



NMUN • LATIN AMERICA

GALAPAGOS 2013

SECURITY COUNCIL BACKGROUND GUIDE 2013

Written By: Rafael Corral, Director



NMUN • LATIN AMERICA

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Message from the Secretary-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2013 NMUN-LatAm Conference

At the 2013 NMUN-LatAm Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee assignment. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as NGOs. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. NMUN/NCCA will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incidents of plagiarism to the Secretariat.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample position paper below this message for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. All papers must be typed and formatted in the same manner as this example. The following format specifications are required for all papers:

- Length must not exceed two single-sided pages (use standard size for your home region: A4 or 8.5x11).
- Margins must be set at 1 inch for the whole paper.
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Body of the paper must be single-spaced.
- Country/NGO name, school name, and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page.
- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections.
- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers.

To be considered for awards, position papers need to be submitted by e-mail in .pdf or .doc formats by 1 December 2012. As proof of submission, include yourself as an e-mail recipient. Please use the committee name, your assignment, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: CSustD_Cuba_Mars College).

1. Send one complete set of all position papers for each of your country/NGO assignments to the Secretary-General at secgen.latam@nmun.org.
2. Send a copy of your position paper for each assigned committee to the corresponding committee e-mail address listed below. Please note, the e-mail addresses will be active on 1 October 2012.

Committee	E-mail Address (after 1 Octt.)
Commission on Population and Development (CPD)	cpd.latam@nmun.org
Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD)	cstd.latam@nmun.org
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSustD)	csustd.latam@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)	csw.latam@nmun.org
Security Council (SC)	sc.latam@nmun.org

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents.
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints.
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations.
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide.
- Outline of official policy aims within the committee's mandate.

Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff.

Sincerely,

Nicole Galindo
Secretary-General
NMUN-LatAm

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. Papers may be no longer than two single-sided pages. Only the first two pages of any submissions will be considered for awards.

Delegation from
Canada

Represented by
University of Jupiter

Position Paper for General Assembly Plenary

The topics before the General Assembly Plenary are: Breaking the Link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict; the Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy; and the Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa. Canada is dedicated to collaborative multilateral approaches to ensuring protection and promotion of human security and advancement of sustainable development.

I. Breaking the Link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict

Canada endorses the Kimberly Process in promoting accountability, transparency, and effective governmental regulation of trade in rough diamonds. We believe the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an essential international regulatory mechanism and encourage all Member States to contribute to market accountability by seeking membership, participation, and compliance with its mandate. Canada urges Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué to strengthen government oversight of rough diamond trading and manufacturing by developing domestic legal frameworks similar to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. We call upon participating States to act in accordance with the KPCS's comprehensive and credible systems of peer review to monitor the continued implementation of the Kimberley Process and ensure full transparency and self-examination of domestic diamond industries. We draw attention to our domestic programs for diamond regulation including Implementing the Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act and urge Member States to consider these programs in developing the type of domestic regulatory frameworks called for in A/RES/55/56. Canada recognizes the crucial role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the review of rough diamond control measures developed through the Kimberly Process and encourages States to include NGOs, such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, in the review processes called for in A/RES/58/290. We urge Member States to act in accordance with A/RES/60/182 to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal and alluvial diamond miners by establishing a coordinating mechanism for financial and technical assistance through the Working Group of the Kimberly Process of Artisanal Alluvial Producers. Canada calls upon States and NGOs to provide basic educational material regarding diamond valuation and market prices for artisanal diggers, as recommended by the Diamond Development Initiative. Canada will continue to adhere to the 2007 Brussels Declaration on Internal Controls of Participants and is dedicated to ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective regulation of the rough diamond trade through the utilization of voluntary peer review systems and the promotion of increased measures of internal control within all diamond producing States.

II. The Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy

Canada is dedicated to integrating alternative energy sources into climate change frameworks by diversifying the energy market while improving competitiveness in a sustainable economy, as exemplified through our Turning Corners Report and Project Green climate strategies. We view the international commitment to the promotion of alternative sources of energy called for in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) as a catalyst to sustainable development and emission reduction. Canada fulfills its obligations to Article 4 of the UNFCCC by continuing to provide development assistance through the Climate Change Development Fund and calls upon Member States to commit substantial financial and technical investment toward the transfer of sustainable energy technologies and clean energy mechanisms to developing States. We emphasize the need for Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2005 Beijing International Renewable Energy Conference to strengthen domestic policy frameworks to promote clean energy technologies. Canada views dissemination of technology information called for in the 2007 Group of Eight Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy Declaration as a vital step in energy diversification from conventional energy generation. We call

upon Member States to integrate clean electricity from renewable sources into their domestic energy sector by employing investment campaigns similar to our \$1.48 billion initiative ecoENERGY for Renewable Power. Canada encourages States to develop domestic policies of energy efficiency, utilizing regulatory and financing frameworks to accelerate the deployment of clean low-emitting technologies. We call upon Member States to provide knowledge-based advisory services for expanding access to energy in order to fulfill their commitments to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Canada urges States to address the concerns of the 2007 Human Development Report by promoting tax incentives, similar to the Capital Cost Allowances and Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses, to encourage private sector development of energy conservation and renewable energy projects. As a member of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Canada is committed to accelerating the development of renewable energy projects, information sharing mechanisms, and energy efficient systems through the voluntary carbon offset system. We are dedicated to leading international efforts toward the development and sharing of best practices on clean energy technologies and highlight our release of the Renewable Energy Technologies Screen software for public and private stakeholders developing projects in energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy. Canada believes the integration of clean energy into State specific strategies called for in A/62/419/Add.9 will strengthen energy diversification, promote the use of cogeneration, and achieve a synergy between promoting alternative energy while allowing for competitiveness in a sustainable economy.

III. Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa

Canada views the full implementation of the treatment and prevention targets of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Especially in Africa, as essential to eradicating malaria and assisting African States to achieve Target 8 of Goal 6 of the MDGs by 2015. We recommend Member States cooperate with the World Health Organization to ensure transparency in the collection of statistical information for Indicators 21 and 22 of the MDGs. Canada reaffirms the targets of the Abuja Declaration Plan of Action stressing regional cooperation in the implementation, monitoring, and management of malaria prevention and treatment initiatives in Africa. To fully implement A/RES/61/228, Canada believes developed States must balance trade and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian objective of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. We continue to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health into our compulsory licensing framework through the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. We urge Member States to support compulsory licensing for essential generic medicines by including anti-malarial vaccines and initiating domestic provisions to permit export-only compulsory licenses to domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, similar to Canada's Access to Medicines Regime. Canada calls upon Member States to establish advanced market commitments on the distribution of pneumococcal vaccines to developing States in cooperation with PATH and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. We emphasize the need for greater membership in the Roll Back Malaria initiative to strengthen malaria control planning, funding, implementation, and evaluation by promoting increased investment in healthcare systems and greater incorporation of malaria control into all relevant multi-sector activities. Canada continues to implement the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) New Agenda for Action on Health to reduce malaria infection rates among marginalized populations in Africa, increase routine immunizations rates, and reduce infection rates of other neglected infections. Canada will achieve the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008-2009 by providing assistance to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We urge Member States to increase donations to intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that support malaria programming in Africa, exemplified by CIDA's contribution of \$26 million to the Canadian Red Cross. We continue our efforts to provide accessible and affordable vector control methods to African States through the Red Cross' Malaria Bed Net Campaign and the African Medical Research Foundation Canada by supplying insecticide-treated mosquito nets and Participatory Malaria Prevention and Treatment tool kits.



Dear Delegates,

It is our immense pleasure to welcome you to the 2013 National Model United Nations Latin America Conference. With an impressive roster of universities and institutions in attendance, an array of intriguing topics, and a unique location in the Galapagos Islands, this year promises to be truly memorable. You and your team are integral in making the 2013 NMUN LatAm Conference historic.

Your Director for the Security Council is Rafael Corral, he obtained his B.A in International Relations with minors in Political Science and Human Rights from Universidad San Francisco de Quito in Ecuador. He is currently starting a new job at the World Bank in Washington D.C. This is his second year as an NMUN staff member, having previously been Assistant Director for UNESCO at NMUN-NY.

The agenda topics for discussions this year are as follows:

1. Climate Change and the Maintenance of International Security
2. The Exploitation of Natural Resources and its Effect on the Outbreak, Escalation or Continuation of Armed Conflict.

