NMUN•DC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE
BACKGROUND GUIDE 2012

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nmun.org/nmun_dc.html

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Message from the Secretary-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2012 NMUN-DC Conference

At the 2012 NMUN-DC Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee assignment. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers or NGOs. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. NMUN/NCCA will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incidents of plagiarism to the Secretariat.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample position paper below this message for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. All papers must be typed and formatted in the same manner as this example. The following format specifications are required for all papers:

- Length must not exceed two single-sided pages

- Margins must be set at 1 inch for the whole paper

- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.

- Country/NGO name, school name, and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page

- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections

- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers

To be considered for awards, position papers need to be submitted by e-mail in .pdf or .doc formats by 1 October 2012. As proof of submission, include yourself as an e-mail recipient. Please use the committee name, your assignment, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_Mars College).

1. Send one complete set of all position papers for each of your country/NGO assignments to the Secretary-General at secgen.dc@nmun.org.

2. Send a copy of your position paper for each assigned committee to the corresponding committee e-mail address listed below. Please note, the e-mail addresses will be active on 4 September 2012.

Committee	E-mail Address (after 4 Sept.)
General Assembly First Committee (GA1st)	ga1st.dc@nmun.org
Security Council (SC)	sc.dc@nmun.org
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)	ecosoc.dc@nmun.org
Human Rights Council (HRC)	hrc.dc@nmun.org
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	iaea.dc@nmun.org
World Health Organization (WHO)	who.dc@nmun.org

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.

- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents

- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints

- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations

- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide

- Outline of official policy aims within the committee's mandate

Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff.

Sincerely,

Michael Aguilar
Secretary-General
NMUN-DC

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. Papers may be no longer than two single-sided pages. Only the first two pages of any submissions will be considered for awards.

Delegation from
Canada

Represented by
University of Jupiter

Position Paper for General Assembly Plenary

The topics before the General Assembly Plenary are: Breaking the Link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict; the Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy; and the Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa. Canada is dedicated to collaborative multilateral approaches to ensuring protection and promotion of human security and advancement of sustainable development.

I. Breaking the Link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict

Canada endorses the Kimberly Process in promoting accountability, transparency, and effective governmental regulation of trade in rough diamonds. We believe the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an essential international regulatory mechanism and encourage all Member States to contribute to market accountability by seeking membership, participation, and compliance with its mandate. Canada urges Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué to strengthen government oversight of rough diamond trading and manufacturing by developing domestic legal frameworks similar to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. We call upon participating States to act in accordance with the KPCS's comprehensive and credible systems of peer review to monitor the continued implementation of the Kimberley Process and ensure full transparency and self-examination of domestic diamond industries. We draw attention to our domestic programs for diamond regulation including Implementing the Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act and urge Member States to consider these programs in developing the type of domestic regulatory frameworks called for in A/RES/55/56. Canada recognizes the crucial role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the review of rough diamond control measures developed through the Kimberly Process and encourages States to include NGOs, such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, in the review processes called for in A/RES/58/290. We urge Member States to act in accordance with A/RES/60/182 to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal and alluvial diamond miners by establishing a coordinating mechanism for financial and technical assistance through the Working Group of the Kimberly Process of Artisanal Alluvial Producers. Canada calls upon States and NGOs to provide basic educational material regarding diamond valuation and market prices for artisanal diggers, as recommended by the Diamond Development Initiative. Canada will continue to adhere to the 2007 Brussels Declaration on Internal Controls of Participants and is dedicated to ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective regulation of the rough diamond trade through the utilization of voluntary peer review systems and the promotion of increased measures of internal control within all diamond producing States.

