# SECURITY COUNCIL

SC

NMUN•08

NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

2008 COMMITTEE BACKGROUND GUIDE

www.nmun.org

WRITTEN BY:
Anna López
Rahul Sharma
Randy Herman
Ricardo Lé

18-22 March
Sheraton New York

22-26 April
New York Marriott Marquis

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE association™

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NMUN Secretary-General
Erin Kennedy | secgen@nmun.org
718.810.5044 phone

NCCA/NMUN Executive Director
Michael Eaton | eaton@nmun.org
1.651.493.4404 phone | 1.651.484.2531 fax

NMUN Director-General (Sheraton)
Linda Poppe | dirgen@nmun.org

NMUN Director-General (Marriott)
Galen Stocking | dirgen@nmun.org

NMUN•08 IMPORTANT DATES

IMPORTANT NOTICE: To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at www.nmun.org and include a $1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

SHERATON	MARRIOTT	
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2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

• Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

• The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

• Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted. Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba_U_of_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

COMMITTEE	E-MAIL | SHERATON	COMMITTEE	E-MAIL | MARRIOTT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY	gaplenary.sheraton@nmun.org	GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY	gaplenary.marriott@nmun.org
GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE	ga1st.sheraton@nmun.org	GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE	ga1st.marriott@nmun.org
GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE	ga2nd.sheraton@nmun.org	GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECOND COMMITTEE	ga2nd.marriott@nmun.org
GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE	ga3rd.sheraton@nmun.org	GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE	ga3rd.marriott@nmun.org
SECURITY COUNCIL	sc.sheraton@nmun.org	SECURITY COUNCIL	sc.marriott@nmun.org
SECURITY COUNCIL 2	sc2.sheraton@nmun.org	SECURITY COUNCIL 2	sc2.marriott@nmun.org
ECOSOC PLENARY	ecosoc.sheraton@nmun.org	ECOSOC PLENARY	ecosoc.marriott@nmun.org
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA	eca.sheraton@nmun.org	ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA	eca.marriott@nmun.org
UN HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME	habitat.sheraton@nmun.org	UN HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME	habitat.marriott@nmun.org
COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN	csw.sheraton@nmun.org	COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN	csw.marriott@nmun.org
UN PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES	unpfii.sheraton@nmun.org	UN PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES	unpfii.marriott@nmun.org
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY	iaea.sheraton@nmun.org	INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY	iaea.marriott@nmun.org
UN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME	unep.sheraton@nmun.org	UN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME	unep.marriott@nmun.org
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE	scsl.sheraton@nmun.org	SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE	scsl.marriott@nmun.org
UN POPULATION FUND	unfpa.sheraton@nmun.org	UN POPULATION FUND	unfpa.marriott@nmun.org
UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST	unrwa.sheraton@nmun.org	UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST	unrwa.marriott@nmun.org
PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZAITON	paho.sheraton@nmun.org	PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZAITON	paho.marriott@nmun.org
AFRICAN UNION	au.sheraton@nmun.org	AFRICAN UNION	au.marriott@nmun.org
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE	ga3rd.sheraton@nmun.org	GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRD COMMITTEE	ga3rd.marriott@nmun.org
SECURITY COUNCIL	sc.sheraton@nmun.org	SECURITY COUNCIL	sc.marriott@nmun.org
SECURITY COUNCIL 2	sc2.sheraton@nmun.org	SECURITY COUNCIL 2	sc2.marriott@nmun.org
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ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE	oic.sheraton@nmun.org	ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE	oic.marriott@nmun.org
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Secretary-General	secgen@nmun.org
Director(s)-General	dirgen@nmun.org

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THE 2008 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

New York City, 18-22 March (Sheraton) & 22-26 April (Marriott) • www.nmun.org

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Linda Poppe &
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Directors-General

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Chiefs of Staff

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Jennifer Radford
Assistant Secretaries-General for
External Affairs

Sarah L. Tulley &
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General Assembly

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Amanda Williams, MSW
Under-Secretaries-General
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Under Secretaries-General
Specialized Agencies

Vera Bardarska &
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Under-Secretaries-General
Conference Services

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2008 National Model United Nations (NMUN). We are excited and honored to serve as the staff of the Security Councils and are looking forward to reading the position papers you are currently preparing.

First, let us introduce ourselves. The directors of the Marriott Venue are Rahul Sharma (SC A) and Randy Herman (SC B). Rahul is currently studying Political Science in conjunction with Economics and Law as minors at the University of Munich, Germany, in oder to attain his Master's degree. Besides regularly participating in MUN conferences, he has an interest in Journalism and has set up an online current affairs magazine. Randy holds a B.A. in History, specializing in Russia and the Soviet Union. It's his second time at NMUN, and he has been involved in MUN conferences for the past five years. The directors of the Sheraton Venue are Anna López (SC A) and Ricardo Lé (SC B). Anna has a Master's degree in Psychology from the University of Munich, Germany, and is currently starting her dissertation on Gender Mainstreaming in Corporate Settings. She was on staff in 2007 and has previously participated in several German MUN conferences. Ricardo is currently completing his B.Sc. at the University of British Columbia in Canada with a focus in Microbiology and Immunology. He has vast MUN experience from other international conferences.

The topics for this year's Security Council are:

1. The Situation in Somalia
2. The Impact of Climate Change on Global Security
3. Post-Conflict Peace Building

The background guide will provide you with invaluable information on the topics, but it is only intended as a starting point for your research. It is imperative to gather as many sources on the topics as possible and to carefully balance their content in order to get a broad perspective on the issues at hand. Rigorous research is required for the substantive part of the conference. Be sure not to rely exclusively on the internet and to always give priority to academic sources. Although your country's position is of utmost importance, you should also be sure to get an image of the topic's significance as a whole in order to maximize your NMUN experience.

Position papers are vitally important to your preparation for NMUN. Every participating delegate must submit a position paper prior to attending the conference. These papers can be submitted via e-mail by March 1, 2008 for the Sheraton venue and April 1, 2008 for the Marriott venue. Please refer to the message from your Directors-General explaining NMUN's position paper requirements and restrictions in this guide. Adherence to these guidelines is imperative.

We would like to thank you in advance for the hard work you will be putting into research for the position papers and beyond. We wish you the best of luck in your preparations. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact us and we will be happy to help you. We look forward to meeting you at the 2008 conference.

Best regards,

Marriott Venue

Rahul Sharma
Director, Security Council A
sc.marriott@nmun.org

Randy Herman
Director, Security Council B
sc2.marriott@nmun.org

Sheraton Venue

Anna López
Director, Security Council A
sc.sheraton@nmun.org

Ricardo Lé
Director, Security Council B
sc2.sheraton@nmun.org

Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the
2008 NMUN Conference

At the NMUN Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in a respective committee has some impact on the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as Member States, some may be observers, NGOs or judicial or technical experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference.
NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. *The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism*. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim recreation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed one double-sided page (two single-sided pages is **not** acceptable)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

> 1**. A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after December 1, 2007. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
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> 2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2008 for Delegations attending the NMUN at the Sheraton venue and April 1, 2008 for Delegations attending the NMUN on the Marriott venue**.

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU_Namibia_University of Caprivi)

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Linda Poppe, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Galen Stocking, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff uses the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation should submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Sheraton Venue	*Marriott Venue*
Linda Poppe	Galen Stocking
Director-General	Director-General
linda@nmun.org	galen@nmun.org

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a maximum of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards.

Delegation from (*Insert Member State/NGO Name*)   **Represented by (*Insert Delegation Name Here*)**

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Racism and Racial Discrimination, and A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The State of Tranquility a proud member of the Regional Alliance of Peaceful Countries and a fully supports other regional groups in their efforts to coordinated a regional plan for sustained and sustainable development. In that regard, the State of Tranquility recognizes the necessity of ensuring the full realization of the Right to Development as declared in the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Final Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development. Tranquility fully supports the implementation of national development plans with the cooperation of regional organizations, the United Nations, and the international community. Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing the underlying factors.

I. The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa

The State of Tranquility believes that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic security lend themselves to the pacific settlement of disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. The lack of development in the region constitutes the root cause of political instability and conflict. The report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Recommendations,* if implemented, could enhance the work of the Organization in its efforts to bring about sustainable development in Africa. Tranquility also believes that the use of preventive development in Africa could ensure that conflicts such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be avoided before they erupt. While obstacles to be overcome are many, international support for effective national programs to ensure the relief to rehabilitation to development continuum through post-conflict peace-building, can enable Sub-Saharan Africa and the entire developing world to achieve the sustainable development which alone will guarantee regional peace and stability. The State of Tranquility fully supports the increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in all aspects of dispute settlement and peace-keeping. Increased support for such regional efforts, when combined with measures to eliminate the root causes of regional conflict, serves to further enhance the prospects for lasting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the entire international community.

II. Racism and Racial Discrimination

The State of Tranquility believes that the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance offers the global community an opportunity to establish an updated plan of action to completely eradicate racism and racial discrimination throughout the world. The necessity for all Member States to sign, accede to and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is an integral part of this plan, as policies and practices based on racism and racial discrimination remain devastating to regional social, economic and infrastructure development. Tranquility encourages all States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to provide assistance to those affected by such practices. The lack of financial resources that prevented the international community from realizing its objectives in the three previous United Nations Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination must not continue to hinder the international community in guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all peoples.

III. A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The State of Tranquility remains firmly committed in support of the continued role of the United Nations Security Council as the primary agent for the maintenance of international peace and security, as mandated under Chapters IV and V of the *UN Charter*. We strongly recommend the authorization, determination, composition and financing of peacekeeping operations should be determined by the Council, as authorized by Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the *Charter* and in conjunction with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the State of Tranquility endorses the current role of the Secretary-General as administrator of the Operations established by the Council. The State of Tranquility remains a central contributor for both financial and logistical support of the United Nations Peacekeeping forces and will continue to contribute to the United Nations Peacekeeping Budget throughout the duration of the current year. The State of Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing all threats to international peace and security through regional arrangements and multilateral forums. The international community must address the underlying causes of these conflicts and the destabilizing effects of such conflicts on entire regions. Tranquility is convinced that increased utilization of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms can enhance the ability of peacekeeping missions to take into account historical, social, and cultural values and traditions within areas of conflict. As operation costs continue to escalate, however, our nation strongly urges all Member States and the Secretary-General to devote greater attention to the monetary and management aspects of peacekeeping operations and provide serious consideration for the establishment of operation termination dates. The State of Tranquility further supports the proposal endorsed within A/Res/44/49, calling for Member States to develop and maintain an inventory of supplies and equipment to be made available for Operations on short-notice. In addition, the State of Tranquility calls upon Member States to recognize the need to maintain voluntary contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to reduce the continuing problems incurred by funding deficits.

History of the Security Council (SC)

Overview

Article 7 of the *Charter of the United Nations* established the United Nations Security Council as one of the six principle organs of the United Nations. As stated in the *Charter*, the purpose of the Security Council is to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and […] make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security."[1] Taking into account this responsibility the Security Council deals with a broad spectrum of issues including: dispatching peacekeeping operations, imposing economic sanctions, monitoring international conflicts, and mandating arms inspections.[2] Non-traditional threats to peace and security, such as climate change, rights of women, and HIV/AIDS, have also been part of the Council's agenda.

Membership

The Security Council consists of fifteen Member States, composed of two groups: permanent and non-permanent members.[3] Initially, there were six non-permanent members of the Security Council. However, the 1965 reform introduced an amendment to the *Charter* that increased the number of non-permanent members to ten.[4] These members are selected by the United Nations General Assembly for two-year terms, with five non-permanent members being chosen every year.[5] The selection of States is done according to a regional key, with five for African and Asian countries, one for Eastern European countries, two for Latin American and Caribbean countries, and two for Western European and other countries.[6] The presidency of the Security Council is rotated amongst its members every month following the English alphabetical order of States' names.[7] Currently, the following States are members of the Security Council[8]

Permanent Members:

China	Congo (Republic of the)	Belgium
France	Ghana	Indonesia
Russian Federation	Peru	Italy
United Kingdom	Qatar	Panama
United States of America	Slovakia	South Africa

Any member of the United Nations (UN) that is not a current member of the Security Council is permitted to participate in discussions if the Council "considers that the interests of that member are specifically affected."[9] The right to be invited by the Security Council can also be applied to non-state actors and countries that are not UN Members who are considered to be a party to the dispute. However, it is important to note that a State or non-state actor invited by the Security Council does not have the right to vote.[10]

Powers

Article 27 of the *UN Charter* gives all five permanent Members of the Security Council a veto power. When this right of the Permanent Five is applied, a single "no" from any of these nations terminates any action, regardless of any other votes.[11] Once a resolution passes and enters into force, however, it is deemed to be binding. If a resolution cannot pass due to the fact that it did not receive the necessary votes despite being widely supported by a significant portion of the Council, the Council has the option of issuing a non-binding Presidential Statement. The

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[1] *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, art. 39.
[2] Global Policy Forum, *Basic Information on the Security Council*, n.d.
[3] United Nations, *Membership in 2007*, n.d.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] United Nations. Security Council, *Security Council: Frequently Asked Questions*, n.d.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] United Nations. Security Council, *Membership in 2007*, n.d.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Soltau, *The Right to Participate in the Debates of the Security Council*, 2000.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] The Green Papers Worldwide, *The United Nations Security Council*, n.d.

purpose of such a Statement is to apply political pressure and to present a view that a majority of the Security Council members holds. However, if an agreement is reached within the Council, it does have the power to define any situation as presenting a threat to "international peace and security" and authorize the use of sanctions, including the use of military force.[12]

Reform of the Security Council

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, attempts at the Security Council reform have remained largely unsuccessful, with the exception of the membership addition of non-permanent Members in 1965.[13] However, the debate on the reform of the Council remains on the agenda of the international community and is widely supported by most UN Member States. The further expansion of membership has been strongly advocated for by Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil, also known as the Group of Four (G4). Each of these States is part of a group of States that desire a permanent seat in the Council.[14] Currently, there are two main models for membership expansion. Both of them were presented in December 2004 in the Secretary-General's *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change*.[15] Both models propose an increase in the Security Council membership to twenty-four States, distributed differently depending on the model.[16] The first model, or Model A, proposes the addition of six new permanent seats (with no veto) and three new two-term non-renewable seats.[17] The second model, or Model B, proposes the creation of a new category of eight seats (renewable every four years) and one new two-year non-renewable seat.[18] While these proposed changes are aimed at increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Security Council, many scholars argue that any type of reform will be ineffective as long as the veto right remains.[19] Consequently, the discussion of the Security Council reform is always accompanied by suggestions to reform the working methods of the Council, as well as the status of the veto power, and the enhancement of the access of non-members to the decision-making process of the Council.[20]

Debating Pros and Cons of the Security Council

The ideas of the Security Council reform usually go parallel with the criticism of the effectiveness of this UN organ in dealing with certain issues. One of the major critiques is the "self-appointed oligarchy" formed amongst the permanent members as a result of their veto power and the resulting privileges.[21] The opinions and actions of non-permanent members and thus the entire Council are shaped and driven by the Permanent Five. Another major criticism is that the involvement of the Security Council in any situation is only as significant and intense as the Member States (especially the Permanent Member States) wish it to be. As a result, many international crisis and disputes do not get the attention they demand and deserve or are neglected completely.