The Security Council is the United Nations organ endowed with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. As such, its enforcement powers, as well as its prestige, are unequalled within the system. Therefore, in line with the importance of this Committee, work by delegates participating in the Security Council should reflect the highest level of preparation, commitment, and effort.

The background guide herein will serve as a brief introduction to the topics listed but cannot replace substantive research of your own. Use it as a springboard for a deep analysis into each topic so that your delegation is empowered to harness the Security Council venue to engender greater prospects for international peace and security.

Each delegation must submit a position paper that identifies its viewpoints on the agenda topics. NMUN will accept position papers via e-mail by December 01, 2012. Please refer to the background guide for a message from your Secretary-General explaining the NMUN position paper requirements and restrictions. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is crucial. NMUN can be one of the most rewarding academic experiences of your college career. We hope that this year's Conference will not only intrigue you to participate again, but also that you find it as beneficial as we have.

If you have any questions regarding your preparation, please feel free to contact the Director of the Security Council or the Secretary-General, Nicole Galindo. Good luck in your preparation for the conference. We look forward to seeing you in January!

Sincerely,

Rafael Corral
Director

History of the Security Council

Introduction

The Security Council is a main organ of the United Nations (UN) and the one entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security.¹ It is around the Security Council that the whole system of collective security vital for the maintenance of international stability is founded. As such, the Council has unparalleled enforcement powers within the United Nations system. Council action to fulfill its responsibility has historically ranged from simple recommendations to the authorization for the use of force. It is this flexibility that has allowed the Council, throughout its more than 65 years of history, to act in the face of hugely diverse threats to international peace and security.

Membership and Voting

The Council is composed by 15 members, five of them are permanent, and the remaining five are non-permanent and are elected by the General Assembly for non-renewable two-year terms. According to its rules of procedure, each year the General Assembly elects five new non-permanent members of the Security Council.² The geographic distribution in members is as follows: five from African and Asian States; one from Eastern European States; two from Latin American States; two from Western European and other States.³ According to article 23 of the Charter, the permanent members of the Security Council are The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.⁴ Due to the important geopolitical changes since the Council's first session in 1946, as successor states, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China currently sit in the place of the Soviet Union and the Republic of China, respectively. According to article 31, the Council can invite any member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Security Council to participate without a vote in its discussion when it considers that the interests of said Member State are specially affected.⁵ As a representative of each of its Member must be present at all times at the UN Headquarters in New York City, the Security Council is meant to function continuously.⁶

The Council's current non-permanent members and the years their terms expire are the following:⁷

Azerbaijan (2013)	Morocco (2013)
Colombia (2012)	Pakistan (2013)
Germany (2012)	Portugal (2012)
Guatemala (2013)	South Africa (2012)
India (2012)	Togo (2013)

According to article 27 of the Charter, Security Council decisions on procedural matters are taken by the affirmative vote of any nine members, while decisions on all other matters are taken by the affirmative vote of nine members, including those of the permanent members. This principle is known as "great power unanimity" or the veto power and ensures that Security Council will not take action contrary to the interests of the five permanent members.⁸ Security Council practice provides that abstentions by permanent members do not prevent decisions from being taken. Finally, when taking decisions related to the peaceful settlement of disputes those member states parties to the dispute must abstain from voting.⁹

Mandate and Powers

According to article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Member States confer to the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international security and agree that in carrying out this responsibility

¹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 24.

² United Nations General Assembly, *Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (A/520/Rev.17)*, 2007.

³ United Nations General Assembly (1964). *Resolution 1991 (AG/Res/1991)*.

⁴ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 23.

⁵ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 31.

⁶ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations Today*, 2008, p. 10.

⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Membership in 2012*.

⁸ Weiss, *The illusion of UN Security Council reform*, 2003, p.150.

⁹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945. Art. 27.

it acts on their behalf.¹⁰ It is important to note that, according to article 25 of the Charter, Member States “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,” which means that Security Council decisions are binding.¹¹ The specific powers granted to the Council are specified in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the UN Charter.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter outlines both the obligations of Member States and the powers of the Security Council in solving international disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. While every Member State must attempt to solve any of the aforementioned disputes or situations by peaceful means, the Security Council can, at any times call on the parties to the dispute to settle it by such means.¹² The Council can also take the initiative in investigating any dispute or situation it considers might lead to an endangerment of the maintenance of international peace and security.¹³ Likewise, Member and non-Member States can bring any situation to the attention of the Security Council.¹⁴ If the parties to a dispute fail to settle it by peaceful means, they must bring it to the attention of the Council, which can recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, refer the case to the International Court of Justice, or recommend other terms of settlement.¹⁵

The Security Council has historically also dispatched military observers or peacekeeping forces in order to “help reduce tension, keep opposing forces apart, and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.”¹⁶

Chapter VII of the Charter outlines the actions to be taken by the Council with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. If the Council identifies the existence of any of these three situations, it can dictate provisional measures to the parties or act according to articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Article 41 outlines that measures not involving the use of force, such as “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations,” may be employed by the Member States.¹⁷ Finally, article 42 gives authority to the Security Council, if it finds that measures under article 41 are inadequate, to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”¹⁸ It is important to note that, under articles 52 and 53 of the Charter, the Security Council can encourage the pacific settlement of disputes through regional arrangements and utilize them for enforcement action under its authority.¹⁹

New Security Threats

While the Security Council was initially conceived to address controversies between states, the nature of the threats to international security has changed dramatically since the UN Charter was drafted. The cold war nearly paralyzed Council action due to the polarization of world politics and the use of the veto power by the United States and the Soviet Union.²⁰ In fact, the veto was used only 12 times between 1990 and 2003, while 193 vetoes were used between 1945 and 1990.²¹ With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council was able to “authorize intervention and the deployment of force in circumstances that would, in earlier time, have been determined to be the internal affairs of sovereign states.”²² During the first years of the 21st century, the Security Council started discussing topics that, by themselves, did not constitute threats to international security but could exacerbate existing threats. In 2000 there was a debate on “the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa,” and in 2003 a briefing on Africa’s food crisis.²³ By 2011 the Council had already placed broad topics such as HIV/AIDS, Women, Peace and Security, the

¹⁰ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 24.

¹¹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 25.

¹² United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 33.

¹³ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 34.

¹⁴ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 35.

¹⁵ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 37.

¹⁶ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations Today*, 2008. P. 10

¹⁷ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 41.

¹⁸ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art. 42.

¹⁹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Art 52- 53.

²⁰ Weiss, *The illusion of UN Security Council reform*, 2003, p.150.

²¹ Weiss, *The illusion of UN Security Council reform*, 2003, p.150.

²² Lorraine, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 50.

²³ Security Council Report, *Energy, Security and Climate: UN Documents*, 2008.

interdependence between security and development, organized crime, and Climate Change in its agenda.²⁴ Notably, in November 2011 a debate was held on “New Challenges to International Peace and Security” where the interconnectedness of these issues was discussed.²⁵ The flexibility that the Charter affords to the Security Council has allowed it to identify these topics as situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and include them in its agenda.

Conclusion

As the organ entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council has the complex task of addressing both traditional and evolving threats, all while keeping within its decades-old mandate. While this task is decidedly complex and many criticize it as slow and ineffective, the Council has allowed itself to innovate and evolve in a certain degree by addressing “new threats.” The future will tell whether the Council can live up to its responsibility in the face of threats, multidimensional in nature and of growing complexity.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the Security Council

Security Council Report (2008). *Energy, Security and Climate: UN Documents*. Retrieved on July 30, 2012 from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gKWLeMTIsG/b.4211099/k.823/Energy_Security_and_ClimatebrUN_Documents.htm

Security Council Report is a website that specializes in providing information about the Security Council and its actions and decisions. This particular section, about energy, security and climate outlines the work of the Council on new threats, including climate change. From this webpage the user can access all documents pertaining to the topic, including Presidential Statements, Reports of the Secretary General and Meeting Records.

United Nations (1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. Retrieved July 30, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>.

The Charter of the United Nations, initially adopted in 1945, is the most important document in the work of the organization. It outlines the rights and responsibilities of Member States as well as the mandates of each of the main organs of the United Nations. Chapters V, VI, and VII outline the main responsibilities and specific powers of the Security Council.

