



THE 2006 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

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www.nmun.org

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Dear Delegates;

Please allow me to welcome you to the 2006 National Model United Nations (NMUN) simulation of the North Atlantic Council, the political decision-making body of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This year's simulation, being held April 11–15, 2006, promises to be a challenging, but enjoyable experience.

I would also like to introduce myself. I am Peter (Pete) Eraca, the committee's director. I am a first year graduate student pursuing a PhD. in Political Science with an emphasis on international and comparative politics, at the State University of New York at Binghamton. I have been with the NMUN for three previous conferences, two as a delegate and one as the Assistant Director of the European Union in 2004.

NATO's mission has been in constant redevelopment since the fall of the Soviet Union. The organization has begun to take action in peacekeeping measures and respond as a united front to calls for assistance from other regional organizations and the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, NATO has begun to bring its attention and focus on this issue of terrorism, especially acts within the Member States. With NATO's membership moving to twenty-six in the last few years, the task of combating terrorism within the Member States could become a larger task with time. These developments make 2006 an important time to hold and participate in a NATO simulation.

The issues before NATO this year are:

1. The Role of NATO in Intra-State and Inter-State Conflict;
2. Reexamination of the Prague and Istanbul Summits as a Means to Combat Terrorism; and
3. The International Role of Women in the Armed Forces.

In order to participate effectively in the simulation please be sure to research each topic concentrating on your particular state's perspective on the issue. In order to facilitate your research I have prepared this background guide to give you an understanding of the history of the committee, as well as the issues that we will be discussing. Please remember that this guide is in no way an exhaustive resource for the topic, but an introduction to the issues at hand. In order to acquire a full and comprehensive understanding of the topics you should refer to the bibliographic section in the back of this guide.

Each delegation is required to submit a position paper. Similar to last year, NMUN is accepting papers via email. All papers are due by **March 10, 2006**. An important message from the Director-General regarding where papers should be submitted, expectations for their content and format, and inquiring about alternatives to email submission is included on page 2-3 of this guide. It is vital that all delegates adhere closely to these instructions.

If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact Erin, our Undersecretary-General or I, we will be more than happy to assist you. Also, feel free to visit the conference website, at www.nmun.org where more information is available and where topic updates will appear in early January.

I look forward to meeting you in April. Good luck in your preparations.

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Message from the DG Concerning Special Features Regarding the NATO Committee

To better simulate the actual workings of the UN system and its related organizations, the 2006 NMUN Conference is using many of the rules and procedures used by the bodies being simulated. It is vital that all materials provided in this background guide be reviewed thoroughly prior to attending the conference in April. All delegates should be very familiar with the particular rules and procedures discussed in this special message and the rules of procedure further illustrated in back of this committee background guide.

The NATO committee will use most of the standard rules used in the General Assembly with one major exception. All substantive matters before NATO will require a consensus to be adopted by the body. The following items are considered substantive matters and will require a consensus to be adopted: votes on draft resolutions, unfriendly amendments, and the second part of the division of the question. Due to this rule, any negative vote by a single member of the body will result in the failure of the particular substantive issue.

Delegates will also find discussion of this variation in the Rules of Procedure for NATO (North Atlantic Council) that can be found at the end of this background guide.

If you have any questions concerning this issue, please do not hesitate to contact Peter Eraca, the Director of NATO at nato@nmun.org; Erin Kennedy, the Under-Secretary General for Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), at usg.igos@nmun.org; or myself at dirgen@nmun.org.

Message from the Director General Regarding Position Papers for the 2006 NMUN Conference

Position papers are submitted for each committee in which a State/NGO participates at the NMUN Conference. Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's foreign policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State/NGO should be identified and addressed. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim recreation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the committee background guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

An important component of the awards consideration process is the format of the position papers. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the background guides (following the specifications below will ensure this)
- Length must **not** exceed one double-sided page (two single-sided pages is **not** acceptable)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections
- No binding, staples, paper clips, or cover sheets should be used on any of the papers

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. (Each address is also listed in individual background guides who will be mailed in November.) These e-mail addresses will be active after 30 November. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should send one set of all position papers to: *positionpapers@nmun.org*. This set (held by the Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. *NOTE: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.*

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 10, 2006**. *E-mailed files should be in Microsoft Word (.doc), Rich Text (.rtf), or Adobe (.pdf) formats.*

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COUNTRY & COMMITTEE

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check by March 20, 2006. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Kevin Grisham, Director General, at dirgen@nmun.org or at 909-991-5506.

Additionally, each delegation should submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country you are representing along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparing your mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 1,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K. Grisham', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Kevin E. Grisham
Director-General

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a maximum of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards. Visit the downloads section at www.nmun.org to find an example of an award-winning position paper. When using these sources, please be mindful of the NMUN's policy against plagiarism.

Delegation from
The State of Tranquility

Represented by the
University of Bohemia

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Racism and Racial Discrimination, and A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The State of Tranquility a proud member of the Regional Alliance of Peaceful Countries and a fully supports other regional groups in their efforts to coordinated a regional plan for sustained and sustainable development. In that regard, the State of Tranquility recognizes the necessity of ensuring the full realization of the Right to Development as declared in the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Final Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development. Tranquility fully supports the implementation of national development plans with the cooperation of regional organizations, the United Nations, and the international community. Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing the underlying factors

I. The Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa

The State of Tranquility believes that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic security lend themselves to the pacific settlement of disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most ethnically diverse region in the world. The lack of development in the region constitutes the root cause of political instability and conflict. The report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Recommendations*, if implemented, could enhance the work of the Organization in its efforts to bring about sustainable development in Africa. Tranquility also believes that the use of preventive development in Africa could ensure that conflicts such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be avoided before they erupt. While obstacles to be overcome are many, international support for effective national programs to ensure the relief to rehabilitation to development continuum through post-conflict peace-building, can enable Sub-Saharan Africa and the entire developing world to achieve the sustainable development which alone will guarantee regional peace and stability. The State of Tranquility fully supports the increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in all aspects of dispute settlement and peace-keeping. Increased support for such regional efforts, when combined with measures to eliminate the root causes of regional conflict, serves to further enhance the prospects for lasting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the entire international community.

II. Racism and Racial Discrimination

The State of Tranquility believes that the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance offers the global community an opportunity to establish an updated plan of action to completely eradicate racism and racial discrimination throughout the world. The necessity for all Member States to sign, accede to and ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is an integral part of this plan, as policies and practices based on racism and racial discrimination remain devastating to regional social, economic and infrastructure development. Tranquility encourage all States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia and to provide assistance to those affected by such practices. The lack of financial resources that prevented the international community from realizing its objectives in the three previous United Nations Decades to

Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination must not continue to hinder the international community in guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all peoples.

III. A Comprehensive Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The State of Tranquility remains firmly committed in support of the continued role of the United Nations Security Council as the primary agent for the maintenance of international peace and security, as mandated under Chapters IV and V of the UN Charter. We strongly recommend the authorization, determination, composition and financing of peacekeeping operations should be determined by the Council, as authorized by Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Charter and in conjunction with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the State of Tranquility endorses the current role of the Secretary-General as administrator of the Operations established by the Council. The State of Tranquility remains a central contributor for both financial and logistical support of the United Nations Peacekeeping forces and will continue to contribute to the United Nations Peacekeeping Budget throughout the duration of the current year.

The State of Tranquility is firmly committed to addressing all threats to international peace and security through regional arrangements and multilateral forums. The international community must address the underlying causes of these conflicts and the destabilizing effects of such conflicts on entire regions. Tranquility is convinced that increased utilization of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms can enhance the ability of peacekeeping missions to take into account historical, social, and cultural values and traditions within areas of conflict.

As operation costs continue to escalate, however, our nation strongly urges all Member States and the Secretary-General to devote greater attention to the monetary and management aspects of peacekeeping operations and provide serious consideration for the establishment of operation termination dates. The State of Tranquility further supports the proposal endorsed within A/Res/44/49, calling for Member States to develop and maintain an inventory of supplies and equipment to be made available for Operations on short-notice. In addition, the State of Tranquility calls upon Member States to recognize the need to maintain voluntary contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to reduce the continuing problems incurred by funding deficits.

Resolution Writing and Report Writing at the NMUN Conference

The substantive output of committees at the NMUN conference generally takes the form of either resolutions or reports. At the 2006 NMUN Conference, the ICJ and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting, will adopt variations on these forms. The ICJ will create judgments and the WTO Ministerial Meeting will produce a declaration.

Please refer to the chart below which designates whether delegates will be writing resolutions or reports in the committee they are participating in at the 2006 NMUN Conference:

- | <u>Resolution Writing Committees</u> | <u>Report Writing Committees</u> |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• GA Plenary; GA First; GA Second; GA Third; and ILC• All Security Council Committees• ECOSOC Plenary; ECA; UNICEF; UNEP; and UNDP• G-77; OIC; AU; and NATO | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• CSTD; CESCRC; WCDR; CSW• UNAIDS and UNHCR• IADB and APEC |

Resolution Writing

A resolution is the most appropriate means of applying political pressure on Member States, expressing an opinion on an important issue, or recommending action to be taken by the United Nations or some other agency. Most UN resolutions are not binding “law”; the only body which may produce resolutions that are binding upon the Member States of the United Nations is the Security Council. (In most cases, the resolutions and reports produced by the IGO committees simulated at the NMUN Conference are binding upon its individual Member States.)

Under UN rules of procedure, unlike other more generalized rules of procedure, the topic on the floor is debated in its entirety. This means that during debate, delegates should discuss the whole issue and all of the resolutions regarding that issue. When debate is exhausted, or is ended, the body then votes on each resolution and amendment and the issue are considered closed.

The National Model United Nations does not allow pre-written resolutions on any agenda topic. For this reason, delegations are not allowed to contact each other before the conference to begin caucusing. The NMUN process of writing resolutions during committee sessions is designed to teach delegates the concepts of negotiation and concession; pre-written resolutions hinder that learning process.

The goal of formal debate and caucusing is to persuade enough countries in the committee to support a particular solution to the topic under discussion. Resolutions formally state the agreed-upon solution by outlining the relevant precedents and describing the proposed actions. The committee is not limited to one resolution per topic; often the committee will pass multiple resolutions dealing with different aspects of a topic.

Report Writing

Some committees at the conference will draft reports during the course of negotiations, instead of resolutions. These reports represent the full work of the committee in question. These reports should not be confused with the summary reports of a committee’s work which are presented at the Saturday Plenary Sessions of either the General Assembly or ECOSOC. Directors of report writing committees will elaborate on the process used in reporting writing committees on opening night (Tuesday night). Prior to the NMUN Conference in April 2006, a handout with a lengthier sample report for delegates to use as a model will be posted on the NMUN Conference website at www.nmun.org.

Reports are similar in nature to resolutions, with only a few key differences. Reports represent the formal recommendations and/or decisions of the committee on the agenda topics at hand, in the same manner as resolutions, but in the form of one document. Committees that write resolutions typically produce a number of draft resolutions for each topic, and each one is subject to a substantive vote by the body. In a similar manner, committees that write

reports produce several draft report segments and then vote on each one. The final report of these committees will combine the adopted draft reports into one comprehensive report at the end of the simulation.

Another key difference is the format of reports. While resolutions consist of one long sentence, reports are a series of complete sentences. Thus, where the clauses of a resolution each contain one whole concept, a report is composed of paragraphs, each constituted by a sentence or a few sentences which contain one whole concept.

What to Expect at the Simulation of Your Committee

Opening session: After a brief introduction of the dais and some announcements, delegates will discuss the order in which the committee will address agenda topics while in formal and caucus sessions. The committee will then vote on a motion from the floor to set the agenda in a proposed order, and will continue to vote on such motions until one passes by a majority vote. If the committee fails to reach agreement on the agenda order by the conclusion of the first evening, the director and assistant director reserve the right to set the agenda. After the agenda has been set, the chair will entertain motions for the opening of the speakers' list to address the first agenda topic. (It should be noted due to the special procedures used by the International Court of Justice [ICJ] a variety on this process will be used. Delegates participating in the ICJ should carefully follow the delegate preparation section of the Background Guide of the ICJ.)

Rules of procedure: The simulation is conducted through the use of the committee rules of procedure, which are included in this background guide. The rules of procedure for this committee – located at the back of this background guide – are the rules of procedure that are only accepted during the simulation of this committee. Interpretation of these rules is left to the sole discretion of the Director-General or her/his designate. It is extremely important to develop a thorough working knowledge of the rules, including when they should be introduced, and in what capacity. The rules of procedure are enforced to facilitate the efficient workings of the committee, not to hinder them. Therefore, the director, assistant director and chair (with the approval of the director) reserve the right to rule motions out of order which may be considered dilatory or disruptive to the committee proceedings. In this respect, one of the quickest ways for a delegate to alienate him/herself within a committee is to be labeled a “rules hound,” or someone who attempts to disrupt committee proceedings with the introduction of redundant, inappropriate or time-consuming motions.

Decorum: Decorum is a *de facto* rule throughout the week of the simulation. In both large and small committees, the ability to conduct normal business while in formal session is an arduous task when decorum is not maintained; delegates will be asked for their assistance in this endeavor. Please see the Delegate Preparation Manual for a specific discussion of delegate decorum in committee and also, delegate behavior while at the Conference.

