

NMUN•NY 2018



25 – 29 MARCH 2018

Documentation of the Work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW)



Conference B

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Committee Staff

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Agenda

- I. The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons
- II. The Role of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Counter-Terrorism Efforts
- III. Providing Protection and Assistance to Victims of Chemical Weapons

Resolutions adopted by the Committee

Code	Topic	Vote
OPCW/1/1	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	116 votes in favor, 5 votes against, 17 abstentions
OPCW/1/2	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	121 votes in favour, 7 votes against, 10 abstentions
OPCW/1/3	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	121 votes in favour, 5 notes against, 12 abstentions
OPCW/1/4	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	105 votes in favour, 5 votes against, 17 abstentions
OPCW/1/5	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	105 votes in favour, 5 votes against, 17 abstentions
OPCW/1/6	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	114 votes in favour, 4 votes against, 20 abstentions
OPCW/1/7	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	125 votes in favour, 4 votes against, 9 abstentions
OPCW/1/8	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	115 votes in favour, 5 votes against, 8 abstentions
OPCW/1/9	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	122 votes in favour, 7 votes against, 9 abstentions
OPCW/1/10	The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons	124 votes in favour, 6 votes against, 8 abstentions

Summary Report

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

- I. The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons
- II. Providing Protection and Assistance to Victims of Chemical Weapons
- III. The Role of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Counter-Terrorism Efforts

The session was attended by representatives of 134 Member States.

On Sunday, the committee adopted the agenda as I, III, II, and began discussion on the topic of “The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons.” By Tuesday, the Dais received a total of 18 proposals covering a wide range of subtopics, including tracking methods and verification mechanisms for dual-use chemicals, the promotion of transparency and accountability mechanisms in declaring chemical weapons transfers and their destruction, and chemical waste management. Further, the committee discussed educational programs for Member States and private industry on the safe destruction of chemical weapons, combating money laundering systems that are used in the illegal trade of chemical weapons, and the promotion of border control to combat chemical weapons from falling into the hands of non-state actors. The committee engaged in fruitful debate with delegates excited to voice out their Member States’ positions on the topic at hand. The committee was orderly, diplomatic, and professional when negotiating many controversial issues.

On Wednesday, 11 draft resolutions had been approved by the Dais, one of which had amendments. The committee adopted 10 resolutions following voting procedure. The resolutions represented a wide range of issues, including implementing a dual-use chemicals database, universal licensing programs for various scheduled chemicals, databases for information sharing amongst Member States on the best-practices of chemical weapons destruction, and the role of private chemical industry. There was a great degree of cooperation between geographical blocs, and all Member States worked together in the true spirit of OPCW as a consensus-building body.



Code: OPCW/1/1

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

2
3 *Recognizes* the increased efficiency and application of the mandate of international organizations, such as the
4 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations (UN), that establish branches and offices of
5 cooperation and oversight to increase international capacity and application of programs and mandate of the
6 respective organizations,

7
8 *Fully aware* of the efforts and collaboration of the (IAEA) in the research and provided guidelines by which OPCW
9 Member States can operate and conduct ethical practices of chemical weapons grade materials and proper disposal
10 and removal of materials that will not cause extensive harm to neighboring Organisation for the Prohibition of
11 Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Member States and permanent environmental degradation,

12
13 *Recalling the success of* Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) in establishing the Joint Investigative Mechanism
14 (JIM) of the United Nations and the OPCW,

15
16 *Noting with deep concern* the danger and security threats associated with the storage and transportation of disposed
17 chemical weapons,

18
19 *Recognizing* the need for the adoption of a basic set of standards that OPCW Member States can implement into
20 their own national legislation that will promote safe practice and trade of dual use materials and control for proper
21 consistency in security measures across regions, as well as domestic borders,

22
23 *Endorses the Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism*
24 *and Stemming the Flow of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”* (Good Practices in Border Security), which highlights and
25 further develops a set of good practices such as but not limited to, interstate transportation, intrastate department
26 cooperation, verification techniques, and cross border information sharing,

27
28 *Fully aware* of the benefits that private partnerships, such as the Duvale Partnership and Rothamsted Research &
29 Inscentinel, bring to OPCW Member States through public actions and protecting the environment through
30 contributing endowment funds,

31
32 *Deeply concerned* with any non-compliance of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,*
33 *Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction* (1993) (CWC), and the provisions set by CWC
34 on disarmament by Member States,

35
36 *Emphasizing* the first paragraph to the preamble of the CWC, which calls for complete disarmament of chemical
37 weapons through strict and effective international monitoring control,

38
39 *Recalling* the importance of dual use chemicals to manufacture of necessary products which are important for every
40 Member State,

41
42 *Acknowledging* the success of the already existing mechanisms for monitoring and licensing national action plan
43 programs recommended by the OPCW, however, nothing Ukraine’s National Licensing Authority
44 that aims towards the monitoring and in-depth tracking of dual use materials and chemicals to prevent the illicit
45 trade, trafficking, and storage of dual use materials for the purpose of chemical weapons as an improvement and
46 expansion upon the recommended systems in place,

47
48 *Emphasizing* the need to track movements of chemicals from countries that have a history of chemical weapons,