United Nations (N.D.). *Meetings conducted/Actions taken by the Security Council*. Retrieved August 25, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm>

This page in the United Nations website contains a collection of all Security Council meetings conducted since 1999 and all resolutions adopted since 1946. It is a very useful way of finding the position of a particular country regarding a particular issue since there are verbatim records of each and every meeting. Also, the documents are organized in such a way that it is easy to see the meeting in which a resolution was adopted.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (July, 2012). *Peacekeeping Factsheet*. Retrieved August 25, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote010101.pdf>

This is a quick reference document containing information about United Nations Peacekeeping Operations around the globe. The factsheet includes data on personnel numbers and types, geographic distribution, and financial aspects. It is also a useful and fast way of referencing to the acronyms used by the different operations.

²⁴ Security Council Report, *November 2011: Emerging Challenges*, 2011.

²⁵ What's in Blue, *Council Briefing on "New Challenges to International Peace and Security"*, 2011.

I. Climate Change and the Maintenance of International Security

*We must make no mistake. The facts are clear: climate change is real; it is accelerating in a dangerous manner; and it not only exacerbates threats to international peace and security, it is a threat to international peace and security.*²⁶

History and Definition

Global

The discussion of climate change in the United Nations Organization has its origins on the scientific realization, during the second half of the 20th century, that emissions of carbon dioxide resulting from human action were accumulating in the atmosphere and contributing to global warming.²⁷ While the existence and effects of global warming have been debated for decades, the international community has accepted that man-made increases in the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere “result on average in an additional warming to the earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.”²⁸

The UN’s first step in addressing this threat was the 1992 “Earth Summit” which produced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a binding document containing the responsibilities of each State in views to limiting global temperature increases and climate change.²⁹ The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was subsequently adopted in 1997, binding developed countries that ratified it to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels within a set timeframe.³⁰ Follow up and continual assessment of the global action on climate change is centered on the yearly UNFCCC Conferences of State Parties (COP), the most recent of which was held in Durban in 2011; the 2012 edition will take place in Doha, Qatar in December 2012. The ultimate objective of the international negotiations on climate is “to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level what will limit dangerous human interference with the climate system.”³¹

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created by the World Meteorological Organization and The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) is a scientific body that “reviews and assesses the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change.”³² Since its creation, it has produced five assessment reports meant to provide policymakers with “rigorous and balanced scientific information.”³³

Security Council

The issue of the potential negative effects on the maintenance of international security of man-made changes to the environment had been briefly brought up in the Security Council by different delegations during debates on topics as diverse as HIV/AIDS and international security, the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa, the African food crisis, small arms, cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, Haiti, and new threats to international peace and security. April of 2007, however, saw the first time the Council discussed the potential impact of climate change on security during a debate initiated by the United Kingdom on the relationship between energy, security and climate.³⁴ Many Member States, among them the Non-Aligned Movement and G77+China, sent letters to the Council expressing their concern over what they considered its encroachment on General Assembly (GA) and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) mandates.³⁵ While this particular session had no formal outcome, global concern about the implications of climate change has intensified since 2007.³⁶ In 2009, the General Assembly held a debate on the security implications of climate change, and adopted resolution 63/281, which made reference to the aforementioned Council debate on energy, security, and climate and invited the relevant UN organs “as appropriate and within their respective mandates, to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate

²⁶ Ban Ki Moon. United Nations Security Council, *6587th meeting (S/PV.6587)*, 2011.

²⁷ United Nations, *Climate Change*.

²⁸ United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992*.

²⁹ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change*.

³⁰ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change*.

³¹ United Nations, *Climate Change: The Negotiations*.

³² Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *History*.

³³ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *History*.

³⁴ Security Council Report, *Maintenance of international peace and security: impact of climate change, 2011*.

³⁵ Security Council Report, *Maintenance of international peace and security: impact of climate change, 2011*.

³⁶ Security Council Report, *Maintenance of international peace and security: impact of climate change, 2011*.

change, including its possible security implications.”³⁷ Likewise, it requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to report on the “possible security implications of climate change.”³⁸

In his report, the Secretary General expressed that climate change is a “threat multiplier, exacerbating threats caused by persistent poverty, weak institutions for resource management and conflict resolutions, fault lines and a history of mistrust between communities and nations, and inadequate access to information or resources.”³⁹

The first ever Presidential Statement on climate change, was produced during a debate on the topic of “maintenance of international peace and security: the impact of climate change” in 2011.⁴⁰ It stressed the responsibility of the GA and the ECOSOC for sustainable development issues, reaffirmed the UNFCCC as the key instrument for addressing climate change, and expressed concern “that the possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security,” and that “possible security implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States.”⁴¹

Definition

The UNFCCC defines climate change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”⁴² Likewise, it defines adverse effects of climate change as “changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change, which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.”⁴³

The Relationship Between Climate Change and International Security

The 2009 Report of the Secretary General entitled *Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications (A/64/350)* provides a comprehensive outline of the relationship between climate change and international security based on the views of Member States and relevant regional and international organizations.⁴⁴ Namely, “what form [these threats] could take, and what combinations of actions could avert them.”⁴⁵

When talking about the links between climate change and international security, the report of the Secretary General emphasizes that security implications can be more pronounced in setting with low levels human development and low institutions, where social and political tensions and armed conflict are more likely to surface.⁴⁶ In this sense, the reports notes that climate change is a threat multiplier that exacerbates already existing sources of conflict and insecurity.⁴⁷ Climate change can impact security through five channels: “increasing human vulnerability; retarding economic and social development; triggering responses that may increase risks of conflict, such as migration and resource competition; causing statelessness; and straining mechanisms of international cooperation.”⁴⁸

Threats to Human Well-being and Increase of Human Vulnerability

While climate change has the potential to threaten human well-being directly, it also exacerbates human vulnerability. In this context, human vulnerability is understood as “the processes by which individuals, societies and

³⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications (A/RES/63/281)*, 2009, P. 1.

³⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications (A/RES/63/281)*, 2009, P. 2.

³⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 2.

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2011/15)*, 2011, p. 2.

⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2011/15)*, 2011, p. 2.

⁴² United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Art. 1.*

⁴³ United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Art. 1.*

⁴⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 2.

⁴⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 2.

⁴⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 12.

⁴⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 13.

⁴⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 21.

ecosystems are susceptible to harm as a result of climate change.”⁴⁹ United Nations documents have established a link between vulnerability of populations and international security. The 2003 UN Report on the World Social Situation, for example, refers to vulnerability as a factor capable of “fuelling social tensions and undermining the social cohesion needed to pre-empt and respond to emerging dangers.”⁵⁰ According to the report, civil strife and the proliferation of conflicts are manifestations of vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity.⁵¹

The main ways in which climate change can increase the vulnerability of populations are through impacts on food production and food security, health and the incidence of disease, the frequency and intensity of weather events, and sea level rise.⁵² People that are dependent on natural capital that is sensitive to climate change are the ones most at risk.⁵³ The mentioned impacts can increase poverty and lead to the reversal of progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.⁵⁴ Finally, “as many least developed countries are both highly exposed and highly vulnerable to climate change, and as the poor within countries are usually the most vulnerable, climate change is likely to exacerbate inequalities both between and within countries.”⁵⁵

According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, due to climate change, food productivity in low latitudes may decrease up to 50% by 2020, causing food crises at a much larger scale than what has previously been seen.⁵⁶ This is a matter of concern since during the last few years, the rise in food prices and its resulting effect on food security, especially in Africa, caused social protests and unrest in many cities around the world.⁵⁷ Climate change can also cause longer and more intense droughts and the accompanying water shortages, especially in drylands and in small-island developing States, potentially affecting the human habitability of these regions.⁵⁸ The lack of access to safe drinking water has a negative effect on nutrition and the prevention of disease. Likewise, climate change could affect health through “death, injury and disease from extreme weather events; heat stress and cardiovascular illness from elevated ground-level ozone in urban areas; and the number of people at risk of dengue fever.”⁵⁹ While there are some positive effects on health such as the reduction in deaths from cold exposure, the negative effects outweigh them, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East.⁶⁰ Furthermore, extreme weather events are associated with costly damages in the infrastructure and productive assets of coastal cities. Finally, sea level rise in small-island developing states is expected to “exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, threatening vital infrastructure, settlements, and facilities that support the livelihoods of island communities.”⁶¹

Economic Growth and Development

As discussed before, climate change is capable of causing economic disruptions, which can negatively impact growth, “eroding the revenue base of Governments and undermining governance capacities.”⁶² A few ways in which this can happen are the following: crop losses from drought and flooding; reduced productivity of humans and

⁴⁹ Adger, *Climate Change, Human Well-Being and Insecurity*, 2010, p. 290.

