2009, p. 14-15.

⁶⁸ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 170.

⁶⁹ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 171.

⁷⁰ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 172.

its citizens from harm.⁷¹ As such, the transitional authority set up in the state by the international community should focus on building sustainable national institutions before all else.⁷²

Responsibility to Protect

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a report written by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, established by Canada, as a response to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's challenge to resolve the dilemma between sovereignty and non-interference.⁷³ The Commission has identified inconsistencies in how the international community has responded to failed states and how the language used in the debate on humanitarian intervention needs to be adjusted.⁷⁴ R2P is one of the first proponents of seeing sovereignty as a responsibility towards individuals and not sovereignty as a control over individuals.⁷⁵ Consequently, the shift in language also means that the international community may not necessarily have the "right to intervene" in failed states, but has the "responsibility to protect" the individuals whom the state has failed.⁷⁶

The R2P doctrine is divided into three pillars: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.⁷⁷ The responsibility to prevent lies foremost with the state itself, as good governance and fair treatment of all individuals result in social and economic stability and subsequently the absence of conflicts.⁷⁸ In fact, this is the enduring legacy of the traditional notion of state sovereignty.⁷⁹ Support from the international community is of course needed in certain cases, and as such the international community also has a responsibility to assist in prevention.⁸⁰ Civil society, regional institutions, and other states of the United Nations all play important roles in meeting the obligation of states to protect their own populations.⁸¹

When preventative measures fail to resolve a violation, or when the state is unwilling to step up, the international community thus has the responsibility to react to these breaches.⁸² States can choose to use political, economic or judicial measures to react, and only in the gravest conditions should military intervention be applied.⁸³ As indicated in the report, sanctions have become a common method to react; they can "inhibit the capacity of states to interact with the outside world" but must be carefully targeted as they can cause as much harm as wellbeing.⁸⁴ The reluctance to use military action is an affirmation to the Charter of the United Nations, which promises non-interference of its Member States.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, the commission identified that military action can be justified in extreme cases, such as situations in which there is a large scale loss of life, ethnic cleansing, or other grave crimes of humanity.⁸⁶ Furthermore, military action may not necessarily be acts *against* the state in question, but can be acts that *support* the state in question to stabilize the situation.⁸⁷

The last section of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, has the most resonance with NATO's activities in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan. Before military action is taken, there must be a post-intervention plan for the rebuilding of the state.⁸⁸ First and foremost, basic security must be provided to all individuals, regardless of ethnicity or relations.⁸⁹ The intervening powers must not allow the occupied state to slide into chaos through

⁷¹ Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 172.

⁷² Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 172.

⁷³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 2.

⁷⁴ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 11.

⁷⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 13.

⁷⁶ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 16.

⁷⁷ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 17.

⁷⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 19.

⁷⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General*, 2009.

⁸⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 19.

⁸¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General*, 2009

⁸² International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 29.

⁸³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 29.

⁸⁴ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 29.

⁸⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 31.

⁸⁶ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 32.

⁸⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General*, 2009

⁸⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 39.

⁸⁹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 40.

vengeance or what R2P calls “reverse ethnic cleansing”.⁹⁰ As part of the state-building process, the intervening powers must also seek to reestablish new armed forces and civilian policing agencies.⁹¹

Challenges in the State Building Process

The biggest challenge that the international community faces in state building is the legitimacy of such endeavors.⁹² As mentioned in R2P, when a state can no longer provide basic security for its population, the international community has a responsibility to enter the state, rebuild state infrastructure, and provide security until local governance takes shape. As such, each task that the intervening powers takes on needs to be seen as valid and legitimate by the local population.⁹³ Without such acceptance, the new state infrastructure will not succeed. Legitimacy is not simply the establishment of a western liberal democracy and the recognition of such. In fact, local social customs play a more integral part in providing legitimacy to the new statehood.⁹⁴ Furthermore, as part of the responsibility to rebuild, the intervening powers must be able to provide basic security to the state, which is defined as the ability to defend the territory from outside attacks, to protect the population from domestic violence, and to enforce rule of law for commercial and civic prosperity.⁹⁵

The concept of success is also difficult to gauge in state building. As state building is such as multifaceted endeavor, often with a myriad of actors, there is no commonly accepted definition of what success entails.⁹⁶ A liberal peace theorist would argue that success is achieved by sustainable democratic elections, while an institutionalist would argue that sustainable state infrastructure leads to a successful state building process. Furthermore, the definition of peace and order is vehemently debated as well. Is peace and order sustainable when the population can perform their daily routines without fear, or when the population takes ownership of the new state and works towards unity?⁹⁷

Experience in Kosovo

As a response to the lack of action to halt ethnic tensions in Kosovo, NATO launched Operation Allied Force in March 1999 and began 78 days of airstrikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁹⁸ On June 10, 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1244, calling for an international civil presence in order to govern Kosovo on an interim basis following NATO airstrikes.⁹⁹ This international presence would subsequently include NATO; Annex II of resolution 1244 indicates that NATO would be involved in establishing security in Kosovo for the safe return of refugees and other displaced persons.¹⁰⁰ The United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) itself was in charge of daily governance of Kosovo; in fact UNMIK had “seized sovereignty over Kosovo with all legislative and executive authority” very early on in the intervention.¹⁰¹ While NATO’s presence, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), was militaristic during the intervention, its ground operations in Kosovo was in fact under the auspices of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, classifying it as a strictly peace support operation.¹⁰² KFOR’s tasks soon expanded to include border patrol, demilitarization of the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo, implementation of a new judicial system, elections, and maintaining the security of ethnic minorities.¹⁰³ The Kosovars lauded the presence of KFOR in Kosovo, however its civilian counterpart UNMIK was much resented by the population as UNMIK was seen to be denying Kosovo of its full sovereignty.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 40.

⁹¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 41.

⁹² Marten, *Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries*, 2007, p. 238.

⁹³ Marten, *Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries*, 2007, p. 238.

⁹⁴ Marten, *Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries*, 2007, p. 237.

⁹⁵ Marten, *Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries*, 2007, p. 237.

⁹⁶ Marten, *Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries*, 2007, p. 233.

⁹⁷ Marten, *Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries*, 2007, p. 234.

⁹⁸ Hehir, *Introduction: Intervention and Statebuilding in Kosovo*, 2009, p. 135.

⁹⁹ NATO, *Background conflict*, 2007.

¹⁰⁰ NATO, *UN Resolution 1244 (1999)*, 1999.

¹⁰¹ Edelstein, *Foreign militaries, sustainable institutions, and postwar statebuilding*, 2009, p. 87.

¹⁰² NATO, *NATO’s role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹⁰³ NATO, *NATO’s role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹⁰⁴ Edelstein, *Foreign militaries, sustainable institutions, and postwar statebuilding*, 2009, p. 88.

At the onset of KFOR and UNMIK's mission, security in Kosovo was provided by three separate agencies. The UNMIK international civilian police (CIVPOL) was responsible for day-to-day security and for preparing the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to eventually take over this responsibility.¹⁰⁵ KFOR was, and continues to be, in charge of matters that the CIVPOL and KPS could not handle.¹⁰⁶ UNMIK and KFOR also established the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), whose tasks included search and rescue, demining, and reconstruction of infrastructure.¹⁰⁷ In 2008, KFOR gained several new responsibilities in the endeavor to return to completely civilian governance, one of which was the transformation of the civilian armed forces for Kosovo.¹⁰⁸ As UNMIK and KFOR began to relinquish certain tasks back to civilian control, KFOR was charged with establishing a new Kosovo Security Force (KSF) to replace the KPC.¹⁰⁹ KSF is a voluntary force trained according to NATO standards and will be composed of both Albanian and Serbian Kosovans.¹¹⁰ It is responsible for security tasks not suitable for the police force, such as emergency response, civil protection, and peace operations when needed.¹¹¹

The presence of NATO in Kosovo has made the state building process one of the most successful in recent history.¹¹² Within the first three weeks after the deployment of KFOR, 480,000 refugees returned to Kosovo, and by August 1999, two months after deployment, 90 % of the refugees returned.¹¹³ Freedom House also improved its rating on Kosovo's rule of law and civil liberties by the fifth year of intervention.¹¹⁴ Rates in crime and terrorism also decreased in the region, largely due to the extensive police presence by KFOR and CIVPOL.¹¹⁵ In short, the presence and effectiveness of KFOR was the enabler to a successful implementation of Kosovan public institutions and rule of law.

Experience in Afghanistan

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) were formed as a result of the 2001 Bonn Agreement and United Nations Security Council resolution 1386, following the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ While ISAF's initial mission was to secure Kabul, NATO has held the command of ISAF since 2003 and the alliance's operations are conducted through ISAF.¹¹⁷ Unlike KFOR, ISAF has had a wider range of responsibilities since the onset. They include, in addition to conducting combat: security and peace operations; support for the Afghan National Army and Police; arms and ammunition security; infrastructure reconstruction; humanitarian assistance; governance; and counternarcotics.¹¹⁸

A cornerstone of ISAF operations is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's).¹¹⁹ PRT's were established in Afghanistan by the United States in 2002 to in order to improve security, reconstruct the Afghan provinces, and to increase the presence of the Afghan national government.¹²⁰ Both military and civilian personnel staff PRT's. The military sector focuses on building security and stability for the civilian sector, whose responsibilities include

¹⁰⁵ Wilson, *Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Kosovo's Police and Justice Systems*, 2006, p. 153.

¹⁰⁶ Wilson, *Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Kosovo's Police and Justice Systems*, 2006, p. 153.

¹⁰⁷ NATO, *NATO's role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹⁰⁸ NATO, *NATO's role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹⁰⁹ NATO, *NATO's role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹¹⁰ NATO, *NATO's role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹¹¹ NATO, *NATO's role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹¹² Wilson, *Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Kosovo's Police and Justice Systems*, 2006, p. 166.

¹¹³ Wilson, *Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Kosovo's Police and Justice Systems*, 2006, p. 166.

¹¹⁴ Wilson, *Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Kosovo's Police and Justice Systems*, 2006, p. 168.

¹¹⁵ Wilson, *Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Kosovo's Police and Justice Systems*, 2006, p. 170.

¹¹⁶ United Nations, *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*.

¹¹⁷ NATO, *NATO's role in Afghanistan*, 2009.

¹¹⁸ NATO, *NATO's role in Afghanistan*, 2009.

¹¹⁹ USAID, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an Interagency Assessment*, 2006.