49

- 50 1. *Encourages* the Executive Council to implement an OPCW expansion by establishing Regional Overview
51 Offices (ROO) in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Oceania, and the Middle East
52 by reason of addressing regional state issues within their respective regions to enhance coordination efforts
53 coinciding with the already established regional divisions of the OPCW itself, with the inclusion of the Middle
54 East as well as Oceania for a more just and equitable representation of all regions consisting of OPCW Member
55 States;
- 56
- 57 2. *Suggests* the ultimate purpose of the ROO establishments to be able to achieve full eradication of declared
58 chemical weapons and to provide OPCW Member States with a greater capacity and ability to address certain
59 circumstances and issues present within their regions in regards to the proposed plans of action and mandate of
60 the OPCW itself, such as the annual reports and implementation of new accountability measures to aid all
61 OPCW Member States in their efforts to implement and establish the proper protocols and measures for
62 complete eradication of declared chemical weapons these offices would model and serve as extended branches
63 to aid in the day to day operations and cooperation between OPCW Member States within the specified regions
64 similar to the way in which other international organizations have regional offices for oversight and gatherings
65 for the purpose of expanding the capacity and ability to have more geographical presence and capabilities;
- 66
- 67 3. *Recommends* the purpose of the newly established ROOs in the aforementioned locations be for the purposes of
68 overview, implementation, and further expansion of regional cooperation between OPCW Member States in the
69 destruction of chemical weapons, their production facilities, and the proper fruition of programs and articles
70 mandated by the OPCW through:
- 71
- 72 a. Regional representatives from each Member State in the region present for discussion as a means by
73 which Member States have easier access and ability to fully voice their concerns and cooperation on
74 the mandate and agenda of the OPCW in terms of proper implementation of programs and initiatives
75 provided by the OPCW;
- 76
- 77 b. Fostering the sharing of information among OPCW Member States and agency affiliates within each
78 region for the streamlining of regional efforts and pivotal points of focus imperative to the fruition of
79 the OPCW mandate with open cooperation for regional offices of other organization such as the IAEA
80 as well as the 1540 Committee;
- 81
- 82 c. Collaboration and focus of efforts for proper overview of specific program and initiatives
83 implementation that can provide reports on the effectiveness and efficiency of the OPCW efforts for
84 the ability and capacity of Member States to properly participate in the OPCW agenda and areas where
85 improvements are needed;
- 86
- 87 4. *Requests* the creation of the Chemical Disarmament Fund (CDF) to be used by Regional Overview Office, as
88 well as Member States in need of aid, with the purpose of eliminating stockpiles, abiding by the following
89 frameworks:
- 90
- 91 a. Funds will be raised on a voluntary basis from OPCW Member States and any willing non-government
92 organizations (NGOs);
- 93
- 94 b. The CDF will be managed by the OPCW Budget and Finance Branch;
- 95
- 96 c. OPCW Member States will have access to the funds upon request at the discretion of the Technical
97 Secretariat;
- 98
- 99 5. *Recommends* the full cooperation between chemical experts from the industry and government officials
100 emphasizing the cooperation of the Technical Executive Council through:
- 101
- 102 a. Normalization of communication between Member States of the OPCW and chemical industry experts
103 is encouraged;
- 104

- 105 b. Continued updates on talks, preferably, through ROO offices as there is a need for clarification of the
106 intergovernmental, state, and private entities;
107
- 108 6. *Urges* the Security Council to re-establish and extend the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM)
109 established in Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), and as proposed in Security Council draft resolution
110 S/2017/962 (2017), for the prolonging of on-site investigations of critical zones affected by armed conflict and
111 areas under probable use and occurrences of chemical weapon strikes;
112
- 113 7. *Recommends*, within the mandate of the OPCW, the creation of bi-annual OPCW hosted conference for OPCW
114 Member States, that will focus on combating the continued trend of dual use chemicals and equipment, which
115 are used as chemical weapons:
116
- 117 a. Two representatives from each OPCW Member States will be given the opportunity to attend the
118 conferences, as well as, representatives from the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the UN
119 Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA);
120
- 121 b. The bi-annual OPCW conference will be hosted in The Hague, Netherlands at the OPCW
122 Headquarters beginning in 2019, and will be scheduled for March 23-31, 2019 and March 19-22, 2021;
123
- 124 c. Best practices in border management, surveillance, and cooperation will be discussed, in accordance
125 with global initiatives such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Center’s Border Security Initiative (BSI) that
126 will further:
127
- 128 i. Identify current gaps in border security measures and chemical import and export
129 mechanisms;
130 ii. Allow for state government officials to voice concerns regarding their inability to adequately
131 adopt effective border security legislation, preventing the proliferation of dual-use chemicals
132 and components for non-peaceful purposes;
133 iii. Encourages Member States to discuss successful border security measures;
134 iv. Reaffirm the obligation of OPCW Member States to adopt necessary measures and legislation
135 to uphold the principles of the CWC, one of those being the complete disarmament of
136 chemical weapons as outlined Paragraph 1 of the CWC Preamble;
137 v. Remind government officials of international initiatives, such as the BSI to further help train
138 their own border security services on ways to improve border security as it relates to the
139 transfer of dual-use chemicals;
140
- 141 d. Provide educational forums and workshops through multilateral instruction including, but not limited
142 to, non-governmental organizations, the WCO, and the UNODA that will further:
143
- 144 i. Give state representatives an opportunity to converse with representatives from the UNODA
145 and WCO to discuss effective border security measures preventing the proliferation of dual-
146 use chemicals and further work towards eradicating all chemical weapons;
147 ii. Discuss ways to verify shipments of chemicals to ensure that they are, in fact, the chemicals
148 listed in cargo manifests such as communication between OPCW Member States along a
149 chemical’s shipping route;
150
- 151 8. *Requests* the adoption of good border security practices that share foundations and guiding principles found in
152 the *Good Practices in Border Security* in training programs and workshops offered by the OPCW so that
153 Member States can take advantage of streamlined training and information regarding the harmonization and
154 strengthening of national capacity of border control regarding chemical weapon transports;
155
- 156 9. *Encourages* developing Member States in need of assistance in the destruction of chemical weapons to engage
157 in partnerships with corporations which will analyze economic conditions, provide cost-effective measures to
158 generate income, and establish businesses to help spur the economy;
159

