

# NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION



# NATO

NMUN•08

NATIONAL MODEL  
UNITED NATIONS

2008 COMMITTEE BACKGROUND GUIDE

[www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org)



WRITTEN BY:  
Benjamin Oppermann  
Daniel Leyva

18-22 March  
Sheraton New York

22-26 April  
New York Marriott Marquis

 NATIONAL  
COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE  
association™

Please consult the FAQ section of [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

#### NMUN Secretary-General

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#### NCCA/NMUN Executive Director

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#### NMUN Director-General (Marriott)

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## NMUN•08 IMPORTANT DATES

**IMPORTANT NOTICE:** To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

#### SHERATON

#### MARRIOTT

31 January 2008

31 January 2008

- Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March)
- Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET!  
(We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)

15 February 2008

15 February 2008

- Committee Updates Posted to [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org).

23 February 2008

21 March 2008

- Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early!  
Registration is first-come, first-served.

1 March 2008

1 March 2008

- Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to [eaton@nmun.org](mailto:eaton@nmun.org)

1 March 2008

1 April 2008

- Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail  
(See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions).

3 March 2008

1 April 2008

- All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$100 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$125 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline.

#### NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

#### The 2008 National Model UN Conference

- 18 - 22 March – Sheraton New York
- 22 - 26 April – New York Marriott Marquis

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2008 (Sheraton Venue) or 1 APRIL 2008 (Marriott Venue)

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 1 March (Sheraton Venue) or 1 April (Marriott Venue) to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active after 15 November. Delegates should carbon copy (cc) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment in the subject line (Example: GAPLEN\_Greece).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.
- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)
- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted. Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba\_U\_of\_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

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OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS:

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers (send only to e-mail for your assigned venue)	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org
Executive Director	eaton@nmun.org
Secretary-General	secgen@nmun.org
Director(s)-General	dirgen@nmun.org

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information



# THE 2008 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

New York City, 18-22 March (Sheraton) & 22-26 April (Marriott)

[www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org)

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Dear Delegates,

We are Daniel and Benjamin, the Directors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the National Model United Nations (NMUN) Sheraton and the Marriott Venue respectively. We both want to say how thrilled we are to be directing this committee this year. We would like to take this opportunity to introduce ourselves and give a few last words of advice.

Daniel is currently pursuing his Bachelor's Degree from the University of California, Los Angeles in Political Science. His concentration is American foreign policy, namely national security. Upon completion of his Bachelor's Degree, Daniel will attend graduate school to begin his PhD program in Political Science. This year will be his third year at NMUN, and the first on staff. Aside from education, Daniel is an athlete participating in both wrestling and cross country running.

Benjamin is originally from Germany, but is currently working in the European Parliament in Brussels. He studied European Studies, Political Science and International Relations at the Universities of Maastricht and Montreal and gained practical experience at internships with the UN in Geneva and the European Commission's Delegation in Tokyo. This year will mark Benjamin's third year at the NMUN and his second on staff. Last year he directed the Conference on Disarmament. Next to politics and history he is interested in soccer, traveling and languages.

Directing NATO was the first choice for both of us, so we are very motivated and very eager to meet you and listen to your ideas. All three topics are interesting and challenging and cover a wide sphere of matters related to international security and stability. They reflect on current debates and issues of world politics. Therefore we encourage you to follow the international media over the next months so that you are well informed about the developments related to the topics.

The topics for this year's NATO committee are:

1. Reevaluating NATO's Mission in Light of Expansion;
2. NATO's Role in Combating Terrorism;
3. Evaluating NATO's Response Force.

Every participating delegation is required to submit a position paper prior to attending the Conference. NMUN will accept position papers via e-mail by March 1, 2008 for delegations attending the Sheraton Venue and April 1, 2008 for delegations attending the Marriott Venue. Please refer to the message from your Directors-General explaining NMUN's position paper requirements and restrictions in this guide.

Please check regularly the NMUN website at [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org) for updates. Also, we strongly recommend the Delegate Preparation Guide available at the NMUN website. In case you have any questions concerning the issues at hand or the conference please feel free to send us an email.

Finally, we want to stress that since we are a small committee we hope to be having a productive, educational but also enjoyable session. We want to encourage you to approach your fellow colleagues in the committee with an open and friendly spirit. This is an excellent opportunity for you to meet young people with a very international and interesting background. We hope you will be able to make new friends and broaden your horizons!

Looking forward to seeing you in March / April!

*Sheraton Venue*

Daniel Leyva

Director

[nato.marriotts@nmun.org](mailto:nato.marriotts@nmun.org)

*Marriott Venue*

Benjamin Oppermann

Director

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## **Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2008 NMUN Conference**

At the NMUN Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in a respective committee has some impact on the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as Member States, some may be observers, NGOs or judicial or technical experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference.

NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. *The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.* In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim recreation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed one double-sided page (two single-sided pages is **not** acceptable)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after December 1, 2007. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.

2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: [positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org) or [positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org). This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2008 for Delegations attending the NMUN at the Sheraton venue and April 1, 2008 for Delegations attending the NMUN on the Marriott venue.**

**PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU\_Namibia\_University of Caprivi)**

*A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Linda Poppe, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or*

*Galen Stocking, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.*

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff uses the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation should submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 1,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

*Sheraton Venue*  
Linda Poppe  
Director-General

[linda@nmun.org](mailto:linda@nmun.org)

*Marriott Venue*  
Galen Stocking  
Director-General

[galen@nmun.org](mailto:galen@nmun.org)

## Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a maximum of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards.

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Delegation from (*Insert Member State/NGO Name*)

Represented by (*Insert Delegation Name Here*)

### *Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary*

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Racism and Racial Discrimination, and A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The State of Tranquility a proud member of the Regional Alliance of Peaceful Countries and a fully supports other regional groups in their efforts to coordinated a regional plan for sustained and sustainable development. In that regard, the State of Tranquility recognizes the necessity of ensuring the full realization of the Right to Development as declared in the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Final Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development. Tranquility fully supports the implementation of national development plans with the cooperation of regional organizations, the United Nations, and the international community. Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing the underlying factors.

#### **I. The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa**

The State of Tranquility believes that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic security lend themselves to the pacific settlement of disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. The lack of development in the region constitutes the root cause of political instability and conflict. The report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Recommendations*, if implemented, could enhance the work of the Organization in its efforts to bring about sustainable development in Africa. Tranquility also believes that the use of preventive development in Africa could ensure that conflicts such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be avoided before they erupt. While obstacles to be overcome are many, international support for effective national programs to ensure the relief to rehabilitation to development continuum through post-conflict peace-building, can enable Sub-Saharan Africa and the entire developing world to achieve the sustainable development which alone will guarantee regional peace and stability. The State of Tranquility fully supports the increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in all aspects of dispute settlement and peace-keeping. Increased support for such regional efforts, when combined with measures to eliminate the root causes of regional conflict, serves to further enhance the prospects for lasting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the entire international community.

#### **II. Racism and Racial Discrimination**

The State of Tranquility believes that the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance offers the global community an opportunity to establish an updated plan of action to completely eradicate racism and racial discrimination throughout the world. The necessity for all Member States to sign, accede to and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is an integral part of this plan, as policies and practices based on racism and racial discrimination remain devastating to regional social, economic and infrastructure development. Tranquility encourages all States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to provide assistance to those affected by such practices. The lack of financial resources that prevented the international community from realizing its objectives in the three previous United Nations Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination must not continue to hinder the international community in guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all peoples.

#### **III. A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**

The State of Tranquility remains firmly committed in support of the continued role of the United Nations Security Council as the primary agent for the maintenance of international peace and security, as mandated under Chapters IV and V of the *UN Charter*. We strongly recommend the authorization, determination, composition and financing of peacekeeping operations should be determined by the Council, as authorized by Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the *Charter* and in conjunction with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the State of Tranquility endorses the current role of the Secretary-General as administrator of the Operations established by the Council. The State of Tranquility remains a central contributor for both financial and logistical support of the United Nations Peacekeeping forces and will continue to contribute to the United Nations Peacekeeping Budget throughout the duration of the current year. The State of Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing all threats to international peace and security through regional arrangements and multilateral forums. The international community must address the underlying causes of these conflicts and the destabilizing effects of such conflicts on entire regions. Tranquility is convinced that increased utilization of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms can enhance the ability of peacekeeping missions to take into account historical, social, and cultural values and traditions within areas of conflict. As operation costs continue to escalate, however, our nation strongly urges all Member States and the Secretary-General to devote greater attention to the monetary and management aspects of peacekeeping operations and provide serious consideration for the establishment of operation termination dates. The State of Tranquility further supports the proposal endorsed within A/Res/44/49, calling for Member States to develop and maintain an inventory of supplies and equipment to be made available for Operations on short-notice. In addition, the State of Tranquility calls upon Member States to recognize the need to maintain voluntary contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to reduce the continuing problems incurred by funding deficits.



## History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

### *Inception*

NATO has its origin in the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> Plans for an organization centered around the question of how to ensure the security and safety of the North American and the Western European States had been developed before the end of the Second World War.<sup>2</sup> In 1941, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter in which they expressed their determination to seek a post-war peace which would uphold, among other things, the principles of self-determination, free trade and non aggression.<sup>3</sup> After WWII it soon became apparent to the United States and non-Communist States in Western Europe that the Soviet Union would become a threat to the security of both Western Europe and North America.<sup>4</sup> The forceful support of Communist parties in their occupation zone and especially the aggressive policy during the first Berlin Blockade in 1948 made the Soviet threat imminent.<sup>5</sup> In order to respond to the Soviet threat and provide security guarantees to each other, a number of Western European and North American countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C in April 1949.<sup>6</sup> The organization would be called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its founding members were the United States of America, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.<sup>7</sup> The inception of NATO marked the deep divide between East and West during the Cold War. The Korean War, which started in 1950, and the foundation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 formalized the divisions which were to hold for almost half a century.<sup>8</sup>

### *Mission and Structure*

NATO was founded on the common external threat of communism posed by the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup> In order to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against one or more of [the Members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”<sup>10</sup> Since NATO was created as a collective defense alliance, Article 5 is the “raison d’être” of NATO.<sup>11</sup> While the North Atlantic Treaty makes many references to the UN Charter, no UN legitimization is needed for NATO to engage on a mission.<sup>12</sup> Due to the East-West divide during the Cold War, a necessity for a UN mandate would have given the Soviet Union an indirect veto power over NATO operation.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, from its inception NATO was created to act independently from the UN.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, NATO Member States are aware of the fact that a UN mandate does indeed increase the legitimacy for their operations.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, attempts are generally made to achieve a UN mandate.<sup>16</sup>

NATO is based on multilateral intergovernmentalism, which means that “all NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries.”<sup>17</sup> As a consequence, there is no voting at NATO.<sup>18</sup> The main decision-making body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which is composed of representatives of the Member States.<sup>19</sup> Currently 26 States are Member States of NATO and therefore represented

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<sup>1</sup> Hodge, *Atlanticism for a new Century - The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p.3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Warwick & Woyke, *Die Zukunft der NATO [The future of NATO]*, 2000, p.23.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Hodge, *Atlanticism for a new Century - The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United - The Evolution of an Alliance*, 2004, pp.9/10.

<sup>9</sup> Overhaus, *Die Nato nach Riga [NATO after Riga]*, p.118.

<sup>10</sup> NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949.

<sup>11</sup> Warwick, *Die transatlantischen Sicherheitsbeziehungen und das Verhältnis zwischen NATO und EU - Eine Einführung [The transatlantic security relations and the interaction between NATO and EU - An Introduction]*, 2005, p.10.

<sup>12</sup> Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United - The Evolution of an Alliance*, 2004, p.2.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> NATO, *Consensus decision-making at NATO*, n.d.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> NATO, *The North Atlantic Council*, n.d.

in the NAC.<sup>20</sup> The NAC was directly created through Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and oversees all other committees or groups under the NATO structure.<sup>21</sup> Twice a year, the NAC holds meetings at the ministerial level, which lead to summits at which Heads of State announce decisions.<sup>22</sup>

At the strategic level, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is the head of the Allied Command Operations. NATO's Headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is in Mons, Belgium.<sup>23</sup> A variety of further military headquarters and planning facilities exist, including the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), and the Military Committee (MC).<sup>24</sup>

### ***History during the Cold War***

During the Cold War, NATO served as the security guarantor for Western Europe since it ensured the American presence in Europe, and guaranteed collective defense.<sup>25</sup> It was able to prevent the Cold War from becoming a "Hot War," since over the course of the Cold War no weapons were ever fired between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.<sup>26</sup> NATO has thus been called "the most successful military alliance in history."<sup>27</sup> It, however, still has had to deal with crises. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the NATO double-track decision, the German "Ostpolitik" and the armament race are but four examples of tensions.<sup>28</sup> While none of these issues was exclusively a matter related to NATO, they all reflected on the alliance as a whole since they brought up the question of how close in terms of common values and interests the alliance truly was.<sup>29</sup> In the end the common threat posed by the Soviet Union forced the alliance to come to an agreement and stick together.<sup>30</sup> After all, the "raison d'être" of the alliance always made the NATO Member States come to a common position, even on delicate issues.<sup>31</sup>

### ***Transition in the Post-Cold War and Post-9/11 World***

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union raised a discussion of the essence of NATO.<sup>32</sup> After all, the 1991 Strategic Concept acknowledged that "the threat of simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied Strategy."<sup>33</sup> Since the common enemy was gone, the future of NATO was unclear.<sup>34</sup> Next to demonstrating that the alliance still had a purpose, the 1990s Balkan Wars also reformed the alliance and institutionalized "out of area" operations.<sup>35</sup> It became evident that the new challenges would be of a "multifaceted" and "multi-directional" nature and would spur from instable regions with ethnic disputes.<sup>36</sup> To adapt to these challenges, NATO would have to reform itself.<sup>37</sup> This would involve, among others, a larger European burden-sharing, increased joint operations capability, and a definition of future tasks and goals for NATO.<sup>38</sup> The Balkan Crises had demonstrated the European inability to effectively operate in crisis regions and therefore ultimately led the Europeans to invest more in military and defense resources.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> NATO, *Enlargement*, n.d.

