AFRICAN UNION

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NMUN·08

NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

2008 COMMITTEE BACKGROUND GUIDE

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
WRITTEN BY:
Mike Aguilar
Thera Watson
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CONTRIBUTION BY:
Guy Tam Bikoi

18-22 March
Sheraton New York

22-26 April
New York Marriott Marquis

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE association™

Please consult the FAQ section of www.nmun.org for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

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NMUN•08 IMPORTANT DATES

IMPORTANT NOTICE: To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at www.nmun.org and include a $1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference — whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

SHERATON	MARRIOTT	
31 January 2008	31 January 2008	• Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March) • Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET! (We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)
15 February 2008	15 February 2008	• Committee Updates Posted to www.nmun.org.
23 February 2008	21 March 2008	• Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early! Registration is first-come, first-served.
1 March 2008	1 March 2008	• Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to eaton@nmun.org
1 March 2008	1 April 2008	• Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail (See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions).
3 March 2008	1 April 2008	• All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. ($100 per delegate if paid by 1 March; $125 per delegate if receved after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline.
NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS	The 2008 National Model UN Conference	
	• 18 - 22 March — Sheraton New York • 22 - 26 April — New York Marriott Marquis	

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2008 (Sheraton Venue) or 1 APRIL 2008 (Marriott Venue)

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 1 March (Sheraton Venue) or 1 April (Marriott Venue) to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active after 15 November. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment n the subject line (Example: GAPLEN_Greece).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

• Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

• The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

• Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted. Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba_U_of_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

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OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS:

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
(send only to e-mail for your assigned venue)	positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org
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Secretary-General	secgen@nmun.org
Director(s)-General	dirgen@nmun.org

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THE 2008 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

New York City, 18-22 March (Sheraton) & 22-26 April (Marriott)   www.nmun.org

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Dear Delegates,

It is with great enthusiasm that we welcome you to the 2008 National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference. Mike Aguilar and Thera Watson have the distinct privilege to serve as the Directors of the African Union (AU) at this year's Conference. We would like to take a moment to introduce the staff for the AU at NMUN 2008, as we will be your principle contact for this committee and hope that we can be of assistance to you if the need arises.

Mike Aguilar, who is a MA candidate at American University in Washington DC, will be Director at the Sheraton Venue. He will be assisted by Stephanie Martins, who is currently a junior at Ursinus College, double majoring in International Relations and Spanish. Thera Watson, who holds a MA in Political Science and a BA in International Relations, will be Director at the Marriott Venue. She will be assisted by Dave Verge, who holds a BA in Political Economy and English and will be pursuing a MA in Political Science at the University of Alberta. We look forward to contributing to NMUN's excellence as we are honored to serve as your Directors and Assistant Directors.

As delegates to the African Union, you should be prepared to discuss the following topics:

1. Implementation of a Pan-African Free Trade Area;
2. Reinventing Growth in Africa: Development and Technological Innovation;
3. The Role of African Union Peacekeepers in Regional Conflicts.

The African Union is premised on the idea that a process of integration within the continent may enable African countries and peoples to find their rightful role in the international community. It provides a setting in which members can discuss how to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African countries; and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the UN. Africa is besieged by the clich headlines of the 4 D's: destruction, death, disease and despair. However, the AU is aspiring to achieve a common vision of a united and strong Africa and to build a strong partnership between governments and civil society. With pursuing this dedicated vision by you the delegates, can we have a triumphant simulation of the African Union. That being said, your knowledge should not only be limited to this Background Guide; it only serves as a starting point for your research.

Every participating delegation is required to submit a position paper prior to attending the Conference. NMUN will accept position papers via e-mail by March 1, 2008 for delegations attending the Sheraton Venue and April 1, 2008 for delegations attending the Marriott Venue. Please refer to the message from your Directors-General explaining NMUN's position paper requirements and restrictions in this guide. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is crucial.

Please check the NMUN website at www.nmun.org regularly for updates. Also, we strongly recommend the Delegation Preparation Guide available at the NMUN website.

We are very excited for your participation in this Conference. We look forward to the life long friendships we all will make and the growth that you will experience at NMUN. Please feel free to contact us with any questions or concerns you may come across. We wish you all the best during your preparations and we look forward to working with you in March or April. Good luck!

Best Regards,

Sheraton Venue	*Marriott Venue*
Mike Aguilar	Thera Watson
Director	Director
Stephanie Martins	Dave Verge
Assistant Director	Assistant Director
AU.Sheraton@nmun.org	AU.Marriott@nmun.org

Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2008 NMUN Conference

At the NMUN Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in a respective committee has some impact on the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as Member States, some may be observers, NGOs or judicial or technical experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference.

NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. *The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism*. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim recreation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed one double-sided page (two single-sided pages is **not** acceptable)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

> 1**. A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after December 1, 2007. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
>
> 2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2008 for Delegations attending the NMUN at the Sheraton venue and April 1, 2008 for Delegations attending the NMUN on the Marriott venue**.

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU_Namibia_University of Caprivi)

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Linda Poppe, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Galen Stocking, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff uses the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation should submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 1,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Sheraton Venue	*Marriott Venue*
Linda Poppe	Galen Stocking
Director-General	Director-General
linda@nmun.org	galen@nmun.org

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a maximum of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards.

Delegation from (*Insert Member State/NGO Name*)   **Represented by (*Insert Delegation Name Here*)**

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Racism and Racial Discrimination, and A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The State of Tranquility a proud member of the Regional Alliance of Peaceful Countries and a fully supports other regional groups in their efforts to coordinated a regional plan for sustained and sustainable development. In that regard, the State of Tranquility recognizes the necessity of ensuring the full realization of the Right to Development as declared in the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Final Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development. Tranquility fully supports the implementation of national development plans with the cooperation of regional organizations, the United Nations, and the international community. Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing the underlying factors.

I. The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa

The State of Tranquility believes that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic security lend themselves to the pacific settlement of disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. The lack of development in the region constitutes the root cause of political instability and conflict. The report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Recommendations,* if implemented, could enhance the work of the Organization in its efforts to bring about sustainable development in Africa. Tranquility also believes that the use of preventive development in Africa could ensure that conflicts such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be avoided before they erupt. While obstacles to be overcome are many, international support for effective national programs to ensure the relief to rehabilitation to development continuum through post-conflict peace-building, can enable Sub-Saharan Africa and the entire developing world to achieve the sustainable development which alone will guarantee regional peace and stability. The State of Tranquility fully supports the increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in all aspects of dispute settlement and peace-keeping. Increased support for such regional efforts, when combined with measures to eliminate the root causes of regional conflict, serves to further enhance the prospects for lasting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the entire international community.

II. Racism and Racial Discrimination

The State of Tranquility believes that the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance offers the global community an opportunity to establish an updated plan of action to completely eradicate racism and racial discrimination throughout the world. The necessity for all Member States to sign, accede to and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is an integral part of this plan, as policies and practices based on racism and racial discrimination remain devastating to regional social, economic and infrastructure development. Tranquility encourages all States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to provide assistance to those affected by such practices. The lack of financial resources that prevented the international community from realizing its objectives in the three previous United Nations Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination must not continue to hinder the international community in guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all peoples.

III. A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The State of Tranquility remains firmly committed in support of the continued role of the United Nations Security Council as the primary agent for the maintenance of international peace and security, as mandated under Chapters IV and V of the *UN Charter*. We strongly recommend the authorization, determination, composition and financing of peacekeeping operations should be determined by the Council, as authorized by Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the *Charter* and in conjunction with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the State of Tranquility endorses the current role of the Secretary-General as administrator of the Operations established by the Council. The State of Tranquility remains a central contributor for both financial and logistical support of the United Nations Peacekeeping forces and will continue to contribute to the United Nations Peacekeeping Budget throughout the duration of the current year. The State of Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing all threats to international peace and security through regional arrangements and multilateral forums. The international community must address the underlying causes of these conflicts and the destabilizing effects of such conflicts on entire regions. Tranquility is convinced that increased utilization of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms can enhance the ability of peacekeeping missions to take into account historical, social, and cultural values and traditions within areas of conflict. As operation costs continue to escalate, however, our nation strongly urges all Member States and the Secretary-General to devote greater attention to the monetary and management aspects of peacekeeping operations and provide serious consideration for the establishment of operation termination dates. The State of Tranquility further supports the proposal endorsed within A/Res/44/49, calling for Member States to develop and maintain an inventory of supplies and equipment to be made available for Operations on short-notice. In addition, the State of Tranquility calls upon Member States to recognize the need to maintain voluntary contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to reduce the continuing problems incurred by funding deficits.

History of the African Union (AU)

Introduction

A united Africa has a long history and is the unique product of the social and cultural attitudes of Africans. Today, the African Union (AU) is an entity that continues to work for integration in the continent to enable its play in the rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic, and political problems.[1] The advent of the AU is described as an event of great magnitude in the institutional evolution of the continent.[2] In a 1959 speech from Kwame Nkrumah, ideological father of the African Union, he stated that "[i]n Ghana we regard our independence as meaningless unless we are able to use that freedom that goes with it to help other African people to be free and independent, to liberate the entire continent of Africa from foreign domination and ultimately to establish a Union of African States."[3]

The historical foundations of the African Union originated in the Union of African States, a short lasting union of 3 West African States.[4] In subsequent attempts to unite Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on May 25, 1963; it remained the collective voice for the continent until 2002.[5] The intended purpose of the OAU was to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States in a time of independence movements.[6] The OAU also aimed to ensure that all Africans enjoyed human rights, raise the living standards of all Africans, and settle arguments and disputes between members.[7] In the *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*, adopted in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African States committed to work together to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa.[8] However, the initial 32 independent Member States of the OAU were regarded as a bureaucratic talking shop with little power.[9] The OAU struggled to enforce its decisions and its lack of an army made it difficult to intervene in civil wars and countries struggling with colonialism.[10] The policy of non-interference in the affairs of Member States also restricted the OAU in achieving its goals.[11]

Consensus was difficult to achieve within the organization.[12] The French colonies, the pro-capitalists and pro-Socialist factions during the Cold War, all had their agendas and made it very difficult to reach an agreement on what had to be done.[13] Through the difficulties and struggles that the OAU endured, it still provided a forum that enabled Member States to adopt coordinated positions on matters of common concern.[14] For example, through the *OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa*, the organization worked and succeeded in forging a consensus in support of liberation struggle and the fight against apartheid.[15] Nevertheless, the idea of attempting to unify Africa surfaced again in the mid-1990s under the leadership of Muammar al-Qaddafi.[16]

Consequently, the *Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999)* decided to establish an African Union.[17] The declaration to establish an AU was followed by the *Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000)*.[18] The Lusaka Summit, a year later, drew the roadmap for the implementation of the AU.[19] And then, on July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa,

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[1] African Union, *African Union In A Nutshell*, 2007, p.1.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah: Father of African Nationalism*, 1998, p. 2.

[4] African Unification Front, *Brief Overview of the History of the African Union: Towards African National Sovereignty*, 2002.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Organization of African Unity, *Purposes and Principles*, 1996, p. 2-3.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Organization of African Unity, *The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter*, 2003, p. 1.

[9] Bujra, *Africa: Transition from the OAU to the AU*, 2002, p. 1.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Boddy-Evans, *Biography: Idi Amin Dada*, 2006, p.1.

[12] Thompson, *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism*, 1969, p. 41-47.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Organization of African Unity Department of Foreign Affairs, *Profile: The Organization of African Unity*, 2000, p. 1.

[16] Browne, *Pan-Africanism and the African Union*, 2005, p. 2.

[17] African Union, *Sirte Declaration on the AU*, 1999, p. 3.

[18] African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, 2000, p. 1.

[19] African Union, *African Union In A Nutshell*, 2007, p. 1.

the African Union was launched by its first president, Thabo Mbeki.[20] The AU was formed in hopes of further improving the objectives to secure Africa's democracy, human rights, sustainable economy, and bringing to an end the intra-African conflict that has plagued the continent.[21]

The Road Ahead

The Assembly of the African Union, the chief decision-making body within the AU, consists of the Heads of State or Government of Member States.[22] While the Assembly is gradually devolving some of its decision-making to the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African Union is also composed of a number of official bodies that have an important say in critical issues. Such bodies like the Executive Council; Peace & Security Council; Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC); Specialised Technical Committees; and Human Rights Institutions, all play a prominent role addressing pressing challenges.[23]

The Member States of the African Union (AU) are:

Algeria	Djibouti	Libya	Senegal
Angola	Egypt	Madagascar	Seychelles
Benin	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Sierra Leone
Botswana	Eritrea	Mali	Somalia
Burkina Faso	Ethiopia	Mauritania	South Africa
Burundi	Gabon	Mozambique	Sudan
Cameroon	Gambia	Namibia	Swaziland
Cape Verde	Ghana	Niger	Tanzania
Central African	Guinea-Bissau	Nigeria	Togo
Republic	Ivory Coast	Rwanda	Tunisia
Chad	Kenya	Sahrawi Arab	Uganda
Comoros	Lesotho	Democratic	Zambia
Democratic Republic of Congo	Liberia	Sao Tome & Principle	Zimbabwe[24]

Currently, three documents structure the work of the AU: the *Vision of the African Union and the Mission of the African Union Commission*, the *2004-2007 Strategic Framework of the African Union Commission*, and the *Action Plans of the various Departments of the Commission*.[25] Included are for instance 23 Priority Programs, divided into six "Action Areas" where the continent will need to coordinate and integrate to address health, political, economic and ecological issues.[26] They include:

- Shared Vision
- Peace, Governance and Human Security
- Economic Integration
- Integration Infrastructure
- Social Development
- Culture[27]

It is imperative that Member States of the AU continue building on these measures to achieve their vision of a unified continent, with periods of peace and prosperity.

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[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Babarinde, *The EU as a Model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation*, 2007, p. 5.

[22] African Union, *The Assembly*, 2007, p. 1.

[23] Council on Foreign Relations, *The Nascent African Union*, 2006, p. 2-3.

[24] African Union, *Member States of the African Union*, 2007, p. 1.

[25] African Union, *Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union*: *Volume 3: 2004-2007 Plan of Action,* 2004; African Union, *Vision and Mission of the African Union*, 2007.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*

Conclusion

The AU's intervention in Burundi in 2003, in which an AU peacekeeping force of some 3,000 was deployed as a bridging force until a larger United Nations (UN) force arrived, is widely known as a success.[28] However, given the short life of the AU and its limited experience with peacekeeping on the continent, the international community is viewing the Darfur situation as a "litmus test" for the AU's ability to promote peace on their continent.[29] In other policy areas, the African Union also faces tremendous organizational and financial barriers.[30] It took many years for the similar regional institutions in Europe, Asia, and Latin America to establish themselves, and the AU faces the additional challenges of endemic poverty and civil conflict among many of its Member States.[31]

The AU must establish ingenuity to keep moving forward, at the same time ensuring that it enjoys the support of its diverse Member States to further regional integration objectives. The eyes of the world may be averted from the routine struggles that the African continent endures, but the eyes of history are upon the Member States of the AU.