¹²⁰ USAID, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an Interagency Assessment*, 2006.

political, economic, and humanitarian aspects of Afghan life.¹²¹ Each PRT is expected to address issues and start projects based on local conditions.¹²² For example, the British PRT in Mazar-e Sharif adopted a “minimum force” approach towards patrolling the region.¹²³ Other the other hand, the German PRT’s in Kunduz and Feyzabad were much more robust with more military presence compared to the PRT in Mazar-e Sharif and more tasks focused on the provision of security instead of development.¹²⁴ A key component to the success of ISAF is the inclusion of community leaders, tribal elders and other local officers in the works of ISAF and PRT’s; this creates a tangible link between the Afghans, provincial governments, and the national government in Kabul.¹²⁵

At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, NATO proclaimed its new Comprehensive Approach for the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.¹²⁶ At the core of the Comprehensive Approach is better integration of civilian and military operations.¹²⁷ The alliance will improve efforts to integrate military and civil planning and take greater advantage of its training programs to harmonize the military and civilian sectors.¹²⁸ Furthermore, NATO also recognizes that a secure Afghanistan is also one led by Afghans; to that end, the Afghan National Security Forces will continue to receive more responsibilities and tasks and will eventually lead the security operations in the country.¹²⁹ Weaknesses in the PRT’s have also been identified, which include a lack of resources and insecure conditions for reconstruction, and NATO promises in the Comprehensive Approach to provide all resources necessary to PRT’s to carry on their tasks.¹³⁰

Conclusion

The approaches taken by NATO in Kosovo and in Afghanistan differ from each other largely due to the scope and responsibilities of each mission. This also led to different experiences and results. In Kosovo, NATO was relegated to performing security-related tasks only while UNMIK took care of governance and socioeconomic reconstruction.¹³¹ Its position as the guarantor of security allowed UNMIK and other reconstruction efforts to take place without much fear of violence or retaliation. Because NATO was involved in Kosovo strictly as a Chapter VII operation, its responsibility of securing the environment was not distracted by other duties it had to carry out.¹³² In Afghanistan, NATO has a much more prominent role in governing the country post-intervention.¹³³ It has to fight against al-Qaeda, provide security, organize a new government, and reconstruct outlying areas of Afghanistan.¹³⁴ The reconstruction efforts of ISAF are conducted through the PRT’s, each of which is led by a different coalition country.¹³⁵ This has caused inconsistent methodologies and varying degrees of success across Afghanistan vertically and horizontally.

As NATO has played two very different roles in the two cases, it is important to consider how NATO should approach its state building efforts in the future. Is it more conducive for state building and reconstruction if NATO

¹²¹ NATO, *Afghan Report 2009*, 2009, p. 34.

¹²² USAID, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an Interagency Assessment*, 2006.

¹²³ Larsdotter, *Exploring the utility of armed force in peace operations: German and British approaches in northern Afghanistan*, 2008, p. 360.

¹²⁴ Larsdotter, *Exploring the utility of armed force in peace operations: German and British approaches in northern Afghanistan*, p. 361.

¹²⁵ Larsdotter, *Exploring the utility of armed force in peace operations: German and British approaches in northern Afghanistan*, p. 361.

¹²⁶ Adams, *Policy Options for State-building in Afghanistan: The Role of NATO PRT’s in Development in Afghanistan*, 2009, p. 5.

¹²⁷ Adams, *Policy Options for State-building in Afghanistan: The Role of NATO PRT’s in Development in Afghanistan*, 2009, p. 5.

¹²⁸ NATO, *A Comprehensive Approach*, 2009.

¹²⁹ NATO, *ISAF’s Strategic Vision Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan*, 2008.

¹³⁰ Adams, *Policy Options for State-building in Afghanistan: The Role of NATO PRT’s in Development in Afghanistan*, 2009, p. 13.

¹³¹ Edelstein, *Foreign militaries, sustainable institutions, and postwar statebuilding*, 2009, p. 87.

¹³² NATO, *NATO’s role in Kosovo*, 2009.

¹³³ NATO, *NATO’s role in Afghanistan*, 2009.

¹³⁴ NATO, *NATO’s role in Afghanistan*, 2009.

¹³⁵ Adams, *Policy Options for State-building in Afghanistan: The Role of NATO PRT’s in Development in Afghanistan*, 2009, p. 3.

remains as the provider of security or if NATO branches out to more humanitarian endeavors? How should the alliance gauge a mission as “successful”? What are the priorities of a state building mission in the beginning, or in other words, should the alliance focus on democratization or institutionalization? How can NATO incorporate the principles of R2P into its framework? Lastly, as an actor in the international community, does NATO have the capacity to respond to every breach of sovereign responsibility? If not, what criteria should be used to determine engagement?

Must Reads

Hehir, A. (2009). “Introduction: Intervention and Statebuilding in Kosovo”. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3(2). 135-142.

In this article, Hehir discusses the significance of NATO intervention in Kosovo and its continued importance in international relations today. Hehir postulates that the conflict in Kosovo and the subsequent intervention served as an indication of how post-Cold War trends and interests have evolved. NATO decided to intervene on humanitarian grounds, which was unprecedented at the time. The practice of state building was also unprecedented, as the United Nations and NATO attended to the affairs of Kosovo on a long-term basis.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre.

The Canadian government commissioned this landmark policy paper after NATO forces has intervened in Kosovo. NATO was met with criticism over the lack of legality in the intervention, as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not provoke the alliance; nonetheless, NATO cited humanitarian reasons to end the conflict in Kosovo.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2008). *Afghanistan National Development Strategy*. Accessed October 5, 2009, from

http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf.

This extensive report is published by the government of Afghanistan, outlining the policies on every aspect of Afghan life and security. The plan was produced using goals set by the Millennium Development Goals. As mentioned in the report, ISAF is involved in many diverse aspects of Afghan development, from transport to health to national security. The Afghan government has made available detailed reports of each sector of Afghan civil life at this website:

http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/ands_docs/index.asp.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *Afghanistan Report 2009*. Accessed July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_03/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf.

This report, now in its second edition, presents the progress Afghanistan has made under international auspices since NATO-ISAF was established. Other than military operations, ISAF’s other projects include governance, women’s rights, and counter-narcotics. Delegates should further explore their Member State’s projects in Afghanistan to fully understand the scope of NATO’s operations.

Paris, R. and Sisk, T. D. (2009). “Understanding the contradictions of postwar state building”. In R. Paris and T. D. Sisk (Eds.). *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (1-20). New York: Routledge.

This is an introduction to the practice of state building and the development from peacekeeping to peace building. At the turn of the 21st century, the literature and practices on state building began to shift, encompassing not just democratization but the construction of legitimate governance. The authors postulate that by better understanding the scholarship behind state building, policymakers will have a better grasp of managing these endeavors.

United Nations. General Assembly. (2009). *Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (A/63/677)*. Accessed October 5, 2009, from

<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/SGRtoPEng.pdf>.

At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders unanimously agreed to the principles of the Responsibility to Protect, proclaiming that each state has the utmost responsibility and duty to protect its citizens. This report by the Secretary-General outlines the methods by which the United Nations will implement the concepts of R2P. This is further impetus for the international community, especially NATO, to start thinking about how to include R2P into existing frameworks.

II. NATO's Role in Afghanistan

Introduction

Since 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has carried out missions in Afghanistan, located far away from the North Atlantic in Southeast Asia. This is a historical shift of NATO's focus.¹³⁶ Created in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, under the lead of the United States, NATO's purpose for its first 42 years was primarily focused on deterrence of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.¹³⁷ After the end of the Cold War, there was a reexamination of NATO's role, but its focus mostly remained on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states.¹³⁸ The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed that.¹³⁹

Invoking Chapter 5 of the NATO Charter, which states that "an armed attack against one [...] shall be considered an attack against them all," NATO offered its full support of the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.¹⁴⁰ In August 2003, NATO took over operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.¹⁴¹ Its official purpose as head of the ISAF is to "assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance."¹⁴²

ISAF's role in Afghanistan

NATO initially planned for five phases of ISAF operations: The first phase was "assessment and preparation," including initial operations only in Kabul.¹⁴³ The second phase was ISAF's geographic expansion throughout Afghanistan completed in 2006.¹⁴⁴ The final three phases would involve stabilization, transition, and redeployment.¹⁴⁵ At the start of 2009, ISAF was operating in Phase III, "stabilization", and NATO officials were reportedly discussing when to announce commencement of Phase IV, the "transition" of lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).¹⁴⁶ Some ISAF officials have expressed the concern that an announcement that ISAF has entered "transition" could trigger a rush by some troop-contributing countries to Phase V – "redemption." They caution that in practice, the shift from stabilization to transition is likely to vary geographically across Afghanistan as the abilities of the ANSF to execute and then lead missions increase.¹⁴⁷ The belief is transition will take place gradually, rather than at a clear single point in time.¹⁴⁸

More specifically, the ISAF is committed to helping with security, reconstruction and development, governance, and counter-narcotics.¹⁴⁹ Its security goals are pursued by "conducting security and stability operations across Afghanistan, in conjunction with the ANSF."¹⁵⁰ While working with the ANSF, its goals are to also improve the

¹³⁶ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹³⁷ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹³⁸ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹³⁹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁴⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949.