However, despite all the criticism, the Security Council has had success in various tasks. One of the most quoted positive contributions of the Security Council is the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces.[22] A significant number of these peacekeeping missions were launched in the early 1990s; at the turn of the Millennium the focus has shifted towards "regional" peacekeeping operations.[23] Since 1945, UN peacekeepers have undertaken over 60 field missions and negotiated 172 peace settlements ending regional conflicts.[24] Moreover, they contributed to reinforcing UN ideals and stability around the world by enabling people in more than 45 countries to participate

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[12] Global Policy Forum, *Basic Information on the Security Council*, n.d.
[13] Weiss, *The Illusion of the UN Security Council Reform*, 147-161.
[14] Ariyoruk, *Players and Proposals in the Security Council Debate*, 2005.
[15] Global Policy Forum, *Security Council Reform: Membership including Expansion and Representation*, n.d.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid*
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] United Nations, *Report to the President of the General Assembly on the Consultations Regarding "The Question of Equitable Representation On and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council",* 2007.
[21] Paul & Nahory, *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*, n.d.
[22] United Nations. Security Council. 4572nd Meeting, *United Nations Peacekeeping (S/RES/1422)*, 2002.
[23] Global Policy Forum, *Peacekeeping*, n.d.
[24] *Ibid.*

in free and fair elections.[25]

Conclusion

Weakness, lack of effectiveness, reform – these words are often associated with the Security Council. However, this organ of the United Nations has been, and still remains, the only international entity that has the right to define "threats to international peace and security" and legitimize the use of means beyond diplomatic dialogue. As long as the Council has this right, it should be the one and only source of the approval of the use of any force. Only this will allow the international community to avoid violations of existing international law, maintain international peace and security, and fulfill one of the key purposes of the United Nations – "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."[26]

I. The Situation in Somalia

"The current situation may represent the best opportunity that Somalia has had in years to find a long-term solution to its protracted conflicts by putting in place a functioning and effective state under the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. At the same time, the risks of renewed and prolonged insecurity will increase unless the Transitional Federal Government is able to rapidly consolidate its authority and ensure stability and the rule of law."[27]

Historical Background

Somalia gained its independence in 1960 following the unification of the Italian-administered United Nations Trusteeship Territory with the British Protectorate of Somaliland.[28] In 1969, General Siyad Barre took control of the country and established a dictatorship. One of his main declared goals aimed at uniting ethnic Somalis throughout the Horn of Africa. After Barre's failure to annex the Ogaden in 1977/78, a region in Ethiopia inhabited by many ethnic Somalis, the Somali National Movement (SNM), a rebel group opposed to Barre, began fighting for the independence of Somaliland in northern Somalia.[29] Due to the conflicts in both Ethiopia and northern Somalia, the socioeconomic conditions throughout Somalia worsened, and old clan loyalties fragmented the country even further.[30] These factors all helped push Somalia towards civil war.

The Barre regime was ousted in 1991 by the United Somali Congress (USC), the SNM, and the Somali Patriotic Movement.[31] Following the overthrow of Barre, Somalia descended into a state of turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy with the USC establishing control in the South and the capitol of Mogadishu, while the SNM gained control of Somaliland.[32] In 1991, Somaliland declared its independence and has since then experienced a period of relative calmness, democracy, and development, though it has not been recognized as an independent State by the international community.[33] In the South, divisions in the USC, led by Ali Mahdi and General Aideed respectively, led to an increase in violence and further escalation of the civil war.[34] Third-party mediations began in an effort to stop the fighting but were unsuccessful.[35] The fighting in the South, which was also the main agricultural region of the country, led to a devastating famine, which was further compounded by displaced people from the civil war and the refugees of the Ogaden conflict.[36] In November 1991, the figures from the International Committee of the Red

[25] United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet*, n.d.

[26] *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945.

[27] Secretary-General of the United Nations., *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,* 2007, p.15.

[28] Bakonyi, J., *Instabile Staatlichkeit. Zur Transformation politischer Herrschaft in Somalia*, 2001, p.48.

[29] United Nations. Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996*, 1996, p.11.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[31] United Nations. Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996,* 1996, p.11.

[32] Dehéz, D., *Somalia vor der Rückkehr der Übergangsregierung – Eine Anleitung zum Scheitern äußerer Intervention,* 2005, p.2.

[33] Doornbos, M. *Somalia: alternative scenarios for political reconstruction*, 2002, p. 96.

[34] Global Security, *Somalia Civil War,* n.d.

[35] Bariagaber, A. *The United Nations and Somalia. An examination of a collective clientelist relationship.* 1996, p.169.

[36] United Nations. Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996,* 1996, p.13-14.

Cross showed that in the southern part of the country, 40% of the people were severely malnourished.[37] However, the rest of Somalia disintegrated due to several factors: personal rule, military rule, "clan-klatura", clan rule, clan relations, urban state terror, and the campaign against the North, inter alia.[38]

United Nations Action: 1993-1995

With the civil war continuing and the famine devastating the population, the attention of the international community was continually drawn to Somalia from 1992 onwards. In order to address the continuing conflict the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed *Resolution 773* (1992), which established a general embargo on weapons to Somalia.[39] It was aimed at stopping weapons transactions destined to be used by the warring factions. Subsequent resolutions, including recent resolutions *1676* and *1725*, have continued the embargo and called for the international community to respect the embargo as it had been largely violated.[40] At the same time, the UN was working to broker a peace deal, and in March 1992 the UN was able to negotiate a ceasefire between Aideed and Mahdi.[41] When it became apparent that the embargo was not effective, and that the political and humanitarian situation was worsening despite the peace agreement, the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in *S/RES/751*.[42] UNOSOM I lasted from 1992-1995 and was largely a traditional peacekeeping mission, although it acknowledged the functional necessity of humanitarian assistance.[43] UNOSOM I began its mission in July of 1992 when 500 peacekeepers arrived in Somalia to ensure the safety of the humanitarian workers, with the numbers gradually increasing throughout the rest of 1992, although never reaching their fully mandated numbers.[44]

Despite the presence of UN peacekeepers, the situation continued to deteriorate and the UN was unable to provide the full humanitarian and military assistance necessary to stabilize the country. To address these concerns, the Security Council, in *S/RES/794* established the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) whose specific goal was to stabilize the country.[45] The mandate of UNITAF was not very clear and presented problems in its operations. Then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had a broader set of tasks in mind for Somalia, ultimately including nation-building while the US, who was in command of the mission, had a narrower perspective on the mission, focusing on providing security for humanitarian assistance provisions.[46] Further problems between the UN and the US included differing views of the goals of the mission, a lack of clarity of command structures, and a failure by the UNITAF troops to disarm the warlords.[47] Although initially successful, UNITAF could not prevent more outbreaks of violence.

In 1993, following the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, the *Addis Ababa Agreement* was signed by leaders of the 15 main factions in the civil war.[48] In order to aid the in the establishment of the goals of the *Agreement*, the UN Secretary-General concluded that UNITAF had not fully succeeded in its goal and that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II should occur in order to stabilize the country.[49] UNOSOM II was officially established in *S/RES/814,* with the mission endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the *UN Charter.*[50] Along with stabilization and enforcement, UNOSOM II's mission included disarmament of rebels, helping the people to establish a representative government as laid out in the *Addis Ababa Agreement*, and restoration of infrastructure.[51]

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[38] Adam, H., *Somalia: a terrible beauty being born*?, 1995, p.71-75.
[39] United Nations. Security Council. *Resolution 733.*, 1992, p.55.
[40] United Nations. Security Council. 61st Session. *Resolution 1676,* 2006, §1.
[41] United Nations. Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996,* 1996, p.19.
[42] Diehl, P.F, *With the best of intentions: lessons from UNOSOM I and II*, 1996.
[43] *Ibid.*, p.162.
[44] *Ibid.*,p.155.
[45] Clarke, W. & Herbst, J., *Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention,* 1996.
[46] Bariagaber, A., *The United Nations and Somalia. An examination of a collective clientelist relationship*, 1996, p.173.
[47] Clarke, W. & Herbst, J., *Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention,* 1996, p.73.
[48] United Nations. Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996,* 1996, p.46.
[49] United Nations. Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996,* 1996, p.42.
[50] Diehl, P.F, *With the best of intentions: lessons from UNOSOM I and II*, 1996.
[51] United Nations. Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996,* 1996, p.42.

On June 24th 1993, 25 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed by militiamen, which led to increasing confrontations between peacekeepers and the militia's, especially those supported by Aideed. At the end of 1993, Aideed entered into negotiations, but several important troop-contributing countries, among them the US and several European countries, were already preparing to withdraw their support for UNOSOM II.[52] At the beginning of 1994, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali decided to go back to the idea behind UNOSOM I, namely humanitarian assistance, because no country would contribute more troops to UNOSOM II.[53] Peace-enforcement and stabilization was therefore no longer a part of the mission of UNOSOM II.[54] In March of 1994, peace talks between Aideed and Ali Mahdi were resumed, resulting in the *Nairobi Declaration*. However, there were no concrete results, in implementing the *Nairobi Declaration*. In November 1994, the Security Council decided to end UNOSOM II in 1995, due to the failure of the various factions to establish a durable peace.[55]

UNOSOM I and II are widely considered to have had some positive impacts on Somalia, but to have failed to reach the wider goal of nation-building, and therefore implicitly questions the envisioning of peace-building operations by the Security Council under the current conditions of the United Nations.[56] Indeed, UNOSOM I and II left the UN with a loss of credibility and legitimacy both among the Somali people and on the international level.[57] Troop contributing countries have been reluctant to endorse UN actions since.[58] Different analyses of UNOSOM I and II have been proposed. Some of them saw the main problem lying within the UN System, while others saw it in the international system.[59] Those who believe in the former identified, among other issues, the structural problems of UN peacekeeping: the need for an early warning system for conflict, the necessity of coordination among Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and local actors, strengthening command and control, the need to follow humanitarian efforts by conflict resolution efforts, or the necessity to adapt missions to civil conflict.[60]

The Current Situation

Following the withdrawal of the UNOSOM II forces, conflicts between rival warlords and their various factions continued throughout the rest of the 1990s. In 2000, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established; it was set up in Djibouti, and returned to Somalia in 2005 from its exile in Kenya. Abdullah Yusuf of the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council is its president. The TFG has a shaky mandate for rule, as Somaliland and Puntland have never participated in it, and it exerts its influence mainly in the capital, Mogadishu.[61] It is not formally recognized by all countries and more importantly, crucial stakeholders within Somalia, which weakens its impact both within and outside of the country.[62] It is constantly threatened by lack of unanimity and the disloyalty of its members. Its representatives are entangled in the conflict, often on competing sides.[63] The legislative branch of the TFG, the Transitional Federal Parliament, which is also in charge of governing the capital, resumed sessions in 2006.[64] Despite the establishment of the TFG, fighting and tensions have continued, particularly between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).

The UIC is an opposition movement that is mainly backed by the Hawiye clan in the South of Somalia, as well as by military aid from Eritrea.[65] It consists of a mix of moderate and radical Islamists and their apparent agenda is to transform Somalia into a haven for political Islam.[66] Tensions have also arisen between the UIC and the clans, further contributing to the destabilization of the country.[67] These tensions reached their peak in June of 2006, when

[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*, p.62.
[54] *Ibid.,* p.66.
[55] Diehl, P.F., *With the best of intentions: lessons from UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p.157.
[56] Clarke, W. & Herbst, J., *Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention*, 1996, p.71.
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] Diehl, P.F, *With the best of intentions: lessons from UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p.163.
[59] Bariagaber, A., *The United Nations and Somalia. An examination of a collective clientelist relationship*, 1996, p.166.
[60] Diehl, P.F, *With the best of intentions: lessons from UNOSOM I and II,* 1996, pp.158-167.
[61] Grosse-Kettler, S., *External actors in stateless Somalia. A war economy and its promoters*, 2004, p.10.
[62] Doornbos, *Somalia: alternative scenarios for political reconstruction*, 2002, p. 93.
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] International Crisis Group, *Can the Somali crisis be contained?*, 2006, p.1.
[65] *Ibid.*, p.i.
[66] *Ibid.,* p.1.
[67] *Ibid.*, p.1.

the UIC seized Mogadishu, and in September 2006, Kismayo. However, the Union was dislodged by troops of the TFG and Ethiopia at the end of 2006.[68] Nevertheless, enough remnants of the UIC persist and are now fighting against the TFG in the capital and elsewhere.

Recognizing that the situation in Somalia would require the use of peacekeepers, the Security Council initially authorized the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – compromised of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda – to establish a peacekeeping mission to Somalia. IGAD established the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) which was approved by the AU and the Security Council in 2006.[69] Although the mission had a broad mandate given to it by the African Union, its means were far from sufficient. Even though the troops had the right to self-defense, they were not entitled to enforce the monopoly of violence of the government.[70] The mandate had a temporal frame of nine months, but faced practical challenges, including budgetary issues and concerns over alliances of IGAD Member States, so immense that the mission was not able to become functional. Recognizing that a peacekeeping force was still needed in Somalia the AU to established the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in January 2007.[71]

The mandate of AMISOM includes the provision of security for the TFG and all concerned with the reconciliation process through the provision of nine infantry battalions, 270 police officers, and civilian staff during an initial period of 6 months.[72] Furthermore, the mandate provides for the training of Somali security forces as well as the protection of humanitarian workers.[73] The first contingent of 1,700 troops, out of the proposed 8,000, was deployed to Somalia on March 6th, 2007. However, the lack of unified command and the perception of the troops as pro-TFG did not encourage positive expectations of the mission. On July 18th, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a communiqué renewing the mission for six more months.[74] Many delegations called for an assistance package from the UN to AMISOM, as the AU has had trouble gathering the physical and logistical support necessary for the mission. In *S/RES/1772*, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of AMISOM for a period of six months and requested the Secretary-General to develop the planning for a UN peacekeeping mission destined to replace AMISOM.[75]

Other Issues

The civil war in Somalia does not rest on ethnicities fighting each other, but on a multitude of clans and sub-clans rivaling each other. Clans have always been the most formative power for identification for Somalis, as opposed to religious identification, as the vast majority of Somali population is Muslim.[76] Militias and business cartels are often built along the lines of clans. An issue of concern is that some clans, especially the ones located in Somaliland and Puntland, are not represented in the National Assembly, which challenges the unifying potential of the TFG.[77] Another important actor within the conflict is the warlords, who are often the leaders of the militia. In the absence of a formal legal system, security is increasingly privatized.[78] Even humanitarian workers have engaged mercenaries for their own protection.[79] The warlords profit from the Somali war economy, and even appear in the new type of warlord-businessmen, especially in Southern Somalia.[80] It is estimated that about 15 warlords, six of which reside in Mogadishu, currently control the Somali territory.