I. Implementation of a Pan-African Free Trade Zone

"Africa: the last frontier for economic and social development and a scar on the conscience of humanity"[32]

Since the early 1960s, countries in Africa have been encouraged to combine their economies into sub-regional markets that would over time ultimately merge together to form one Pan-African Economic Union.[33] Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah famously advocated a United States of Africa in 1963, only five years after the Treaty of Rome was signed, which gave birth to the European Economic Commission (EEC).[34] However, many African leaders disagreed with this notion and instead agreed only to establish the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[35] The OAU, like the Organization of American States, advocated bringing together nations to strengthen cooperation on democratic values and defend common interests.[36] In 1980, at the OAU's Second Extraordinary Summit Meeting in Logos, Nigeria, the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted, which emphasized "the need to take urgent action to provide the political support necessary for the success of the measures to achieve the goals of rapid self-reliance and self-sustaining development and economic growth."[37] However, it soon became evident that the OAU was unable to transform itself into an efficient organization capable of promoting peace and security throughout Africa.[38] Its failure to address the core problems or to serve the interests of the African people led to it acquiring the widespread negative image.[39] On July 8, 2002, the OAU ceased to exist and the African Union (AU) was established at the Durban Summit held in the Republic of South Africa.[40] The basic principles and objectives of intergovernmental cooperation and full African Economic Development adopted by the AU are laid down in the Constitutive Act, which is the codified framework under which the African Union is to conduct itself.[41] Moreover, creating a clear distinction between the focuses of both entities, the scope of the OAU was to fight colonialism and

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[28] Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation*, 2004, p. 7.
[29] Council on Foreign Relations, *The Nascent African Union*, 2006, p. 2-3.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] African Union, *President John Kufuor of Ghana*, 1981.
[33] Republic of South Africa. Department of Foreign Affairs, African Economic Community (AEC), 2004.
[34] Gottschalk & Schmidt, *The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States?*, 2004.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] Organization of American States, *OAS Charter*, 1948.
[37] Organization of African Unity, *Logos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa*, 1980-2000.
[38] Gottschalk & Schmidt, *The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States?*, 2004.
[39] El-Ayouty, Yassin. *The Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years*, 1994.
[40] African Union, *The African Union-European Commission Fact Sheet 2006, Year?!. Put n.d. if unavailable.*
[41] Gottschalk & Schmidt, *The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States?*, 2004.

apartheid, while the aim of the AU is to unify its 53 Member States politically, socially and economically in addition to attracting foreign aid and investment through the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance.[42]

Creation of the African Economic Community (AEC)

On June 3, 1991, the Abuja Treaty was adopted, which acknowledged the commitments of Member States in Africa to work towards establishing an African Economic Community (AEC).[43] The establishment of the AEC also represents an acknowledgement that there are "various factors which hinder the development of the African Continent and seriously jeopardize the future of its peoples."[44] More importantly, beyond establishing and environment of cooperation among Member States, this treaty was designed to promote better terms of trade for African commodities and improve market access for local community products.[45] In addition to the Abuja Treaty, the AU later developed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) framework which is "a comprehensive strategy to increase intra - African trade and promote exports and integrate Africa's trade into the international trading system."[46] Furthermore, the Abuja Treaty established five main building blocks or Regional Economic Communities (RECs): The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[47] Likewise, according to the treaty each building block or REC is to be strengthened, becoming free trade areas by 2011.[48] They are nominally scheduled to merge to form a continental single market by 2028.[49]

In July 2006, the African Union met in Banjul to address the repositioning of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in order to better respond to the economic development priorities, particularly focusing on issues related to regional integration.[50] The Summit also reaffirmed the role of ECA as a key institution needed to facilitate the work of the AU and the RECs in advancing the development agenda on the continent.[51] Also at this Summit, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa* (ARIA II) was launched, as a follow-up to *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa* (ARIA I) which allowed policy makers to make strategic evidence-based decisions on regional integration.[52] It is also a tool for monitoring and tracking integration process and its success in key sectors at the sub-regional and regional levels.[53] The outcome of ARIA II affirmed that that the regional economic communities become strengthened as overlapping functions of intergovernmental organizations are eliminated.[54]

Establishing the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

According to the implementation schedule of the Abuja Treaty, during the first stage Member States were to undertake measures to strengthen existing RECs and encourage the establishment of new communities throughout Africa.[55] In addition, Member States within these communities were encouraged to develop measures aimed at progressively promoting close co-operation among the various RECs, particularly through co-ordination and

[42] The Courier ACP-EU, *From OAU to AU: turning a page in the history of Africa*, 2002.

[43] Gottschalk & Schmidt, *The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States?*, 2004.

[44] African Union-African Economic Community (AEC), *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, 1991.

[45] African Union, *AEC Treaty Article 31 Section 1 and 2*, 1991.

[46] The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), *A Summary of NEPAD Action Plans.* p. 41.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Republic of South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs, *African Economic Community (AEC)*, 2004.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa, *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts*, 2007.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] United Nations, *Regional Commissions Regional Update, Twenty First Issue,* 2006.

[53] United Nations. Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa, *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts,* 2007

[54] Economic Commission for Africa, *ARIA II Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities Chapter Five, Inadequate Coordination at the Continental Level*, 2006.

[55] Abdoulahi, *Progress Report on Regional Integration Efforts in Africa towards the Promotion on Intra-African Trade,* 2005.

harmonization of their activities in all fields or sectors in order to ensure the realization of the objectives of the Community.[56] During the second stage, Member States are to first abstain from establishing any new customs duties and second they are discouraged from increasing those custom duties that apply in trade relations among other REC Member States. Moreover during the third stage of the schedule, it is advocated that Member States work favorably toward eliminating customs duties finally among themselves, at a regional level.[57]

Though the Abuja Treaty was originally designed to divide the continent into five regional areas, the establishment of several RECs was needed to bring the continent economically closer together and foster trade.[58] Currently, Africa has several regional integration groups, with most countries belonging to two or more.[59] This "constitutes a 'spaghetti bowl' that hinders regional integration by creating a complex entanglement of political commitments and institutional requirements that add significantly to the costs of conducting intra-regional business."[60] Therefore it was necessary to develop a framework that could help facilitate the attainment of a Pan- African Market.[61] The search for this framework led to the first continent-wide ministerial-level conference addressing regional integration issues, held in Burkina Faso on March 30-31, 2006, which recommended that certain RECs be designated as building blocks for the AEC while continent wide suspending the development of any new RECs .

Case Study: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

COMESA, Africa's largest regional trading bloc, was established on 8th December 1994 to replace the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which had been in existence since December 1981[62]. Almost half of Africa's population lives in the COMESA region, with a total population of 406,102,471 (2006 est.).[63] COMESA is also home to 10 of the poorest countries in the world: Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Peoples Republic of Congo Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Zambia.[64] It is important to note that the establishment of PTA, and its transformation into COMESA, was in conformity with the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) of the Organization of African Unity (Organization of African unity).[65]

According to the COMESA treaty, Member States have recognized that unless a large enough economic space can be created to attract and give guarantees to domestic, cross-border and foreign direct investment, the transformation of these economies from extreme dependence to self-reliance cannot be realized within the foreseeable future.[66] In addition, there are numerous agreements and protocols that have been signed by heads of state and their finance ministers to facilitate successful integration.[67]

In October 2000, the COMESA Free Trade Area (FTA), the first of its kind in Africa, was launched.[68] Nine Member States, including Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe, were in the first wave of the 20-country body to join the FTA.[69] The key mechanism for trade liberalization is the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-COMESA trade.[70] In this regard, COMESA has adopted a program for the reduction and eventual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-COMESA trade.[71] In November 2006, COMESA held its Summit in Djibouti and called on all Member States not yet participating in the Free Trade

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[56] African Union, *AEC Treaty Article 31 Section 1 and 2*, 1991.
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] South African Yearbook, *2001/02*, 2007.
[59] Economic Commission for Africa, *Annual Report on Integration 2002 Overview*, March 2002.
[60] Draper, Halleson, & Alves. *Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue in Southern Africa: From spaghetti to cannelloni?,* 2007.
[61] Manelisi, Kornegay, & Rule, *African Union and Pan-African Parliament: Working Papers,* 2000.
[62] Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), *Overview*, 2007.
[63] Muuka, Harrison, & McCoy, *Impediments to Economic Integration in Africa: The Case of COMESA*, 1998.
[64] COMESA, *Overview*, 2007.
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] Muuka, Harrison, & McCoy, *Impediments to Economic Integration in Africa: The Case of COMESA*, 1998.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] COMESA, *News Bulletin for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa*, 2006.
[69] Muuka, Harrison, & McCoy, *Impediments to Economic Integration in Africa: The Case of COMESA*, 1998.
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), *Overview*, 2007.

Area (FTA) to join before its next Summit in May 2007.[72] As part of the preparations for COMESA to become a Customs Union in 2008, the COMESA leadership also mandated that the work on the Common External Tariff (CET) for the zone be completed by its next Summit.[73] To encourage cooperation between COMESA and other RECs, the Summit endorsed the enhanced collaboration between COMESA and the East African Community, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Indian Ocean Commission using the framework provided by the Interregional Coordination Committee (IRCC) and the Southern African Development Community.[74] The IRCC and the Joint Task Force met to discuss coordination and harmonization of the activities of the institutions with the objective of achieving program harmonization and convergence so as to expedite the realization of the African Economic Community.[75]

Conclusion

Although the creation of RECs has brought the African Economic Community closer to the goal of establishing an African Economic Union, Africa still faces a number of ongoing challenges. Despite their good intentions, African countries are not independently pushing aggressively toward the goal of full integration.[76] Unfortunately, there are really no true enforcement mechanisms to deal with Member States that decide to not adhere to protocols and treaties they are signatories to.[77] The lack of a compensation mechanism for those who do not adhere to the integration process also acts as a constraint for the full implementation of integration.[78] It must be noted that tariffs and other trade taxes account for a large share of the revenues for many African countries.[79] The potential loss of this revenue, if all the protocols of the integration process are implemented, could inhibit the integration process, even if the potential benefits of integration outweigh the cost.[80] Compared to world standards, Africa's infrastructure network is generally very weak, constraining the physical integration of the continent.[81] Compounding the problems of the inadequate infrastructure are the numerous roadblocks on African highways, delays at border posts, long and inappropriate customs clearance and corrupt activities engaged in by some officials.[82] The multiple memberships of countries in various RECs, and the resulting overlap and duplication of functions of the RECs also act as stumbling blocks to the integration agenda.[83] With the exception of a few countries, most African countries belong to more than one regional economic community.[84] The existence of multiple RECs and overlapping membership in Africa's integration process therefore create unhealthy multiplication and duplication of efforts and the misuse of the continent's scarce resources.[85] Besides the multiplicity of "RECs", a

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[72] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa. *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts*, 2007.

[73] *Ibid*.

[74] *Ibid*

[75] *Ibid*.

[76] Gondwe, *Making Globalization Work in Africa,* 2001.

[77] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa. *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts*, 2007.

[78] Economic Commission for Africa, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II (ARIA II), Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, 2006.

[79] African Union, *First Conference of African Ministers of Economic Integration*, *Consultative Meeting of ACCRA and LUSAKA: Consolidated Report*, 2006.

[80] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa. *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts*, 2007.

[81] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, *World Development Indicators: States and Markets*, 2006.

[82] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa. *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts*, 2007.

[83] Economic Commission for Africa, *Annual Report on Integration 2002 Overview* , 2002.

[84] *Ibid*.

[85] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa. *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts,* 2007.

number of countries tend to belong to two or more "RECs" simultaneously.[86] Of the 53 African countries, 27 are members of two regional groupings, 18 belong to three, and one country is a member of four. Only seven countries have maintained membership in one bloc.[87]

Africa's macroeconomic and financial environment is very weak.[88] It is extremely important that Member States of a REC pursue convergent macroeconomic policies.[89] However, what is observed in most RECs are significant differences in tariffs, inflation, exchange rates, rate of money growth and other vital macroeconomic variables between Member States.[90] Equally important is the strengthening and deepening of financial markets and institutions on the continent to support the developmental agenda of the RECs. [91]

The success of regional integration also hinges critically on Member States pursuing convergent macroeconomic policies.[92] Misalignments of tariffs, inflation, exchange rates, rate of money growth and other vital macroeconomic variables between Member States would be disruptive to the regional integration process. In addition, these misalignments could lead to rent-seeking activities by government and private individuals that could stifle legitimate investment opportunities.[93] This could contribute to the demise of the economy of a member country, weakening the whole integration process. It is therefore imperative that the process of strengthening regional integration includes guidelines for the convergence of macroeconomic and trade polices of the entire regional space so as to strengthen the overall regional integration agenda.[94] Strengthening and deepening of Africa's financial markets and institutions are also essential for mobilizing the financial resources needed to finance integration projects such as infrastructure. These institutions also enhance the payment system and contribute to facilitating trade within and outside the regional communities. In addition to improving the financial markets, efforts may be needed to encourage the RECs to establish development banks in their regions to assist Member States in financing infrastructure projects. However, the integration of financial markets in Africa requires the harmonization of national policies and procedures governing these markets and institutions across Member States.[95]

Questions for Further Consideration

The globalization of trade and foreign investment over the past decade, as expressed in the World Trade Organization (WTO), have significantly exposed African economies to competitive pressures of the global economy.[96] Thus, how can we assure the benefits of broadly based societal involvement of all in Africa? Moreover, if there is agreement on the scope of integration plans and on an overall architecture, what should be the pace of integration? Likewise, new global trading rules under the WTO present both steep challenges and fresh new opportunities to national economies on the African continent.[97] Thus how can plans of regional integration be made more efficient while at the same time assuring Member States adequate financing? Currently the belief is that creating larger markets and promoting specialization helps generate wealth and reduce poverty. However, how can we assure that economic integration equitably serves to foster all parts of our societies? Indeed, increased trade between countries creates a demand for better roads, something Africa desperately needs, but how can we assure regional public goods including infrastructure, peace and security, public health and research throughout Africa? There is a growing consensus that Africa is damaging its economic prospects by restricting intra-Africa trade. As Oxfam has said, "increasing trade and investment between developing countries by reducing trade barriers could

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[86] Economic Commission for Africa, *Annual Report on Integration 2002 Overview*, 2002.

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa. *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts*, 2007.

[89] Mutasa, *Regional Integration and Debt in Africa: A Comparative report on Africa's Regional Groupings,* 2003.

[90] *Ibid.*

[91] United Nations Economic and Social Council-Economic Commission for Africa. *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts*, 2007.

[92] *Ibid.*

[93] *Ibid.*

[94] *Ibid.*

[95] *Ibid.*

[96] Freezones, *Concept Document on Formation of a Pan African Free Trade Zone Association* , 2006.

