



NMUN · DC

WASHINGTON, DC
25 - 27 October 2013
nmun.org/nmun_dc.html

GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE BACKGROUND GUIDE 2013

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Message from the Executive Staff Regarding Position Papers for the 2013 NMUN•DC Conference

At the 2013 NMUN•DC Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee assignment. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers or NGOs. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the [Delegate Preparation Guide](#).

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. NMUN/NCCA will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incidents of plagiarism to the Secretariat.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample position paper below this message for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. All papers must be typed and formatted in the same manner as this example. The following format specifications are required for all papers:

- Length must not exceed two single-sided pages
- Margins must be set at 1 inch or 2.54 centimeters for the whole paper
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Country/NGO name, school name, and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page
- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections
- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers

To be considered for awards, position papers need to be submitted by email in .pdf or .doc formats by 1 October 2013. As proof of submission, include yourself as an email recipient. Please use the committee name, your assignment, and delegation/school name in both the email subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_Mars College).

1. Send one complete set of all position papers for each of your country/NGO assignments to the Secretary-General at secgen.dc@nmun.org.
2. Send a copy of your position paper for each assigned committee to the corresponding committee email address listed below. Please note, the email addresses will be active on 1 August, 2013.

Committee	Email Address (active on 1 August)
General Assembly First Committee	ga1.dc@nmun.org
General Assembly Second Committee	ga2.dc@nmun.org
International Conference on Population and Development Beyond 2014	icpd.dc@nmun.org
Food and Agriculture Organization Council	fao.dc@nmun.org
United Nations Environment Programme	unep.dc@nmun.org
Security Council	sc.dc@nmun.org

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:


- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of official policy aims within the committee's mandate

Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff.

Sincerely,



Kristina Getty
Secretary-General, NMUN•DC 2013



Cara Wagner
Director-General, NMUN•DC 2013

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. Papers may be no longer than two single-sided pages. Only the first two pages of any submissions will be considered for awards.

Delegation from
Canada

Represented by
University of Jupiter

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The topics before the General Assembly Plenary are: Breaking the Link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict; the Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy; and the Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa. Canada is dedicated to collaborative multilateral approaches to ensuring protection and promotion of human security and advancement of sustainable development.

I. Breaking the Link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict

Canada endorses the Kimberley Process in promoting accountability, transparency, and effective governmental regulation of trade in rough diamonds. Canada believes the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an essential international regulatory mechanism and encourages all Member States to contribute to market accountability by seeking membership, participation, and compliance with its mandate. Canada urges Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué to strengthen government oversight of rough diamond trading and manufacturing by developing domestic legal frameworks similar to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Canada further calls upon participating states to act in accordance with the KPCS's comprehensive and credible systems of peer review to monitor the continued implementation of the Kimberley Process and ensure full transparency and self-examination of domestic diamond industries. The delegation of Canada draws attention to our domestic programs for diamond regulation including Implementing the Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act and urges Member States to consider these programs in developing the type of domestic regulatory frameworks called for in General Assembly resolution 55/56. Canada recognizes the crucial role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the review of rough diamond control measures developed through the Kimberley Process and encourages states to include NGOs, such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, in the review processes called for in General Assembly resolution 58/290. Canada urges Member States to act in accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/182 to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal and alluvial diamond miners by establishing a coordinating mechanism for financial and technical assistance through the Working Group of the Kimberley Process of Artisanal Alluvial Producers. Canada calls upon states and NGOs to provide basic educational material regarding diamond valuation and market prices for artisanal diggers, as recommended by the Diamond Development Initiative. Canada will continue to adhere to the 2007 Brussels Declaration on Internal Controls of Participants and is dedicated to ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective regulation of the rough diamond trade through the utilization of voluntary peer review systems and the promotion of increased measures of internal control within all diamond producing states.

II. The Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy

Canada is dedicated to integrating alternative energy sources into climate change frameworks by diversifying the energy market while improving competitiveness in a sustainable economy, as exemplified through the Canadian Turning Corners Report and Project Green climate strategies. Canada views the international commitment to the promotion of alternative sources of energy called for in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a catalyst to sustainable development and emission reduction. Canada fulfills its obligations under Article 4 of the UNFCCC by continuing to provide development assistance through the Climate Change Development Fund and calls upon Member States to commit substantial financial and technical investment toward the transfer of sustainable energy technologies and clean energy mechanisms to developing States. Canada emphasizes the need for Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2005 Beijing International Renewable Energy Conference to strengthen domestic policy frameworks to promote clean energy

technologies. Canada views dissemination of technology information called for in the 2007 Group of Eight Declaration on Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy as a vital step in energy diversification from conventional energy generation. Canada calls upon Member States to integrate clean electricity from renewable sources into their domestic energy sector by employing investment campaigns similar to the Canadian \$1.48 billion initiative ecoENERGY for Renewable Power. Canada encourages states to develop domestic policies of energy efficiency, utilizing regulatory and financing frameworks to accelerate the deployment of clean low-emitting technologies and calls upon Member States to provide knowledge-based advisory services for expanding access to energy in order to fulfill their commitments to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Canada urges states to address the concerns of the 2007 Human Development Report by promoting tax incentives, similar to the Capital Cost Allowances and Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses, to encourage private sector development of energy conservation and renewable energy projects. As a member of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Canada is committed to accelerating the development of renewable energy projects, information sharing mechanisms, and energy efficient systems through the voluntary carbon offset system. We are dedicated to leading international efforts toward the development and sharing of best practices on clean energy technologies and highlight our release of the Renewable Energy Technologies Screen software for public and private stakeholders developing projects in energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy. Canada believes the integration of clean energy into state-specific strategies called for in the General Assembly Second Committee's report to the General Assembly Plenary on Sustainable development: promotion of new and renewable sources of energy (A/62/419/Add.9) will strengthen energy diversification, promote the use of cogeneration, and achieve a synergy between promoting alternative energy while allowing for competitiveness in a sustainable economy.

III. Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa

Canada views the full implementation of the treatment and prevention targets of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Especially in Africa, as essential to eradicating malaria and assisting African states to achieve Target 8 of Goal 6 of the MDGs by 2015. Canada recommends Member States to cooperate with the World Health Organization to ensure transparency in the collection of statistical information for Indicators 21 and 22 of the MDGs. Canada reaffirms the targets of the Abuja Declaration and Plan of Action stressing regional cooperation in the implementation, monitoring, and management of malaria prevention and treatment initiatives in Africa. To fully implement General Assembly resolution 61/228, Canada believes developed states must balance trade and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian objective of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. We continue to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health into our compulsory licensing framework through the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. Canada urges Member States to support compulsory licensing for essential generic medication by including anti-malarial vaccines and initiating domestic provisions to permit export-only compulsory licenses to domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, similar to Canada's Access to Medicines Regime. Canada calls upon Member States to establish advanced market commitments on the distribution of pneumococcal vaccines to developing States in cooperation with PATH and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. Canada emphasizes the need for greater membership in the Roll Back Malaria initiative to strengthen malaria control planning, funding, implementation, and evaluation by promoting increased investment in healthcare systems and greater incorporation of malaria control into all relevant multi-sector activities. Canada continues to implement the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) New Agenda for Action on Health to reduce malaria infection rates among marginalized populations in Africa, increase routine immunizations rates, and reduce infection rates of other neglected infections. Canada will achieve the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008-2009 by providing assistance to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We urge Member States to increase donations to intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that support malaria programming in Africa, exemplified by CIDA's contribution of \$26 million to the Canadian Red Cross. We continue our efforts to provide accessible and affordable vector control methods to African States through the Red Cross' Malaria Bed Net Campaign and the African Medical Research Foundation Canada by supplying insecticide-treated mosquito nets and Participatory Malaria Prevention and Treatment tool kits.

Official Welcome

On behalf of the committee staff of the General Assembly First Committee, we welcome you to the 2013 National Model United Nations Washington D. C. (NMUN•DC) Conference. This year, your Assistant Director will be Julius Adebayo and your Director will be Lauren Shaw. Lauren holds a Master of Public Policy from Georgetown University and has been attending NMUN conferences since 2008. This is her third year on staff at NMUN and her second year at NMUN•DC. Julius recently completed a BSc in Mechanical Engineering in 2012, and will be starting a master's degree in Technology and Public Policy in 2013. This is his second year on staff at NMUN and first year at NMUN•DC. Throughout the year, everyone at NMUN•DC has worked tirelessly preparing for this conference, and to also provide you with an experience that would give you a greater appreciation for global affairs.

Model United Nations serves as a truly unique opportunity for delegates to improve important skills, ranging from public speaking to writing. More importantly, it is an excellent environment to engage in high-level discussions about the important issues that are currently affecting our world. We have prepared this background guide to help you begin, and hopefully instruct, your research on your country's policies on the committee topics.

This year, the issues facing the First Committee reflect some of the recent challenges that the world as a whole faces relating to issues involving international security and disarmament. The First Committee is the principal organ of the United Nations that addresses security issues outside of the Security Council. We hope that as passionate representatives of your Member States, you will come prepared to engage in fascinating debates about the committee topics.

We wish you good luck in your preparation for the conference, and we look forward to meeting you in Washington, D. C. in October.

History of the General Assembly First Committee

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA), consisting of 193 Member States, is one of the principal organs of the UN system, providing a unique forum for policymaking and discussion of different international issues. It was established in 1945 under the *Charter of the UN* with each Member State accorded one vote. Article 10 of the *UN Charter* enables the GA to discuss a variety of topics, as well as the roles and functions of other UN organs, with the goal of making recommendations about such issues to Member States. The GA provides an avenue through which Member States can discuss and ultimately reach agreements that enhance international cooperation and promote peace. To accomplish such goals, Article 22, Chapter IV of the *UN Charter* enables the GA to create "subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." Accordingly, the GA has six main committees addressing issues ranging from economic and financial issues to those concerning the UN budget. Each of the main committees addresses specific areas of importance to the GA towards "promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification." The First Committee considers all matters relating to international security and disarmament, with the goal of providing a framework among Member States that ultimately leads to measures that promote peace and strengthen "stability through lower levels of armaments." In addition to the First Committee's focus on disarmament, it also considers issues relating to missile proliferation, disarmament in outer space, and use of weapons of mass destruction. The First Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament based in Geneva, Switzerland, and several related non-governmental organizations like the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Global Action to Prevent War in order to tackle issues relating to international security.