<sup>21</sup> NATO, *The North Atlantic Council*, n.d.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> NATO, *NATO Command Structure*, n.d.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Medcalf, *NATO - A Beginner's Guide*, 2006, pp. 160.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 2006, p.9.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Medcalf, *NATO - A Beginner's Guide*, 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1990.

<sup>34</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 2006.

<sup>36</sup> Medcalf, *NATO - A Beginner's Guide*, 2006, p.53.

<sup>37</sup> Hodge, *Atlanticism for a new Century - The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Grazioso, *ESDP and NATO Capability Generation*, 2007, p.5.

The terrorist attacks of September the 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 and the resulting US American-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 further led the alliance to rethink its purpose.<sup>40</sup> Some claim that the U.S.A. pursued a path more inclined to unilateral than to multilateral solutions, which is supported by statements such as the one by former US American Minister of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld who stated that “the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission.”<sup>41</sup> However, when talking about American unilateral actions, one must not forget that many European States actively supported the US, both indirectly by expressing their support, and directly by sending troops themselves.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, the shift in US American policies brought up the question about the purpose of NATO.<sup>43</sup> Despite the fact that NATO assumed full command of the ISAF Afghanistan in 2003, there is still no agreement inside the alliance on how the future of the alliance will look like.<sup>44</sup>

### ***Membership and Partnerships***

NATO has enlarged its membership several times. Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain joined the alliance during the Cold War.<sup>45</sup> After the end of the Cold War, NATO added several new members, with the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joining in 1999 and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joining in 2004.<sup>46</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has set-up a number of partnership forums to improve cooperation with non-NATO States.<sup>47</sup> To pursue this goal, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) were established.<sup>48</sup> Through participation in one of these forums, partner States like Russia or Croatia can intensify their cooperation with NATO, which not only helps to establish good and friendly relationships, but for some States also serves as a preparation for eventual membership in NATO.<sup>49</sup>

At the end of 2007, 26 States were Member States of NATO:<sup>50</sup>

United States of America	Italy	Estonia
Canada	Germany	Lithuania
Belgium	Denmark	Czech Republic
Netherlands	Norway	Slovakia
Luxembourg	Iceland	Hungary
United Kingdom	Turkey	Slovenia
Spain	Greece	Romania
Portugal	Poland	Bulgaria
France	Latvia	

## **I. Reevaluating NATO’s Mission in Light of Expansion**

<sup>40</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Rumsfeld, *Transforming the Military*, 2002.

<sup>42</sup> Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United - The Evolution of an Alliance*, 2004.

<sup>43</sup> Overhaus, *Die Nato nach Riga [NATO after Riga]*, p.118.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p.116.

<sup>45</sup> NATO, *Enlargement*, n.d.

<sup>46</sup> NATO, *Enlargement*, n.d.

<sup>47</sup> Medcalf, *NATO - A Beginner’s Guide*, 2006, pp.159-163.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005, p.29.

<sup>50</sup> NATO, *Enlargement*, n.d.

*...NATO enlargement will take place. Some new members will be adopted into that organisation. Whose security will that action enhance? Which country of Europe, which country of the world, and citizens of which country of the world would feel more secure?[... ] ask a person in the street whether he or she would feel more secure after the expansion of NATO, enlargement of NATO, and whether that person from the street would feel secure against the threat of terrorism...*<sup>51</sup>

## **Introduction**

With the changing dynamics in world politics, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finds itself at a crossroad for the future. There have been five rounds of expansion since the creation of the organization. In the 1950's, the Alliance expanded to embrace Greece, Turkey, and West Germany; in 1982, NATO expanded to include Spain.<sup>52</sup> After the breakup of the Soviet Union, NATO brought a united Germany into the Alliance; the 1999 expansion of the organization included farther Eastern countries including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.<sup>53</sup> In 2004, seven new Member States were admitted under the umbrella of NATO. The fifth round (2004) of NATO enlargement, the second since the end of the Cold War, was by far the largest, involving as many countries as in all four previous rounds combined.<sup>54</sup> This meant forty-five million additional Europeans are guaranteed the security, prosperity, and obligations attached to becoming member of the organization.<sup>55</sup>

Expansion not only entails extending membership to different countries within the Alliance's geographical area; expansion also entails a different mandate for NATO to abide under and extended missions for the Alliance to forego. There are numerous reasons to extend the NATO mandate. These include: addressing greater global threats; assisting in peacekeeping missions; and alleviating stress off United States (US) forces around the world.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, the Alliance must look at different ways to handle threats as they face far less warning time, but much more complex circumstances than a regular assault from a threat. This includes terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear proliferation, or ethnic strife.<sup>57</sup>

## **The Road for Potential Member States**

Enlargement is not a new phenomenon within NATO. Article 10 of the *North Atlantic Treaty* states, "[t]he Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."<sup>58</sup> Expansion of the Alliance was thus already perceived at the creation of NATO. Since, NATO has implemented various programs to assist States in becoming Member States of the organization. The major programs are the Membership Action Plan (MAP), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). States seeking to join the NATO are expected, but not obligated, to participate in the MAP to prepare for entrance into NATO, as it will forward the acceptance by the organization.<sup>59</sup>

### **Partnership for Peace Program**

The PfP Program, launched in 1994, is a major program of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries, representing a significant leap forward in the cooperative process.<sup>60</sup> Within three years, the PfP was further complimented with the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to replace the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and to build on its achievements.<sup>61</sup> This paved the way for the development of enhanced and more operational partnerships.<sup>62</sup> In essence, the goal of the PfP Program is to establish a working relationship with a partner country and NATO; the Alliance is then to guide that partner country into eventual

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<sup>51</sup> Putin, *September 11, 2001: Attack on America*, 2001, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup> Beehner, *NATO Looks to Expand its Mission*, 2006.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> NATO, *Expanding Security and Extending Stability Through NATO Enlargement*, 2004.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Beehner, *NATO Looks to Expand its Mission*, 2006.

<sup>57</sup> Ek, *Prague Commitment and Capabilities*, 2005.

<sup>58</sup> *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949.

<sup>59</sup> NATO, *NATO Enlargement-What does it Mean in Practice?*, 2007.

<sup>60</sup> NATO, *Expanding Security and Extending Stability through NATO Enlargement*, 2004.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2006.

admittance as a Member State of the NATO Alliance.<sup>63</sup> In addition to the help offered by NATO to the partner countries if there is a perceived threat, the partner country must also be committed to do the following: uphold democratic societies within the aspiring States; maintain the principles of international law; abide by the obligations under the *Charter of the United Nations* and *Washington Treaty*; uphold the principles of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the *Helsinki Final Act*, all international arms control and disarmament agreements, and to refrain from the use of force against other States; and to settle disputes diplomatically and peacefully, as mandated under the *United Nations Charter*.<sup>64</sup>

Aspiring Member States and participants in the PfP Program must furthermore ensure stability within the parameters of their State. For example, since the *2002 Prague Summit*, conditions were stipulated for candidate countries to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes by peaceful means before they could become members.<sup>65</sup> The ability of candidate countries to contribute militarily to collective defense and to peacekeeping operations would also be a factor.<sup>66</sup> The way the PfP is organized already indicates that aspiring to membership is closely related to goals NATO defines for its organization and beyond.

#### *Membership Action Plan*

At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO launched the MAP to assist countries wishing to join the Alliance; the MAP helps them in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and support.<sup>67</sup> It is important to note that MAP was not designed to overshadow the PfP Program, rather to complement it. Nine countries initially adhered to the MAP: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.<sup>68</sup> Of these countries, three are still in the process of accession into NATO: Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Alliance noted the progress taken by States aspiring to join NATO in the *2006 Riga Summit Declaration*, taking into account the goal of long term stability.<sup>69</sup> In light of this progress, NATO extended invitations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to join the PfP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.<sup>70</sup> This extended invitation indicates aspiration by the Alliance to extend their mandate in terms of membership to further the principles of the organization.

When looking to join the Alliance under MAP, NATO aspirants submit an annual national program on preparations for possible membership.<sup>71</sup> This covers political, economic, defense, military, resource, security, and legal issues the respective country needs to have address in order to comply with NATO standards.<sup>72</sup> States then set their own objectives, targets and work schedules and update them annually. At the end of the cycle, NATO draws up progress reports for the individual countries participating in the MAP.<sup>73</sup> Upon successful completion of the MAP, States can then be formally asked to join the NATO Alliance.<sup>74</sup> At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO extended the precursor invitation to countries upon their completion of MAP: “The Prague Summit was the occasion for extending invitations to seven aspirant countries. For the 19 current members of the Alliance and for the seven countries invited to join, the Summit was another historic step in the unification of Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea.”<sup>75</sup> After the initial invitation from NATO, the aspiring States became, as stated before, Member States of NATO in what was the largest round of expansion in the history of the organization.

#### *Role(s) of NATO*

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<sup>63</sup> NATO, *Expanding Security and Extending Stability through NATO Enlargement*, 2004.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> NATO, *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation*, 2002.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2006.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, 2006.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2006.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

Currently, NATO serves as the primary military Alliance in Europe. The *Riga Summit Declaration* reiterates the six missions NATO is currently undergoing in three separate geographic regions.<sup>76</sup> NATO looks to promote peace and security with those States affirmed to defending the common values stated in the original *Washington Treaty* and the *Charter of the United Nations*.<sup>77</sup> To address the changes in military standards required to keep NATO alive and performing well in a changing environment, the Alliance affirmed the Prague Commitment Capabilities (PCC) at the 2002 *Prague Summit*.<sup>78</sup> The PCC was created as an upgrade to the *Defence Capabilities Initiative* (DCI), which stemmed from the 1999 *Washington Summit*.<sup>79</sup> Additionally, at NATO's 2004 *Istanbul Summit* and its 2006 *Riga Summit*, the Alliance reaffirmed the goals of PCC.<sup>80</sup> In light of NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan, NATO stressed the urgency of acquiring specific capabilities such as airlift capabilities to enhance the strength of the missions within this framework.

According to Article 5 of the *North Atlantic Treaty*, an attack on one NATO State is an attack on all.<sup>81</sup> Only once in the history of the organization (the September 11th attacks on the United States) has this article been invoked by the Alliance. Instances such as those attacks show the need for growing change for the organization; NATO is no longer fighting a Soviet invasion into Western Europe as it did at its conception.<sup>82</sup> This confrontation with new challenges also drove NATO into Afghanistan; at the same time "the operation is a decisive test of NATO's ability to measure up to the threats of the future, but it is precisely in Afghanistan where the future for NATO looks rather grim."<sup>83</sup> At the 2006 *Riga Summit*, leaders from NATO's 26 Member States thus agreed to remove some restrictions placed on forces in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the NATO-led forces in the country.<sup>84</sup> Also in 2006, "NATO acknowledges the importance of stability and security in Afghanistan to Central and South Asia and the wider international community, and the challenging nature of security threats facing the Afghan Government", thus explicitly including these concerns in its own mission.<sup>85</sup>

Furthermore, NATO is helping to bring stability to the Balkans by leading a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in reforming their armed forces.<sup>86</sup> While Afghanistan marks a movement outside of the geography of NATO, the Balkans was the first indication that NATO no longer was only defending against a Soviet attack, but was involved in crisis management outside its traditional borders.<sup>87</sup> In Bosnia, the conflict was perceived "as a quagmire out of which the Alliance would never be able to extract itself, arguing that NATO should continue to focus exclusively on collective defense; however, since the 1995 *Dayton Peace Agreement*, NATO was able to intervene in the area and deploy forces in order to bring stabilization back to the country."<sup>88</sup> A United Nations Security Council mandate gave NATO the opportunity to deploy forces to help aid in the conflict in accordance with the United States and the United Nations (UN).<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw a number of firsts for the Alliance.<sup>90</sup> NATO shot down four Bosnian Serb warplanes that violated an UN imposed flight ban in February 1994.<sup>91</sup> NATO then launched its first air campaign entitled Operation Deliberate Force.<sup>92</sup> Operation Joint Endeavor (IFOR) was the first peacekeeping mission launched by NATO; later, IFOR evolved into the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR).<sup>93</sup> IFOR and SFOR became the models of peacekeeping missions, due in large part to their success, as indicated by the Kosovo Force (KFOR) being modeled after its Bosnian predecessor.<sup>94</sup> Since then, the Alliance was able to build up

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<sup>76</sup> NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, 2006.

<sup>77</sup> NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, 2006.

<sup>78</sup> Ek, *NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment*, 2007.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> *North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949.

<sup>82</sup> Gompert, *Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (And Europe Can Help)*, 1995.

<sup>83</sup> Lukyanov, *The Globalization of NATO: Prospects and Consequences*, 2007

<sup>84</sup> NATO, *NATO Boosts Efforts in Afghanistan*. 2006.

<sup>85</sup> NATO, *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*. September 2006.