[97] *Ibid.*

bring real benefits in terms of employment and incomes to the people."[98] Therefore, what is the best pace and sequence of tasks towards regional integration? The conclusion is that Africa needs a new bold, constructive and ever encompassing road map of rethinking, rereading the past with a view of genuinely reconstructing the past, present and future within the true aspirations of the people to full realization. Proactive strategic policy measures are advanced.[99] Unless these informal trade barriers are tackled, millions of poor Africans will remained shackled in poverty.

II. Reinventing Growth in Africa: Development and Technological Innovation

"*Innovation is the main driver of economic growth but the capacity to innovate is quite low in most African countries, both in the private and in the public sector. Thus the ability to adopt new technologies and adapt them to local conditions will be the crucial first step to increase productivity, which is a precondition for growth and decent employment.*"[100]

Contemporary history informs us that the main explanation for the success of the industrialized countries lies in their ability to learn how to improve performance in a variety of fields – including institutional development, technological adaptation, trade, organization, and the use of natural resources.[101] In other words, the key to their success is putting a premium on learning by focusing on their skills as a way to solve problems. One of the most critical aspects of a learner's strategy is that every generation receives a legacy of knowledge from its predecessors that it can harness for its own advantage.[102]

Empirical analysis from the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) shows that the importance of secondary school enrollment, economic incentives, access to technology through imports, infrastructure and not least a functioning innovation system are likely to increase technological progress that results in labor productivity growth.[103] Each country must develop an innovation strategy based on its specific reality and situation.[104] The private sector should be involved in designing the innovation strategy.[105] For most African countries, improvements in the educational system, the initiation of interactions between the private sector and research institutions, the provision of risk capital for innovative firms, and the improvement of infrastructure for quality controls should feature high on the agenda.[106]

"The emphasis on knowledge should be guided by the view that economic transformation is a process of continuous improvement on productive activities, [advanced] through business enterprises."[107] The promotion of science and technology as a way to meet human welfare needs must take into account the additional need to protect Africa's environment for present and future generations.[108] "The concept of sustainable development has been advanced specifically to ensure the integration of social, economic and environmental factors in development strategies and associated knowledge systems."[109] Mapping out strategic options for Africa's economic revival will therefore need to be undertaken in the context of sustainable development strategies and action plans.[110]

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[98] Mitchell, *Shadow secretary of State for International Development Speech to the Cato Institute*, *A Pan-African Free Trading*, 2006.
[99] Forje, *Self-determination, Nationalism, Development and Pan-Africanism Stuck on the Runway: Are Intellectuals to Blame?*, 2007.

[100] Kim, *Technology, Learning, and Innovation: Experiences of Newly Industrializing Economies*, 2000, p 7.
[101] UNCTAD, *The Least Developed Countries Report 2002,* 2002, p. 1.
[102] *Ibid.*
[103] Juma, *Going for Growth: Science, Technology and Innovation in Africa*, 2005, p. 6-7.
[104] *Ibid.*
[105] *Ibid.*
[106] UNCTAD, *The Least Developed Countries Report 2002*, 2002, p.1.
[107] Juma, *Reinventing Growth: Technical Innovation and Economic Growth in Africa,* 2006, p. 4.
[108] *Ibid.*
[109] *Ibid.*
[110] Nelson, *Economic Growth via the Co-Evolution of Technology and Institutions*, 1994, p. 26.

Millennium Development Goals: Task Force on Science, Technology & Innovation

Technological change is at the heart of developmental worldwide.[111] "Yet, the conventional development advice meted out to developing countries is that they struggle and fail because of poor governance, usually associated primarily with governmental corruption and inability to develop or protect basic infrastructure."[112] The "common culprits for failing economies and low levels of overall [developments] in Africa are usually attributed to war and corruption."[113] Available figures suggest that as many as 30,000 Africans holding PhD degrees are living outside the continent.[114] Students who are able to find employment abroad leave, while some of those trained abroad do not return.[115] In Japan, the United States and Europe, there are between two and five scientists and technicians per 1,000 population.[116] Most of Africa has only one scientist or technician for about 10,000 population.[117] These factors have adverse effects for economies. A Task Force, created at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, addressed "the question of how science and technology can be enhanced and put to use to help all countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)."[118] "The mission of the Task Force is guided by the understanding that most MDGs cannot be achieved without a strong contribution from a framework of action that seeks to place science and technology at the center of development."[119]

In the past, transfer of technology has been focused on a very advanced level, arguably wrongly so.[120] For achieving the MDGs, "down to earth technologies" like mechanization of small farm, small-scale irrigation and potable water installation, small energy system, rural road to market and basic communications and computer facilities would be most telling.[121] In order for the African continent to achieve success, the reorientation of appropriate technology will not only require better funding trough donors, "but also a paradigm shift from political leaders" and elites inscience and technology.[122] By learning from those who have successfully achieved economic revival, would improve the chances of a reinvented growth in Africa.

Globalization of Technology: Windows of Opportunity or Further Burden?

Performance in Africa's economies has been deteriorating in the past two decades.[123] In 1970, sub-Saharan Africa's annual growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was at 3.2%, while South Asia's was 1.2%.[124] By 1989, the trend had been reversed with Africa averaging 2.2% and South Asia 3.2%.[125] In 1998, more than 301 million Africans were living on less that US$1 per day; which means an increase by 88 million since 1987.[126] Africa now has the largest share of people living on less than US$1 per day; it is the poorest region of the world."[127]

The ability to create, acquire and adapt new technologies is a critical requirement for competing successfully in the global marketplace.[128] It is a well-documented fact that Africa has not been able to participate in technological advancement.[129] Its technological gap is thus viewed as a possible cause of economic deterioration as other

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[111] Smith, *Transforming Technological Regimes for Sustainable Development: A Role for Appropriate Technology Niches*, 2003, p.15.

[112] *Ibid.*

[113] Wong, *USAID and Science and Technology Capacity Building for Development*, 2002, p. 3.

[114] UNESCO, *Science and Technology in Africa: A Commitment for the 21st Century*, 2004, p. 2.

[115] *Ibid*.

[116] *Ibid*.

[117] *Ibid*.

[118] United Nations Millennium Project, *Background Paper of the Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation*, 2003, p. 1.

[119] *Ibid.*

[120] Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, *Systems of Innovation and Human Capital Development in African Development*, 2003, p. 6.

[121] *Ibid.*

[122] *Ibid.*

[123] African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), *Africa, Science and Technology in the Age of Globalization*, 2002, p. 4-5.

[124] World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century*, 2002, p. 11.

[125] *Ibid.*

[126] *Ibid.*

[127] *Ibid*.

[128] Ayogu, *Globalization and Technology: Africa's Participation and Perspectives*, 2002, p. 2.

[129] *Ibid.*

developing regions are constantly upgrading their technological capabilities, and become more competitive.[130] Globalization offers new opportunities for diffusion of knowledge.[131] Acknowledging that developing countries are at disadvantage, it becomes even more important for them to implement active policies "designed to increase learning and improve access to knowledge and technology."[132]

The cases of Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have shown that effective technology strategies are based on a clear understanding of the basic unit of technological activity, the industrial firm, which imports, masters, uses and improves technology.[133] Business entrepreneurs and government officials have called upon the African Union (AU) to address the five main factors affecting technology development: physical infrastructure, skills, financing, technology, and supply clusters.[134] The continent of African has observed East Asia's newly industrialized economies, which indicate to them "that coherent and carefully crafted technology policies can accelerate competitiveness and promote entry into more complex and higher-level technology activities."[135] But other countries will need to follow the steps of Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, where effectiveness promoted capabilities.[136] And because of this, changes in traditional mindsets occurred to form "interactions and linkages with other firms or institutions, and to build technical know-how, as well as to overcome the problem of leakage of trained workers."[137]

Technical Education: Fuel for Growth

"Over the past three decades, Africa has had to face new challenges in both the political and the socio-economic contexts."[138] Most African countries today are still characterized by the following: Most populations are rural based, between 70-90% mainly depending on subsistence farming.[139] In urban areas, most people are engaged in crafts and manual labor.[140] Fast growing populations are mostly composed of youth.[141] For example, 48% of Uganda's population is under 15 years of age and 20% being children under five years.[142] This implies a heavily dependent population. "Combined with prevalent economic malaise at home, most countries experienced high rates of inflation, frequent devaluation of national currencies, and high interest rates, all of which adversely affected the growth of industry and business, and eroded the purchasing power of the people."[143]

The current situation has lead to a decline in enrollments in both education and training situations.[144] "A common feature underlining educational reforms in Africa is the introduction and expansion of technical and vocational education in the general school curriculum."[145] Other than providing technical and vocational education, a new view is emerging that places universities and research institutions at the center of the development process.[146] Higher education and research institutions have therefore become a valuable resource for business, industry and society.[147]

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[130] Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, *How Can Africa Benefit from Globalization: Global Governance of Technology and Africa's Global Exclusion*, 2005, p. 1.

[131] Tchuente, *Globalization, Science and Technology: Challenges and Opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa,* 2004, p. 3-4.

[132] Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, *How Can Africa Benefit from Globalization: Global Governance of Technology and Africa's Global Exclusion*, 2005.

[133] Archibugi, *The Globalization of Technology and its Implications for Developing Countries*, 2002, p. 1.

[134] *Ibid.*

[135] Lall, *Technological Change and Industrialization in the Asian Newly Industrializing Economies: Achievement and Challenges*, 2000, p. 10-11.

[136] UNCTAD, *Africa's Technology Gap: Case Studies on Kenya, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania*, 2003, p. 7-8.

[137] *Ibid.*

[138] African Union, *Strategy to Revitalize Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Africa*, 2007, p. 1.

[139] Scherwin, *Learning Innovation Policy Based on Historical Experience*, 2003, p. 1.

[140] *Ibid.*

[141] *Ibid.*

[142] *Ibid.*

[143] *Ibid.*

[144] Fredriksen, *Building Capacity in the Education Sector in Africa: The Need to Strengthen External Agencies' Capacity to Help*, 2005, p. 2.

[145] *Ibid.*

[146] Hansen, *Agents of Change: Universities as Development Hubs*, 2006, p.1-2.

[147] *Ibid.*

In facilitating the development of business and industrial firms, universities can contribute to economic revival and high-tech growth in their regions.[148]

The Colombo Plan: An Example for Africa

At the Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs held in Colombo in 1950, "convened to exchange views on the needs of the countries of Asia, a Consultative Committee was established to survey needs, assess the resources available and required, focus world attention on the problems involved, and provide a framework within which international cooperation efforts could be promoted to assist the countries of the area to raise the living standards."[149]   The Colombo Plan promotes a common intergovernmental effort in order to strengthen economic and social development in the Asia-Pacific region.[150]   The Plan encouraged "developing member countries to become donors themselves and participate in economic and technical cooperation."[151]   The Plan from the 1950s to the 1970s had the most successful human resource capacity building program for South East Asia.[152]

"Without doubt, States such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, were greatly helped by the technological and professional manpower trained under the Colombo Plan. It contributed significantly to the stable administrative transition from colonial rule in South-East Asia." [153]   The presence of Plan students from Asia gradually triggered a flow of students from South-East Asia to Australia.[154]   The Plan Scholarship and Fellowship Program for South-East Asia, however, very much ended in the late 70s; before similar issues in Africa were recognized by the international community.[155]   The Colombo Plan could serve as a model for Africa and its concept could thus be further examined.

Looking Ahead

"Poverty in Africa is substantially higher than in other developing regions. More enigmatic is that poverty in Africa is chronic and rising. The share of the total population living below $1 a day threshold of 46% is higher today than in the 1980s and 1990s – this despite significant improvements in the growth of African GDP in recent years."[156] "The implication: poverty has been unresponsive to economic growth. Underlying this trend is the fact that the majority of people have no jobs or sources of income."[157]

The *Declaration on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa* by the Heads of State and Government of the African Union in 2004 acknowledged that in order to be a part of the world market for new technologies, enterprises need to be aware of the opportunities being presented by technological development.[158]   Africa will need to chart a new development path that will require creative thinking and risk taking.[159]   All learning processes – of which development is a part – entail a large degree of experimentation and risk taking.[160]   What is critical is therefore not simply assessing the final impact of special projects, but creating environments that promote trust through continuous feedback.[161] Conventional judgments about project "failure" and "success" will need to be replaced with

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[148] *Ibid.*

[149] Overseas Aid, *The Virtual Colombo Plan – Bridging the Digital Divide,* 2001, p. 11-13.

[150] *Ibid*.

[151] *Ibid*.

[152] *Ibid.*

[153] Rivkin, *An Economic Development Proposal for Africa: A New Multilateral Aid Organization*, 1958, p. 16.

[154] Overseas Aid, *The Virtual Colombo Plan – Bridging the Digital Divide*, 2001, p. 11-13.

[155] *Ibid.*

[156] Economic Commission for Africa, *Economic Report on Africa 2005: Meeting the Challenges of Unemployment and Poverty in Africa*, 2005, p. 8-9.

[157] *Ibid*.

[158] *Ibid.*

[159] Juma, *Reinventing Growth: Technical Innovation and Economic Growth in Africa,* 2006, p. 4.

[160] *Ibid.*

[161] *Ibid.*

a greater emphasis on lessons learned.[162] As Einstein put it, "[a]nyone who has never made a mistake has never tried anything new."[163]

When preparing for the Conference, delegates should research their national policies on innovation and technology. Does the respective State participate in regional or international cooperation? How is the lack of human resources and expertise addressed? What can be done to improve educational programs and how should resources be allocated? How could the AU contribute to increase chances for technological innovation in a regional perspective? How can benefits best be put to use for development? Which role should non-State and other international actors play? What can be learned from other regions or previous projects?