- 160 10. *Encourages* the creation of public relation mechanisms, such as information campaigns and government to
161 public relation, that primarily focuses on the voluntary actions of private sectors participation with
162 governmental institutions through:
163
- 164 a. Public action initiatives such as public workshops for citizens to become more locally involved and
165 active in the responsible use and trade of dual use technologies commonly found in chemical weapons
166 and mundane household items;
 - 167
 - 168 b. Environmental protection guided by the IAEA guidelines on the safe and environmentally friendly
169 disposal and interaction with chemical weapons grade materials;
 - 170
- 171 11. *Requests* State Parties that have failed to implement the CWC into their national legislation to do so with the aid
172 of the OPCW tools and resources, including:
173
- 174 a. Legal Technical Assistance, which provides an informal working mechanism focused on sharing of
175 experience, resources and information, as well as facilitation of bilateral, regional and sub-regional
176 cooperation;
 - 177
 - 178 b. A network of legal experts, consisting of Member States nominated legal experts with in-depth
179 knowledge of the national implementing legislation required by the convention;
 - 180
 - 181 c. A Technical Secretariat's National Implementation Kit, which provides an information of how national
182 legislation can implement Initial Requirements of the CWC;
 - 183
- 184 12. *Establishes* a long-term plan of action for full eradication of chemical weapons through full participation from
185 all OPCW Member States still in control of chemical weapons along with production and storage facilities with
186 penalties by:
187
- 188 a. Mandating that in the yearly reports of progress given to the executive council, Member States still in
189 control of chemical weapons must show proof of reduction of storage and arsenals by four to five
190 percent on a yearly accord;
 - 191
 - 192 b. Increasing the required percentage of the reduction to 6% after the year 2028;
 - 193
 - 194 c. Setting an action plan for the full eradication of chemical weapons still existing by the year 2035;
 - 195
 - 196 d. Failure to comply with the new provisions as mandated will result in loss of privileges, such as:
197
 - 198 i. Rescinding of voting status on council meetings in accordance with the CWC Article XII
199 Paragraph 2;
 - 200 ii. Status changing to observer states during the deliberation, which would last for a
201 predetermined length of two calendar years or until proper percentage provisions are met;
 - 202
- 203 13. *Recommends* harmonizing national export licensing measures seeking to achieve in depth tracking, inspections,
204 and certification of all imports and exports at all levels of point of entry, point of exit, and in Member State
205 circulation to ensure materials do not fall into the illicit trade and selling of dual use technologies for maleficent
206 purposes keeping in mind licensing serves as a pivotal pillar of ensuring that legitimate trade in chemicals can
207 proceed unfettered;
208
- 209 14. *Draws attention to* the need to foster close cooperation with partners of the chemical industry to identify newly
210 developed chemicals which might be classified as dual-use chemicals including, but not limited to:
211
- 212 a. Annual meetings with the International Council of Chemical Associations to receive a detailed report
213 of current research in the fields of chemicals that might be classified as dual-use chemicals;
 - 214

- 215 b. Encouraging annual meetings to foster knowledge exchange between national industries and
216 governments concerning research, usage and stockpiling of chemicals;
217
- 218 c. Cross examination of existing databases which provides detailed information about newly developed
219 chemicals, is mandatory to be updated by industry partners on a quarterly basis and accessible by all
220 Member States;
221
- 222 15. Endorses the expansion of the existing CWC schedules of chemicals in the verification annex in order to keep
223 track of chemicals which have the potential as dual-use weapons with the following initiatives:
224
- 225 a. Creating a tracking system which attaches unique and immutable labels to industrial chemicals to
226 identify the source, destination and type and can be queried by all OPCW Member States and
227 designated NGOs;
228
- 229 b. Ensuring transparency through detailed reports to local headquarters, including periodic analysis of
230 trade channels, trade volume and any irregularities;
231
- 232 c. Establishing the possibility to request an investigation of production facilities if irregularities of any
233 kind such as a financial reason give rise to;
234
- 235 d. Providing capabilities to analyze chemicals in laboratories run by OPCW which arouse suspicion.



Code: OPCW/1/2

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

2
3 *Acknowledges* Article III of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use*
4 *of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction* (1993) (CWC) requiring States Parties to declare and identify
5 possessions of chemical weapons in order to reach complete eradication of chemical weapons,

6
7 *Recalling* the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism
8 established by United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) on chemical weapons and the extent to
9 which it was successful in accomplishing its purpose in identifying individuals, entities, groups or governments who
10 perpetrated the use of chemicals as weapons,

11
12 *Recognizing* the efforts of non-governmental organizations, which work to promote the complete eradication of
13 chemical weapons such as the Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

14
15 *Emphasizing* that the present goal of the Fact-Finding Missions, a tool defined by Article IX of the CWC, is to
16 verify an alleged use of chemical weapons,

17
18 *Appreciating* the Fact-Finding Missions in place and its efforts to report instances of chemical attacks for the
19 international community,

20
21 1. *Encourages* the further utilization of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-
22 Finding Missions in every alleged use of chemical weapons, including the territory of non-OPCW Member
23 States, provided that consent is granted by all parties;

24
25 2. *Recommends* reforming the jurisdiction for the OPCW Fact-Finding Missions to include investigative duties in
26 order to more accurately identify instances of chemical weapons attacks by:

- 27
28 a. Identifying the agent used in a chemical weapon attack, including attributes of the agent, particularly
29 any precursors that may have been used in an agent's manufacture;
- 30
31 b. Inspecting the delivery mechanism to discern how it affected chemical dispersion during the attack;
- 32
33 c. Disseminating information regarding health risks and casualties resulting from the attack;
- 34
35 d. Attributing an attack to an offender, whether state or non-state actor;
- 36
37 e. Discovering the chain of custody for chemical weapons and its precursors, to inhibit the use of future
38 chemical weapons;
- 39
40 f. Archiving all relevant evidence and notes for use in future investigations;

41
42 3. *Requests* collaboration between OPCW Member States and the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition to
43 provide compliance incentives by:

- 44
45 a. Providing aid in the implementation of transparent practices which work toward the eradications of a
46 Member States' chemical weapons;
- 47
48 b. Facilitating national capacity building in regard to chemical weapons;
- 49

- 50 c. Protecting and assisting against chemical weapons;
51
- 52 4. *Proclaims* that following a chemical attack, an investigation can be initiated when there is alleged use by:
53
- 54 a. State actors, in instances without the consent of the Executive Council, and a majority vote of the
55 OPCW Member States, or in instances without the consent of the Executive Council but with the
56 support of a two-thirds majority vote by the OPCW Member States;
57
- 58 b. Non-state actors, in instances where the investigation has been approved through a majority vote of the
59 Executive Council, or in instances without the consent of the Executive Council but with the support of
60 a two-thirds majority vote by the OPCW Member States;
61
- 62 5. *Trusts* OPCW Member States with oversight of the investigative duties of the Fact-Finding Missions by holding
63 annual hearings solely focused on discussing the effectiveness of investigations conducted by the Fact-Finding
64 Missions;
65
- 66 6. *Invites* Member States and non-Member States to comply with investigations conducted by the Fact-Finding
67 Missions, despite their voluntary nature and the right of a Member State to refuse compliance;
68
- 69 7. *Suggests* that all monetary resources for the Fact-Finding Missions be allocated only from the OPCW General
70 Fund, not permitting any other direct contributions to the Mission, in order to avoid conflict of interest
71 regarding Fact-Finding Missions funding.