II. The Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy

Canada is dedicated to integrating alternative energy sources into climate change frameworks by diversifying the energy market while improving competitiveness in a sustainable economy, as exemplified through our Turning Corners Report and Project Green climate strategies. We view the international commitment to the promotion of alternative sources of energy called for in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) as a catalyst to sustainable development and emission reduction. Canada fulfills its obligations to Article 4 of the UNFCCC by continuing to provide development assistance through the Climate Change Development Fund and calls upon Member States to commit substantial financial and technical investment toward the transfer of sustainable energy technologies and clean energy mechanisms to developing States. We emphasize the need for Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2005 Beijing International Renewable Energy Conference to strengthen domestic policy frameworks to promote clean energy technologies. Canada views dissemination of technology information called for in the 2007 Group of Eight Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy Declaration as a vital step in energy diversification from conventional energy generation. We call

upon Member States to integrate clean electricity from renewable sources into their domestic energy sector by employing investment campaigns similar to our $1.48 billion initiative ecoENERGY for Renewable Power. Canada encourages States to develop domestic policies of energy efficiency, utilizing regulatory and financing frameworks to accelerate the deployment of clean low-emitting technologies. We call upon Member States to provide knowledge-based advisory services for expanding access to energy in order to fulfill their commitments to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Canada urges States to address the concerns of the 2007 Human Development Report by promoting tax incentives, similar to the Capital Cost Allowances and Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses, to encourage private sector development of energy conservation and renewable energy projects. As a member of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Canada is committed to accelerating the development of renewable energy projects, information sharing mechanisms, and energy efficient systems through the voluntary carbon offset system. We are dedicated to leading international efforts toward the development and sharing of best practices on clean energy technologies and highlight our release of the Renewable Energy Technologies Screen software for public and private stakeholders developing projects in energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy. Canada believes the integration of clean energy into State specific strategies called for in A/62/419/Add.9 will strengthen energy diversification, promote the use of cogeneration, and achieve a synergy between promoting alternative energy while allowing for competitiveness in a sustainable economy.

III. Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa

Canada views the full implementation of the treatment and prevention targets of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Especially in Africa, as essential to eradicating malaria and assisting African States to achieve Target 8 of Goal 6 of the MDGs by 2015. We recommend Member States cooperate with the World Health Organization to ensure transparency in the collection of statistical information for Indicators 21 and 22 of the MDGs. Canada reaffirms the targets of the Abuja Declaration Plan of Action stressing regional cooperation in the implementation, monitoring, and management of malaria prevention and treatment initiatives in Africa. To fully implement A/RES/61/228, Canada believes developed States must balance trade and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian objective of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. We continue to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health into our compulsory licensing framework through the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. We urge Member States to support compulsory licensing for essential generic medicines by including anti-malarial vaccines and initiating domestic provisions to permit export-only compulsory licenses to domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, similar to Canada's Access to Medicines Regime. Canada calls upon Member States to establish advanced market commitments on the distribution of pneumococcal vaccines to developing States in cooperation with PATH and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. We emphasize the need for greater membership in the Roll Back Malaria initiative to strengthen malaria control planning, funding, implementation, and evaluation by promoting increased investment in healthcare systems and greater incorporation of malaria control into all relevant multi-sector activities. Canada continues to implement the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) New Agenda for Action on Health to reduce malaria infection rates among marginalized populations in Africa, increase routine immunizations rates, and reduce infection rates of other neglected infections. Canada will achieve the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008-2009 by providing assistance to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We urge Member States to increase donations to intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that support malaria programming in Africa, exemplified by CIDA's contribution of $26 million to the Canadian Red Cross. We continue our efforts to provide accessible and affordable vector control methods to African States through the Red Cross' Malaria Bed Net Campaign and the African Medical Research Foundation Canada by supplying insecticide-treated mosquito nets and Participatory Malaria Prevention and Treatment tool kits.

Official Welcome

On behalf of the committee staff of the General Assembly First Committee, we welcome you to the 2012 National Model United Nations Washington D.C. (NMUN-DC) Conference. This year, your Assistant Director will be Patrick Parsons and Director will be Théo Thieffry; both are experienced NMUN staff members dedicated to making NMUN-DC an unforgettable conference for you. For the past few months, the staff of the General Assembly First Committee has been committed to the creation of this background guide to help you research and to stimulate debate between you and your fellow delegates at the conference.

This year, the topics for General Assembly Committee reflect some of the recent and most important challenges that the world faces regarding international security, and the changing aspect of these issues that Members States of the First Committee have to solve. The General Assembly First Committee is the key organ of the United Nations for security issues outside of the Security Council, and we hope that, as the representatives of your Member State, you will put all of your efforts into debating these fascinating issues and understanding the committee's significance.