The GA opens for its yearly sessions in September. Over the course of the first few days, it begins with addresses from several heads of state and world leaders. Following these speeches, the GA moves on to substantive items on its agenda with different issues addressed by the six main committees. After substantive discussion and deliberation of the different issues on its agenda, representatives of Member States vote to adopt resolutions. To adopt a resolution, a simple majority of Member States is needed. Resolutions adopted by each of the six GA committees are then presented before the GA Plenary for a vote. During the GA Plenary session, if Member States deem a specific issue important, a two-thirds majority is needed. It is important to note that a two-thirds majority of the Member States is rarely needed because a significant amount of GA resolutions tend to be adopted by acclamation.

This is important because it highlights the crucial role that the GA plays in facilitating consensus among Member States. Resolutions represent policy recommendations and action plans that the GA as an entity encourages Member States to adhere to in order to foster peace. As is true of other GA committees, the First Committee's resolutions are not legally binding documents; however, they represent important principles that guide Member States as they approach different issues. The legal ambiguity of UN resolutions has been a source of criticism of the GA and the UN as a whole with some dismissing resolutions as "mere recommendations." However, with "over 6,000 resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and forty years of practice," the GA has enabled Member States to tackle a tremendous host of issues, leading to substantial documentation of guiding principles for international action around several vital transnational issues. Thus, UN resolutions have increasingly come to serve as accepted principles regarding issues in the international community.

Routinely, the First Committee passes about 50 resolutions in a session, which are then presented to the GA Plenary for consideration. Over the years, the First Committee has passed several notable resolutions in order to influence global discussion on issues relating to disarmament and security. In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which builds on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, was passed. Other notable resolutions passed include the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction* of 1971, the *Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices*, and adoption of recent resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East. More recently, at the 67th session of the First Committee, a wide variety of topics were presented including: an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, effects of atomic radiation, international cooperation on the peaceful uses of outer space, disarmament and non-proliferation, and the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. Issues relating to international security and disarmament comprise delicate and sensitive, but necessary components of discussions that take place at the UN. It is because of such critical issues that the formation of the UN became necessary and today is a primary forum through which different parties can engage with one another and build consensus. The First Committee thus plays a crucial role in facilitating discussions on issues of international security and disarmament and aids in fulfilling an important component of the UN mission to foster international cooperation and peace among Member States.

I. Increasing Women's Role in Disarmament and Nonproliferation

- Are existing United Nations programs sufficient for ensuring women's role in disarmament and nonproliferation or are new programs necessary?
- What can the United Nations and individual Member States do to help women overcome barriers to their participation in disarmament and nonproliferation discussions?
- How can women overcome cultural or societal barriers to become more involved in international security as a whole?

Recent events in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as continuing disarmament negotiations involving the recognized nuclear weapons states (NWS) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have highlighted the need for continuing negotiations with regard to nuclear weapons, notably stockpile reduction and prevention of proliferation. Concurrently, ongoing international debate regarding the role of women, peace, and security, held most visibly in the Security Council, has focused much attention on growing the role of women in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This new focus has included attention on the intersection of gender and security issues. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) First Committee has traditionally considered agenda items related to nuclear disarmament, but has only recently begun to examine women's role in such issues. As the First Committee continues to debate disarmament and nonproliferation, it now must consider the specific roles women can play in addressing the implementation of the NPT, and methods to help women overcome barriers to participation in security issues in general.

The NPT was negotiated in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Almost all Member States are party to the Treaty, with the only current exceptions being India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan. The NPT was intended to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and is built around the three pillars of nonproliferation, disarmament, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Article IX allowed five countries – China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) – to become States Party despite their existing nuclear stockpiles because the stockpiles existed prior to the beginning of the negotiations. Any other States Party who

attempt to develop nuclear weapons, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), are considered to be in violation of their NPT obligations. Adherence to the NPT is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which can refer states in violation to the UN Security Council as well as take legal action. States Party to the NPT meet every five years at review conferences to discuss the implementation of, and any proposed changes to, the NPT.

Implementation of the NPT's three pillars, however, has moved slowly. The five NWS have taken some steps towards disarmament, but none have fully disarmed their nuclear weapons stockpiles. However, four other countries – Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and South Africa – have disarmed their relatively small stockpiles. India, Israel, Pakistan, and the DPRK also currently have nuclear weapons programs with additional concerns growing that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. Despite ongoing negotiations between many of these states, and the work of many other bodies, including the IAEA and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and non-governmental organizations like the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Countdown to Zero, total disarmament does not seem imminent.

In considering this history, it is important to note that women have traditionally been excluded from most negotiations related to disarmament and security. There are many barriers to participation for women, including greater responsibilities in the home, less access to education, cultural expectations regarding gender roles, and under-representation in militaries (in some countries caused by policies that do not allow women to serve as soldiers). Even in countries where women receive equal education and professional training, they are often absent from negotiations. In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, China established the Platform for Action, a framework for women's inclusion and equality, including in armed conflict. The Security Council later passed Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, meant to promote the role of women in security issues. The resolution marks the first formal identification by the UN of gender roles in conflict resolution and the Security Council has continued to convene regular open debates on Resolution 1325 and its implementation.

The UNODA has also taken a role in promoting the role of women in disarmament. In 2003, UNODA became the first UN body to develop a Gender Action Plan, an internal strategy for the promotion of gender equality. UNODA's continued focus on the role of gender in disarmament has kept the issue in focus for Member States, many of which have developed unilateral National Action Plans to promote women's inclusion in peace and security. Many of these National Action Plans focus on removing barriers to participation for women, as well as the promotion of gender equality in negotiating teams in disarmament and post-conflict situations. However, many countries have not moved beyond the development of a NAP. For example, the United States' NAP places particular emphasis on the inclusion of women in senior military and government positions in Afghanistan, without addressing women's lack of representation in these same institutions within the United States.