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[68] Secretary-General of the United Nations., *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia*, 2007, p.1.
[69] Dehéz, D., *Somalia vor der Rückkehr der Übergangsregierung – Eine Anleitung zum Scheitern äußerer Intervention,* 2005, p.6.
[70] *Ibid.*, p.5.
[71] United Nations. Security Council., *Resolution 1725*, 2007, §3.
[72] Secretary-General of the United Nations., *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2007/115),* 2007, p.6.
[73] United Nations. Security Council., *Resolution 1744*, 2007, §4
[74] Security Council Report, *August 2007 Somalia*, 2007.
[75] United Nations. Security Council, *Resolution 1772,* 2007, § 9, 16.
[76] Menkhaus, K., *Political Islam in Somalia*, 2002, p.110.
[77] Doornbos, M., *Somalia: alternative scenarios for political reconstruction*, 2002, p. 94.
[78] Grosse-Kettler, S, *External actors in stateless Somalia. A war economy and its promoters*, 2004, p.9.
[79] Dehéz, D., *Somalia vor der Rückkehr der Übergangsregierung – Eine Anleitung zum Scheitern äußerer Intervention*, 2005, p.13-14.
[80] Grosse-Kettler, S, *External actors in stateless Somalia. A war economy and its promoters,* 2004, p.5.

Along with these issues, many see Islamism in Somalia as intricately linked with terrorism. The US is convinced that the UIC has been involved in the bombing of two of its embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam by Al-Qaeda in 1998.[81] Somalia has been suspected of being a safe haven for terrorist activities for a long time and therefore is increasingly checked by anti-terrorism measures.[82] The bank Al-Barakaat was closed down after 9/11 because of alleged money laundering activities. The organisation Al-Ittihad-Al-Islamiya has been accused of involvement in the shoot-down of three US-helicopters in 1993. Islamic charity organizations have built an extensive alternative to the educational system.[83]

Conclusion

Many see Somalia as a prime example of a failed State.[84] The lack of a central governmental authority for more than ten years has spawned the development of a war economy. War has become a self-perpetrating state hindering development and forcing people to look to help wherever they can find it, most often with members of their clans. In order to stop this cycle the UN country team has identified six priorities for assistance to South-Central Somalia: capacity-building, establishment of the rule of law, basic social services, assistance to internally displaced persons, employment, and livelihood recovery. [85]

After years of conflict and of conflict-resolution trials, the arms embargo remains unasserted. What can the Security Council do more to enforce this basic requirement for peace-building via the Monitoring Group? All observers and experts agree that no intervention can be successful that does not have the adequate resources in manpower, logistics and strategic counseling.[86] How can UN Member States be convinced that Somalia is worth the effort? Somalia remains a war economy that will prosper as long as young, depleted men are attracted by warlords. How can they be offered alternatives to violent action? Can ideas from successful demobilization, as happened in Somaliland, be borrowed? In failed States such as Somalia, conflict will prevail as long as no transitional justice is found and implemented. How can the Security Council better address the need for jurisdiction in the peacebuilding process? As long as the IGAD members have not found a common path to peace, peace cannot be stabilized in the region. How can they be motivated to look beyond their particular interests? The civil society in Somalia does not identify itself with the TFG. How can trust be rebuilt?

II: The Impact of Climate Change on Global Security

"Climate change is a security issue: but it not a matter of narrow national security – it has a new dimension. This is about our collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world."[87]

Global climate change is one of the most controversial world issues today and potentially the one with the widest-ranging and most dramatic effects. While epidemics, natural disasters, global poverty and even weapons proliferation are serious issues with significant consequences for the international community, climate change affects the entire world - and may do much to exacerbate all of the issues mentioned above and more.[88] More relevant to the current discussion, the specific changes, global and regional, that result from climate change can act to significantly disrupt global security.[89] Ethnic, regional and national tensions can be accentuated, or even created wholesale, as resource patterns change or fail and environmental refugees flee their homes.[90] These patterns are

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[81] International Crisis Group, *Can the Somali crisis be contained?*, 2006, p.10.
[82] International Crisis Group, *Can the Somali crisis be contained?*, 2006, p.1.
[83] Grosse-Kettler, S, *External actors in stateless Somalia. A war economy and its promoters*, 2004, p.3.
[84] Dehéz, D., *Somalia vor der Rückkehr der Übergangsregierung – Eine Anleitung zum Scheitern äußerer Intervention,* 2005, p.13.
[85] Secretary-General of the United Nations., *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2007/115).,* 2007, p.10.
[86] Clarke, W. & Herbst, J., *Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention* , 1996, p.81.
[87] Beckett, *Margaret Beckett At UN Security Council Climate Change Debate*, 2007.
[88] Billions face climate change risk, *BBC News*, 2007.
[89] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001. p. 75.
[90] United Nations Environment Programme, *Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment,* 2007, p. 8.

already visibly at work in areas like Sudan and the Caspian Sea region but will continue to spread as the process of global climate change continues and accelerates, affecting more people and more nations.[91]

Background on climate change

The term "climate change" is itself fraught with controversy.[92] Although most sources, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), define "climate change" as referring to any significant change in climate regardless of its cause,[93] the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) states in Article I that: "'Climate change' means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods" and thus distinguishes between a human-caused "climate change" and a natural "climate variability".[94] Although this guide will briefly consider the issue of causation, our primary concern here is with the impact of such changes, which is the same regardless of their cause, and therefore the term "climate change" will be used to refer to any change in climate. More specifically, it refers to "a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer)" in the words of the IPCC 2001 Synthesis Report.[95]

The most basic aspect of climate change is a general warming of the earth's surface temperature, estimated by the IPCC at about 0.6 degrees Celsius since 1900,[96] a warming which is accelerating and is estimated at as much as 5.8 degrees by 2100.[97] As a consequence of this warming, world snow cover has decreased 10% since the 1960s, glaciers have retreated significantly and Arctic ice thickness has decreased as much as 40%.[98] Plant and animal ranges around the globe have shifted poleward[99] and global sea levels have risen about 0.2 meters in the 20th century.[100] Precipitation in the Northern Hemisphere has increased between 5-10% while Africa and the Mediterranean have seen significant decreases in precipitation.[101] In other words, as the IPCC 2001 Report states: "The Earth's climate system has demonstrably changed on both global and regional scales since the pre-industrial era."[102]

The potential impacts of this warming and its associated effects are varied and increase with the magnitude of climate change.[103] In other words, the longer our climate continues to change and the more this change accelerates, the more likely it is to have significant impacts on human systems.[104] This includes higher maximum temperatures and increased risk of heat waves across the globe, a general decrease in crop yields in tropical and semi-tropical areas as well as many mid-latitude regions, decreased water availability, increase in the number of people exposed to a large number of diseases, increased flooding of costal and island areas, increase in the severity of tropical cyclones and increased variability of Indian Ocean monsoons.[105]

Causes of Climate Change

As stated above, the committee should focus its work on the possible effects of global climate change on global security than with addressing its cause. Nevertheless, as the international community attempts to take action to reduce or reverse the effects of climate change, it is clear that the international community cannot act against the problem if it has no clear understanding as to what caused it in the first place. The kind of warming pattern that has

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[91] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001, Annex B.
[92] *Ibid.*
[93] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001, Annex B.
[94] United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 1994, Art. 1, §2.
[95] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001, Annex B.
[96] *Ibid.,* p. 75.
[97] *Ibid.,* p. 78.
[98] *Ibid.,* p. 75.
[99] *Ibid.,* p. 110.
[100] *Ibid.,* p. 20.
[101] *Ibid.,* p. 76.
[102] *Ibid.,* p. 19.
[103] *Ibid.,* p. 111.
[104] *Ibid*.
[105] *Ibid.,* p. 112.

been observed over the past century can potentially be caused either by natural activity (fluctuations in solar output and volcanic activity) or by human activity (release of greenhouse gases and aerosols).[106] Careful climate modeling on the basis of known natural fluctuations over the last century led the IPCC to conclude that the changes in climate in that period were inconsistent with any natural explanation and that therefore "most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations."[107]

In a security context, this conclusion is significant in that it raises the possibility that direct action can be taken to reduce or reverse the effects of climate change.[108] A completely natural climate change scenario, although still a security risk, would leave the international community with no choice but mitigation.[109] Anthropogenic climate change, however, can be resisted with the same resources used to combat any other risk to national and international security if the international community can reach a consensus on the dangers involved and the proper method for combating these dangers.[110] For this reason the Security Council, as the world's leading international security forum, is an essential arena for discussing the dangers of climate change.[111]

Potential Security Impact

Just as climate change is a global effect which may have very different specific consequences in different regions, the security impacts of climate change are likely to vary by region.[112] These impacts may already be seen in some particularly vulnerable regions, while other regions remain secure and unfazed.[113] It is possible, however, to foresee both broad and specific impacts to global security based on presently occurring and projected climate change scenarios.[114] Predicted impacts of human systems include a general reduction in crop yields, especially in tropical and subtropical areas, decreased water availability, increase in the number of people exposed to both insect-borne and water-borne diseases, and generally increased risk of flooding.[115] Some of these consequences necessarily follow others; for instance, increased exposure to water-borne diseases results from a decrease in water availability and consequent increase in sharing of remaining water sources.[116] Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that as climate continues to change, climate extremes such as droughts, floods, heat waves and landslides will become both more common and more severe.[117] Even larger and more complex impacts, such as slowing of oceanic currents, are barely understood but may have disastrous consequences for human settlements.[118]

The security potential of some of these issues is clear. Access to water resources, especially in water-deprived regions, can be a major source of international conflict.[119] At the same time, reduced crop productivity, droughts, floods and heat waves will combine to exacerbate local tribal or ethnic conflicts over arable land,[120] especially in regions bordering the Indian Ocean, where monsoon cycles are likely to become more erratic and extreme.[121] At the same time, flooding, sea level rise, extreme weather events and decreased crop productivity will combine to create a new class of "environmental refugees" forced to flee their homes due to the effects of climate change.[122] This will put increased stress on host countries, which are already likely to be weakened by their own climate change issues.[123] This movement of landless people, already a serious destabilizing force in many of the world's poorest regions and a potential security threat, could create conditions of insecurity in entire regions.[124] Projections place

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[106] *Ibid.,* p. 22.
[107] *Ibid.,* p. 77.
[108] *Ibid.*
[109] *Ibid.*
[110] *Ibid.*
[111] *Ibid.*
[112] *Ibid.,* p. 76.
[113] *Ibid.*
[114] *Ibid.*
[115] *Ibid.,* p. 111.
[116] *Ibid.*
[117] *Ibid.,* p. 111.
[118] *Ibid.,* p. 112.
[119] *Ibid.*
[120] *Ibid.,* p. 115.
[121] *Ibid.,* p. 112.
[122] HM Treasury, *Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change*, in press, ch. 3, p. 22.
[123] *Ibid.*
[124] *Ibid.*

the number of persons displaced by climate change at 150-200 million using conservative estimates.[125] In all of the above impacts, those likely to see the greatest negative effects are the citizens of the poorest nations, which lack the technology, infrastructure and institutional resources to adapt to a changing climate.[126]

Case study - Sudan

The clearest example of climate change in progress, which has received a good deal of international attention due to the efforts of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, is the instability in the Sudan.[127] The former British colony was granted independence in 1956.[128] Even prior to this date there were existing tensions between the North, dominated by Arabs and the center of anti-colonial nationalism, and the South, which is predominately African and economically depressed.[129] Discontent with Northern domination led to full-scale rebellion in 1963 continuing until 1972.[130] In 1983, when the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) became the predominant rebel group, the conflict reignited.[131] The SPLA called for autonomy rather than independence for the South and this, along with a general increase in prosperity accompanying the export of petroleum beginning in the late 1990s, finally allowed for an end to the long civil war in 2002.[132] Almost immediately a second conflict broke out in 2003 in the western Darfur region.[133] Rebel groups in the region claimed the national government was neglecting the economic development of Darfur.[134] Militias reportedly charged by the national government with putting down the rebellion, known as *janjaweed*, have been widely accused of atrocities including torture and mass rape.[135] The conflict has also to some extent merged with the larger Central African War, involving Chad and Central African Republic as well as Sudanese-backed rebel groups in both countries.[136] At present, efforts are underway to insert a large UN-African Union peacekeeping force into the region to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.[137] A third conflict, in the eastern part of the country, was resolved in 2006.[138] Portions of the Ugandan rebel group Lord's Resistance Army continue to operate in the far south of the country.[139]

Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, in a June editorial to the *Washington Post*, stated his belief that "the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change."[140] This is not idle speculation but a carefully considered train of thought based on the best available scientific evidence: climate change caused a warming of the waters of the Indian Ocean, which as we have already seen is causing a gradual decrease in the consistency of monsoon cycles.[141] Dry years, in which not enough rain falls to grow sufficient food, alternate dramatically with wet years which wash away soil and leave the land poor in nutrients.[142] The result is a lack of arable land and, in Darfur, a conflict between farmers and herders over control of the decreasing food and water.[143] This escalated into full-scale fighting, in which one side was, because of ethnic solidarity, backed by the resources of the national government in Khartoum.[144] The result was the crisis we see today.[145] This progression of events is backed by the findings of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which reports that "competition over oil and gas reserves, Nile waters and timber, as well as land use issues related to agricultural land, are important causative factors in the instigation and perpetuation of conflict in Sudan. Confrontations over rangeland and rain-fed

[125] *Ibid.*
[126] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001, p. 70.
[127] Ban Ki Moon, *A Climate Culprit in Darfur,* 2007.
[128] Library of Congress, *Country Profile: Sudan*, 2004.
[129] *Ibid.*
[130] *Ibid.*
[131] *Ibid.*
[132] *Ibid.*
[133] United Nations Environment Programme, *Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment,* 2007, p. 75.
[134] Reuters, *Darfur Conflict in Detail*, 2007.
[135] *Ibid.*
[136] *Ibid.*
[137] *Ibid.*
[138] United Nations Environment Programme, *Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment,* 2007, p. 76.
[139] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[140] Ban Ki Moon, *A Climate Culprit in Darfur,* 2007.
[141] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001, p. 70.
[142] *Ibid.*
[143] Reuters, *Darfur Conflict in Detail*, 2007.
[144] *Ibid.*
[145] *Ibid.*

agricultural land in the drier parts of the country are a particularly striking manifestation of the connection between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict."[146] The UNEP report concludes that the international community should "invest in environmental management to support lasting peace in Darfur, and to avoid local conflict over natural resources elsewhere in Sudan"[147] a significant warning for a country that has already experienced four major separatist conflicts in its 51 years of existence.[148]

Case Study - Caspian Sea

The Caspian Sea is the world's largest enclosed body of water.[149] Bordered by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation and the center of a prolonged legal dispute over control of gas and oil resources, it is potentially one of the least stable regions in Asia.[150] It is also a region whose security will be strongly impacted by the effects of climate change, with potentially disastrous consequences.