⁵⁰ United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation 2003 (A/58/153/Rev. 1)*, 2003, p. 1.

⁵¹ United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation 2003 (A/58/153/Rev. 1)*, 2003, p. 1.

⁵² United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 27.

⁵³ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 27.

⁵⁴ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 27.

⁵⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 30.

⁵⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 32.

⁵⁷ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 2009, p. 4.

⁵⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 35.

⁵⁹ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 37.

⁶⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 38.

⁶¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 44.

⁶² United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 45.

animals due to the adverse effects on health; land degradation and damage to infrastructure in coastal areas, among others. The effects are most pervasive in economies dependent on primary sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, and forests, those that depend on tourism, and small-island States.⁶³

The report of the Secretary General notes that a significant slowdown in economic growth could pose “a serious security threat to developing countries, not least by worsening poverty and desperation. Growth is seen as important to strengthening resilience, maintaining political stability, increasing the attractiveness of cooperation and providing hope to undermined populations.”⁶⁴

Threats from Uncoordinated Coping

Much of the discussion surrounding the security implications of climate change has to do with the consequences of the aforementioned effects on human well-being and economic developments if they happen at a large-scale or very rapidly. In this sense “climate change is likely to overwhelm local capacities to adapt to changing environmental conditions and reinforce the trend towards general instability that already exists in many societies and regions, particularly in weak and fragile states with poorly performing institutions and systems of government.”⁶⁵ Societies that unable to cope will apply strategies of survival that might conflict with those of other communities and societies.⁶⁶ Uncoordinated coping and survival strategies might include large-scale migration and competition for resources, both of which could increase the risks of conflict.⁶⁷ There is the concern that climate change will reverse the progress made in the reduction of armed conflict in Africa. According to the 2007 United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) Sudan Post-conflict Environmental Assessment, “climate change, land degradation and the resulting competition over scarce natural resources are among the root causes as well as the consequences of the violence and grave humanitarian situation in the [Darfur] region.”⁶⁸

The situation related to the availability of water resources in Sub-Saharan Africa can best exemplify how sudden resource scarcity could lead to violent conflict. Because of their nature, water sources are usually shared at the local, national and international levels. This means that sometimes many different groups of people with different needs, not only communities but also corporations and public institutions, draw water from the same sources. Tensions can arise even without water scarcity because of the many factors that must be considered, which depend on the nature of the need of each actor. For example, a better quality of the resource is needed for some uses, such as human consumption, while others depend on the concentration of great quantities of water, such as dams. In this regard, the effects of water scarcity may exacerbate those existing tensions or create new ones, “limited water availability and lacking adaptation reinforce existing marginalization of population groups,” and where political instability is already present “lacking access to water may be an additional destabilizing factor.”⁶⁹

Climate change can trigger environmental migration by exacerbating current environmental problems that affect people’s livelihoods such as food and water scarcity, land degradation, sea-level rise, and increased intensity of weather events. According to the International Organization for Migration, estimates of how many people could migrate –both nationally and internationally- by 2050 because of climate change vary between 200 million and 1 billion.⁷⁰ Migration is already a cause of concern in many receiving and transit countries, especially in the developing world. Several countries in Africa, a continent that hosts 30% of the world’s refugees, have already experienced social unrest and problems related to xenophobia and human trafficking.⁷¹ In this sense, “large-scale

⁶³United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 45.

⁶⁴United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 15.

⁶⁵ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 2009, P. 4.

⁶⁶United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 53.

⁶⁷United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 53.

⁶⁸ United Nations Environment Program, *Sudan: post-conflict environmental assessment*, 2007, P. 20.

⁶⁹ Carius, Houdret and Kramer, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, 2010, p. 7.

⁷⁰ International Migration Organization, *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*, 2010, P. 1.

⁷¹ Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 2009, p. 18.

population displacement will redraw the ethnic map of many countries, bringing previously separate groups into close proximity with each other and in competition for the same resources.”⁷² In fact, according to the 2009 Report of the Secretary General, 32 out of 103 ethnic conflicts between 1945 and 2005 resulted from conflicts between indigenous peoples and migrants from other parts of the country.⁷³

Another problem that surfaces with the transnational movement of large amounts of people due to environmental reasons is that there is currently not an international legal framework to deal with these environmental migrants. The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees only protects people that have crossed a national border due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” and are unable or unwilling to come back their country of habitual residence.⁷⁴ This means that the States that have ratified that convention do not have an obligation of protecting environmental migrants, but rather, are free to consider them mere economic migrants since they do not fit into the definition of a refugee. The development of a parallel legal framework of protection is complicated because “as displacement often results from a combination of factors, it is particularly challenging to define a category of protected person based on the cause of migration.”⁷⁵

Possible Security Council Action

An issue of great controversy in the international community is to what extent the mandate of the Security Council could allow it to discuss and take action on environmental issues and specifically on climate change. As mentioned before, until now, the Security Council has only adopted a Presidential Statement on climate change and the maintenance of international peace and security. Some countries, especially in the developing world, reject the notion that the topic should even be discussed in the Council. History, however, has shown that the Council is flexible enough to discuss evolving security concerns and generally accepted science has proven the existence and pervasive effects of climate change.⁷⁶ How, then, could the Security Council, in keeping with its mandate, act upon the threat of climate change before the actual outbreak of conflict?

The UN Charter does not dictate which topics the Security Council can or cannot discuss; the only criteria is that they should be limited to situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, or that the Council has identified them as a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.⁷⁷ In this sense, the Council can itself identify what constitutes a threat to the peace.⁷⁸ Therefore, “it would not need to wait until climate change had prompted war in order to act. The Security Council can authorize a response to an actual or threatened internal conflict or humanitarian crisis and could do so if the threat to a specific country were of a direct nature.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Council could use its binding power under the Charter to respond to cases of imminent danger arising from climate change, this would not mean that the Council could authorize the use of force but rather, for example, “require that some or all states take action to assist a State... mitigate the impacts of climate change and adapt to altered geographical realities.”⁸⁰

A different approach can be based on the dangers of climate change not as a specific threat but as a threat of a general nature, much in the way the Security Council has acted regarding international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In this sense, the Council could establish an *ad hoc* committee as it did under resolutions 1773 and 1540 to deal with the environment and development.⁸¹ This approach seems, however, unlikely since there are already many forums worldwide which discuss different aspects related to climate change and the environment in general, and the Security Council would not want duplicate those efforts.⁸² Perhaps the most realistic way in which the Council could incorporate the climate change into its actions would be in the contexts of Chapter VI of the

⁷² Brown and Crawford, *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2009*, p. 19.

⁷³ United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*, 2009, p. 53.

⁷⁴ United Nations, *Convention on the status of refugees, 1951*, Art. 1.

⁷⁵ Hausler and McCorquodale, *Climate Change and its impact on security and survival*. 2011, p. 620.

⁷⁶ United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992*.

⁷⁷ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations, 1945*, Arts 39, 40.

⁷⁸ Scott, *Securitizing climate change: international legal implications and obstacles*, 2008, p. 608.

⁷⁹ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 61.

⁸⁰ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 60.

⁸¹ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 60.

⁸² Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 60.