We wish you good luck in your preparation for the conference, and we are looking forward to meeting you in Washington, D.C. in October.

History of the General Assembly First Committee

From April 26 to June 24, 1945, 50 allied states gathered for the United Nations (UN) Conference on International Organization, also known as the San Francisco Conference. It resulted in the signing of the Charter of the United Nations, under which the General Assembly (GA) and Security Council (SC) were established. The GA held its first meeting in London in January 1946, gathering the 51 original signatories of the Charter (Poland was a signatory although it did not attend the San Francisco Conference). The membership of the UN and the GA has significantly evolved since 1946, as the UN now counts 193 Member States. A session of the GA lasts for one year, and in September 2012, the GA will begin its 67th session. Once the session opens in September, the general debate takes place over the course of a few days, during which time leaders and representatives from all 193 Member States address the GA. The GA then moves on to consider the substantive items on the agenda, each of them being allocated to one of the six committees of the GA.

The First Committee of the GA is the Disarmament and International Security Committee. All 193 Member States of the UN can attend the meetings of the First Committee, during which 50 to 70 resolutions are typically passed every year. While its main focus is disarmament, topics debated by the GA First Committee cover a range of issues such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, missile proliferation, and even the disarmament of outer-space. The mandate to debate such issues is given to the GA by Article 11 of the Charter, under which the GA is empowered to make recommendations to the Security Council and Member States; through the passing of resolutions, the GA First Committee recommends actions and decisions to the SC. The First Committee is, however, criticized by some observers who consider it a mere forum in which delegates speak and express their positions but do not listen to one another. The concern is thus that the First Committee has become redundant, and does not serve the purpose of being a political forum on important issues.

Criticism of the First Committee also echoes criticism of the GA and the UN in general in regards to the need for reform and modernization of these institutions. There is a will to increase the power of the GA and to make debate within the GA more productive and less repetitive. One example of reform that has been taken so far is the decision to reaffirm the substantial role of the GA's president, a decision made through GA Resolution 59/313, which was adopted in 2005. However, the Council on Foreign Relations also underlines that some of the UN General Assembly's resolutions have had a significant impact on international politics. For example, the GA promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Millennium Declaration, which established the Millennium Development Goals, was adopted in 2000. A more recent example of the GA First Committee's work is the passing of two resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East sponsored by Egypt. These examples show how crucial the work of the First Committee is to the UN and its members, and that matters discussed by this body are of high priority to the whole of the international community.

I. Debating the Inalienable Right to use Nuclear Materials for Peaceful Purposes

- Under what circumstances does the right to nuclear development extend and how should the international community engage to protect that right?
- What actions can be taken to better enforce the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons?
- How can verification measures be strengthened to ensure peaceful uses of nuclear material?
- How can safety and security concerns be balanced against the right to increased access to nuclear technology?

Ongoing events regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran highlight the debate over peaceful uses of nuclear materials—namely, ensuring that peaceful purposes do not lead to, or mask, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) explicitly addresses the inalienable right to peaceful purposes in stating, "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…" Importantly, while international debate on nuclear technology often centers on energy production, the peaceful use of nuclear materials broadly extends from the fields of agriculture and food safety to medicine and scientific research. Just as the scope of peaceful uses expands beyond nuclear energy, the arguments for and against those uses have broadened beyond traditional security concerns. Understanding this debate therefore requires a close analysis of nuclear technology, the role of the international community in safety and verification, and the changing debate as new states express peaceful, nuclear ambitions.

The inherent "problem" of nuclear development is the dual-use capability of nuclear materials—at low levels of enrichment, nuclear material is usable for energy production, but with further enrichment that material can then be used for weapons development. Although some nuclear energy reactors are designed to use uranium in its natural form—predominately Uranium-238—as fuel, the majority of reactors worldwide require uranium that is enriched to 3-5% Uranium-235. This enriched form is often referred to as reactor grade or low-enriched uranium. However, uranium can also be further enriched and, at 20%, Uranium-235 is referred to as highly enriched uranium. At 20% enrichment, fissile material can be used to create a crude nuclear weapon, although 85% enrichment is needed for weapons-grade material.