The legal status of the Caspian Sea focuses on the technical issue of whether it is legally a sea or a lake. It is generally referred to as a sea due to the salt content of its waters, but a treaty signed by the Soviet Union and Iran in 1940 declared the body a lake, with control to be divided between the two nations at a median line.[151] If it is considered a sea, the 1940 agreement would be overridden by the 1982 Convention on the International Law of the Seas, limiting national waters to twelve miles from shore and leaving much of the body's interior outside of national control.[152] The issue was complicated in 1991 by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of three new states with Caspian Sea coastline: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. A number of bilateral and trilateral agreements currently govern control of the Caspian, with the most significant being a 2003 agreement which governs 64% of the sea and divides control between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.[153] Turkmenistan has been unable to advocate a firm position on the issue and has been largely left out of discussions while Iran has refused to acknowledge or sign any agreements in the absence of a five-nation convention on the legal status of the sea.[154]

The cause of this legal wrangling was control over the sea's resources.[155] Water is highly significant given that much of the surrounding region is desert and that the only other major body of water in the area, the Aral Sea, is rapidly drying up.[156] The Caspian is also the source of 90% of the world's caviar, which is one of the world's most valuable natural resources in terms of sale price by volume, selling at $100 per ounce or above.[157] Both of these factors, however, pale in comparison to recent discoveries of offshore oil and gas in the Caspian and in practical terms much of the detailed claims over the location of borders has been calculated to decide control of specific oil fields, which are concentrated in the northeast and southwest of the sea.[158] Oil reserves are estimated between 17 and 49 billion barrels, and even at the current suboptimal rate of exploitation, oil exports from the sea are expected to exceed those of Venezuela by 2010.[159] Gas reserves may be even more significant and are believed to be the fourth largest in the world.[160]

The competing territorial claims of the five countries bordering the sea are complicated by the Caspian's dramatic rise and fall in water level, which are not fully understood.[161] The sea is fed by a large number of different rivers but water leaves only through evaporation.[162] It thus represents a fairly closed system which is easily influenced by

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[146] United Nations Environment Programme, *Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment,* 2007, p. 8.
[147] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[148] Reuters, *Darfur Conflict in Detail*, 2007.
[149] United Nations, *United Nations Atlas of the Oceans*, n.d.
[150] *Ibid.*
[151] Energy Information Administration, *Caspian Sea Region: Regional Conflicts,* 2002.
[152] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.
[153] United Nations, *United Nations Atlas of the Oceans*, n.d.
[154] *Ibid.*
[155] Energy Information Administration, *Caspian Sea Region: Oil,* 2007.
[156] United Nations, *United Nations Atlas of the Oceans*, n.d.
[157] Caviar Emptor, *Roe to Ruin*, n.d.
[158] Energy Information Administration, *Caspian Sea Region: Oil,* 2007.
[159] *Ibid.*
[160] Energy Information Administration, *Caspian Sea Region: Natural Gas,* 2007
[161] Caspian Environment Programme, *Sea Levels,* 2000.
[162] *Ibid.*

precipitation and evaporation rates.[163] Between 1930 and 1972 the Caspian's water level fell about 15 feet.[164] Since that time it again rose about six feet,[165] probably due to the effects of pollution, which creates a film on the water's surface and consequently reduces evaporation.[166]

As climate change continues, it is likely that water levels will begin to fall again in response to reduced rainfall and a higher rate of evaporation due to higher temperature.[167] In any case, oscillation in water level, and therefore in the size and boundaries of the sea, can only decrease stability in a body of water where national zones of control are already poorly defined.[168] Drought will tend to increase the importance of the water itself as a resource as well as fish stocks, which will become an increasingly important source of food.[169] At the same time, demand for oil and gas will tend to increase as energy demand for space cooling increases globally, sharpening struggles for control of those resources as well.[170]

The Caspian Sea region is not only one of the areas most likely to be affected by climate change: it is also one of the most dangerous. Russia is increasingly aggressive, especially toward the so-called "Near Abroad" countries, as it seeks a restoration of national dignity following the collapse of the Soviet Union.[171] One of the Russian administrative regions which border the Caspian is the Dagestan Republic, whose leaders have been accused of giving support to rebels in neighboring Chechnya.[172] As in so many other regions, access to natural resources may prove a source of support for rebels in the North Caucuses and thus prolong the conflicts there.[173] Azerbaijan continues to be locked in a dispute with Armenia over the latter's support for ethnic Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh.[174] Kazakhstan, while relatively stable, has yet to agree to a border treaty with neighboring Kyrgyzstan and may grow to resent extensive Russian control over Kazakh affairs as Kazakh oil wealth grows.[175] Turkmenistan has largely been uninvolved with the border dispute but, as its economy largely depends on cotton exports, it is involved in a dispute with Uzbekistan over water access rights, a dispute which can only grow more rancorous as water becomes less available.[176] Iran, eager to be viewed as a regional power, has massed ground troops on the border with Azerbaijan in 2001 over Caspian Sea issues.[177] The Islamic Republic continues to insist on a fifth share of the sea despite a relatively small coastline, and is believed to be developing nuclear weapons.[178] Thus, the Caspian Sea is bordered by an aggressive nuclear state (Russia), an aggressive state that may soon have nuclear weapons (Iran), a rebellious province (Dagestan), an unstable state with a large separatist region (Azerbaijan), and two states with weak economies, insufficient water access, and standing border disputes (Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). Any or all of these countries could become involved in a conflict over resources as the Caspian is affected by climate change.

Conclusion and Committee Directive

On April 17, 2007 the Security Council held it first ever debate on the impact of climate change, inviting representatives from a number of different countries and hearing over 50 speakers.[179] Although it was largely agreed that climate change was a long-term development issue, there was little consensus on the extent of the security impact or on the proper forum for its discussion. Some states, in particular those likely to be most impacted by climate change, welcomed the involvement of the Security Council while others, including Russia, China, and

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[163] *Ibid.*
[164] *Ibid.*
[165] *Ibid.*
[166] *Ibid.*
[167] *Ibid.*
[168] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001, p. 70.
[169] *Ibid.*
[170] *Ibid.*
[171] Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook,* 2007.
[172] *Ibid.*
[173] *Ibid.*
[174] *Ibid*.
[175] *Ibid.*
[176] *Ibid.*
[177] *Ibid.*
[178] *Ibid.*
[179] United Nations Department of Public Information, *Press Release,* 2007.

Pakistan speaking on behalf of the Group of 77, objected to consideration of what they perceived as an issue of environment and development by a body strictly concerned with security.

Climate change has already begun to affect the world's climate: increasing temperatures, raising sea levels, decreasing precipitation, melting ice caps, and increasing the severity of extreme weather events. The world has begun to respond through the creation of the IPCC and UNFCCC and agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions. It is now time for the international community to decide whether or not to heed growing indications that climate change has implication for global security as well as global environment. What is the proper forum for such a debate? What evidence is needed to confirm the security impact of climate change and what bodies should be responsible for gathering it? How will the international community respond to an increasingly insecure world?

Topic III. Post-Conflict Peace Building

"We know, from experience, that there is no gap between peacekeeping, recovery and development."[180]

An Imperiled Peace

Following the end of the Cold War, a dramatic shift in the nature of international conflicts took place.[181] While the number of inter-state conflicts has seen a decline, intra-state conflicts surged throughout the world, wreaking havoc in a variety of places like Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Cambodia.[182] Although it has been possible to bring peace to worn-torn countries, the peace that follows is often fleeting in nature.[183] Countries are vulnerable to relapse into war in the post-conflict period.[184] The statistics speak for themselves: within five years, nearly fifty percent of peace settlements culminated in a war.[185] The floundering of peace in Rwanda and Angola caused mayhem on an unimaginable scale that left three million people dead.[186] The effects on neighboring countries can be detrimental and can lead to problems like refugees, arms flows as well as severe economic strain.[187]

Thus, the opportunities emanating from peace seem wholly insufficient to maintain peace.[188] The needs of society emerging from conflict are not adequately met, creating a volatile mix of poverty, population displacement and renewed violence. [189] Moreover, the profound weakness of the post-conflict institutions makes them ill prepared to deal with the challenges arising in post-conflict situations. [190] The challenges range from a lack of physical security, good governance, an erratic economy and social justice.[191] In addition, tension between former rivals gives rise to political instability and is often made worse by the legacy of a culture of violence from the war and the availability of arms.[192] The end of war does not necessitate an end to hostilities, but as merely changes the form of a society's violence.[193] Many post-conflict areas are often beset by insecurity as a result of violent crimes after the hostilities of

[180] Sardenberg, *Statement by Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations Security Council*, 2007.
[181] Abiodun, *New Issues in Refugee Research. The role of African regional and sub-regional organisations in conflict prevention and resolution. Working Paper No. 23*, 2000.
[182] *Ibid.*
[183] The Digital Libary of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Benefits and Challenges*.
[184] *Ibid.*
[185] Collier, P. et al, *The Conflict Trap*, 2003, p.7.
[186] Evans, *Building Peace from the Ashes of War*, 2006.
[187] The World Bank, *The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview*, 1999, p.8.
[188] The Digital Libary of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Benefits and Challenges*.
[189] *Ibid.*
[190] The World Bank, *The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview,* 1999, p.8.
[191] Evans, *Building Peace from the Ashes of War*, 2006.
[192] The World Bank, *The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview,* 1999, p.8.
[193] Call, C.T., *Conclusion: Constructing Justice and Security after War. In Charles T. Call (Ed.). Constructing Justice and Security after War.* 2007, p. 377.

the war cease, which poses a grave threat to reconstruction efforts of government institutions and nature of justice as well the life of the ordinary people.[194]

The Peacebuilding Commission

The Peace Building Commission was advocated by former Secretary General Kofi Annan in his report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Peace, Security and Human Rights for All* [195] with the intention to fill an institutional void at the United Nations, as there had been no United Nations organization that addressed how countries battered by war could attain lasting peace.[196] Notwithstanding the fact that the United Nations had played an important role in mediating and implementing peace agreements, the colossal failures in Angola and Rwanda blatantly brought to the fore the necessity for achieving sustainable peace.[197] Thus, the intergovernmental Peace Building Commission simultaneously came into existence in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, which was acting in accordance with Articles 7, 22 and 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, as an integral part of the United Nations reform process in 2005.[198]

The Peacebuilding Commission consists of an Organizational Committee with 31 member states.[199] Seven members come from the Security Council, seven from the Economic and Social Council, five from the best ten financial contributors to the United Nations budget, five from the best ten military contributors of staff and civilian police to UN missions and, finally, other seven members are elected by the General Assembly.[200] [201]

The composition of the membership to the Peacebuilding Commission has to fulfill specific purposes. Thus, according to Article 23 of the Charter of the membership to the Security Council of the United Nations this invariably means that they have to contribute towards maintaining peace and security.[202] Subsequently, all Permanent Members and two other members of the Security Council are members of the Peacebuilding Commission.[203] Furthermore, there has been particular emphasis on having countries that were directly confronted by conflicts as members,[204] Prominent members in this category include Angola, Burundi, El Salvador and Fiji. In addition, members of the Economic and Social Council were chosen to be part of the Peacebuilding Commission as they can provide expertise relating from the transition of recovery towards development. [205]

Furthermore, the Peacebuilding Commission is an intergovernmental organization with advisory capacity.[206] Although the Commission possesses mere advisory capacity and has no means to sanction parties that do not comply with its decisions, it is assumed that the recommendations will have greater legitimacy as a result of the participation of certain states in the work of the body, such as members of Security Council, the key troop contributors and important financial donors.[207] The relationship of the Peacebuilding Commission to other United Nations bodies is unique. It is, officially, an advisory organ with a subsidiary status vis-à-vis both the Security Council and the

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[194] *Ibid.,* p.377.
[195] United Nations. General Assembly. 59th Session, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General (A/59/2005)*, 2005.
[196] Annan, *Explantory Note of the Secretary General: Peacebuilding Commission*, 2005.
[197] *Ibid.*
[198] *Ibid.*
[199] The Peacebuilding Commission, *The Peacebuilding Commission. Questions and Answers,* n.d.
[200] *Ibid.*
[201] The current composition of the Peacebuilding is as follows, seven members of the Security Council: China, France, Panama, Russia, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States; seven members of the Economic and Social: Angola, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Luxembourg, Indonesia and Sri Lanka; five of the of top contributors to the financial budget of the United Nations: Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway; five of the top military and police personnel providers to the United Nations: Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan; seven members elected by the General Assembly: Burundi, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Georgia, and Jamaica. See Peacebuilding Commission, *Membership,* n.d.
[202] Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: Our Shared Responsibility*, 2004.
[203] *Ibid.*
[204] *Ibid.*
[205] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1645 (2005), (S/RES/1645),* December 2005.
[206] *Ibid.*
[207] *Ibid.*

General Assembly.[208] The responsibilities are shared between the latter two bodies: the General Assembly reviews the progress of the Peacebuilding Commission by discussing its yearly report.[209] With regards to the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission makes plans and recommendations on peacekeeping activities. [210]

Moreover, the objective of the organization is to adopt an integrated approach to peacebuilding and the recovery process in post-conflict areas.[211] During the very early stages of the post-conflict period, the Peacebuilding Commission can provide invaluable information to the Security Council and allude to important developments and institutional-building issues.[212] The Peacebuilding Commission can also highlight to the Security Council which institutions are involved and accessible for financing for early peacebuilding efforts as part of an integrated approach to peacekeeping missions.[213] The Peacebuilding Commission can establish ways to ensure the commitment of donors in order to secure financing that focuses not only on relief and recovery but also development.[214]

Thus, the Peacebuilding Commission strives to improve the cooperation between political, military, humanitarian and development players.[215] The Commission is responsible for creating robust institutions that guarantee rule of law, enhance the ability of states to provide public services, encourage sound economic policies and stimulate economic activities in the private sector.[216]

The Peacebuilding Commission is also entrusted with the task of reviewing progress in post-conflict areas.[217] This ensures that shortcomings are quickly spotted and relevant suggestions for improvements are made.[218] More poignantly, an intermittent review of progress is a highly useful early warning mechanism for the Security Council as well as the international community.[219] In the past, the Security Council showed reticence towards removing troops from certain post-conflict area as it feared instability, but with regular reviews the Security Council could fairly accurately determine whether to increase or decrease troop-levels.[220] In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission is also intended as the main coordinator for the work of UN agencies and bodies in post-conflict areas, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other relevant United Nations Organizations.[221]