Code: OPCW/1/3

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*
2
3 *Expressing concern for the persistent and tragic loss of lives caused by chemical weapons,*
4
5 *Reaffirming the Protocol for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and*
6 *Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction (1993) (CWC), as the key framework of the prohibition of*
7 *chemical weapons,*
8
9 *Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 1977 (2011), which emphasizes the need for Member States to*
10 *implement and improve border control in order to counter chemical terrorism and secure international trades as well*
11 *as keeping chemical weapons from circulation,*
12
13 *Recognizing the definition of toxic chemicals as stipulated by Article II of the CWC,*
14
15 *Respecting the right to national sovereignty as espoused in General Assembly resolution 50/635 (1996), and the*
16 *inalienable right of all Member States to peaceably pursue development of their chemicals industries, and exercise*
17 *the control over their borders as they see fit,*
18
19 *Recalling General Assembly resolution 55/283 (2001), which encourages greater cooperation and coordination*
20 *between the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),*
21
22 *Noting the United Nations collaboration efforts with international non-governmental organizations that combat*
23 *crime, illicit trafficking and trade of dual-use chemicals and chemical weapons such as International Criminal Police*
24 *Organization, European Law Enforcement Cooperation, European Cybercrime Centre, American Law Enforcement*
25 *Organization, and the World Criminal Justice Library Electronic Network,*
26
27 *Appreciating the existing Scheduled Chemicals Database which provides information on chemical identifiers*
28 *including CAS Registry Numbers, International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry and CAS chemical names,*
29 *synonyms, and World Customs Organization Harmonized System codes,*
30
31 *Bearing in mind that such a database is limited in that it does not track or record the movement of chemical*
32 *identifiers across borders,*
33
34 *Applauding the role of the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals in its practice*
35 *of encouraging regular updates,*
36
37 *Acknowledging that contemporary challenges before the OPCW include the potential emergence of new chemical*
38 *weapons due to scientific and technological development and the possession of such weapons by non-state actors,*
39
40 *Observing the proliferation of chemical weapons by non-state actors via vulnerable borders should Member States*
41 *lack the capability to prevent such activity,*
42
43 *Highlighting the emerging threat of dual-use chemicals and their diversion from peaceful purposes,*
44
45 *Considering the existing work of international groups in contributing to the harmonization of export controls*
46 *through the coordination of export control measures,*
47
48 *Alarmed that existing National Action Plans have not been effective in all cases,*
49

50 *Deeply concerned* with the discrepancies in education and outreach provided to non-governmental organizations,
51 Member States, and civil society in the context of potential diversion of dual-use goods and chemical weapons,
52
53 *Realizing* the importance of judicial training to successfully implement the legal frameworks as previously occurred
54 in several member states,
55
56 *Aware* of the United Nations Environment Programme's *Strategic Approach for International Chemical*
57 *Management* as a policy framework fostering the management of chemicals to ensure they are produced and utilized
58 in ways that minimize the negative impacts on the environment and human health,
59
60 *Calling attention* to the strategic approach for *International Chemical Management Guidelines* surrounding the
61 proper handling of hazardous chemicals,
62
63 *Taking into account* the strategy and mandate of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
64 Force's Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorist Attacks,
65
66 *Emphasizing* the protected nature of the Secure Information Exchange (SIX) database of the OPCW and its
67 efficiency in information sharing technologies that ease the communication process between OPCW Member States
68 to facilitate chemical agent eradication and verification processes,
69
70 *Having examined* the OPCW and World Customs Organisation's collaborative training of customs officials and
71 national authorities in the Chemical Weapons Transfer Regime,
72
73 *Appreciative of* the Analytical Skills Development Course, which attempts to enhance national capabilities of
74 OPCW Member States by facilitating training in analytical chemistry and the national implementation of the CWC
75 to personnel in the industry, academic institutions and government laboratories,
76
77 *Approving* of the OPCW FIRES Project, an education program utilizing visual media in order to educate students
78 and educational faculty on the responsibilities, ethics and peaceable use of chemical agents, and on general issues
79 surrounding chemical related matters,
80
81 *Commending* the success of the International Advanced Assistance and Protection Course and its training regarding
82 the use of protective equipment, decontamination operations, and responses to incidents involving chemical agents,
83
84 *Recalling* the OPCW *Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security 2011* and its
85 facilitating role for the international cooperation in decreasing chemical threats, and the prevention of, and
86 preparedness against the misuse of toxic chemicals,
87
88 *Recognizing* the flexibility of internet tools, such as the Legislative Assistance Support Tool, and its effectiveness in
89 providing information regarding legislation and information sharing to OPCW Member States to effectively
90 implement CWC legal frameworks,
91
92 1. *Requests* the improvement of the existing SIX database to allow party states to meet the best practices standards
93 detailed in this resolution by:
94
95 a. Reforming the SIX database to incorporate a feature (SIX Shipment Registry Feature) that includes
96 which corporations may register future transnational transfers with their export licenses and end user
97 certificates;
98
99 b. Including information, such as the date, time and location of scheduled transfer of dual use chemicals
100 and technology across borders;
101
102 c. Expanding the SIX database's informational basis by including the tracking of interstate distribution of
103 chemicals, company compliance chemical industry inspection by including a digital platform to
104 efficiently update the database in a timely manner;
105