<sup>86</sup> NATO, *NATO in the Balkans*, 2007.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> NATO, *Bringing Peace and Stability back to the Balkans*, 2005.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

its operating procedures to become an effective peacekeeper, developing invaluable experience in the IFOR to help them in missions across the world.<sup>95</sup> Another significant aspect of NATO's involvement was the cooperation entailed with the European Union (EU). In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, NATO formally handed over its peacekeeping mission to the EU, but left some troops behind to assist with the reform and activity in the Balkans.<sup>96</sup>

### ***Beyond the North Atlantic***

A significant part of the success of NATO in the Balkans was, in large, due to cooperation with NATO partners and non-NATO partners.<sup>97</sup> Among non-NATO partners was Russia, who led all non-NATO contributors with 1,600 peacekeepers sent between 1996 and 2003.<sup>98</sup> Other non-NATO troop contributors include Finland and Sweden, both of which had generals command sectors in Kosovo.<sup>99</sup> Most non-NATO countries contributing troops to NATO peacekeeping are participating in the PfP Program and come from Europe; however, several contributors are from other continents and had no formal relationship with NATO.<sup>100</sup>

Moreover, with the continued role NATO is enduring in Afghanistan, the Alliance has relied heavily on assistance from countries outside not only NATO, but well beyond the boundaries of Europe, namely Japan. Japan has been vital to the NATO led forces in the Balkans, and now in Afghanistan; it committed over US\$140 million to the States that comprised the former Yugoslavia.<sup>101</sup> Japan has shown support for the Afghanistan compact and reconstruction within the country by sending humanitarian aid, and providing such assistance as classrooms for the Afghan children.<sup>102</sup> Additionally, Japan has shown commitment to dismantling militia groups and illegal combat groups in various areas.<sup>103</sup> According to the Japanese Prime Minister, Japan's promotion of democratic values and peace is his indication that the two should foster a greater partnership with one another in order to maintain international peace and security.<sup>104</sup> Since Prime Minister Shinzo's speech to NATO in 2006, Japan has contributed US\$300 million in assistance to NATO's mission in Afghanistan to show further cooperation between NATO and Japan.<sup>105</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

There are a number of questions and ideas that tie into expansion. For example: assessing the Alliance's current role in light of a changing world since the events of September 11th; how to embrace enlargement via new Member States; how to include States beyond not only the NATO Alliance, but beyond NATO's European boundaries; how to emerge victorious for the people of Afghanistan? These are not the only questions to be addressed; any other questions or situations relating to NATO expansion can and *should* be brought to light in order to ensure the highest quality experience during the conference. Remember to incorporate your State's position on enlargement with an open, diplomatic mindset, as NATO is committed to peaceful resolution, even though it is a military Alliance.

It will be important for States to assess their countries' policy on enlargement. Has your State been adamantly involved with the enlargement process? Has it played a key role in NATO's missions? The countries that are currently seeking admittance should be evaluated as to their progress of meeting NATO standards; however, an evaluation, according to your State's policy, should also be included to see whether the standards currently put forward by NATO are able to be met not only by the current aspiring States, but for future States as well. Since Afghanistan is NATO's first, and most important, mission outside the realm of Europe, cooperation outside the Alliance, should be researched in order to bring greater productivity to the mission. While Japanese incorporation is an important issue, there are other issues related that should be addressed. Should NATO embrace even more States

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<sup>95</sup> NATO, *NATO in the Balkans*, 2007.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> NATO, *NATO in the Balkans*, 2007.

<sup>98</sup> Donaldson, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*, 2005.

<sup>99</sup> NATO, *NATO in the Balkans*, 2007.

<sup>100</sup> NATO, *Bringing Peace and Stability back to the Balkans*, 2005.

<sup>101</sup> Brull, *Japan's Diplomatic Blitz in the Balkans*, 1995.

<sup>102</sup> Erdmann, *NATO in the Age of Global Challenges*, Speech, 2007.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Shinzo, Abe, *Japan and NATO: Toward Further Collaboration*, Speech, 2006.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

outside their European borders? If any type of expanded role beyond Europe is set forth, would NATO cease to be a European Security Force, and become solely a global collective security force? Other ties to be looked at are NATO/Russia relations; Ukraine/NATO relations; and Chinese/NATO relations.

## II. NATO's Role in Combating Terrorism

*"In New York, Washington, Moscow, Istanbul and Madrid – but also in Bali, Casablanca, Riyadh or lately in Tashkent – a new breed of terrorism has shown its true face. A breed of terrorism which harbors no clearly identifiable political grievance; which tolerates no argument; which respects no national boundaries, political systems, ideologies or religions; and which threatens all of us—everywhere, and every day."*<sup>106</sup>

### **Introduction**

In the aftermath of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) saw a transformation of its role. The attacks induced a series of events that were "firsts" for the Alliance. First, the Alliance invoked Article 5, the collective defense clause, of the *North Atlantic Treaty* for the first time. Also, the Alliance conducted its first active military operation outside of Europe by helping guard airspace for the United States. On August 11, 2003, NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.<sup>107</sup> This was the first time NATO took an active role outside the borders of Europe. In addition to the role NATO took in Afghanistan, it created Operation Active Endeavor, which is NATO's maritime surveillance and escort operation in the Mediterranean. Active Endeavor demonstrates the Alliance's resolve and ability to respond to terrorism.<sup>108</sup> NATO also began to enhance cooperation with other States in the fight against terrorism. Included among those States are Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.<sup>109</sup> According to Robert A. Bradke, NATO has transfigured itself from their former role of protecting Alliance members against a possible Soviet threat; now, NATO has engaged in roles outside of Europe and moving toward more expeditionary military roles to meet new challenges.<sup>110</sup>

The role of NATO within the context of terrorism can be evaluated based on four key factors: the current fight against terrorism in Afghanistan; stopping the spread of weapons of mass destructions (WMDs); the measures NATO is taking in the realm of technology to combat terrorism; and cooperation outside the Alliance.

### **Afghanistan**

The primary fight against terrorism is within NATO's mission in Afghanistan, where the Alliance took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003. The ISAF was created not as a primary NATO operation, but rather a coalition of the willing under the *Bonn Conference* after the fall of the Taliban.<sup>111</sup> With the help of the ISAF, NATO looks to sustain peace and prosperity in the country; the Alliance also seeks to give Afghanistan a representative government, self sustaining peace, and lead it to a rebuilding process in order for the country to become self sufficient without NATO presence (or any other presence) for assistance.<sup>112</sup>

Two military operations in Afghanistan seek to stabilize the country: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the ISAF. OEF is a combat operation led by the US against Al Qaeda, primarily operating in the east and south of the country along the Pakistan border.<sup>113</sup> OEF is not a NATO operation, even though many coalition partners are NATO Members.<sup>114</sup> The OEF is in charge of different policing duties including a critical role in combating terrorists and insurgents; it also takes a crucial role in training the Afghan soldiers and military.<sup>115</sup> Duties include

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<sup>106</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism*, 2004.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> NATO, *Combating Terrorism at Sea*, 2006.

<sup>109</sup> NATO, *Interoperability for Joint Operations*, July 2006.

<sup>110</sup> Bradke, *US Initiatives at Istanbul Summit*, 2004.

<sup>111</sup> NATO, *Helping Secure Afghanistan's Future*, 2006.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Volker, *Why Helping Afghanistan Matters*, 2007.



intelligence gathering, counter-insurgency, and security operations; two thirds of the operations are dedicated primarily to training and mentoring.<sup>116</sup> There are 11,000 troops in OEF, including 10,000 U.S. Forces.<sup>117</sup>

The second operation is the ISAF, established by the international community through the *Bonn Declaration* in 2002.<sup>118</sup> One characteristic of the ISAF is the retrieval of weapons from factions around the State and securing them in government regulated sites.<sup>119</sup> To date, there have been 10,000 heavy weapons and around 34,000 light weapons withdrawn from public circulation thanks to the ISAF.<sup>120</sup> The ISAF is made up of 37 countries, including the 26 NATO Member States.<sup>121</sup> While the troop count is at least 40,000, that number is not too high considering the size of Afghanistan.<sup>122</sup> As a whole, the NATO engagement in the ISAF is a three fold process: first, NATO was taking initial control of the force; second, NATO established a civilian representative liaison that is responsible for ensuring the political aspects are taken out to the standards of the ISAF; lastly, ISAF is responsible for defense building, defense institution building, and security sector reform.<sup>123</sup> ISAF is lead by Article 1 of the *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, which states that “NATO acknowledges the importance of stability and security in Afghanistan to Central and South Asia and the wider international community, and the challenging nature of security threats facing the Afghan Government.”<sup>124</sup>

One of the key shortcomings of the ISAF is the lack of command structure and a coherent vision shared by all Member States.<sup>125</sup> There are a variety of areas where the Alliance States do not fully agree; some States are for instance equipped for both stabilization and combat, others are only equipped and ready for one or the other, but not both.<sup>126</sup> For example, Germany’s overall view is stabilization with no aspiration for combat.<sup>127</sup> This has become a problem because German troops stationed in Afghanistan stay within their Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) due to an apprehension of encountering armed conflict.<sup>128</sup> The US and Great Britain, have a similar approach with one another; both seek to be aggressive in combat operations. The US looks to the ISAF and OEF as a primarily counter-terrorism operation; it does, however, also take part in some economic development and political construction activities.<sup>129</sup> Britain has now vested interest in an aggressive counter-terrorism approach because of the influx of terrorists from south Asia which particularly endanger British soldiers stationed in the south of Afghanistan.<sup>130</sup> France takes a part in all three different points of view. The French troops are trained for both combat operations and stabilization operations; however, the French believe that Afghanistan must be able to withstand on its own without aid from NATO or any other State or organization. Unlike the US, France does not necessarily believe that a democracy should be established in Afghanistan, since there has been no historical implication that it can be sustained; instead, France seeks to merely install a “more representative and tolerable society.”<sup>131</sup> This indicates that despite the achievements of the ISAF, there are differing views within the coalition on how to best ensure success for the future and create stability in Afghanistan.

### ***Weapons of Mass Destruction***

NATO realizes the importance to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction for not only NATO States, but States outside the Alliance as well. NATO’s role in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) started at the April 1999 Washington Summit.<sup>132</sup> Since then, NATO has built upon the promises of the

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<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>117</sup> Feickart, *U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan*, 2006.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> NATO, *Helping Secure Afghanistan’s Future*, 2006.

<sup>121</sup> Volker, *Why Helping Afghanistan Matters*, 2007.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> NATO, *Helping Secure Afghanistan’s Future*, 2006.

<sup>124</sup> NATO, *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, 2006.

<sup>125</sup> Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 2007.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> NATO, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 2005.

*Washington Communiqué*, and has taken further measures in the 2002 Prague Summit and the 2004 Istanbul Summit.

NATO launched a WMD initiative to address the risks posed by the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery.<sup>133</sup> The initiative taken by NATO during the Washington Summit was to counter access to weapons, prevent proliferation from occurring in the first place, and if they become prevalent, to rid them through diplomatic means.<sup>134</sup> During the Summit, NATO declared that the Alliance would ensure international cooperation in regards to non-proliferation treaties and any other related international legislation as well as information sharing among NATO States.<sup>135</sup> The most important aspect that stemmed from the Washington Summit was the creation of the NATO WMD Center.<sup>136</sup> The WMD Center has the task of improving coordination of WMD-related activity among Member States; additionally, the Center strengthens consultations on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament issues.<sup>137</sup> NATO also introduced a five-step process to deter the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBCs). The first step is a joint assessment team, setup to evaluate the effects of a possible NBC attack; second is the creation of an analytical laboratory (which is readily deployable) to investigate, collect, and identify NBC agents if an attack occurs; thirdly, the creation of a registry concerning pharmaceutical and medical capabilities of NATO members for times of crisis; enhanced NBC training; and a disease surveillance system which collects information on the outbreak of diseases, fuses data, and alerts NATO commanders of unusual incidences.<sup>138</sup>

The Istanbul Summit introduced new and more effective efforts to battle terrorists from acquiring WMDs, including: improved intelligence sharing through the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit - which was established as a permanent NATO entity at the Summit - and a greater ability to respond rapidly to national requests for assistance in case of an attack with WMD.<sup>139</sup> Also, the Summit approved increased support for the CBRN Defence Battalion and saw the creation of the NATO Response Force.<sup>140</sup> Lastly, the Summit reiterated the commitment of Member States for strict arms control and ensuring the continuance of already existing non-proliferation regimes, and their endorsement of international legislation to combat terrorism and WMDs in the form of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty* and Security Council *Resolutions 1373* and *1540*.<sup>141</sup>

### ***Technology and Cooperative Efforts***

NATO has taken a promising role in the fight against terrorism, but understands the need for cooperation with other Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), the United Nations (UN), and States outside the Alliance to battle terrorism.<sup>142</sup> One of the main cooperative efforts refers to NATO/Russia relations to battle terrorism. In 2002, the *Rome Declaration NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality*, which created the NATO-Russia Council, singled out the struggle against terrorism as a key area for practical cooperation.<sup>143</sup> Furthermore, while the two differ in approaches, NATO and Russia share common views on both the nature of terrorist threats and how to address it.<sup>144</sup> The NATO-Russia Council seeks “to continue to intensify cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.”<sup>145</sup> In 2004, after the terrorist attacks in Russia, the Council met in an extraordinary meeting to strengthen and intensify common efforts to fight the scourge of terrorism in the form of an action plan to coordinate practical cooperation under the

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<sup>133</sup> NATO, *The Washington Summit Reader's Guide*, 1999.

<sup>134</sup> NATO, *Washington Communiqué*, 2004, Art. 30.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, Art. 31.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> NATO, *Prague Summit Communiqué*, 2002, Art. 4 E.

<sup>139</sup> NATO, *Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide*, 2004; NATO, *Istanbul Communiqué*, 2004.

<sup>140</sup> NATO, *Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide*, 2004.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>142</sup> NATO, *NATO and the fight against Terrorism*, 2005.

<sup>143</sup> Kelin, *NATO-Russia Cooperation to Counter Terrorism*, 2005.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> NATO, *NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality*, 2002.

Council.<sup>146</sup> In December of 2004, the NATO-Russia Council convened to enhance capabilities on both sides to act individually or jointly in preventing terrorism.<sup>147</sup>

NATO has also established a relationship with the European Union by exchanging civil emergency action planning inventories in the event of a terrorist attack.<sup>148</sup> The relationship between the European Union and NATO was reaffirmed in the *Riga Summit Declaration* in Article 41 which outlined the cooperation between the two organizations to ensure safety to all of Europe against terrorist attacks.<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, NATO has been working with the United Nations (UN) - especially within the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) - to foster cooperation between the two bodies.<sup>150</sup> This cooperation is shown by the CTCs endorsement of the *Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism* and other documents including *NATO's Contribution to the Fight against Terrorism* at the 5th high level meeting between the UN and regional organizations, the *Way Forward Document*, and the *Common Platform Document* from the Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management.