Caucusing: Caucusing is an important and logistically difficult component of the United Nations simulation. These informal meetings between voting blocs, as well as between States with positions that are diametrically opposed, often produce compromises acceptable to all parties. However, delegates are required to address issues within a week's time which, in many cases, the international community has failed resolve after years of debate and negotiation. Further, delegates to the NMUN do not have individual offices in which to convene informal meetings. As a result, the bulk of informal negotiation and the construction of working papers will occur within, or in the close proximity of, the committee chambers. In consideration for the other Conference participants, delegates are asked to respect the formal proceedings occurring both within and between all committees participating at the Conference. Finally, given the importance of decorum within committee chambers, all caucusing should occur outside of the committee chambers while committee is in session.

Chairs and Rapporteurs: Delegates should also take note that the director and assistant director (with the approval of the Director-General) will select a committee chair and rapporteur (committee administrative assistant) following the conclusion of interviews on the first evening of the Conference (Tuesday evening). For those interested in the opportunity to serve the committee as a chairperson or rapporteur, an application is available online at www.nmun.org. The application should be completed and submitted to the director no later than the opening night of the Conference. The successful candidate for chair will demonstrate an excellent working-knowledge of the rules of procedure through a series of situations presented to her or him and exhibit qualities of leadership, patience and

humility. The rapporteur will assist the chair, the director and the assistant director with the abundance of paperwork and record keeping required in the efficient workings of the committee, as well as provide logistical support for the chair while in voting procedures. Multiple years of attendance at the NMUN Conference is preferred in candidates for the committee chair and rapporteur, but it is not the only defining characteristic used by the Directors and Assistant Directors to select chairs and rapporteur for committees.

Delegates selected to serve in these positions must forfeit their rights to participate in substantive debate within the committee. Although the chair and rapporteur continue to serve as representatives of their assigned State, their primary duty is to assist the director and assistant director in facilitating the professional operation of the committee. Additionally, delegates selected as committee chairs and rapporteurs do retain an equal eligibility for awards consideration. All delegates are encouraged to apply for these challenging and rewarding positions. Many individuals who serve as chairs and rapporteurs have in later years served as members of the NMUN Volunteer Staff.

Attire: In keeping with the spirit of the simulation, delegates are *required* to wear professional business attire. Further, national symbols of any kind are forbidden in committee chambers, in accordance with practices of the UN. Symbols associated specifically with the United Nations (e.g., the seal of the UN) are allowed in committee chambers.

Your Role as a Delegate at the 2006 NMUN Conference

Taking on the Role of a Diplomat

The most important aspect of participating as a delegate to the NMUN is your assumption of the role of a foreign diplomat. In this role, you are acting as a representative of the government and the peoples of the Member State or NGO to which you have been assigned. The only exception is those delegates who are serving as justices on the International Court of Justice [ICJ]. In their capacities, those delegates serving as justices are serving as independent technical experts.

While in preparation for and throughout the duration of the Conference, you may find personal disagreement with the foreign policy of the country you are representing or with the policy of the NGO you are representing. Your personal opinions are entirely inapplicable during the course of the simulation. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance for all delegates to arrive well-versed in the dynamics of their State's foreign policy or in that of their NGO, and anticipate possible obstacles their State or NGO may encounter during the simulation. The simulation's quality depends on the collective preparation of its participants.

As a delegate, you should be able to demonstrate thorough knowledge of your assigned country's policies, specific issues to be discussed, and the procedures, activities, and history of your committee. Delegates should also exhibit the ability to negotiate and compromise, demonstrate leadership, and the ability to influence by gaining the professional respect of fellow delegates. States and NGOs maintain specific and adaptive foreign policy methods and goals to allow delegates to function in the negotiation process. As a representative of the NGO or State to which you have been assigned, you will be expected to work within the historical confines of your NGO or country's foreign policy at the UN. Even though many Member States and Observer States do not assume strong leadership roles in the UN, the reality of the NMUN is that each delegation will be judged on its ability to provide leadership to other delegates throughout the Conference.

Delegates are reminded that professional diplomats conduct themselves, and regard one another, with the utmost dignity and respect, regardless of foreign policy affiliation or personal feelings. Even States and NGOs who observe severely conflicting ideological perspectives will work closely together, within the UN, on diplomatic matters of mutual concern. Likewise many delegates are forced to work together despite personal conflicts.

The Preparation and Introduction of Resolutions and Reports

Resolutions and reports adopted within respective committees represent Member States' decisions and recommended courses of action with respect to the topics under discussion. Clauses within the preamble of

resolutions should provide a brief outline of historical and current perspectives and endeavors regarding the issues to be addressed within the operative clauses of the document. The operative clauses of resolutions provide the objectives and potential actions that Members designed to address the issues outlined within the preamble. More simply, the preamble states the problems before the committee in relation to the topic under deliberation and operative clauses outline the decisions of the committee for the solution of these problems.

Although delegates are encouraged to develop resolution and report writing skills, both in classroom scenarios and at regional MUN simulations, the NMUN will not accept any pre-written resolutions or reports, and which have not been developed by a plurality of the committee. This determination is at the sole discretion of the Secretariat. Due to the goal of creating an environment where the skill of compromise and conflict resolution skills can be learned, delegates may be asked to merge working documents with other individuals working on the same issue in a committee. In addition, *any delegates found to be submitting plagiarized material within resolutions will be subject to dismissal from further participation within the Conference.* Although UN documents are within the public domain, the verbatim exploitation of these documents will not be permitted at the Conference.

Resolutions and reports are developed in three stages. In the initial stage, a resolution or report is referred to as a working paper (in resolution writing committees) or a working draft report segment (in report writing committees). It is generally developed by States or experts that share common perspectives on the issues to be addressed. The working paper/working draft report segment is shared with other delegates in the committee for their input and support. Once the working paper/working draft report segment gathers the required signatories, it is to be submitted to the committee director for approval. On the approval of the director, the working paper/working draft report segment will be copied by Conference Services and introduced by the chair to the committee as a draft resolution or report.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been approved by the committee director, it will be copied by a member of the dais. Delegates in the committee are not required to copy approved working paper/working draft report. Yet, working paper/working draft report which have not been approved by the committee director will not be copied by the dais and it is the responsibility of the delegates to copy their own working paper/working draft report if they choose to share copies of the pre-approved document. Any questions concerning this issue should be directed to the committee director or the assistant director. Also, questions concerning this rule can be directed to members of the NMUN Conference Service Staff.

Once the working paper/working draft report has been introduced as a draft resolution or draft report segment, it becomes the property of the committee and all references to sponsorship, with the exception of identifying the status of amendments while in voting procedure, are formally removed. The central contributors to the contents of the draft resolution or report will continue to enlist the advice and support of as many States or experts as possible to expand upon the substance of the draft and, thereby, gain as much input and support as possible prior to the closure of debate. Once the committee moves to closure on a given topic, all draft resolutions and draft report segment will be voted upon and when adopted, it will thereafter be recognized as formal resolutions or reports.

Adopted resolutions and reports represent recommendations for States and the international community. The legal status of each document depends on which committee the resolution or report is coming from within the organization. For instance, the General Assembly's resolutions are not legally binding political treaties, but the decisions of the Security Council are binding on all Member States. Most countries avoid the embarrassing political position of failing to promote and implement the recommendations they publicly endorsed within the UN. In regard to the IGO committees simulated at the 2006 NMUN Conference (G-77; OIC; AU; APEC; IADB, and NATO), many of the documents passed by the committee are only binding on the Member States of that particular IGO. For example, decisions made by the Organizations of the Islamic Conference (OIC) are only binding on those states which belong to this body. (The decisions by these IGOs will be reported to the General Assembly at the Saturday meeting on the General Assembly.)

It is highly recommended that delegates introduce their ideas to the committee in the form of working papers/working draft report segments as soon as possible in order to contribute to the potential development and adoption of resolutions and reports which characterize the united representative strength and will of regional blocs or, ultimately, the committee as a whole. Typically, a number of working papers/working draft segments before any

committee will overlap in content, style, and substance. In this event, the director will request delegates to integrate their individual endeavors into a single and, thus, more comprehensive and internationally representative document.

The Executive Bureau, the General Committee and Saturday Plenary Sessions

By the conclusion of Tuesday night sessions, the Economic and Social Council Plenary will select four vice-presidents to assist the president (chair) as members of the Council Executive Bureau. Likewise the General Assembly will select 21 of its Members to the General Committee by Tuesday evening. The members of the Bureau and the General Committee are to be selected with regard for equitable geographic representation from: African States, Asian and Pacific States, Eastern European States, Latin American States and Western European and other States. The Bureau will meet on Friday evening, following the conclusion of regular sessions. The General Committee will be composed somewhat differently than the Bureau. It will be comprised of each committee chair from the General Assembly department. They will also meet at the end of regular sessions on Friday evening.

On Friday, the Bureau and General Committee will be briefed by a representative from each relevant committee regarding the work accomplished by their body throughout the week. After reviewing the reports and resolutions submitted by the committee representatives, the Bureau and General Committee will set the agenda for Saturday sessions to deliberate upon each committee's recommendations to the Plenary.

ECOSOC Executive Bureau: The Saturday ECOSOC Plenary Session will deliberate upon the work of all the committees within the ECOSOC Department, as well as other relevant bodies, including most of the specialized agencies. During the Friday evening meeting, the Bureau will set an agenda order for the review of these reports for deliberation and potential adoption during Saturday sessions. Additionally, the Saturday session of ECOSOC Plenary will be deliberating upon a fourth topic to be prepared and introduced by the director and assistant director. This topic will be made available to delegates on Friday afternoon and will encompass a broad theme that relates, as much as is possible, to issues discussed by each of the committees within ECOSOC and the specialized agencies.

GA General Committee: On Saturday the General Assembly Plenary will deliberate upon the work submitted by each of the committees in the GA and Security Council department, as well as relevant inter-governmental organizations and other bodies. Following the conclusion of regular sessions on Friday, the General Committee will set the agenda order for the review of these reports and resolutions and for their potential adoption during Saturday sessions.

Saturday Sessions: On Saturday, the final day of the Conference, the ECOSOC Plenary, General Assembly Plenary, and Security Council will convene at United Nations Headquarters. Plenary deliberations will encompass the work of all Conference committees; and all delegates are advised to participate in the Saturday sessions in order to assist Plenary representatives with their broad scope of work. Minimally, Member State representatives to the Plenary should be briefed in regard to the work of the committees that report to their respective departments. Ideally, the representatives of the committee whose work is being considered will sit with Plenary representatives as expert advisors to the State. The agenda for Saturday sessions will be made available outside Delegate Resources by 9:00 p.m. on Friday.

The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in the Simulation

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are recognized in Article 71 of the *UN Charter* as consultative bodies in relationship to ECOSOC. These organizations also maintain a close working relationship with almost all ECOSOC funds and programs, specialized agencies, General Assembly committees, and regional organizations. In this role, NGOs are an invaluable resource to the UN system because they provide information on political, economic, social, humanitarian, and cultural developments in all parts of the world. Their recommendations may address potential solutions to global problems, speak to specific country or regional needs, or call attention to an emerging crisis.

NGOs are a crucial link between policy-makers and the individuals directly affected by those policies. They represent civil society and its impact on the UN system. There are two primary advantages NGOs have over the UN in terms of information gathering and program implementation. First, NGOs are often locally based and have better knowledge of regional conditions, needs, and constraints. Second, NGOs may find it easier to gain the acceptance,

trust and cooperation of the communities in which they work because they are more aware of the indigenous cultural climate than many intergovernmental organizations. If the UN attempted to gather independently all of the information available to NGOs, it would consume vast amounts of time and scarce financial resources that are better applied to actual programs.

The global summit process that characterizes much of the UN's work in the 1990s has brought new attention to NGOs. At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, participation in the NGO forum surpassed all previous records. Although they were not invited to formally participate in negotiations, the massive NGO presence indicated recognition of their importance by conference organizers. In 1993, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the NGO forum took place in the same building as the official meetings. This increased access to the proceedings brought NGOs to a new level of integration in global summits. At later conferences, such as the Cairo Conference on Population and Development, the Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and Habitat II in Istanbul, NGO forums grew in numbers as well as in their abilities to contribute substantively. As the international community continues to review Conferences of the past ten years, it is apparent that the influence of NGOs will set a new precedent for the incorporation of civil society into UN activity at the global level.

NGOs at the National Model United Nations Conference

Over the past several years, the NMUN has integrated the presence of NGOs into committees at the conference. It is an ongoing project that improves the educational quality of the simulation and mirrors developments in the UN itself, where NGOs are gaining both visibility and respect as a resource for program design and implementation. A large number of delegates will take on the challenging task of representing NGO delegations this year.

NGO delegations maintain all of the privileges accorded to traditional country delegations, and are required to exhibit the same level of preparedness. NGO delegations are eligible for awards, based on the same criteria as country delegations, and may select head delegates to attend the Head Delegate Meetings each night. NGO representatives are also required to submit position papers reflecting the perspectives and priorities of their assigned NGO on the agenda topics at hand.

All delegates should take the role of NGOs very seriously. NGO representatives must be prepared to fully participate in all committee activities, including formal debate, caucusing and drafting working papers. In turn, Member State delegates must be prepared to engage NGO delegates in these activities. Mutual recognition and respect between NGO and country delegates is necessary to a successful conference experience.

NGO delegates maintain the following privileges in each committee to which they are assigned:

1. the right to make any procedural motion;
2. the right to vote on all procedural motions;
3. the right to speak before all assigned committees; and
4. the right to act as a signatory on working papers.