III. The Role of African Union Peacekeepers in Regional Conflicts

"I dream of an Africa which is in peace with itself, I dream of the realization of the unity of Africa, whereby its leaders combine in their efforts to solve the problems of this continent."[164]

On July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa, the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union adopted the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* for the purpose of "establishing an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction."[165] The Peace and Security Council (PSC) represents a recognition by the African Union (AU) that the "prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa… has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population" than any other single internal factor.[166] In the past fifty years, Africa has seen approximately thirty conflicts, accounting for nearly ten million deaths, at a financial cost of some $250 billion.[167] Recent failures by the international peacekeeping system, such as the Rwandan genocide of 1994, illustrate the need for Africa to assume more responsibility for peace operations on the continent.[168] There have been steps toward this goal; in Burundi in 2003, for example, the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution authorized the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which operated for 14 months before handing over responsibility to the UN.[169] The UN has worked closely with the OAU, and now the AU, through UN Development Programme (UNDP) support for the Conflict Management Centre, the development of an early-warning and response capacity, and support through the Peace Fund.[170] The UN, however, is not currently prepared to assist on an ongoing basis with the deployment of regional peacekeeping forces, which leads to questions regarding the future of collaborative AU-UN missions.[171]

Peacekeeping Mechanisms

Increasingly, African conflicts have been intrastate, rather than interstate, in character,[172] which may limit the capacity of the AU to respond in a timely fashion.[173] To address this gap, the AU authorized creation of the PSC, its

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[162] *Ibid.*
[163] A.S.L.& Associates, *Memorable Albert Einstein Quotes*, 2007.
[164] Nelson Mandela, quoted in Godwin, *Without Borders: Uniting Africa's Wildlife Reserves*, 2005.
[165] African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,* 2002.
[166] *Ibid.*
[167] Murithi, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development,* 2005, p.82.
[168]*Ibid.,* p.98.
[169] Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation,* 2004, p.10.
[170] United Nations. General Assembly. 56th Session, *Report of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,* (A/56/45), 2001, p.5.
[8]Henry L. Stimson Center, Future of Peace Operations Program., *UN-AU Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa,* 2007.
[172] International Peace Academy, *The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions,* 2002, p.2. That is not to say there are no transnational repercussions, only that the nature of the conflict is that of civil war, rather than interstate war.
[173] *Ibid.*

"standing decision-making body for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts."[174] Like the UN Charter, the Constitutive Act of the AU indicates a respect for the sovereign equality of Member States, and for the principle of non-intervention by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.[175] It takes the significant step, though, of giving the AU the right to "intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity."[176] The Constitutive Act also takes the further step of "condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government."[177] These provisions allow for the possibility of peace operations without the expressed permission of the Member State in which the conflict is occurring.[178]

To carry out its decisions, the PSC has mandated the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF),[179] a system of regionally based standby brigades, capable of responding to a crisis far more quickly than the three to six months it takes to deploy a UN peace operation once the decision has been made to do so.[180] The ASF, as outlined by the African Chiefs of Defense Staff, will ultimately consist of five sub-regional brigades of 3000 to 4000 troops, for total troop strength of 15000 to 20000.[181] It will also consist of 300 to 500 trained military observers, 240 individual police officers, and two company strength police units - some 700 total police officers - and is intended to be fully operational by 2010.[182]

Perhaps the most significant obstacle threatening the successful implementation of the ASF is the issue of funding.[183] Peacekeeping operations are extremely expensive; the African Mission in Burundi, with 3335 personnel, had an operational budget of $110 million per year.[184] Compared to the AU Commission's 2003 budget of $32 million, it becomes evident that AU Member States will likely have to finance troop and equipment contributions out if their own pockets, as South Africa has done, or find donor funds, as Ethiopia has done.[185] In either case, there is little chance of reimbursement from the AU anytime soon.[186]

Peace Operations: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding

Traditional peacekeeping refers to the efforts of a neutral, external military force intervening between two or more warring factions to both maintain peace and to facilitate a lasting settlement to the conflict.[187] Peacemaking, on the other hand, refers to the other means of ending a conflict, consisting of the political and diplomatic activities which create the circumstances under which peacekeeping troops may be withdrawn.[188] South African troops intervening in Burundi were peacekeepers.[189] Nelson Mandela acted as a peacemaker when facilitating talks between government and rebel groups in Burundi.[190] The third category of peace operations, peacebuilding, is a "long-term, complex, multidimensional process during which the previously warring parties lay down their arms, learn to manage their differences without resorting to violence, develop a common set of goals and common identity, move towards the creation of a just and more equitable society, and rebuild relationships that have broken."[191] Peacebuilding is the overall, long-term process of moving from negative peace - the mere absence of violent conflict - to a situation of positive peace - the provision of real human security for a country's population.[192]

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[174] African Union. *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,* 2002.
[175] African Union, *Constitutive Act*, 2000.
[176] *Ibid*.
[177] *Ibid.*
[178] African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,* 2002.
[179] *Ibid*.
[180] Kent & Malan, *The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects*, 2003, p.73.
[181] de Coning, *Refining the African Standby Force Concept*, 2004, p.21.
[182] *Ibid*.
[183] Neethling, *Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects*, 2005, p.70.
[184] *Ibid*.
[185] de Coning, *Peacekeeping Trends,* 2003, p.35.
[186] *Ibid.*
[187] Mirbagheri, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The Example of Cyprus*, 2006, p.37.
[188] *Ibid*.
[189] Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation,* 2004, p.11.
[190] *Ibid.*, p.10.
[191] Ali & Matthews, *The Long and Difficult Road to Peace,* p.395.
[192] *Ibid.*

UN peacekeeping troops may be deployed under several guidelines.[193] For a UN mission to occur, for example, "there must be a peace to keep, and all key parties to the conflict must consent to stop fighting, and to accept the UN role in helping them resolve their dispute and to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission."[194] In the case of the AU, however, the guidelines are slightly different. The PSC "is empowered to mandate peacekeeping missions in conflict areas where ceasefire accords have been signed and to recommend to the assembly of AU heads of state that troops be deployed uninvited in cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity."[195]

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

The concept of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is currently one of the most talked about solutions for conflict-prone areas.[196] The first two components of the process are finite and inherently quantifiable, while reintegration is ongoing, difficult to accurately measure, and dependent upon many interconnected issues extending far beyond the formal end of the war.[197] The World Bank states that "ex-combatants are an especially vulnerable group in a post-conflict setting. Their reintegration into civil society and opportunities for a stable livelihood in a peacetime society are crucial to the sustainability of peace."[198] Sustainable peace is the obvious goal, yet 44% of post-war countries will relapse into conflict within the first five years of peace.[199] Even with a durable peace, it can take more than a generation for living standards to return to pre-war levels.[200]

Sierra Leone presents a valuable example of the DDR process, as laid out in the 1999 Lomé Agreement.[201] Disarmament is the process of assembling combatants, collecting personal information, gathering and disabling for storage their weaponry, and transporting the disarmed combatants to demobilization centres.[202] Disarmament removes the means by which violence is committed, providing a more stable environment for the continuation of the peace process.[203] During demobilization, ex-combatants are provided with the basic necessities of life and prepared for reinsertion into civil society through such activities as psycho-social counselling, trauma healing, sensitization training, and civic education.[204] Demobilization is often combined with the process of selecting ex-combatants to serve in the security and military forces of the newly-peaceful country, integrating formerly opposed soldiers and creating reliance and trust between them.[205] At the end of the demobilization process, ex-combatants are assisted with travel to their chosen places of resettlement, given a three month reintegration allowance, and provided with support in their new communities.[206]

Reintegration is the most important element to the establishment of a lasting peace, involving social, economic, and psychological elements, all crucial to the long-term capabilities of ex-combatants to live peaceful and constructive lives.[207] Successful reintegration must involve not only the ex-combatants, but also their families and communities.[208] In Angola, for example, 55,000 disarmed ex-combatants had 300,000 family members who, against UN advice, did not go through the reintegration program, creating extremely difficult economic and social circumstances.[209] It is also worth noting the importance of societal support, as evidenced by the fact that demobilized soldiers are more successfully reintegrated into rural communities, where the tradition of support is

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[193] United Nations, *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine Draft 3),* 2007, p.23.

[194] United Nations. United Nations Peacekeeping, *Meeting New Challenges*, n.d.

[195] Agence France Presse, *Pan-African Grouping Launches Its Own Security Council*, 2004.

[196] Ngoma, *Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration: A Conceptual Discourse,* 2004, p.79.

[197] Thusi & Meek, *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, 2003, p.23.

[198] The World Bank. *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*: *Demobilization and Reintegration*, 2004.

[199] The World Bank. *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, 2007.

[200] *Ibid*.

[201] Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 1999.

[202] Thusi & Meek, *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, 2003, p.27.

[203] Spear, *Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration in Africa*, 2006, p.63.

[204] Thusi & Meek, *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, 2003, p.27.

[205] Spear, *Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration in Africa*, 2006, p.67.

[206] Thusi & Meek, *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, 2003, p.27.

[207] Spear, *Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration in Africa*, 2006, p.68.

[208] *Ibid.,* p.69.

[209] *Ibid.*

stronger than in urban areas.[210] Execution of the DDR processes can have long-lasting implications for the successful establishment of a political economy for peace.[211]

Case Study: The African Mission in Burundi

On August 28, 2000, the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi was signed, bringing to an end the civil war which began in 1993 with the assassination of Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi army officers.[212] The civil war claimed some 350,000 lives, and required years of difficult peace talks before the Arusha Agreement was finally signed.[213] After facilitating negotiation of the Agreement, Nelson Mandela used his influence to gain consent from South Africa for deployment to Burundi of the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) in October 2000.[214] Following the Arusha Agreement, there were two separate ceasefires signed in October and December of 2002.[215] Article 8 of Protocol V of the Arusha Agreement provided for the Burundian Government to request from the UN a peacekeeping force to, among other duties, ensure adherence to the ceasefire, provide support for demobilization efforts, and ensure protection of public institutions and persons .[216] The October 2002 ceasefire, however, provided for monitoring by a UN or an African Mission, while the December 2002 agreement called for monitoring by an African Mission.[217] Following these two ceasefire agreements, in April 2003 the Central Organ of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution mandated "deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) for an initial period of one year subject to renewal by the Central Organ, and pending the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Force to be mandated by the UN Security Council as envisaged in the Agreements."[218] As the first African Peacekeeping Mission, AMIB had four stated objectives: first, to oversee implementation of the ceasefire agreements; second, to support disarmament and demobilization initiatives and advise on reintegration of combatants; third, to strive towards securing conditions favorable for the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping mission; and finally, to contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi.[219]

Altogether, AMIB involved 3,335 personnel, including troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, and observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Togo and Tunisia.[220] In striving to meet its objective of DDR, AMIB set up three demobilization centers, expecting to disarm an estimated 20,000 ex-combatants, but succeeded in disarming only around 200, and even then only with substantial support from the EU, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the German Technical Corporation (GTZ).[221]

After 14 months of operations, AMIB handed over control of peace operations in Burundi to the UN.[222] UN Security Council Resolution 1545, adopted May 21, 2004, created United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB).[223] AMIB was arguably quite successful in three of its four aims, but the DDR process fell far short of expectations, largely due to limited resources, and this raises questions about future AU peace operations, and their capacity for successful DDR.[224]

Conclusion

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[210] *Ibid.*

[211] *Ibid.*, p.76.

[212] Southall, *A Long Prelude to Peace: African Involvement in Ending Burundi's Civil War,* 2006, p.201.

[213] *Ibid.*

[214] Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation,* 2004, p.10.

[215] *Ibid.*, p.9.

[216] Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi, 2000.

[217] Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation,* 2004, p.9-10.

[218] Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, *91st Ordinary Session*, 2003.

[219] *Ibid.*

[220] Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation,* 2004, p.11.

[221] *Ibid.*, p.11-12.

[222] *Ibid.*, p.10.

[223] United Nations Security Council, *S/Res/1545*, 2004.

[224] Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation,* 2004, p.11.

The AU has undertaken a number of initiatives in peace operations, but there are still many questions left unanswered. What will be the role of the RECs as participants in AU missions? What obstacles may keep an REC or country from getting involved, and how may those obstacles be overcome? What will be the ultimate role of the PSC, still a relatively new body, still to face its most difficult challenges? What role will AU peacekeepers play as the PSC develops? As evidenced by the African Mission in Burundi, there is a will on the continent to take on a greater responsibility for peace operations, and AMIB provided a solid footing from which to step forward. What effect may the outcome of one mission have upon subsequent decisions of the PSC? One successful operation may create the drive to continue, but one failure can destroy public confidence. AMIB also demonstrated some of the severe difficulties the AU will face - namely, problems in funding large-scale peace operations. Since the PSC is an attempt to move away from reliance upon the West for peacekeeping; is it acceptable to be reliant upon Western donors to fund AU peace operations? The question of cost arises at every turn, it seems. Who will support the ASF, both financially and with the troops and equipment it needs, and will the Force be able to realize its goals? As countries benefit from peace operations, are they under a greater obligation in the future, as they recover, to contribute to other missions? And just what are the benefits of a successful operation? How far do those benefits extend? Refugees, internally displaced persons, extraterritorial environmental impacts of conflict all must be considered, but just how much weight should such factors carry in calculating the benefits of success? Considering success, one must also consider post-conflict operations, like DDR. Given the high cost of programs like DDR, is it worth it? What role can AU peacekeepers play in the DDR process? Should this even be an AU concern, or should DDR be left to the UN? What role is the AU to play? Is the ultimate goal of AU peacekeeping to replace UN peacekeeping, or to fill in the gaps between UN missions? Clearly, the role of AU peacekeepers has yet to be finalized. There are indications of things to come, such as the collaboration between the AU and UN in Darfur,[225] and Darfur may well prove to be a significant step in the formalization of the operational relationship between the AU and UN. There are other relationships, too, though, which must be considered. The AU does not exist in a vacuum on the continent, and among the chief concerns must be the relationship between AU peacekeepers and RECs, like the South African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS, largely through the efforts of Nigeria, created the ECOWAS Armed Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which has been deployed to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Guinea-Liberia border.[226] The SADC intervened in 1998 in Lesotho, with mixed results, but ultimate success.[227] These examples further illustrate the growing desire within Africa for self-reliance, and the increasing capacity to handle, from within the continent, the plague of conflict across the continent. Just how AU peacekeepers will accomplish this remains to be seen.

The questions are seemingly endless; they arise from past experience and from future plans, as well as from current events and conditions. Some are plainly evident, while others lurk behind the tiny details and pop up unexpectedly. Which questions are the truly important ones, the ones upon which rest the success of the PSC, the ASF, and peace in Africa, is a matter open for debate. Open for even more debate are the answers.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the African Union (AU)

Adeniji, Kolawole. (2005). *The African Union and the African Model Law*. Retrieved October 6, 2007, from
http://www.eli.org/pdf/africa/adeniji.pdf
The African Union (AU) initiative is an effort to put into place a "sui generis" system of protection of the rights of local communities. This source will be very useful in understanding the formulation of the African common position which calls for fair trade rather than free trade, thus carrying the African Union to one of their goals of growth.

African Unification Front. (2002). *Brief Overview of the History of the African Union: Towards African National Sovereignty*. Retrieved October 1, 2007, from http://www.africanfront.com/history.php

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[225] United Nations Security Council, *S/Res/1769,* 2007.
[226] BBC News. Africa, *Profile: ECOMOG,* 2004.
[227] de Coning, *Lesotho Intervention: Implications for SADC*, 1998, p.1.

The struggle for national sovereignty is the central theme of this article, in which it examines the previous centuries of Africa, in its struggles of slavery and colonialism, through the Cold War and decolonization, to the battles of poverty and civil conflict. A great article to understanding who were the key players and actors in determining the need of an organization for unification, this will help in realizing how the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the AU were created.

African Union. (2007). *African Union In A Nutshell*. Retrieved October 1, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm
The history of the African Union is a short and new story for the continent, but its advent and creation has been in the making since the 1950s. This Web site is a great source in establishing the foundation and principles needed for the African continent to fully achieve the goal of unity and solidarity, in a time of globalization, crisis, poverty, and opportunities.