While NATO promotes cooperation to combat terrorism, the Alliance also understands that in the 21st century a new breed of terrorism has emerged. Because of this, NATO stresses the need to emerge with new technology to combat the new breed of terrorism.<sup>151</sup> NATO has evaluated areas where it believes technology can be beneficial to counter terrorist attacks. Among them are technologies to become less vulnerable to ground weapons such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) shot at aircrafts.<sup>152</sup> This effort is being led by Bulgaria and Greece.<sup>153</sup> Also, the Alliance is heavily working to stop the spread and use of improvised explosive devices to neutralize the threat of road side or car bombs against militaries or civilians.<sup>154</sup> This technology includes measures to better detect such threats, and significant progress has been made in the realm of stand-off detection by Spain and the US.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, within the NATO-Russia Council, the two are currently working on anti-terror technologies and missile defense to help counter the threat of a WMD attack; however, these issues are also cause of considerable disagreement between Russia and some NATO Member States, somewhat challenging NATO's approach towards terrorism and its partnership with Russia.<sup>156</sup>

### **Conclusion**

All three of the discussed sub-sections create a challenge for NATO, but can be analyzed and resolved with cooperation. The fight against terrorism is ongoing and NATO understands its need to continue the battle. While the organization was created to defend against a Soviet attack into Western Europe, the Alliance has (and is) making the necessary changes to strive in the 21<sup>st</sup> century against a new face of terrorism that needs to be assessed in a new manner. Additionally, the relationship between NATO and other States and organizations should be carefully looked at: What can NATO contribute to the UN? What does the NATO-Russia Council need to move forward with to stop terrorism? Lastly, the threat of WMDs is vital. Delegates should look at their State's position on the issue, and analyze their State's legislation regarding issues relevant to WMDs and the fight against terrorism.

NATO's role in Afghanistan is pivotal; the Alliance needs to ensure ways to establish a stable government. How to cooperate with other States, how to address issues of disagreement, and where to deploy forces (and what kind of deployment to take)? Each State should look at the differing roles of NATO Member States and attempt to reach a consensus to ensure the best possible outcome for Afghanistan. Additionally, the treatment of prisoners has become a point of contention between some of the NATO Allies. How best to address this? NATO's mission in Afghanistan is complex and it calls for renewal of commitment and re-examining of each NATO Member State's position and contribution.

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<sup>146</sup> NATO, *NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism*, 2005.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, 2006.

<sup>150</sup> Kelin, *NATO-Russia Cooperation to Counter Terrorism*, 2005.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> NATO, *Defense Against Terrorism Program*, 2007.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup> NATO, *Improving Capabilities to Meet New Threats*, 2006.

### III. The NATO Response Force (NRF)

*“The world is better off, America is better off, Europe is better off, when we work together.”<sup>157</sup>*

#### *NRF – how does it work?*

The NRF was created to give NATO the ability to deploy a rapid forcible-entry mission to respond to crises anywhere in the world.<sup>158</sup> It is composed of a single well-armed ground brigade task force, one or two tactical fighter wings, and a naval flotilla of eight to ten combatants with aircraft, cruise missiles, and other strike assets.<sup>159</sup> It can deploy within five days notice and can operate for up to 30 days.<sup>160</sup> Depending on the mission, the NRF is composed of up to 25,000 troops.<sup>161</sup> Since its purpose is to lay the ground for a larger operation later, it is characterized by the principle of “first force in, first force out.”<sup>162</sup>

The NRF is based on a rotational concept, in which a new national force rotates through every six months.<sup>163</sup> NATO Member States are free to volunteer to take part in the NRF, but it is generally seen as a prestigious, yet very costly, opportunity to upgrade the performance of one’s forces.<sup>164</sup> Prior to serving the six month tour as the NRF, each force is enrolled in an intense six months training program.<sup>165</sup> After the six months training and the six months in the NRF, the forces remain available for emergencies for another six months.<sup>166</sup> Thus, the entire period of serving in relation to the NRF is 18 months in total.<sup>167</sup> The deployment of the NRF is not linked to a UN mandate, instead, its main purpose is to carry out Article 5 (collective defense) or non-Article 5 (disaster prevention/assistance) missions.<sup>168</sup> As stated on the NATO Web site, the NRF can be deployed

“...[for] evacuation operations, [to] support disaster consequence management (including chemical biological, radiological and nuclear events), humanitarian crisis situations and counter terrorism operations; ... as an initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-up forces; ... [and] as a demonstrative force to show NATO’s determination and solidarity to deter crises (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required).”<sup>169</sup>

Like all NATO decisions, the NRF can only be deployed if the members of the North Atlantic Council reach a unanimous decision.<sup>170</sup> The costs for the NRF “lie where they fall,” which means that the country serving under the NRF at the time of a deployment pays all expenses and is not compensated.<sup>171</sup> This has been largely criticized since it basically created, as the Secretary-General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, put it, a “lottery” of who has to pay if the NRF is actually deployed.<sup>172</sup> Up until August 2007 the NRF has only been deployed in a few missions, which were mainly of a humanitarian character.<sup>173</sup> The NRF helped to protect the 2004 presidential elections in Afghanistan, helped protect the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004, deployed aid to the United States of America

<sup>157</sup> US American President George Walker Bush on transatlantic Cooperation, in: Meiers, *Transatlantic relations after the U.S. Elections: From Rift to harmony?*, 2004, p.41.

<sup>158</sup> Binnendijk & Kugler, *Needed: A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force*, 2004, p.1.

<sup>159</sup> Binnendijk & Kugler, *The next phase of Transformation: A new Dual-Track Strategy for NATO*, 2004, p.47.

<sup>160</sup> Meiers, *Die NATO Response Force und die European Rapid Reaction Force: Kooperationspartner oder Konkurrenten? [The NATO Response Force and the European Rapid Reaction Force: Partners or Competitors?]*, 2005, p.124.

<sup>161</sup> NATO, *At the centre of NATO transformation*, n.d.

<sup>162</sup> NATO, *What does this mean in practice?*, n.d.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>164</sup> Binnendijk & Kugler, *The next phase of Transformation: A new Dual-Track Strategy for NATO*, 2004, p.48.

<sup>165</sup> NATO, *What does this mean in practice?*, n.d.

<sup>166</sup> Binnendijk & Kugler, *The next phase of Transformation: A new Dual-Track Strategy for NATO*, 2004, p.48.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup> NATO, *What does this mean in practice?*, n.d.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> Riecke, *Strategiediskussionen in NATO und EU über die neuen Sicherheitsbedrohungen [Strategic discussions within NATO and EU concerning the new security threats]*, 2005, p.104.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>172</sup> Rühle, *NATO Gipfel in Riga: Mehr Hügelkuppe als Gipfel [NATO Summit in Riga: More like a knoll than a summit]*, 2006, p.111.

<sup>173</sup> NATO, *At the centre of NATO transformation*, n.d.

(USA) in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in 2005, and provided assistance after the devastating earthquake in Pakistan in 2005.<sup>174</sup>

### ***NATO Transformation: The need for the NRF***

Ever since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since 9/11, NATO has committed itself to a path of internal transformation.<sup>175</sup> In order to adapt to new threats and the given security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, NATO decided that it needed a quick force to intervene in crises areas within a relatively short period of time.<sup>176</sup> The concept of the NRF was brought up by then US American Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, at the Prague Summit in 2002.<sup>177</sup> After four years of planning and preparation, the NRF was announced as fully operational at the Riga Summit in 2006.<sup>178</sup> As the Secretary-General of NATO de Hoop Scheffer has pointed out, the NRF

“can be given ... a variety of missions: stand alone for collective defense or crisis response operations; it can support national authorities in managing the consequences of natural or manmade disasters; it can serve as an initial entry force for a larger or follow-on mission; it can show the Alliance’s determination and ability to act effectively in the early stages of a crisis when such a display can often serve an important role in crisis prevention.”<sup>179</sup>

As a result, some see the NRF as the “flagship of NATO’s structural intervention capability.”<sup>180</sup> Another key reason for the creation of the NRF was to close the capability gap between the European and US American forces.<sup>181</sup> As has become visible in the Balkan Wars, the US American military capabilities far outmatch those of all European armies.<sup>182</sup> While this has been a known fact for decades, it now becomes problematic since it poses a tremendous obstacle to successful joint operations.<sup>183</sup>

Since the USA is increasingly asking its European allies to “share the burden” of military operations and deploy more troops of their own, the ability to work smoothly together is absolutely necessary.<sup>184</sup> During the six month training period for the NRF, the national forces involved undergo a series of challenging exercises.<sup>185</sup> Through these training and exercises, the soldiers gain valuable experience with state of the art technology and equipment.<sup>186</sup> Therefore, by “rotating through the NRF [the national forces] meet these high standards, new concepts, technologies and the transformation of military capabilities spreads throughout the forces of all member countries.”<sup>187</sup> Next to improving the quality of the European forces, the NRF also contributes to an increased notion of burden-sharing in the alliance.<sup>188</sup> Since the NRF is meant to enhance the skills of the forces, it is obvious that US American troops only play a minor role in the NRF.<sup>189</sup> This means that especially small Member States, which previously only played a minor role, have the chance to contribute an equal share to the general performance of the alliance.<sup>190</sup>

### ***Other types of international intervention forces***

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<sup>174</sup> NATO, *What does this mean in practice?*, n.d.

<sup>175</sup> Binnendijk & Kugler, *The next phase of Transformation: A new Dual-Track Strategy for NATO*, 2004.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, p.46.

<sup>178</sup> NATO, *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Revjikaivk*, 2002.

<sup>179</sup> de Hoop Scheffer & Jones, *Press Conference on the NATO Response Force (NRF)*, 2004.

<sup>180</sup> Lindley-French, *The Capability-Capacity Crunch: NATO’s New Capacity for Intervention*, 2006, p.265.

<sup>181</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005, p.52.

<sup>182</sup> Lindley-French, *The Capability-Capacity Crunch: NATO’s New Capacity for Intervention*, 2006.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>184</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005, p.52.

<sup>185</sup> NATO, *At the centre of NATO transformation*, n.d.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>187</sup> NATO, *What does this mean in practice?*, n.d.

<sup>188</sup> Binnendijk & Kugler, *The next phase of Transformation: A new Dual-Track Strategy for NATO*, 2004.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>190</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005, p. 41.

The NRF is not the first NATO reaction force, nor is it the only one. The NRF forms part of the broad category of NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs).<sup>191</sup> However, the NRF constitutes the prototype of this force structure since it is much smaller and faster to deploy.<sup>192</sup>

Interestingly, the major non-NATO intervention force is composed of almost the same European soldiers that make up the NRF.<sup>193</sup> The EU Rapid Reaction Force, and its nine EU Battlegroups, form part of the crisis response system of the European Union (EU).<sup>194</sup> In 2004, as part of the European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP), the EU created the Battlegroups, which are based on a framework that “calls for two Battlegroups to be on standby at the same time during a six month period, ready to be deployed on two separate operations, if necessary. One or more countries provide Battlegroups following a rotating schedule.”<sup>195</sup> Being made up of 1,500 soldiers, the Battlegroups, which reached Full Operational Capability (FOC) in January 2005, are to be deployed within ten days after a decision by the European Council of Ministers, and afterwards are to be sustainable for a period of up to 120 days.<sup>196</sup> In contrast to the NRF, the Battlegroups have the narrowly defined mission of assisting and supporting a UN-mandated peacekeeping mission.<sup>197</sup>

### ***Is the NRF enough?***

While the NRF is meant to intervene in on-going crises, and eventually pave the road for future, more intense operations, it sparks questions of how to best reconstruct a conflict-torn area. The USA and NATO have learned that in order to fully succeed with their missions in Afghanistan and Iraq a civil and reconstruction component is necessary.<sup>198</sup> Some scholars go as far as to propose the establishment of a NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (SRF).<sup>199</sup> Such a force would, among other tasks, repair damage, restore electric power, and provide medical help before the arrival of a larger civilian reconstruction mission.<sup>200</sup> It would therefore upgrade the current NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan.<sup>201</sup> In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century there is the need for the “networked multi-tasked soldier, not the networked combat soldier.”<sup>202</sup> Thus, there can be no “going in” without a plan for “staying there,” which means repairing and reconstructing the region.<sup>203</sup>

The general need for a concrete reconstruction plan is not disputed among the allies.<sup>204</sup> However, there is disagreement on whether or not such a force should be set-up within NATO.<sup>205</sup> This question reflects the division of the Member States regarding the question of what role NATO as a whole should play.<sup>206</sup>

### ***NATO and the EU: Cooperation or Competition?***

As the specific case of the SRF shows, there are unanswered questions within the alliance. However, since both organizations are mainly made up of the same members, a long period of cooperation has existed.<sup>207</sup> Additionally, the fact that the NRF and the EERF are made up of almost the same forces makes it obvious that cooperation between NATO and EU is fundamental for a smooth functioning of both organizations.<sup>208</sup> However, to fully understand the EU-NATO link, it is necessary to analyze the process of the European military developments inside the EU, not just inside NATO.

Interestingly, it was the North Atlantic Council that initially sought a greater role for European forces.<sup>209</sup> Just after the end of the Cold War, when the USA started to adapt to the geopolitical changes, which implied a shift away from Europe, the NAC, in the Final Communiqué of the Brussels Summit in December 1990 stated that “a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European States, but

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<sup>191</sup> Deni, *Alliance Management and maintenance - Restructuring NATO for the 21st century*, 2007, p.1.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>193</sup> Lindstorm, *Enter the EU Battlegroups*, 2007.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Sweden, *The EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup*, 2007.

<sup>196</sup> Lindstorm, *Enter the EU Battlegroups*, 2007, p.13.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>198</sup> Binnendijk & Kugler, *Needed: A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force*, 2004.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> Overhaus, *Die Nato nach Riga [NATO after Riga]*, p.119.