Please note that NGO delegates do not have substantive voting rights, and may not sponsor working papers. In order to ensure a positive educational experience for all delegates, these rights and privileges may not exactly reflect those granted by ECOSOC. Any alterations made by the Director General gave due consideration to existing realities and the need to provide a learning environment that encourages active participation. *Please note: Those individuals representing NGOs in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) will be afforded the right to speak for a maximum of two minutes at the beginning of the discussion of a topic from the agenda and a maximum of two minutes prior to moving into voting procedures on a given topic. This alteration to the normal rules has been made by the Director General to better simulate the true workings of this particular committee.*

Country delegates are fully expected to work with NGO delegates in the spirit of collaboration upon which the UN was founded. The exclusion of NGOs from committee work simply because they do not have substantive voting rights is both unrealistic and unprofessional. In almost all cases, actions denigrating the participation of NGOs will be considered extraordinarily out of character and be noted in awards consideration. NGOs are expert organizations

in their respective fields that possess specialized knowledge of the subject matter at hand. The recommendations of NGO delegates maintain the same validity as those of Member States, and it is incumbent upon country delegates to ensure that those perspectives are recognized.

How to Prepare as an NGO Delegation

As an NGO delegation, your preparation should be structured in the same way as a typical country delegation. The most basic pieces of this process include fundamental knowledge of the organization and of the agenda topics. Based on your research, you will decide how your assigned NGO will approach each topic, and the recommendations you will make for potential solutions. This includes identifying blocs of countries and other NGOs that may share the same perspectives and priorities and collaborate with you in committee sessions.

NMUN Resources: In this background guide, each agenda topic contains a section specific to NGO action. This will provide you with basic information on the general role of NGOs in that topic area. These sections may not specifically address your assigned NGO, but will provide a broad discussion of relevant NGO activities. You should not hesitate to contact the main office of your assigned NGO during the course of your preparations. In addition, you should arrange a mission briefing with the UN Liaison Office in New York City of the NGO you are representing. If you need assistance in arranging this briefing, visit the NMUN Web site at www.nmun.org or contact Tracy Kingsley, Assistant Secretary-General for Internal Affairs at asg.internal@nmun.org or the Director-General, Kevin Grisham at dirgen@nmun.org.

Doing Research: A large portion of your research will likely rely on Internet resources. Because most NGOs do not have expansive budgets that allow for the widespread reproduction and dissemination of their written materials and reports, they choose to publish such documents on their Web sites. If you have difficulty obtaining materials from these electronic sources, please contact your director, assistant director, departmental USG, or the Director General for assistance. The UN Web site, as well as the sites for many of the specialized agencies, also contains valuable information about NGO activity. Finally, do not exclude traditional resources from your preparations. Newspapers, scholarly journals, and books will provide differing perspectives on your agenda topics, and may give interesting insight into the evolving role of NGOs. In particular, there is an increasing amount of sources on the issue of civil society and its role in the UN. It is recommended that this literature be consulted as needed for your preparation.

Position Papers: NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

The most critical part of a successful NGO delegate experience at the NMUN Conference is active participation in committee sessions. This includes utilizing the rules of procedure, speaking in formal debate and contributing during caucus sessions. Although you may not sponsor working papers or vote on draft resolutions/draft report segments, you have both the right and the obligation to participate in their composition and refinement. You may act as a signatory to any working paper on the floor of your committee if you wish to illustrate your support for continued development of the document. Getting involved in the simulation is the best way to enhance your own educational experience and that of your fellow delegates.

The Role of Inter-Governmental Organizations in the Simulation

IGOs are invaluable resources to the UN because they facilitate the coordination of issues and allow for the UN system to function with more relevant tools for understanding and guiding economic, political, and social policy.

IGOs, along with NGOs, are crucial links between policy-makers and the individuals directly affected by those policies. They represent civil society and its impact on the UN system. There are two primary advantages IGOs have over the UN in terms of information gathering and program implementation. First, IGOs are often regionally

based and have better knowledge of the regional conditions, needs, and constraints. Second, the UN depends on the work of IGOs to gain information that its limited time and financial resources do not allow.

IGOs allow Member States to use their organization as a tool to achieve policy objectives and push their own interests and development agendas. Being part of an IGO also helps to develop countries' infrastructure by gaining knowledge and skills from other representatives they interact with. Many IGOs are actual UN subsidiary bodies, while other is independent entities with ties to the UN system. Their decisions are regarded as decisions of the organization and not of individual member countries. IGOs continue to help set and create international rules and policies within the economic, social, and political forums, which help to bridge the divide between regions and individual countries as they aim to help countries help themselves.

IGOs at the National Model United Nations Conference

Since 2005, IGOs have been invited to participate at the NMUN Conference. (This is separate from the simulation of IGOs as committees at the NMUN Conference which has occurred for many years.) This is part of the Conference's ongoing efforts to improve the educational quality of the simulation by mirroring developments in the UN itself, where IGOs have increasing visibility and respect as a resource for program design and implementation.

IGO delegations maintain all of the privileges accorded to traditional country delegations, and are required to exhibit the same level of preparedness. IGO delegations are eligible for awards, based on the same criteria as country delegations, and may select head delegates to attend the Head Delegate Meetings each night. IGO representatives are also required to submit position papers reflecting the perspectives and priorities of their assigned IGO on the agenda topics at hand.

All delegates should take the role of IGOs seriously. IGO representatives must be fully prepared to participate in all Committee activities, including formal debate, caucusing, and drafting working papers. In turn, Member State delegates must be prepared to engage IGO delegates in these activities. Mutual recognition and respect between IGOs, NGOs, and country delegates is necessary for having a successful Conference experience.

IGO delegates maintain the following privileges in each Committee to which they are assigned:

1. The right to make any procedural motion;
2. The right to vote on all procedural motions;
3. The right to speak before all assigned Committees; and
4. The right to act as a signatory on working papers.

Please note that IGO delegates do not have substantive voting rights, and may not sponsor working papers.

In order to ensure a positive educational experience for all delegates, these rights and privileges may not exactly reflect those granted by ECOSOC. Any alterations made by the Director-General were given due consideration to existing realities and the need to provide a learning environment that encourages active participation.

Country delegates are fully expected to work with IGO delegates in the spirit of collaboration upon which the UN was founded. The exclusion of IGOs from Committee work simply because they do not have substantive voting rights is both unrealistic and unprofessional. In almost all cases, actions denigrating the participation of IGOs will be considered extraordinarily out of character and be noted in awards consideration. IGOs have specialized knowledge on the subject matter at hand as well as important regional perspectives and experiences that could be applied more broadly. The recommendations of IGO delegates maintain the same validity as those of Member States, and it is incumbent upon country delegates to ensure that those perspectives are recognized.

How to Prepare as an IGO Delegation

As an IGO delegation, your preparation should be structured in the same way as a typical country delegation, but always remembering that you are representatives of a specific organization and what they stand for, not representatives of their individual members' perspectives. The most basic pieces of this process include fundamental knowledge of the organization and the agenda topics. Based on your research, you will decide how

your assigned IGO will approach each topic, and the recommendations you will make for potential solutions. This includes identifying blocs of countries, NGOs, and other IGOs that may share the same perspectives and priorities and collaborate with you in Committee sessions.

NMUN Resources: In the background guide, each agenda topic contains a specific section on NGO action. While not fully relevant to IGOs, it can be used to provide basic information on the general role of non-country participation in that topic area. You should not hesitate to contact the main office of your assigned IGO during the course of your preparations. In addition, you should arrange a mission briefing with the UN Liaison Office in New York City of the IGO you are representing. If you need assistance in arranging this briefing, visit the NMUN Web site at www.nmun.org or contact Tracy Kingsley, Assistant Secretary-General for Internal Affairs at asg.internal@nmun.org or the Director-General, Kevin Grisham at dirgen@nmun.org.

Doing Research: Most of your research will likely rely on Internet resources. Because most IGOs do not have expansive budgets that allow for the widespread reproduction and dissemination of their written materials and reports, they choose to publish such documents on their Web sites. If you have difficulty obtaining materials from these electronic sources, please contact your Director, Assistant Director, departmental USG, ASG-Internal, or the Director-General for assistance. Finally, do not exclude traditional resources from your preparations. Newspapers, scholarly journals, and books will provide differing perspectives on your agenda topics, and may give interesting insight into the role of IGOs.

As an initial point of reference, listed below are the Web sites for the IGOs being represented at NMUN 2005.

Inter-Governmental Organization

African Development Bank
Asian Development Bank
Caribbean Community
Council of Europe
European Community
Institute for Media, Peace and Security
Inter-Parliamentary Union
League of Arab States
Non-Aligned Movement
Pan-American Health Organization
The Commonwealth
World Bank

Web Site

<http://www.afdb.org>
<http://www.adb.org>
<http://caricom.org>
<http://www.coe.int>
<http://europa.eu.int>
<http://www.mediapeace.org>
<http://www.ipu.org/>
<http://www.arableagueonline.org>
<http://www.nam.gov.za>
<http://www.paho.org>
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org>
<http://www.worldbank.org/>

Position Papers: IGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned IGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your Committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

The most critical part of a successful IGO delegate experience at the NMUN Conference is active participation in Committee sessions. This includes utilizing the rules of procedure, speaking in formal debate, and contributing during caucus sessions. Although you may not sponsor working papers or vote on draft resolutions, you have both the right and the obligation to participate in their composition and refinement. You may act as a signatory to any working paper on the floor of your Committee if you wish to illustrate your support for continued development of the document. Getting involved in the simulation is the best way to enhance your own educational experience and that of your fellow delegates.

The Roles of State Delegates, Technical Experts & Independent Technical Experts at the 2006 National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference

The Variety of Roles That Delegates Simulate at the NMUN Conference

At the National Model United Nations (NMUN) Conference, delegates assume one of three roles when they participate in committee proceedings. They serve as a delegate representing the national interest of their state (state delegate), a technical expert, or an independent technical expert. At the 2006 NMUN Conference, only the justices of the International Court of Justice will serve in this capacity. Due to independent technical experts only serving in the ICJ, this role will specifically be addressed in the ICJ Background Guide.

The United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, is essentially a political organization. However, there is also a significant role within the system for technical experts in many areas. Because the UN, its subsidiary bodies, related programs, and affiliated organizations speak to such a broad range of issues, experts are often needed to properly address complex problems and make informed recommendations to the General Assembly and Member States. Several ECOSOC committees and almost all of the Specialized Agencies consist of technical experts in the field, as opposed to political representatives. It is critical that delegates representing technical experts understand the complex nature of the expert role.

The following committees at the 2006 NMUN Conference consist of technical experts: *International Law Commission (ILC)*, the *Commission on Science and Technology for Development* and the *Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)*.

Technical Experts within the United Nations System

The most important distinction between technical experts and political representatives is the relevance of global objectives, as opposed to national priorities. While the political needs and limitations of your individual countries and regions are important, and must be considered in the appropriate context, you are charged with serving as experts in the fields addressed by your respective committees. In other words, the top priority of a technical expert is to assess challenges and propose solutions to relevant issue areas, not to present or promote the political agenda of one particular country.

As you prepare your position papers, please keep in mind your status as technical experts. Instead of traditional, country-specific policy statements, position papers should reflect your expert opinions and recommendations on your committee's topics. This should also be kept in mind when working on documents for the committee during the NMUN Conference in April 2006.

History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

At the end of World War II, U.S. President Harry S. Truman withdrew his U.S. troops from the European theater.¹ Britain had withdrawn from the eastern areas of the Mediterranean Sea, leaving Greece and Turkey both under threat from the Soviet Union.² The policy known as containment began in 1947 when the United States Congress responded to the Truman Doctrine and appropriated US\$400 million in aid to both Turkey and Greece.³ To prevent the Soviet Union or Germany from becoming the dominant power in Europe, Belgium, France, Britain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands formed the Western European Union.⁴ Later, in 1949, the United States of America and the Western European Union combined forces due to the aggression of communists in South Korea and Czechoslovakia, as well as the blockade of Berlin, and became the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁵

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949.⁶ The article that is considered to be one of the most important aspects of the Treaty is Article 5, which states:

*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.*⁷

This Article of the Treaty was intended for use if the Soviet Union ever exhibited aggression against the States or territories of Western Europe.⁸ Twelve States, including Iceland, Italy, the USA, Norway, Portugal, Canada, Belgium, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, signed the Treaty initially.⁹

The Soviet Union made a bid to join the organization in 1954 but the bid was rejected by both the United Kingdom, and the USA.¹⁰ The next year Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, drafted the Warsaw Pact in response to a NATO threat that was perceived by many States in the Soviet bloc. The pact had seven members at the time it was signed.¹¹

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the Premier of the Soviet Union, and with him came new policies for the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).¹² Glasnost and perestroika became the leading components of his agenda through the end of the Cold War.¹³ Upon German reunified in 1989, NATO, as well as some of its eastern neighbors, did not look favorably on a neutral united Germany outside of NATO.¹⁴ However, the Soviets did not want NATO forces moving into the eastern areas of Europe.¹⁵ As a result, Germany remained a member of NATO, as it did when it joined in 1955, and NATO forces did not move into Eastern Germany.¹⁶

¹ Duignan, Peter. (2000). NATO: Its past, present, and future. Stanford, California: Hoover Institutional Press. p. 1.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Wikipedia. (n.d.). *NATO*. Retrieved June 16, 2005, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO>.
North Atlantic Treaty (opened for signature April 4, 1949). Retrieved June 16, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Duignan, *supra*, note 1, p. 7.