African Union. (2007). *The Assembly*. Retrieved October 6, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/assembly_en.htm
A short look into how the Assembly of the African Union operates, this source is important in understanding how Heads of State or Government will determine the common policies of the organization and how to receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations from other organs of the Union. Taking a quick look at the rules of procedure of the Assembly can help in seeing how the AU has improved their efforts for furthering unification of the continent.

African Union. (2002). *Constitutive Act of the African Union*. Retrieved October 5, 2007, from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.pdf
The Constitutive Act of the African Union is a helpful in comprehending the noble ideals which guides the organization in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa. It also recalls the struggles waged by the African people for their political independence, human dignity and economic emancipation. Taking a close look at what necessary measures need to be taken to strengthen the common institutions will help in understanding the theme of unity for the organization..

African Union. (2007). *Member States of the African Union*. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/Member_states/fmmember_states_a.htm
This brief webpage includes the full membership of the African Union and their years of admittance to the organization. Utilize this source to familiarize yourself with the 53 African Member States who work to promote their vision of unity and growth within the continent.

African Union. (1999). *Sirte Declaration on the AU*. Retrieved October 4, 2007, from http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/african/docs/ahsg/ahsg64.doc
This document is an excellent source in learning the history of how the African Union was established. By looking at the extensive deliberations on how to strengthen the continent and organization known as the OAU, this document will reveal how Heads of State and Government came to an understanding for a new vision of a stronger and unified Africa, capable of meeting global challenges and shouldering more responsibility.

African Union. (2004). *Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union*: *Volume 3: 2004-2007 Plan of Action*. Retrieved September 30, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Vision/Volume3.pdf
The Strategic Plan constitutes a clear and coherent whole, containing day-to-day concerns of the peoples of Africa. It presents a clear-cut activities program with devoted energy to craft the programs that would serve as a platform for it to fulfill all its missions and produce enough visible and positive effect. This source is an excellent one for understanding how the African people will be fully utilized in enhancing the meaning and value of citizenship in Africa.

African Union. (2007). *Vision and Mission of the African Union*. Retrieved October 6, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/vision_mission.htm.

This is an important resource to maintain when researching the history and topics of the African Union. The Commission of the African Union has set their vision to three vital documents to achieve their mandate. The question of how does the African Union attain their objectives is a worthy question that their organization puts forward in its daily routines. The necessary road maps and requisite conditions will help in understanding how the AU can achieve their objectives.

Agoagye, Festus. (2004). *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation*. Retrieved October 6, 2007, from http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2004-2/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf.
In 1993, prospects for peace and stability of Burundi were disturbed in the wake of assassination of President Francois Ndadaye. The African Mandate in Burundi (AMIB) and then the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) were assigned the task to restore peace and stability in the country. This article provides an overview of the establishment, mandate and concept of operations. It also undertakes a brief assessment of the strategic and operational challenges and accomplishments from the mandates.

Babarinde, Olufemi. (2007). *The EU as a Model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation*. Retrieved October 4, 2007, from http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/BabarindeEUasModellong07edi.pdf.
While the optimism among African leaders and delegates about the African Union is present and strong, Olufemi Babarine urges the key players to caution "not to mistake hope for achievement." He claims that this is an apt and timely reminder of Africa's poor record on following through on intra-continental treaties and agreements, where it seems that they are more content with launching new initiatives than delivering on results. This is a wonderful article to remind those on a key component of bridging nations together on the continent is through continued efforts and not new initiatives.

Birmingham, David. (1998). *Kwame Nkrumah: Father of African Nationalism.* Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
David Birmingham's book is a great read to understanding how the theme of "unification" was first created among the peoples of Africa. Known as the father of African Nationalism, Kwame Nkrumah was a brilliant man whose heart was in seeing his people and neighbors come together and achieve greatness among the great powers of the world.

Boddy-Evans, Alistair. (2006). *Biography: Idi Amin Dada*. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from http://africanhistory.about.com/od/biography/a/bio_amin.htm
This short article looks at the history and biography of Idi Amin Dada, whose regime initiated and prolonged years of acts of torture, crime and despair in Uganda. This is one of the many examples that the Organizational of African Unity had in front of their eyes to put down, but were unable to because of a lack of unity among Member States.

Browne, Dallas E. (2005). *Pan-Africanism and the African Union*. Retrieved October 5, 2007, from http://www.siue.edu/~mafolay/JournalInfo/Vol-2/Issue%201%20revised.pdf
Dallas Browne researches the political philosophy of how an organization can encourage unity among the peoples of Africa. Pan-Africanism, the philosophy tool used by Browne to conduct his research, is a unique way into looking how by acting together, an entire continent can accomplish much more than if any of the Member States acted alone. With the birth of the African Union and official recognition by Africans as full members, unity is finally seen as a dream that can be finally realized.

Bujra, Abdulla. (2002). *Africa: Transition from the OAU to the AU*. Retrieved September 30, 2007, from http://www.dpmf.org/meetings/From-OAU-AU.html
This source is a very helpful introduction on how the transformation from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union occurred. While the OAU and its founding was the culmination of a long struggle that goes back to even the 19th century, those struggles were finally realized in a new entity that could work better to unify the continent of Africa.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2006). *The Nascent African Union*. Retrieved October 5, 2007, from
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11616/nascent_african_union.html
*A good introduction of how the African Union was created and its functions, this article from the
Council on Foreign Relations also endeavors into the barriers that the AU still faces today. A key
component of what will make or break the African Union is its role in handling the Darfur crisis.
This article will examine the Darfur crisis and other interventions that the AU has mounted since
its creation in the early 2000's.*

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http://www.oau-creation.com/OAU%20Charter.htm
*The Organization of African Unity Charter is worth noting, especially when trying to distinguish
the similarities and differences between this and the African Union's Charter. Examine the
language of this Charter, and notice how the theme of unity and solidarity is uniquely stated in
this Charter, compared to that of the African Union.*

Diawara, Manthia. (1998). *In Search of Africa.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
*With unending images of cultural backwardness and tribal warfare, the continent of Africa
remains the most misunderstood region on Earth. That is why Manthia Diawara's book is a
special book to read, with an empirical look at the past, present and future. While not overlooking
the horrible historical impact of slavery and European colonialism, Diawara looks into the
internal corruption and dangerous ethnic customs. The final chapter is worth noting, with the
quote "Our desire to be modernized has been awakened, and it cannot be denied."*

Ford, Neil. (2004). United We Succeed. In *News Africa*, March 2004, p.32-33.
*Neil Ford's article from News Africa is a wonderful story about how the theme of "unity" is
slowly being achieved in the continent of Africa. With the Organization of African Unity and now
the African Union, the goal of uniting the entire continent has had its hardships. But Neil Ford
examines a few case studies that have shown Africa can succeed from its current stages of poverty
and civil conflict, if the other Member States contribute energy and willingness to assist for the
purpose of a safer and better continent.*

Mohammed, Abdul. (2002). *Challenges of the African Union*. Symposium on the African Union: Organized by
InterAfrica Group and Justice Africa. Retrieved October 9, 2007, from
http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Speeches/2002_speeches/030202presentation_abdul.htm
*Abdul Mohammed's piece is an excellent source to familiarize oneself with in regards to the
challenges and obstacles that the African Union faces in the next decade. The author's main point
is the importance of having open dialogue and an exchange of ideas when attempting
reconciliation. Doing so will allow the continent of Africa to unite as the founding fathers
imagined.*

Organization of African Unity. Department of Foreign Affairs. (2000). *Profile: The Organization of African Unity*.
Retrieved October 4, 2007, from http://www.nepad.org.ng/PDF/About%20Nepad/OAU.pdf.
*This source looks at the history and organizational responsibility of the Organization of African
Unity. Its aims of promoting the unity and solidarity of African States and coordinating and
intensifying their efforts to achieve a better life for the African peoples, shows the usefulness in
coordinating political, economic, educational, cultural, and other priorities into achieving their
objectives.*

Organization of African Unity. (1996). *Purposes and Principles*. Retrieved October 1, 2007, from
http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/law/oau.htm
*Another introductory reading in learning about the responsibilities and functions of the
Organization of African Unity. The purposes and principles of the OAU were important in
creating a unified organization, but it lacked the expertise and decision-making aspects needed to
develop and strengthen their continent.*

Salim, Salim A. (2004). The Challenges Facing Africa for the Coming Decade. *DPMN Bulletin*, *8*, p. 7. Retrieved October 2, 2007 from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/IDEP/UNPAN002468.pdf
Salim's speech on the challenges facing Africa demonstrates the resilience of the African people, in that after centuries of subjugation, humiliation, and of being divided through the twin historical evils of slavery and colonialism, the African people can still remain adamant in their quest for carving a destiny of unity and solidarity. In his words, there was a "common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and cooperation among our States in response to the aspirations of brotherhood and solidarity."

Thompson, Vincent B. (1969). *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism*. New York: Beacon Books.
This book is an excellent source in identifying the required skills needed to achieve the wide range of disciplines for integration. It also examines the capacity-building that should be used when strengthening national capacities. Without using capacity-building to achieve better regional integration, there will arise ineffective application and enforcement to establish a unified continent.

United Nations Information Service. (2003). *In Address to African Union Summit, Secretary-General Outlines Major Challenges, Urgent Areas Where Africa Must Demonstrate Ownership Through Action*. Retrieved October 9, 2007, from
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sgsm8778.html
Kofi Annan's address to the African Union on 11 July, 2003 sets the picture of Africa needing to do more and demonstrating responsibility and ownership to their past history. Partnership is a key focus in the Secretary-Generals' speech, where Africa will need to respect, acknowledge, and accept Africa's contribution to its own development and development of humanity.

I. Implementation of a Pan-African Free Trade Zone

African Union. (n.d.). *Plan of the African Union Commission*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/AU%20summit%202004/VOLUM%201%20-%20STRATEGIC%20PLAN%20OF%20THE%20COMMISSION%20-%20last%20version-%E2%80%A6.pdf
This document discusses the vision of an integrated African and the mechanisms needed to transfer Africa from its current state in to a complete union. Secondly the document the impact that NEPAD has had on African development and what is needed from this framework to continue down the path of total African integration. Finally, it also discusses the political stability needed to address the social issues such as Human Rights abuses and political distrust that hinder economic developmental success in Africa.

African Union. (n.d.). *Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.africaunion.org/AU%20summit%202004/Volume3%20%20Strategic%20Plan%20final.pdf
This document goes over in detail the various plans or action sheets which discuss the AU Commission's plans for the up coming year. This document details each the priorities of the commission and step-by-step how the Commission plans to achieve them. The document also provides a recap table that gives a portfolio of the major players responsible for carrying out these plans.

African Union. (n.d.). *Symposium on the African Union Statement of Consensus*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/AUsymposiumconsensus.htm
This document discusses the consensus that was established on part of the participants in the Symposium on the African Union. Furthermore, this consensus declares that Africa must unite and gives an overview of how this goal can be achieved. In addition, this document gives some insight on the integration lessons that have already been learned and how they can be applied now to help Africa overcome existing economic obstacles.

African Union. (2006, March). *First Conf of African Ministers of Economic Integration, Consultative Meeting of ACCRA and LUSAKA*. Retrieved July 1, 2007, from http://www.africaunion.org/Economic%20Affairs/ RECS%20Rationalization/AU%20site5/ Documents/Draft%20Consolidated%20Report%20on%20Rationalization%20Consultation.doc
The consolidated report first discusses and compares the AU's RECs in relation to other Inter-Governmental Organization that currently operate in Africa to foster intra-regional trade. Second, the report discusses the changes and direct effects that two Consultative Meetings held in Accra, Ghana and Lusaka, Zambia respectively had on the AU's goal of Establishing a African Free Trade Zone. Finally, this report discusses the motivations that existed to establish the AU's plan to develop a strategy for total REC economic integration.

African Union. (2007, June 30). 1st Session. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace. In *African Union*. Retrieved August 25, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/ Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf
This is the founding document for the AU Peace and Security Council, it outlines the reasoning behind its creation. The document also discusses the intended goals of the PSC, and their respective roles and duties they have in promoting peace on the African Continent. The document also outlines the relationship the PSC should have with other pertinent bodies within the AU. Finally the document, provides information on funding guidelines, and replaces the Declaration on the Establishment, within the OAU, of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

Agoagye, F. (2004, February). The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation. *Conflict Trends Magazine*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2004-2/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf
This article discusses the successes and failures of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). From this, the document discusses nine key lessons and how these will need to incorporated in future AU peacekeeping operations. The document also discusses the difficulties encountered by AMIB, under the current political and economic conditions in Africa which lead to the author to suggested further challenges that must be dealt with if Africa is to have successful peace keeping operations.

Amponsah, W. A. (n.d.). *Analytical and Empirical Evidence of Trade Policy Effects of Regional Integration*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/docs/afrdevforpapf02.pdf
Overall in this document the author reviews some of the recent theoretical arguments and provides empirical evidence in support of lessons learnt from the implementation of RTAs around the world. First Africa's trade policy challenges are discussed giving insight on how certain social factors have hindered the process. Second, research findings on key trade theory and policy considerations that are influenced by RTAs are comprehensively reviewed and evaluated in relation to the rate at which Africa is able to move towards integration. Third, implications from lessons are discussed in relation to Africa's specific emerging challenge as it tries to create an RTA.

Carbone, M. (2002, September). From OAU to AU: Turning a Page in the History of Africa. *The Courier ACP-EU, 194*, 30-31. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/ courier194/en/en_030.pdf
This document discusses the initiative of the African leaders to dissolve the Organization of African Unity and transform it into the African Union. It also discusses the need to ensure that this transfer progressively moves forward in transforming Africa and not letting the goals and objectives of the OAU that were successful grow stagnate.

CATO. (2006, October). *Pan-African Free Trade Agreement: Helping Africa through Free Trade Policy Forum*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from https://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=3256&print=Y
This is a connection to a forum that discusses how Africa is one of the most economically troubled regions in the world. Moreover, it discusses how most imports, including life-saving drugs and medical equipment, continue to be subjected to high tariff and face man trade barriers. Therefore,

it provides solid evidence to support the need to establish a common market that would reduce or eliminate trade all such trade barriers in Africa.

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Overview. (n.d.). *COMESA*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.comesa.int/about/Multi-language_content.2007-04-30.2847/view
This is the COMESA website, which lists detail information on its history and trade relations. COMESA is associated with the AU.