Establishing Peace in Post-Conflict Areas - Immediate Stabilization and Transition to Peace

Security plays a very central role, as without a certain level of security it is impossible for people to engage in economic activities of any form or take part in the reconstruction of their community.[222] Consequently, peacekeeping is irrevocably a key for the peacebuilding process in order to guarantee peace and security and the very notion that the Security Council authorizes the peacekeeping operations gives them legitimacy on an unimaginable scale. [223]

Thus, peacekeeping seeks to closely monitor and observe the peace during the post-conflict period and help the former enemies to realize the peace agreement they signed.[224] The task of peacekeeping is chiefly carried out by

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[208] The Peacebuilding Commission, *The Peacebuilding Commission. Questions and Answers,* n.d.
[209] *Ibid.*
[210] *Ibid.*
[211] The Peacebuidlding Commission, *Home,* n.d.
[212] Annan, *Explantory Note of the Secretary General: Peacebuilding Commission*, 2005.
[213] *Ibid.*
[214] *Ibid.*
[215] The Peacebuidlding Commission, *Home,* n.d.
[216] Annan, *Explantory Note of the Secretary General: Peacebuilding Commission*, 2005.
[217] Huefner, *Reforming the UN: The case of Peacebuilding Commission.* 2007.
[218] Annan, *Explantory Note of the Secretary General: Peacebuilding Commission*, 2005.
[219] *Ibid.*
[220] *Ibid.*
[221] Attwood and Tanner, *UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva*, 2007.
[222] *Ibid.*
[223] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Overview. DPKO Factsheet,* n.d.
[224] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *FAQ about Department of Peacekeeping Operations:. Peacekeeping,* n.d.

soldiers and military officials, police and civilian workers from many different nations.[225] Most recently, there has been a surge in the number of Peacekeeping Operations by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), despite the fact that the number of civil wars has declined.[226] Since of the end of the Cold War UN peacekeeping operations increased by nearly 400%, highlighting how international involvement in conflict areas has soared in breadth as well as depth.[227] In May 2006, the DPKO was responsible for 18 peacekeeping operations throughout the world, which involved nearly 89, 000 soldiers, police officers and civilian workers.[228]

The engagement of the United Nations in post-conflict areas can be divided into two aspects: First and Second generation involvement.[229] The former pertains to peacemaking and peacekeeping and security mechanisms and structures while the latter focuses on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction UN institutions responsible for development.[230] The distinction between the two generations' engagement has become increasingly blurred.[231] The mandate for peacekeeping has expanded from merely monitoring and observing a peace agreement into a new catalogue of responsibilities, which involve observing elections, implementing human rights, ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches those in need of it.[232] Thus, peacekeeping has evolved into peacebuilding, which seeks to advocate governance efforts.[233] The broader mandate of the peacekeeping operations also reflects the increased capacity and determination of Security Council to take action, a trend that can be traced back to the end of the cold war.[234]

Transformation and consolidation of peace in the medium and long term

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have become an important part of peacekeeping with the objective of building peace in order to ensure a lasting stability.[235] Thus, disarmament invariably means that inspections for weapons take place and weapons (light weapons, munitions, explosives and heavy weapons) are collected and destroyed.[236] Demobilization is equated with the process in which the armed forces in the conflict, whether Government or opposition, are drastically reduced and fully disbanded within a framework that allows a transformation to peace.[237] For demobilization to be effective, the centers of command and control must be eliminated.[238] This helps relieve the burden that post-conflict societies encounter, as combatants are prevented from getting involved in the war again, resorting to crime, or from challenging the regime.[239]

Reintegration seeks to assist ex-combatants and their families in order to allow economic and social integration to take place.[240] This assistance often takes the form of economic assistance, compensation, or perhaps some training programmes or some sort employment that enables them to earn an income.[241] However, reintegration can give rise to an economic quandary, as integrating demobilized soldiers in a very erratic economy makes the situation of unemployment even worse and prevents the government drawing from a pool of trained labor that would help the quality of public work.[242] What makes reintegration such a cumbersome process is that DDR resources on their own

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[225] *Ibid.*
[226] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Overview, DPKO Factsheet,* n.d.
[227] *Ibid.*
[228] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *FAQ about Department of Peacekeeping Operations. What are the current challenges to successful peacekeeping?,* n.d.
[229] Santiso, *Promoting Democratic Governance and Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of United Nations Development Programme in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,* 2002.
[230] *Ibid.*
[231] Saira, *From keeping peace to building peace: A proposal for a revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council*, n.d.
[232] *Ibid.*
[233] *Ibid.*
[234] *Ibid.*
[235] United Nations, *International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers 2003*, n.d.
[236] *Ibid.*
[237] United Nations, *International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers 2003, n.d.*
[238] Feil, *Laying the Foundation. Enhancing Security Capabilities*, p. 51
[239] Call, *Conclusion: Constructing Justice and Security after War.* p. 384.
[240] *Ibid., p. 384.*
[241] *Ibid., p. 384.*
[242] Feil, *Laying the Foundation. Enhancing Security Capabilities*, 2004, p.50.

cannot suffice to create new jobs, but the creation of jobs depends on the market forces beyond the control of DDR programs. [243]

Furthermore, it is important not to be oblivious to the importance of the peace agreement: the very nature of the peace agreement incontrovertibly reflects the success of DDR.[244] The agreement can enhance the process of DDR by setting deadlines, suggesting means for the destruction of weapons and ammunitions, creating ways to restructure defense forces and nominating institutions responsible for coordinating and implementing DDR activities.[245]

Rule of Law
The importance of rule of law for any society is incontrovertible.[246] In essence, rule of law subscribes to the notion that the rights of citizen are protected by impeding the government from using power in an arbitrary and abusive manner and governing people's interaction in accordance to the law.[247] Some of the criteria that need to be fulfilled include the necessity that laws remain constant, of the formalization of laws, of non-retroactivity, and of clarity of laws in order to avoid unjust implementation.[248]

The importance of rule of law for reconstructing a society emerging from conflict is crucial.[249] It is a stepping-stone for peace, stability and development, as societies and economies need rules that govern the interaction within their borders.[250] Rule of law is indispensable to a well functioning economy, as investors display vehement reservations towards investing in regions where trade is not governed by transparent and fixed rules that are enforced by the law.[251] Security through rule of law is not only a precondition for major international companies and investors, but also for smaller business owners.[252] They are unlikely to be able to be very productive in their economic activities if they are preoccupied with whether their land and resources are secure.[253]

Rebuilding a floundering justice system can help reduce tension within society as the injustices that occurred are exposed.[254] Injustices, like discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, the unjust allocation of resources, abuse of power, refusal to citizenship and property can be addressed.[255] Moreover, a process of reconciliation between the legitimate government of the post-conflict period and those responsible for crimes during the conflict period can be initiated.[256] Furthermore, 'restorative justice' involving the rapprochement between combatants, victims and those responsible for the crimes can be achieved.[257] Prominent examples include transitional courts like the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in Sierra Leone and South Africa that helped to deal with the past during the post-conflict period[258] and dismantle any grievances stemming from the conflict.[259]

Transitional justice is crucial during the immediate post-conflict period, but needs to be supplemented by certain reforms of the legal system in order implement rule of law.[260] The essential parts of the judicial infrastructure that might need reforms include prisons and courts as well as a modification of the constitution and legal codes.[261]

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[243] Call, *Conclusion: Constructing Justice and Security after War*, 2007, p. 384.
[244] United Nations, *International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers 2003, n.d.*
[245] *Ibid.*
[246] The International Iowa Center for Finance and Development, *What is rule of Law?* n.d.
[247] *Ibid.*
[248] *Ibid.*
[249] Flournoy et al, *Dealing with Demons*, 2004, p. 89.
[250] Brown, *Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. UNDP Administrator M. Brown speaking to the SC,* 2004.
[251] *Ibid.*
[252] *Ibid.*
[253] *Ibid.*
[254] United Nations Development Programme, *Sustaining Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Lessons and Challenges*, 2005.
[255] Annan, *The rule of law and* transitional *justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,* 2004.
[256] United Nations Development Programme, *Sustaining Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Lessons and Challenges*, 2005.
[257] *Ibid.*
[258] *Ibid.*
[259] Orr, The United States as a Nations Builder. Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 2004, p. 11.
[260] United Nations Development Programme, *Sustaining Post-Conflict Economic Recovery:Lessons and Challenges*, 2005.
[261] Flournoy et al, *Dealing with Demons*, 2004, p. 92.

Furthermore, in order to spark the development of the legal system legal education and assistance for organizing the legal community, for example through bar associations, must be provided.[262]

All in all, a smooth running judiciary must be created with various instruments that adjudicate disagreements.[263] However, this is often a very cumbersome process. In post-conflict areas a lack of political determination to create reforms, the institutions within the justice system are far from independent, material and financial resources are inadequate, there is suspicion and distrust towards the government.[264]

More poignantly, the mandate for peacekeeping operations has been enlarged and comprises of the supervision of rule of law, human rights and institution building.[265] Local and national laws ensure the protection of international human rights.[266] The Security Council advocated the creation of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti in 2004 that would give an account on the human rights situation, rebuild the prison system and look into violations of human rights, help strengthen the judiciary and take part in the process to restore and maintain rule of law.[267] In addition, constructing and enabling national actors to develop the rule of law agenda must be one of the first priorities for any peacekeeping operation.[268]

Conclusion

Ultimately, each country emerges from a conflict under different circumstances.[269] Consequently, priority, the commensurability and the implementation of tasks will vary from post-conflict situation to post-conflict situation.[270] Moreover, post-conflict reconstruction is going to involve a whole plethora of activities, which may range from peacekeeping to electoral assistance.[271] One challenge, however, relating to post-conflict peacebuilding is the coordination of the work of different agencies of the United Nations.[272] This challenge has been taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission, which was announced at the World Summit in 2005, and has been become a key part of the structure and mandate of the United Nations.[273]

Committee Directive

What role is the Security Council going to play directly and indirectly in the post-conflict peacebuilding process? Consider the role of peacekeeping operations and how they have evolved to become a part of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Moreover, pay attention to the disarmament and demobilization components of DDR programs. Due regard to reform of the police sector and its crucial function in maintaining security in the wake of crime and violence in the post-conflict period should be given. Furthermore, how far can the Peacebuilding Commission successfully fill the void it was set up for, overcoming the post-conflict era, enabling security and, then, fostering development?

Beyond the security aspect take into consideration the theme of justice within the context of post-conflict reconstruction, especially transitional justice and its effects in the short and long term. Can transitional justice really foster reconciliation between different groups in society? What impact can rule of law have on a war-ravaged

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[262] Annan, *The rule of law and* transitional *justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,* 2004.
[263] United Nations Development Programme, *Sustaining Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Lessons and Challenges*, 2005.
[264] Annan, *The rule of law and* transitional *justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,* 2004.
[265] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *The rule of law tools for post-conflict areas. Mapping the Justice sector*, 2006.
[266] *Ibid.*
[267] *Ibid.*
[268] *Ibid.*
[269] Center Strategic and International Studies and Association of the United States Army, *Joint Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*, 2004, p. 305.
[270] *Ibid.,* p. 305.
[271] *General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/54/1), Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization,* n.d.
[272] *Ibid.*
[273] Grey-Johnson, C., *Beyond Peacekeeing: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Recontruction and Peacebuilding in Africa*, n.d.

society? Take stock of the short and long term impact of rule of law on society, economy and development. More poignantly, to what extent can rule of law be implemented in a war torn society? What factors could possibly impede the implementation of rule of law?

In order to foster economic recovery in the immediate post-conflict period what organizations, at the international, regional and local level, need to be involved? What factors could enhance or hinder development?

With all the above-mentioned points, give due consideration to the role of the Security Council. More poignantly, explore the stance your country has towards post-conflict reconstruction, taking into account the following factors: Is your country involved in peacekeeping operations or does it benefit from peacekeeping operations? Is your country located in vicinity to a state in the post-conflict reconstruction phase?

Annotated Bibliography

History of the Security Council (SC)

Ariyoruk, A. (2005, July 3). *Players and Proposals in the Security Council Debate*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1/2005/0603models.htm
This article deals with the various proposals for Security Council reform. The specific players involved are discussed, as well as the groups that have formed amongst the various proposals. The author then goes on to question the difference between the permanent and non-permanent models. Delegates should familiarize themselves with the various models and the pros and cons of each model as well.

Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No.993, 3 Bevans 1153.
The Charter of the United Nations provides the basic framework on which all committees are based. Chapter III establishes the Security Council as a main organ of the United Nations. Chapter VII goes on to establish the purpose and power of this committee. Delegates are strongly encouraged to become familiar with the UN Charter if it has not previously been encountered. A version of the Charter can be found at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/

Global Policy Forum. (n.d.). *Basic Information on the Security Council*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/introindex.htm
This Web site contains basic information about the Security Council. Background information is provided, as well as the history of membership. Delegates may access tables and charts to get a feeling of the operations of this committee.

Global Policy Forum. (n.d.). Membership including Expansion and Representation. In *Security Council Reform*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/cluster1index.htm
As mentioned above there have been a variety of proposals for reform of the Security Council since its inception. This Web site presents an overview of various Security Council reform proposals. Each proposal is summarized individually. A link is available for delegates to gain further information regarding any of the proposals to get a complete idea of reformation. Delegates should familiarize themselves with the past and present reform topics in order to gain a sense of what has worked and what hasn't.

Global Policy Forum. (n.d.). *Peacekeeping*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/index.htm
Peacekeeping missions are becoming an increasingly important aspect of Security Council actions. This Web site provides a basic overview of the Security Council's role in peacekeeping. Articles regarding specific peacekeeping operations are available for examination. An article regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Security Council is also available for an in-depth explanation of the peacekeeping missions.

Paul, J., & Nahory, C. (2005, July 13). *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713theses.htm
This Web site contains 21 different views surrounding Security Council reform. The authors do not specify one favorable proposal, as each view discusses pros and cons of each council. Delegates may examine the various views for background knowledge, although the depth of each view may not be necessary for the purposes of this committee.

Soltau, F. (2000, October). The Right to Participate in the Debates of the Security Council. *The American Society of International Law*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh52.htm
The participation of non-Member States in the discussions of the Security is a useful tool for the members of the Security Council. The adopted rules of procedure for dealing with non-members is also discussed and analyzed. The remainder of the article contains an analysis of several cases when non-member participation occurred, and the outcomes of these occurrences.

The Green Papers. (n.d.). *The United Nations Security Council*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.thegreenpapers.com/ww/UNSecurityCouncil.phtml
This site presents basic information about Security Council membership. It is unique in the fact that it shows membership for each year listed as one large table so that delegates can see how the two-year terms of the non-permanent members mesh together. Membership is also broken down into regional columns so that specific trends can be observed.