¹¹ Wikipedia. (n.d.). *Warsaw Pact*. Retrieved June 18 2005, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Pact

¹² Kaplan, Lawrence S. (2004). NATO divided, NATO united: the evolution of an alliance. London: Praeger. p. 99.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

In the 1990s, under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO approved of taking action in Yugoslavia, citing that the crisis threatened the security of the members of NATO and that such a crisis could send an endless flow of refugees west into Europe.¹⁷ In 1993, the United Nations requested that NATO create a plan for a no-fly zone, to be implemented over Bosnia.¹⁸ The allies united in conducting an air strike against the Serbs when thirty-eight people were killed, as a result of the firing of Serbian artillery into a Sarajevo market.¹⁹ This 22 day strike was ordered in 1995.²⁰

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked for the first time in the history of the organization on September 12, 2001 the day after the World Trade Center and Pentagon were attacked by al-Qaeda.²¹ The activation of Article 5 not only seemed to invigorate the alliance, but also provide it with a newfound purpose never seen before this time.²²

North Atlantic Council

The 26 Member States that make up the North Atlantic Council (NAC) govern NATO, which is chaired by the Secretary-General of the organization.²³ When policies are decided in the NAC, they are done so by unanimity and consensus, as the council has no formal voting procedure.²⁴ The work of the council is organized and facilitated by the Secretary-General, and the six divisions of the Secretariat.²⁵ The six divisions are Political Affairs, Defense Planning and Policy, Defense Support, Infrastructure, Logistics and Council Operations, and Scientific Affairs.²⁶ Occasionally, NAC meets at higher levels with Foreign Ministers, Heads of State and Government or other high officials.²⁷

The Military Committee (MC) is seen as the next highest committee of the alliance.²⁸ The second most pivotal member of a delegation to NATO is its military representative, who sits on the MC.²⁹ The military representative is a high-ranking military official, or the chief of staff of a State's military forces.³⁰ The MC advises the NAC on operations related to the common defense of the alliance and provides advice on military strategy and policy.³¹ Finally, subordinate to the MC is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, among others.³²

NATO has dealt with many issues, both internal and external during its history. In the coming years, it will deal with many more, including the future of NATO and its role in the 21st century, Terrorism, and its role in conflict. Its 26 Member States consisting of the following will decide upon these issues:

Belgium	Hungary	Portugal
Bulgaria	Iceland	Romania
Canada	Italy	Slovakia
Czech Republic	Latvia	Slovenia
Denmark	Lithuania	Spain
Estonia	Luxembourg	Turkey
France	the Netherlands	United Kingdom

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Wikipedia, *NATO*, *supra*, note 6.

²² Kaplan, *supra*, note 11, p. 134.

²³ Wikipedia, *NATO*, *supra*, note 6.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Duignan, *supra*, note 1, p. 12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁷ Wikipedia, *NATO*, *supra*, note 6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Duignan, *supra*, note 1, p. 13.

³¹ Wikipedia, *NATO*, *supra*, note 6.

³² Duignan, *supra*, note 1, p. 13.

Germany
Greece

Norway
Poland

United States³³

I. The Role of NATO in Intra-State and Inter-State Conflict

Introduction

Since the inception of the North Atlantic Treaty in April of 1949, the primary mission of NATO has been collective action as stipulated under the terms and conditions of Article 5 of the treaty.³⁴ The primary function of NATO was safeguarding against any aggression by the Warsaw Pact, particularly the Soviet Union. However, after the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s, the military mission of NATO was in question, namely the defensive nature of the alliance.³⁵ In the Madrid Declaration of 1997, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States recognized the improvements the alliance had made to adapt to its new mandates in managing conflicts and regional crises.³⁶

In its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO's governing body demonstrated its commitment to its new and ever changing mission through Sections 10 and 31.³⁷ In section 10, NATO sought to enhance the security of NATO states to further implement Crisis Management, which included response operations and partnership in order to promote cooperation and transparency in all workings of the organization.³⁸ In section 31, NATO strove to prevent conflict through cooperation with regional organizations' crisis response operations.³⁹

NATO has expanded its operations to include out-of-area conflicts as well as missions that are closer to each Member State's operational theater.⁴⁰ The organization has participated in conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, Kosovo, and is beginning to look further into coordinated efforts outside the sphere of Europe that are vital to the security of the Member States.⁴¹

The 1991 Persian Gulf Conflict

On November 29, 1990, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted to pass Resolution 678, the twelfth regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.⁴² This resolution was the final in a series under which Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes the use of "all necessary means" to uphold the wishes of the international community as outlined in the previous resolutions of the Security Council.⁴³ Under this resolution, the Member States of NATO, acting as a coalition of the willing, along with States from other regions of the world, entered the Persian Gulf under the command of the United States military as a UN force to drive Iraq out of the sovereign State of Kuwait.⁴⁴

The 1991 conflict, as well as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm lasted two months, but were an important collective action by the members of NATO, even though they were not acting in the capacity of a NATO force.⁴⁵ In addition, the Europeans agreed to mutual support in operations and logistics and well as mutual military protection

³³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, 10 May). *NATO Member Countries*. Retrieved June 18, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm>

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Kaplan, *supra*, note 12, p. 107-108.

³⁶ North Atlantic Council. (1997). *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation*. Retrieved June 27, 2005 from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>

³⁷ North Atlantic Council. (1999). *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Retrieved June 27, 2005 from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

³⁸ *Ibid.*, section 10.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, section 31.

⁴⁰ Kaplan, *supra*, note 12, p. 111.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² United Nations Security Council, (1990, November 29). (n.t.). (S/RES/678). New York: Author.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Kaplan, *supra*, note 12, p. 110.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

and intelligence exchange.⁴⁶ This cooperation was essential to enforcing the economic embargos, no-fly zones, and operations in minesweeping.⁴⁷

Kosovo

In the spring of 1999, NATO moved to intervene in a humanitarian crisis in the Kosovo region of the Former Yugoslavia via a bombing campaign.⁴⁸ This intervention occurred only after intense diplomatic negotiations in 1998 and early 1999.⁴⁹ The diplomatic solution posed by the discussions was non-negotiable and required NATO peacekeeping forces deployed in the region be provided with substantial interim autonomy for the regional government and a referendum on the future of autonomy after three years.⁵⁰ This was unacceptable to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.⁵¹ However, the Kosovo Liberation Army reluctantly accepted this provision.⁵²

Many criticized NATO for not securing approval from the UN Security Council prior to the bombing campaign.⁵³ It appeared obvious that the UN was ill suited to lead this mission.⁵⁴ It had failed in Bosnia, mostly due to political non-commitment to the mission due to the internal friction of the Security Council.⁵⁵ This friction was born from conflicting opinions regarding the action that should be taken in the region.⁵⁶ Conflict over the role the Security Council should play, in terms of support, in conflicts such as that in Kosovo were another source of hostility throughout the ordeal.⁵⁷

Article 27(3) of the *United Nations Charter* stipulates that in order for intervention to be mandated by the Security Council, no permanent member may veto the resolution.⁵⁸ The precarious circumstances in Kosovo made unanimous support from the permanent five members regarding any military action extremely unlikely.⁵⁹ The Security Council did approve three resolutions that addressed the issues in Kosovo.⁶⁰ These resolutions called for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to place an observer force to monitor the region.⁶¹ However, in the months prior to the NATO action, a veto seemed imminent in the Security Council from the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China regarding any action that the UN could have taken, or that the UN could have passed to NATO.⁶²

NATO's decision not to go through the channels of the Security Council was made because a veto would have aggravated the diplomatic efforts taken to resolve the situation before it escalated further and required greater military intervention.⁶³ Furthermore, the veto would have made any necessary military action more complicated for leaders of NATO Member States.⁶⁴ The Organization's intervention was collective and pursued through a decision by three permanent members of the UN Security Council.⁶⁵ On March 26, 1999, the Security Council rejected a

⁴⁶ Yetiv, Steve A. (1992). The outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: some anecdotal causes. *Political Science Quarterly*, 107, p. 209.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Charney, Jonathan I. (1999). Anticipatory humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, p. 834

⁴⁹ Falk, Richard A. (1999). Kosovo, world order and the future of international law. *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, p. 850

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 847

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Henkin, Louis. (1999). Kosovo and the law of "humanitarian intervention." *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, p. 825

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Charney, *supra*, note 48, p. 835.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Falk, *supra*, note 49, p. 850.

⁶³ Henkin, *supra*, note 58, p. 825.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 826.

Russian resolution to halt the NATO intervention in Kosovo.⁶⁶ This vote supported the impetus of the organization.⁶⁷ Finally on June, 10 1999 the Security Council approved Resolution 1244 regarding the Kosovo Settlement, essentially retroactively approving NATO action.⁶⁸

Peace Keeping via Collective Action

NATO's actions in the Balkans in the 1990s brought about a new era for the organization's mission of mutual defense to peace keeping through collective action. In 1993, the North Atlantic Council declared that:

*[c]onflict prevention, crisis management, and peacekeeping will be crucial to ensuring stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area in the years ahead.... While reaffirming that the primary goal of Alliance military forces is to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of Member State, we will contribute actively to these new tasks in order to enhance our security and European stability.*⁶⁹

This statement came as a response to the changing geo-political climate, which occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ During that time, the primary mission of NATO was to respond to Soviet aggression.⁷¹ The organization needed a new mission in order to maintain its livelihood.⁷² This new mission became peacekeeping.⁷³ NATO reaffirmed its 1999 Strategic Concept and its offer to support peacekeeping or other necessary operations that were requested by the UN Security Council or the OSCE, including making the expertise and resources of the Member States of the Alliance available to fellow members.⁷⁴

NATO has remained cognizant that its primary mission is the protection and defense of its Member States.⁷⁵ Thus, it has forced officials within the organization to contemplate whether the costs of training, weapons procurement and other exercises are feasible due to the shrinking budgets.⁷⁶ Whether or not these missions can be accomplished without compromising NATO's primary mission of defending Member States is also an important consideration.⁷⁷ The organization has agreed, at the request of the UN and the OSCE, to begin participating fully in peace operations.⁷⁸ However, the full scope of this undertaking is unclear.⁷⁹

NATO's first experience with peacekeeping operations was in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸⁰ The organization had reservations regarding its initial involvement in conflicts that occurred outside of the area of its Member States.⁸¹ NATO initially gave the mantle for maintaining the peace to the European Community (EC) in 1991.⁸² When the EC failed, NATO looked to the UN to lead missions in Bosnia.⁸³ However, less than a year after the EC failed, NATO began involvement in the region while under leadership of the UN.⁸⁴ The allies drew upon the assets of NATO to limit the destruction caused by the conflict.⁸⁵

⁶⁶ Charney, *supra*, note 48, p. 836.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Chayes, Antonia Handler, & Weitz, Richard. (1996). The military perspective on conflict prevention: NATO. In Chayes A., & Chayes A.H. (Eds.). *Preventing conflict in the post community world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, p. 381

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, *supra*, note 37, section 31.

⁷⁵ Chayes, *supra*, note 69, p. 385.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Developments outside Europe

The Strategic Concept, approved by the North Atlantic Council in April 1999, recognizes that the security of the alliance is subject to risks that encompass both military and non-military endeavors.⁸⁶ It further recognizes that these risks could also take the form of regional conflicts at the borders of the Member States and that said conflicts could affect or spill into NATO States.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the document views alliance security in a global context, contemplating the flow of necessary resources that come from other States who work with Member States within the alliance.⁸⁸ Such acts could include acts of organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations.⁸⁹

NATO has taken into account conflict prevention and, if necessary, effective crisis management on a global or regional scale.⁹⁰ This assistance would be consistent with the provisions of international law, including possible non-Article 5 operations.⁹¹ The concept takes into consideration the Mediterranean region as special interest, whose security is closely related to the security of Europe.⁹²

Concerns regarding NATO's operations outside the European theater, and more specifically in the Middle East, date back to the 1970s.⁹³ It was then that the United States began discussing the concept of rapid deployment and encouraging its allies to consider out of area exercises.⁹⁴ This furthered the alliance's involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict, which some believe highlights the organizations more intensive preparations for "out-of-area operations."⁹⁵

In Resolution 1556, regarding the continued situation in the Darfur region of Sudan, the UN Security Council requested that the Member States of the UN assist the African Union (AU) monitoring team and the protection force through finances, supplies, command support, among other areas.⁹⁶ On May 26, 2005, the Secretary-General of NATO announced that the organization would assist the African Union in its efforts in three distinct areas.⁹⁷ First, by assisting in the deployment of AU forces, especially by means of airlift, NATO would also establish a command center for those operations.⁹⁸ Second, NATO would train staff in the AMIS headquarters in operational planning.⁹⁹ Finally, at the discretion of the AU, NATO would assist in gathering intelligence along with offering field training.¹⁰⁰ NATO recognized that these options were broad, and began working with the leaders of the AU on how to develop these options into tangible plans of action.¹⁰¹ NATO began airlifting AU troops into Darfur on July 1, 2005 and this program will continue into September.¹⁰² NATO has also begun to implement the other two assistance areas and will continue to improve upon their development.¹⁰³

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, *supra*, note 37, section 20.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, section 24.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, section 31.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, section 31.

⁹² *Ibid.*, section 38.

⁹³ Aguirre, Mariano, & Fischer, Penny. (1992). Discriminate intervention: defining NATO for the '90s. *Middle East Report, Arms Race or Arms Control in the Middle East?*, 177, p. 28-29.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ United Nations Security Council. (2004, July 30). (n.t.). (S/RES/1556). New York: Author.