While passage of the NPT codified the right to peaceful nuclear development, it was the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that marked the first international commitment to peaceful nuclear development. Amongst its three main pillars of Safety and Security, Science and Technology, and Safeguards and Verification, the IAEA is perhaps most visible in its verification role. A central role of the IAEA is the inspection of nuclear facilities to sample and inventory nuclear materials to ensure that material is being used solely for peaceful purposes and not diverted to weapons development or proliferation. Additionally, the IAEA's Department of Safeguards verifies declarations made by Member States regarding their nuclear material and activities. Specifically, the IAEA's safeguards comprise a three-tiered system of traditional measures, strengthening measures (developed in 1992 to reinforce the traditional measures and referred to as the "Additional Protocol"), and integrated safeguards (created in 1998 to combine all safeguard measures and increase efficiency). Non-nuclear-weapons states that are party to the NPT agree to accept safeguard measures as set by the IAEA. There are those states, however, that follow specially developed rules. India, Israel, and Pakistan, though not party to the NPT, have special arrangements with the IAEA for site inspections. As a member of the NPT, Iran has agreed to safeguards and inspections but only at declared sites. Finally, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in contrast, withdrew completely from the NPT in 2003, severing its responsibilities to the IAEA safeguards system.

Despite the way some countries have regarded the safeguards system, following the disclosure of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program in the early 1990's, efforts were made to strengthen the IAEA's safeguard system, culminating in the Additional Protocol document. This protocol increased the scope of safeguards to include research and development of nuclear technologies and greater access to inspection sites. At present, the Additional Protocol has been signed by 142 states and entered into force in 116 states. These case studies and varying situations demonstrate why the issue of safety and verification is paramount in debating the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology.

Understanding the political debate in creating the NPT, and particularly Article IV, also lies at the heart of the current nuclear debate. The NPT essentially established a three-way bargain between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)—NWS agreed to work toward disarmament while NNWS

agreed to not seek nuclear weapons. The third section of the bargain, contained in Article IV, sought to balance tensions between developed and developing countries by guaranteeing the global South's right to nuclear development for peaceful purposes and charging the global North with facilitating that right through technology transfer. Current arguments, however, debate to what extent and how nuclear development should be facilitated by citing safety and security concerns of broader access to nuclear material.

With growing global energy demand and increased environmental pressure, many experts predict a coming "nuclear renaissance" in energy production—approximately 60 new reactors are currently being built with 150 additional reactors planned to be active in the coming decade. Undeniably this proliferation of nuclear technology, even for peaceful purposes, poses serious safety and security concerns for the entire globe. Yet, while valid, those concerns must balance the nuclear development aspirations of Member States. The work of this committee should therefore focus on balancing both security concerns and development rights to meet the challenges of a coming nuclear renaissance to the current non-proliferation framework.

II. The Role of Media in the Context of International Security

- How has the development of the Internet and the media revolution affected international security? Has this revolution increased or decreased the role of states?
- Can new sources of information such as Wikileaks constitute a threat to international security?
- Can actions be taken to prevent some forms of media from becoming the voice of terrorist groups?

The world is now more connected than it was ten years ago, as technologies and means of communications have developed. The percentage of people in the world who use the Internet has risen from roughly 10% in 2005 to 36% in 2011. These new technological developments are rapidly changing the media landscape and driving a media revolution. This revolution of media has occurred through the development of new communication tools such as the Internet and mobile devices, and also through greater access to more common media such as radio or television, especially in developing countries. This media revolution is also symbolized by the arrival of social media, which encourages users to interact and not just passively watch or listen to the news. To understand the issues, this guide covers the role countries have in shaping the way media behaves internationally, the use of media by civil society, and also the role of media when reporting to citizens on international issues and conflicts.