- 106 d. Allowing the SIX Shipment Registry Feature of the SIX database to be made available to national
107 border and customs authorities, allowing them to check shipments of chemical agents across databases
108 and verify end user and export license certificates in order to ensure privacy by sharing data provided
109 by corporations willingly to national authorities;
110
- 111 2. *Calls for OPCW* to expand upon the Chemical Weapons Transfer Regime to use voluntary contribution by
112 Member States and non-governmental organizations to local law enforcement and border security agents to
113 ensure logistical and financial support in order to implement eradication policies as well as compliance with the
114 new reforms of the database;
115
- 116 3. *Suggests* the incorporation of the guidelines stipulated by the Strategic Approach for International Chemical
117 Management into local national legislation in order to provide strong and efficient management of hazardous
118 chemicals and to prevent illegal trade of chemicals within Member States of the UN;
119
- 120 4. *Calls for OPCW* Member States to expand upon the Analytical Skills Development Course, which facilitates
121 analysis of chemicals related to the national implementation of the convention as well as providing training in
122 analytic chemistry to incorporate training on disarmament measures for law enforcement and policies for the
123 eradication of chemical weapons by including state policies and legislation on training on a local level;
124
- 125 5. *Encourages* all Member States to establish nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination within their
126 national territories, which will ensure the safe destruction of chemical weapons overseen by the Technical
127 Secretariat and to be funded by the OPCW Voluntary Trust Fund;
128
- 129 6. *Emphasizes* the OPCW International Advanced Assistance and Protection Course, which aims to train first
130 responders, medical professionals and local citizens on protection measures in the wake of chemical attacks and
131 how to use significant identification and decontamination technologies to update its training course on the use
132 of Automatic Mass Spectral Deconvolution and Identification Software, which, once applied on a wide-scale,
133 can track and identify low concentrations of chemical agents used for chemical weapons in complex matrices;
134
- 135 7. *Recommends* the Expansion of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force's Working
136 Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorist Attacks, which aims to improve coordination in
137 planning a response to and preventing terrorist attacks, to include research into mechanisms to dispose
138 chemical weapons seized from non-state actors as well as the distribution of training techniques, and the
139 technical application of these techniques in order to improve coordination between OPCW Member States,
140 preventing future terrorist attacks;
141
- 142 8. *Endorses* the inclusion of research into effective local policies on the inclusion of courses and curriculum based
143 on chemical agents and chemical weapons disarmament within the OPCW Conference on International
144 Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security, which details and expands chemical management, innovations
145 in chemistry, chemical safety management and the decrease of toxic chemical agents used in chemical weapons
146 and to include youth training initiatives into safe uses of chemicals and on chemical weapons disarmament;
147
- 148 9. *Encourages* OPCW Member States to expand the existing OPCW Chemicals Database to include information
149 on the location, availability and use of disposal technologies to help eradicate chemical weapons within
150 countries lacking financial and logistical resources;
151
- 152 10. *Requests* that the OPCW extend the chemical components banned internationally to include newer forms of
153 harmful chemical agents, such as newer forms of phosphorous compounds that are used as nerve agents;
154
- 155 11. *Strongly Recommends* OPCW Member States to adopt policies detailed within the OPCW Second Symposium
156 on Women in Chemistry promoting gender equality in chemical eradication, counter proliferation and chemical
157 incident preparedness policies and processes, in conjunction with the unique and essential role women play in
158 conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building.

159 **Annex**

160

161 1. *Strongly Recommends* that OPCW Member States adopt a system of best practices that would allow Member
162 States, especially those vulnerable to chemical attacks, to control and secure the chemical trade between
163 territories under their jurisdiction and promote border security, which would include:

164

165 a. National export licensing regimes that would ensure the legality of transnational shipments of
166 scheduled chemicals, by means of national legislation and regulation of shipping industries, which
167 would provide an enhanced layer of global security;

168

169 b. Implementing end-user certificate programs that allow integration into the updated SIX database
170 Shipment Tracking System, in order to create efficient and secure trade of chemical agents;

171

172 c. Export Control Lists in order to ban and control chemical substances that are not covered by the
173 Chemical Weapons Convention scheduling annex;

174

175 d. Domestic regulations that implement export authorization requirements for unlisted materials that, may
176 contribute to chemical weapons proliferation, as deemed by the CWC and mandatory reporting
177 requirements for companies that suspect their suppliers are contributing to the proliferation of chemical
178 weapons;

179

180 e. National export risk-assessment programs, in which OPCW Member States deny export licenses or
181 authorization of chemical and equipment transfer that would risk contribute to the proliferation of
182 chemical weapons to domestic corporations;

183

184 f. Labeling policies that would implement the UN Globally Harmonized System that employs a
185 standardized series of pictograms in order to effectively communicate the risks of transporting specific
186 chemicals;

187

188 g. Pending investigation policies, which stipulate that State Parties to the OPCW treat new chemicals that
189 are pending assignment to either schedules 1, 2, or 3, as enumerated in the CWC verification annex by
190 the OPCW Executive Council be treated as whatever schedule the state determines it should be
191 classified as within national legislation;

192

193 h. The requirement for Member States to ensure equal access to all professional, technical, and law
194 enforcement training and education, emphasizing groups that have been disenfranchised from
195 educational opportunities, such as women and racial/ethnic minorities.



Code: OPCW/1/4

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

2
3 *Noting with concern* that not all Member States of the United Nations (UN) have signed the *Convention on the*
4 *Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction*
5 *(CWC) (1993)* and recognizing the work that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
6 has accomplished as an organizational body in declaring the destruction over 96 percent of all reported chemical
7 weapons stockpiles,

8
9 *Affirming* Article IV of the CWC in outlining the importance of all OPCW Member States upholding their
10 responsibility to the CWC and dismantling their stockpiles to continue international peace and security,

11
12 *Benefitting* from technological tools such as OPCW Legislative Assistance Support Tool, which strengthens
13 legislative and legal support for states to implement the CWC,

14
15 *Bearing* in mind United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), emphasizing the use of
16 communication and cooperation among OPCW Member States in tracking efforts and strengthening international
17 security,

18
19 *Guided by* Cluster II UN Conference on Disarmament Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons Coordinator on
20 Issues pertaining to Chemical Weapons Production Facilities the existence of chemical facilities installed by OPCW
21 Member States within other States, whose presence of dangerous chemical weapon components still pose a
22 significant threat to its citizens and its environment,

23
24 *Believing* the creation of an independent body under the Technical Secretariat would provide the OPCW with the
25 ability to better implement stronger communication and tracking,

26
27 *Fully aware* of the fact that proper training of and equipment for security and technical personnel are crucial in the
28 effective eradication of chemical weapons,

29
30 *Recalling* Environmental Development Journal J/14 (2002) implemented a summit for Globally Harmonized System
31 for Classification and Labeling by providing programs that include training and guidance materials,

32
33 *Recalling* OPCW decision C-20/DEC.9 (2015) “Establishment of an Advisory Board on Education and Outreach”
34 which established the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) on the OPCW education and outreach
35 agenda for long term strategies and short-term actions,

36
37 *Fully aware* of the continuous efforts of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and the working groups under them in
38 research efforts to completely eradicate chemical weapons,

39
40 *Viewing with appreciation* the efforts done by OPCW programs including, but not limited to, the Analytical
41 Chemistry Course and the need for further incorporation of all Member States,