United Nations. (n.d.). *Membership in 2007*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp
Basic information regarding the Security Council. This Web site contains the names of the current members of the Security Council, as well as membership history dating back to 1946. The presidency of the Security Council is discussed, as well as the methodology for the selection of members. Delegates have the option of viewing countries that have never had a seat on the Security Council, and those who have.

United Nations. (n.d.). *Security Council: Frequently Asked Questions*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scfaq.htm
This Web site contains answers to basic questions regarding the operations of the Security Council. Many of the answers contain links to other United Nations (UN) sites. This is a convenient resource for delegates looking for more in-depth information regarding the Council.

United Nations. (n.d.). *Security Council Sanctions Committee: An Overview*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from http://www.un.org/sc/committees/
Non-military sanctions are one tool used by the Security Council when it does not feel that the use of force is required or appropriate to a situation; however, also the use of force is a sanction that the Council may decide upon. This Web site provides an overview of the Security Council's use of sanctions. There are examples listed of cases where sanctions have been used. Delegates are able to access links to review further information about each of these cases.

United Nations. (n.d.). *United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf
This Web site provides facts and figures for empirical evidence of the results of the UN peacekeeping efforts. An overview of all current Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) led missions is presented. The effectiveness of these efforts is described with the high success rate.

United Nations. (2007, June 26). *Report to the President of the General Assembly on the Consultations Regarding "The Question of Equitable Representation On and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council"*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/267
As mentioned above, reform of the Security Council, while a continuing topic of discussion, is one that is not met without controversy. This report is published as an overview of the necessity for Security Council reform. Several discussion topics are raised, such as size and new members.

The author also raises the point of how reform to working methods and enlargement need to go hand in hand, and how they are linked to the access of non-member States. If delegates are wishing to delve further into the topic of Security Council reform, this report presents a strong, single-sided persuasive view.

United Nations. Security Council. 4572nd Meeting. (2002, July 12). *Resolution 1422*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/crisis/scres1422.pdf
This Security Council resolution from the 4572nd meeting describes the goals behind the UN peacekeeping missions. References are made to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute) and how this relates to the peacekeeping work that the United Nations is undertaking. It asserts the Security Council's powers in all peacekeeping issues.

Weiss, T. G. (2003, Fall). The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform. *The Washington Quarterly, 26*(4), 147-161. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn_weiss.pdf
This article is a debate paper about Security Council reform. The author presents many strong opinions about the effectiveness of certain models. Basic elements such as the veto power and membership are questioned in an effort to further the idea of reform.

I. The Situation in Somalia

Abbink, J. (2003). Ethiopia-Eritrea: proxy wars and prospects of peace in the Horn of Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 21*(3), 407-425.
This article outlines an analytical perspective on the proxy war phenomenon in the Horn of Africa region. It explains why conflict factors that caused the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict persist and calls for a stop of the underestimation of proxy wars by the international community. It shows ways out of mistrust by suggesting confidence-building measures and economic exchange.

Adam, H. M. (1995). Somalia: A terrible beauty being born? In I. W. Zartman (Ed.), *Collapsed states. The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority* (pp. 69-89). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Adam begins by a reflection on how clans came to be politicized in Somalia. He then analyzes the factors that contributed to the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990ies. The phases of the disintegration of the country are outlined and different scenarios of the reconstitution are balanced. The appendix provides a complete list of Somali political factions.

Ahmed, I. I., & Green, R. H. (1999). The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction. *Third World Quarterly, 20*(1), 113-127.
Ahmed and Green's essay first gives a historical background to the conflict between Somalia and Somaliland. It then critically assesses the results of UNOSOM, claiming that insufficient knowledge of the situation by the peacekeepers eased the warlords' task and disregarded the importance of "peacelords." On the contrary, Somaliland has been able to develop a national identity.

Amnesty International (Ed.). (n.d.). *Report 2007*. Amnesty International. Retrieved June 28, 2007, from http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Africa/Somalia
This annual report on the situation in Somalia addresses the pressing human rights issues of the country. It focuses on internally displaced persons, discriminated minorities, the ratification of the African Convention on Human and People's rights, as well as on the roles of the Transitional Federal Government, the Union of Islamic Courts and the response of the international community. It outlines how the rule of law is not respected via documenting the violation of human rights of journalists, religious minorities and women.

Bakonyi, J. (2001). Instabile Staatlichkeit. Zur Transformation politischer Herrschaft in Somalia [Monograph]. *Arbeitspapiere der Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung, 3*. Retrieved July 28, 2007, from Universität Hamburg Web site: http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/publ/ap3-01.pdf
The author starts by analyzing the role of the nation-state in globalization as well as by outlining why the post-colonial State bears factors of instability in capitalism. She then makes a case study

of Somalia with a special focus on past colonial structures as a cause of modern State failure. She concludes by stating that the first and the third world are interdependent in the solutions to State failure.

Bariagaber, A. (1996). The United Nations and Somalia. An examination of a collective clientelist relationship. *JAAS XXXI, 3-4*, 162-177.
Bariagaber's article focuses the likelihood of different explanations for the failure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). In his view, the mission did not fail only due to lack of means or the anarchy of the international system. Rather, he points to the relationship between the United Nations (UN) and Somali factions involved in the conflict. According to his perspective, the UN should not have positioned itself in a vertical situation towards Somali factions, but rather in a horizontal partnership.

Boulden, J. (2001). *Peace Enforcement. The United Nations experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Westport: Praeger.
Boulden's work is seminal in that it starts by outlining the juridical context in which peace enforcement takes place. Moreover, she analyzes the operations in Somalia from the UN's perspective without failing to use a balanced approach. Finally, core issues of the UN missions to Somalia are discussed: command and control, overdependence on the United States, the mixing of political and military goals, and impartiality.

Clark, J. (1993). Debacle in Somalia. *Foreign Affairs, 72*, 109-123.
Clark sees Somalia as an example for the failure of the international community to adapt to the changed security environment after the Cold War. After a short outline of Somalia's recent history, he breaks down the reasons for the failure of the UN to provide relief to the Somali people: he shows why some UN interventions exacerbated the conflict, and criticizes the lack of action due to an overestimation of simultaneous other international conflicts. He critically assesses the US relief process as well. Finally, a restructuring of the international assistance system is outlined.

Clarke, W., & Herbst, J. (1996). Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention. *Foreign Affairs, 75*(2), 70-85.
Clarke & Herbst evaluate the UN mission in Somalia and point to lessons learned somewhat different than other authors. After analyzing the nature of the mission, they shed a critical light upon the intervention led by the US by arguing the ambivalence in US leadership failed to address the crisis properly. Several dilemmas of such interventions are then highlighted: working with warlords and nation-building processes. Finally, three lessons are drawn for the future of humanitarian interventions.

Dehéz, D. (2005). Somalia vor der Rückkehr der Übergangsregierung – Eine Anleitung zum Scheitern äußerer Intervention [Monograph]. *Analyse des Düsseldorfer Instituts für Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik* , (18). Retrieved June 28, 2007, from http://www2.dias-online.org/Dokumente/analyse/DIAS-Analyse-18_10.2005.pdf
Dehéz analyzes problems that prevented IGASOM from establishing lasting peace in Somalia. He points to clan structures, the failed State, warlords and the role of neighbor countries. Finally, recommendations are made to the international community on how to assist the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and to embed the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.

Diehl, P. F. (1996). With the best of intentions: lessons from UNOSOM I and II. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,19*, 153-177.
The author looks at the two peacekeeping missions to Somalia and derives recommendations for future such missions. Among many others, he suggests that early warning be implemented and coordination with local actors as well as Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). He questions the utility of peacekeeping in a civil conflict.

Doornbos, M. (2002). Somalia: Alternative scenarios for political reconstruction. *African Affairs, 101*, 93-107.

The author balances pros and contras of the regionalist and the centralist approach to state-building in Somalia. The peculiarities of Somaliland and Puntland are analyzed. The problem is then put into two larger contexts: the context of the Horn of Africa and of the international community.

Grosse-Kettler, S. (2004). External actors in stateless Somalia. A war economy and its promoters [Monograph]. *Paper of the Bonn International Center for Conversion , 39*. Retrieved June 28, 2007, from http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper39/content.php
Grosse-Kettler investigates the causes of the establishment of a war economy in Somalia. She analyzes the formal, the informal and the criminal sector and how their inter-relations contribute to the stability of the war economy. In her conclusion, she outlines which measures could help the Somali people to get back to civil economy.

International Crisis Group. (2006). *Can the Somali Crisis be contained?* (Africa Report No. 116). Retrieved June 28, 2007, from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4333
This report of a crisis-focused, independent NGO gives a deep insight into the multi-faceted aspects of the conflict in Somalia. It includes a detailed analysis of the role of the transitional federal government as well as of the Islamist structures and the regional spread of the conflict. It makes detailed recommendations for all involved actors with a strong policy orientation.

Menkhaus, K. (2002). Political Islam in Somalia. *Middle East Policy, IX*(1), 109-123.
Menkhaus analyzes the relationship between Islamic activism and identity politics in Somalia. The goals and structures of Al-Ittihad throughout the 1990ies are explained and the potential threat of international terrorism finding a home-base in Somalia is assessed. Finally, the Somali answer to the "war on terrorism" is explored.

Menkhaus, K. (2004). Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia. *Conflict, Security and Development, 4*(2), 149-165.
The author posits Somalia can emerge with a new political order because of the dynamism of its security development. He looks at formal and informal network structures that organizations and people have created to adapt to the situation. He points to the catalyzing interests of businesses for whom crime and lawlessness represent serious threats.

Menkhaus, K. (2006). Governance without Government in Somalia. *International Security, 31*(3), 74-106.
Menkhaus examines the spoilers of the peace process in Somalia and suggests distinguishing between war, lawlessness, and State failure. Next, the state-building process is analyzed: its difficulties due to its protraction, the risk-management of several actors, its potential conflict-production, its low tax revenues, and its dependence on partnerships with other sources of authority. Menkhaus concludes by investigating the "politics of coping."

Mersiades, M. (2005). Peacekeeping and legitimacy: Lessons from Cambodia and Somalia. *International Peacekeeping, 12*(2), 205-221.
Mersiades analyzes the importance of the legitimacy for the success of peacekeeping operations. Drawing on two case studies in Cambodia and Somalia, factors influencing legitimacy are laid out. Recommendations for peacekeeping operations wanting to increase legitimacy are made.

Samatar, A. I. (1997). Leadership and ethnicity in the making of African state models: Botswana versus Somalia. *Third World Quarterly, 18*(4), 687-707.
Samatar explains why tribal conflicts are a consequence rather than a cause of recent political and economic turmoil in African countries. In a comparison of Botswana and Somalia, he argues that although Somalia had less tribal problems than Botswana in the beginning, the dominant elites used them to fragment the country and drive it into war, while Botswana has become a prospering democracy. After analyzing the transformation of traditional authority in both countries before and during colonialism, the misuse of the clan structure by politicians and economic leaders is shown for the case of Somalia.

Security Council Report (SCR). (n.d.). August 2007 Somalia. In *Security Council Report*. Retrieved September 21, 2007, from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.3041215/k.F6D2/ August_2007BRSomalia.htm
This Web site of a non-profit organization that strives to publish high-quality information on the Security Council's (SC) activities has monthly updates on the situation in Somalia. It includes expected Council action, key recent developments, options, key issues, council dynamics, UN documents, other relevant facts, and other SCR reports on this issue. The August issue highlights the necessities for both the TFG and the SC to reaffirm their commitment to AMISOM.

Tripodi, P., & Belyeu, G. (2005). Whatever happens to Somalia...ignoring it is no longer an option. *Low intensity conflict & law enforcement, 13*(3), 212-226.
The authors analyze the potential of Somalia to become a safe haven for terrorism. The paper suggests ways for the US administration to become more assertive and to stabilize the country. It concludes by supporting the crucial role of the Somali civil society.

United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 50th session. (1995). The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). In *UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*. Retrieved July 28, 2007, from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/ UNOSOM.pdf
The report is the outcome of a seminar held in 1995 with DPKO officials to discuss how peacekeeping operations can profit from the lessons learned in Somalia; many of those are still highly relevant today. It addresses the main aspects of peacekeeping operations: mandate and means, planning, coordination, reconciliation and institution-building, humanitarian imperatives, command and control, logistics and administration, accountability, public information, intelligence. It outlines the lessons learned in Somalia, which center around a clear and practicable mandate, the necessity of the political will of the conflict parties, a matching of mandates and means, more integration of measures and actors, better training of personnel, clear guidelines for disarmament.

United Nations. Department of Public Information. (1996). *The United Nations in Somalia 1992-1996* (Vol. VIII). The United Nations Blue Books Series. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
This UN publication is a primary source because it contains all the documents issued by UN bodies as well as NGOs relevant to the situation in Somalia from 1992-1996. Furthermore, the introduction by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provides a unique perspective of the heart of the United Nations in dealing with the conflict. Detailed descriptions of all the phases of UNOSOM I and II are made, as well as conclusions on the achievements and limitations of UN engagement in Somalia. Maps can help to understand the complexity of the multi-country deployment especially in Mogadishu.

United Nations. Secretariat. (2007). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia . In *Reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Retrieved July 28, 2007, from http://www.un-somalia.org/docs/ Report%20of%20the%20SG.pdf
The report of the UN Secretary-General provides a comprehensive overview of the main recent developments in Somalia. It also reviews the current situation of the security-related as well as humanitarian activities of the UN and the international community. It concludes by outlining operational activities to promote peace structured into nine different domains: reconstruction and development framework for Somalia, governance, judiciary, community-driven recovery, internally displaced persons, health, water and sanitation, gender, child protection.

United Nations. Security Council. 47th Session. (1992). *Resolution 733*. Retrieved August 7, 2007, from http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres733.html
The resolution calls for humanitarian assistance for the Somali people. It requests the Secretaries-General of the UN, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to contact the conflict parties to start talks on facilitation of humanitarian relief operations and the cease-fire. It sets up a complete arms embargo.

United Nations. Security Council. 61st Session. (2006). *Resolution 1725 (S/RES/1725)*. Retrieved June 28, 2007, from http://www.un-somalia.org/docs/Resolution1725-2006.pdf
    This recent resolution of the Security Council on Somalia, begins by recalling previous resolutions on the matter and placing dialogue at the center of the peace process. It then emphasizes the necessity of dialogue and adhering to commitments between the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts. It authorizes IGAD and the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia and asks Member States for their financial support to this mission.

United Nations. Security Council. 61st Session. (2006). *Resolution 1676 (S/RES/1676)*. Retrieved August 7, 2007, from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20SRES%201676.pdf
    The Security Council deals with the failures to comply fully with the arms embargo. It specifies the duties and reporting mechanisms of the Monitoring Group. It asks to consider a visit to Somalia by the Chairman of the Council.