<sup>202</sup> Lindley-French, *The Capability-Capacity Crunch: NATO's New Capacity for Intervention*, 2006, p.261.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>205</sup> Squarr, *Kooperation EU-NATO in Theorie und Praxis [EU-NATO Cooperation in Theory and Practice]*, 2007.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> NATO, *NATO-EU: Chronology*, n.d.

<sup>208</sup> Squarr, *Kooperation EU-NATO in Theorie und Praxis [EU-NATO Cooperation in Theory and Practice]*, 2007

<sup>209</sup> NATO, *Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Brussels*, 1990.

also help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity.”<sup>210</sup> Whereas some countries were in favor of an independent role for the EU, some Member States, especially the Atlanticists, which favored very close cooperation with the USA, in the EU, opposed such steps.<sup>211</sup> Since unanimity is still necessary within the EU to conclude decisions related to foreign and security policy, no concrete reforms could be institutionalized. A key break-through in this stalemate was the Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo in December 1998.<sup>212</sup> For the first time the United Kingdom (U.K.) gave up its resistance to an EU defense element.<sup>213</sup> In the final document of this summit it was acknowledged that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness, to do so in order to respond to international crisis.”<sup>214</sup> This agreement removed the last obstacles to conclude the ESDP.<sup>215</sup>

While the EU had already initiated its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the Maastricht Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) in 1992, it had cooperated in the context of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) since the Luxembourg Report in 1970.<sup>216</sup> At Maastricht, it was also decided that the EU should be able to support the so-called Petersberg Tasks, which include peacekeeping missions, combat missions in crisis management to ensure peacemaking, and humanitarian and rescue missions.<sup>217</sup> The EPC in particular remained of a purely declaratory nature, and both forums were hindered by the need for unanimity, which due to the Atlanticists’ scepticism meant that no ground-breaking reforms could be achieved.<sup>218</sup> After the St. Malo declaration it took only about one year, until the Cologne summit in June 1999, where the decision to launch the ESDP was made.<sup>219</sup> Six months later at the European summit in Helsinki, the EU published the so-called “Helsinki Headline Goals” which called on the EU to be able to deploy within 60 days a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) consisting of up to 60,000 troops for up to one year to cover the full range of the Petersberg Tasks.<sup>220</sup> At Helsinki it was further decided that the EU would only launch a mission if “NATO as a whole is not engaged.”<sup>221</sup> This was widely interpreted as granting NATO a “right of first refusal.”<sup>222</sup>

During this time, the EU also took steps to institutionalize the ESDP.<sup>223</sup> The ESDP’s structure was outlined at the IGC in Nice in December 2001.<sup>224</sup> The EU military cooperation was further enhanced through the establishment of the European Defense Agency and the European Agency for Disarmament, Research and Military Capabilities.<sup>225</sup> In order to enhance the capability of the EU to send forces to crises regions within a shorter period of time, the EU decided to launch the EU Battlegroups at the European Council in Brussels in June 2004.<sup>226</sup> Just like in NATO, all EU military missions are ad-hoc and have to be agreed upon via unanimity.<sup>227</sup>

In order to facilitate NATO-EU cooperation the decision to develop the “Berlin Plus” agreement was made at Washington Summit in April 1999.<sup>228</sup> This agreement allows the EU to use NATO assets in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of assets.<sup>229</sup> The Berlin Plus agreement stated that NATO and EU assets are “separable but not separate.”<sup>230</sup> The Berlin Plus framework established “a NATO - EU Security Agreement; Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO); Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO; Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities; Terms Of Reference for DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and European Command Options for NATO; EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an

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<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>211</sup> Meier-Walser, *Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]*, 2005.

<sup>212</sup> Ratten, *Joint Declaration, British-French Summit, Saint Malo, 3-4 Dec 1998*, May 2001, pp.21-22.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>216</sup> Schmalz, *Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1990-2004 [The development of the European Security and Defense Policy 1990-2004]*, 2005, p.45.

<sup>217</sup> Torpan, *EU-NATO Relations: Consistency as a Strategic Consideration and a legal requirement*, 2007, p.271.

<sup>218</sup> Schmalz, *Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1990-2004 [The development of the European Security and Defense Policy 1990-2004]*, 2005, p.45.

<sup>219</sup> Grazioso, *ESDP and NATO Capability Generation*, 2007, p.5.

<sup>220</sup> Torpan, *EU-NATO Relations: Consistency as a Strategic Consideration and a legal requirement*, 2007, p.275.

<sup>221</sup> Helsinki European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, 1999.

<sup>222</sup> Overhaus, *Die Nato nach Riga [NATO after Riga]*, p.194.

<sup>223</sup> Schmalz, *Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1990-2004 [The development of the European Security and Defense Policy 1990-2004]*, 2005, p.45.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> Schmalz, *Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1990-2004 [The development of the European Security and Defense Policy 1990-2004]*, 2005, p.52.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>227</sup> Squarr, *Kooperation EU-NATO in Theorie und Praxis [EU-NATO Cooperation in Theory and Practice]*, 2007.

<sup>228</sup> NATO, *NATO-EU: Chronology*, n.d.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>230</sup> Michel, *NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations*, 2007, p.2.

EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities; Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements.<sup>231</sup> In short, the EU is granted access to NATO assets if the North Atlantic Council agrees.<sup>232</sup> If this happens to be the case, the EU missions are planned and operated by the NATO personal at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) which is assisted by the EU cell at SHAPE, which was set up November 2005.<sup>233</sup> In order to ensure further improvement of relations between NATO and the EU, formal NATO-EU meetings at the level of foreign ministers have been held since 2001 and a NATO-EU capability group was created.<sup>234</sup> NATO-EU cooperation is most striking in the Balkans, where the EU has taken over the NATO missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.<sup>235</sup>

Nevertheless, severe tensions remain between NATO and the EU.<sup>236</sup> Through the accession of Cyprus to the EU in May 2004, the Turkish-Cypriot issue has become an obstacle to effective EU-NATO partnership.<sup>237</sup> Since Cyprus has no security agreement with NATO, Turkey blocks all intelligence transfer from NATO to the EU.<sup>238</sup> At the same time, Cyprus is trying to prevent a closer integration of Turkey with the EU. This “double veto” has led to a situation which many describe as a “frozen conflict.”<sup>239</sup> While both Cyprus and Turkey are not benefiting from the conflict, the issue hinders a more effective EU-NATO partnership.<sup>240</sup>

### *Different views on security: Can EU-USA cooperation work?*

One reason for cooperation between the EU and USA might be that “even in the post-communist world neither America nor Europe is ever likely to face a security threat that does not imperil the other in some degree.”<sup>241</sup> Nevertheless, in order to effectively cooperate in security and defense related matters, a common risk perception is absolutely essential.<sup>242</sup> Ultimately, it is true that EU-NATO relations reflect and are based on the EU-USA relationship.<sup>243</sup> Therefore, by comparing the European Security Strategy (ESS) with the US American National Security Strategy (NSS), one gets a better opinion on what Robert Kagan means when he states that the US Americans are from Mars, since they see the world like Hobbes as a chaotic place which can best be ordered by force and power, and the Europeans are from Venus since they believe in the Kant’s vision of a perpetual peace which can only be created through rules, laws and order.<sup>244</sup> While one might disagree with Kagan’s final conclusion, many share his viewpoint that the EU and the USA have a different perception of the world and how to deal with crises.<sup>245</sup> An analysis of the respective security strategies therefore is useful to clarify the EU and US American position. While the ESS, which was published in Brussels in December 2003, analyzes the challenges of today more as a global responsibility requiring a joint global effort, the NSS is focused on a USA-led alliance against terrorism.<sup>246</sup> As the NSS reads “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.”<sup>247</sup> While the ESS also refers to the struggle against terrorism, in contrast to the NSS, it does not see Europe in a state of war against it.<sup>248</sup> Next to focusing on destroying terrorist networks, communication and financing, which is a center part of the NSS and which is based on the US American perception “that our best defense is a good offense,” the EU is following a wider approach.<sup>249</sup> The ESS sees terrorism as a result of a variety of factors - in this context, the EU views the issues of poverty, hunger, diseases and competition for natural resources as directly interlinked with the struggle against terrorism. As the ESS states, terrorism is a result of “the pressure of modernization, cultural, social and political crisis and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.”<sup>250</sup> Thus, an all encompassing picture of the world security is created.<sup>251</sup> Whereas the NSS is said to be based more on a unilateralist point of view, the EU sees itself as a

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<sup>231</sup> NATO – SHAPE, *Berlin Plus Agreement*, n.d.

<sup>232</sup> Michel, *NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations*, 2007.

<sup>233</sup> NATO – SHAPE, *Berlin Plus agreement*, n.d.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>235</sup> Krieger, *Common European Defense: Competition or Compatibility with NATO?*, 2007, p.285.

<sup>236</sup> Grazioso, *ESDP and NATO Capability Generation*, 2007.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>238</sup> Squarr, *Kooperation EU-NATO in Theorie und Praxis [EU-NATO Cooperation in Theory and Practice]*, 2007.

<sup>239</sup> Hofmann & Reynolds, *Die EU-NATO Beziehungen [The EU-NATO Relations]*, 2007, p.1.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>241</sup> The Economist, *The Future of NATO - A time to rebuild*, 2004, p.16.

<sup>242</sup> Hofmann & Reynolds, *Die EU-NATO Beziehungen [The EU-NATO Relations]*, 2007, p.1

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>244</sup> Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, 2003, p.1.

<sup>245</sup> Hofmann & Reynolds, *Die EU-NATO Beziehungen [The EU-NATO Relations]*, 2007.

<sup>246</sup> Dembinski, *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU von “Berlin” zu “Berlin Plus”: Konzepte und Konfliktlinien [The NATO-EU relations from “Berlin” to “Berlin Plus”: Theories and Conflicts]*, 2005, p.84.

<sup>247</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002, p.1.

<sup>248</sup> Aledo, *Siamese Twins: NATO, the EU and collective defense*, 2007.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>250</sup> Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe In A Better World - European Security Strategy*, 2003, p.4.

<sup>251</sup> Grazioso, *ESDP and NATO Capability Generation*, 2007, p. 6.



part of an interconnected multipolar world.<sup>252</sup> In this regard it is important to recall what this says about the role that allies play for the USA and the EU. In order to reach the final objectives of the strategies, some claim that the NSS does not view the cooperation with allies as fundamental as the EU does.<sup>253</sup>

The differences between the USA and EU position become even more apparent when looking at the section regarding the pre-emptive use of force.<sup>254</sup> As laid down in the NSS, the USA will engage in pre-emptive self-defense based on a unilateral decision that an attack is imminent.<sup>255</sup> However, as criticized by the Europeans, the USA has established no clear criteria when such a situation arises.<sup>256</sup> Thus, as Joseph Nye criticized, the USA is ultimately acting as “prosecutor, judge and executioner.”<sup>257</sup> The roots of this situation have to be analyzed. In the end, both the EU and the USA are interested in the same outcome, and thus a solution simply has to be found how to reach this outcome<sup>258</sup>. For this to happen, however, the Europeans need to find a common position themselves.<sup>259</sup> As the crisis before the Iraq war showed, European countries themselves often have fundamental differences regarding the use of force and their relationship with the USA.<sup>260</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The issue of the NRF has spurred a general debate about the future of the alliance. It has become clear that cooperation between the EU and NATO, and the Member States that are members of both organizations is deemed by some as an absolute necessity in order to achieve a satisfactory output. However, as demonstrated, many obstacles remain. A main obstacle certainly is the different level of military spending. While the USA is investing huge sums of its GDP in defense, military and armament research related matters, its European counterparts are rather passive in this area. The European States only invest roughly two percent of their GDP in defense.<sup>261</sup> This is only a small figure compared to the US American investments of over \$626 billion in 2007, which accounts for over 43 percent of the worldwide military spending.<sup>262</sup> Over the years, this development led to an unbalanced share of responsibilities and tasks within NATO. As a consequence, the USA, especially after the end of the Cold War, has demanded a larger burden-sharing from its European allies. The NRF plays one part in this demand since it increases the abilities of the European forces and makes future joint operations possible. It therefore serves as a means for the European states to upgrade their military. For some EU Members States the EU seems to be the right forum to proceed with this upgrade. However, in the future, new agreements have to be found between the EU and NATO but especially among the European States about what kind of EU and NATO they want to be a part of.

The divergence of views among the States that are both a member of NATO and the EU about the role of the NRF and eventual reconstruction groups certainly needs to be overcome. While certain countries favor the establishment of a more civil orientated force under NATO, some countries strictly oppose this. The crises in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that in order to install long lasting peace and stability more than a superior military is needed. The proposed Reconstruction Force is therefore an interesting idea that needs to be considered among the allies. If Member States oppose such a force, for whatever reasons, they should still engage in a constructive dialogue on how to ensure a long-term success of NATO and EU missions. It is apparent that neither organization can ultimately afford to see the other fail.<sup>263</sup> However, for a functional cooperation between the two, fundamental questions have to be answered. How shall the future divisions of tasks between NATO and the EU look like? How to reach a satisfactory level of independence for the EU ESDP from US American assets while simultaneously guaranteeing smooth EU-NATO relations without any unnecessary duplication? These questions are directly linked to the issue of the NRF and whether or not a new complementary force is desirable. It has to be asked whether NATO shall simply remain a military alliance. Thus, the question is, how can NATO operations ensure a smoother transit to stability, how can reconstruction efforts be incorporated into NATO missions? Shall NATO set-up a Stabilization and Reconstruction Force? How to arrange the financing of such a force and how to set-up a better financing system for the NRF? This ultimately brings up the question how the EU and NATO can improve their cooperation? Is there a need for an updated “Berlin Plus” agreement? Can the European and American partners agree on a common all-encompassing long-term strategy? How shall the future division of tasks between NATO and EU look like? What role shall UN legitimization play for future NATO operations?

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<sup>252</sup> Dembinski, *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU von “Berlin” zu “Berlin Plus”: Konzepte und Konfliktlinien [The NATO-EU relations from “Berlin” to “Berlin Plus”: Theories and Conflicts]*, 2005, p.84.