A common way of conceptualizing the role of media in international affairs is to mention the "CNN Effect." The CNN Effect was defined by Steven Livingstone as viewing media as "1) a policy agenda-setting agent, 2) an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, and 3) an accelerant to policy decision-making." In other words, the term tries to capture the idea that media, because it reports directly to citizens, has an influence on governments' policy-making. It originated in 1995, during the Bosnian War, when it was argued that 24-hour news coverage influenced the United States' and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) decision to intervene in the region. On the other hand, one can also argue that international news channels play a role in favor of states as they contribute to the expansion of their cultural influence. For example, one recently created channel, France 24, is an initiative of the French government and its Web site states that, "its mission is to cover international current events from a French perspective and to convey French values throughout the world."

Another example of such channels is the Qatari channel Al-Jazeera. It demonstrates how much influence such a media tool can generate. The channel helped expand Qatar's cultural influence—in the Arab world but also in western countries—and develop its role in regional diplomacy. The channel also played a key role during the uprising of the people of Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrating the new features of modern media and how they have an impact on international issues. It was one of the only media outlets capable of reporting directly from Tahrir Square in Cairo in 2011, and it thus played an important part in shaping the way the uprising was reported to people outside of Egypt. During the Tahrir Square uprising, the Egyptian government that was being challenged by its population even considered Al-Jazeera to be a threat and decided to close down the offices of the network in Cairo. In spite of this, the sources used, the use of social media, and the local population all actually magnified the impact of Al-Jazeera. Thus, the combination of social media and satellite television has created a new media space. As Marc Lynch believes, this combination of media also helped to facilitate the debate over the Arab Spring by providing facts and images along with the necessary framing.

These events also demonstrate that non-state actors can now easily use media, which is especially important to international security. These actors can be insurgents inside a country, but also non-governmental organizations, civil society, or even terrorists groups. The development of new technology and media over the past few years has made it easier for these actors to communicate with the rest of the world and pass on their message, helping

them acquire legitimacy with the public and further their cause. For example, during the protests in Iran, when protesters used Twitter to coordinate their actions and receive help from foreign actors, new forms of media played a significant role. The Internet also constitutes a large tool for propaganda, often used by terrorist groups, which also sometimes benefit from the support of TV networks and channels. This is the case with Hezbollah, which controls the channel Al Manar in Lebanon and uses it to broadcast its messages and actions against Israel. The enhanced role of non-state actors through media poses the question of states' intervention in the matter. To prevent negative impact, some states have turned to censorship, such as in China where Facebook is censored. The use of the Internet by non-state actors also poses the question of control over the Internet. Currently, the Internet is managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which some see as a tool for the United States (US) to extend its cultural hegemony. Thus, while non-state actors have benefited from the development of new media, states also seek to extend their powers through these developments, which in turn fuels tensions.

Finally, the recent phenomenon of Wikileaks has demonstrated how much the role of media and information in international security has changed. Wikileaks is even more of an untraditional information source than those described before, because it works by relying on anonymous contributions from sources around the world for the purpose of promoting better transparency. One of its purposes, by broadcasting "secret" files and information including diplomatic cables, is to end diplomatic secrecy to allow better transparency for the citizens of the world. Some, however, see the activity of this organization as dangerous and believe that it could have deleterious consequences on diplomatic relationships and even national security. It is interesting to note that most states have reacted similarly to released information and are in agreement that Julian Assange, founder of Wikileaks, should be held accountable by all means. Nonetheless, while most see it as already being a threat to US national security, as the US was primarily targeted by the cables release, others believe that its actions will only lead to more secrecy and less transparency in international relations. As media and its technology evolve, they change the way we think about the media's role and impact on international security and raise new issues as described above. Most importantly, the impact on international security exists because media now affects not only states, but also non-state actors, and therefore media and security becomes a much more complex issue than what it has been in the past.

III. Spreading Nuclear Free Zones

- What barriers exist to the creation of additional nuclear weapon free zones?
- Can incentives be developed to encourage broader support for nuclear weapon free zones by Member States?
- What gaps and limitations exist in current treaties and international frameworks regarding nuclear weapon free zones?

In the first resolution of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA), *Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy*, Member States affirmed the goal "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." In the spirit of that goal, the concept of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) was first enumerated in Poland's Rapacki Plan to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons in Poland, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and East Germany. Numerous proposals for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe followed, but growing Cold War tensions halted early efforts to create such zones. In 1974, the GA revived discussions on NWFZs with the creation of a comprehensive study on all aspects of NWFZs. The following year, GA Resolution 3472 defined the concept of a NWFZ as "any zone…which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby: (a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject…is defined."