⁹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, May 26). *Statement by the Secretary-General at the Pledging Conference for the AU Mission in the Sudan*. Retrieved June 16, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050526a.htm>

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, July 1). *NATO starts airlifting African Union troops to Darfur*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/07-july/e0701a.htm>

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

In the last fifteen years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO has redefined its mission to include conflict and crisis management especially on a regional level. It has continued to maintain its core principles of collective action and mutual defense. NATO has begun looking outside the strict confines of Europe to incorporate its security into the constantly globalizing society that has developed since NATO's founding. For example, the organization has offered its services and assistance to the African Union in order to attempt to uphold peace and stability in war torn regions of the continent. NATO has also intervened in the Balkans in the attempt to abate a humanitarian crisis that was occurring.

In order to go forward in the development of a new and more progressive organization, the following questions need to be answered. What particular plan of action should NATO employ in assisting the African Union in Darfur? How broadly should the organization define the "global context" of its security?¹⁰⁴ In particular, how should that definition deal with any type of disruption of the flow of "vital resources" into Europe?¹⁰⁵ How far outside the European theater should NATO be willing to install peacekeepers or engage in conflict management? Should NATO work more closely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in recognizing threats to European security? Should a set of criteria be developed encompassing both Human Rights and threats to sovereignty and regional stability that should be met prior to offering assistance? Finally, how broadly should NATO be looking at the link between the Mediterranean and the stability of all of Europe?

II. Reexamination of the Prague and Istanbul Summits as a Means to Combat Terrorism

Part of the new mission of NATO, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the U.S., has been counter-terrorism.¹⁰⁶ The two NATO summits have since contemplated combating terrorism as an integral part of the agenda of discussion.¹⁰⁷ In the most recent summit, Istanbul, NATO leaders declared that:

*Defence against terrorism may include activities by NATO's military forces, based on decisions by the North Atlantic Council, to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad, against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any Member State including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbor them.*¹⁰⁸

These two summits, Prague and Istanbul, have made great advances in the means that the alliance combats terrorism. These advances include increased sharing of intelligence, the foundation of a NATO response force and the work of the new permanent part of NATO headquarters, the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit.¹⁰⁹ Europe has experienced terrorist attacks since September 11, 2001, such as the train bombings in Madrid and London.¹¹⁰ NATO continues to cooperate with other international and regional organizations to continue to attempt to combat this scourge of random attacks on innocent populations.¹¹¹

Terrorism in the Alliance Theater

On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization at the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.¹¹² Once the North Atlantic Council invoked Article 5 of

¹⁰⁴ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, *supra*, note 37, section 24.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Bensahel, Nora. (2003). *The counterterrorism coalitions: cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing. p. 24

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2004). *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm> section 13.

¹⁰⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2003). *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation, A Reader's Guide*. Retrieved June 21, 2005 from <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-prg/rdr-gde-prg-eng.pdf> p. 11 and 28. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*, *supra*, note 104, section 13.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Lansford, Tom. (2002). *All for one: terrorism, NATO, and the United States*. Hampshire, England: Ashgate. p 1.

the Washington Treaty, the council stated that an attack on one member is an attack on all members.¹¹³ After which, the U.S. made requests of the North Atlantic Council, including intelligence cooperation regarding terrorism and counterterrorism, open airfields in allied States to facilitate counterterrorism, and deployment of the Airborne Early Warning Force.¹¹⁴

Although these were not contributions in the combat zone, NATO acted as a support structure for actions taken in the initial fight against terrorism.¹¹⁵ NATO sent eight Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to patrol U.S. airspace in the days following September 11th.¹¹⁶ This deployment of AWACS further allowed the U.S. to conduct its campaign over Afghanistan.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, NATO sent nine vessels into the Eastern Mediterranean from its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean.¹¹⁸

Although NATO was not a primary player in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, it did play both direct and indirect roles in the campaigns in Afghanistan and in counter-terrorism in general.¹¹⁹ NATO's deployment of its AWACS and naval forces showed resolve and allowed United States forces that were previously occupied on other missions to participate in the Operation on a direct level.¹²⁰ This move by the organization showed the interoperability of the forces of the alliance and allowed for close cooperation within the alliance during this campaign.¹²¹ Finally, the relationships that were fostered within the organization allowed a speedy peace in Afghanistan once the Taliban was removed from power.¹²² Germany hosted a conference of officials who are anti-Taliban, which eventually fostered into an interim government and the United Kingdom took an immediate and active role in United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the country.¹²³ These were supported by a variety of non-military operations facilitated by the other members of the alliance.¹²⁴

However, this was not the only attack in the alliance theater of operations. On July 7, 2005, four bombs went off in London: three on busy subways and one on a public bus.¹²⁵ Due to the crude nature of the explosives, investigators believe that it was a domestic sleeper cell of extremists from the United Kingdom.¹²⁶ The casualty toll from these attacks was reported at approximately 50 dead, as well as 700 injured.¹²⁷ The attacks took place the same day that a Group of Eight (G-8) meeting was scheduled to begin in Scotland.¹²⁸ The attacks in London changed the mood of the G-8 meeting. Although the agenda of discussing global warming and African poverty was maintained, leaders were distracted by the developments happening to their south. In response to these bombings, international leaders in attendance held steadfast in their resolve to condemn these acts in public statements.¹²⁹ Furthermore, from his office in London, Prime Minister Blair gave the stoic and resolute message that "the purpose of terrorism is to do just that – to terrorize people and we will not be terrorized."¹³⁰

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 111-112.; North Atlantic Treaty, *supra*, note 6.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Deighton, Anne. (2002). The eleventh of September and beyond: NATO. In Lawrence Freedman (Ed.), *Superterrorism: policy responses*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, p. 119-134. p. 120.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Lansford, *supra*, note 112, p. 112.

¹¹⁸ Deighton, *supra*, note 115, p. 120.

¹¹⁹ Lansford, *supra*, note 112, p. 126.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 126-127.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Van Natta, Jr., Don, & Sciolino, Elaine. (2005, July 8). Timers used in blasts, police say; parallels to Madrid are found. *The New York Times*, p. A1.

¹²⁶ Van Natta, Jr., Don, & Johnston, David. (2005, July 9). London Bombs seen as crude, death toll rises to 49. *The New York Times*, p. A1.

¹²⁷ Cowell, Alan. (2005, July 9). First details of bombs emerge; toll reaches 49 and some bodies aren't yet recovered. *The New York Times*, p. A7.

¹²⁸ Van Natta & Sciolino, Timers used in blasts, police say; parallels to Madrid are found, *supra*, note 125.

¹²⁹ Stevenson, Richard W. (2005, July 7). Bombings rewrite agenda for world leaders in Scotland. *The New York Times*, p. A13.

¹³⁰ Cowell, *supra*, note 127.

On March 11, 2004, bombs ripped through commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killing 192 people.¹³¹ The force was of such magnitude that several cars of nearby standing trains were ripped apart by the blast.¹³² Spanish officials stated that investigations concluded that the attacks were carried out by the al-Qaeda network, making it the first known European attack by that network.¹³³ The attack was chilling to officials in Europe because of its sophisticated nature.¹³⁴ Remote detonation was used, as opposed to suicide bombers.¹³⁵ Also shocking was the lack of even a general warning in intelligence that gathered in the weeks leading up to the attack.¹³⁶

The Prague Summit

On November 21 and 22, 2002, the NATO Prague Summit was held regarding the response of NATO to new security issues of the new millennium.¹³⁷ The leaders of the Member States agreed at the summit to a new military concept to defend against the scourge of terrorism.¹³⁸ In addition, NATO has continued to work effectively with its partners to defend against this new threat.¹³⁹ In the declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit, the organization officially recognized terrorism as a “grave and growing threat to Alliance populations, forces, and territory.”¹⁴⁰

NATO also outlined the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to take the place of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that was enacted in 1999.¹⁴¹ The difference between these is that allies have made a complete political commitment to improve military capabilities in multiple fields of defense, with an emphasis on defending against terrorism, under an agreed upon timetable.¹⁴² One particular difference between the PCC and the DCI is that it gives the Member States the ability to specialize their contributions to specific areas.¹⁴³ Also at this meeting, NATO leaders agreed to implement a plan to create a NATO Response Force (NRF).¹⁴⁴ This organization will consist of components from all modes of military capability.¹⁴⁵ The NRF should be operational by October 2006.¹⁴⁶ The NRF will be the primary source for defending against threats and aggression from outside the territorial makeup of the alliance.¹⁴⁷

The Military Concept for Combating Terrorism (MCCT) was charged to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in December 2001 by the defense ministers of the Member States, it outlined four pillars that provide a concept for defending against terrorist activities, which were approved during the 2002 Prague Summit.¹⁴⁸ The four pillars outlined are counterterrorism, antiterrorism, consequence management and military cooperation.¹⁴⁹ Counterterrorism is offensive measures taken to decrease vulnerabilities.¹⁵⁰ The concept realizes two methods, one where NATO takes the lead in improving its military

¹³¹ Richburg, Keith B. (2004, March 12). A catastrophe ‘like the twin towers’; witnesses describe scenes of chaos. *The Washington Post*, p. A.01.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ Frankel, Glenn, & Finn, Peter. (2004, March 8). Blast evidence points to al-Qaida: Investigators believe Madrid bombing was carried out by multinational cell. *The Houston Chronicle*, p. 9.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2003). *NATO after Prague*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/docu/0211prague/after_prague.pdf

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2002, November 21). *Prague Summit Declaration*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

¹⁴¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation*. *supra*, note 109, p. 26.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ Bensahel, *supra*, note 106, p. 28.

¹⁴⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation*. *supra*, note 109, p. 26.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ Bensahel, *supra*, note 106, p. 25.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

capabilities by creating a joint standing military force, the NRF.¹⁵¹ The other concept would be NATO supplementing the efforts of Member States.¹⁵² It can accomplish that by backfilling national forces and access to bases, among others.¹⁵³ While antiterrorism encompasses defensive measures that will decrease a State's vulnerability, NATO has the ability to supplement the efforts of Member States by standardizing a threat-warning system.¹⁵⁴ Consequence management establishes alliance requirements for capabilities of the Member States, or forming military forces solely dedicated to assisting Member States in dealing with terrorist acts after they occur.¹⁵⁵ Finally, the fourth pillar was enacted in a Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan and is being implemented to improve the preparedness of civil authorities of the Member States to respond to an attack involving chemical, biological, or radiological agents.¹⁵⁶ These types of attacks could easily overwhelm a Member State's domestic capabilities.¹⁵⁷

Under the auspices of the North Atlantic Council, NATO and its partner States adopted the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T).¹⁵⁸ This plan affirms the resolve of NATO and its partners to combat terrorism on a cooperative and consistent basis.¹⁵⁹ It also outlines specific initiatives to cooperate on numerous intelligence gathering and military capabilities that are necessary to counter terrorism both within and without States.¹⁶⁰

Istanbul Summit

NATO held its Istanbul Summit on June 28 and 29, 2004.¹⁶¹ The Member States agreed to an improved set of protective measures against terrorism.¹⁶² The enhanced package of measures designed to combat terrorism included more rapid response rates to requests of the Member States for assistance in dealing with terrorist threats or actions and with handling the consequences of those attacks.¹⁶³

The Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit was made a permanent fixture at NATO headquarters in Brussels upon the conclusion of the Summit.¹⁶⁴ The unit was created after the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, with a mission to gather and analyze terrorist threats in both a general sense and those aimed directly at NATO Member States or the alliance.¹⁶⁵

In addition, the NRF that was approved at the Prague Summit achieved its initial operating ability on time, with approximately 17,000 troops in October 2004, and will become operational by 2006.¹⁶⁶ The NRF will have the ability to be deployed worldwide.¹⁶⁷ It is comprised of land, sea and air forces.¹⁶⁸ One of its possible missions is counter terrorism under both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations as decided by the North Atlantic Council.¹⁶⁹

Finally, NATO endorsed the PAP-T report at the Summit, which called for numerous improvements to help combat the scourge of terrorism.¹⁷⁰ Multiple allies and partners have called for greater border control in order to fight illegal

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² Bensahel, *supra*, note 106, p. 26.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation*. *supra*, note 105, p. 29.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89-90.

¹⁶¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2004). *Istanbul Summit Readers Guide*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-ist/rdr-gde-ist-e.pdf> p. 26.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57-58.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

arms trafficking.¹⁷¹ If implemented, these controls would inhibit the ability of terrorist groups to obtain Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).¹⁷² The controls would also reemphasize the need to address and control the financing of terrorist networks.¹⁷³ This can only be achieved by the mutual cooperation of States, the international community, and civil society.¹⁷⁴

NATO in Cooperation with other International Organizations

Issues stemming from the ongoing threat of terrorist activities have become a primary focus of the organizations dialogue with other international organizations.¹⁷⁵ NATO realizes that any counter-terrorism strategy must work in concert with that of other international and regional organizations in order to maintain a broad base approach.¹⁷⁶ NATO specifically works with the UN, the OSCE, and the European Union (EU).¹⁷⁷ Some specific examples of cooperation between the organizations are the planning and execution of seminars to educate principle civil servants, as well as the joint use of resources to hinder the funding and further spread of terrorist cells.¹⁷⁸

The UN Security Council in Resolution 1373 of 2001 condemned the acts of terrorism on the United States, became resolve in its efforts to end all acts of the same nature.¹⁷⁹ It also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the Security Council.¹⁸⁰ NATO recognizes the primacy of the UN Security Council in facilitating the response of the international community.¹⁸¹ The organization has maintained its commitment to cooperation with the CTC.¹⁸² The Member States of NATO have continued to support efforts of the international community, both within and without NATO.¹⁸³ NATO is committed to ensuring that all allies and partners recognize and answer requests from the CTC in a timely manner.¹⁸⁴

NATO's cooperation with the OSCE and the EU are primarily in the areas of border control and small arms trafficking, as well as dealing with limiting the finances of terrorist networks.¹⁸⁵ NATO has determined that working cooperatively with other organizations can avoid "dysfunctional duplication and seek complementarity" in its efforts to combat terrorism.¹⁸⁶

Conclusions

Terrorist attacks that have taken place since September 11, 2001 have influenced the manner in which NATO handles its response to these events. These attacks could be used as an example of whether NATO has dealt with its response in a manner that has appropriate efficacy in connection with its resources as an international military alliance.