Council of Europe. (n.d.). *Dialogue Newsletter 27*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.coe.int/t/e/north-south_centre/programmes/5_europe-africa_dialogue/h_pd_newsletter/PDNews_27.asp
This document discusses the notion of an accelerated implementation of the NEPAD framework and the effect that it would have on economic development in Africa. It also gives an overview NEPAD statistics and its structure. In addition, the document discusses the objectives of NEPAD and the challenges in Africa that it was designed to combat.

de Coning, C. (2004, February). Refining the African Standby Force Concept. *Conflict Trends Magazine*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2004-2/CT2_2004%20PG%2020-26.pdf
This document raises several questions about the ASF operating in Africa and challenges the current vision for the ASF. Secondly the document points out problems within the current ASF vision, and offers an alternative proposal, which point out that the ASF might be more successful in establishing long-term peace if it turned its from rapid deployment and short term missions. The document also alludes to the fact that political unrest must be resolved before Africa can move forward to the goal of unification.

Draper, P., Halleson, D., & Alves, P. (n.d.). *Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue in Southern Africa*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from SACU Web site: http://www.saiia.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=262
In this article The South African Institute for International Affairs (Trade Report No 15, February 2007) details some of the major integration problems faced by the African Union as it peruses the goals outlined in the Abuja Treaty.

East Africa's First Step towards Union. (2007, November 30). *British Broadcasting Corporation*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/543582.stm
This article discusses actions taken by the presidents of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to sign a treaty to launch the East African Community. It discusses the social and political challenges in general that had to be dealt with prior to this accomplishment. It also eludes to lesions that learned that could be applied to the challenges of the AEC as it tries to stay on schedule and reduce the number of regional trade zones into one. Finally it also in general gives the reader a snap shot of the integration atmosphere in Africa and indicated the challenges that must be eliminated if Africa is to truly unite.

Economic Commission for Africa. (n.d.). *Annual Report on Integration Overview*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN002810.pdf
This document provides an overview of the report which gives a comprehensive evaluation of the state of Africa's integration process. The overview discusses where the efforts in Africa have succeeded or failed and why. The overview also includes a discussion why intra African trade remains low and in some cases stagnate and how lack of macro-economic policy and insufficient infrastructures hamper and will continue to hamper integration until they are eliminated.

Economic Commission for Africa. (n.d.). *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II (ARIA II)*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/aria2/full_version.pdf
This report discusses the effectiveness of Africa's regional economic communities in pushing Africa forward down the path of regional integration. It also discusses how Africa has addressed meeting the objectives of the Abuja Treaty which established the African Economic Community that was supposed to set Africa on a journey to full economic integration. This report also discusses how if a fully functioning African Economic Community could be established it would

remove all trade related barriers and political and social challenges to movement of people, goods and services across the continent.

Economic Commission for Africa. (n.d.). *Conference on African Ministers of Finance & Planning*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/cfm/2007/docs/assessementRI.pdf
This document provides a progress report on Africa's regional integration initiatives. It also discusses the role of the developmental agenda of the continent in relation to the other goals and objectives of the AU.

Economic Commission for Africa. (n.d.). *Methodology for Preparing Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/aria2/annexe.pdf
This article outlines the measures taken to preparation of the concept paper and questionnaires used to collect data for the ARIA II report. It is helpful for delegates trying to comprehend the issues at hand.

Economic Commission for Africa. (n.d.). *Press Release: ADF 2001 to Focus on Defining Priorities for Regional Integration*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Press_Releases/ 2001_pressreleases/pressrelease0701.htm
This press release discusses the need to set regional integration priorities to measure economic success in African Free Trade Development. Africa is taking extensive efforts to establish itself as an economic powerhouse.

Economic Commission for Africa. (n.d.). *The Third African Development Forum, Defining Priorities for Regional Integration*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/aria3/full_version.pdf
This document discusses the actions endorsed by ADF and provides information on ways to accelerate regional integration in Africa. The document also discusses how creating a single economic aid space in Africa can address other sustainable development issues that plague the continent. The document also compares the critical role that the regional/ local political institutions in general can perform, and the specific role that African institutions perform in the goal of achieving integration. The analysis contained in this document focuses on the regional economic communities, which have been designated by the African Union as the building blocks for achieving the African Economic Community.

El-Ayouty, Y. (1993). *The Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years*. Praeger.
This book discusses how the Organization of African Unity is a unique entity. It also gives opinions based on observation of what Africa's goals of unity include and how they measure the success of integration. The document also gives and account of what political and economic changes must be met in order to obtain their vision of outlined in the in the OAU Treaty.

Fisher, J. (n.d.). Darfur's Doomed Peacekeeping Mission. *British Broadcasting Corporation*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4790822.stm
This document gives some details of the problems faced by the African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), including the issue of limited funding faced by AMIS. It also alludes to the pressures faced by the AU to create a framework that is just as aggressive as NEPAD or the AEC that can combat political instability and violence.

Forje, J. (n.d.). *Self-determination, Nationalism, Development and Pan-Africanism Stuck the Runway: Are Intellectuals to be Blamed?* Retrieved June 30, 2007, from Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa Web site: http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/anniversary-dakar/forje.pdf
This document examines the national deficiencies that give the African continent such a negative image in respect to other regions or continents in the world. It also address the notion that after many attempts African leaders still seem, unable to address the myriad of problems and provide quality living standard for the people.

FreeZones. (n.d.). *Concept Document on Formation of a Pan African Free Trade Zone Association*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.freezones.org/PAFTZA_4.PDF

This article discusses the objective of establishing a free trade zone in Africa and the variety of trade mechanisms that countries in recent years have begun to develop and implement. Although all these mechanisms are differently structured and implemented, they share a similar objective in the promotion of trade integration.

GCIS. (2007). Chapter 11: Foreign Relations. In *South African Yearbook, 2001/02*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/yearbook02/chap11.pdf
This yearbook chapter discusses the primary objective of the South African Government and how their foreign policy objectives relate to those of the African Union. The yearbook in general provides several interesting details on Africa.

Gondwe, G. (2001, December). *Making Globalization Work in Africa. Finance and Development*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/gondwe.htm
In this document the author suggest some way for Africa to promote growth and reduce poverty by establishing methods of economic and fiscal responsibility winch would allow the continent as a whole to embrace the global economy. This thus leads to improvements in regional political corporation among countries within Africa: but an overall strengthening of social institutions throughout the continent.

Gottschalk, K., & Schmidt, S. (2004, April). *The African Union and the New Partnership for Development*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/IPG/IPG4_2004/ARTGOTTSCHALK_SCHMIDT.PDF
In this document the authors assess the progress NEPAD and the AU have made since their foundation. The document takes a look at efforts made in the process of institution- and capacity-building within both organizations. It also identifies that they see many similarities between NEPAD and the AU and how this effects Africa's ability to meet economic objectives.

InterAfrica. (n.d.). *Paper for the African Union Symposium: The Economic Dimension to the African Union*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/docs/issuepn1.pdf
In this document the author identifies some of the principal negative issues surrounding African regional economic integration and how the African Union is addressing them. The document also explores the concept of economic integration in Africa as an imperative objective that must be met if the continent is to achieve its potential, and to participate on equal terms in the global economy.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (n.d.). *The World Bank World Development Indicators*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section5_1.htm
In this document the author brings together indicators that measure the actions of governments and the responses of markets through three cross-cutting development themes: managing the public sector, developing the private sector, and providing infrastructure.

Kent, V., & Malan, M. (n.d.). The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects. *African Security Review, 3*(12). Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/iss/asr123.pdf
In this document, the authors outline the reasoning for the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and how a timeline for its implementation is imperative for it success. The document also discusses the goals and intended and how financial constrains could possibly hinder its ability to operate as planed.

Kotkin, S. (n.d.). Off the Shelf in Africa, One Step Forward and Two Back. *New York Times*. Retrieved July 30, 2007, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/business/yourmoney/08offtheshelf.html?ex=1185940800&en=99eac3a292aa14e9&ei=5070
In this document the author states the adjustment in global trade policy on the part of wealthy countries needed to help Africa get a successful global trade policy established. It also discusses some tools and tips that could be applied within Africa to help it merge the regional economic communities into one market.

Mahamat, A. (2005, December). *Progress Report on Regional Integration Efforts in Africa towards the Promotion on*. Retrieved June 27, 2007, from African Trade Policy Centre Web site: http://www.uneca.org/atpc/Work%20in%20progress/30.pdf
This paper gives an overview of efforts including the successes and failures made by African countries since the creation of the Regional Economic Community to promote intra-African trade through the implementation of the various Trade Liberalization methods. The paper also discusses the impact that intra-African trade has on intra-regional trade over time. Finally the paper suggest a minimal implementation option alongside data collected that could be used to achieve the objective of expanding intra-African trade.

Manelisi, G., Kornegay, F., & Rule, S. (n.d.). *African Union and the Pan-African Parliament*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/idep/unpan003885.pdf
This document provides a perspective of the history of the African Union and its attempt to develop the African Economic Community. Here the authors provide a synopsis of the history and objectives of the AU and the AEC and how well the African countries are moving towards meeting the desired goals of both.

Mitchell, A. (n.d.). *A Pan-African Trading Area*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.globalisation.eu/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=732
In this speech, Mr. Mitchell proposes a Pan-African Trading Area that would help Africa develop an economic system that could eventually allow them to compete equally within the global Market. In his opinion the establishment of this trade area could help develop the entrepreneurial dynamism of the people of Africa
.

Murithi, T. (n.d.). *From Pan-Africanism to the Union of Africa*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200706211028.html
This article gives ample background information on how the Pan-African school of thought can be seen in the actions taken by the AU. The AU in general has been pursuing pan-Africanism for years.

Mutasa, C. (2003, March). *Regional Integration and Debt in Africa: A Comparative Report on Africa's Regional Groupings*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from SARPN Web site: http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000299/P295_Mutasa.pdf
This document provides an assessment of how debt has and will continue to affect the economic integration plans in Africa. Here the author describes some of the challenges that Africa must deal with that are somewhat different than those faced by the European Union when it was formed. It also discusses how Africa could learn from previous attempts at unification under the OAU.

Muuka, G., Harrison, D., & McCoy, J. (n.d.). *Impediments to Economic Integration in Africa: The Case of COMESA*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from JNDN Web site: http://www.ewp.rpi.edu/jbdn/jbdnv203.htm
In this document the authors study the success and failures of COMESA in relation to the other RECs that currently operate in Africa. The document also takes an in depth look at the objectives of COMESA and how close they have come over the years to attaining them.

News Bulletin for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. (2006, November). *eCOMESA, 76*. Retrieved July 5, 2007, from http://www.comesa.int/COMESA%20Newsletter/e-comesa%20Newsletter%2076/view
This newsletter discusses the 11th COMESA Heads of State and Governments Summit in the Republic of Djibouti on 15 November 2006. It focused on re-dedication the commitment to the regional integration agenda.

Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. (n.d.). *Reflections on African's Historic and Current Initiatives for Political and Economic Unity*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from UNECA Web site: http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/docs/niser.doc

This article discusses in length the successes and failures of the African states to unify and create a stable economic and political environment. In this document the author suggests some ways for Africa to promote growth and reduce poverty by establishing methods of economic and fiscal responsibility which would allow the continent as a whole to embrace the global economy.

Organization of African Unity. (n.d.). *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/docs/lagos_plan.pdf
This is a copy of the Lagos Plan of Action, which outlines the OAU's plans for economic integration. The Lagos Plan is an important document for the integration process.

Pearce, J. (2000, October 31). United States of Southern Africa? *British Broadcasting Corporation*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/871612.stm
This article discusses the eventual creation of a single market involving 200 million people living in 14 countries in Southern Africa. It is the easiest area in Africa to develop in this manner.

Republic of South Africa. Department of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). *African Economic Community (AEC)*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/aec.htm
The Department of Foreign Affairs-Republic of South Africa provides a detail implementation schedule of the Abuja Treaty and a brief synopsis of the Pan-African school of thought.

Southern Africa Development Community. (1992). *Free Trade Agreement*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/sadcfta.pdf
This is the treaty which affirms the establishment of a Development Community in Southern Africa. Southern Africa is the wealthiest region of the continent.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). (n.d.). *Summary of NEPAD Action Plans*. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/actionplans.php
In this document a summarization of the action plans established by NEPAD framework is given. This summary outlines how African leaders have come together to utilize the share knowledge of economic development and put measures in to place to meet some of the objectives outlines in the NEPAD framework.

United Nations Economic and Social Council Economic Commission for Africa. (2007). *Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development/Fortieth session of the Commission Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Committee of Experts Assessment of Progress on Regional Integration in Africa, (E/ECA/COE/26/5)*. Retrieved October 29, 2007, from http://www.uneca.org/cfm/2007/index.htm
The UN, particularly ECOSOC, has several regional bodies that try to develop integration and communication plans. Each year, the African version of this meets; this web site provides documents from that meeting.

West Africa Opts for Currency Union. (2000, April 21). *British Broadcasting Corporation*. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/721707.stm
This article discusses the measures taken by the six West African states that have agreed to create a new shared currency in the region by the year 2003. In this article, the writer eludes to the challenges Africa will face as a whole as it tries to establish a continental currency union.

What's the Difference between the OAU and the African Union? (2001, July 9). *British Broadcasting Corporation*. Retrieved June 30, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1430504.stm
This article briefly discusses the differences between the OAU and the AU. The OAU was the precursor to the AU, which was modeled on the EU.

II. Reinventing Growth in Africa: Development and Technological Innovation

African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS). (2002). *Africa, Science and Technology in the Age of Globalization*. African Technology Policy Studies. Retrieved August 1, 2007, from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN005550.pdf

This report outlines issues that were discussed at and recommendations of the roundtable. The general overview of global trends in and implications of new technologies will be helpful in comprehending the role of information and communication technologies in human development.

African Union. (2007). *Strategy to Revitalize Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Africa*. Meeting of the Bureau of the Conference of Ministers of Education of the African Union. Retrieved July 22, 2007, from www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/2007/May/HRST/29-31/TVET_Strategy_english.doc
The African Union (AU) has a vision of an integrated, peaceful, prosperous Africa, driven by its own people to take its rightful place in the global community and the knowledge economy. This report recognizes the fact that vast numbers of young people are outside formal school systems. It also recommends the integration of non-formal learning methodologies and literacy programs.

African Union. (2007). *Vision and Mission of the African Union*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/vision_mission.htm
Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, gives a profound statement in his vision for the African Union. It is important to recognize what goals and objectives the African Union pursues in order to fully understand the effort to revive economic growth in Africa, via technological innovation and development.

Archibugi, Daniele. (2002). *The Globalization of Technology and its Implications for Developing Countries*. Roundtable on Africa, Science and Technology in the Age of Globalization. Nairobi, Kenya.
This roundtable analyzes the technology-related provisions, which could enlarge the capabilities of African countries to procure and develop modern technologies. Insights from this roundtable should prove useful in analyzing the qualitative implications of technical aid

A.S.L.& Associates. (2007). *Memorable Albert Einstein Quotes*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from http://www.asl-associates.com/einsteinquotes.htm
A familiar quote known for years, Albert Einstein's quote serves relative to today's difficulties in Africa's economy and socio-political system. Africa will need to take risks and prepare to commit mistakes in order to learn and remedy errors, in to making a successful plan for economic revival for the African continent.