At present there are five regional treaties establishing NWFZs in 33 Latin American and Caribbean states, 13 south Pacific states, the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), five central Asian states, and 50 African states. Beyond the five regional zones, four international agreements govern the prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Antarctic (1961), outer space (1967), the seabed (1972), and the moon (1982). Additionally, in 1992 Mongolia became the first state to seek single-state nuclear weapon free status. Garnering broad international support, GA Resolution 55/33S, *Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status* formally recognized Mongolia's weapon's free status in 2001.

With the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 2009, NWFZs cover 56% of the globe's landmass and 60% of UN Member States. Importantly, zones do not include international waters, where freedom of the seas bars prohibition, and although banned from deploying nuclear weapons into outer space,

international law allows for the transit of nuclear missiles through space—as is the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Another inhibitor to the spread of NWFZs is the presence of nuclear-weapon state territories and interests within those zones. For example, ASEAN has spent the last 12 years negotiating with the five recognized nuclear-weapon states (China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and the Unites States of America) to agree not to violate the zone with the use or threat of nuclear weapons. Initially, all five states were set to sign the protocol on July 12, 2012, but recent reservations from four of the five states have postponed signing. Stated reservations include the right to self-defense and free passage of nuclear-powered ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

Additional NWFZs have been proposed in the Arctic, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, Central Europe, and the Middle East although progress has stalled on nearly all of the proposed zones. All proposed zones have come about because of perceived threat, but have been deterred because of political tensions. For example, after India's nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan proposed the South Asian zone to the UN GA. Despite recent discussion at the 2000 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, India and Bhutan are opposed to such a zone, particularly one that excludes the People's Republic of China. In the same year, Iran and Egypt proposed a Middle Eastern zone, beginning perhaps the longest historical discussion of a possible nuclear free zone. The UN Security Council, GA, expert analysis, NPT review conferences, and multiple Middle Eastern peace plan talks endorse such a Middle Eastern zone. The proposal, however, remains stalled over the issue of Israel's nuclear status, with Arab states demanding Israel's accession to the NPT and Israel requiring a comprehensive regional peace plan before disarmament. Similar discussions on a zone in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia have failed following the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's testing of nuclear weapons. Belarus's 1990 proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltics has been obstructed by the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. For similar reasons, progress on an Arctic NWFZ remains mired in the issue of NATO's "nuclear umbrella" treaty obligation to Member States as well as the Russian Federation's and the United States' nuclear policies. While passage of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signaled a shift in nuclear policy, both states continue nuclear-powered submarine patrols through the Arctic. Russia, in particular, views the Arctic as key to its nuclear deterrence policy, viewing its Northern Fleet (equipped with long-range nuclear weapons) as its most important naval asset.

Despite the challenges of expanding NWFZs, progress in line with the GA's expressed goals is attainable in a number of regions. Of the 40% of Member States not encompassed by NWFZs, 22 are not nuclear weapons states, members of a military alliance, or members of a security pact—12 states in the Middle East, 6 in South Asia, and 4 in Eastern Europe. It is therefore imperative to discuss the opportunities present to spread NWFZs, which include expansion of existing zones or the creation of new zones to include the above-mentioned 22 states. However, these are not the only options. To truly work toward a nuclear-weapons-free world, serious debate on the issues of self-defense, deterrence, regional conflict, existing military agreements, and the transit of nuclear-powered vessels must also to occur.