Charter and in its peacekeeping and peace building operations. On one hand the Council could be more active in identifying and addressing situations where an escalation of conflict is possible due to the negative effects of climate change and use the mechanisms devised in Chapter VI. On the other hand, it could incorporate into the mandates of the different peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission considerations in “fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development.”⁸³

Case Study: the Marshall Islands

A rise in the level of the seas is one of the most certain and dramatic impacts of climate change.⁸⁴ It is small-island developing states (SIDS), most of them “remote, small in land area and population (less than 1.5 million), with a very narrow resource base and fragile land and marine ecosystems,” which are the most vulnerable to this phenomenon.⁸⁵ Currently, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs lists 51 SIDS in three regions: the AIMS (Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea), the Caribbean, and the Pacific.⁸⁶ Hundreds of people live in the archipelagoes and coral atolls of the Pacific, and about two million in the Caribbean Islands.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands, located in the North Pacific Ocean region, is a collection five single islands and 29 remote coral atolls, each made up of small islets, which together amount to approximately 1,000. The country’s average altitude is just 2 meters above sea level, which makes IPCC projections of sea-level rise of between 0.19 and 0.58m especially worrying.⁸⁷ Climate change, therefore, is a threat to the habitability and physical presence of much of the territory of the Marshall Islands, especially “entails a threat to both the future habitability and physical presence of the Marshall Islands’ thin and low-lying islands.”⁸⁸

The security impacts of sea-level rise for the Marshall Islands, accompanied by ““multiplier” issues such as the ability to preserve social order, or intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources... also serve as a threat to national survival.”⁸⁹ In fact, “the potential “vanishing” of a sovereign nation, without a successor state, is not only a security implication but may rise to the level of a threat to international peace and security.”⁹⁰ For the government of the Marshall Islands, facing the possibility of disappearance due to man-made climate change is no different from facing a large-scale military invasion.⁹¹ In this context, the distinction between security and development that is sometimes unclear in other climate impacts is very clear for the Marshall Islands because it poses a severe threat to physical existence; “there can be no national sustainable development without an associated nation.”⁹²

A 2009 report presented to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by the Permanent Representative of the Marshall Islands to the UN on views regarding the possible security implications of climate change outlines two major security implications of sea-level rise for that country. First, climate change threatens resources completely, even to the point in which it undermines essential social foundations, in addition to serving as a multiplier for tension and competition for resources, ultimately causing conflict.⁹³ The effects on food and water security would be devastating. For example, since the Marshall Islands rely on a thin freshwater lens, any shift in salinization and weather patterns

⁸³ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 61.

⁸⁴ Leatherman and Beller-Simms, *Sea-level rise and small island states: an overview*, 1997, p. 1.

⁸⁵ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Small Island Developing States*.

⁸⁶ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Small Island Developing States*.

⁸⁷ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability*, 2007, p. 694.

⁸⁸ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 4.

⁸⁹ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 7.

⁹⁰ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 7.

⁹¹ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 9.

⁹² Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 11.

⁹³ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*, 2009, p. 12.

could pose a threat to the ability to supply water.⁹⁴ Also, lacking access to food and water, the islands may become uninhabitable even before they become inundated.⁹⁵

Finally, climate change threatens statehood sovereignty and territorial integrity because it threatens the very existence of the state. This poses challenges related to the respect for self-determination since the independence of a Government that has lost its territory may come into question “even in a potential scenario wherein the legal “existence” of affected States were permitted to continue by the international community, governments of affected States would face many constraints in practice and their populations would be likely to find themselves largely in a situation that would be similar to, if not the same as, if statehood had ceased.”⁹⁶ The resulting statelessness could mean that the population of the country, since they would not qualify as refugees, would become dependent on the rights a host state is willing to grant them. Problems likely to surface are “restrictions on their freedom of movement, including detention; the inability to seek employment; and lack of access to property or even basic health care.”⁹⁷

Conclusion

The topic of climate change and the maintenance of international security is a complex one. While the Security Council seems more open than ever to discuss non-traditional security topics, and the issue of climate change has already been brought up in its midst, the discussion as to what exactly should be its role is still prevalent in international circles. A main question that surfaces is whether the Security Council should take a more active role in addressing the issue, and if so, should it take a case-by-case approach or a more general one? Also, since climate change affects many different aspects of people’s lives, how can the Security Council effectively coordinate its actions with the existing international framework for climate change and sustainable development in a way that will not overstep the mandates of other UN bodies?

Annotated Bibliography

I. Climate Change and the Maintenance of International Security

Brown, O. and Crawford A. (2009). *Climate Change and Security in Africa: A study for the Nordic-African Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2009*. Retrieved July 31 from: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/climate_change_security_africa.pdf.

This is a very thorough and comprehensive study on the implications of climate change in African security. Its contents include: scientific data related to climate change; information on Africa's particular vulnerabilities, information on water and food scarcity, the possible causes and consequences of climate induced migration, the impact of climate change on poverty, and the prospects for the future.

United Nations General Assembly (11 September, 2009). *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary General (A/64/350)*. Retrieved July 21st, 2012 from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/sg%20report%202009.pdf>

In 2009, The Security Council asked the Secretary General for this report on the security implications of climate change. This is, therefore, the essential document for this topic as it outlines the views of different member states regarding the topic. It is the logical starting point for any research on climate change and the Security Council. In his report, the Secretary General

⁹⁴ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change, 2009*, P. 12.

⁹⁵ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change, 2009*, P. 12.

⁹⁶ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change, 2009*, P. 14.

⁹⁷ Park, *Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States, 2011*, P. 15.

focuses on five channels through which climate change could affect security: vulnerability, development, coping and security, statelessness and international conflict.

Park, S. (May 2011). *Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States*. Retrieved August 25 from: <http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cb0c9.pdf>

This document, prepared for the UNHCR, is a comprehensive assessment of statehood and the problem of statelessness in low-lying Island States. The report contains basic information about the concepts of statehood and statelessness, as well as an overview of the implications of statelessness caused by climate change, especially from the viewpoint of international human rights and refugee laws. Furthermore, it outlines possible strategies to prevent statelessness and early actions to be taken.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability*. Retrieved August 24, 2012 from: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm

This document was prepared by the IPCC, which has the task of providing authoritative international statements of the scientific understanding of climate change. The IPCC creates periodic assessments of causes, impacts and possible responses to climate change. This particular report is organized by regions and by themes. Of special interest for research on this topic are the chapters dealing with the different regions, and also chapter 18, which deals specifically with the inter-relationships between adaptation and migration.

Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations (July 2009). *Republic of the Marshall Islands: Views regarding the possible security implications of climate change*. Retrieved August 25, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/Marshall_Islands_CCIS.pdf

This document was presented by the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands as part of the preparation of Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's report on the possible security implications of climate change. It is an extremely interesting study tool to understand the position of those states that see their very survival affected by climate change and specifically sea-level rise. The Government of the Marshall Islands sets forth its view on international security, the threat posed to its country by climate change, and the possible actions that can be taken by the international community to prevent it.

International Migration Organization (2009). *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*. Retrieved July 21, 2012 from: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/migration_and_environment.pdf

This report, prepared by the International Migration Organization, gives a comprehensive assessment of migration as related to climate change. It reviews the available scientific knowledge on the topic, notes the challenges to measuring a migration-environment nexus, show data on that nexus, addresses the problem of migration in different kinds of natural disasters, including drought and desertification and how to manage them, and finally makes an overview of the existing legal and normative framework for the protection of environmentally displaced people.

United Nations Security Council (20 July, 2011). *Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2011/15)*. Retrieved July 22nd, 2012 from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/PRST/2011/15>.

This Presidential Statement made by the Security Council in 2011 is one of the most important documents to take into account when researching for this topic because it is the only official

document of the Security Council that deals exclusively with the issue of climate change and international security. Delegates should carefully analyze each of the thoroughly negotiated paragraphs, being especially mindful of the language the Council uses.

II. The Exploitation of Natural Resources and its Effect on the Outbreak, Escalation or Continuation of Armed Conflict

Introduction

In a concept paper for the open debate held by the Security Council on June 6th, 2007 on the topic of “Maintenance of international peace and security: natural resources and conflict” the representative of Belgium gave a simple but comprehensive background to the issue with the purpose of providing a blueprint for Council debate; ultimately it led to a Presidential Statement.⁹⁸ In this document, the Council noted that “in specific armed conflict situations, the exploitation, trafficking, and illicit trade of natural resources have played a role in areas where they have contributed to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict.”⁹⁹

In fact, natural resources have a multidimensional effect on conflict, as they are able to cause, sustain, and contribute to its intractability.¹⁰⁰ While the presidential statement only referred to the existence of specific instances in which natural resources have caused or sustained conflict, the concept paper gives a more general idea about how this can happen. In that sense, the exploitation of natural resources can become both a direct and an indirect cause of conflict: a direct one conflict because “disputes about ownership and distribution of revenue can lead to conflict” and an indirect, but probably more pervasive one, because “on average, in poor countries, high dependency on natural resources is associated with an increased risk of weak governance and poor economic performance.”¹⁰¹ Natural resources can also fuel conflict as the revenue coming from their exploitation can finance the activities of armed groups and their control can be the motivation behind sustained fighting.¹⁰² Finally, the exploitation of natural resources in post-conflict situations may aid a country in its reconstruction processes, but might also increase the risk of relapse into conflict if subsisting grievances are not properly addressed.