¹⁴¹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁴² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁴³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁴⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁴⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁴⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁴⁸ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁴⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

ANSF's operational capabilities through training exercises, operational support, and monetary as well as equipment donations.¹⁵¹

Equally important to the ISAF's security goals is to provide support for the Afghan National Police (ANP).¹⁵² In conjunction with the Afghanistan government, the specific benchmark for the ANP is to train a "62,000 person professional police service committed to the rule of law."¹⁵³ In order to achieve this goal, the ISAF "assists the ANP, primarily at the tactical level, with military support to operations, advice, shared information and informal mentoring and guidance."¹⁵⁴ Local support involves both niche training of non-police specific skills provided by ISAF units, and indirect support, mentoring, and joint patrolling.¹⁵⁵ Much of this assistance is delivered through the medium of "security committees and coordination centres."¹⁵⁶

In addition to helping the ANSF and the ANP, the ISAF is helping remove illegal weapons from the country, manage the security of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) ammunition deposits, and provide humanitarian relief.¹⁵⁷ In the area of reconstruction and development (R&D), success is largely achieved through an extension of improved security.¹⁵⁸ The ISAF's goals are to help "extend the authority of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [...] throughout the country by providing area security and supporting the R&D activities of Afghan, international, national and non-governmental actors in the provinces."¹⁵⁹

On the issue of governance, the ISAF, through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), is "helping the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. PRTs' principal mission in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve."¹⁶⁰

According to many sources, the successes of the ISAF's counter-narcotics plans are crucial to overall success in Afghanistan.¹⁶¹ The Afghan government has also stated a belief in the importance of counter-narcotics, as shown by its 2003 goal of reducing the production of illegal drugs by 70% by 2007 and eliminating all production by 2012.¹⁶² The ISAF is helping with this goal by "sharing information, conducting an efficient public information campaign, and providing in-extremis support to the Afghan National Security Forces' counter-narcotics operations."¹⁶³ In addition, the ISAF "assists the training of Afghan National Security Forces in counter-narcotics related activities and provides logistic support, when requested, for the delivery of alternative livelihood programs."¹⁶⁴

Geographically, the ISAF's mission has greatly expanded during its time in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁵ Initially limited to the capital of Kabul and its surrounding areas, the ISAF's scope now covers all of Afghanistan.¹⁶⁶ NATO's geographic expansion has occurred over four stages.¹⁶⁷ In Stage One, which occurred from 2003-2004, NATO moved into the northern part of the country.¹⁶⁸ In Stage Two, beginning in May 2005, NATO moved west.¹⁶⁹ Stage Three, which occurred on July 31, 2006, NATO expanded into the south to bring stability.¹⁷⁰ NATO's expansion to the south of

¹⁵¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁵⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁶⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁶¹ Council on Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan's Troop Deficit Problem*, 2009.

¹⁶² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁶⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*.

¹⁶⁶ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁶⁷ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁶⁸ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁶⁹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁷⁰ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

Afghanistan has been most contentious, as the south is the most violent region in Afghanistan.¹⁷¹ The instability and violence of the southern regions is the one of the main political challenges that NATO faces with its continued presence in Afghanistan.¹⁷² Stage Four was the consolidation of the ISAF's responsibilities to cover all of Afghanistan.¹⁷³

Expanding or Declining Presence?

Like any country, alliance or organization, NATO has a finite amount of resources. What NATO does in Afghanistan comes at the expense of what it could do elsewhere. Accordingly, any action by NATO must be viewed through a cost-benefit analysis. When NATO first took over control in Afghanistan, the country was largely secured and the thought of an expansive counter-insurgency operation seemed unlikely and was not part of the calculation for many Member States.¹⁷⁴

“What we do see is a strain as different home governments look at their overarching objectives and the circumstances in which they are engaged in the conflict. We have to remember that when this became a NATO mission, it looked as though the country had been secure, and it did not look as though there was going to be an intense counterinsurgency fight. So many of the NATO countries came in with their caveats and mission sets based on a situation that has changed over the past few years. It is really one of the reasons why we now have to talk about the implications of a counterinsurgency strategy for the alliance writ large.”¹⁷⁵

As discussed, the NATO-led ISAF has had an expanding presence in Afghanistan, both geographically and strategically.¹⁷⁶ Initially, the ISAF was limited to Kabul and focused more on reconstruction, development, good governance, and security support and training.¹⁷⁷ Since expanding to the South, however, NATO has been more involved in tactical counter-insurgency actions.¹⁷⁸ Counter-insurgency missions are costly in terms of time, money, and bodies.¹⁷⁹

Despite an increasing presence in Afghanistan, it can be argued that the coalition forces are not large (?) enough to achieve success.¹⁸⁰ According to Kagan, “What we need to ensure is that coalition forces are able to fill the gap both in terms of bringing the violence down over the next year and being able to secure terrain while the Afghan national army is growing.”¹⁸¹

However, since early 2009, the United States (U.S.) has begun to push NATO's role to focus back on “civilian support” rather than counter-insurgency actions.¹⁸² At the same time, NATO has been urged to become “less reactive and more proactive in dealing with threats” and to improve their counter-insurgency capabilities, a pledge that several European members have agreed to.¹⁸³ Meanwhile, other European members have suggested or even acted upon troop reduction, with Germany as a notable example.¹⁸⁴ After a failed NATO attack ordered by a German commander that resulted in the death of over 100 Afghan civilians, there may be even more pressure to reduce the presence of troops in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷¹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁷² Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁷³ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁷⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan's Troop Deficit Problem*, 2009.

¹⁷⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan's Troop Deficit Problem*, 2009.

¹⁷⁶ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁷⁸ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁷⁹ Gulula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 2006.

¹⁸⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan's Troop Deficit Problem*, 2009.

¹⁸¹ Council on Foreign Relations, *Afghanistan's Troop Deficit Problem*, 2009.

¹⁸² Bruno, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 2009.

¹⁸³ Bruno, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 2009.

¹⁸⁴ Bruno, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 2009; The Economist, *Collateral Damage of Every Sort*, 2009.

¹⁸⁵ The Economist, *Collateral Damage of Every Sort*, 2009.

“German politicians have tried to portray the Afghan deployment not as a combat mission but as a humanitarian one. That claim now rings hollow. Germany’s participation in ISAF must be debated anew by the parliament, the Bundestag, in December. There is little doubt that it will be renewed, but pressure is growing for an exit strategy. The chancellor, Angela Merkel, has joined Britain’s prime minister, Gordon Brown, and France’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy, in calling for an international conference on how to shift responsibility for security from ISAF to the Afghan government. But America is expected to ask for more from its allies, not less.”¹⁸⁶

Success: What is it and can it be achieved?

Upon change to the Obama Administration in the United States, the U.S. redefined its goals in Afghanistan and has begun developing objective benchmarks to track whether they are achieving them.¹⁸⁷ NATO must similarly define what it hopes to achieve in Afghanistan and whether it is realistically possible.

In determining whether success is possible, NATO’s current track record in Afghanistan must be heavily considered. U.S. forces have joked that ISAF is the short form for “I Saw Americans Fight” and more serious assessments have harsh evaluations for the ISAF.¹⁸⁸ Since the outset of NATO’s takeover of the ISAF, there has been numerous concerns and critiques directed toward NATO.¹⁸⁹ NATO has constantly had problems persuading its Member States to contribute forces and has been unable to consistently determine how these forces would operate, due to national restrictions on how they could be used.¹⁹⁰ As former NATO General James Jones said, “It’s not enough to simply provide forces if those forces have restrictions on them that limit them from being effective.”¹⁹¹

The ISAF is having particular problems in succeeding in its attempts to halt Afghanistan’s illicit poppy trade, one of its major goals.¹⁹² However, it is unclear if this is a sign that the ISAF is unlikely to ever succeed or if simply more resources are needed.¹⁹³ The NATO/ISAF mission, from its inception, was not authorized to play a direct role in the counter-narcotics effort, such as destroying poppy fields or processing facilities.¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless, NATO commanders have been instructed to provide assistance to the local counter-narcotics authorities.¹⁹⁵

Great Britain leads the ISAF effort to coordinate the counter-narcotics operation.¹⁹⁶ The allies provide training, intelligence, and logistics to Afghan army units and police who destroy poppy fields and opium labs.¹⁹⁷ One former regional commander believed that the Afghan government’s destruction of poppy fields was too random to be effective and that the government had not taken decisive action to end warlord involvement in the narcotics trade.¹⁹⁸ There are also reports that the government primarily destroys the crops of the poorest farmers and leaves those of more influential families whose support is needed by the government untouched.¹⁹⁹ The Bush Administration had initially urged the Karzai government to consider spraying herbicide on the poppy fields.²⁰⁰ However, the Afghan government decided against this proposal because of possible effects of herbicide on public health and the environment.²⁰¹ No other ally reportedly supported aerial spraying largely for fear of alienating the local populations that rely on poppy cultivation for income.²⁰² The U.S. Congress also weighed in on this issue by

¹⁸⁶ The Economist, *Collateral Damage of Every Sort*, 2009.

¹⁸⁷ Bruno, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 2009.

¹⁸⁸ Mulrine, *In Afghanistan, the NATO-led Force is 'Underresourced' For the Fight Against the Taliban*, 2009; Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁸⁹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹⁰ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹¹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹² Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹³ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹⁴ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹⁵ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹⁶ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹⁷ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹⁸ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

¹⁹⁹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

²⁰⁰ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

²⁰¹ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

²⁰² Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

including language in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 110-161) prohibiting U.S. counter-narcotics funds from being used for aerial spraying of poppy fields.²⁰³

According to the United States State Department, the counter-insurgency program consisted of eight “pillars.”²⁰⁴ The eight pillars are “public information, alternative development, eradication, interdiction/law enforcement, prosecution/criminal justice reform, demand reduction, institution building, and international and regional cooperation.”²⁰⁵

In August, 2009 many hoped that the Afghanistan elections would bring increased legitimacy to the Afghan government, allowing it more room to grow and more power to defend itself from the Taliban.²⁰⁶ The belief was that a successful election would “mark a decisive turning point in the effort to create a legitimate, reasonably functioning, national Afghan state, and the public would be reassured that the Afghan effort was on the right track.”²⁰⁷ Furthermore, “the United States, its allies, and the United Nations went to extraordinary lengths and spent hundreds of millions of dollars to try to ensure that the election would be, if not “free and fair,” at least digestible.”²⁰⁸

While the goals of a successful election in Afghanistan are worthwhile, results are harder to achieve. In unstable, war-torn areas, “elections [...] are always an uncertain thing. The results can be a turning point in establishing political legitimacy -- or they can freeze a bad situation or produce bad rulers.”²⁰⁹

Leading up to the election, there was a concerted effort to secure several regions, including the critical area of Chahar Dara where militants are strong.²¹⁰ Unfortunately, successes proved easier to plan for than to achieve.²¹¹

“In July a 2,000-strong clearing operation tried to pacify Chahar Dara before the presidential election on August 20th. Locals say the militants, including some from Uzbekistan and the Afghan south, left the area only to return later, and more are coming every month. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, has reportedly called on his fighters to open a new front in the north to stretch coalition forces.”²¹²

Unfortunately, the elections were characterized by wide-spread problems and arguably have worsened the Afghan government’s legitimacy.²¹³

“An election that was meant to refresh the decaying leadership of Mr Karzai has made him appear even more rotten. The country risks starker polarisation between Tajiks in the north and Pushtuns in the south. The fight against the Taliban has become harder. The more predatory and corrupt the government, the more difficult it will be to draw Afghans away from insurgents, and the harder to convince the Western public to send soldiers to die for its sake. In the words of America’s counterinsurgency manual, now akin to a warfighters’ bible, “legitimacy is the main objective.” Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, wants greater “Afghanisation”. But how can that work when the West’s Afghan ally has lost legitimacy?”²¹⁴

Conclusion

For the foreseeable future, the war in Afghanistan will be the paramount issue of NATO’s global focus. Due to the

²⁰³ Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2009.