The fight against terrorism is not yet over. Recent events in London and Madrid have shown that the threat has not decreased.¹⁸⁷ In fact, it can be argued that the progress envisioned at the Prague and Istanbul summits is negated by the most recent terrorist attacks. To go forward with expediency some questions need to be addressed. How could the means of terrorism, small arms, currency, etc, be better controlled and monitored? Are there other organizations,

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 80-81.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ United Nations. (n.d). *CTC: about the Counter-Terrorism Committee*. Accessed July 7, 2005, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/mandate.html>

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide*, *supra*, note 156, p. 85.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

regional or global, that NATO could work with to combat terrorism further? Are there more effaceable means to gather and share intelligence within the alliance? Is there anything else that can be added or expedited in the Prague Capabilities Commitment or PAP-T to reduce the terrorist threat or increase response capabilities? Based on the recent events in London and Madrid, are the initiatives of NATO, based on the Prague and Istanbul Summits, in combating terrorism working? Is a further plan of action needed to handle and prevent the terrorist attacks that have occurred in London and Madrid? Are there initiatives or “best practices” that Member States have implemented on a domestic level that could benefit the alliance in general? Should the PCC and the MCCT be revisited and further developed to increase the capabilities of the alliance and the Member States? Should NATO have the ability to create a more defined role for itself in combating terrorism outside offering support to the Member States?

III. The International Role of Women in the Armed Forces

The topic of women serving in the armed forces has been a subject of debate for centuries, going as far back as 400 B.C.¹⁸⁸ According to Plato’s *Republic*, “the defining characteristic ‘thymos’ or spiritedness of a warrior clan protecting the Just City was found in both genders.”¹⁸⁹ Plato also stated “what has to do with war, must be assigned to women also, and they must be used in the same ways.”¹⁹⁰ Historically, women were involved for the “best defense” of the State.¹⁹¹ The reasoning of Plato, however, did not survive into modern thinking.¹⁹²

There have been women who have posed as men to serve in the military as far back at the crusades in the 12th century when Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine “led an entire group of women dressed as men” into battle.¹⁹³ This also occurred in the American Revolution, as well as numerous other wars.¹⁹⁴ One of the most famous women warriors was Joan of Arc who wore men’s clothing, carried arms and armor, and led the battle of Orleans to a French victory in 1429.¹⁹⁵ She was captured, however, and sold to the English who burned her at the stake in 1431, as an accused witch.¹⁹⁶

The issue of women serving in combat has been debated for centuries. This debate became more highly contested in the 1900s as women started serving in more military positions, no longer feeling it necessary to dress as men.¹⁹⁷ There are, however, fundamental conflicting opinions that are still present in this debate.¹⁹⁸ These differing opinions primarily regard women in the front line of combat and other positions where injury or high-pressure situations could occur at a higher risk for injury or death than men.¹⁹⁹ The Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF) works tirelessly for the causes of women serving the NATO forces.²⁰⁰

Contemporary Historical and Sociological Aspects

Long before women were allowed in service positions, many women acted as nurses, or in later years, enlisted in the Navy and Marine Corps as support staff.²⁰¹ For example, women were assigned to duties such as clerical assistants, masters-at-arms, and yeomen.²⁰² In World War II, women served outside combat in almost all other occupations.²⁰³

¹⁸⁸ Skaine, Rosemarie. (1999). *Women at war: gender issues of Americans in combat*. London: McFarland & Company, Inc. p. 45

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 46

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49-50.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

²⁰⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (n.d.). *Committee on women in the NATO forces*. Retrieved July 11, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/index.html

²⁰¹ Skaine, *supra*, note 188, p. 56

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 57

Military leaders consistently praised women's efforts in Europe.²⁰⁴ This was not the case in the Pacific theater, where women were treated scornfully.²⁰⁵ This was shown to be the case when an American "army investigation revealed that not only male soldiers but many wives back home started and perpetuated the resentment... [and that] the attitude at this time... had a devastating effect on policy for years to come."²⁰⁶ Women have served in more positions and in more conflicts as time went on, including becoming pilots and taking on command positions.²⁰⁷

There are some sociological theories regarding the military in composition and/or combat scenarios.²⁰⁸ One theory is the "conflict theory."²⁰⁹ This theory consists of the military's role in conflict, where "the self-sacrificing soldier plays a 'representative' role."²¹⁰ One such example occurs when an individual takes a less interested view of his or herself and becomes identifiable only as a part of the group.²¹¹ When this occurs, the group becomes an extension of the individual's personality, and the person gains the ability to sacrifice for the group.²¹² It was seen in the Gulf War that "women in combat do and will sacrifice for the good of the entire organization."²¹³

There are three variables to women's military participation consisting of "social structure, military and culture."²¹⁴ Each of these variables consists of sub-sections that determine how the variable acts.²¹⁵ The military variable has factors that all deal with the necessities of the military and its situation at the time.²¹⁶ Some examples are structure, technology, the "national security situation," and the "combat to support ratio."²¹⁷ The variable of social structure consists of factors that are regarded as parallel to the standing of women in society.²¹⁸ Examples of this include family, economics, "women's labor force participation and occupational sex segregation," and demographics.²¹⁹ The final variable is the culture of society and their opinions on issues.²²⁰ For example, "social construction of gender and family," "public discourse regarding gender," "social values of gender and family," and "values regarding ascription and equality" are areas that compose this variable.²²¹ However, even with these variables it seems that the demands for military personnel are the "single most important factor in women's military involvement."²²² These factors and variables all contribute to the policies States could enact regarding women serving in the military and they could affect how many women choose to serve in the military.²²³

Two thoughts concerning violence and gender are the social constructivist and the biological feminist perspectives.²²⁴ The social constructivist school holds that violent behavior is based in environmental, not biological, causes.²²⁵ An example of this would be the norms of one's society.²²⁶ This is converse to the biological feminist perspective, which argues that women are the natural peacemakers of a society and are biologically

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57-59.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p. 137

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ Segal, Mady Wechsler. (1995). Women's military roles cross-nationally: past, present and future. *Gender and Society*, 9, p. 759.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 760.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ Dowler, Lorraine. (2005). Amazonian landscapes: gender, war, and historical repetition. In Colin Flint (Ed.). *The geography of war and peace: from death camps to diplomats*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 135.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

incapable of violence.²²⁷ Based on these perspectives, it would be difficult to argue that biology does not play a role in propensity of violence.²²⁸ This could be a reason why militaries are composed in a gender-skewed manner.²²⁹

Committee on Women in the NATO Forces

In 1961, NATO held its first conference of Senior Women Officers. This conference was composed of delegates from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.²³⁰ The conference focused on issues regarding the conditions of employment and career advancement possibilities of the women in the alliance's military forces.²³¹ The conference unanimously articulated that it hoped NATO and authorities in its Member States would reflect on the prospects of women gaining employment more vastly within each State's military.²³² In 1973, the conference adopted a resolution that stated, "women should have the opportunity to serve in all job specialties with the exception of combat where their employment should be determined by national policy."²³³ On July 19, 1976, the NATO Military Committee (MC) endorsed the formal recognition of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF).²³⁴ After years with adjunct staff, the MC provisionally approved the creation of an advisory office within NATO headquarters in the International Military Staff (IMS), which was approved as permanent by the MC in December 2000.²³⁵

The CWINF is comprised of a representative of each Member State that holds a seat on the military committee.²³⁶ It also consists of a Chairperson and three Deputy Chairpersons.²³⁷ Those holding these positions are non-voting members of the committee.²³⁸ Additionally, each of the three Deputy Chairs acts as the Chairperson of one of three subcommittees in a period of duty.²³⁹ The CWINF meets once annually, with alternating years acting as a conference of the Member States.²⁴⁰ The three subcommittees consist of Recruitment and Employment, training and Development, and Quality of Life.²⁴¹ The CWINF is satisfied with the amount of progress in the expansion of military assignments available to the women serving in the Alliance's forces, however is cognizant that there is much work to be done.²⁴²

The Work of the CWINF

The work of the CWINF takes place primarily in its subcommittees, Recruitment and Employment, Training and Development, and Quality of Life.²⁴³ There are approximately five members of each subcommittee and its chair, and each has its own basic objectives and goals to guide its work.²⁴⁴ These members consistently use the committee and subcommittees as a means of sharing information between the Member States to learn from each other's experiences and not to repeat any mistakes or poor practices.²⁴⁵

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, February 18). *Committee on women in the NATO forces: history*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/history.htm

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, February 18). *Committee on women in the NATO forces: committee structure*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/structure.htm

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Committee on women in the NATO forces: history*, *supra*, note 230.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

The main objective of the subcommittee on recruitment and employment is to “improve and enhance upon the services’ ability to recruit, retain, employ, and advance women in the total force.”²⁴⁶ Three goals guide the work of the subcommittee.²⁴⁷ They are the development of policies for employment and recruitment, recruiting of candidates for military careers, and increasing access for women to more career fields.²⁴⁸ It realizes these goals through multiple objectives.²⁴⁹ These objectives include eliminating barriers to recruitment and employment and evaluating the restrictions that are based on physical differences in characteristics.²⁵⁰ The Member States in this subcommittee are the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal and the United States.²⁵¹

The subcommittee on training and development has determined that, as “military women should have the same personal and professional possibilities in all aspects of their careers as their male counterparts.”²⁵² This subcommittee is composed of constituents from Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.²⁵³ The subcommittee has two goals in its primary objective: improving women’s opportunity for career development, and ensuring the meritorious advancement of women through military ranks.²⁵⁴ Some of the objectives within those goals are eliminating barriers, information gathering on how women progress through fields and grades within the ranks, and identification of leaders within the ranks.²⁵⁵

The third subcommittee on quality of life has a primary objective to improve the personal and professional life of women while serving in the military.²⁵⁶ The subcommittee is mindful of equal treatment, full acceptance and allows for a balance of family and career.²⁵⁷ Within the main objective there are three goals: the promotion of “equitable treatment between women and men,” the promotion of “family related support,” and increasing the “awareness of gender-related issues in [the] military population.”²⁵⁸ The subcommittee has objectives, some of which are to upgrade the programs and regulations to help balance career and family, gender-sensitivity training as part of the intra-military cultural awareness, and ascertain information on national policies surrounding harassment and gender discrimination.²⁵⁹ The membership on this final subcommittee is Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland.²⁶⁰

Prospects for the Future

The CWINF sees that many improvements can be made to the NATO military forces in order to include more women. One could be to increase active recruiting of women so that it is equal to the proportion of the population.²⁶¹ Although lofty, it is a goal that achieved in the coming years.²⁶² In fact, 23 out of 26 Member States have women in their forces as of 2004, in varying degrees, the mean composition of women being 8.09%.²⁶³ This

²⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Committee on women in the NATO forces. (2005, February 18). *Recruitment and employment*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/recruit_employ.htm

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² North Atlantic Treaty Organization Committee on women in the NATO forces. (2005, February 18). *Training and development*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/training_develop.htm

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Committee on women in the NATO forces. (2005, February 18). *Quality of life*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/qual_life.htm

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁶¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2003, 25 June). *Video Interview with Colonel Cheryl D. Lamerson, Chairperson of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces* (Transcript). Retrieved July 10, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030625a.htm>

²⁶² *Ibid.*

²⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Committee on Women in the NATO Forces. *Year in Review 2004. 2004 Total Strength of women in the NATO Forces (graph)*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/ims/2004/win/strength.pdf>

variance is caused by many different factors.²⁶⁴ Some women only serve in certain occupations, and some only at particular rank levels, and these variances are based on the laws and politics of each individual Member State.²⁶⁵

Working conditions in the military are seen as quite favorable to women, although conditions depend on the State.²⁶⁶ “But most of the women [the committee] know who are in the military think very highly of their organization.”²⁶⁷ The committee believes that women can serve effectively in the high-tech military of today in any position.²⁶⁸ It is just a matter of training these soldiers to do the job.²⁶⁹

Finally, the CWINF takes no official position on whether women should serve or in the front lines of combat.²⁷⁰ The committee grasps the sensitivity of the issue, and encourages the full use of women.²⁷¹ It yields, however, to the policies and rules of the particular State.²⁷²

Conclusion

The ability of women to serve in the military will be an ongoing debate in many States. NATO must contend with the forces that the Member States have at their disposal. However, 25 Member States have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).²⁷³ In addition, all Member States have recognized the document through signature without ratification.²⁷⁴ While the CEDAW does not mention the military in particular, it does mention that women cannot be discriminated against in employment situations.²⁷⁵

A topic such as this requires answers to many questions. Is modern society in the Member States of the alliance ready for women to take a major and active command and leadership role in the operations of the military? Should States give women more combat training and place them in harm’s way on the front lines of combat? Should NATO give a greater mandate to the CWINF? Should the MC advise the North Atlantic Council regarding the make-up of women in the armed forces and recommend measures to aid in the recruitment and acceptance of more female soldiers? Should NATO look toward the CEDAW in determining policies regarding women serving in the armed forces?