United Nations. Security Council. 61st Session. (2006). *Resolution 1724 (S/RES/1724)*. Retrieved August 7, 2007, from http://www.un-somalia.org/docs/Resolution1724-2006.pdf
    The Security Council deals with the non-compliance with the arms embargo. It requests the Secretary-General to establish a Monitoring Group to investigate arms embargo violations. It calls for the Monitoring Group and the Member States to suggest and implement recommendations to make compliance with the arms embargo stricter.

United Nations. Security Council. 61st Session. (2006). *Resolution 1725 (S/RES/1725)*. Retrieved August 7, 2007, from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20SRES1725.pdf
    This resolution reaffirms the commitment of the UN towards the Transitional National Government. The Security Council decides to establish IGASOM. Finally, it asks all Member States to comply with the arms embargo.

United Nations. Security Council. 62nd Session. (2007). *Resolution 1744 (S/RES/1744)*. Retrieved August 7, 2007, from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20SRES1744.pdf
    The Security Council endorses the Transitional Federal Charter. It welcomes the national reconciliation congress. It decides to authorize the African Union to establish AMISOM.

United Nations. Security Council. 62n Session. (2007). *Resolution 1772 (S/RES/1772)*. Retrieved September 21, 2007, from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20SRES1772.pdf
    The Security Council stresses the need for broadly based institutions and welcomes the National Reconciliation Congress. It requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts in reporting about the situation and in furthering the reconciliation process. It decides to prolong the mandate of AMISOM for a period of six months and requests the Secretary-General to develop the planning for a UN peacekeeping mission destined to replace AMISOM.

Additional Sources

Adebajo, A. (2003). In search of warlords: hegemonic peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia. *International Peacekeeping, 10*(4), 62-81.
    This essay compares the "hegemonic peacekeeping" of Nigeria in Liberia and the US in Somalia. It analyzes the political and informational strategies of both peacekeepers and warlords. Finally, avenues for more multilateral, accountable peacekeeping measures are shown.

Bolton, J. R. (1994). Wrong turn in Somalia. *Foreign Affairs , 73*(1), 56-66.

The author analyzes the decision-making process of the Bush and the Clinton administrations in sending missions to Somalia as well as the talks with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that led to Resolutions SC/RES/794 and SC/RES/814. Bolton argues the United Nations asked the US to expand the mission from a limited mission aimed at ensuring security for UN humanitarian relief operations followed by direct retreat to a broader mission ultimately leading to nation-building without conceding that a more robust mandate was necessary, as the Bush administration requested. While the Clinton administration endorsed this shift, American casualties in Somalia mounted. Bolton questions whether peace enforcement makes sense under these conditions.

Dorff, R. R. (2005). Failed states after 9/11: What did we know and what have we learned?. *International Studies Perspectives, 6*, 20-34.
Dorff analyzes the perspective of US foreign policy on the linkages between failed states and terrorism. He shows that information on this relationship was known before the World Trade Centre attacks, but that the impact of this linkage on foreign policy after 9/11 is still not sufficient. He pleads for an acknowledgement of policies aimed at fostering legitimacy and good governance.

Mullenbach, M. J. (2005). Deciding to keep peace: an analysis of international influences on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping missions. *International Studies Quarterly , 49*, 529-555.
Mullenbach analyzes under which conditions third-party states will contribute to the establishment of peacekeeping missions. The post-WWII period is analyzed. The author shows why international-level factors are more important than state-level factors in the establishment of peacekeeping missions.

Reyner, A. S. (1960). Somalia: the problems of independence. *Middle East Journal , 14*(3), 247-255.
The author assesses the state of affairs in Somalia shortly after its independence from the Italian and British rule. After a historical outline of the pre-colonial times, he provides information on the land, the people, politics, and the economy of Somalia in 1960. In a short outlook, he argues why he doesn't believe Somalia will be economically independent in the coming years.

United Nations. (n.d.). *United Nations Political Office for Somalia.* Retrieved October 13, 2007 from
http://www.un-somalia.org/
"The Secretary-General established the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) on 15 April 1995, to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations and the States and organizations concerned." It will serve delegates as a very good resource, linking to a vast amount of reports, UN documents, press releases, etc. It is frequently updated and delegates will be able to access some of the most recent information about Somalia.

II. The Impact of Climate Change on Global Security

Ban Ki Moon. (2007, June 16). A climate culprit in Darfur [Editorial]. *Washington Post*. Retrieved June 17, 2007, from Lexis/Nexis database.
This article provides the Secretary-General's view on the role of climate change in exacerbating tensions in Darfur. According to this editorial, climate change is largely responsible for creating the ethnic divisions in Darfur that led to the current situation in that region. The Secretary-General calls for greater international cooperation to combat climate change.

Beckett, Margaret. (2006, April 17). *Margaret Beckett At UN Security Council Climate Change Debate*. Retrieved June 23, 2007, from
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1176454354972
In April, the Security Council discussed the impact of climate change on international security. At the time, Margaret Beckett was the UK's Foreign Secretary, and, accordingly, she spoke on the UK's behalf on the issue. In her speech, she urged Member States to take action and characterized the issue as one affecting global security.

Billions face climate change risk. (2007, April 6). *BBC News*. Retrieved August 29, 2007, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6532323.stm
*Published soon after the finalization of the 2007 IPCC report "Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability", this article presents the dangers of climate change for the general public. It
outlines the potential for natural disasters as well as exacerbation of conflict. Issues mentioned
include flooding, heat waves and intense storms.*

Caspian Sea Environment Programme. (2005). Background. In *Caspian Sea Environment Programme*. Retrieved
July 2, 2007, from http://www.caspianenvironment.org/newsite/Caspian-background.htm
*A source of general information on the geography, environment and political status of the Caspian
Sea can be found on this website. The website focuses on environmental issues, including climate
change, but also provides basic background information on the Caspian. This is a good place to
look for basic data.*

Caviar Emptor. (n.d.). *Roe to Ruin*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.caviaremptor.org/quickfacts.html
*Many around the world are concerned by the harvesting of caviar. This is a factsheet from a
website advocating a halt to caviar production. It contains a list of facts about caviar and the
history of caviar production, including references to further sources. This source is of limited use
beyond the facts presented in the background guide.*

Central Intelligence Agency (Ed.). (2007, July 19). Azerbaijan. In *The World Factbook*. Retrieved August 3, 2007,
from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html
*This source contains an overview of the situation in Azerbaijan. It includes information on
disputes with neighboring countries. Disclaimer: CIA World Factbook is used to obtain statistical
information only. Every effort has been made to avoid potential bias.*

Central Intelligence Agency (Ed.). (2007, July 19). Iran. In *The World Factbook*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html
*The CIA explains the situation in Iran on this web site. It includes information on disputes with
neighboring countries. Disclaimer: CIA World Factbook is used to obtain statistical information
only. Every effort has been made to avoid potential bias.*

Central Intelligence Agency (Ed.). (2007, July 19). Kazakhstan. In *The World Factbook*. Retrieved August 3, 2007,
from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html
*This source contains an overview of the situation in Kazakhstan. It includes information on
disputes with neighboring countries. Disclaimer: CIA World Factbook is used to obtain statistical
information only. Every effort has been made to avoid potential bias.*

Central Intelligence Agency (Ed.). (2007, July 19). Russia. In *The World Factbook*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html
*This source contains an overview of the situation in Russia. It includes information on disputes
with neighboring countries. Disclaimer: CIA World Factbook is used to obtain statistical
information only. Every effort has been made to avoid potential bias.*

Central Intelligence Agency (Ed.). (2007, July 19). Turkmenistan. In *The World Factbook*. Retrieved August 3,
2007, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html
*This source contains an overview of the situation in Turkmenistan. It includes information on
disputes with neighboring countries. Disclaimer: CIA World Factbook is used to obtain statistical
information only. Every effort has been made to avoid potential bias.*

Climate flooding risk "misjudged". (2007, August 29). *BBC News*. Retrieved August 29, 2007, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6969122.stm
*According to this article, climate change may create a greater risk of flooding than previously
thought. This is due to the effect of high temperatures on plants, which tend to both absorb and*

release less water. This in turn will tend to increase water saturation in the ground and create potential for flooding.

Energy Information Administration. (2002, July). Caspian Sea region: Oil. In *Country analysis briefs*. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from United States Department of Energy Web site: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Oil.html
This source contains a detailed estimate of oil reserves in the Caspian and current exports. Created for the US government and potential investors in the region, it is best used with caution to avoid bias. Nevertheless, it is a good source of statistical information.

Energy Information Administration. (2002, July). Caspian Sea region: regional conflicts. In *Country analysis briefs*. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from United States Department of Energy Web site: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/caspconf.html
An overview of existing conflicts in the Caspian Sea region from American perspective is presented in this source. It focuses on the potential of such conflicts to interfere with the construction of various proposed pipelines through the region. This is a good overview of the complexity of Caspian Sea regional conflicts.

HM Treasury. (in press). *Stern review on the economics of climate change*. Retrieved July 31, 2007, from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm
The British Treasury commissioned this report on climate change. It focuses on economic and development issues and possible methods of mitigation. Although limited by its economic focus, it still provides useful data as well as representing the British position on climate change issues.

Intergovermental Panel on Climate Change. (2001). *Climate change 2001: Synthesis Report*. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/vol4/english/index.htm
This source contains the full text of the 2001 IPCC synthesis report. The main source for scientific consensus on climate change, the IPCC report is cautious in many of its claims and does its best to include dissenting opinions. Despite this caution it presents a bleak picture of the potential effects of even a very small change in global temperature.

Library of Congress. (2004, December). Sudan. In *Country Profiles*. Retrieved July 31, 2007, from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Sudan.pdf
A good background on Sudanese history up to 2004 is presented in this source. Prepared by researchers at the Library of Congress, it focuses on internal disputes and international conflicts. This information is helpful in understanding the current conflict in Darfur.

Reuters. (n.d.). In detail. In *Darfur conflict*. Retrieved July 31, 2007, from http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/SD_DAR.htm?v=in_detail
This is a basic overview of the conflict in Darfur from Reuters. As such, it presents the picture of Darfur as perceived by the Western media and much of the Western public. A good source for basic data, this should be taken as a starting point for larger research for those delegates interested in the Darfur conflict.

United Nations. (n.d.). Caspian Sea. In *UN Atlas of the Oceans*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from http://www.oceansatlas.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0xMTYxMjcmNj1lbiYzMz0qJjM3PWtvcw~
This source is part of an ongoing project of the United Nations. As an atlas, this source provides geographical and environmental data on the Caspian Sea. It has good basic data, but little or no analysis.

United Nations. (1982, December 10). *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

This is the primary legal document regarding the Law of the Sea. It provides specific guidelines for the division of maritime territory and the settlement of disputes. It has not been used in the case of the Caspian as it is unclear whether the Caspian is legally a sea or a lake.

United Nations. (1994, March 21). *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Retrieved July 15, 2007, from http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php
Sponsored by the United Nations, the UNFCCC is designed to create a set of guiding principles for combating climate change and help provide a framework in which international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol can be implemented. It is also helps to present the UN perspective on climate change.

United Nations Department of Public Information. (2007, April 17). *Security Council holds first ever debate on impact of global climate change on peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers (SC/9000)*. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm
This source is a press release summarizing the results of the Security Council debate on climate change. Opinion was closely divided between those delegations favoring the use of the Council as a forum on climate change and those considering the venue inappropriate for a number of reasons. Those most in favor of the use of the Council were generally those likely to be most affected by climate change.

United Nations Environment Programme. (2007, June). *Sudan post-conflict environmental assessment* (Job No. DEP/0816/GE). Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://sudanreport.unep.ch/UNEP_Sudan.pdf
The full text of UNEP report on the environmental situation in Sudan, including the conclusion that climate change has been a major factor in the conflicts in the country, is contained in this source. Created primarily to assess the effects of the various internal conflicts which have kept Sudan unstable for most of its history, this report also considered the effects of environment on creating or exacerbating the conflicts in the first place. It is an excellent example of climate change having showing effects in the present day.

United Nations Security Council 5663rd Meeting. (2007, April 17). Letter dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. *United Nations Security Council 5663rd Meeting*, s/pv.5663. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N07/309/08/PDF/N0730908.pdf
The minutes and text of speeches from the Security Council debate on climate change can be found on this web site. This historically unprecedented debate took place at the request of the United Kingdom and included representatives from over 50 states not currently sitting on the Council. Debate was extensive and the meeting failed to achieve any sort of decision, including on the issue of the appropriateness of the Council as a forum for such debates.

Working Group I. (2001). *Climate change 2001: the scientific basis*. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from International Panel on Climate Change Web site: http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/index.htm
This is the submission of Working Group I to the IPCC 2001 report. This report focuses on the scientific evidence for climate change, including the most updated climate models. It also considers whether such change is natural or anthropogenic.

Working Group II. (2001). *Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability*. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from International Panel on Climate Change Web site: http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/index.htm
This is the submission of Working Group II to the IPCC 2001 report. This report considers the possible impacts of climate change on the global environment and on human societies. It also considers how adaptable natural and human environments are to the likely changes and which environments are most vulnerable to change.

Working Group III. (2001). *Climate change 2001: mitigation*. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from International Panel on Climate Change Web site: http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/index.htm

> *This is the submission of Working Group III to the IPCC 2001 report. This report considers possible mitigating actions which the international community can take to reduce the effects of climate change. These range from greater emissions controls to relocation of entire urban areas.*

III. Post-Conflict Peace Building

Abiodun, A. (2000). *New Issues in Refugee Research. The role of African regional and sub-regional organisations in conflict prevention and resolution. Working Paper No. 23*. Retrieved 30 July, 2007 from http://www.jha.ac/articles/u023.htm

> *The website considers the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in preventing conflicts. Since Africa is one of the continents with a very large number of conflicts this working paper is wholly indispensable to understanding post-conflict situations. The working paper provides a good overview of the missions taking place in Africa, which allow the reader to comprehend the scope of conflict on the continent. The working paper looks at the mechanisms involved in preventing conflicts. It also considers structural flaws of regional organizations in seeking to prevent conflicts.*

Annan, K. (2005). *Explanatory Note of the Secretary General: Peacebuilding Commission*. Retrieved 25 July, 2007 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/annan/2005/0417peacebuilding.htm

> *This note by the former Secretary General of the United Nations is invaluable for a better understanding of the Peacebuilding Commission, which emerged as an integral part of the United Nations institutional reform. The work of this newly created organization has come to be regarded as central to ensuring a process of peacebuilding in post-conflict areas. This note by the former Secretary General is highly recommended as it very succinctly lays out the aims and objectives its creators had in mind with the organization. The note also addresses the various functions of the organization as well as the Peacebuilding Commissions structure.*

Annan, K. (2005). *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. An Executive Summary*. Retrieved 7 August, 2007 from http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/summary.html

> *This Executive Summary is key to understanding the nexus between development, security and human rights and the contemporary debate relating to the topic. This document is highly useful, as it is easily understandable. Moreover, the document provides an excellent overview of the original and more detailed version of In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Despite its brevity the document remains highly informative.*

Annan, K. (2004). *The rule of law and* transitional *justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report of the Secretary-General. S/2004/616*. Retrieved 28 July, 2007 from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html

> *This document is highly important, as it provides vital information regarding how to strengthen the rule of law in post -conflict situations. Moreover, the summary of the report provides a solid overview of the issues later addressed in the report. The document is highly recommended as it discusses how the Secretariat of the United Nations perceives the issues and explores the way it chooses to present the topic to the Security Council.*

Attwood, D. and Tanner, F. (2007). *UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva*. Retrieved 29 July, 2007 http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-periodique.php?ref_periodique=1020-7287-2007-2-en#contents

> *The earlier parts of this essay are highly relevant to the topic, as they provide important background information about the Peacebuilding Commission. This essay elaborates on how peacekeeping operations increasingly involve peacebuilding aspects as well. In addition, the essay analyzes how the Peacebuilding Commission can work together with other relevant organizations in order to guarantee lasting peace and stability*

Call, C. T. (2007). Conclusion: *Constructing Justice and Security after War*. In Charles T. Call (Ed.). Constructing Justice and Security after War. p. 375-410.