In this context, it is important to examine how the Security Council can fulfill its responsibility of maintaining international peace and security with regard to the effect of the exploitation of natural resources in causing, fueling and prolonging conflict, as well as their potential effects on peace-building and reconstruction. The Belgian concept paper puts forth three main issues related to conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict situations. The first one is “how to prevent natural resources from becoming a cause of conflict;” the second one is “how to prevent the exploitation of natural resources from fuelling and perpetuating war;” and the third one is “how to reinstate these natural resources as an engine for development.”¹⁰³

The Link between the Exploitation of Natural Resources and Conflict

The problem of distribution: the exploitation of natural resources as a cause of conflict

According to research undertaken by the World Bank, developing countries which depend heavily on primary commodities are at a substantially higher risk of violent conflict. Many times, large rents from natural resources “weaken state structures and make governments less accountable, often leading to the emergence of secessionist

⁹⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 6 June 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S007/334)*, 2007.

⁹⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, 2007.

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 10.

¹⁰¹ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 6 June 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S007/334)*, 2007, p. 3.

¹⁰² United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 6 June 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S007/334)*, 2007, p. 3.

¹⁰³ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 6 June 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S007/334)*, 2007, p. 3.

rebellions and all-out civil war.”¹⁰⁴ The presence of abundant natural resources, though never the sole cause of conflict, can exacerbate its risks and tends to prolong it and complicate its resolution.¹⁰⁵

The unsustainable use of natural resources is a serious challenge for developing countries.¹⁰⁶ At the most basic level, the sole existence of significant natural wealth can become a source of tension when these resources are not properly allocated.¹⁰⁷ Competing demands for the same goods can result in the formation of disadvantaged groups within society, and ultimately conflict if governance institutions fail to regulate the exploitation of natural resources.¹⁰⁸ The UNEP identifies three specific ways in which the problem of distribution may cause conflict. First, when the “local abundance of valuable resources, combined with acute poverty or the lack of opportunity for other forms of income, creates an incentive for groups to attempt to capture them by taking control of resource-rich territories or violently hijacking the State.”¹⁰⁹ Second, when the local demand for the direct use of scarce resources, like land, forests, water and wildlife, exceeds the available supply and institutions are unable to properly distribute the available resources, forced migration or conflict may arise at the local level.¹¹⁰ Finally, since States that base their economies on the export of one or few primary commodities tend to be politically fragile, their success and strength is tied to the inevitable fluctuations of international commodity prices. The resulting lack of transparency, corruption and alienation of the ruling classes can exacerbate social tensions and inspire conflict.¹¹¹ In fact “the combination of the problems of currency appreciation and the opaque revenue management and corruption that have developed in many resource-rich countries is known as the “resource curse.””¹¹²

Although there is some dissent between scholars, a common explanation for the cause of violent conflict related to natural resources lies in the state weakness and its failure in resolving grievances inspired by the distribution of resources peacefully and equitably.¹¹³ In this sense, states that depend on natural resources tend to have weak institutions. Since the government can rely on natural resource revenue instead of taxation, it has little incentive to create strong bureaucratic systems and conversely, since they are not taxed, societies have little control over the government.¹¹⁴ In fact the lack of taxation may cause individuals to “have less information about government activity, weaker incentives to monitor government behavior, and fewer instruments at their disposal to withdraw support from governments.” Accordingly “resource dependent states may have little compulsion to respond to the demands of their citizens or create structures that engage their citizens.”¹¹⁵

The Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Prolongation of Conflicts.

Clear links between the exploitation of natural resources and the prolongation of violence have been established. Natural resources can serve to finance and sustain conflict and undermine peacemaking. The clearest way in which natural resources finance conflict is through the generation of revenue that is later used to finance armed forces and the acquisition of weapons; well-fed and well-equipped troops are able to sustain longer campaigns.¹¹⁶ Similarly, “capturing such resources becomes a strategic objective for military campaigns, thereby extending their duration.”¹¹⁷

¹⁰⁴ World Bank, *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*, 2003, p. 1

¹⁰⁵ World Bank, *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*, 2003, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 8.

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.8.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 8.

¹¹⁰ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.10.

¹¹¹ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.10.

¹¹² United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.10.

¹¹³ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.10.

¹¹⁴ , *Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms*, 2005. P. 512.

¹¹⁵ Humphreys, *Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms*, 2005, P. 512

¹¹⁶ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.13.

¹¹⁷ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.13.

In this context, easily captured and exploited natural resources can also transform the mindset of those fighting and turn their rationale from grievance-based to greed-based.¹¹⁸ The economic incentives provided by the exploitation of high-value natural resources can also complicate peace efforts; “as the prospect of a peace agreement appears closer, individuals or splinter groups who stand to lose access to the revenues gained from resource exploitation can act to spoil peacemaking efforts.”¹¹⁹

Resources that are used to finance armed conflict are commonly known as “conflict goods” and while there is not a universally accepted definition for the term, a commonly cited one is the following:

“Conflict goods are non-military materials, knowledge, animals or humans whose trade, taxation or protection is exploited to finance or otherwise maintain the war economies of contemporary conflicts. Trade can take place by direct import or export from the conflict zone or on behalf of military factions (both government and non-government) by outside supporters. Conflict goods do not include arms, military aid or the services of mercenaries, although these may be paid for in kind with goods or concessions to trade in products which would then become conflict goods.”¹²⁰

According to UNEP, eighteen civil wars and cases of internal unrest have been fuelled by natural resources in the last twenty years.¹²¹ This comes as no surprise since there are many mechanisms through which revenue can be obtained from the exploitation of natural resources. The most obvious way is through their direct commercialization, by the government or non-state actors, in the national or international markets. Much as governments institute taxes on the production and sale of resources –especially in times of war- rebel groups or warlords that control territories can tax natural resources or commercial activities as a source of revenue that does not require the effort of producing or commercializing products.¹²² Furthermore, through the collection of protection money, governments and armed groups can benefit from the exploitation of natural resources by national or international companies or individuals by charging them for armed protection of their products and infrastructure.¹²³ While it is not uncommon for rebel groups and irregular armed forces to charge protection money to multinational corporations, even governmental war taxes generate the expectation of armed protection.¹²⁴

In Angola, for example, after the Cold War ended and support to the warring factions of an ideology-based political struggle dried up, the *Union Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) was able to sustain its military efforts to overthrow the government of the *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* through the trade in diamonds.¹²⁵ Similarly, the government financed its war effort through government revenues from oil exports.¹²⁶ In fact, “the civil war in Angola can be considered the ultimate natural resource war as the course of the conflict broadly followed the price of oil relative to diamonds.”¹²⁷

Finally, it is important to note that different commodities have different effects on the outbreak and continuation of conflict. In this sense, “oil exports are linked to the onset of conflict, [while] ‘lootable’ commodities like gemstones and drugs are correlated with the duration of conflict.”¹²⁸

¹¹⁸ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.13.

¹¹⁹ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p.11.

¹²⁰ Cooper, N (2001). Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention, *International Peacekeeping*. (8) 3. p. 25.

¹²¹ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 24.

¹²² Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 24.

¹²³ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 25.

¹²⁴ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 25.

¹²⁵ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 12.

¹²⁶ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 12.

¹²⁷ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 12.

¹²⁸ Ross, M. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war?. *Journal of Peace Research*. (4) 3. p. 338.

Prevention of Conflict

The role of the Security Council and regional organizations in identifying potential conflict arising from disputes over the exploitation of natural resources.

The research undertaken by the World Bank and other institutions suggests that there are preemptive approaches that may be applied in order to reduce the risk of conflict related to natural resources. In essence, there is a global responsibility “in assisting developing countries to ensure that revenues from the exploitation of natural resources do not exacerbate the risk of conflict.”¹²⁹ Recently, in keeping its role of maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council has “given more attention to a culture of prevention which stresses the importance for peace and security of preventive actions which address the root causes of conflict.”¹³⁰ In fact, as stated in resolution 1366, it has committed itself to “pursue the objective of prevention of armed conflict,” in addition to its role in the management of existing conflicts.¹³¹

There are various ways in which the Council can use its powers to prevent conflict related to the exploitation of natural resources. For example, it could use the mechanisms of preventive diplomacy in instances where it determines that the exploitation of natural resources might lead to a threat to international peace. In order to be informed of these situations as they arise, the Council could ask the Secretary-General for periodic reports on issues which may constitute threats. Other similar approaches are to use fact-finding missions, “to employ its good offices in times of environmental dispute, [and to] appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so.”¹³²

Avoiding the Prolongation of Conflict

Due to the fact that the prolongation of conflict is linked to the various forms of revenue from the exploitation of natural resources, a discussion over how the Security Council should manage conflicts involving natural resources revolves around the concept of action regarding conflict goods.