42
43 *Deeply concerned* by the inherent risks of insufficient documentation of chemical compounds and weaponry and the
44 adverse consequences of the deficiency in keeping up with the continued regional and global developments,

45
46 *Further recalling* the importance of OPCW’s Analytical Skills Course to strengthen cooperation, outlining
47 safeguard agreements and confidence-building measures between OPCW Member States,

48

49 *Further acknowledging* the success of the International Council for Chemical Association (ICCA) Responsible Care
50 Program in enhancing the fields of health and protection, environmental safety and security, and chemical product
51 stewardship,
52

53 *Highlighting* United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) which requires states to adopt adequate
54 national legislation and to improve border controls to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using weapons of
55 mass destruction, including chemical weapons,
56

57 *Noting with deep concern* the detrimental consequences due to the failure to maintain proper tracking and effective
58 prosecution of chemical weapons use,
59

60 *Reaffirming* Technical Secretariat Report 1603 (2018), outlining the necessity of the assessment and compilation of
61 tools, guidance, and best practices on chemical safety, and security management,
62

63 *Further recalling* International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (2007) in providing additional
64 verifications and valid affirmations that Member States respecting their commitments,
65

66 *Appreciating* the work that the OPCW actively does in aiding OPCW Member States to implement legislation to
67 assist in the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles,
68

69 *Recalling* General Assembly resolution 71/250 (2016), on cooperation between the UN and the Organisation for the
70 Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, promoting the continued cooperation between the UN and the OPCW,
71

72 *Recognizing* the vulnerability of civilians during chemical weapon attacks,
73

74 *Cognizant of* the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) report, *Promotion of Multilateralism in the Area of*
75 *Disarmament and Non-Proliferation* (2007),
76

77 *Further recalling* OPCW report *Preventing the Re-Emergence of Chemical Weapons: Lessons for Non-Proliferation*
78 (2016), which promotes transparency and confidence-building measures,
79

80 *Reaffirming* the partnership between the OPCW and the ICCA, and its continuous goal to regulate chemicals and to
81 continue international peace and security,
82

- 83 1. *Encourages* all remaining Member States to the UN who have not done so to sign and ratify the CWC to halt
84 the production and transfer, as well as destroy any and all chemical stockpiles, and only conduct peaceful uses
85 of chemistry to ensure international peace and security for all States;
86
- 87 2. *Further invites* all OPCW Member States to fully implement the National Implementation Tool Kits, which aids
88 Member States of the OPCW to implement the applicable legislation of the CWC, and encourage application of
89 the Research Project Support Program to ensure functionality and continued accountability;
90
- 91 3. *Encourages* regional bodies to work with the regional disarmament centers as mandated by the CWC to fully
92 implement and include region specific solutions using the Legislative Assistance Support Tool as a guide to
93 develop this disarmament plan;
94
- 95 4. *Suggests* that OPCW Member States should enact more legislation through the National Legislation
96 Implementation Kit, complying with the CWC in order to:
 - 97
 - 98 a. Participate as a liaison between regional lawyers, legislative bodies, scientists, and educational
99 institutions as it relates to the prohibition of chemical weapons;
 - 100
 - 101 b. Draft and implement legislation regarding compliance;
 - 102
 - 103 c. Suggest the establishment of regional bodies under the supervision of the Technical Secretariat;
 - 104

- 105 5. Calls upon OPCW Member States to adhere to commitments formulated by *the protocol for the Prohibition of*
106 *the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare* (1925),
107 and reaffirmed by General Assembly Resolution 71/59 (2016), by assuming material responsibility regarding
108 chemical weapon facility ownership within the territory of another Member State;
109
- 110 6. *Recommends* the Technical Secretariat to streamline collaboration when dealing with regional chemical weapon
111 issues dictated by the appropriate regional bodies to:
112
- 113 a. Replace the current third-party system to a direct communication system;
114
- 115 b. Giving access to reports concerning OPCW Member States, selected NGO's such as, but not limited
116 to, Amnesty International and security forces;
117
- 118 7. *Suggests* annual regional summits be modeled after the OPCW's Regional Tabletop Exercise on Chemical
119 Emergency Response for the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries Member States, to foster round
120 table discussion on disarmament activities, provide training to relevant personnel in efficient disarmament
121 procedures, and give technical assistance to Member States in adopting their national plan;
122
- 123 8. *Suggests* more OPCW Member States to participate in the OPCW Equipment Exchange Programme, which
124 assists developed countries in providing updated technologies to transitioning countries for purposes including:
125
- 126 a. Detection, protection, and decontamination equipment;
127
- 128 b. Alarm systems, decontaminants, medical antidotes, and treatments;
129
- 130 9. *Strongly suggests* that the OPCW Member States face stricter requirements for an extension for chemical
131 weapons eradication as comparable to the Small Arms Limitation Treaty (1979) which complies with the
132 responsibility outlined in Article IV of the CWC;
133
- 134 10. *Requests* the Member States of the OPCW to coordinate regional forums under the Scientific Advisory Board,
135 such as the SAB regional workshop held by the European Union in 2017, for the purpose of sharing expertise
136 on:
137
- 138 a. Facilitating temporary working groups focused on the complete eradication of chemical weapons in
139 areas more prone to chemical threats in industry inspections in regard to the impact of technological
140 changes;
141
- 142 b. Working with state and non-state actors in problem areas to ensure chemical production follows the
143 guidelines of the CWC;
144
- 145 c. Continued efforts towards responsible use of chemistry as set by the precedent of the Forum on the
146 Peaceful Uses of Chemistry Developing a Chemical Cradle-to-Grave Responsibility Culture;
147
- 148 11. *Stresses* the need for re-publication of the Science and Technology Monitor to report and provide updates on the
149 peaceful use of chemicals with the intent that the information will emphasize and contribute to safer use of new
150 chemical advancements;
151
- 152 12. *Further requests* that OPCW Member States utilize information sharing technologies provided by the OPCW
153 such as the Legislation Database and the Science and Technology Resources to enhance information-sharing
154 through collaboration of the databases and regional conferences to work towards eradicating chemical weapons;
155
- 156 13. *Suggests* that organization of analytical chemistry courses managed by the OPCW to further incorporate:
157