<sup>253</sup> Aledo, *Siamese Twins: NATO, the EU and collective defense*, 2007.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>255</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002.

<sup>256</sup> Nye, *Der ungeschickte Hegemon [The clumsy hegemon]*, 2003, p.11.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>259</sup> Schmalz, *Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1990-2004 [The development of the European Security and Defense Policy 1990-2004]*, 2005.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12.

<sup>262</sup> Global Issues, *World Military Spending*, 2007.

<sup>263</sup> Michel, *NATO-EU cooperation in operations*, 2007, p.4.

## Annotated Bibliography

### *History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*. (1991, November). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>

*After the end of the Cold War the alliance had to redefine its purpose and role in the world. Through passing this New Strategic Concept NATO tried to do this in a comprehensive manner. By reading the document one gets a good understanding of how complicated it is to reform and modify a complex organization like NATO.*

*Consensus decision-making at NATO*. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html>

*NATO is an organization based on consensus decision-making. This article from the NATO Web site lays out the decision-making progress within NATO. Understanding the decision-making progress inside NATO is crucial to understanding the complexity behind NATO's decisions.*

*Enlargement*. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/evolution.html>

*Throughout its history NATO was enlarged several times. It is important to know which country is a Member State of NATO in order to understand the complexity behind the EU-USA and NATO-EU relations. While most EU Member States are also a Member State of NATO, several countries like Austria or Sweden remain neutral and are not Member States of NATO.*

Grazioso, A. (2007, February). ESDP and NATO Capability Generation. *NATO Research Paper, 31*, 5-6. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Defense College, Rome Web site:

[http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp\\_31.pdf](http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_31.pdf)

*ESDP and NATO assets are widely connected. As this article proves, without NATO assets ESDP missions are often unthinkable since the reliance on NATO assets is a prerequisite for most missions. This highlights the importance of good NATO-EU relations.*

Hudge, C. (2005). *Atlanticism for a new Century - The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO*. New Jersey: Pearson.

*This article demonstrates the difficult position that NATO is currently in. By analyzing the past developments, it becomes clear that NATO has undergone a tremendous period of change. However, despite the reforms in the past a large number of challenges remain.*

Kaplan, L. (2004). *NATO Divided, NATO United - The Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

*In his book, Kaplan lays out the different periods of NATO's history. It becomes clear that intense debates were held within NATO and that many disputes existed among the Allies. To know the history of NATO is important in order to be able to judge the future path and the transition process of NATO.*

Medcalf, J. (2006). *NATO - A Beginner's Guide*. Oxford: One World Publications.

*This book provides an excellent overview over the development of NATO. An in-depth analyze of every period of NATO's history is provided. Despite the title of the book, the book is quite demanding and is addressed at experts of NATO who are keen on finding new information and insights about the alliance.*

Meier-Walser, R. (Ed.). (2004). Die Transformation der NATO - Zukunftsrelevanz, Entwicklungsperspektiven und Reformstrategien [The transformation of NATO - Relevance for the future, development perspectives and reform strategies]. *Hans Seidel Stiftung, Aktuelle Analysen [Recent studies]*, (34).

*The horrible events of September the 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 have not only changed the world, but have also left a deep imprint on NATO. This book explains how exactly the alliance has reacted and what reforms it must further undertake in order to have a purpose in the future. It thus provides a good overview of overview of past and possible future NATO actions.*

Michel, L. (2007, February). NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations. *NATO Research Paper*, 31, 2-5.  
*A consequence of the ESDP was that the EU was able to take over its mission from NATO. In the Balkans various NATO military mission were transformed into EU police and other missions. This article provides a good overview of how this cooperation works in practice and thus demonstrates how the "Berlin Plus" framework functions.*

Overhaus, M. (2007). Die NATO nach Riga [NATO after Riga]. *Internationale Politik* [International Politics], 62(1), 116-121.

*The Riga Summit in 2006 showed that the alliance itself is uncertain about its future track. While many problems exist, little solutions were found at the summit. Therefore, as the article lies out, NATO States should engage in a process of comprehensive discussion to come up with a new strategic reform process.*

*NATO command structure.* (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site:

[http://www.nato.int/issues/military\\_structure/command/index-e.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/military_structure/command/index-e.html)

*Since NATO is a military organization, it not only has the political forum of the NAC, but also a clear military structure. It is important to be aware of the complex structure when making judgments about future or past missions, or when one analyzes the possibilities for eventual future missions. Knowledge about the command structure is furthermore vital for analyzing the performance of combat operations.*

*The North Atlantic Council.* (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/nac/index.html>

*The NAC is NATO's main decision-making body. Thus, it is of fundamental importance to be familiar with its working method if one wants to discuss and analyze NATO. All NATO Member States are represented in the NAC.*

*The North Atlantic Treaty.* (1949, April 4). Retrieved August 6, 2007, from NATO Web site:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

*The North Atlantic Treaty founded NATO. It laid out the core purpose of NATO, which is still valid today. Of major importance is Article 5, which constitutes the collective defense mechanism of NATO.*

Rumsfeld, D. (2002, May/). Transforming the Military . *Foreign Affairs*, 81(3). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from Foreign Affairs database: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020501faessay8140/donald-h-rumsfeld/transforming-the-military.html>

*Donald Rumsfeld, the former US American Secretary of Defense, describes the position of the Bush administration after the period of 9-11. The US American position to establish a so-called "coalition of the willing" led to a huge crisis within NATO and brought up the question of the purpose of NATO. Since this issue is still not resolved today, it still has a high relevance for current and future operations.*

Varwick, J. (2005). Die transatlantischen Sicherheitsbeziehungen und das Verhältnis zwischen NATO und EU - Eine Einführung [The transatlantic security relations and the interaction between NATO and EU - An Introduction]. In J. Varwick (Ed.), *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU - Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalität?* [The NATO-EU relations - Partnership, Competition, Rivalry?]. Opladen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

*This article provides a good introduction about the transatlantic security cooperation. By focusing among others on the different security strategies, it becomes clear that many obstacles remain. It is therefore obvious that long rounds of discussions and negotiations are still needed in order for Europe and the USA to effectively cooperate and improve their respective security environments.*

Warwick, J., & Woyke, W. (2000). *Die Zukunft der NATO* [The future of NATO]. Opladen, Germany: Leske & Budrich.

*Interestingly, this book was written in the period before 9-11. Nevertheless, it still provides a precise description of how NATO must adapt to future challenges. Only if NATO is able to transform itself effectively, will it be able to continue to play an important role in international matters.*

### **I. Reevaluating NATO's Mission in Light of Expansion**

Abe, Shinzo (2007, January 12). *Japan and NATO: Toward Further Collaboration*. Keynote Speech presented at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

*This is an address by the Prime Minister of Japan in regards to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Japan relations. The Prime Minister says that the Japanese Security Defense Force (SDF), while staying within the parameters of the Japanese Constitution, will engage in operations around the world to assist the spread of peace and democracy. Additionally, the Prime Minister affirmed further talks in regards to the relationship between Japan and NATO at the Tokyo meeting.*

Beehner, L. (2006, July 27). *NATO Looks to Expand Mission and Membership*. Retrieved August 3, 2007, from Council on Foreign Relations Web site:

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/11159/nato\\_looks\\_to\\_expand\\_mission\\_and\\_membership.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11159/nato_looks_to_expand_mission_and_membership.html)

*This article gives two points of view on NATO expansion and two roles the author believes the Alliance should take: assistance with peace keeping efforts; and alleviating stress on US forces around the globe. Additionally, it offers insight to the benefits a State has on admission into the organization, as well as the current missions and roles of NATO. Furthermore, it offers information on the possible continued role of NATO in a new world in the 21st century.*

Brull, S. (1995, April 25). Japan's Diplomatic Blitz in the Balkans. In *International Herald Tribune*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from [http://www.iht.com/articles/1995/04/25/tokyo\\_2.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/1995/04/25/tokyo_2.php)

*This article is a critique of Japan's role in the Balkans in 1995. The author asserts that Japan had no vital interests in the area, but chose to contribute monetarily to help in the area. The author notes that \$140 million US dollars was donated by Japan to the States that comprised the former Yugoslavia.*

Crawley, V. (2006, February 10). United States Envisions Global Partnership for NATO. In *United States State Department*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from

<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=February&x=20060210180824mvyelwarc0.5826837>

*Crawley is urging that if NATO continues to take on missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan, than it will be necessary for the Alliance to expand beyond the European borders of NATO. He reiterates that most States assisting NATO, that are outside the Alliance's boundaries of Europe, do already have liaisons working closely with NATO. Furthermore, while the author does speak of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, he does extend cooperation to include the European Union.*

Donaldson, R. H. (2005). *The Foreign Policy of Russia* (3rd ed.). London, England: M.E. Sharpe. (Original work published 1984).

*This book is an excellent source of the history of Russian foreign policy, its current struggles, and Russia's relationship with NATO. Some sections within the book are also dealing with the enlargement of NATO. The book is also complimented by a variety of sources to be found within the footnotes on a number of international issues that can correlate to NATO Expansion.*

Ek, C. (2007, January 24). NATO's Prague Capabilities and Commitment. In *CRS Report for Congress*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from Congressional Research Service Web site:

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21659.pdf>

*Carl Ek is a specialist in International Relations. He prepared this report for the members of the US Congress. First, he gives the history of mobilization of NATO from the Balkans to the current mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, he assesses the two major NATO summits: Prague and Istanbul, and gives an assessment for the 2006 summit in Riga.*

Erdmann, M. (2007, March 8). *NATO in the Age of Global Challenges*. Keynote Speech presented at Tokyo, Japan.

*The Tokyo Conference was a key conference to reaffirm NATO/Japan relations. Ambassador Erdmann affirmed that the relationship between NATO and Japan was strong, and will be strengthened in due time. The Ambassador asked to ensure that Japan would continue to assist with the efforts in Afghanistan. Additionally, as a whole, the Ambassador was sure to include three major points: the current view of security; developing relations with other institutions; and developing partnerships with other nations to help NATO in their missions and role in the international community.*

Gompert, D. (1995, January/February). Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (And Europe Can Help). In *Foreign Affairs*, 75 (1).

*Written in 1995, this article assesses the new role NATO should take on in light of a no longer existing Soviet threat. Furthermore, the author proposed an expanded role by European countries to alleviate stress of the US. This document is useful in assessing the evolution of thought in regards to NATO expansion and enlargement between 1995 and today.*

Lukyanov, F. (2007). The Globalization of NATO: Prospects and Consequences. In *Moscow Defense Brief*.

Retrieved September 20, 2007, from <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2007/item2/article2/>

*This article gives a view of the 2006 Riga Summit Declaration from the perspective of the Russian Federation. It first states that all in all, the Riga Summit did not create or truly "did" anything important. The author, also gives a very sceptic point of view on the NATO and US indications at the summit.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2007, July). *NATO in the Balkans*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/issues/balkans/index.html>

*This document takes a look at NATO's role in the Balkans. It focuses on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and assesses the current roles the Alliance still has in the region. It does not go too in depth, but gives a nice overview of NATO's work in the area.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2007, May 2). *NATO Enlargement- What does it mean in practice?* Retrieved

August 6, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/practice.html>

*This Web site gives an detailed outline of the road for a country aspiring to be a Member State of NATO. It gives the seven step process for accession including: accession talks, formal invitations, and signing documents pertinent to NATO. Furthermore, it offers comprehensive insight to the different programs entailed with a possible invitation to join the NATO Alliance.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2006, September). *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan..* Retrieved September 20, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b060906e.htm>

*This declaration first reaffirms the goals that NATO has for Afghanistan including peace, development, and rule of law. Additionally, it outlines the main areas of operation for NATO and Afghanistan; furthermore, it sets consultation from NATO to Afghanistan officials to help promote capabilities for the Afghan people.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2006). *NATO Handbook*. Retrieved August 4, 2007, from North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site: <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm>  
*NATO Handbook provides an overview of everything dealing with NATO. Included are for instance the Planning and Review Process ( PARP) the Membership Action Plan (MAP), the NATO Council, and issues of Peacekeeping Operations. This large document will give an excellent outlook on the organization, as it attempts to answer any question concerning the Alliance.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2006, November 28). *NATO Boosts Efforts in Afghanistan*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/11-november/e1128a.htm>  
*Outlining the new troop numbers being implemented and led by NATO forces, this article addresses NATO's current role in Afghanistan. Most importantly, the Secretary General of NATO called for more international assistance in the State, because he believes the mission would be greater accompanied by a broader international force.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2006, September). *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b060906e.htm>  
*This declaration first reaffirms the goals that NATO has for Afghanistan including peace, development, and rule of law. Additionally, it outlines the main areas of operation for NATO and Afghanistan; furthermore, it sets consultation from NATO to Afghanistan officials to help promote capabilities for the Afghan people.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, February). *Bringing Peace and Stability Back to the Balkans* .Retrieved September 20, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans/balkans-e.pdf>  
*This document gives an in depth look at the history of NATO in the Balkans. It starts with Bosnia and Herzegovina and goes to the Kosovo conflict. Additionally, it gives great background to the successful missions NATO embraced, as well as the use of partners outside of NATO to help in the victory. Furthermore, the missions (IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR) are looked at and can be better understood through this document.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2004). *Expanding Security and Extending Stability through NATO Enlargement*. (2004).. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from [http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement\\_eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf)  
*Expanding Security and Extending Stability through NATO Enlargement provides an overview of NATO expansion. Furthermore, it offers an insight to the stipulations countries face to become a NATO Member State. This also shows the benefits and struggles that come with expansion. While it is not an entirely comprehensive or complex document, it gives useful insight to enlargement of NATO and relevant history of the organization in the same regard.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.(2003). *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-prg/rdr-gde-prg-eng.pdf>  
*This reader's guide is a reference to the Prague Summit of 2002. It is not the primary document for the summit, but rather an analysis put out by NATO itself. It goes in depth with the actual document and dives further into the meaning of the end results of the summit. It talks about the expansion of the Alliance and different approaches to security to take in light of a new world since 9/11. Moreover, it has three main sections: the decisions from the Summit; the key issues the summit faced; and the documentation that stemmed from the summit.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2006, November 29). Article 29. In *Riga Summit Declaration*. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm#enlargement>

*The Riga Summit Declaration is one of the first major declarations after the seven country expansion of NATO. It provides a status of the new States of the organization. Furthermore, it draws attention to the status of the countries aspiring to become members of NATO.*

Putin, V., & Robertson, G. I., Lord. (2001, October 20). *September 11, 2001: Attack on America*. Keynote Speech presented at Palais d'Egmont Brussels.