²⁶⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Video Interview*, *supra*, note 261.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² *Ibid.*

²⁷³ United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advancement of Women. (n.d.). *States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*. Retrieved July 16, 2005, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm>

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (opened for Signature on 17 July 1980). Retrieved July 16, 2005, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm>

Annotated Bibliography

History of the Committee

Duignan, Peter. (2000). *NATO: Its past, present, and future*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institutional Press. *A history of NATO since its founding in 1949 and an assertion of prospects for its future in the 21st century are in this book. Duignan does this in both a chronographic and issue based fashion, detailing the different issues and challenges the alliance faced in the eras of its existence. While it does not offer a full discussion of the modern impacts of Article 5, as it was written prior to 2001, its historical account of the evolution of NATO is well detailed and thorough. It also offers a comprehensive, yet brief, background on the enlargement of the alliance as well as the alliance's actions in the former Yugoslavia.*

Kaplan, Lawrence S. (2004). *NATO divided, NATO united: the evolution of an alliance*. London: Praeger. *Kaplan takes a different approach to detailing the history of NATO since its inception. While generally formatted in chronology, it encompasses more broad themes of the eras as opposed to detailing the specific events. Chapters of particular historical interest include a discussion of Article 5 in chapter 1, Détente and the ending of the Cold War in chapters 4 and 5. The collective security ability of NATO is discussed in the context of its intervention experiences in the conflicts of other States, both inside and outside Europe. Kaplan offers a brief discussion of the implementation of Article 5 and other ramifications for the alliance after the September 11 attacks.*

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, 10 May). *NATO Member Countries*. Retrieved 18 June 2005, <http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm>
A listing of current NATO Member States is on this Web site. It also provides links to the Web pages, if available, of particular government areas of interest, such as the Ministries of State and Defense, the legislature, and chief executive. This could be a good resource in finding information on particular Member States.

North Atlantic Treaty (opened for signature April 4, 1949). Retrieved June 16, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>
This document is the Washington Treaty. It is the primary founding document of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. All Member States are held to its clauses. It enumerates the primary function of the alliance and its purpose, as well as its governing bodies.

Wikipedia. (n.d.). *NATO*. Retrieved June 16, 2005, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO>
Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia, provides a good, brief, introduction to NATO. It also outlines the political and military structure of the alliance. As well as having a chronographic listing of the Member States of the alliance.

Wikipedia. (n.d.). *Warsaw Pact*. Retrieved June 18 2005, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Pact
This is a online encyclopedia Web site that provides a brief account of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. It also details the pact's Member States, history and downfall. Finally, it provides an anecdotal account of what has occurred since the downfall of the pact.

I. The Role of NATO in Intra-State and Inter-State Conflict

Aguirre, Mariano, & Fischer, Penny. (1992). Discriminate intervention: defining NATO for the '90s. *Middle East Report, Arms Race or Arms Control in the Middle East?*, 177, 28-33.
The debate over NATO's out-of-area operations is discussed in this article. It provides a different perspective on the motives and prospects of NATO selecting the Middle East as its area of choice for military intervention in the 1990s and beyond. It also discusses the development of new major centers of power, both economic and military, and the role those could play independent and in concert with other International Organizations.

- Charney, Jonathan I. (1999). Anticipatory humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, 834-841.
This article analyzes the causes, effects and potential legal ramifications that happened when NATO went into Kosovo to abate humanitarian disaster that was occurring. While this article is critical of the legality of NATO's actions, it provides a background on the legal arguments both in favor of, and opposed to the intervention that took place. It also highlights the legal developments that occurred for NATO to be able to take this action.
- Chayes, Antonia Handler, & Weitz, Richard. (1996). The military perspective on conflict prevention: NATO. In Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes (Eds.). *Preventing conflict in the post community world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. p. 381-427.
A great resource on NATO's military abilities and its perspectives in the area of conflict prevention both in an intra-state and inter-state basis, this book is a powerful tool for delegates. While it focuses primarily on the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia. It uses the conflicts as a prime example of what NATO has done and what it could do in the future in the realm of conflict intervention and peacekeeping.
- Falk, Richard A. (1999). Kosovo, world order and the future of international law. *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, 847-857.
An analysis of the legal ramifications and the overall legality of NATO's intervention in Kosovo absent a mandate from the UN Security Council are provided in this journal entry. It also discusses the political games that were being played in the Security Council in the time before the non-UN sanctioned intervention by NATO in the region. The legal abilities of the U.N. charter in regard to dealing the issue of humanitarian crisis and genocide are illustrated as deficient and subject to the internal politics of the permanent members, as well a "masked unilateralism" that was undertaken in the intervention.
- Henkin, Louis. (1999). Kosovo and the law of "humanitarian intervention." *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, 824-828.
Further analysis of the new law of Humanitarian Intervention and whether that is grounds for a military intervention without a mandate from the UN Security Council is provided in this article. It also discusses principles of law prohibiting unilateral intervention, however not collective intervention. However, in section IV, the U.N. Charter's prohibition on intervention is discussed in a context that would be not authorized by the Security Council.
- North Atlantic Council. (1997). *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation*. Retrieved June 27, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>
This declaration projects the future of the Alliance as seen through the heads of State and government as they move towards the 21st century. It highlights issues such as enlargement and self-defense. It also goes on to discuss partnership countries.
- North Atlantic Council. (1999). *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Retrieved June 27, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/p99-065e.htm>
The most recent military doctrine of NATO, this Web site outlines what the North Atlantic Council sees as its responsibilities and interests for the coming years. It focuses primarily on NATO's readiness to fulfill its purpose as outlined in the Washington Treaty. Secondly, it discusses strategy, crisis management, as well as enumerates guidelines for alliance forces.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, May 26). *Statement by the Secretary-General at the Pledging Conference for the AU Mission in the Sudan*. Retrieved June 16, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050526a.htm>
This is a statement made by the NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. NATO pledged to assist the African Union in the AU's efforts to subdue the situation in Darfur, Sudan. The statement goes on to elaborate the assistance NATO could potentially provide. However, it does not give a timetable for such assistance to occur.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, July 1). *NATO starts airlifting African Union troops to Darfur*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/07-july/e0701a.htm>
The assistance that NATO pledged to provide to the AU in May 2005 is the topic on this Web site. It sets down a timetable and some basic contributions NATO plans to make in Darfur, Sudan. NATO plans on primarily offering technical and air lift support to the African Union.

United Nations Security Council. (2004, July 30). (n.t.). (S/RES/1556). New York: Author.
This resolution, concerning the crisis happening in Darfur, called for the International Community to aide the African Union in ending the conflict in the region. The resolution does not elaborate on the method of assistance, just that assistance is warranted. NATO has responded to this resolution in kind.

United Nations Security Council. (1990, November 29). (n.t.). (S/RES/678). New York: Author.
The final in a series of regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this resolution authorizes military action to drive Iraq out of the territory. This authorizes one of the first instances where NATO Member States acted as a group, in concert with one another militarily. Even though it was a U.N. mandated force, NATO was the primary contributor of military resources to the invasion.

Yetiv, Steve A. (1992). The outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: some anecdotal causes. *Political Science Quarterly*, 107, 195-212.
The general causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are discussed in this article. It also addresses the probable causes and pre-existing institutions in the Middle East that allowed the UN Coalition to be successful in the campaign so quickly. It does not discuss NATO by name, but is relevant due to the amount of NATO Member States on the ground in Iraq.

II. Reexamination of the Prague and Istanbul Summits as a Means to Combat Terrorism

Bensahel, Nora. (2003). *The counterterrorism coalitions: cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing.
The necessity of Europe in struggle to combat terrorism is the focus of this book. It discusses the lack of full concerted capabilities in the multilateral institutions that are in place in Europe. While it criticizes the lack of capabilities, it shows that the ability is there for those institutions to improve their abilities. It also discusses implications for the United States' ability to work within Europe.

Cowell, Alan. (2005, July 9). First details of bombs emerge; toll reaches 49 and some bodies aren't yet recovered. *The New York Times*, p. A7
Part of the continuing coverage of the bombing attacks in London, United Kingdom in July, this newspaper article provides updated information. It details likely dimensions of the bombs as well as gives an updated casualty toll. It also creates parallels to the reactions of both commoners and royals. Cowell also provides early theories of the perpetrators based on the information provided by police and government officials.

Deighton, Anne. (2002). *The eleventh of September and beyond: NATO*. In Lawrence Freedman (Ed.), *Superterrorism: policy responses*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, p. 119-134.
This section focuses on the redefinition of NATO after the September 11 attacks on the United States. It takes into account the fact that NATO was not a direct combat party to the military operations in Afghanistan following the attacks. It also analyzes how NATO could be become a greater player in the fight against terrorist activities.

Frankel, Glenn, & Finn, Peter. (2004, March 8). Blast evidence points to al-Qaida: Investigators believe Madrid bombing was carried out by multinational cell. *The Houston Chronicle*, p. 9.
Frankel and Finn provide part of the coverage of the Madrid commuter train bombings in March 2004. Further, the article goes on to discuss the identities of the five men named by the Spanish Interior Minister. It also details the possible motives for the choice of a Spanish target by the cell, as opposed to another State.

- Lansford, Tom. (2002). *All for one: terrorism, NATO, and the United States*. Hampshire, England: Ashgate. *Tom Lansford analyzes the ability of NATO to work within and without its alliance to further combat terrorism in a uniform nature. Furthermore, it also provides a comprehensive understanding of NATO's capabilities and shortcomings both institutionally and militarily in the fight against terrorism, and introduces the possibilities of its Post-September 11 role. Chapters of interest are five and the conclusion, however the book in its entirety is an excellent background in NATO and its new, perceived, role in the 21st century.*
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2004). *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>
This communiqué provides an outline and discussion of what occurred and the important outcomes of the Istanbul Summit. The communiqué discusses many of the outcomes of the Summit, and it touches particularly on terrorism (sections 12 & 13), arms control (section 14), and how the alliance has progressed on the outcomes of Prague (section 19). Also relevant is the sections relating to the alliance's military capabilities and its current peacekeeping operations in Europe and the Middle East.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2004). *Istanbul Summit Readers Guide*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-ist/rdr-gde-ist-e.pdf>
A readable and succinct account of what occurred at the Istanbul Summit and how it could change NATO are provided on this Web page. The document highlights the outcomes of the Istanbul Summit, and groups them into three "pillars." The most relevant is the capabilities pillar and the partnerships pillar. The capabilities pillar outlines the military capabilities of the alliance, and discusses its progress on the NRF and the PCC, among others. The pillar discusses NATO's cooperation with other States in the region and, more importantly International Organizations such as the U.N.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2003). *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation, A Reader's Guide*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-prg/rdr-gde-prg-eng.pdf>
A readable and succinct account of what occurred at the Prague Summit and how it could change NATO are provided on NATO's Web site. The guide provides a narrative version of the decisions of the summit as well, as well as discussing the PCC, the NRF and other military capabilities and operations that were discussed at Prague. In addition, the text of the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism is included that discusses the commitment of NATO and its partner States in the areas that concern the fight against terrorism.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2003). *NATO after Prague*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/docu/0211prague/after_prague.pdf
A brief account of what occurred at the Prague Summit, and how NATO has implemented the outcomes if the summit are provided in this resource. It provides brief narratives regarding the NRF, the new Military Command Structure, and what NATO plans on doing to further combat new threats to the alliance. It also talks about NATO's relations with other International Organizations outside the alliance and with other States.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2002, November 21). *Prague Summit Declaration*. Retrieved June 21, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>
NATO approved this declaration at the Prague Summit. It discusses what was achieved in a myriad of areas NATO deals with, including Terrorism. It also formally approved the PCC and the NRF, and ordered that the military command structure be streamlined as to provide a more efficient command structure. Finally, it discusses how NATO plans to work with its partners to further its goals.

- Richburg, Keith B. (2004, March 12). A catastrophe 'like the twin towers'; witnesses describe scenes of chaos. *The Washington Post*, p. A.01.
Richburg provided this part of the coverage of the Madrid commuter train bombings in March 2004. The article further provides an account of the witnesses and victims of the train bombings. As well as the general scene and commotions, that occurred after the bombing.
- Stevenson, Richard W. (2005, July 7). Bombings rewrite agenda for world leaders in Scotland. *The New York Times*, p. A13.
Stevenson's article is part of the continuing coverage of the bombing attacks in London, United Kingdom in July and their effect on the G-8 summit occurring at that time in Scotland. The article details the response of the global leaders. It also provides possible policy responses to the attacks on London as well as to Terrorism in general.
- United Nations. (n.d.). *CTC: about the Counter-Terrorism Committee*. Retrieved July 7, 2005, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/mandate.html>
The UN's CTC Web site discusses the foundation, mandate and recent work of the United Nations Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee as established in Resolution 1373 (2001). It maintains links to the membership of the CTC as well as what the CTC asks of States. Finally, you can access the secretariat responsible to the CTC.
- Van Natta, Jr., Don, & Sciolino, Elaine. (2005, July 8). Timers used in blasts, police say; parallels to Madrid are found. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
Van Natta and Sciolino's article is part of the continuing coverage of the bombing attacks in London, United Kingdom in July. It details the methods of the explosions and that the fourth bomb that detonated in a bus could have been intended for another target. It also discusses the likelihood of currently monitored terrorist cells being involved in this attack.
- Van Natta, Jr., Don, & Johnston, David. (2005, July 9). London Bombs seen as crude, death toll rises to 49. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
Another NY Times article provides part of the continuing coverage of the bombing attacks in London, United Kingdom in July. It details the bombings and the methods of explosions as well as the death toll that is current at the time. It does not delve into responses of national leaders, just actions being taken by local authorities to handle the bombings.