This chapter draws a conclusion from all the findings in the book. The chapters analyzes post-conflict crime and violence in detail, with the latter being divided into social, political and ecnomic violence. Moreover, the section on DDR looks at past failures and successes. The section on police reform is essential for understanding the role the police the fairly significant role the police plays in post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, the section on judicial reform looks at how justice can be delivered to ensure peace is long lasting.

Center Strategic and International Studies and Association of the United States Army. (2004). *Apendix 1. Joint Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework.* In Robert Orr (E.d.). Winning the Peace. An American Strategy for Post–Conflict Reconstruction. p. 305-327.
This apendix is highly useful as it is a manual for undertaking post-conflict reconstruction. The framework for post-conflict reconstrution is split into three aspects: initial response, transformation and fostering sustainablity. The appendix provides a guideline for what needs to be done in most post-conflict cases. The table which considers these three aspects in relationship to numerous variable relating to post-conflict reconstruction, such control of belligerents, territorial security etc. This allows the reader to imagine different post-conflict scenarios.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (n.d.). *Peacekeeping.* Retrieved 28 July, 2007 from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/index.htm
The website paints an accurate picture of the nature of Peacekeeping, answering key questions about the scope of its mandate and the various responsibilities a mission is entrusted with during a peacekeeping operations. As peacekeeping is often the preliminary step to peacebuilding it is vital to comprehend the exact nature of peacekeeping. The official website of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations offers a quick and fairly informative insight into peacekeeping.

Diamond, L. (2006). *What went right and wrong in Iraq.* In Francis Fukuyama (Ed.). Nationbuilding. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq.
Diamond's essay is very topical and important for understanding post-conflict situations, as it shows the mistakes that were made in Iraq and highlights the components that are necessary for post-conflict transition to peace. The document is very useful, as it provides sufficient amount of detail pertaining the situation in Iraq. The reader should not be oblivious to the fact that each post-conflict situation necessitates a different kind of response.

The Digital Library of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (n.d.). *The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Benefits and Challenges.* Retrieved 24 July, 2007 from http://library.fes.de/library/fr-digbib.html
Published by a German think tank, this essay is highly relevant for any research involving the Peacebuilding Commission. The essay at first considers post-conflicts and outlines the problems that have emerged as a result. It also provides some vital historical background information about the creation of the organization. Moreover, the essay considers the possible strengths and weaknesses of the organization and difficulties that the organization may encounter in the future.

Evans, Gareth. (2006). *Building Peace from the Ashes of War.* Retrieved 26 July, 2007 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/topics/pbc/2006/0120evans.htm
The Baltimore Sun's overview of the need to build peace in post-conflict situations is incredibly useful. This article should serve as an excellent introduction to the topic. Moreover, the article is lucidly written and despite its brevity it is highly analytical. It is absolutely indispensable as it was written by the member of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

Feil, S. (2004) *Laying the Foundation. Enhancing Security Capabilities.* In Robert C. Orr (Ed.). Winning the Peace. An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. p. 39-57.
This essay offers some historical insight into various post-conflict situations, obliquely comparing them. More poignantly, the chapter explores in great detail the theme of security in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and seeks of provide a definition of what security entails. In addition to providing an overview about DDR programmes, this essay also explores the steps the United States has undertaken in post-conflict situations and the ways to improve security.

Flournay, M and Pan, M. (2004). *Dealing with Demons. Enhancing Justice and Reconciliation.* In Robert Orr (E.d.). Winning the Peace. An American Strategy for Post –Conflict Reconstruction. p. 89-102.
This essay explores in quite extensive detail the issue of justice and reconciliation. The first section of this essay reduces the components pertaining to justice in post-conflict recontruction to six aspects and provides a sound outline of the topic. Moreover, the definition of justice and reconciliation within the context of post-conflict reconstruction is highly useful while the section on International Courts and Commissions is integral for understanding transitional justice. The conclusion offers an excellent summary of the chapter.

Fukuyama, F. (2006). *Conclusion: Guidelines for Furture Nation-Builders.* In Francis Fukuyama (Ed.). Nationbuilding. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq.
This chapter of the above mentioned book provides an excellent summary of the various issues addressed in the book. The author looks at the key components of nation-building. The reader should be aware of the fact that the United Nations does not use the term nation-building. The author prefers to use the word peacebuilding, despite the fact that both nation-building and peacebuilding, consist of similar components. Perhaps, nation-building has become popularly associated with the invasion of a state and, then, the reconstruction of that state.

General Assembly and Security Counicl. (2000). 55th Session. *Selected Special Reports. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects. (A/55/305–S/2000/809). Compiled by the Special Representative of the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi, this is one of the most important documents concerning reforms and the future for peacekeeping operations. The report comprehensively explores nearly all aspects of peacekeeping operations. The summaries in each section make the topic easy to comprehen and provide a good overview.*

General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/54/1). (1999) *Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.* Retrieved 24 September, 2007 from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report99/postconf.htm
This document provides relevant information about post-conflict peacebuilding. In addition, it offers insight into how post-conflict peacebuilding was perceived and there were voices in favour of an agency that would coordinate the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, such as the current Peacebuilding Commission. Moreover, this document provides some important imformation relating to post-conflict peacebuilding in South America.

Grey-Johnson, C. (n.d.). *Beyond Peacekeeing: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Recontruction and Peacebuilding in Africa.* Retrieved 24 September, 2007 from http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2006/issue1/0106p08.htm
The representative of Gambia to the United Nations provides insight into post-conflict peacebuilding. The site provides some important information about various conflicts in Africa. Moreover, the site is very useful as it addresses all the key aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding, giving regard to the role the Peacebuilding Commission could play in that process.

Huefner, K. (2007). *Reforming the UN: The case of Peacebuilding Commission.* Retrieved 27 July, 2007 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/topics/pbc/2007/01klaus.htm
This article provides detailed insight into how the UN reform process evolved and peacebuilding started to become relevant. In the early nineties the notion emerged that peacekeeping would not suffice to maintain peace, but peacebuilding was actually necessary. The author focused on this idea and how it has advanced since then. Furthermore, the author alludes to various key events and documents that led to the evolution of peacebuilding.

The International Iowa Center for Finance and Development. (n.d.). *What is rule of Law?* Retrieved 22 August, 2007 from http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/Rule_of_Law.shtml
This website offers a highly succinct introduction to rule of law. The simple structure of the source, consisting of many small sections relating to the subject, makes the information easily accessible. Rule of law is addressed in sufficient detail for the purpose of this topic. The article

also considers the difficulties that are ecountered when implementing rule of law. Moreover, the notion of rule of law is considered in conjunction with development.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2006). *The rule of law tools for post-conflict areas. Mapping the Justice sector.* Retrieved 24 August, 2006 from
http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/trans_justice.shtml
This document explores different means and methods that can be used in order to implement rule of law. The brochure gives insight into the close nexus between rule of law and human rights. The introduction and conclusion of the document are particularly relevant for topic and, therefore, highly recommendable.

Orr, R. (2004). *The United States as a Nations Builder. Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* In Robert Orr (E.d.). Winning the Peace. An American Strategy for Post–Conflict Reconstruction. p. 3-18.
Orr's essay provides a highly useful introduction to the topic. The author considers the historical background to post-conflict reconstuction, in particular the role played by the United States in them. More importantly, in one section of this essay the author looks at the four main components of post-conflict reconstruction, succintly refering to each one of them in a paragraph. The chapter is going to offer the reader an excellent overview of the topic.

Saira, M. (2005). *From keeping peace to building peace: A proposal for a revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council.* Retrieved 28 July, 2007 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/index.htm
Saira's essay considers the changed nature of peacekeeping, looking at the various new aspects relating to it. Moreover, the essay advocates that the Security Council should be responsible for peacekeeping while a revitalized Trusteeship Council could be responsible implementing peacebuilding.

Sardenberg, Ronaldo. (2007, January 31). *Statement by Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations Security Council.* Retrieved July 26, 2007, from the United Nations Web site: http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/007d-rms-csnu-Post-conflict%20Peacebuilding-english-%200131_files.htm
Sardenberg serves as Brazil's Permanent Representative to the Security Council. As such, and because of Brazil's involvement in the Peacebuilding Commission's creation, his statement is an important indicator of the issues associated with the body.

Santiso, C. (2002). *Promoting Democratic Governance and Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of United Nations Development Programme in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.* Journal of Latin American Studies. Retrieved 27 July, 2007 from http://www.certi.org/themes/Peace_Building-Conflict.htm
Santiso's essay provides excellent insight into the topic of democratic governance and the impact it can have on securing and establishing lasting peace. The focus of this article is more on the issue of development and, as a result, the essay addresses peacebuilding at large. Moreover, the essay provides insight into post-conflict situations in Latin America.

The Peacebuilding Commission. (n.d). *The Peacebuilding Commission. Questions and Answers.* Retrieved 26 July, 2007 from http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm
The official website of the Peacebuilding Commission is highly recommendable, as it looks at the aims and objectives of the organization and provides some vital information. The information is clearly structured and presented in an easily understandable manner. In addition, the website considers the relationship of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Security Council and General Assembly.

The Peacebuilding Commission. (n.d.). *Membership.* Retrieved 12 September, 2007 from
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/membership.htm
This section of the website of the Peacebuilding Commission gives a list of all the members of the Peacebuilding Commission and the committee they belong to in the United Nations. Moreover, the official press releases provide some background information about the Peacebuilding Commission

and the vote outcome of the election in the General Assembly for the membership to the Peacebuilding Commission.

Training for Peace. (n.d.). *United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL).* Retrieved 12 September, 2007 from http://www.trainingforpeace.org/themes/civpol.htm
The website looks at how the role of the United Nations Civilian Police has evolved within the context of peacekeeping operations. This site provides an excellent overview of the United Nations Civlian Police and gives vital statistical data about the number of forces deployed in different mission. Special attention is given to the specific function of United Nations Civilian Police in Kosovo.

United Nations Events. (2003). *International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers 2003.* Retrieved 1 August, 2007 from http://www.un.org/events/peacekeepers/2003/docs/ddr.htm
This source looks at the functions peacekeepers perform. This website particularly explores some of the key components of peacekeepers: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.   The website provides some important statistics and alludes to the example of Sierra Leone.

United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo. (n.d.). *At a glance.* Retrieved 25 August, 2007 from http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm
The website provides a rudimentary insight into the the work of UNMIK. It illustrates some of the key functions of the mission. Despite not going into excessive detail about the mission, the website is highly useful, as it offers the reader a great introduction to the work of missions.

United Nations Police Magazine. (2006). *Building Institutional Capacity in Post-Conflict Enviornments. Retrieved 12 September, 2007 from* http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/civpol/civpol1.html
This brochure from the United Nations Civilian Police looks at the problem of insecurity and crime in post-conflict area. The article considers the role of the United Nations Civilian Police within the context of peacekeeping operations. The brochure provides some key statistics about the involvement of the United Nations Civilian Police, giving particular attention to the role of the United Nations Civilian Police in DR Congo, Timor Leste and Kosovo.

World Bank. (1999) *The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview.*
This brochure from the World Bank is highly useful as in the first section it provides definition of important terms relating to peace and conflict, giving due regard to the reconstruction efforts of the World Bank. Moreover, the brochure then goes on to explore the characteristics of post-conflict areas. Furthermore, the brochure looks at the lessons learned in the past and considers what needs to be done in the future for post-conflict reconstruction.

United Nations Security Council
Rules of Procedure

Introduction
1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Security Council (hereinafter, referred to as "the Council") and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Security Council Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the "Secretariat."
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her/his or her designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations, and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, "President" shall refer to the chairperson, or acting chairperson of the Council.

I. MEETINGS

Rule 1
Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time he or she deems necessary.

Rule 2
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Council.

Rule 3
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4
Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held once a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5
Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.
Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

II. AGENDA

Rule 6
The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7
The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9
The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

Rule 10
Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11
The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement on matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12
The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting. The provisions of rule 7, paragraph one, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Rule 13
Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14
Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting, which he or she is invited to attend.

Rule 15
The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

Rule 16
Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representatives shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

Rule 17
Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

IV. PRESIDENCY

Rule 18

The Presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19
The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

Rule 20
Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfillment of the responsibilities of the presidency he or she should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he or she shall indicate her/ his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19 or her/his duties under rule 7.

V. SECRETARIAT

Rule 21
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

Rule 22
The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 23
The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24
The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25
The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 26
The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 27
The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 28
The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 29
The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 30
If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 31
Proposed resolutions, amendments, and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

> *For purposes of this rule, all "proposals" shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.*

Rule 32
Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 33
The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:
1. To suspend the meeting;
2. To adjourn the meeting;
3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

> *As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council's next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.*

Rule 34
It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 35
A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

Rule 36
If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 37
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

> *If the Council considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Council according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Council is no longer required.*

Rule 38
Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative of the Security Council.

Rule 39
The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

VII. VOTING

Rule 40
Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

VIII. LANGUAGE

Rule 41
English shall be the official and working language of the Security Council.

Rule 42
Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the language of the Security Council. In this case, he or she shall herself/himself provide for interpretation into English.

> *This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.*

Rule 43
Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the language of the Council.

Rule 44
All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the language of the Security Council.

Rule 45
Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides be published in any language other than the language of the Council.

IX. PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS, RECORDS

Rule 46

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 47
Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10:00 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

Rule 48
The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 49
The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 50
Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives of the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 51
The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 52
The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official language of the Council as soon as possible.

Rule 53
At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a *communiqué* through the Secretary-General.

Rule 54
The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 55
The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

X. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANS

Rule 56
Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for