*Russian President Putin was asked a question on NATO Enlargement and expanded upon the view of the Russian Government during a speech that entailed a number of issues involving global security. It reiterated the position of Russia against enlargement, and saw the former Secretary General of NATO ensure the enlargement of NATO in the next year.*

*The North Atlantic Treaty*. 1949, April 4, 34 UNTS 243. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

*The North Atlantic Treaty laid the foundation for NATO in 1949. It is an essential source for delegates and should be integral part of preparations. Among other things, the Treaty gives the original perspective, found in article 10, of what expansion should entail for States aspiring to be in the Alliance. This document is imperative for any aspect relating to NATO's mission, objectives, and role.*

United States of America. Department of State. (1995, December 19). *Dayton Accords*. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html>

*The Dayton Peace Accords initially ended the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, the Dayton Agreement is what initially gave NATO its mandate to create the IFOR and pursue a military mission in the newly emerged State. This was the stepping stone for NATO to expand its force to face a new threat, and no longer the threat of a Soviet invasion.*

## **II. NATO's Role in Combating Terrorism**

Bradtke, R. A. (2004, June 16). *US Initiatives at Istanbul Summit*. Address presented at United States Congress, House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe, Washington, DC, United States.

*Robert A. Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, gave an address to a committee of the US House of Representatives. In this, he evaluates the passed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Prague and addresses the progress the Alliance has made since. In his most vital part, he commented on the key aspects the Alliance should address in the 2004 Istanbul Summit.*

Feickart, A. (2006, June 9). U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress. In *CRS Report for Congress*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from Congressional Research Service Web site:

[http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/coalition\\_afghan.pdf](http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/coalition_afghan.pdf)

*Andrew Feickart is a specialist in foreign affairs and national defense. In this report for Congress, he addresses what role the Congress of the United States should take in evaluating the presence in Afghanistan. He asserts that Congress must assess NATO's command in the State, counter-narcotic operations, and counter insurgency.*

Gallis, P. (2007, July 16). NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance. In *CRS Report for Congress*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from Congressional Research Service Web site:

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf>

*Paul Gallis, a specialist in European Affairs and defense, discusses the current victories and struggles in Afghanistan. Furthermore, he outlines the details of separate States' policies in the country. Gallis also takes an in depth look at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and evaluates the history and goals of the operation.*

Kelin, A. (2005, Fall). NATO-Russia cooperation to counter terrorism. *NATO Review*. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from NATO database: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art2.html>

*Kelin assesses NATO and Russia's role in the fight against terrorism. The source outlines the history of cooperation between the two. Additionally, it analyzes the roles they are both taking individually and together to stop the threat of terrorism.*

Monaco, A. (2002, December). A Closer Look at NATO's New NBC Defence Initiatives. *NATO Notes*, 4(10).

*This article looks at two main points: NATO's nuclear, biological and chemical initiatives, and the NATO weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Center. It assesses the progress of the initiatives in regards to their function and capabilities. The article also describes the role of the WMD Center and what aspects of countering WMDs it takes a pivotal role in.*

NATO. (1999). *The Washington Summit Reader's Guide*. Retrieved August 18, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde/rdr-gde-e.pdf>

*This is not the primary document from the Washington Summit, but it gives the background and summary of what is in the primary document. Furthermore, it has an in depth bibliography for basic terms and can help delegates understand the summit a little better if needed.*

NATO. (1999, April 24). *Washington Communiqué*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>

*The Washington Communiqué was a major step in NATO's role in countering weapons of mass destruction. The communiqué saw the creation of the WMD Center within NATO. Also, it reiterated the goals of prior summits.*

NATO. (2002, May 28). *NATO Russia Relations: A New Quality*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b020528e.pdf>

*This declaration, during the Rome Summit of 2002, was to enhance cooperation and foster partnership between NATO and Russia. It details the steps the two will take in facing challenges and threats to them. It outlines military cooperation, information sharing, and counter-terrorism (to name a few).*

NATO. (2002, November 21). *Prague Summit Declaration*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

*The Prague Summit was a key summit in NATO's fight against terrorism. The summit saw the creation of two major NATO entities: the Prague Commitment Capabilities and the NATO Response Force. Both were key components to a changing military aspect to NATO. The commitment capabilities was/is to enhance technological capabilities for NATO for modern warfare. The NATO Response Force is a body ready to deploy rapidly at the disposal of the Alliance.*

NATO. (2004). *Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-ist/rdr-gde-ist-e.pdf>

*This reader's guide gives all of the official texts and declarations from the Istanbul Summit of 2004. Moreover, it gives information and clarification of terminology used in the text. Also, it provides background information on the policies and initiatives taken at the summit.*

NATO. (2004, June 28). *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

*The Istanbul Communiqué is the official declaration of the summit. The communiqué was key in the development of the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, expanding the International Security Assistance Force, and concluding the role of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

NATO. (2005, March). *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Retrieved August 17, 2007, from North Atlantic

Treaty Organization Web site: <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/wmd/wmd-e.pdf>



*The document contains information in the Alliance's efforts to stop the spread of WMDs. Moreover, it goes over the different strategies taken by NATO, such as deterrence and cooperation with other States and organizations, to counter the spread of WMDs. It further talks about civil emergency planning, deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation.*

- NATO. (2005, March). *NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism*. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/rtt/rtt-e.pdf>  
*This is a fairly recent document pertaining to NATO's role in combating terrorism on many fronts. Furthermore, it assesses the various missions NATO has in the fight against terrorism. Additionally, it offers insight to strengthening the Alliance for NATO States to fight terrorism. It does not specify too much, but is helpful in providing initial background on the subject.*
- NATO. (2006, July). *Combating Terrorism at Sea*. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from [http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism\\_at\\_sea2006/terrorism\\_at\\_sea2006-e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea2006/terrorism_at_sea2006-e.pdf)  
*This document provides an overview of NATO's mission: Active Endeavour. It also assesses the role of NATO in combating the threat of terrorism at sea and in the air. It details, very well, NATO naval operations as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its roles and capabilities.*
- NATO. (2006, July). *Interoperability for Joint Operations*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from [http://nids.hq.nato.int/docu/interoperability/html\\_en/interoperability01.html](http://nids.hq.nato.int/docu/interoperability/html_en/interoperability01.html)  
*Interoperability refers to different military organizations from different backgrounds and ethnicities coming together and operating in conjunction with one another. This backgrounder gives information on NATO's policies to work with different military organizations within the Alliance. Furthermore, it guides the reader through NATO's formal agreements and forces within the organization.*
- NATO. (2006, September). *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b060906e.htm>  
*This declaration first reaffirms the goals that NATO has for Afghanistan including peace, development, and rule of law. Additionally, it outlines the main areas of operation for NATO and Afghanistan; furthermore, it sets consultation from NATO to Afghanistan officials to help promote capabilities for the Afghan people.*
- NATO. (2006, October). *Improving Capabilities to Meet New Threats*. Retrieved October 8, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/capabilities/briefing-capabilities-e.pdf>  
*This document gives all of NATO's new capabilities in military, command structure, and partnership. It talks about missile defense systems, strategic lift, and different battalions NATO has to fight against terrorism. Additionally, it reiterates the Prague capabilities and the Defence Capabilities Initiatives. Lastly, it tells about NATO's cooperation with other organizations and States to help NATO evolve into a defense organization for the 21st Century.*
- NATO. (2006, October 20). *Helping Secure Afghanistan's Future*. Retrieved August 13, 2007, from North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site: [http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/afghanistan-2006/afghanistan\\_e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/afghanistan-2006/afghanistan_e.pdf)  
*This document provides an introduction into NATO's role in the Afghanistan. It talks about the different missions within the state. Additionally, it gives a history of the Alliance's role and the future of NATO in Afghanistan.*
- NATO. (2006, November 29). *Riga Summit Declaration*. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm#terrorism>  
*This summit and its resulting declaration offer information on the most recent alliances to be taken to combat terrorism. The source also talks about the mission in Afghanistan, and cutting edge technologies to defend against terrorism.*
- NATO. (2007, June 14). *Countering terrorism with technology*. Retrieved August 13, 2007, from <http://nids.hq.nato.int/issues/dat/index.html>

*NATO finds it essential to counter terrorism with new technology. This is due to the new type of terrorism breeding that requires cutting edge technology in order to combat. Furthermore, this article gives NATO's 10 step process the Alliance looks to implement to meet the new threats of terrorism.*

Scheffer, J. D. H. (2004, April 5). *The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism*. Keynote Address presented at NATO-Russia Council Conference, Norfolk, Virginia, USA.

*The NATO Secretary General spoke to promote the need for NATO to keep enhancing the military. Additionally, he outlined the new face of terrorism facing the international community. In this, he asserts the need for greater cooperation, and the continued role of operations NATO is engaged in, as a primary goal of the Alliance for the future.*

Volker, K. (2007, September 14). *Why Helping Afghanistan Matters*. Address presented at Atlantic Council of Finland, Helsinki, Finland.

*Kurt Volker made an address to the Atlantic Council of Finland. Here, he laid out three pillars he was going to address: the pivotal role in Afghanistan; the importance of the presence in Afghanistan to the Afghan people; and the successes currently being seen in the State. This address does not only address NATO, but also addresses key roles taken by States and organizations outside the Alliance.*

### **III. The NATO Response Force**

Aledo, P. (2007, January). Siamese Twins: NATO, the EU and collective defense. *CFSP Forum*, 5(1), 10-13. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from

<http://www.fornet.info/documents/CFSP%20Forum%20vol%205%20no%201.pdf>

*This interesting article describes the correlation between the European defense structure and NATO. It becomes apparent that a duplication of efforts almost seems inevitable. Therefore a better coordination and division of tasks between the EU and NATO is needed.*

At the centre of NATO transformation. (n.d.). *The NATO Response Force*. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site: <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html>

*The NRF is a prime example of NATO transformation. The NATO Web site offers interesting information as to how the NRF was set-up and what its tasks are. Therefore, a good overview is provided.*

*Berlin Plus agreement*. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO - SHAPE Web site:

[http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape\\_eu/se030822a.htm](http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm)

*The Berlin-Plus agreement shows that EU-NATO cooperation is possible and useful. It is important to be aware of the close and necessary EU-NATO relations in order to be able to judge the future of their cooperation. After all, this cooperation is of fundamental importance to the success or failure of both organizations.*

Binnendijk, H., & Kugler, R. (2004). The next phase of Transformation: A new Dual-Track Strategy for NATO. In *Transatlantic Transformation: Equipping NATO for the 21st century*. Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations.

*As this article explains, NATO needs to undergo a serious path of reformation. The decision to launch the NRF was a good start but must be matched by further steps. The article is of high relevance since it creates the interesting link between the NRF and the NATO reform process.*

Binnendijk, H., & Kugler, R. (2004, September). Needed - A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force. *Defense Horizons*, 45. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from National Defense University Web site:

[http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/DH\\_45.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/DH_45.pdf)

*This article proposes the creation of a NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force. It is outlined that the inclusion of a clear reconstruction and thus civilian component into NATO's missions is desirable and needed in order to ensure the survival of NATO. The idea of a NSRF is interesting because it spurs an entirely new debate about the role of NATO.*

Dembinski, M. (2005). Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU von "Berlin" zu "Berlin Plus": Konzepte und Konfliktlinien [The NATO-EU relations from "Berlin" to "Berlin Plus": Theories and Conflicts]. In J. Warwick (Ed.), *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU - Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalität?* [The NATO-EU relations - Partnership, Competition, Rivalry?]. Opladen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich. *Since the end of the Cold War, EU-NATO relations have intensified and through the Berlin and later on Berlin Plus agreement have become institutionalized in a complex series of rules and procedures. In order to judge EU-NATO relations and to develop an opinion about the future track of these relations, knowledge about this agreement is vital. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the development of these relations.*

Deni, J. (2007). *Alliance Management and maintenance - Restructuring NATO for the 21st century*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

*As has been demonstrated, NATO needs to restructure itself in order to have a purpose in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This book lays down possible scenarios and tracks for this restructuring. Therefore, it is of high relevance for a reader with interest in the future path of NATO.*

*The EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup*. (2007, May 28). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from The Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Sweden Web site: <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/9133/a/82276> *The EU Battlegroups form a core part of the European defense and military plans. Interestingly, they are often also composed of the same forces that make up the NRF. This already says a lot about EU-NATO relations. While this article provides an insight into EU Battlegroups, it also gives the reader an idea about the fact that the EU will most likely play a larger role in military issues in the future. The article makes the reader thus think about how such a long-term development of the EU capability might affect the position of the EU Member States inside NATO.*

*Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 17-18 December 1990*. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c901218a.htm> *After the end of the Cold-War, NATO decided to open its doors to the former Warsaw Pact members. The minutes of this NAC meeting outlines how NATO started to set-up relations with these countries in the period between the German reunification and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Obviously this document was written at a very historic moment and therefore provides key insights into the make-up of the key Western powers pattern of acting and thinking.*

*Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002*. (2002, May 14). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from <http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0205&L=natopres&T=0&F=&S=&P=1022> *In Reykjavik, the roots for the NRF were laid. By initiating the process of setting-up the forces, the summit was able to set NATO on the right track for its transformation. This document represents the start of a long period of reforming which has yet to be finished.*

*The Future of NATO - A time to rebuild*. (2004, June). *The Economist*, 15-16.