While historically the most common sanctions approach in reducing conflict is to attempt to curbe the illegal traffic of arms, a focus on how to target the war economies of actors that rely on revenues from the exploitation of natural resources -through the multiple aforementioned mechanisms- could also prove effective. As a response to the increase in conflicts financed by conflict goods, in 1998 the Security Council began imposing commodity sanctions and creating groups of experts with the purpose of investigating and reporting on their effectiveness.¹³³ Commodity sanctions are those that “seek to prohibit the import of resources under the control of the sanctioned party, an alternative being restricting investment for, or export of production technology to, the sanctioned party.”¹³⁴ Sanctions can be directed towards governments and non-state groups. While sanctions usually apply to all exports of a particular commodity coming from a specific country, sometimes exceptions can be made for certain certified products.¹³⁵ Historically, not only the Security Council but also regional organizations such as The Economic Community of West African States and individual states such as the United States have applied commodity-based sanctions. An advantage of this kind of sanctions is that it is possible to direct them only towards those benefiting from the exploitation of that particular resource, without causing negative effects over the general population.¹³⁶

The purpose of removing the means by which belligerents sustain conflicts can be attained by raising the costs of waging war.¹³⁷ This means tackling the production and commercialization of conflict goods directly. For example, when Thailand closed its border with Cambodia after the United States threatened to impose sanctions against countries that aided the Khmer Rouge, the latter’s military operations were severely impaired because they were stripped of the revenue from trade in gems and timber.¹³⁸ In this sense, embargoes on the commercialization of conflict goods can remove the incentives for individual combatants.¹³⁹ Measures of this kind might be especially

¹²⁹ World Bank, *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*, 2003, p. 1.

¹³⁰ Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p. 59.

¹³¹ United Nations Security Council, *S/res/1366*, 2001.

¹³² Elliot, *Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council*, 2003, p.58.

¹³³ Le Billion and Nicholls, *Ending Resource Wars: Revenue Sharing, Economic Sanction or Military Intervention*, 2007, p. 618.

¹³⁴ Le Billion and Nicholls, *Ending Resource Wars: Revenue Sharing, Economic Sanction or Military Intervention*, 2007, p. 618.

¹³⁵ Le Billion and Nicholls, *Ending Resource Wars: Revenue Sharing, Economic Sanction or Military Intervention*, 2007, p. 618.

¹³⁶ Le Billion and Nicholls, *Ending Resource Wars: Revenue Sharing, Economic Sanction or Military Intervention*, 2007, p. 618.

¹³⁷ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 29.

¹³⁸ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 29.

¹³⁹ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 29.

effective “where the trade in conflict goods depends on companies operating in legitimate markets (eg. diamonds, timber, etc). Such companies have to work within the framework of domestic law (which is self-evidently not the instance for illicit arms brokers.)”¹⁴⁰ This means that international agreements and pressure from civil society might influence their willingness to support the trade in conflict goods.¹⁴¹

An important issue to consider is that control over the trade of conflict goods in one country can affect the legitimate trade of such goods by other countries. For example “a general boycott against diamonds would only have an impact on the military elites of Angola and Sierra Leone but also the 80000 people employed in the diamond cutting industry in Bombay.”¹⁴² Moreover, there is concern that sanctions on conflict goods could be used not to address the link between violence and the exploitation of those natural resources, but rather as a way for certain countries in the international community to strip certain actors they oppose for political reasons of their source of economic support.¹⁴³ A final consideration is that such approaches might bear in mind a “consideration of the appropriate balance between the long-term need to promote order and the legitimate economy, and the short-term requirement to maintain reasonable levels of economic satisfaction.”¹⁴⁴

Post-Conflict Situations and Peacebuilding

When conflict ceases, the existence of natural resources can both aid with the peace-building process and contribute to a relapse into violence. In this sense “it is critical that the environmental drivers and impacts of conflict are managed, that tensions are defused, and that natural assets are used sustainably to support stability and development in the longer term.”¹⁴⁵ For example, natural resources that provide communities with their livelihoods cannot be damaged, degraded or destroyed.¹⁴⁶ The adequate management of natural resources is critical to effective peace building, especially when the state’s economic recovery depends on them.

The challenge of post-conflict situations in countries where natural resources have been the cause of the outbreak or prolongation of violence is to reinstate them as an engine for development.¹⁴⁷ In cases where sanctions have been applied the challenge is also “how to move from a sanctions-driven approach to a development-oriented one without natural resources becoming again a factor of instability and thus triggering a relapse into conflict.”¹⁴⁸

Modern peace building strategies “complement traditional security priorities with efforts to hold democratic elections and establish good governance and rule of law programs,” they, however, sometimes lack strategies to “adequately address the challenges posed by the political economy of a particular juncture.”¹⁴⁹ Taking these issues into account is important because, in many cases, topics such as the inadequate distribution of resources lie at the center of tensions and may cause violence to resurface. An adequate post-conflict transition in this context can be best understood as “a realignment of political interests and a readjustment of economic strategies rather than a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production or from repression to democracy.”¹⁵⁰ Peace building strategies should take into account the existing of a still criminalized or informal economy and strike a balance between promoting the rule of law and ensuring people’s livelihoods. In essence, “those involved in peace building have to address the dysfunctional elements of the criminalized and informal economy, while retaining its socially beneficial aspects.”¹⁵¹ The Security Council, for example, has instructed peacekeepers in Sierra Leona to “support the government in

¹⁴⁰ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 28.

¹⁴¹ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 28.

¹⁴² Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 31.

¹⁴³ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 31.

¹⁴⁴ Cooper, *Conflict goods: The challenges for peacekeeping and conflict prevention*, 2001, p. 31.

¹⁴⁵ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 19.

¹⁴⁶ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, 2009, p. 19.

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 6 June 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S007/334)*, 2007, p. 5.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 6 June 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S007/334)*, 2007, p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Nitzschke and Studdard, *The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 226.

¹⁵⁰ Nitzschke and Studdard, *The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 226.

¹⁵¹ Nitzschke and Studdard, *The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 230.

establishing effective control over the diamond area.”¹⁵² Similarly, it included the responsibility to assist the government in restoring proper administration of the country’s natural resources in the mandate of its peacekeeping mission in Liberia.¹⁵³

Peace building strategies should, thus, focus on creating or restoring transparent, efficient, and inclusive resource management.¹⁵⁴ This, in turn requires building institutions capable of good governance over natural resources, which can be a monumental long-term task. In order to achieve it, the international community can “integrate the economic dimensions of conflict and conflict transformation in the design and mediation of peace processes.”¹⁵⁵

Case study: Conflict Diamonds in Central Africa and the Kimberley Process

According to General Assembly Resolution 55/56 (A/RES/55/56) a conflict diamonds are “rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments.”¹⁵⁶ These resources originate mostly in Central Africa.

The initial reaction of the Security Council to the knowledge that diamonds were being used to finance conflict in Central Africa was to prohibit arms imports to Angola and establish sanctions committee.¹⁵⁷ It was not until 1998 that Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998) prohibited member states from importing, directly or indirectly, any diamonds not controlled through the Angolese government’s Certificate of Origin scheme.¹⁵⁸ Similar measures for Sierra Leona quickly followed suit. In this way, the Security Council imposed targeted sanctions to those involved in the illegal diamond trade without affecting those in the legitimate trade.¹⁵⁹ These sanctions however did not have the expected effect since governmental supervision on the part of Angola was corrupt and inefficient.¹⁶⁰ In 1999 UNITA still controlled \$300 million in rough diamonds.¹⁶¹

General Assembly Resolution 55/56 of 2000 recognized the prevalent problem of conflict diamonds and called for “the creation and implementation of a simple and workable international certification scheme for rough diamonds.”¹⁶² The Kimberley process started when Southern African diamond-producing states met in South Africa in 2000 “to discuss ways to stop the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’ and ensure that diamond purchases were not financing violence by rebel movements and their allies seeking to undermine legitimate governments.”¹⁶³ Basically, States participating in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme have agreed, in negotiations carried out with the participation of industry and civil society, to meet minimum requirements that allow them to certify that their shipments of rough diamonds are ‘conflict-free’.¹⁶⁴ These minimum requirements are extensive and countries must put in place “national legislation and institutions; export, import and internal controls; and also commit to transparency and the exchange of statistical data.”¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, those participating can only trade with other participants and their international shipments of rough diamonds “must be accompanied by a Kimberley Process certificate guaranteeing that they are conflict-free.”¹⁶⁶

The Kimberley process has had successes, but it has also experienced limitations. A reduction in the share of conflict-diamonds in the global trade came along after the agreement was instituted, but it could also be attributed to

¹⁵² Nitzschke and Studdard, *The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 231

¹⁵³ Nitzschke and Studdard, *The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 231

¹⁵⁴ Nitzschke and Studdard, *The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 233

¹⁵⁵ Nitzschke and Studdard, *The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and peacebuilding*, 2005, p. 233

¹⁵⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *A/RES/55/56*, 2001.