Ayogu, Melvin. (2002). *Globalization and Technology: Africa's Participation and Perspectives*. African Technology Policy Studies Network (ATPS). Retrieved July 29, 2007, from http://www.atpsnet.org/pubs/specialpaper/SPS%201.pdf
The specific issues raised in this research links globalization and technology as models that can be developed for developing countries. Under globalization, the implication of the foregoing predictions is that the North-South technology gap will be exacerbated by integration unless globalization comes with reduction in the costs of adoption. This understanding will assist in comprehending the complex link of globalization and development for the African countries.

Economic Commission of Africa. (2005). *Economic Report on Africa 2005: Meeting the Challenges of Unemployment and Poverty in Africa*. Retrieved August 18, 2007, from http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/uneca/era2005.pdf
This 2005 report on the current economic situation in Africa is unique as Africa has begun to experience economic growth in the gross domestic product (GDP), but the population and even the experts are having trouble identifying where the growth is occurring. This report examines that Africa is ready to meet the challenges of risking failure with scientific and technological innovations, but economic growth will not be made visible to the continent without learning from its mistakes.

Enos, John. (1992). *The Creation of Technological Capability in Developing Countries*. London: Printer Publishing.
John Enos look into the effects of creating a foundation of technological capabilities is a helpful one in analyzing how developing countries can reinvent their growth with more attention of technological infrastructure. This book helps us understand that developing countries need to get

away from focusing on natural resources or primary sources of trade and focus on technology in hopes of creating a new face of economic growth.

Fredriksen, Birger. (2005). *Building Capacity in the Education Sector in Africa: The Need to Strengthen External Agencies' Capacity to Help*. World Bank. Retrieved July 24, 2007, from www.worldbank.org/afr/netf/sem05/fredriksen.pdf
This World Bank report examines the resumption of growth and the challenges that need to be addressed to make progress sustainable. Fredriksen argues that for countries to succeed, they will need to develop stronger capacity to deal with both the political economy and technical restraints to build their own capacity to provide technical support.

Hansen, J. (2006). *Agents of Change: Universities as Development Hubs.* Retrieved October 21, 2007 from http://campus-sostenible.mty.itesm.mx/emsuiii/PDF_articulos_completos/a01_158_j_hansen_full.pdf
The importance of universities and higher education is emphasized in Hansen's research. The frightening figures throughout the past decades have shown that Africa has not succeeded in maintaining their students with PhD's or degrees in engineering, science, or development. Decision-makers and scholars both agree that a stronger emphasis must be placed on the importance of universities and Hansen does an excellent job in examining this for other African countries to follow suit.

Juma, Calestrous. (2005). *Going for Growth: Science, Technology and Innovation in Africa*. The Smith Institute. Retrieved July 31, 2007 from http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/GoingforGrowth_AMENDEDFINAL.pdf
The adoption of the United Nations (UN) Millennium Declaration in 2000 marked the beginning of a re-examination of international development cooperation. But what Juma attempts to achieve in his study is one of the central messages that African countries have failed to realize: its emphasis on building capacity to solve its problems of a lack of growth in science, technology and innovation. His focus is reflected in the stress placed on economic growth as a critical basis for addressing poverty.

Juma, Calestous. (2006). *Reinventing Growth: Technical Innovation and Economic Growth in Africa.* African Development Bank. Retrieved July 26, 2007 from http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,1068298&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
Juma argues that African countries have historically been associated with natural resources and raw materials. He points out that a transition into modern economies will involve considerable investment and use of knowledge to escape the long-standing status of a continent in poverty and under-developed. Juma thus illustrates his recommendations on what Africa can do to reinvent growth in their economies through innovation.

Kim, Linsu. (2000). *Technology, Learning, and Innovation: Experiences of Newly Industrializing Economies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kim discusses economic growth and technological advance. Her conclusion is that technological advance accounted for the lion's share of growth in worker productivity. And since that time, a vast empirical literature has grown up on technological progress in the advanced industrial nations.

Lall, S. (2000). *Technological Change and Industrialization in the Asian Newly Industrializing Economies: Achievement and Challenges*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reading Lall's account of how South-East Asia went from a least-developed region to one of strong and healthy economic growth is worth reading to comprehend what can be accomplish with respect to growth and development. Lall's account has been compared and examined closely with other scholars and many believe that Africa can achieve similar results if they follow the steps that Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, etc., attempted in the 1990s.

Nelson, Richard. (1994). *Economic Growth via the Co-Evolution of Technology and Institutions*. London: Pinter Publishing.

This book is a very useful piece of literature as it explores the planning and implementation of economic agreements for the use of technology in African communities. By examining the positive influences that technology has had for the developed world, Nelson examines the impact the evolution of accepting technological advances in the labor force and educational systems can have for the third world.

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Banji. (2005). *How Can Africa Benefit from Globalization: Global Governance of Technology and Africa's Global Exclusion*. African Technology Policy Studies Network (ATPS). Retrieved July 29, 2007, from http://www.atpsnet.org/pubs/specialpaper/SPS%2017.pdf
Another of the experts in African economics, Oyeleran-Oyeyinka poses the question of whether or not globalization is right for Africa. By further studying the steps of how Africa can benefit from globalization, can the reader begin to understand the other paths African countries can take to achieve economic growth.

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Banji. (2003). *Systems of Innovation and Human Capital Development in African Development.* United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies.
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka does a wonderful job in his study by showing how innovation and human capital can further enhance the development stages for Africa. By looking at cases such as Ghana, the author makes it clear in his argument that African States need to work as a team if they want to escape dismal facts of poor economic growth and no sound infrastructure for technological innovation.

Overseas Aid. (2001). *The Virtual Colombo Plan – Bridging the Digital Divide*. The Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program. Retrieved July 31, 2007, from www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/vcp_background.pdf
The Colombo Plan, successful in the Asia-Pacific region, is the central piece of this article that poses the question of whether or not Africa can follow the steps of this economic plan to achieve employment growth and technological innovation. Furthermore, it is argued that learning from history can assist in bridging the digital divide in Africa.

Rivkin, Arnold. (1958). An Economic Development Proposal for Africa: A New Multilateral Aid Organization. *International Organizations*, *10*, p.303-19.
Rivkin's article is a useful source to use when researching why past economic agendas and proposals have failed for Africa. The author's solution is a new proposal that encompasses old and new agendas for economic revival, such as multilateral aid, with special attention to technological infrastructure and better educational programs in science.

Scherwin, J. (2003). Learning Innovation Policy Based on Historical Experience. *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, *14*(4).
Following the foot steps of Southeast Asia, Scherwin writes a powerful piece on how Africa should be learning from the innovations that other countries have implemented. Learning from historical experience is what Africa should be focusing its attention on, argues Scherwin, as several similarities lie between the Asia-Pacific region and the continent of Africa.

Smith, Adrian. (2003). Transforming Technological Regimes for Sustainable Development: A Role for Appropriate Technology Niches. *Science and Public Policy*, *30* (2) p. 127-135.
The importance of technology for developing countries cannot be emphasized more than the way Smith does in this report. Simply bringing technological proposals or ideas on the table is not enough, argues Smith, as long-term planning is needed before installing and implementing technological systems throughout the country.

Tchuente, Maurice. (2004). *Globalization, Science and Technology: Challenges and Opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa*. Board of National Agency for Information and Communication Technologies. Retrieved July 28, 2007, from http://www.unu.edu/globalization/2006/files/Tchuente_Conference_Japan_07_06.pdf
Tchuente's publication focuses on the role of globalization, science and technology, and why Africa has not been able to fully implement essential tools for economic growth. For the most part,

Tchuente argues that Africa has lacked the infrastructure to have a complete and strong system of technological innovations to transform its economy.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. *Africa's Technology Gap: Case Studies on Kenya, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania*. United Nations Publications, 2003, Pg. 7-8. Retrieved July 26, 2007, from http://stdev.unctad.org/docs/gap.pdf
These four case studies that the UN Conference on Trade and Development scrutinizes are very helpful in researching the lack of technological advance also in other African countries. What patterns does one see in these case studies that the continent seems to display? Paying close attention to the importance of science and technology is a big reason that certain case countries have begun to see drastic changes in their living standards.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2002). *The Least Developed Countries Report 2002. Escaping the Poverty Trap*. Geneva: Author.
This report looks at least developed countries and how certain countries can escape the poverty trap, especially African countries with their potential rich pool of natural resources and young populations. The UN Conference on Trade and Development does a wonderful job at looking at the current and troubling patterns of poor economic growth in the least developed countries, and having this knowledge and comparing it to the other sources that examines how economic growth does succeed, helps the reader fully understand the complexities in economic growth.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2004). Science *and Technology in Africa: A Commitment for the 21st Century*. Retrieved on August 1, 2007, from http://www.unesco.org/bpi/scitech/facts.htm
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) examines the role of science and technology in Africa for the future years to come. The authors of this piece argue that science and technology have not had the full opportunity to enter the continent and begin their exploration in the economic sector, thus hindering the chances of economic growth for African countries.

United Nations Millennium Project. (2003). *Background Paper of the Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation*. Retrieved July 31, 2007, from www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/tf10apr18.pdf
This paper outlines the elements of a global action program to apply science, technology and innovation to meeting the Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Project Task Force is structured accordingly around issues such as poverty, hunger, primary education, gender equality, child and maternal mortality, and access to essential medicines.

Wong, A. (2002). *USAID and Science and Technology Capacity Building for Development*. Research and Science and Technology Discussion Paper.
The United States Agency of International Development examines the role of science and technology in further enhancing capacity building to third world countries, with special attention to Africa. New technological advances being brought to Africa is the central piece of this source and will be of great use for readers in comprehending the importance of such tools in reinventing growth in Africa.

World Bank. (2002). *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century*. Retrieved August 9, 2007, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/complete.pdf
The World Bank looks at why Africa has been unable to copy the success stories from the globalization era and the growth the continent has had recently, even though it is still the poorest region in the globe. Experts from the World Bank argue that other factors will need to come into play if Africa wants to escape its constant zone of poverty and underdevelopment, such as getting away from the phase of natural resources extraction.

III. The Role of African Union Peacekeepers in Regional Conflicts

Organization of African Unity Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. (2003, April 2). *Communiqué (Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (XCI))*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from Institute for Security Studies Web site: http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/centorg/comapr03.pdf
This is the document which authorizes deployment of AMIB, laying out the mission's objectives and mandate, size of the peacekeeping force and its rules of engagement, and its command structure. It also calls upon AU Member States and the international community to assist with funding the mission.

Aboagye, F. B. (Ed.). (2007, May). *Complex emergencies in the 21st century: Challenges of new Africa's strategic peace and security policy issues* (Monograph No. 134). Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved August 28, 2007, from Institute for Security Studies Web site: http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3&slink_id=4604&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3
Several issues of importance to peace operations in Africa are addressed in this paper. Chapter 5 examines the relationship between peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, and the mission gap between the two activities, which presents the opportunity for a reemergence of conflict. The author presents an alternative approach, the 'developmental peace mission,' which combines peacekeeping and peacebuilding planning in such a way as to avoid this mission gap. Chapter 6 looks at the role of the private sector in peace operations, detailing the many positive influences which private enterprise can bring, many of which contribute to operational cost reductions.

Addo, P. (2005, November). *Peace-making in West Africa: Progress and prospects* (Monograph No. 3). Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Retrieved August 27, 2007, from Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Web site: http://www.kaiptc.org/upload/general/Mono_3_Addo.pdf
Examining specifically the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau and Liberia, this report looks in depth at the successes and failures of ECOWAS' peace-making efforts in West Africa, and the causes and factors which contributed to those successes and failures. It looks at the effects of the 1999 "Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security." The report makes 4 key recommendations for improving the chances of success in ECOWAS peace-making efforts.

African Union. (2000). *Constitutive Act*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from African Union Web site: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm
This is the document that created the African Union, signed July 11, 2000, in Lomé, Togo. It lays out the objectives and the principles of the AU, making specific reference to the negative impact upon Africa of continuous conflict, and the need to overcome these conflicts to ensure for sustainable development.

African Union. (2002). *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from http://www.africa-union.org/rule_prot/PROTOCOL-%20PEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20COUNCIL%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf
This is the document which outlines the reasoning behind, as well as the principles and powers of the Peace and Security Council. It emphasizes the need for a solution to Africa's constant conflicts, outlining numerous severe problems caused by conflict, and stressing the desire for an African-based solution.

Agence France Presse. (2004, May 25). Pan-African Grouping Launches Its Own Security Council. *Global Policy Forum*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from Global Policy Forum Web site: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/0525grouping.htm
This is a news article announcing the launch of the PSC, modeled after the UNSC. It lists some of the situations the new PSC intends to tackle, including Darfur, Cote d'Ivoire, and Somalia.

Agoagye, F. (2004). The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union peacekeeping operation. *Conflict Trends*, (2), 9-15. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from ACCORD Web site: http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/ctrends204/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf
Agoagye lays out in great detail the components of AMIB, along with the mission's successes and failures. He gives key information relating to troop counts and operational costs. He examines the relationship between the AU, the UN, and other international actors, finally arriving at a list of 9 recommendations to increase the chances for success in missions following AMIB. Finally, he argues that cooperative action between the AU and the UN is the best course of action.

Ali, T. M., & Matthews, R. O. (2004). Conclusion: The long and difficult road to peace. In T. M. Ali & R. O. Matthews (Eds.), *Durable peace: Challenges for peacebuilding in Africa* (pp. 393-425). University of Toronto Press.
In the conclusion to their collection of case studies, Ali and Matthews make the case that achieving peace is only the beginning, and may actually be the easiest part of the conflict resolution process. Hanging onto peace and making peace last is extremely difficult. Every situation is unique, and there are no clear-cut answers as to how to gain sustainable peace. They do, however, present some guidelines, and some circumstances which appear to be relevant to varying degrees in all post-conflict situations.