Annotated Bibliography

History of the General Assembly First Committee

Bloom, R. and L. Vreins. (2011). *The Role of the UN General Assembly*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on May 23, 2012, from: http://www.cfr.org/un/role-un-general-assembly/p13490.
> *The Council on Foreign Relations is a think-tank dealing with questions of international politics and US foreign relations. This article constitutes a useful additional reading for delegates wishing to learn more about the UN GA and the issues it faces. It also provides a brief critical assessment of its role, serving as a global forum for world peace, and how it fulfills it.*

Reaching Critical Will. (2011). *General Assembly First Committee*. Retrieved on May 23, 2012, from: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga.
> *This Web site is a good database for further research. It provides background and explanations of the First Committee's activities. It is also a source for records from past resolutions, votes, and statements from Member States. Unlike other sources that tend to focus on the GA as a whole, this source has the advantage of focusing particularly on the First Committee, and provides links to resolutions and voting records in the First Committee for the past 10 years.*

United Nations. (n.d.). *History of the United Nations.* Retrieved on May 3, 2012, from: http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/.

> *This page from the UN's Web site contains a complete history of the UN. Part of it also focuses on the Charter history, and the source provides a description of the various meetings that were held before the San Francisco conference. It is a useful resource for delegates who wish to familiarize themselves with the UN system and its history.*

I. Debating the Inalienable Right to use Nuclear Materials for Peaceful Purposes

Franceshini, G. (2012). *The NPT Review Process and Strengthening the Treaty: Peaceful Uses*. Retrieved on July 31, 2012, from http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/non-proliferation-paper-11.

> *In this position paper to the European Union Non-Proliferation Consortium, Franceshini lays out a new nuclear energy map as more states seek nuclear energy development. Delegates should pay particular attention to the "bargain" between nuclear states and non-nuclear states in drafting the NPT. Delegates should also refer to the analysis of the debate on interpretation of Article IV of the NPT.*

International Atomic Energy Agency (n.d.). *About the IAEA: The "Atoms for Peace Agency."* Retrieved on July 25, 2012, from: http://www.iaea.org/About/about-iaea.html.

> *This Web site provides a wealth of information about the work of the IAEA. Beyond general information about the creation of the IAEA, this Web site also contains a repository of technical and statistical data. The Web site also provides delegates with current news and information through the IAEA's News Centre. The IAEA's Web site is also useful in researching peaceful uses of nuclear technology through the agency's Nuclear Sciences and Applications department.*

Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation. (2008). *Chapter 8: The Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*. Retrieved on July 30, 2012, from: http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/bb1/Bb1Chap8.pdf.

> *This chapter from the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation's (PPNN) Briefing Book details the evolution of international law as it pertains to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Delegates should be mindful that while the PPNN only discusses the relation to nuclear energy, a wide range of uses for peaceful nuclear energy exist. Delegates should also note the arguments and debates detailed from NPT review conferences.*

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (1968). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. Retrieved on July 25, 2012, from: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml.

> *The NPT serves as the foundational document for multilateral discussion on nuclear affairs. With 189 parties to the treaty and numerous resolutions from the General Assembly affirming its importance within the last few years, the NPT continues to play a central role. Most recently, and of further importance to delegates, are the recommendations of NPT review conferences available through the "Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences" link.*

World Nuclear Association. (n.d.). *Public Information Service*. Retrieved on July 27, 2012, from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/infomap.aspx.

> *This Web site explains every facet of nuclear technology, from enrichment to waste management. Delegates should pay particular attention to factsheets explaining the enrichment process and non-proliferation to better understand the safety and security concerns involved in this debate. Additionally, delegates can access country specific reports on nuclear energy and production to better understand how nuclear development impacts their own state and region.*

II. The Role of Media in the Context of International Security

COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management. (2008). *Terrorism and the Media.* Retrieved on May 25, 2012, from: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%206.pdf.

> *This report analyses the relationship between terrorism and the media. It contains a wide range of examples on how terrorists groups, at national and international levels, use media for propaganda and to communicate with their allies as well as their enemies. Because the report is relatively recent, it takes into account the important changes modern media is going through and how terrorists are using these changes to their advantage.*

Cukier, K. (2005). Who Will Control the Internet?. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved on May 2, 2012, from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61192/kenneth-neil-cukier/who-will-control-the-internet.

> *This essay underlines issues related to the question of the settlement of an international organization in charge of controlling the Internet. The author voices the concerns of UN Member States who wish to establish a multilateral treaty as an alternative to the present situation, as they feel that the US has too much oversight on the ICANN. Cukier later wrote an update to this essay, titled "No Joke,"* which delegates should also consider reviewing as a follow-up.