- 158 a. The implementation of the number of specialized bodies trained under the auspices of the OPCW to
159 ensure the tangible skills from professionals in the sector from all OPCW Member States;
160
- 161 b. The possibility to engage these specialized bodies in countries with higher risk of potential chemical
162 attacks in order to guarantee a satisfying capacity building to all OPCW Member States that lack in it;
163
- 164 14. *Endorses* a partnership between Member States of the OPCW and the Responsible Care Program to enhance
165 security of corporate facilities manufacturing dual-use chemicals and establishing training sessions for any and
166 all involved personnel to continue peaceful uses of chemistry;
167
- 168 15. *Suggests* the expansion of the Fellowship Programme, which helps developing or transitioning OPCW Member
169 States to gain experience in advanced laboratories in training scientists to include:
170
- 171 a. Emphasis on educating scientists in situations of conflict through exchange programs to appropriately
172 safeguard techniques involving dual use chemical technology;
173
- 174 b. Emphasis on the involvement of advance in emerging science and technology sectors of OPCW
175 Member States;
176
- 177 16. *Encourages* international cooperation between CWC States Parties focusing on border security by:
178
- 179 a. Improved border security workshops and training exercises concerning chemical weapons and deadly
180 agents for border officers;
181
- 182 b. Increased funding to international bodies dealing with border control, such as the Chemical,
183 Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) defense;
184
- 185 c. Enacting active border security operations using sensor fused barriers, rapid response vehicles, patrols
186 and watchtowers which are supported by an active command and control center;
187
- 188 17. *Emphasizes* the need of the safe handling, distribution and, disposal of chemicals and interdicting the illicit
189 trade of chemical weapons through national borders by providing annual reports on the implementation of CWC
190 strategies;
191
- 192 18. *Advocates* for enhancing OPCW Member State's long-term capacity building programs, by utilizing the
193 Industry Outreach, within OPCW sponsored workshops, on dual-use chemical technology with the desire to
194 prevent the spread of dual-use chemical weapons;
195
- 196 19. *Calls on* OPCW Member States to continuously fund workshops on dual-use, production, stockpiling and the
197 proper destruction of Chemical Weapons regarding:
198
- 199 a. Bilateral and multilateral best-practice and expertise sharing between developed and transitioning
200 countries;
201
- 202 b. Regional capacity building for standardized training of security and technical personnel;
203
- 204 20. *Encourages* increased collaboration between the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the
205 ABEO to share best practices of scientific and technological skills in the Member States' CBRN Defense Units
206 to detect, analyze, and destroy dangerous chemicals by:
207
- 208 a. Promoting expertise sharing in security drills and provide support for simulations to prepare for threats
209 involving chemical weapons;
210
- 211 b. Encouraging OPCW Member States to attend sponsored workshops, such as the Conference Support
212 Programme on chemical eradication to uphold their responsibility to the CWC in security protection;

- 213
214 21. *Calls upon* OPCW Member States to educate civilians through programs such as Education for Peace: New
215 Pathways for Securing Disarmament on responding to chemical weapons attacks by:
216
217 a. Researching appropriate emergency procedures for civilians to prevent exposure to chemical weapons;
218
219 b. Working with civil servants or civil society to disseminate these emergency procedures;
220
221 22. *Welcomes* the cooperation of intelligence and data sharing regarding potential chemical threats across OPCW
222 Member States borders by providing information on national and private holdings by:
223
224 a. Expanding the International Commission on Inquiry, Commissions on Human Rights, Fact-Finding
225 Missions and Other Investigations to monitor, discover and report chemical weapons for all OPCW
226 Member States;
227
228 b. Encourages OPCW Member States in reporting to the Scheduled Chemical Database (SCD);
229
230 c. Recommends the SCD's mandate to include chemical-stockpiling, production, and an updated list of
231 dual-use chemical compounds;
232
233 23. *Encourages* the establishment of a liaison partnership between the Greenpeace REACH program and OPCW
234 Member States modeled after the IAEA REACH Partnership through:
235
236 a. Acting as a tracking agency of dual-use chemical agents using voluntary usage geographic
237 information systems;
238
239 b. Furnishing accessible data to all Member States of the OPCW, UNODA, and REACH Program in
240 order to act quickly in case of suspicious or threatening activities;
241
242 24. *Encourages* the Security Council Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution
243 1540 (2004), to work in conjunction with the OPCW's SAB and the World Customs Organization to:
244
245 a. Assist effectively help Member States to catalog chemicals and enforce stricter verification of
246 chemicals;
247
248 b. Ensure that these regulations and catalogs of dual-use chemicals are included in any future trade
249 agreements;
250
251 25. *Endorses* the Technical Secretariat to report annually to the Director General on developments and
252 technological advancements in both the neutralization and incineration disposal methods to ensure efficiency
253 and environmental consideration;
254
255 26. *Recommends* the establishment of a financial assistance fund to be garnered from and later offered through a
256 monetary fund based on donations allocated to said fund by donors towards OPCW Member States for:
257
258 a. Implementation of advanced technological systems;
259
260 b. Educational purposes that encompass storage of chemicals, safe-guarding of existing chemical
261 weapons until their destruction, and the recognition of potential threats.



Code: OPCW/1/5

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

2
3 *Guided by General Assembly resolution 55/28 (2001) that establishes a framework for cooperation between the*
4 *United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),*

5
6 *Recognizing the need to establish secure methods of funding chemical weapon removal and non-proliferation*
7 *efforts, focused on targeting the free flow of illicit funds reducing the proliferation of chemical weapons while*
8 *increasing tracking capabilities,*

9
10 *Fully aware of the necessity of maintaining sovereign Member States right to economic self-determination and its*
11 *importance in OPCW Member States ability to implement funding efforts within a national and international*
12 *framework,*

13
14 *Recalling the importance of informational reciprocity and transparency between OPCW Member States to ensure*
15 *the availability of important data and statistics in an effort to curtail the ability of non-state actors to acquire said*
16 *chemicals, in accordance with Article IX of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,**
17 *Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction (1993) (CWC),*

18
19 *Affirming the urgency of early detection of chemical weapons usage across borders through global technological*
20 *partnerships and collaboration, tracking monetary channels through the creation of Financial Information Systems,*
21 *Coordination and Logistics (FIS-CaL),*

22
23 *Emphasizing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations from the *International Standards on**
24 *Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation 2018 for combating money*
25 *laundering under the establishment of Financial Intelligence Units as the basic structure of FIS-CaL,*