Women's inclusion and nuclear disarmament began to visibly intersect when the oldest women's peace group, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, established a nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation program called Reaching Critical Will in 1999. Reaching Critical Will, and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security (formed after the passage of Resolution 1325) have worked to disseminate information about, and promote the inclusion of, the role of women in nonproliferation and disarmament. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom has specifically identified the First Committee as a UN body that should do more to highlight the links between gender and disarmament.

Women have begun to be visibly included in nonproliferation and disarmament negotiations, most recently the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), a bilateral disarmament agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. The treaty, which entered into force in February 2011, is a ten-year agreement that limits the number of warheads each country may have, and establishes verification mechanisms. Many women were involved in the negotiation of the New START, particularly those from the United States. The White House Project and Participant Media hosted a two-day summit for these women, providing leadership training on how women can be more involved in nuclear security issues. This summit, and the work of NGOs like Reaching Critical Will and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, represents vital avenues for civil society groups to promote the inclusion of women in such peace and security issues. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom also hosts international summits to discuss these issues, which have included women from Costa Rica, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, among others. Thus far, women have largely been responsible for organizing such efforts of inclusion as part of the broader women's movement. However, moving forward, increasing the role

of men in promoting the role of women may be necessary to allow greater opportunities for women to participate in disarmament.

The UN and Member States have yet to identify a specific strategy for the inclusion of women in disarmament and nonproliferation. Despite efforts like the Beijing Platform and Resolution 1325, women remain under-represented in negotiations related to security. These efforts, as well as the GA resolutions on the subject, fail to provide concrete, actionable steps for Member States or UN bodies to increase the role of women specifically in nonproliferation. Possible guidance may come from the IAEA, as the international nuclear regulatory body has taken internal steps to increase the role of women within the agency and in its research. The IAEA's commitment to gender equality gives possible best-practice approaches that could be considered by the UN, including increasing educational and training opportunities for women, particularly in technical expertise, and normalizing the inclusion of women in policy areas that remain dominated by men.

The GA Plenary, on the recommendation of the First Committee, passed Resolution 67/48 on women, disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control in January 2013. The resolution urges Member States and UN bodies to promote the participation of women in disarmament and security negotiations and actions through providing equal opportunities for women in disarmament negotiations, as well as capacity-building opportunities for women to receive necessary training. The resolution also places emphasis on the inclusion of women at all levels of disarmament, including at the local, national, and regional levels. However, the resolution does not establish a timeframe or methods to measure inclusion of women. The First Committee has put forward many other resolutions in recent years related to disarmament, nonproliferation, and steps for a nuclear-free world, but this resolution marks a new focus on the inclusion of women, particularly in the history of the First Committee. As the First Committee continues to consider nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, it can, and should, do more to include gender-specific language and make vital steps forward for the increased participation of women in such crucial discussions relating to international security.

II. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

- What do increasing improvements in technological capabilities suggest about the trend of weaponization and securitization of outer space? Are there potential benefits or dangers to this weaponization?
- What roles should the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations take in preventing an arms race in outer space? How can the United Nations, in partnership with intergovernmental organizations, properly execute such roles without infringing upon state sovereignty?
- Should Member States seek to create a Code of Conduct in Outer Space? Why or why not?

Outer space has always represented a new frontier for mankind. Its continued exploration has represented and, in fact, led to advancements in scientific and technological capabilities. From high-altitude balloon flights and Yuri Gagarin's orbit of the earth aboard the Vostok spacecraft to present day rocket launches and flights to and from the International Space Station, space exploration has always represented mankind's curiosity about the environment. These endeavors have led to increased development of technological capabilities across multiple areas of science, ranging from providing answers to profound questions on the origin of life, allowing for increased efficiencies in technologies that power communication satellites, to several critical medical technologies such as radiation therapy and the development of magnetic resonance imaging used in generating detailed images of the human anatomy. Increasingly, space-based devices also power modern navigation and communication systems like the Global Positioning System (GPS). Given increased reliance on space-based technology as the primary tools for coordinating navigation and communication, especially sensitive government information, states have recognized the importance of maintaining a secure, safe, and peaceful outer space environment as well as developing a general framework detailing acceptable outer space behavior throughout the international community, which ultimately could prevent an arms race in outer space.

Considering this growing reliance and the vital contributions that our presence in outer space has made to society, the United Nations (UN) and countries at the forefront of technology development for outer space continue to highlight the debate around the potential weaponization of space, particularly towards the prevention of a war or an arms race in outer space. In 1947, the General Assembly (GA) passed Resolution 2/110, which firmly declared that, "the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind."

Further building on the resolution, in 1959 the GA set up a UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which seeks to assess the level of international cooperation on peaceful uses of outer space and also to “study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space.”