¹⁵⁷ World Bank, *Conflict Diamonds*, 2001.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations Security Council, *S/RES/1173*, 2001

¹⁵⁹ Wright, C. (2004). Tackling conflict diamonds: the Kimberley process certification scheme. *International Peacekeeping*. (11) 4. P. 697-708. p. 698

¹⁶⁰ World Bank, *Conflict Diamonds*, 2001, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ Dietrich, C. (2001). “Blood Diamonds.” *African Security Review*, (10) 3. P. 99-114 p. 99.

¹⁶² United Nations General Assembly, *A/RES/55/56*, 2001, p. 3.

¹⁶³ The Kimberly Process, *About*.

¹⁶⁴ The Kimberly Process, *About*.

¹⁶⁵ The Kimberly Process, *About*.

¹⁶⁶ The Kimberly Process, *About*.

other factors such as the end of the armed conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leona.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, “the Kimberley Process has brought a discipline to the international trade that many believed could not be achieved.”¹⁶⁸ Through close collaboration, governments, industry, and civil societies were able to surmount their differences and focus on reaching understandings on key international issues related to need to curb the fueling of violence through diamonds.¹⁶⁹ Limitations include the fact that the agreement is non-binding, although subjecting it to parliamentary ratification would have delayed its implementation. Related to this, however, is the fact that “there are few sanctions for non-compliance, no way of suspending or disciplining those who behave badly, and no international body to judge and enforce implementation.”¹⁷⁰

Conclusion

The link between the exploitation of natural resources and the outbreak and prolongation of conflict has been clearly established both by scientific research and political discourse. In this context, the Security Council has acknowledged that mere reaction to conflict when it happens is not enough to address the issue and that strategies need to take into account preventive strategies to avoid conflict outbreak, strategies to limit the prolongation of conflict, and peacebuilding strategies to prevent it from resurfacing. In this sense, to what extent should the Security Council consider the link between natural resources and conflict as a thematic issue rather than addressing it as a factor in the consideration of a certain specific situation? Another pressing question is what is the real effectiveness of commodity-based sanctions? Finally, how can the Security Council streamline the consideration of issues relating to resources in its peacebuilding strategies?

Annotated Bibliography

II. The Exploitation of Natural Resources and its Effect on the Outbreak, Escalation or Continuation of Armed Conflict

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This is the Concept Paper drafted by the delegation of Belgium for the Security Council's open debate on natural resources and conflict. It is a useful document to start research about the topic because it outlines very briefly and efficiently the effects of the exploitation of natural resources before, during, and after armed conflict occurs.

United Nations Environment Program (2009). *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment*. Retrieved July 30, 2012 from: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/conflict_peacebuilding.pdf

This report, drafted by UNEP, gives a very comprehensive view on natural resources and conflict. Its contents include: the role of natural resources and environment in conflict, the impacts of conflict on natural resources and the environment, and the role of natural resources in peacebuilding.

The Kimberley Process (N.D.). *Kimberley Process Certification Scheme*. Retrieved August 25, 2012 from: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/10191/14969/0004_KPCS_Document_en.pdf

This document constitutes the agreement of the participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. It includes all information necessary to understand the minimum requirements participants are required to fulfill in order to be a part of the process. Its annex I, for example,

¹⁶⁷ Wright, *Tackling conflict diamonds: the Kimberley process certification scheme*, 2004, p. 702.

¹⁶⁸ Wright, *Tackling conflict diamonds: the Kimberley process certification scheme*, 2004, P. 702.

¹⁶⁹ Wright, *Tackling conflict diamonds: the Kimberley process certification scheme*, 2004, P. 702.

¹⁷⁰ Wright, *Tackling conflict diamonds: the Kimberley process certification scheme*, 2004, P. 703.

specifies the information that the certificates must contain in order to be valid, as well as optional information.

Cooper, N. (2001). Conflict Goods: The Challenges for Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention. *International Peacekeeping*. (8) 3. P. 21-38

This journal article makes an assessment of the role played by the trade in non-military goods or conflict goods in the promotion and perpetuation of conflict. It provides a typology of the strategies involving conflict goods used by the parts to a conflict and e types and effectiveness of control strategies at the national and international level, including sanctions.

Elliot, L. (2003). Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council. *Contemporary Security Policy*. (24) 2. P. 47-68.

This journal article makes an assessment of how the Security Council could have an environmental role in the future. In particular, it examines which kind of circumstances might require its response, and also how this response can fall within its mandate. It provides a discussion on the nature of current and future environmental threats to international security and examines the options of the Security Council in this respect in the context of the Charter of the United Nations, its own resolutions and statements and international law in general.

Hmphreys, M. (2005). Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. (49) 4. P. 508-537.

This article discusses the relationship between conflict and natural resources by examining a wide variety of mechanisms through which there could be a correlation. The author's findings include correlations between types of resources and the probability of conflict outbreak and prolongation. For example, he argues that natural resources are associated with shorter wars which end in a clear military victory for one side.

Ross, M. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? *Journal of Peace Research*. (4) 3. P. 337-356.

This article further elaborates on the relationship between natural resources and conflict. Using econometrics, it arrives to four conclusions: oil increases the likelihood of conflict, 'lootable' commodities do not make conflict more likely to begin but make conflict more likely to perpetuate, there is no link between legal and agricultural commodities and civil war, and the association between primary commodities and the outbreak of civil war is not robust.

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Rules of Procedure Security Council

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Security Council (hereinafter, referred to as “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Security Council Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under- Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General are designates and agents of the Secretary- General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her/his or her designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations, and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson, or acting chairperson of the Council.

I. MEETINGS

Rule 1

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time he or she deems necessary.

Rule 2

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Council.

Rule 3

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4

Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held once a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5

Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations. Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

II. AGENDA

Rule 6

The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7

The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9

The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

Rule 10

Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11

The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement on matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting. The provisions of rule 7, paragraph one, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Rule 13

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting, which he or she is invited to attend.

Rule 15

The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

Rule 16

Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representatives shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

Rule 17

Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

IV. PRESIDENCY

Rule 18

The Presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19

The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

Rule 20

Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfillment of the responsibilities of the presidency he or she should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he or she shall indicate her/ his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19 or her/his duties under rule 7.

V. SECRETARIAT

Rule 21

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

Rule 22

The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 23

The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24

The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25

The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 26

The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 27

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 29

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 30

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 31

Proposed resolutions, amendments, and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

For purposes of this rule, all "proposals" shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 32

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 33

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting: 1. To suspend the meeting; 2. To adjourn the meeting; 3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour; 4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur; 5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or 6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council's next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.

Rule 34

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 35

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

Rule 36

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 37

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

If the Council considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Council according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Council is no longer required.

Rule 38

Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative of the Security Council.

Rule 39

The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

VII. VOTING

Rule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

VIII. LANGUAGE

Rule 41

English shall be the official and working language of the Security Council.

Rule 42

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the language of the Security Council. In this case, he or she shall herself/himself provide for interpretation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

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Rule 43

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the language of the Council.

Rule 44

All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the language of the Security Council.

Rule 45

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides be published in any language other than the language of the Council.

IX. PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS, RECORDS

Rule 46

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 47

Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10:00 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

Rule 48

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 49

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 50

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives of the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 51

The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 52

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official language of the Council as soon as possible.

Rule 53

At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a *communiqué* through the Secretary-General.

Rule 54

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 55

The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

X. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANS

Rule 56

Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority vote.