²⁰⁴ Schweich, Thomas A., *U.S. Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan*, 2007.

²⁰⁵ Schweich, Thomas A., *U.S. Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan*, 2007.

²⁰⁶ The Economist, *Re-Rigging Hamid Karzai*, 2009.

²⁰⁷ Abramowitz, *The Afghanistan Mess*, 2009.

²⁰⁸ Abramowitz, *The Afghanistan Mess*, 2009.

²⁰⁹ Abramowitz, *The Afghanistan Mess*, 2009.

²¹⁰ The Economist, *Collateral Damage of Every Sort*, 2009.

²¹¹ The Economist, *Collateral Damage of Every Sort*, 2009.

²¹² The Economist, *Collateral Damage of Every Sort*, 2009.

²¹³ The Economist, *Re-Rigging Hamid Karzai*, 2009.

²¹⁴ The Economist, *Re-Rigging Hamid Karzai*, 2009.

challenges of the operation and what is at stake, it remains a complex and difficult situation for NATO. As of late 2009, there is a significant amount of public and private contemplation on what should be done in Afghanistan.²¹⁵ Most notably is the Obama Administration's review of its Afghanistan-Pakistan policy.²¹⁶ At Foreign Policy Magazine, they recently asked:

“What levers do we possess to encourage the reduction of corruption and improve representative governance at the local, provincial, and national levels in Afghanistan, and are they synchronized with those of the Afghan government?

Does the United States have the capacity to undertake the civilian aspects of a counterinsurgency strategy, given that currently only about 100 of the 450 civilian diplomats and technical specialists promised in the civilian surge have thus far reached the Afghan theater and that U.S. agencies are scrambling to find additional civilians to deploy?

What is the best strategy for ensuring aid money provided by the United States and other countries has maximum impact in building Afghanistan's economy? More than 60 international donors and entities are providing aid to Afghanistan, and efforts remain fragmented and poorly coordinated across the country.

What measures are we taking to build the long-term sustainability of Afghan government institutions for an eventual transition away from dependence on international donors?”²¹⁷

While these questions are specific to the U.S., they are relevant questions to ask of NATO. In addition, considering such a complex topic, the following basic and challenging questions merit attention: What should NATO define as success and failure in Afghanistan? What can NATO do to achieve success? How likely is a successful outcome? What are the costs needed to achieve success? What are the costs of failure? What are the costs of leaving? And relative to other global issues that can use NATO resources, is Afghanistan worth it?

Must Reads

Central Intelligence Agency (n.d.). *The World Factbook - Afghanistan*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>
Afghanistan is a country with many complex elements that offer potentially unique challenges to NATO. It is therefore important to understand the basic facts about the country. The CIA World Factbook, while low in analysis, is one of the most reliable and detailed sources for understanding the key components of any country. In order to move forward with reconstruction, it is important to know the makeup of the economy. To assist with security, geographical information is important as well. Most basic information that delegates will need can be found here.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *Afghanistan Report 2009*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_03/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf
This is NATO's second annual report on its role in Afghanistan. The purpose of the report is to outline the progress of the NATO-led ISAF missions in Afghanistan. It is rich in facts, figures, and insight. This will be one of the most useful sources for delegates in understanding NATO's role in Afghanistan and how to move forward.

Jones, S. (2009). *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
This is a crucial book in understanding the current war in Afghanistan. It is full of information, covering Afghan history, current geo-political analysis, and analysis of the tactics and strategy of

²¹⁵ Wadhams, *The Wrong Question*, 2009.

²¹⁶ Bruno, *The Cost of Commitment in Afghanistan*, 2009.

²¹⁷ Wadhams, *The Wrong Question*, 2009.

all the major players in the war. This book is absolutely critical for delegates to understand the mission in Afghanistan and all its complexities.

Galula, D. (2006). *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York, NY: Greenwood Publishing Group.

This is an excellent resource for delegates in understanding counter-insurgency operations. The book takes an exhaustive look on counterinsurgency operations in history, including Afghanistan. In determining NATO's role in Afghanistan, delegates must understand the challenges it faces. This book will help them understand and appreciate the challenges.

Gerson, M., & Hertog, R. (2008, February 13). *NATO's Afghan Stumbles*. Retrieved August 19, 2009, from Council on Foreign Relations Web site:

http://www.cfr.org/publication/15503/natos_afghan_stumbles.html

This critical piece looks at NATO's role in Afghanistan. It argues that the uneven commitment of NATO Member States is a crucial problem. Delegates should use this to contextualize the problems of the current mission and how it can be changed.

III. NATO's Engagement with other International Organizations

"NATO is doing far more and far less than it should be doing today. That paradox lies at the heart of the question facing the Alliance's leaders as they gather next week in Bucharest: Will the Alliance, established to fight the Cold War, survive the 21st century?"²¹⁸

Introduction: NATO's "Comprehensive Approach"

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO endorsed an action plan that would increase its interactions and cooperation with other countries, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities.²¹⁹ This plan is referred to as NATO's "Comprehensive Approach."²²⁰

More specifically, NATO is trying to "build closer partnerships with other international organizations that have experience and skills in areas such as institution building, development, governance, judiciary and police."²²¹ NATO believes increased engagement will help "deal with 21st century security challenges, such as fighting terrorism, improving energy security, preventing proliferation of weapons and dangerous materials, protecting against cyber attacks and confronting the threat of piracy."²²²

NATO has identified five areas where it hopes the Comprehensive Approach will help.²²³ The first of these is "Planning and Conduct of Operations."²²⁴ According to NATO, it hopes to promote a "sense of common purpose and resolve, the clear definition of strategies and objectives before launching an operation, as well as enhanced planning to support nations' contributions to operations."²²⁵

The second area is called "Lessons Learned, Training, Education and Exercises."²²⁶ NATO plans to offer joint training of civilian and military personnel that will promote the "sharing of lessons learned and also helps build trust

²¹⁸ Sherwood-Randall, *Is NATO Dead or Alive?*, 2008.

²¹⁹ Petersen and Binnendijk, *From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability*.

²²⁰ Petersen and Binnendijk, *From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability*.

²²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²²³ Petersen and Binnendijk, *From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability*.

²²⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²²⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

and confidence between NATO, its partners and other international and local actors, which has encouraged better coordination.”²²⁷

“Enhancing Cooperation with External Actors” is the third area of focus.²²⁸ NATO believes that “achieving lasting mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect among the relevant organizations and actors will make their respective efforts more effective.”²²⁹ NATO hopes to achieve this by “actively pursuing extensive civil-military interaction with other relevant organizations and actors on a regular basis, as appropriate, while respecting the autonomy of decision-making of each organization.”²³⁰

The fourth area of focus is “Public Messaging.”²³¹ In order to achieve its goals of a Comprehensive Approach, NATO argues that a sustained and coherent public messaging program must be activated.²³² Included in this is an effort at producing consistent and non-contradictory messages from NATO and cooperating institutions.²³³ More specific aspects of its public messaging program are the substantiation of “systematic and updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas.”²³⁴

Finally, “Stabilization and Reconstruction” is the fifth area of focus.²³⁵ NATO hopes to improve its capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction in conflict zones.²³⁶ To do this, NATO will attempt to achieve better coordination with its partners and “exploiting the full range of existing and planned Alliance capabilities relevant to this broad activity.”²³⁷

Current Engagements

NATO has several current active engagements with other IGOs.²³⁸ Included are partnerships with other broad-based organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and African Union (AU).²³⁹ NATO also works with smaller, more narrowly-focused organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRC).²⁴⁰

NATO has a long-standing, but growing relationship with the UN.²⁴¹ During the Cold War, working relations between the two organizations were limited.²⁴² The conflict in the Balkans, however, led to an “intensification of practical cooperation between the two organizations in the field.”²⁴³ The two organizations have since cooperated on issues such as crisis-management, civil-military cooperation, combating human trafficking, mine action, civil emergency planning, women and peace and security, arms control and non-proliferation, and anti-terrorism.²⁴⁴ According to NATO, “The UN is at the core of the framework of international organizations within which the Alliance operates, a principle that is enshrined in NATO’s founding treaty.”²⁴⁵ Examples include the UN Security

²²⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²³⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the European Union*; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²³⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the European Union*; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁴⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the European Union*; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁴¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*.

²⁴² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*.

²⁴³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*.

²⁴⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*.

²⁴⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO’s Relations with the United Nations*.

Council providing the mandate for NATO's roles in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.²⁴⁶ In addition, NATO has supported UN-sponsored operations, such as AU-UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan, and Somalia.²⁴⁷ After the devastating 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, NATO provided support for the UN disaster-relief operations.²⁴⁸ NATO has also helped against piracy by escorting merchant ships off the coast of Somalia that were carrying World Food Programme humanitarian supplies.²⁴⁹

Much like the NATO-UN relationship, NATO's relationship with the EU has evolved and grown over the last two decades.²⁵⁰ In the 1990s, there was a "growing realization of the need for European countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security."²⁵¹ NATO and the EU supported plans to strengthen European defenses.²⁵² In addition, NATO developed a "European Security and Defense Identity" within NATO that would be "both an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures and an important contributing factor to the development of European defense capabilities."²⁵³

NATO and the EU have defined several areas of cooperation, within and outside Europe.²⁵⁴ Within Europe, the most important area is the Western Balkans, including the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.²⁵⁵ Outside of Europe, they have partnered in Afghanistan, Darfur and the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia.²⁵⁶

The EU and NATO have also worked together to increase the capabilities of each organization.²⁵⁷ In May 2003, the NATO-EU Capability Group was established, which ensured the "coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts."²⁵⁸ The following year, NATO created the European Defense Agency (EDA) to "coordinate work within the European Union on the development of defense capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research."²⁵⁹ Less officially, but still noteworthy, is NATO-EU cooperation on counterterrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).²⁶⁰ Part of their cooperation on these issues includes exchanging information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks.²⁶¹

NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have a working relationship on European security as well as environmental issues.²⁶² In the Western Balkans, for example, NATO and the OSCE have carried out complementary missions aimed at arms control, security building, and other security issues.²⁶³

After the Dayton Agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO "assisted the OSCE in its work in the area of arms control and confidence and security-building measures in the country."²⁶⁴ Moreover, NATO provided security for OSCE personnel and humanitarian assistance what has contributed to the proper conduct of elections under OSCE auspices.²⁶⁵ After the adoption of Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council in June 1999, NATO and

²⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁴⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁴⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁴⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the European Union*.
²⁵¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁵⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁶⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁶¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*.
²⁶² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO – OSCE Relations*.
²⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO – OSCE Relations*.
²⁶⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO – OSCE Relations*.
²⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO – OSCE Relations*.

the OSCE have worked together in Kosovo to supervise the “progress of democratization, the creation of institutions, and the protection of human rights.”²⁶⁶

Case Study: NATO and the African Union

While NATO’s relationship with the AU is recent and limited, it is a significant moment for NATO and how it views its place in the international system. The problems in Sudan and Somalia have no obvious connection to NATO’s Member States own security. Accordingly, the NATO-AU relationship could signal an important shift in NATO’s focus and reach. Indeed, according to NATO, “this was the Alliance’s first mission on the African continent and as such represents a landmark decision by the North Atlantic Council.”²⁶⁷

In 2005, the AU requested NATO’s assistance for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which “aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003.”²⁶⁸ Before its support ended at the end of 2007, “NATO helped the AU expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel.”²⁶⁹ According to NATO, it “harmonised the airlift of some 37 500 troops, civilian police and military observers in and out of the Sudanese region. NATO alone coordinated the airlift of over 31 500 AMIS troops and personnel.”²⁷⁰ The NATO airlifts were coordinated in Europe with cooperation from the European Union.²⁷¹ The coordination of the movement of incoming troops on the ground was at a special “AU Air Movement Cell” at the AU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.²⁷² Both the European Union and NATO provided staff to support the cell, but the African Union had the lead.²⁷³

NATO is quick to note that its support “did not imply the provision of combat troops,” but it did provide training assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in a variety of disciplines.²⁷⁴ At the strategic level and operational planning, NATO focused on training in “technologies and techniques to create an overall analysis and understanding of Darfur, and to identify the areas where the application of AU assets could best influence the operating environment and deter crises.”²⁷⁵ According to NATO, 184 AU officers benefited from this training.²⁷⁶ They were based at two different AMIS headquarters: the Darfur Integrated Task Force Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the AMIS Force Headquarters (FHQ) in El Fasher, Sudan.²⁷⁷

In August, 2006, NATO contributed to a UN-led mapping exercise.²⁷⁸ The exercise was designed to “help AU personnel understand and operate effectively in the theatre of operations, as well as to build their capacity to manage strategic operations. NATO provided 14 officers, including exercise writers and tactical-level controllers.”²⁷⁹

Similarly, NATO has agreed to assist the AU’s mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by “providing airlift support to AU member states willing to deploy in Somalia under AMISOM.”²⁸⁰ Additionally, NATO has provided its expertise for the AU’s strategic planning.²⁸¹ Moreover, NATO will also “assist the AU in its contingency planning effort for AMISON by deploying an expert for three weeks.”²⁸²

²⁶⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO – OSCE Relations*.

²⁶⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁶⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁶⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁷⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁸⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁸¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁸² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

According to NATO, its work with the AU in the Sudan was successful.²⁸³ In addition, a UN military commander from the region declared the war in Darfur being no more, but is instead problem low-level disputes and banditry.²⁸⁴ However, it is difficult to judge how much of this is due to NATO. This is mostly due to its limited role in Sudan.²⁸⁵ Indeed, some have been critical of NATO's limited role: "NATO has also been ferrying African Union troops inside Darfur, but the support has been *ad hoc* and limited. A more dedicated effort would improve the AU's responsiveness, enabling a smaller number of troops to be more effective."²⁸⁶ As previously stated, NATO merely provided airlift and some training.²⁸⁷ While NATO's role was undeniable helpful, can it be claimed that it was crucial? Accordingly, it is difficult to see what this case-study says about NATO's future role in humanitarian conflicts outside its borders.

Reassessing NATO's Mandate

"With little fanfare -- and even less notice -- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has gone global" argued Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier in 2006.²⁸⁸ They go on to argue that NATO has moved past its initial role in balancing against the Soviet Union and now "the alliance is now seeking to bring stability to other parts of the world."²⁸⁹ As such, NATO is "extending both its geographic reach and the range of its operations."²⁹⁰ In recent years, "it has played peacekeeper in Afghanistan, trained security forces in Iraq, and given logistical support to the African Union's mission in Darfur. It assisted the tsunami relief effort in Indonesia and ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and to those of a massive earthquake in Pakistan."²⁹¹

In 2005, NATO ministers discussed and identified what issues should follow under NATO's mandate.²⁹² These issues are "oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."²⁹³ And in 2002, NATO created a Response Force intended for a variety of missions in addition to collective self-defense, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement.²⁹⁴ More broadly, some argue that current international organizations and alliances are currently ill-prepared to deal with modern challenges:

"Challenges like Afghanistan illustrate that the current international security architecture is inadequate. However, it is not politically viable to pursue dramatic changes to the current institutional framework. The priority must be to ensure that the different actors – NATO, EU, UN, NGOs – are better connected and work together more effectively and deliberately on the ground. No single organization can achieve its objectives alone. NATO should be seen as contributing to a broader comprehensive approach of the international community. Yet, the UN and others cannot fill all gaps in an operation. NATO will be forced to take on a greater role in certain situations, including on non-military efforts. The Alliance must be prepared to meet this responsibility on the civilian side, based on contributions from nations. This is why agreeing on an elaborated CA concept and plan is critical to the Alliance."²⁹⁵

NATO's Comprehensive Approach is its attempt to meet these challenges.²⁹⁶ However, even if there is agreement in establishing and defining a new mandate, NATO has to determine its logistical capabilities in responding to the new issues it may find under its umbrella.²⁹⁷ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall argues that "NATO is actually doing far less than it should be doing. The current pace of operations creates a crisis-like environment in which the urgent

²⁸³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Supporting African Union's Missions*, 2008.

²⁸⁴ BBC, *War in Sudan's Darfur 'Is Over'*, 2009.

²⁸⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁸⁶ Feinstein, *Darfur and Beyond*, 2007.

²⁸⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Assistance to the African Union*.

²⁸⁸ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 2006.

²⁸⁹ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 2006.

²⁹⁰ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 2006.

²⁹¹ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 2006.

²⁹² Feinstein, *Darfur and Beyond*, 2007.

²⁹³ Feinstein, *Darfur and Beyond*, 2007.

²⁹⁴ Feinstein, *Darfur and Beyond*, 2007.

²⁹⁵ *NATO Comprehensive Approach Roundtable*, 2009.

²⁹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *A Comprehensive Approach*.

²⁹⁷ Sherwood-Randall, *Is NATO Dead or Alive?*, 2008.

crowds out the important. For several years, NATO's political and military leaders have had literally no time for strategic discussion or planning.²⁹⁸ This is important, as NATO could provide the "institutional home for coalitions to meet crises beyond Europe."²⁹⁹ Furthermore, NATO can be the cornerstone of an evolving security order in Europe:

"But a cornerstone is not a sponge. The function of a cornerstone is to protect its own integrity to support a wider security structure, not to dissipate its cohesion by absorbing members and responsibilities beyond prudent limits. A powerful NATO undergirds other institutions, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Western European Union. It makes possible the Partnership for Peace to promote cooperation among countries that are not NATO members."³⁰⁰

With the expansion of NATO's mandate, it is important to remember NATO's primary role as a military alliance providing protection for its Member States.³⁰¹ Some have argued that NATO "provides the infrastructure and experience indispensable to coping with instabilities [...]. NATO is vital to insuring arms control and maintaining the kind of industrial base that provides a solid defense."³⁰² Furthermore, European leaders may need military options to respond to new attacks:

"NATO and the European Union must work together to bring resources and assets to bear. But NATO would be well advised to develop its own military options based on a prudent combination of deterrence, defense and retaliation. One conclusion should already be obvious. NATO forces, particularly in Central and Northern Europe, must be better prepared for military operations far away from home and in defense of common interests beyond Europe's borders."³⁰³

In discussing NATO's expanding international role, it should be noted that there are some—such as the militaries of France and Great Britain, who have raised skepticism over an expanded mandate that might undermine their own military independence.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, some argue that NATO is too narrow of an organization to handle the full range of cooperation needed in the years ahead:

"In the evolving Europe, the EU will become responsible for key areas of transatlantic cooperation—from homeland security to democracy promotion to humanitarian assistance. NATO remains a key forum and the institution of choice for acting militarily. But a second U.S.-European anchor is needed to coordinate other aspects of strategy. Indeed, NATO needs to be more closely connected to the EU to ensure the proper coordination of overall policy and strategy."³⁰⁵

Conclusion

As shown, NATO is in a transitional stage, evolving to face new challenges and unsure of what challenges to face. Even though it has been almost 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO is still attempting to stake its claim in the international system. As NATO changes, its existing relationships with other IGOs and potential new relationships will become even more important. These relationships will reinforce and redefine NATO's global role.

In considering this complex and imaginative topic, the following questions should be given particular consideration: While continuing to work with the UN and the EU, what sort of issues should NATO commit itself to? What does NATO's relationship with the AU mean for its future engagements? Was NATO's limited role in Sudan a sign of

²⁹⁸ Sherwood-Randall, *Is NATO Dead or Alive?*, 2008.

²⁹⁹ Nunn, Scowcroft, Baker Jr., and Frye, *NATO: A Debate Recast*, 1998.

³⁰⁰ Nunn, Scowcroft, Baker Jr., and Frye, *NATO: A Debate Recast*, 1998.

³⁰¹ Nunn, Scowcroft, Baker Jr., and Frye, *NATO: A Debate Recast*, 1998.

³⁰² Nunn, Scowcroft, Baker Jr., and Frye, *NATO: A Debate Recast*, 1998.

³⁰³ Weisser and Asmus, *Refit NATO to Move Against Threats From Beyond Europe*, 2001.

³⁰⁴ Feinstein, *Darfur and Beyond*, 2007.