Along the lines of preventing the placement of weapons in space, the concept of space security promotes the “absence of unjustifiable man-made or natural threats to space assets.” In general, space assets consist of physical entities such as satellites, vehicles, and any kind of space-based device. Usually, space assets serve critical functions in telecommunications and can also be used for exploratory activities such as testing for life in space. The weaponization of space assets involves arming these space-based objects. If an increased level of weaponization of space-based devices is allowed to occur, risks of a potential war in space increases. As the threat of increased weaponization continues to grow, it becomes necessary to clearly define what a weapon, in the context of space, is. This is especially important because as technological advances improve military capabilities it can become particularly difficult to differentiate between potential weapons in space and regular exploratory or navigation devices. Given the increased dependence of modern technology on space-based systems, the International Telecommunication Union and the European Union (EU) have called for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The Council of the EU presented a draft of the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities on September 27, 2010, with overall goals of “strengthening the security of activities in outer space in the context of expanding space activities that contribute to the development and security of states.” Exploring the ramifications of crafting a code of conduct is important because it would present sets of behavior that are deemed acceptable in space as well as potentially address other issues that could prevent an arms race in space.

Some of the first discussion over weapons in space came as multilateral treaties. The Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 signed by the United States, the former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom was one of the first multilateral documents to regulate outer space activities. The treaty bans nuclear tests and explosions in space, but does not explicitly prevent placement of other forms of weapons in space. Further building on the PTBT, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) was negotiated by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union in January 1967 and entered into force in October of the same year. The OST is currently the principal document governing the behavior of states in space. The OST outlaws placement of nuclear weapons or other forms of weapons of mass destruction in space. It further prevents the testing and deployment of any weapon on the Moon or other celestial bodies. Furthermore, it explicitly reserves the use of outer space and celestial bodies for peaceful and exploratory purposes. As of January 2013, 102 states are party to the OST, and an additional 26 states are signatories. Other treaties such as the Rescue Agreement, the *Liability Convention*, and the Moon Agreement have been adopted to expand upon aspects of the OST as well as to encourage Member States to ratify it.

In addition to the political and legal advances on detailing acceptable space activities, since the 1960s there has been a steady increase in the technological capability of states and in incidents involving the test and use of weapons in space. Some of these incidents have involved the destruction of space-based devices that have malfunctioned or become completely non-functional. For example, in February of 2008, the USS Lake Erie, a United States naval missile cruiser, fired a missile at and destroyed a satellite that was considered a threat to humans on earth because of a possibility of falling out of its orbit. Similar actions have also been carried out by the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A separate category of incidents in space has involved outright tests of specific military capabilities. In January of 2007, China successfully conducted an anti-satellite missile test. This test involved firing a missile at and destroying a weather satellite in orbit. These categories of incidents pose threats not only because of the use of weapons in space, but also because of the potential threats from the debris created by destruction of physical objects in space. Debris in outer space can become a critical problem as it can restrict the functionality of the surrounding environment, inhibit the placement of new, vital devices in space, and potentially cause harm if it falls out of orbit.

As mentioned, increasingly, proper functioning of several critical infrastructures on earth relies on space-based devices, such as GPS for navigation purposes and military operations. If these space-based systems are affected, it could lead to severe telecommunication problems, such as a critical breakdown in communication infrastructure across the world, or significant threats to international security. Because space-based systems like satellites are critical to the transmission of military signals to earth, and because they are being used in military operations such as drone navigation, countries have become increasingly concerned by the potential danger that could occur should state owned space-based systems be damaged, becoming ineffective. Such awareness can lead states to secure and

potentially arm space-based devices such as satellites, navigation systems, and space stations with defenses because they are concerned about potential threats to these devices.

A critical question that ought to be answered about current regulatory frameworks such as the OST, and the PTBT regarding weapons in outer space, then, involves enforcement mechanisms. Given a set of laws guiding activity in outer space, it becomes critical to find ways to ensure that there are ramifications for breaching such laws. An enforcement mechanism could ensure that states remain committed to the ideals that necessitated such laws. It is also necessary to make sure that states cannot sidestep specific measures covered by the laws created. For example, recent technological advances can enable certain military satellites to avoid detection while travelling in orbit depending on the altitude. Such capabilities could potentially be misused leading to tension among organizations or states involved in the use of such satellites. The First Committee provides a forum through which Member States can engage one another in order to reach and clearly articulate a consensus on acceptable behaviors such as these and the use of such devices in space.

The GA, and the First Committee in particular, provides an avenue to have critical debates around the issue of preventing an arms race in space. High-level discussions facilitated by the GA, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and other intergovernmental organizations have resulted in the *Liability Convention*, and the Moon Agreement among other treaties, which attempt to define proper use of outer space. Through the *Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space*, a GA resolution on which the OST is largely based, the GA provided a principal framework which continues to guide behavior in outer space today. Despite these guides, GA Resolution 39/59 (1984), indicated that openness and increased discussion among Member States is necessary to achieve a general consensus on acceptable behavior in outer space, keep up with ever-changing technologies and thus threats, and to meet the growing needs of the international community in outer space. Year after year, the First Committee has continued to put forward resolutions that aim to curtail any form of arms race in outer space as well as to promote international cooperation among states on the issues relating to outer space; it is imperative to maintain this path and continue to foster this collaborative on such pertinent international security issues.

III. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

- What steps have Member States taken towards implementation? What should be the next steps?
- Should the use of chemical weapons in Syria require the acceleration of the implementation of the *Convention*?
- How can the General Assembly First Committee work with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to promote implementation of the *Chemical Weapons Convention*?