Livingstone, S. (1997). *Clarifying the CNN effect*. Retrieved on May 25, 2012, from: http://tamilnation.co/media/CNNeffect.pdf.

> *The author of this article is the creator of the term "CNN effect" that was used for the first time during the Bosnian War. He explains that international news coverage can influence a state's international agenda because it triggers awareness from citizens and shapes their expectations towards their government. This is a good source for delegates who wish to understand better how media coverage can influence a population, and, through this, push for certain issues on the international agenda.*

Lynch, M. (2011). *Tunisia and the New Arab Space*. Retrieved on May 25, 2012, from: http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/15/tunisia_and_the_new_arab_media_space.

> *In this article, Marc Lynch describes the new media space that was created by the development of both technology and new forms of media. He shows that this new media space served as a catalyst for the Arab Spring, and that the situation in Tunisia had an impact on the whole Arab world because of new media. Important to note is that this article was written during the Tunisian revolution, but before the uprising in Egypt, Libya, or Syria.*

Page, M. and J.E. Spence. (2011). Open Secrets Questionably Arrived At: The Impact of Wikileaks on Diplomacy. *Defense Studies,* 11(2): p.234-243. Retrieved on May 3, 2012, from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2011.590046.

> *The authors of this article discuss the impact of Wikileaks on diplomatic secrecy following the release by the organization of US diplomatic cables. According to the authors, while the intent of Wikileaks is to call for more transparency in international relations, its actions will only contribute to reinforce secrecy. Since the security implications of the Wikileaks phenomenon are sometimes difficult to grasp, this article will help delegates understand the situation better.*

III. Spreading Nuclear Free Zones

Buckley, A., R. Dallaire, E. Simpson, and M. Wallace. (2010). A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Arctic. *Embassy*. Retrieved on July 29, 2012, from: http://www.arcticsecurity.org/?p=421.

> *Although this magazine article broadly advocates for Canadian leadership on the creation of an Arctic NWFZ, it specifically cites reasons for optimism and doubt on the possibility of its creation. Delegates will find the information important to understanding both sides of the argument and expand those arguments to other regions. Delegates can also find further information on the Arctic NWFZ through the linked articles on ArcticSecurity.org.*

Ganjanakhundee, S. (2012). Nuclear states shun ASEAN treaty. *The Jakarta Post*. Retrieved July 29, 2012, from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/09/nuclear-states-shun-asean-treaty.html.

> *In each treaty establishing NWFZs, a separate protocol is developed for the five recognized nuclear states to effectively "join" the zone. The recent negotiations between ASEAN and nuclear weapon states clearly demonstrates to delegates the issues preventing wider agreement on NWFZs. While this source explains issues surrounding the southeast Asia NWFZ, delegates can gain a deeper understanding by further researching political debates surrounding the other regional zones.*

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. (2010). *Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) Clearinghouse*. Retrieved on July 27, 2012, from: http://cns.miis.edu/nwfz_clearinghouse/.

> *The Center for Nonproliferation Studies seeks to prevent nuclear proliferation through increased information exchange and analysis. The NWFZ Clearinghouse provides broad information on the creation of each current regional weapon free zone treaty. The Clearinghouse also contains information on the political situations and agreements, which led to each zone's creation. Delegates*

should take particular note of the "Lessons Learned" and "Challenges" sections to better understand the political debate of NWFZs.

United Nations General Assembly. (2011). *Resolution 66/25*. Retrieved on July 27, 2012, from: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/25.

This resolution provides an example of how the international community can encourage the creation of nuclear weapon free zones. The resolution further cites over three decades of previous resolutions that have encouraged the creation of a Middle East NWFZ. Importantly, this series of resolutions and the surrounding debate will demonstrate to delegates the challenge of creating a new NWFZ.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (n.d.). *Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones*. Retrieved on July 27, 2012, from: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was established in 1998 to strengthen disarmament regimes relating to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. UNODA's Web site provides a primer on information regarding nuclear weapons free zones. This Web site also provides links to treaty documents of all current NWFZs that will provide delegates with examples of the rules and establishment of NWFZs.