³⁰⁵ Asmus, Blinken, and Gordon, *Nothing to Fear*, 2005.

its limited capabilities for humanitarian support or was it just the beginning of a transition? And finally, as NATO's mandate changes and expands, what other IGOs could NATO work with?

Must Reads

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *A Comprehensive Approach*. Retrieved August 18, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm
NATO's Comprehensive Approach is a crucial piece in understanding NATO role in the current international system. It has attempted to redefine how NATO will operate with other international actors. Accordingly, delegates must fully understand the details of the Comprehensive Approach.

Shalikhavilli, J. and Sloan, S. (2002). *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
This book provides a historical account of NATO's role in the world. It has extensive analysis on NATO's changing role in the world and what new issues it faces. This book will be a valuable source for delegates in understanding NATO's place in the international system.

Kaplan, L. (2004, May 30). *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
This is a historical overview of NATO, with an emphasis on NATO's relationship with its European partners. It offers quality analysis of NATO in the post-Cold War international system. Accordingly, delegates should use this book to further expand their understanding of NATO and how it can interact with other IGOs.

Moore, R. (2007, February 28). *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
This book argues for the success of NATO's enlargement and expansion since the Cold War. It has detailed and robust arguments about NATO's evolving role. This book will be very valuable for delegates in understanding how NATO can work with IGOs and what that means for NATO's role in the world.

Orfy, M. (2007). *The New NATO: Its Survival and Resilience*. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.
While a relatively short book, its analysis of NATO's changing role after the end of the Cold War is well done. This book deals with all the major issues facing NATO and how NATO can evolve to meet these new challenges. Delegates will find this helpful as a background of NATO's evolution over the past 20 years.

Annotated bibliography

Committee History

Ambassade de France (2009). *Discours du Président Sarkozy sur la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au 21ème siècle [Speech by President Sarkozy on France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century]*. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Discours-du-President-Sarkozy-sur.14609.html>.
In this speech, President Sarkozy affirms that France will be returning to the NATO integrated military command. His decision is based on the fact that France no longer needs to assert a third force in Europe, and that the country is not benefitting from isolating herself from NATO's military structure. In fact, by reintegrating France will gain more latitude in NATO by simply having a say in military matters.

Bozo, F. (2001). *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
This book describes the interactions between France and NATO during the years of the de Gaulle presidency. De Gaulle was weary of American and British leadership in Europe and sought to establish France's own sphere of influence, which ultimately led to the departure of France from the unified military command. As noted in the

Committee History, President Nicholas Sarkozy has decided to reintegrate the French military into NATO command.

France Diplomatie (2009). *Colloque « la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au XXIème siècle » - Intervention de Bernard Kouchner [“France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century” Symposium – Speech by Bernard Kouchner]*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/defense-securite_9035/france-otan_9044/france-defense-europeenne-otan-br-11.03.09_71337.html.

Bernard Kouchner is the French Minister for Foreign and European Affairs at the time of writing. In this speech, Minister Kouchner announces a drastic change in French foreign and military policy, allowing the French armed forces to once again be part of NATO's integrated command. France has not formally contributed forces to the integrated command since the 1960's, when former President de Gaulle sought an independent stance in North Atlantic affairs.

Kaufman, J. P. (2002). *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

While the purpose of this book is to trace the developments of NATO's actions in the former Yugoslavia, its introduction serves as a good retelling of NATO's history. Events prior to the intervention in Kosovo, such as the reunification of Germany and the 1991 Gulf War, have placed the alliance under incredible stress as it sought to revitalize itself with each major event.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1991). *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=en.

This iteration of the alliance's strategic concept was released in 1991, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of other Communist governments in Europe. The alliance promptly recognized that the disappearance of an ideological enemy meant NATO needed to identify a new focus. Likewise, it reached out to its former enemies by asking them to jointly participate in securing Europe's peace and stability.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2007). *Consensus decision-making at NATO*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html>.

NATO is a military alliance and as its decisions will affect all of its Member States, decisions reached at the NAC and other levels of governance are unanimous. While Member States will disagree on certain issues, the regularity of these meetings and the NATO consultation process allow Member States to understand where each other stand. The Secretary General is also in charge of conducting such consultations to ensure a smooth decision process.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2007). *The North Atlantic Council*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/nac/>.

The North Atlantic Council is the only deliberative body of NATO whose responsibilities are explicitly mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty. Representatives from Member States meet once a week to discuss political and military matters concerning the alliance. Ministers or heads of state from Member States will also gather at council meetings on a regular occurrence; the level at which meetings are held does not represent its importance in the alliance's affairs.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *Member countries*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm.

NATO is currently a military alliance with 28 Member States. Its biggest wave of expansion happened in 2004, when several former Warsaw Pact countries joined the alliance. In 2008, NATO welcomed Albania and Croatia. Critics of the alliance have questioned whether an expansive membership will truly benefit the alliance, and in broader terms the stability and security of Europe.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *The Partnership for Peace*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html>.

The Partnership for Peace program is one of NATO's several programs catered towards cooperation with non-Member States. The alliance and the Partner Country establish a number of goals to work towards, such as training standards, security, and military affairs. Several former PfP Countries are now full Member States of NATO.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *NATO's relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_fyrom/index.html.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is currently the only country who has signed a Membership Action Plan with NATO. The MAP is an important prerequisite towards full membership. While the country has performed well in all aspects of the MAP, its naming dispute with Greece remains an obstacle towards full membership.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *NATO—Russia Council*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F03B7F54-23CF1D4A/natolive/topics_50091.htm.
The NATO—Russia Council is the latest iteration of the partnership between former enemies. While Russia is hesitant to become a full Member State, unlike its former allies in the Warsaw Pact, NATO and Russia still cooperate on several mutually beneficial fronts, such as antiterrorism and peacekeeping.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *The NATO Secretary General*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50094.htm.
The Secretary General of NATO presides over meetings of the North Atlantic Council, is the main bureaucrat of NATO, and acts as the primary spokesperson for the alliance. While NATO is a military alliance, the selection process for the Secretary General does not necessarily consider military experience. This position is currently held by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark.

I. Reassessing NATO's Role in State Building

Adams, N. T. (2009). *Policy Options for State-building in Afghanistan: The Role of NATO PRTs in Development in Afghanistan*. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/southasia/pdf/Role_NATO_PRT_AFghanistan_ADAMS.pdf.
This article suggests changes that NATO should make in regards to PRT's to allow the PRT's to work more effectively. Currently the PRT's support rebuilding efforts by providing security for third parties as well as undertake the rebuilding efforts themselves. However, security is often lacking which hinders the rebuilding process. Adams suggests that the role of PRT's can be transformed in three ways: expand, focus or diminish.

Bellamy, A. J. (2009). *Responsibility to Protect*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.
Bellamy is the Executive Director of the Asia-Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect. He discusses how the doctrine emerged and the development of the three tenets: prevent, react, and rebuild. He goes on to assert that although R2P was conceived as a guiding principle for policymakers in response to mass atrocities, decisions about intervention will still be made on a case by case basis for political reasons.

Edelstein, D. M. (2009). "Foreign militaries, sustainable institutions, and postwar statebuilding". In R. Paris and T. D. Sisk (Eds.). *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (81-103). New York: Routledge.
The role of foreign militaries in state building is often a contentious one. In this chapter, Edelstein mentions the two dilemmas foreign militaries often face in state building: duration and footprint. While foreign presence may be a welcoming change for a post-conflict country, this welcome will diminish as the local population becomes more eager to assume self-rule. Furthermore, the permeation of foreign forces will also dictate the success of the mission. As such, intervening powers such as NATO must balance between continued presence or an effective exit, and between staying too long and be resented or be welcomed but ineffective.

Huysmans, J. (2002). Shape-shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis. *Review of International Studies*, 28(3). 599-618.
Huysmans discusses the humanitarian work of NATO in Kosovo. He suggests that NATO's successes in humanitarianism were politically significant; NATO was able to improve its image reputation through providing assistance to Kosovo refugees.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background*. Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre.

The same commission who drafted the Responsibility to Protect policy releases this compilation of essays. The commission was called to meet after questions of legality over NATO's involvement in Kosovo and this book reveals the rationale behind the stance taken in R2P, which legitimized the intervention of Kosovo.

Kaufman, J. P. (2002). *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

In this book, Kaufman argues that NATO was unable to secure an identity in the post-Cold War World and that conflicts in the former Yugoslavia had forced the Alliance to come to terms with an unprecedented responsibility. Even so, NATO has not fully reconciled its history with its new role and Kaufman suggests that NATO would have to contend with socioeconomic responsibilities, not just military ones.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2007). *Background conflict*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/KFOR/docu/about/background.html>.

This NATO web site traces the events leading up to the airstrikes in 1999. Upon the dissolution of Communist Yugoslavia, its constituent states became embroiled in ethnic violence. The President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Slobadan Milosevic, relinquished all of the autonomy Kosovo enjoyed before the collapse of communism. NATO intervened in Kosovo on the basis that Serbia could no longer guarantee basic necessities to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, who form the largest ethnic group in Kosovo but is still a minority in Serbia.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2008). *ISAF's Strategic Vision Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan*. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc_208.html.

At the 2008 Summit at Bucharest, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to Afghanistan. The alliance further affirmed that Afghans would soon lead the way towards peace and prosperity in their own country, starting with the assumption of more responsibilities by the Afghan National Security Forces.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *A Comprehensive Approach*. Accessed September 12, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm.

The Comprehensive Approach was drafted at the 2008 NATO Summit at Bucharest and it was brought to attention again at the 2009 Summit at Strasbourg/Kehl. NATO has identified, based on experience in Kosovo and Afghanistan, that security today requires a wider set of civil and military cooperation. To that end, the five areas of development include: planning and conduct of operations; education; cooperation with third parties; communication; and reconstruction.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *NATO's role in Afghanistan*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1DE14FA3-2EEACFA0/natolive/topics_8189.htm.

This web site provides a concise description of NATO's activities in Afghanistan. NATO acquired command of the ISAF in 2003 and through the ISAF has had to provide military, governmental and civilian security for the Afghans. ISAF also works in conjunction with UNAMA to provide other aspects of humanitarian aid in the country.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *NATO's role in Kosovo*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm.

NATO continues to play a significant role in the daily lives of Kosovans, ten years after the airstrikes halted ethnic violence in the region. As both NATO and the United Nations continue to relinquish responsibilities to civilian control, especially after the unilateral declaration of independence, NATO's reputation and relevance hinges on the successful transition.