The *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction*, or the *Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)*, was negotiated in 1992 and entered into force in 1997. Its goal is to eliminate existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, defined in Article II as devices using toxic chemicals that can cause death, incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals, and to prevent the further acquisition of such weapons. Common examples of chemical weapons are nerve agents, such as sarin gas, and defoliants, such as Agent Orange. Chemical weapons are considered distinct from biological weapons, which are diseases used as warfare, or nuclear weapons, which are munitions that use radioactive material. There are currently 113 States Party, with Angola, Burma, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel, and South Sudan not participating. Destruction of declared stockpiles is verified by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW also assists in determining if dual-use materials, or chemicals that have both weapons and civilian uses, are being used for appropriate civilian purposes. Currently, nearly 80% of the declared stockpiles of chemical weapons have been destroyed. However, there are likely to be delays in destroying the remaining 20%, in part due to the associated expense, and the non-participation of states with weapons stockpiles poses a significant threat to international security. Thus, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) First Committee serves as a key forum for taking steps to promote participation and compliance with the *CWC*.

The *CWC* was negotiated because of increasing concerns about the use of chemical weapons in warfare, particularly after their use in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. The *CWC* requires States Party to refrain from producing chemical

weapons and to destroy all existing stockpiles, including production facilities and any stockpiles held in the territory of another state. The *CWC* also requires a verification system for dual-use chemicals, with increasing scrutiny depending upon how the chemical is classified. An annex to the treaty establishes three schedules of chemicals, with Schedule 1 chemicals having few uses outside of weapons; Schedule 2 chemicals having small-scale civilian applications, and ability to be acquired with declaration for manufacture; and Schedule 3 chemicals having large-scale civilian applications. The verification annex of the *CWC* establishes the authority of the OPCW to ensure that weapons stockpiles are being destroyed. The OPCW's authority is far-reaching compared to similar verification bodies for other weapons treaties, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency's capacity to verify nuclear weapons disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and includes the ability to perform what are called "challenge inspections," or unscheduled visits to a state suspected of violating the *CWC*. Such challenge inspections can be taken on as a result of intelligence gathered by the OPCW, or requested by another Member State. The right for requesting a challenge inspection, and the specific methods by which it is carried out, are outlined in Article IX of the *Convention* and its Verification Annex, specifically. Although there have been multiple accusations against certain States Parties of violation of the *CWC*, the OPCW has never carried out, or been requested to perform, a challenge inspection. This is likely because States Parties that possess chemical weapons have largely declared their stockpiles and taken steps to disarm them; most suspected stockpiles not declared to the OPCW are in states not party to the *CWC*, and thus exempt from these inspections, although the UN can request the OPCW to provide inspection services in these states. However, it is possible that challenge inspections will be used in the future.

Although the OPCW maintains an active relationship with the UN, including the GA, it is not a UN body but rather a related organization. As a related organization it operates independently of the UN system and the UN itself does not have jurisdiction to dictate the OPCW's actions. The current relationship agreement between the OPCW and the UN was agreed upon in 2001, and identifies key areas of cooperation, coordination, reporting, and reciprocal representation. The OPCW is governed by the Conference of the States Parties, a plenary body that consists of all Members of the OPCW and is charged with overseeing the implementation of the *CWC*. The OPCW is headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands, and has a Secretariat staff of 500 people. The Conference of the States Parties meets annually in November and December. Among other responsibilities, it elects 41 states to the Executive Council, which holds four to six meetings annually to supervise the activities of the Secretariat and resolve ambiguities and concerns regarding compliance with the *CWC*. Although they are separate entities, the largely similar membership between the UN and the OPCW means they have similar goals and perspectives on the implementation of the *CWC*. Thus, issues related to chemical weapons are regularly discussed at the UN, particularly in the First Committee, but because of the GA's larger membership, it allows participation from states not party to the *CWC*.

The OPCW maintains records of known stockpiles of chemical weapons, which have been declared by the state possessing them. The Arms Control Association, a respected non-governmental organization that reports on disarmament issues, augments these records with a compilation of allegations made against other states suspected of having chemical weapons. Many of these states are not party to the *CWC* and thus are not subject to the authority of the OPCW. However, some states that are party to the *CWC* and have declared stockpiles are accused of maintaining separate, undeclared chemical weapons. Without an accurate understanding of chemical weapons stockpiles and their destruction status, it is impossible for the OPCW to fully verify the implementation status of the *CWC*, particularly given the apparent hesitance to make use of challenge inspections. Due to the possibility of hidden stockpiles, it is also impossible for the OPCW to accurately record destruction status. It is possible, in this light, for the First Committee to positively impact the universality of the *CWC* through actions such as suggesting methods for accumulating records of chemical weapons stockpiles and developing means for the sharing of best practices for destruction.

The sharing of best practices is necessary because chemical weapons are dangerous to destroy, due to their high volatility and potential harm to humans and the environment, including the high toxicity of some components even after the weapons are dismantled. However, Member States and the OPCW have developed many successful methods for the safe destruction and disarmament of chemical weapons stockpiles and their production facilities. Such facilities are included to prevent future production as well as eliminate any weapons components still at the site. The two most common methods are incineration and neutralization. The *CWC* prohibits methods of destruction that are harmful to the environment, including disposal in bodies of water, land burial, or pit burning. While the permitted techniques are safer, they are also more expensive, leading to the need for financial assistance to some

countries wishing to destroy their stockpiles. Albania, the first country to destroy its entire stockpile, was able to complete its obligations because of financial assistance from the United States. As other less developed countries undertake this expensive process, the OPCW and UN Member States will have to consider how to fund the safe destruction of chemical weapons moving forward. The First Committee may be able to promote continued disarmament, as well as funding, by drawing attention to the widespread support for implementation of the CWC currently present in the international community.