Conflict prevention and reconstruction. (2007). *The World Bank*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from The World Bank Web site: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTCPR/0,,menuPK:407746~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:407740,00.html
This page shows the connection between conflict prevention and poverty reduction, and introduces the efforts of the Bank, through the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit and the Post-Conflict Fund, to assist in building sustainable peace in conflict-affected areas. It contains statistics about the sustainability of peace, information about areas in which the Bank is playing a role, and links to specific Bank-funded post-conflict projects.

de Coning, C. (2000). Lesotho Intervention: Implications for SADC. *Contributions Towards an African Renaissance: The Africa Dialogue Monograph Series, 1*(1). Retrieved August 2, 2007, from ACCORD Web site: http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/lesothomono.pdf
The author describes the 1998 intervention in Lesotho by SADC forces to prevent a military coup. He examines the implications of the action in Lesotho, as it was the first military action for post-apartheid South Africa, and signaled that country's commitment to the African Renaissance. He points out a number of things that went wrong with the Lesotho intervention and the lessons which should be learned from those mistakes.

de Coning, C. (2003). Peacekeeping trends. *Conflict Trends*, (4), 30-36. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from ACCORD Web site: http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/ct403deconing.pdf
de Coning looks at developments in peacekeeping in Africa, including the ASF, AMIB and the failed efforts at DDR, as well as the importance of South Africa's emergence as a leader in continental peace operations. He also examines UN operations in Liberia and the DR Congo. He spends significant time evaluating what he calls "the financial realities of peacekeeping," and concludes that for reasons of money, the ASF may have to act in a more limited capacity than originally intended.

de Coning, C. (2004). Refining the African Standby Force concept. *Conflict Trends*, (2), 20-26. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from ACCORD Web site: http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/ctrends204/CT2_2004%20PG%2020-26.pdf
de Coning argues here that the focus of the ASF upon traditional, complex peace operations is misplaced, and that it is much more likely that the ASF will be involved in observer missions, and short-term high intensity operations. This, he argues, is more likely to fit with AU budgetary constraints, and will fulfill the ASF mandate, leaving more complex and costly operations to the UN.

Demobilization and reintegration. (2004). *The World Bank: Conflict prevention and reconstruction*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from The World Bank Web site: http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/PrintFriendly/1F5AEC282F0B259B85256D50004EA0E8?Opendocument
World Bank efforts in assisting with the DDR process are assessed, and some basics of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) are given on this web site. There is emphasis that successful DDR efforts will need to be focused not only on a single country, but also to address the linkages between countries.

Godwin, P. (2005). Without borders: Uniting Africa's Wildlife Reserves. Retrieved October 10, 2007, from National Geographic Online Web site: http://www7.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/data/2001/09/01/html/ft_20010901.1.fulltext.html
In this article, the author looks at the system of National Parks in Africa, and at efforts being made to amalgamate parks which cross national borders. These transfrontier conservation parks aim to put conservation into the hands of the people, and show that money can be made from conservation, without having to destroy wildlife. The parks are part of a larger effort to create better paying jobs for young people, by establishing an ecotourism industry.

Henry L. Stimson Center (2007). *Future of Peace Operations Program.* Retrieved September 18, 2007, from http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FP200607181029.
The Henry L Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. partnered with New York University to host a workshop in February 2007, examining coordination between the UN and the AU to foster and strengthen peace throughout the African continent. This site contains links to reports which resulted from this workshop, including the hybrid mission in Darfur and a number of other relevant topics.

International Peace Academy. (2002). The infrastructure of peace in Africa: Assessing the peacebuilding capacity of African institutions. Author.
The IPA examines the nature of conflict, and attempts to analyze why conflict has been so prevalent in Africa. It begins by breaking down conflicts by region, and addressing what factors influence the various parts of the continent. Following this, the report analyzes various regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the SADC, and their contributions to peace and security. Finally, it returns to a regional breakdown, addressing what is being done in the various parts of Africa to address the causes of conflict.

Kent, V., & Malan, M. (2003). The African Standby Force: Progress and prospects. *African Security Review, 12*(3), 71-81. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No3/EKent.pdf
The authors examine the evolution of the ASF concept, and detail the timeline proposed for the creation and implementation of the ASF. They look at key issues such as funding, including a joint plan between the AU and the G8, the capabilities of the ASF to fulfill its intended purposes, and the need for a transparent and representative decision-making process within the PSC.

Malan, M. (2005, August). *Intelligence in African peace operations: Addressing the deficit* (Monograph No. 7). Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Retrieved August 27, 2007, from Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Web site: http://www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/no_7.pdf
This paper looks at the vital role of good intelligence in peace operations, and the difficulty of obtaining and utilizing that intelligence effectively in a transparent organization like the UN, and stresses the necessity to implement the Brahimi Report recommendation on establishing an intelligence capability. The report examines specifically the situations in DR Congo, Darfur, and Liberia. It also examines the efficacy of the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) concept which has been introduced by UN DPKO.

Mirbagheri, S. F. (2006, Spring). Peacekeeping and peacemaking: The example of Cyprus. *Contemporary Review, 288*(1680), 37-45. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from Academic Search Complete database (20613870): http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.aec.talonline.ca/ehost/detail?vid=7&hid=102&sid=177a484b-db70-4c6c-825e-4833d4ef4c9a%40sessionmgr107
The author defines peacekeeping and peacemaking, comparing and contrasting the two, using the situation in Cyprus as his example. Peacekeeping is a finite, concrete activity. Peacemaking, which relies upon peacekeeping, is a more abstract activity, more subject to the dictates of circumstance. He also outlines various unintended consequences which may arise from peace operations.

Murithi, T. (2005). The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development. Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
Murithi traces the developmental history of Pan-Africanism from the Pan-African Congress to the African Union. He points out the problems the AU will face, and the institutions which have been developed to address those problems. He examines the relationship between conflict and development, and presents several strategies which may be used by the AU to help secure success in peacebuilding.

Neethling, T. (2005, May/June). Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, challenges, and prospects. *Military Review*, 68-71. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MayJun05/neethling.pdf
Neethling outlines the basic structure of the ASF, and its objectives, and compares it to the UN Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). He discusses the Brahimi Report as it relates to the AU and the ASF, and argues in favor of more regionally-based peace initiatives to replace UN missions. He also discusses the role of the SADC as sub-Saharan Africa's largest economic actor, and their standby brigade.

Ngoma, N. (2004). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration: A conceptual discourse. In G. Chileshe, M. Chimanse, N. Ngoma, P. Lwando, & T. Mbewe (Eds.), *Civil-military relations in Zambia* (pp. 79-89). Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from Institute for Security Studies Web site: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/civmilzambiaaug04/Contents.htm
The author examines the process of DDR in detail, and while acknowledging that there can be no single universal answer to guarantee success, he argues for a general framework which can greatly improve the odds of success. He argues that peace is measured in degrees, and dedication to DDR can increase the degree of peace. Finally, he argues that improving the degree of peace allows for greater development, which improves security and decreases the chances of a return to conflict.

Profile: ECOMOG. (2007). Retrieved August 2, 2007, from BBC News Web site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/2364029.stm
The site includes a historical timeline for ECOMOG, and information about its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Also included is information regarding the makeup of ECOMOG, and funding of its efforts. The article raises questions about Nigeria's domination of ECOMOG, and the poorly equipped forces from other ECOWAS Member States.

Southall, R. (2006). A long prelude to peace: African involvement in ending Burundi' war. In O. Furley & R. May (Eds.), *Ending Africa's wars: Progressing to peace* (pp. 201-220). Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
The author first lays out the history of the conflict in Burundi, and then details the long and difficult process by which peace was finally achieved, through the efforts of a committed African community. He goes through all of the key actors in the conflict and explains the position of each throughout cease-fire talks, and explains the important roles played by both Nelson Mandela and former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. The role of South Africa is emphasized as crucial to the success of peace efforts in Burundi, and paralleled with efforts in the DR Congo.

Spear, J. (2006). Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration in Africa. In O. Furley & R. May (Eds.), *Ending Africa's wars: Progressing to peace* (pp. 63-80). Hampshire, England: Ashgate.

Spear discusses the DDR process, and includes also a fourth element, reinsertion, between the demobilization and reintegration phases. She also discusses the effects on an economy of conflict as compared to peace, and the relationship between economic conditions and the sustainability of peace, linking the reintegration process to long-term peace.

Thusi, T., & Meek, S. (2003, March 1). *Sierra Leone: Building the road to recovery* (Monograph No. 80). Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No80/Content.html#Anchor-49425
The authors examine closely the first two steps of the DDR process, using as their example the very successful efforts in Sierra Leone, giving detailed analysis of the timeline and progress in that situation. They also detail related efforts, such as the collection of weapons which are not part of the disarmament process, and the destruction of collected weapons. The work includes numerous tables of statistics related to the DDR programme in Sierra Leone.

United Nations. (n.d.). *Meeting new challenges*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from United Nations Web site: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q7.htm
The page outlines the factors considered to be vital to the success of a UN peacekeeping operation, including that there must be an existing cease-fire, and the key parties to the conflict must agree to stop fighting and allow the UN to assist in the peace process. It also outlines important issues currently facing UN peacekeeping operations. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that to be successful, UN peacekeeping operations are dependent upon the support of the international community, and to this end, increased support from "northern" countries is necessary.

United Nations. Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine Draft 3). June 29, 2007. Retrieved September 18, 2007, from website: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone%20Doctrine%20--%20Consultation%20Draft.pdf.
This document seeks to summarize into usable form six decades worth of experience in the field of peacekeeping operations. It outlines principles under which peacekeepers may be deployed, the objectives of UN peace operations, and how those objectives and operations have evolved, and strategies for achieving success within an operation's mandate. The document places all of these factors in perspective, giving the evolving international environment, and the changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War period.

United Nations General Assembly. (2005, March 21). *In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005)*. Retrieved August 27, 2007, from United Nations Web site: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement
Secretary General Kofi Annan's report contains a lengthy list of suggestions for reforming the UN and bringing its objectives and operations into line with the realities of the modern world, which is vastly different from the world of 1945 in which the UN Charter was written and adopted. Suggested reforms include the Security Council reform models A & B, and replacing the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council. The report stresses the necessity of investment in peacebuilding and prevention of conflict, pointing out that successful implementation of just 2 agreements from the early 1990s, the Bicesse Accords in Angola and the Arusha Accords in Rwanda, could have prevented 3 million deaths.

United Nations General Assembly. (2001). *Report of the open-ended ad hoc working group on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (UN Doc. A/56/45)*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from United Nations Web site: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5645.pdf
Outlining the importance of specific educational initiatives in creating an environment conducive to sustainable peace, this UN document lists programs already in place, such as the Africa Girls' Education Initiative and the African-led Partnership for Capacity-Building. It also prescribes new ways for these programs to be used in the support of educating about peace to prevent conflict, and stresses the importance of peacebuilding after conflict ends.

United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council. (2000, August). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (UN Doc.A/55/305–S/2000/809)*. Retrieved August 27, 2007, from United Nations Web site: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/
The Brahimi Report, convened in 2000 by Secretary General Kofi Annan, is the pivotal literature on UN Peace Operations. It examines lessons learned from past successes and failures of the UN, the goals of peacekeeping, the tools necessary for successful peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and acknowledges the challenges to peacekeeping which exist in the modern world. The Report arrives at 20 recommendations, ranging from DPKO interaction with other Offices and funding to mission leadership, personnel and deployment logistics.

United Nations Security Council. (2007, July 31). *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/RES/1769 (2007))*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from United Nations Web site: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm
This Resolution authorizes the Hybrid AU/UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) for 12 months, including up to 19,555 military personnel. It outlines the cooperational command structure and outlines the goals of UNAMID. It also stresses the impossibility of a military solution to the situation in Darfur, and calls on all involved parties to seek a lasting peaceable solution.

United Nations Security Council (2004, May 21). *The situation in Burundi (S/RES/1545 (2004)*. Retrieved August 2, 2007, from United Nations Web site: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html
This is the Security Council Resolution authorizing ONUB to take over from AMIB in Burundi, laying out the operational objectives and principles of the UN mission. It stresses the importance of fulfilling the objectives of the Arusha Accord. ONUB was authorized initially for six months, subject to renewal after that period.

Rules of Procedure
African Union

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the African Union (hereinafter referred to as "the Union") and shall be considered adopted by the Union prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the "Secretariat."
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, "President" shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Union.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - *Dates of convening and adjournment*
The Union shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - *Place of sessions*
The Union shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - *Provisional agenda*
The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Union at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - *Adoption of the agenda*
The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Union by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

> *The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, "those present and voting" means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.*

Rule 5 - *Revision of the agenda*
During a session, the Union may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Union so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Union decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

> *For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an "important and urgent character" is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Union to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Union until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, "the members present and voting" means those*

members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum
Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General
1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Union.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Union and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat
The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Union, and shall distribute documents of the Union to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Union may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat
The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Union concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the President
The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Union for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the President
If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language
English shall be the official and working language of the Union.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)
Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

> *This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.*

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 - Quorum
The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Union are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Union shall be required for any decision to be taken.

> *For purposes of this rule, "members of the Union" means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.*

Rule 15 - General powers of the President

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Union, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Union and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Union the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

> *Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to "propose to the Union" entails her/his power to "entertain" motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.*

Rule 16
The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Union.

Rule 17 - Points of order
During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

> *Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, "the members present and voting" mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.*

Rule 18
A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Rule 19 - Speeches
1. No one may address the Union without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Union, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Union may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

> *In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Union in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.*

Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers
Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Union, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Union.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Union. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Union and the President should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 21 - Right of reply

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that "impugns the integrity of a representative's State" is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Union by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Union shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Union's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Union.

Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Rule 25 - Closure of debate

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Union favors the closure of debate, the Union shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 26 - Order of motions

Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:
    a) To suspend the meeting;
    b) To adjourn the meeting;
    c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
    d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Union would like the Union to consider the proposal or amendment. The

Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Union unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Union for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

> *For purposes of this rule, all "proposals" shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Union by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution/report segment. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution/report segment and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Union. These draft resolutions/report segments are the collective property of the Union and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.*

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions
A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic
When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Union, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

> *For purposes of this rule, "those present and voting" means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.*

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights
Each member of the Union shall have one vote.

> *This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions/report segments, and portions of draft resolutions/report segments divided out by motion. As such, all references to "member(s)" do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.*

Rule 31 - Request for a vote
A proposal or motion before the Union for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Union may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

> *For purposes of this rule, "proposal" means any draft resolution/report segment, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution/report segment divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.*

Rule 32 – Consensus

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, the Union shall take its decisions by **consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority** of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase "members present and voting" means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

   All members declaring their representative States as "present and voting" during the attendance role call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are objections to the proposal or motion, then the report segment is voted on, requiring a two-thirds majority to pass.

Rule 33 – Omitted

Rule 34 - Method of voting
1. The Union shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply "yes," "no," "abstention," or "pass."

   Only those members who designate themselves as "present" or "present and voting" during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying "pass," must, on the second time through, respond with either "yes" or "no." A "pass" cannot be followed by a second "pass" for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Union votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Union shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 35 - Explanations of vote
Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

   All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 36 - Conduct during voting
After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Rule 37 - Division of proposals and amendments
Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, "most radical division" means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution/report segment, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is "most radical" is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 38 - Amendments
An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.

Rule 39 - Order of voting on amendments
When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, "furthest removed in substance" means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution/report segment. The determination of which amendment is "furthest removed in substance" is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 40 - Order of voting on proposals
If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Union decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 41 - The President shall not vote
The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VII. MINUTE OF SILENT PRAYER OR MEDITATION

Rule 42 - Invitation to silent prayer or meditation
Immediately after the opening of the first plenary meeting of the Union, representatives may request to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation. This is the only time this motion will be entertained and its approval is at the discretion of the Secretariat.