United Nations. (n.d.) *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*. Accessed July 21, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>.

This agreement, also known as the Bonn Agreement, established how Afghanistan was to be governed immediately after NATO intervention. The agreement established the transitional authority that governed the country, rooted Islamic and western rules of law in the legal system, and paved way for the existence of ISAF.

United Nations. Security Council. (1999). *Security Council Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244)*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm>.

NATO conducted airstrikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo for 78 days, and this resolution, passed after the conclusion of the airstrikes, permitted international presence in Kosovo to govern the territory. Under resolution 1244, Kosovo, while still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, became under the jurisdiction of the United Nations through UNMIK. NATO was also authorized by the resolution to provide for security in the region.

United Nations. Security Council. (1999). *Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386)*. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1386.pdf.

Along with the Bonn Agreement, resolution 1386 provides the mandate to establish ISAF in Afghanistan. Initially, ISAF's responsibility was securing Kabul and surrounding areas to facilitate the Afghan Interim Authority. As a Chapter VII mission, ISAF was initially strictly a peacekeeping operation, but began to take on more responsibilities when NATO took over the ISAF command.

United States Agency for International Development (2006). *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an Interagency Assessment*. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf.

The PRT's in Afghanistan were originally formed by the United States independently of other NATO activities, and the primary goal of the PRT's is to extend the presence of Kabul in outlying provinces. While this assessment was written after most PRT's were transferred under the authority of NATO, the United States is determined to use the model in other interventions. In here, the United States point out that civil-military cooperation must be enhanced and that each PRT, NATO and the government of Afghanistan must also harmonize efforts in order to improve the efficiencies of PRT's.

II. NATO's Role in Afghanistan

Abramowitz, M. (2009, October 8). *The Afghanistan Mess*. Retrieved October 9 2009, from Foreign Policy Web site: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/08/the_afghanistan_mess?page=0.1

This article looks at recent events in Afghanistan, most notably the elections of August 20, 2009, and argues for a new strategic review for the mission in Afghanistan. This article is important for delegates, as it is a critical look at current strategies in Afghanistan. It provides context for the problems of the failed elections and asks critical questions of why there are so many problems with the mission.

Beste, R., Hammerstein, K. & Szandar, A. (2007, October 10). *The Discount War*. Retrieved August 18, 2009, from Spiegel Online Web site: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,510674,00.html>

While an opinion piece, this article is still a valuable source for delegations. Written in 2007, it provides a good overview of the arguments for NATO continued role in Afghanistan. Delegates should consider the variety of view points that exist in order to reach the best possible decision when reconsidering NATO's role.

Bruno, G. (2009, October 8). *The Cost of Commitment in Afghanistan*. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from Council on Foreign Relations Web site: http://www.cfr.org/publication/20374/cost_of_commitment_in_afghanistan.html

This article is a valuable overview of the current debate about the future of the Afghanistan mission. Summarizing the recommendations to the U.S., delegates should use this as a gateway to understanding potential options in Afghanistan. While this is U.S.-specific analysis, the U.S. role is perhaps the most influential Member State of NATO and what it does in Afghanistan on its own effects how NATO can proceed.

Bruno, G. (2009, February 19). *NATO in Afghanistan*. Retrieved August 16, 2009, from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18560/>

The Council on Foreign Relations is a nonpartisan think tank in the United States that focused on international affairs. Their website provides frequent updates on many international issues, including Afghanistan. This Daily Analysis is a valuable source for delegates the recent status of NATO in Afghanistan.

The Economist (2009, September 10). *Collateral Damage of Every Sort*. Retrieved September 14, 2009 from http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14419428.

This article reports on the current problems in Afghanistan. Following the flawed Afghan-elections, there is an increased focus on re-analyzing the way forward in Afghanistan. Delegates will find this article help in understanding the current situation and what options are available.

The Economist (2009, September 10). *Re-Rigging Hamid Karzai*. Retrieved September 14, 2009 from http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14419168

Analyzing the flawed Afghan-elections, this article looks at the problems of the Hamid Karzai-led government. It looks at the options NATO and the U.S. have on pressuring Mr. Karzai. In determining how NATO can succeed in Afghanistan, it is important for delegates to understand the key internal actors in the country.

Goldgeier, J. (2009, Spring). *Facing Old Divisions and New Threats*. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from Harvard International Review Web site: <http://harvardir.org/php?page=article&id=1879&p=1>

This article is a great look at assessing NATO's role in the world now and going forward. It discusses NATO's work in Afghanistan and what this means for NATO in the future. While this is an article non-specific to Afghanistan, it still remains relevant to NATO's role in Afghanistan. In determining how to proceed in Afghanistan, it is important for delegates to not just consider Afghanistan, but how NATO's role in Afghanistan is changing the organization itself and what costs there are in staying or leaving Afghanistan.

Kagan, K., Bruno, G. (2009, September 9). *Afghanistan's Troop Deficit Problem*. Retrieved October 9, 2009, from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/20159/>

This is an interview between two experts on the war in Afghanistan. It covers the size of troops in Afghanistan whether it should be expanded or reduced. Kagan argues for an increase of troops, believing that a reduction would create a "power vacuum" for terrorist troops. This interview is important for delegates in understanding the argument for an increased commitment in Afghanistan and the potential dangers and drawing back.

McChrystal, S. (2009, August 30). *Commander's Initial Assessment*. Retrieved October 9, 2009, from Washington Post Web site: http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140

General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, produced a report this summer assessing the situation in Afghanistan and what needs to be done for success. McChrystal argues for additional resources and a significant strategic change in Afghanistan. Delegates will find this first-hand assessment enormously valuable and should use it to get a better understanding of the situation and how to move forward.

McMahon, R. (2009, August 17). *Governing Afghanistan*. Retrieved August 18, 2009, from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: http://www.cfr.org/publication/20034/governing_afghanistan.html

This article looks at the current debate on how to proceed in Afghanistan. It pulls together a variety of sources that will be valuable for delegates. Delegates will find this valuable of a summation of the current situation and the dangers ahead and as a gateway to further analysis.

Morelli, V. & Belkin, P. (2009, July 2). *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*. Retrieved August 17, 2009, from the Federation of American Scientists Web site:

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf>

This is a comprehensive report on NATO's role in Afghanistan. Included is a historical summary of NATO in Afghanistan, how it took over the ISAF, its goals, its tactics, and its evolving role. In addition, the intersect between NATO and the U.S. is important. Delegates should find this very helpful in understanding what NATO is doing and what can be done.

Mueller, J. (2009, April 15). *How Dangerous Are the Taliban?* Retrieved October 9, 2009, from Foreign Affairs Web site: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban>

This article looks at the threat the Taliban poses to the United States and Western Europe and analyzes whether the threat is worth the cost of the mission in Afghanistan. This is a valuable source for delegates to get a better understanding of the potential consequences of failing or quitting in Afghanistan. However, it is important to remember that this is an opinion-piece and its possible to reach different conclusions than that of the author.

Mulrine, A. (2008, June 5). *In Afghanistan, the NATO-led Force is 'Underresourced' For the Fight Against the Taliban*. Retrieved October 9, 2009, from U.S. News Web site:

<http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/06/05/in-afghanistan-the-nato-led-force-is-underresourced-for-the-fight-against-the-taliban.html>

The different roles of the U.S. troops and NATO troops in Afghanistan are a crucial element in the element of Afghanistan. This article looks at the conflict between U.S. and NATO troops and why it exists and what problems it poses. This is a valuable source for delegates in understanding the situation in Afghanistan and what changes can be made.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *NATO's Role in Afghanistan*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm

On this webpage, NATO has created an extensive overview of its role in Afghanistan. Included within is a historical overview, its role with the ISAF, the missions, and mandate. In order to reassess NATO's role in Afghanistan, delegates will need to have a solid understanding of its past and current role. Delegates will find this page very helpful, as it is first-hand source detailing NATO's role in Afghanistan.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949, April 4). *The North Atlantic Treaty*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxtxt/treaty.htm>

The North Atlantic Treaty is the foundational document that created NATO. Originally signed by 12 Member States, 16 more have signed on, agreeing to the basic principles of the text. This source is fundamental to delegates since it is the most basic outline of NATO's principles, goals, and rules. Understanding this treaty will help delegates build a framework to view all issues relating to NATO.

Schweich, T. (2007, August). *U.S. Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan*. Retrieved September 14, 2007, from U.S. Department of State Web site: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/90671.pdf>

While this report is over two years old, it is still an extremely valuable source for delegates. It provides an extensive overview of the mission in Afghanistan, the U.S. strategy, and what needs to be done to succeed. Delegates will find this useful not only for the detailed information of the mission, but in understanding the U.S.'s role. In addition, with the advantage of being able to look back, delegates can see has succeeded or failed since this report was written.

Simon, S. (2009, July/August). *Can the Right War Be Won?* Retrieved on October 9, 2009, from Foreign Affairs Web site: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65159/steven-simon/can-the-right-war-be-won>

This article reviews two recent and important books on Afghanistan: "In the Graveyard of Empires" by Seth Jones and "The Accidental Guerilla" by David Kilcullen. In reviewing the books, this article provides an extensive look at the difficulties faced in Afghanistan. This is a valuable source for delegates in trying to understand how challenging success will be.

Thier, J. A. (2009, October 7). *The Eight Years' War*. Retrieved October 9, 2009, from Foreign Policy Web site: http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/07/the_eight_years_war

On the eight-year anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, this article looks back on the beginnings of the way and how things have proceeded since. In looking back, it provides the context for the war, which may be sometimes forgotten due to the ongoing difficulties. This article will be valuable for delegates in understanding the history of the war and why it was initiated.

Tiedemann, K. (2009, September 8). *Daily Brief: Suicide Bomber Attacks NATO Air Base in Kabul*. Retrieved October 9, 2009, from Foreign Policy Web site:

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/08/daily_brief_suicide_bomber_attacks_nato_air_base_in_kabul

This daily brief includes a quick recount of a deadly suicide bombing in Kabul. It is important for delegates to stay on top of recent developments in Afghanistan. The Daily Briefs from the Foreign Policy website include a valuable overview of pertinent news and offers a multitude of valuable sources for further study.