*The article establishes that, despite the fact that the mission of NATO has changed, it is still needed in order to guarantee stability and peace. Now that the common threat of communism has ceased, NATO has to adapt to the new environment and the threats that it poses. A long road of challenges lies ahead, but the start has been made.*

Hofmann, S., & Reynolds, C. (2007, July). Die EU-NATO Beziehungen [The EU-NATO Relations]. *SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) Aktuell* [Foundation for Science and Politics], (37).

*This short paper presents an overview of current EU-NATO relations. It highlights the difficult situation that arose after the accession of Cyprus to the EU. By highlighting this complex issue of EU-NATO relations, this article does a good job in introducing the reader to the issues that have to be solved in order to set-up a more efficient EU-NATO relationship.*

Kagan, R. (2003). *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

*In this bestseller Robert Kagan describes the core differences between America and Europe. While one might challenge his final conclusion, this book provides a very good introduction into the nature of the transatlantic differences. It thus allows one to work out possible solutions to current misunderstandings.*

Krieger, H. (2007). Common European Defense: Competition or Compatibility with NATO? In M. Trybus & N. White (Eds.), *European Security Law* (pp. 174-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*Due to the fact that the EU is highly dependent on NATO assets, it is widely believed that the plans for a European Defense are complementary to NATO. This article, however, brings up the hypothesis that, given certain developments, a situation of competition between the ESDP and NATO could evolve. To familiarize oneself with Krieger's idea is useful since it makes one understand that despite over 60 years of European-North American security cooperation, the future of NATO is not written in stone and that both Europe and the USA have to continue to cooperate and find common solutions in order to ensure a survival of the alliance.*

Lindley-French, J. (2006, September). The Capability-Capacity Crunch: NATO's New Capacity for Intervention. *European Security*, 14(3), 259-280.

*This article clearly lays out that NATO needs to transform its military in order to be well-equipped for the conflicts of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. By reading this article the reader gets an idea of the challenges that lie ahead NATO and how NATO can address these challenges. Thus, it is of key relevance for the subjects discussed.*

Lindstrom, G. (2007, February). *Enter the EU Battlegroups* (Vol. 97). Chaillot Paper. Paris: Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai97.pdf>

*The Chaillot Papers are a series of papers published by the Institute for Security Studies, which is linked to the EU. It analyzes a number of relevant issues for the EU defense and military policy. By introducing the working method of the EU Battlegroup this book provides a perfect introduction to the work and to the missions of the Battlegroup.*

Meiers, F.-J. (2005). Die NATO Response Force und die European Rapid Reaction Force: Kooperationspartner oder Konkurrenten? [The NATO Response Force and the European Rapid Reaction Force: Partners or Competitors?]. In J. Varwick (Trans.), *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU - Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalität?* [The NATO-EU relations - Partnership, Competition, Rivalry?]. Opladen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

*This article sheds light on the interrelationship between the ERRF and the NRF. Interestingly, this article brings up the question of how both forces could best divide possible missions among themselves. Therefore, a proposal is made how to ensure the smooth functioning of both forces.*

Meier-Walser, R. (2005). Die Entwicklung der NATO 1990-2004 [The Development of NATO 1990-2004]. In J. Varwick (Ed.), *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU - Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalität?* [The NATO-EU relations - Partnership, Competition, Rivalry?]. Opladen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

*Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has engaged in a process of transformation. This article provides a detailed description of the developments that occurred during this period. It becomes apparent that many changes have been introduced, but that yet many challenges lie ahead of the alliance.*

Michel, L. (2007, February). NATO-EU cooperation in operations. *NATO Research Paper*, 31, 2-4. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Defense College, Rome Web site:

[http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp\\_31.pdf](http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_31.pdf)

*Through the Berlin Plus agreement, NATO-EU cooperation has been institutionalized. This article describes how it works in practice and points out possible areas for improvement. Since NATO-EU cooperation is of key relevance for the future of NATO, knowledge of this issue is fundamental.*

Moore, R. (2006). "NATO's New Mission" - *Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

*In the Post-Cold War world NATO plays a different role than before. While NATO served as the counterpart to the Warsaw Pact and thus to the Communist threat until 1990, it now has to find new means to ensure its original purpose of projecting stability. This book outlines how NATO tries to do so.*

*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (2002, June). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from The White House Web site: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss1.html>

*Confronted with the threats of terrorism and rogue States, the USA issued the NSS in order to ensure the best cooperation between its ministries and military. The document is of high importance since it outlines how exactly the USA is pursuing the fight against terrorism. By analyzing the NSS one can work out differences with other major allies and pick out possible areas of convergence or conflict.*

NATO-EU: *chronology*. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site: <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/chronology.html>

*As one can see at the NATO Web site, NATO and the EU have a long history of intense cooperation. To be aware of this history is important if one makes a judgment about the future of EU-NATO relations. Since good relations are of core relevance for both organizations, knowledge of the history is of key relevance.*

Nye, J. (2003, April 16). Der ungeschickte Hegemon [The clumsy hegemon]. *Die Zeit*. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from [http://www.zeit.de/2003/17/Essay\\_Nye?page=all](http://www.zeit.de/2003/17/Essay_Nye?page=all)

*Joseph Nye is a very important US American scholar in the field of international politics. He served under the Carter and Clinton administration and has published many books and articles on security and defense policy. In this article, which was published in one of the most important German newspapers, Nye outlines that the US American approach to focus on its military power is counterproductive. Instead, he says that the USA should make greater usage of its immense possibilities for soft power and increase its cooperation with its European allies.*

*Presidency Conclusions - Helsinki European Council - 10 and 11 December 1999*. (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from <http://www.dpt.gov.tr/abigm/abtb/Zirveler/1999%20Helsinki%2010-11%20Aralik.pdf>

*At the EU Summit in Helsinki in 1999, the Helsinki Headline Goals were published. They called upon the creation of the ERF. The decisions of the Cologne Summit were thus institutionalized and taken to the next level. This decision is of high importance since it launched the autonomous development of the European defense abilities within the EU.*

*Press Conference on the NATO Response Force (NRF) by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)*. (2004, October 13). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041013b.htm>

*At this press conference the specific details and advantages of the NRF are presented. It becomes apparent that the NRF is going to be a center piece of NATO's transformation process. Since this is press conference, one can get a good insight into de Hoop Scheffers and General Jones personal opinions, which is useful when judging the NRF as a whole.*

Ratten, M. (Ed.). (2001, May). *British-French Summit - St. Malo 3-4 December 1998*. In *From St. Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents* (Vol. 47). Chaillot Paper. Paris: Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved August 5, 2007, from <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.pdf>

*The St. Malo agreement was the ground-breaking event in the development of the ESDP. Looking back, it might constitute one of the key agreements between European States. It ended the British resistance to an ESDP and thus laid down the path for future military developments inside the EU.*

Rühle, M. (2006). NATO Gipfel in Riga: Mehr Hügelkuppe als Gipfel. *IP (Internationale Politik)* [NATO Summit in Riga: More like a knoll than a summit], 61(11), 108-115.

*This article highlights the disagreements that still exist within the alliance. The fact that most of the problems were not addressed at the Riga Summit shows that the Member States are uncertain as to how to reconstruct the alliance. Thus, a common effort by all is needed in order to overcome current disagreements to effectively address the conflicts which NATO is facing.*

Schmalz, U. (2005). Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1990-2004 [The development of the European Security and Defense Policy 1990-2004]. In J. Varwick (Ed.), *Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU - Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalität?* [The NATO-EU relations - Partnership, Competition, Rivalry?]. Opladen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

*Since the end of the Cold War European foreign and defense policy has undergone a major transformation. The IGCs in Maastricht and Amsterdam laid down the foundations for the CFSP while the Cologne and Helsinki Summit established the ESDP. This article provides a detailed history of the military and defense developments within the EU.*

*A Secure Europe In A Better World - European Security Strategy.* (2003, December 12). Retrieved August 6, 2007, from Council of the European Union Web site:

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

*The ESS is the counterpart to the US American NSS. Just like the NSS, it lays out how to deal with the threats of our time. In the end the question which has to be answered is how compatible the NSS is with the ESS.*

Squarr, T. (2007, July 5). *Kooperation EU-NATO in Theorie und Praxis [EU-NATO Cooperation in Theory and Practice]*. Lecture presented at The Representation of Baden-Württemberg to the European Union, Brussels, Belgium.

*At this lecture Oberst I.G. (Colonel) Torsten G. Squarr laid out his visions of EU-NATO relations. Squarr is the deputy representative of Germany in the Military Committee of NATO. Next to analyzing the different visions about the EU among the European Member States of NATO, Squarr explained the complexity behind the Turkish-Cypriot dispute and how it affects NATO and the EU.*

Torpan, F. (2007). EU-NATO Relations: Consistency as a Strategic Consideration and a legal requirement. In M. Trybus & N. White (Eds.), *European Security Law* (pp. 270-295). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*In his article Torpan describes how the EERF is set up. His article is of high relevance for the issue of the NRF since the EERF and the NRF both mirror and reflect a larger European interest in military and defense related matters. It thus shows that the ESDI, which was set up after the Cold War, has already led to concrete developments and changes of the European military policies.*

What does this mean in practice? (n.d.). *The NATO Response Force.* Retrieved August 5, 2007, from NATO Web site: <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/practice.html>

*This article shows the kind of missions the NRF is engaging in and what sort of training the national forces undergo to participate in the NRF. In order to understand the NRF, knowledge of such issues is fundamental. To gain information on practical issues, access to this site is quite helpful.*

*World Military Spending.* (n.d.). Retrieved August 5, 2007, from

<http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp>

*This Web site shows that worldwide large sums are spent on military and defense budgets. It becomes clear that the USA is spending far more than all European countries combined. Therefore, it is no surprise that a divergence between the military capabilities of the USA and the European States exist. Since the USA is asking its European allies to share a larger part of the burden, the European States will ultimately have to invest more in defense related issues if they want to continue to exert any influence on the USA.*

# **Rules of Procedure North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

## ***Introduction***

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Alliance”) and shall be considered adopted by the Alliance prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Alliance.

## **I. SESSIONS**

### ***Rule 1 - Dates of convening and adjournment***

The Alliance shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

### ***Rule 2 - Place of sessions***

The Alliance shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

## **II. AGENDA**

### ***Rule 3 - Provisional agenda***

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Alliance at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

### ***Rule 4 - Adoption of the agenda***

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Alliance by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

*The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, “those present and voting” means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.*

### ***Rule 5 - Revision of the agenda***

During a session, the Alliance may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Alliance so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Alliance decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

*For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an “important and urgent character” is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Alliance to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Alliance until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, “the members present and voting” means those*



*members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.*

***Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum***

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

***Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General***

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Alliance.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Alliance and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

***Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat***

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Alliance, and shall distribute documents of the Alliance to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Alliance may require.

***Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat***

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Alliance concerning any question under consideration.

***Rule 10 - Selection of the President***

The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Alliance for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

***Rule 11 - Replacement of the President***

If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

***Rule 12 - Official and working language***

English shall be the official and working language of the Alliance.

***Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)***

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

*This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.*

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

***Rule 14 - Quorum***

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Alliance are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Alliance shall be required for any decision to be taken.

*For purposes of this rule, "members of the Alliance" means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.*

**Rule 15 - General powers of the President**

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Alliance, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Alliance and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Alliance the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

*Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to "propose to the Alliance" entails her/his power to "entertain" motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.*

**Rule 16**

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Alliance.

**Rule 17 - Points of order**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

*Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, "the members present and voting" mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.*

**Rule 18**

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

**Rule 19 - Speeches**

1. No one may address the Alliance without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Alliance, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Alliance may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

*In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Alliance in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.*

**Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers**

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Alliance, declare the list

closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Alliance.

*The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Alliance. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Alliance and the President should not act on her/his own motion.*

**Rule 21 - Right of reply**

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

*For purposes of this rule, a remark that "impugns the integrity of a representative's State" is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Alliance by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.*

**Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

**Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Alliance shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

*As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Alliance's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Alliance.*

**Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate**

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

**Rule 25 - Closure of debate**

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Alliance favors the closure of debate, the Alliance shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

**Rule 26 - Order of motions**

Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

**Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments**

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Alliance would like the Alliance to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Alliance unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Alliance for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

*For purposes of this rule, all “proposals” shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Alliance by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Alliance. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Alliance and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.*

**Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions**

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

**Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic**

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Alliance, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

*For purposes of this rule, “those present and voting” means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.*

VI. VOTING

**Rule 30 - Voting rights**

Each member of the Alliance shall have one vote.

*This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to “member(s)” do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.*

**Rule 31 - Request for a vote**

A proposal or motion before the Alliance for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Alliance may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

*For purposes of this rule, “proposal” means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.*

**Rule 32 - Consensus required**

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Alliance shall be made by a **consensus** of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

*All members declaring their representative States as “present and voting” during the attendance roll call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.*

**Rule 33 – Omitted**

**Rule 34 - Method of voting**

1. The Alliance shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

*Only those members who designate themselves as “present” or “present and voting” during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying “pass,” must, on the second time through, respond with either “yes” or “no.” A “pass” cannot be followed by a second “pass” for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.*

2. When the Alliance votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Alliance shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

**Rule 35 - Explanations of vote**

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

*All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.*

**Rule 36 - Conduct during voting**

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

**Rule 37 - Division of proposals and amendments**

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

*For purposes of this rule, “most radical division” means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is “most radical” is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

***Rule 38 - Amendments***

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

*An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.*

***Rule 39 - Order of voting on amendments***

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

*For purposes of this rule, “furthest removed in substance” means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is “furthest removed in substance” is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

***Rule 40 - Order of voting on proposals***

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Alliance decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

***Rule 41 - The President shall not vote***

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

## VII. MINUTE OF SILENT PRAYER OR MEDITATION

***Rule 42 - Invitation to silent prayer or meditation***

Immediately after the opening of the first plenary meeting of the Alliance, representatives may request to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation. This is the only time this motion will be entertained and its approval is at the discretion of the Secretariat.