Destroying existing weapons stockpiles and production facilities, despite the danger and associated costs, is critical to preventing future use, especially when there is potential for the weapons to be acquired and used by non-state actors. These weapons saw widespread use during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, particularly nerve agents. Such weapons cause rampant disability and death, and are indiscriminate, meaning that they affect all persons within the attack zone and cannot be targeted in the manner of a gun or missile. More recently, evidence has come forward indicating the use of similar chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War, with use of chemical weapons confirmed by the United States and France. However, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is unwilling to accept this confirmation without analysis performed within Syria by the OPCW, which is currently refused by President Assad. Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles were known prior to the beginning of the war, and thought to be secure. Now, it remains unclear if there are chemical weapons outside of the control of the Syrian government, and if such weapons are in the hands of the Free Syrian Army, or other non-state actors that may have ties to Syrian citizens. This alleged use of chemical weapons has brought renewed international focus to the need for the full implementation of the CWC, particularly given the increased potential for external involvement in Syria by military actors like the Russian Federation, the United States, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The GA, on the recommendation of the First Committee, has passed several resolutions concerning the implementation of the CWC and the relationship between the UN and the OPCW, most recently Resolution 67/54, passed on January 4, 2013. These resolutions suggest implementation mechanisms and emphasize the need for Member States to cooperate with OPCW inspectors. The GA plays a unique role in the destruction of chemical weapons because of its inclusion of all UN Member States, whereas the OPCW excludes states not party to the CWC, including some states with chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as the possibility that a GA resolution could provide important symbolic support in influencing the actions of other bodies, including the Security Council. It is possible then, that the GA can pass new resolutions to help bridge the gap between the OPCW and these states and assist the OPCW in creating a more accurate database of chemical weapons stockpiles and fully verifying their destruction, thus moving towards the universality of the CWC.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the General Assembly First Committee

Sloan, B. (1987). *General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)*. British Yearbook of International Law, 58(1): 39-150.

This is a journal article by Professor Blaine Sloan addressing the issue of GA resolutions and their associated legal ambiguity. This source traces the history and perception of resolutions over the years looking at how they are regarded by the legal community. The article goes into detail about the different legal ramifications of the different views with which Member States accord resolutions. This source is used to highlight the non-binding nature of GA resolutions.

United Nations. (1945, June 26). *Charter of the United Nations: Chapter IV: The General Assembly*. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml>.

This section of the Charter of the United Nations is used to highlight the roles of the GA. It also highlights the specific mandates vested in the GA, such as the power to create subsidiary organs. The UN Charter also explains the mandate of the GA in regards to addressing issues relating to international security and disarmament and its relation to other organs working on the same subject, such as the Security Council.

United Nations General Assembly. *United Nations General Assembly: Functions and Powers of the General Assembly*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

This Web site contains an overview of the mandates and functions of the GA as indicated in the Charter of the United Nations. It also contains several links highlighting the overall history of the body, and the role

the GA plays in the UN system. This would serve as a relevant resource to delegates looking for an overview of the GA's function.

United Nations General Assembly. *United Nations: Disarmament and International Security*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/>.

This Web site contains an overview of the functions of the GA First Committee. It provides details and links to further resources on the outcomes of the recently concluded sessions of the First Committee. The documents include draft resolutions, decisions, and meeting records, which are useful for delegates seeking to get a sense of the recent issues that the First Committee has tackled.

I. Increasing Women's Role in Disarmament and Nonproliferation

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2013). *Gender*. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from: <http://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/programme/policy-context/Gender/index.html>.

The IAEA is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the NPT. Its gender equality policy focuses on gender mainstreaming in the Agency's programs and operations. It places particular emphasis on gender equality in technical cooperation, and may provide a guide for increasing the role of women in other areas of nuclear technology and disarmament.

United Nations General Assembly. (2013, January 4). *Resolution 67/48*. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/48.

This resolution, adopted and recommended by the First Committee, focuses on the role of women in disarmament and arms control. It provides specific language regarding steps UN bodies and Member States can take to promote the inclusion of women. However, it also leaves many gap areas that can be filled by future resolutions and thus is an important reference for delegates in beginning their research.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2013). *Gender and Disarmament*. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/gender/gender.shtml>.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was the first UN body to enact a Gender Action Plan, and has continued to encourage the inclusion of women in disarmament. The UNODA also gives special attention to gender mainstreaming, identified as critical to gender equality in disarmament. Delegates can use resources and briefings produced by the UNODA to understand the role of women in disarmament, particularly in the UN system.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2013). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>.

This Web site provides the full text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the founding document for nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons. Delegates should be familiar with its text to better understand how women can be involved in its implementation. In particular, delegates can focus on the articles related to the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

United States Executive Office of the President. (2011). *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*. Retrieved June 28, 2013, from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf.

The United States National Action Plan details the broad goals for American implementation of Resolution 1350, as well as steps the United States plans to take to achieve these goals. It also contains small case studies for United States policy in other countries, such as Afghanistan. Delegates should examine National Action Plans, particularly that of their assigned country, to understand individual Member State actions taken regarding gender and disarmament.

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. (2011). *Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control*. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from:

http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/disarm_womendisarmamentnonproliferationandarmscontrol_wilpf_march2011.pdf.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom hosted an International Women's Day seminar in March 2011. This outcome document summarizes the panel discussions that were held at the summit. It also provides several high-level recommendations to improve the engagement of women in disarmament issues.

II. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

Gamaramone, J. (2008, February 24). *Lake Erie Crew Describes Satellite Shot*. American Forces Press Service: U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from: <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=49058>.

This Web site describes the destruction of a satellite shot by the USS Lake Erie, a United States naval ballistic missile launcher. It goes into some detail on the capabilities of the naval ship as well as the debris created because of the missile attack. This source provides delegates with an example of the kinds of outer space activity possible.

Nicholson, B. (2007, January 20). *World Fury at Satellite Destruction*. The Age National. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from: <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/01/19/1169095981210.html>.

This Web site describes the missile test conducted by China in 2007. This provides an example of a modern weapons test in outer space. It serves to alert the delegates about the increased technological capabilities of states. The Web site further gives a brief history of nuclear and non-nuclear tests conducted in outer space since the 1980s. Reactions by various states are also presented in the article.

United Nations General Assembly. (1967, October 10). *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from: <http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html>.

This is the Outer Space Treaty adopted by the GA in 1967. It provides useful context on the way the UN believes Member States should behave in outer space. The document serves as a useful guide for delegates as it provides detailed statements about what the international community thus far deems acceptable behavior in outer space. It also serves as a major historical document that represented how several Member States over decades have believed activities should be conducted in outer space.

United Nations General Assembly First Committee. (2010, October 25). *Momentum Gathering for Weaponization of Outer Space, Risk of Outer Space Arms Race*. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gadis3421.doc.htm>.

This a UN press release that gives an overview of the recent debate at the GA First Committee on weaponization of outer space at the 65th session of the GA. In addition, it gives an overview of the different positions held by various Member States involved in discussions on the state of weaponization of outer space. Particularly, it provides an overview on historical UN actions on the issue of weaponization in outer space.

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. (2013, March 8). *Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space*. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from: <http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html>.

This is a UN page that contains links to major UN treaties regarding activities in outer space. It contains links to the text of the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement. It also contains additional links to other recent international agreements on outer space activities. This would be a useful repository where delegates can find major and recent treaties on relevant outer space activities.

Wolfgang, R., N. Remuss, and K. Schrogl. (2009). *Space Security and the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities*. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR): Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=110539>.

This document provides a history of conduct in outer space. It also goes into detail about a variety of treaties that have been passed by the UN and other agencies in order to regulate behavior in outer space.

The source will be useful for delegates to gain a high-level understanding of the landscape in terms of a potential arms race in outer space.

III. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Arms Control Association. (2012, September). *Chemical and Biological Weapons Status At A Glance*. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from: <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cbwprolif>.

This fact sheet provides useful information regarding the current status of chemical weapons stockpiles. Understanding the status of these stockpiles is critical to considering methods for disarming them. The fact sheet also discusses methods by which past stockpiles have been destroyed and the associated destruction costs.

Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2013). *UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection*. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from: <http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/1540-reporting-overview/>.

The Resource Collection is a compilation of background, ongoing efforts, and new challenges related to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Delegates can use the sections on chemical weapons to understand the current situation and future steps. Particular attention should be given to the role of the UN in disarmament.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (2013). *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction*. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from: <http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/>.

This Web site provides the full text of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Delegates should be familiar with the text of the treaty, as it establishes the schedules of chemical weapons and compounds, as well as expectations for treaty implementation. Delegates should also be sure to examine the Annexes to the Convention, which establish the three schedules, as well as the verification mechanisms.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (2013). *Executive Council Briefed on UN Secretary-General's Request to Assist Investigation of Alleged Chemical Weapons Use in Syria*. Retrieved June 28, 2013, from: <http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/the-opcw-and-syria/statements-and-press-releases/executive-council-briefed-on-un-secretary-generals-request-to-assist-investigation-of-alleged-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/>.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) provides inspection and verification of chemical weapons destruction for States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and may also work with the UN to provide inspections in other states. In this statement, the OPCW indicates support for such an investigation in Syria. Such cooperation is possible due to the relationship agreement between the OPCW and the UN.

United Nations General Assembly. (2013, January 4). *Resolution 67/54*. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/54.

This resolution is the GA's most recent text regarding chemical weapons. It identifies obstacles to implementation and suggests methods for the UN and Member States to rid the world of chemical weapons. It also reaffirms global commitment to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

United States Department of State. (2007, August 17). *Albania Completes Destruction of Deadly Chemical Weapons*. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from: <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2007/08/20070817153824dmslahrellek0.9905817.html#axzz2WFjpAi00>.

Albania, the first country to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile, did so with funding assistance from the United States. This press release details the agreement between the two countries, as well as the rationale of the United States for providing funding. It also discusses the role of potential non-state actor acquisition in destroying the stockpiles.

Washington Post. (2013, June 14). *U.S. Claims of Chemical Weapons Against Syrian Rebels Meet Caution at U.N.* Retrieved June 28, 2013, from: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-14/world/39976895_1_chemical-weapons-syrian-government-government-forces.

The potential use of chemical weapons in Syria has raised many questions regarding verification of these claims and the appropriate response from the international community. The Assad regime's refusal to allow the OPCW inspectors into the country and the ensuing disagreement regarding a course of action may result in external military action. This article provides some important background information regarding various Member State policies towards verification of chemical weapons use, and steps to be taken if such use is proven.