Wadhams, C. (2009, September 28). *The Wrong Question*. Retrieved October 9, 2009, from Foreign Policy Web site: http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/28/the_wrong_question

This article takes a critical look at Gen. Stanley McChrystal's recent assessment in Afghanistan. The article argues that the assessment is misguided and does not ask or answer the right questions. Wadhams asks a series of important questions about the mission in Afghanistan. Delegates should consider her questions, as they can help shed light on how to best proceed.

III. NATO's Engagement with other International Organizations

Asmus, R., Blinken, A., and Gordon, P. (2005, January/February). *Nothing to Fear*. Retrieved on October 10, 2009, from Foreign Affairs Web site: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60442/ronald-d-asmus-antony-j-blinken-and-philip-h-gordon/nothing-to-fear>

This article looks at the potential organizational conflict between NATO and the EU. In addition, this article argues for the importance of strong, coordinated international action to deal with the modern challenges of the international system. Delegates will find this article helpful in understanding the potential of international cooperation in the modern era.

BBC (2009, August 27). *War in Sudan's Darfur 'Is Over.'* Retrieved October 10, 2009, from BBC News Web site: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8224424.stm>.

This news article looks at the claim that the war in Sudan is over. It quotes a UN military commander from the region who argues that the war is over and is now mostly small-scale violence and conflict. In addition to his claim, the article offers those who disagree with his analysis and an objective overview of the current status of the conflict.

Daalder, I. and Goldgeier, J. (2006, September/October). *Global NATO*. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from Foreign Affairs Web site: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61922/ivo-daalder-and-james-goldgeier/global-nato>

This essay argues that "only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day." Specifically, the geographic expansion and evolution of NATO's focus is analyzed. This article is a great source for understanding the importance of NATO's evolution, not only for itself, but for the entire international system.

Feinstein, L. (2007, January). *Darfur and Beyond*. Retrieved on October 10, 2007, from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: http://www.cfr.org/publication/12444/darfur_and_beyond.html

This report deals with the issue of "mass atrocities" in Darfur and elsewhere. Feinstein looks at how international bodies can respond to the challenges of mass atrocities. Because genocide and ethnic cleansing are issues that seem to require global action, it is important that delegates fully understand the complexities of the issues. Then delegates determine how NATO can respond with other international organizations.

National Defense University (2009, June 18). *NATO Comprehensive Approach Roundtable*. Retrieved on October 10, 2009, from [http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/pubs/NATO CA - 21 May 09 Danish Embassy-NDU Roundtable Final Report - 18 June 09.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/pubs/NATO_CA_-_21_May_09_Danish_Embassy-NDU_Roundtable_Final_Report_-_18_June_09.pdf)

This is a report about a roundtable discussion on the topic of NATO's Comprehensive Approach. It specifically looked at NATO's interaction with other international actors and its own logistical abilities. This roundtable can help delegates understand the full implications of NATO's Comprehensive Approach.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2002, October 10). *NATO-EU Relations*. Retrieved July 23, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0403.htm>

With an overlap in Member States, there are obvious reasons for cooperation between NATO and the EU. And while they have different purposes, their interests are connected and reinforce each other's goals. Accordingly, there are many deep ties between the two organizations. Delegates will find this page important in exploring those ties.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *NATO-OSCE Relations*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49911.htm

Like some other relations, NATO and OSCE share common geography. However, they also have some overlap in goals, mainly security and stability. Delegates should understand the relationship to see how the two organizations can help and strengthen one another. This page is a helpful source in reaching that understanding.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan*. Retrieved on October 10, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D47F464D-277EDBD7/natolive/topics_49194.htm

In this Web site, you will find an extensive account of NATO's role in the conflict in Sudan. The article includes details on the operations in Sudan, NATO's evolution, and the key bodies involved. In addition, there is a helpful timeline of NATO in the Sudan. Delegates should fully understand NATO's mission in Sudan, as it is a unique moment in NATO's history.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52057.htm
Because NATO and the EU have some geographical overlap, there is an incentive to cooperate. As a larger organization, NATO can offer its institutional capabilities while the Center, with its narrow focus, can offer its expertise in disaster relief. This page is a primary source for understanding the specifics of this relationship.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm
Created to help adapt to NATO's changing nature, EPAC is an important council in understanding NATO and its goals. According to NATO, this council was set up to help NATO coordinate better with its partner countries. Delegates should fully understand to goals of EPAC and what it says about NATO in the international system.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *NATO Assistance to the African Union*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-96D53284-1B12D207/natolive/topics_8191.htm
With no obvious connection, the NATO-AU relationship is crucial in understanding NATO's changing role in the international system. While the relationship is not at the moment particularly extensive, it is still significant. Delegates should consider what this relationship means to NATO. This page will provide an excellent summary and resource to understanding the relationship.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *NATO's Relations with the European Union*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html>
NATO and the EU have an evolving and important relationship. With common interests and different focuses and capabilities, there is a natural connection between the two organizations. The intensity at which they interact will be important for both organizations. This page will be a valuable resource in detailing their work together.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (n.d.). *NATO's Relations with the United Nations*. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-41A0E454-947384E0/natolive/topics_50321.htm
While not always a strong relationship, the NATO-UN relationship is essentially embedded in the founding principles of NATO. Because the UN has international legitimacy, it is important for NATO to be in good standing with the UN to gain international support with its missions. This is one of the most important relationships for NATO, so it is crucial for delegates to understand it fully. This page is a good overview and outline of the NATO-UN relationship.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2008, February 01). *NATO Supporting African Union Missions*. Retrieved on October 10, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D47F464D-277EDBD7/natolive/news_8306.htm?selectedLocale=en
This is a further explanation of NATO's relationship with the AU. It provides a quick overview of how NATO has assisted the AU, in Sudan in particular. Because the NATO-AU relationship may be a signal of NATO's further evolution, it is important that delegates fully understand the details of the relationship.

Nunn, S., Scowcroft, B., Baker Jr., H., Frye, A. (1998, February 4). *NATO: A Debate Recast*. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/172/nato.html>
Even though this article is over 10 years old, it is still relevant today. It discusses the transition of NATO after the Cold War and its importance to European security and global stability. Delegates will find this article helpful in developing an understanding of NATO's role in regional and global security.

Petersen, F.A. and Binnendijk, H. (n.d.). *From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability*. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from NATO's Web site: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/03/ART7/EN/index.htm>
This is an excellent look at NATO's Comprehensive Approach. The authors very clearly lay out the challenges facing NATO and how to best approach them. Delegates should use this to help further understand the promises and significance of NATO's Comprehensive Approach.

Security & Defence Agenda (n.d.). *Revisiting NATO-ESDP Relations*. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Portals/7/Reports/2007/SDA_NATO_ESDP_relations_DiscussionPaper2008.pdf

The ESDP is the EU successor of the European Security and Defense Identity, a former NATO division. Accordingly, there are obvious connections and overlap between the ESDP and NATO. Delegates should understand how they interact and how they work apart. This report is an extensive look at the relationship.

Sherwood-Randall, E. (2008, April 1). *Is NATO Dead or Alive?* Retrieved on October 10, 2009, from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site: http://www.cfr.org/publication/15901/is_nato_dead_or_alive.html

Within this op-ed, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall examines the potential and challenges for NATO, as well as its successes and disappointments. This op-ed argues that despite much good being done, NATO is not investing in its future enough. This is a valuable source for delegates in understanding how NATO can improve its future position.

Yost, D. (1999). *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. New York, NY: United States Institute of Peace Press.

This book analyzes the changes and challenges of NATO after the Cold War. Looking at its enlargement and cooperation with other organization, this book will be very helpful for delegates. It should be used to help conceptualize NATO's potential and challenges going forward.

Weisser, U. and Asmus, R. (2001, December 6). *Refit NATO to Move Against Threats From Beyond Europe*. Retrieved October 10, 2009, from the Council on Foreign Relations Web site:

Written only a few months after the September 11, 2001 attacks, this article looks at NATO's historic decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This article discusses how NATO should respond to the threat of international terrorism. Delegates will find this to be a valuable source on NATO's global role in the fight against terrorism.

Rules of Procedure North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Alliance”) and shall be considered adopted by the Alliance prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Alliance.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - *Dates of convening and adjournment*

The Alliance shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - *Place of sessions*

The Alliance shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - *Provisional agenda*

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Alliance at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - *Adoption of the agenda*

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Alliance by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, —those present and voting means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.

Rule 5 - *Revision of the agenda*

During a session, the Alliance may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Alliance so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Alliance decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an —important and urgent character is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Alliance to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Alliance until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting — means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Alliance.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Alliance and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Alliance, and shall distribute documents of the Alliance to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Alliance may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Alliance concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the President The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Alliance for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the President If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language

English shall be the official and working language of the Alliance.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 - Quorum

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Alliance are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Alliance shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, —members of the Alliance means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.

Rule 15 - General powers of the President

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Alliance, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules,

shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Alliance and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Alliance the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to —propose to the Alliance entails her/his power to —entertain motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.

Rule 16

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Alliance.

Rule 17 - Points of order

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 18

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Rule 19 - Speeches

1. No one may address the Alliance without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Alliance, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Alliance may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Alliance in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.

Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Alliance, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Alliance.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Alliance. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Alliance and the President should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 21 - Right of reply

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that —impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Alliance by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Alliance shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Alliance's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Alliance.

Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Rule 25 - Closure of debate

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Alliance favors the closure of debate, the Alliance shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 26 - Order of motions Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Alliance would like the Alliance to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Alliance unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be

taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Alliance for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all —proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Alliance by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Alliance. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Alliance and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Alliance, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

For purposes of this rule, —those present and voting[¶] means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights

Each member of the Alliance shall have one vote.

This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to —member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Rule 31 - Request for a vote

A proposal or motion before the Alliance for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Alliance may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, —proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 32 - Consensus required

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Alliance shall be made by a **consensus** of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative States as —present and voting[¶] during the attendance role call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.

Rule 33 – Omitted

Rule 34 - Method of voting

1. The Alliance shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

Only those members who designate themselves as —present or —present and voting during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying —pass, must, on the second time through, respond with either —yes or —no. A —pass cannot be followed by a second —pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Alliance votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Alliance shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 35 - Explanations of vote

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 36 - Conduct during voting

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Rule 37 - Division of proposals and amendments

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, —most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is —most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 38 - Amendments

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.

Rule 39 - Order of voting on amendments

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, —furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is —furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 40 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Alliance decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 41 - The President shall not vote

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.