III. The International Role of Women in the Armed Forces

- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (opened for Signature on 17 July 1980). Retrieved July 16, 2005 from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm>
The Convention is the first International instrument discussing the areas where women are historically discriminated against and the International Community's solution to the problem. Of particular interest to the topic is Article 11, dealing with employment. From this page, you will be able to access the reservations to the Convention as well as the listing of States parties.
- Dowler, Lorraine. (2005). Amazonian landscapes: gender, war, and historical repetition. In Colin Flint (Ed.). *The geography of war and peace: from death camps to diplomats*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 133-148.
Dowler discusses how gender and warfare have interplayed during modern history. She discusses the concept of "nature versus nurture" in women's development, particularly as it pertains to violence. Finally, she discusses the contributions of women during the September 11, 2001 attacks.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005). *Committee on women in the NATO forces*. Retrieved July 11, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/index.html
This is the Web site for the CWINF. From this page, you will be able to access all the CWINF documents available. It is a good tool for finding information about the structure, history, and work of the committee.

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, February 18). *Committee on women in the NATO forces: history*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/history.htm
A brief history of the foundation and development of what today is the CWINF is provided on this Web site. This history includes a narrative on the first conference of senior military women from the founding States. It goes through until the present day.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005, February 18). *Committee on women in the NATO forces: committee structure*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/structure.htm
This Web site outlines the structure of the CWINF and its subsidiary to the MC. In particular is relationship to the MC. In addition, it outlines the times that it reports to the MC. This is a good resource that provides understanding of how the CWINF fits into the structure of NATO and also how it is organized as a subcommittee.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Committee on Women in the NATO Forces. (2005, February 18). *Recruitment and employment*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/recruit_employ.htm
The CWINF focuses in recruitment and employment due to the disproportion of women enlisting in the military. This Web site provides information on how the CWINF assists women in the military. It also outlines recruitment initiatives that the committee is using to interest women in serving in their State's military.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization Committee on women in the NATO forces. (2005, February 18). *Training and development*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/training_develop.htm
An outline of the work of the CWINF sub-committee on Training and Development is provided on this Web site. This area is training and leadership & skills development of women in order for them to attain the ability to advance in the military. This area is focused on due to the disproportion of women who are officers compared to men.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization Committee on women in the NATO forces. (2005, February 18). *Quality of life*. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/qual_life.htm
The Quality of Life for Women in the Armed Forces has become important in recent years. This is due to the amount of women who have some sort of lifestyle issues. This CWINF sub-committee develops methods for militaries to handle situations when they arise.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Committee on Women in the NATO Forces. (n.d.). *Year in Review 2004. 2004 Total Strength of women in the NATO Forces* (graph). Retrieved July 10, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/ims/2004/win/strength.pdf>
This is a breakdown of the percentage of women in each State's military in 2004. This breakdown is used to assess the needs of each State's military in terms on female representation. It is also used to assist the subcommittees in their work.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *Video Interview with Colonel Cheryl D. Lamerson, Chairperson of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces* (Transcript), 25 June 2003. Retrieved July 10, 2005, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030625a.htm>
The history and future of the CWINF are discussed in this interview with the chairperson of the subcommittee. It also discusses the future prospects of Women serving a greater role in the military. It was conducted with the outgoing chairperson of the CWINF.
- Segal, Mady Wechsler. (1995). Women's military roles cross-nationally: past, present and future. *Gender and Society*, 9, 757-775.
Some theories as to the role of women in the armed forces regarding the variables of military, social structure, and society are outlined in this article. In addition, it discusses the components to those variables. It also discusses all variables and components in depth as they interrelate to one another.

Skaine, Rosemarie. (1999). *Women at war: gender issues of Americans in combat*. London: McFarland & Company, Inc.

Chapters in this book include historical accounts of women in the military. These include philosophical arguments, sociological theories and general themes that are included in the debate over women serving in the armed forces. Although this text focuses on the American military in particular, it has general themes that are cross-national in nature.

United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advancement of Women. (n.d.).

States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Retrieved July 16, 2005, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm>
Here delegates can find a listing of all signatories and States parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. You may also access the convention itself as well as the reservations of each State Party. The CEDAW is the first treaty of its kind to address discrimination of women.

Additional Sources

Fine, Ketha Saspsin. (1996). Fragile stability and change: understanding conflict during the transitions in east central Europe. In Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes (Eds.). *Preventing conflict in the post community world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Fine gives an alternate perspective on the development of conflict in the post-communist bloc. It focuses on the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which help to resolve conflict before it escalates into a situation that is not easily controllable. NGOs, even with strapped resources, have begun to work with civil society to handle potential conflicts before they begin to take shape.

Flint, Colin. (2005). Dynamic metageographies of terrorism: the spatial challenges of religious terrorism and the "War on Terrorism." In Colin Flint (Ed.). *The geography of war and peace: from death camps to diplomats*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Flint discusses the geopolitical aspects of terrorism in modern times. He enumerates three separate perspectives on terrorism. Also, how geography affects the ability to have a standard definition of terrorism. Finally, Flint discusses the political geography and justness of the war on terrorism.

Huntington, David S. (1996). A peacekeeping role for the Western European Union. In Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes (Eds.). *Preventing conflict in the post community world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Huntington discusses the new abilities of the Western European Union (WEU) after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, where the WEU was officially designated the defense arm of the European Union (EU). The chapter discusses the historical origins of the WEU and how it plays into the situation regarding European security structure. It also goes into the WEU's role in the Persian Gulf conflict and the actions in the Former Yugoslavia.

Oas, Ian. (2005). Shifting the iron curtain of Kantian peace: NATO expansion and the modern Magyars. In Colin Flint (Ed.). *The geography of war and peace: from death camps to diplomats*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Oas focuses on NATO's expansion in the post cold war era. The chapter discusses a brief history of NATO. It goes on to talk about NATO and its success in the concept of Kantian Peace.

- Tharoor, Sashi. (1996). The role of the United Nations in European peacekeeping. In Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes (Eds.). *Preventing conflict in the post community world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Tharoor discusses the characteristics of the United Nations' (UN) involvement in peacekeeping activities in the European area, especially focusing on its interactions with regional organizations. Its political abilities and working with the media are also discussed. The chapter also discusses the challenges of UN involvement in regional and internal strife that requires intervention from outside sources.
- Zucconi, Mario. (1996). The European Union in the Former Yugoslavia. In Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes (Eds.). *Preventing conflict in the post community world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
This chapter provides a further analysis of the European Union's (EU) intervention attempts in the Former Yugoslavia, including a chronology of the conflict. Zucconi also discusses the status of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and offers an introduction to the formal policy structure that goes into making foreign policy decisions for the European Union.

**Rules of Procedure
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(North Atlantic Council)**

INTRODUCTION

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the North Atlantic Council (hereinafter “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Committee Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director General or his or her designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations, and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “Chairperson” shall refer to the presiding officer, or acting presiding officer of the body.

I. SESSIONS

Dates of convening and adjournment

Rule 1

The Council shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Place of sessions

Rule 2

The body shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Provisional agenda

Rule 3

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Adoption of the agenda

Rule 4

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting in the body. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the body by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, “those present and voting in the body” means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

Explanatory memorandum

Rule 5

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Duties of the Secretary-General

Rule 6

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the body.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the body and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Duties of the Secretariat

Rule 7

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the body, and shall distribute documents of the body to the members of the United Nations, and generally perform all other work which the body may require.

Statements by the Secretariat

Rule 8

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the body concerning any question under consideration.

Selection of the Chairperson

Rule 9

The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a Chairperson who shall hold office and, inter alia, chair the Council for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Replacement of the Chairperson

Rule 10

If the Chairperson is unable to perform her/his function, a new Chairperson shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGES

Official and working language

Rule 11

English shall be the official and working language of the body.

Interpretation

Rule 12

Any representative wishing to address any United Nations body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the translation must be within the set time limit.

Quorum

Rule 13

The Chairperson may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one quarter of the members of the body are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the body shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, "members of the body" is based on the number of total members (not including observers) in attendance for the Tuesday night session.

General Powers of the Chairperson

Rule 14

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him/her elsewhere by these rules, the Chairperson shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the body, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The Chairperson, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the body and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. She or he shall rule on points of order. She or he may propose to the body the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the Chairperson's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the Chairperson is to use his or her discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the Chairperson's power to "propose to the body" entails his or her power to "entertain" motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.

Rule 15

The Chairperson, in the exercise of his or her functions, remains under the authority of the body.

Points of order

Rule 16

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the Chairperson. Any appeal of the decision of the Chairperson shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the Chairperson shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the Chairperson, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, "the members present and voting" means those members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 17

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Speeches

Rule 18

1. No one may address the body without having previously obtained the permission of the Chairperson. The Chairperson shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the body, and the Chairperson may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

The body may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the Chairperson shall call him or her to order without delay.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the Chairperson determines that the body in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the Chairperson, in his or her discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.

Closing of list of speakers

Rule 19

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the Chairperson may announce the list of speakers and, with consent of the body, declare the list closed.

When there are no more speakers, the Chairperson shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the body.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the Chairperson and should not be the subject of a motion by the body. A motion to close the speaker's list is within the purview of the body and the Chairperson should not on his own motion the body.

Right of reply

Rule 20

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the Chairperson may permit a right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that "impugns the integrity of a representative's State" is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All rights of reply shall be made in writing addressed to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point or motion. The reply shall be read to the body by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Suspension of the meeting

Rule 21

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Adjournment of the meeting

Rule 22

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the body shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the body's next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the Chairperson will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last session of the body.

Adjournment of debate

Rule 23

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Closure of debate

Rule 24

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his or her wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the body favors the closure of debate, the body shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Order of motions

Rule 25

Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Proposals and amendments

Rule 26

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Assembly who would like the Assembly to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the body unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The Chairperson may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the body for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all "proposals" shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the body by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of that working paper. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the body. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the body, and as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Withdrawal of motions

Rule 27

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Reconsideration of a topic

Rule 28

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the body, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

For purposes of this rule, "those present and voting" means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

V. VOTING

Voting rights

Rule 29

Each member of the body shall have one vote.

This section applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to “member(s)” do not include observers or NGOs, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Request for a vote

Rule 30

A proposal or motion before the body for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the body may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, “proposal” means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the Chairperson may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without vote.

Consensus required on all substantive decisions

Rule 31

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the body shall be made by a consensus of the members present and voting. A negative vote by one member of the Council will result in the substantive issue failing.

For purposes of this rule on voting, the following items are considered substantive and require a consensus to be adopted by the Council: a draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion (second portion of the motion to divide a question). For the 2006 NMUN Conference, the Secretariat has chosen to adopt this voting procedure used by the actual body in furtherance of the educational mission of the NMUN Conference.

2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative states as “present and voting” during the attendance roll call for the session during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.

Method of voting

Rule 32

1. The body shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the Chairperson. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

Only those members, who designate themselves as “present” or “present and voting” during the attendance roll call or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the Chairperson and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote, and as such, no others will be called during a roll call vote. Any representatives replying “pass,” must, on the second time through respond with either “yes” or “no.” A “pass” cannot be followed by a second “pass” for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the body votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by the show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll call. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the body shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.

3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Explanation of vote

Rule 33

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the Chairperson in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the Chairperson in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Conduct during voting

Rule 34

After the Chairperson has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Division of proposals and amendments

Rule 35

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the Chairperson where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole. (See Rule 32).

For purposes of this rule, "most radical division" means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is "most radical" is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Amendments

Rule 36

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect preambulatory clauses.

Order of voting on amendments

Rule 37

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, "furthest removed in substance" means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is "furthest removed in substance" is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Order of voting on proposals

Rule 38

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the body decides otherwise, be voted on in order in which they were submitted.

The Chairperson shall not vote

Rule 39

The Chairperson shall not vote but may designate another member of his or her delegation to vote in his or her place.

VIII. MINUTE OF SILENT PRAYER OR MEDITATION

Invitation to silent prayer or meditation

Rule 40

Immediately after the opening of the first plenary meeting of the General Assembly, representatives may request to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation. This is the only time this motion will be entertained and its approval is at the discretion of the Secretariat.

**NMUN RULES OF PROCEDURE - SHORT FORM
LISTED IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE**

Motion	Purpose	Debate	Vote
Point of Order	Correct an error in procedure	None	None
Appeal of the Chair	Challenge a decision of the Chair	None	Majority
Suspension of the Meeting	Recess meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of the Meeting	End meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of Debate	End debate without a substantive vote	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Decision of Competence	Declare committee unable to consider issue or resolution	None	Majority
Closure of Debate	Move to immediate vote	2 con	2/3
Declare an Important Question (applicable in GA Plen only)	Require all substantive actions to obtain a 2/3 majority to pass	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Amendments and 1 st Vote on Divisions of the Question	Vote on sections separately, prior to voting on the entire resolution	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Roll Call Vote	Vote by roll call, rather than show of placards	None	None
Reconsideration	Re-open debate on an issue	2 con	2/3
Set the Speakers time	Set or change the speakers time limit	2 pro / 2 con	Majority
Close the Speakers list (also applies to re-opening list)	No additional speakers added to speakers list on topic	None	Majority
Adoption of the Agenda	Approval of agenda order	None	Majority

DIVISION OF THE QUESTION DIAGRAM