26
27 *Highlighting the strong need for chemical detection and resistance technology partnerships in large chemical*
28 *shipments, according to the chemical's CWC-designated Schedule and the CWCs import and export requirements,*
29 *should be vigilantly tracked through the associated transaction records of chemical shipments should be vigilantly*
30 *tracked through FIS-CaL,*

31
32 *Acknowledging the work of the Egmont Group in international cooperation against money laundering and the*
33 *financing of terrorism, using them as a model to be expanded upon for the creation of FIS-CaL,*

34
35 *Noting the international communication and mechanisms detailed within the *United Nations Global Counter-**
36 *Terrorism Strategy 2006, Section II, paragraph 5 for the purpose of providing aid in the eradication of chemical*
37 *terrorism,*

38
39 1. Requests an expansion of the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the OPCW, detailed in General
40 Assembly resolution 55/283 (2001), where the OPCW reports to the UN on any matter that threatens prevailing
41 peace and security, in order to improve cooperation between both bodies and mitigate redundancy for increased:

42
43 a. Budgetary and financial cooperation:

44
45 i. To ensure further funding for studies with budgetary interest for the OPCW as far as fiscally
46 possible;

47 ii. To develop budgets jointly with the OPCW and providing allowances for fact finding
48 missions and investigations into illicit activities;

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50 b. Coordination and ensured consistency:

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105
- i. For further cooperation between the UN and the OPCW in the establishment of programs such as the Joint-Investigative Mission in order to promote global peace and security through funding;
 - ii. In order to better promote peace and security through the eradication of chemical weapons;
 - c. Reporting between the UN and the activities of the OPCW making discussions more frequent:
 - i. In order to ensure a universal and consistent message and budget to reduce inaccuracies in reporting;
 - ii. To strengthen the relationship between the OPCW and the UN;
 - 2. Suggests expanding upon the OPCW Voluntary Trust Fund to accept voluntary donations via:
 - a. Suggesting that OPCW Member States provide consistent financial contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund to promote stability;
 - b. Inviting members of the OPCW NGO Coalition and private corporations to give charitably to the cause of chemical weapons eradication through research forums and collaboration of international chemical societies;
 - 3. *Encourages* OPCW Member States to adopt national action plans ensuring transparency within their respective chemical industries by:
 - a. Requiring exports of precursor and dual-use chemicals to be licensed;
 - b. Improving transparency between OPCW Member States using the *UN Transparency and Accountability Initiative 2005* as a model to include:
 - i. Public access to all relevant documentation related to issues involving pertinent chemical concerns;
 - ii. “Whistleblower protection” to ensure retaliation against those who come forward is not allowed;
 - iii. Financial disclosure policies involving chemical trade and transportation;
 - c. Strengthening technical assistance assessment, and follow-up mechanisms such as:
 - i. The European Union’s (EU) Dual Use Export Control Regime set-up in the EU Regulation 428 (2009) and;
 - ii. Reports to the Secretary-General of the UN;
 - 4. Further suggests the creation of FIS-CaL:
 - a. To be headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands;
 - b. To consist of OPCW Member States and signatories to the CWC;
 - c. Drawing funding from participating Member States of FIS-CaL;
 - d. With the purpose of:
 - i. Implementing both financial monitoring and anti-laundering mechanisms for the complete eradication of chemical weapons;
 - ii. Vigilantly tracking large chemical shipments and associated transaction records through the money trail left behind;

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- iii. Identifying and reducing possible illegal shipments of dual-use chemicals concerning large-quantity transactions to improve OPCW Member States early detection capabilities concerning possible dual-use and precursor transfers;
 - iv. Ensuring that data involving any money trail comes from reputable source including but not limited to licensed distributors, governments, and corporations;
 - v. Alerting OPCW Member States to any potential security breaches and purchases of large amounts of chemical weapons, dual-use chemicals, and precursor chemicals;
 - vi. Reporting suspect transactions and sales to the appropriate investigatory body;
- 115 5. Urges the Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to work with FIS-CaL to define and specify the concept
116 of financial intelligence universally by:
117
- a. Developing mechanisms to improve efficiency of financial intelligence and enhance financial tracking efforts across land and sea borders to eliminate terrorists' access to intermediaries;
 - b. Raising awareness among OPCW Member States that are not a party to the Egmont Group;
- 122
- 123 6. *Calls upon* OPCW Member States to implement FIS-CaL in order to solve challenges posed by increasingly
124 complex proliferation financing within the cybersphere including, but not limited to, money laundering,
125 improving upon the Egmont Group by:
126
- a. Focusing efforts on combatting financing chemical terrorism;
 - b. Using initiatives including but not limited to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and Commonwealth guidelines, the Council of Europe's MONEYVAL, and FATF recommendations;
 - c. Exchanging information without the need for a Memorandum of Understanding;
 - d. Affiliation to both a judicial authority and specialized police task force agencies, eliminating action delays in order to efficiently freeze funds or arrest suspects associated with the illegal obtainment of chemical weapons with malevolent intent;
- 137
- 138 7. Recommends collaboration with the Economic and Social Council for the establishment of Anti-laundering
139 Tracking Mechanism cryptocurrencies for use within the framework of FIS-CaL for financial supervision
140 fostering an anti-laundering mechanism which can be easily tracked.



Code: OPCW/1/6

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

2
3 *Fully aware of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical*
4 *Weapons and their Destruction (CWC), and the efforts of all signatory states to tackle the chemical weapons threat,*

5
6 *Recognizing the determination of the CWC as the most useful tool for the complete eradication of chemical*
7 *weapons,*

8
9 *Guided by the conclusions of the International Partnership Against the Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons*
10 *Conference, held in Paris on 23 January, 2018 that put shame and sanctions on entities that use Chemical Weapons,*

11
12 *Concerned that there are still countries remaining which have not become states members of the Organisation for the*
13 *Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and have neglected to adopt and implement the CWC,*

14
15 *Deeply disturbed that chemical weapon production facilities could be misused and manipulated by non-state actors*
16 *for confrontational purposes, as has been pointed out in the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)*
17 *and United Nations Security Council resolution 2325 (2016),*

18
19 *Appreciating the support of all relevant organizations, such as the International Council of Chemical Associations*
20 *(ICCA), on enforcing the CWC in banning the production the stockpiles of chemical weapons,*

21
22 *Fully alarmed that chemical weapons are still used by certain signatories of the CWC as weapons to spread an*
23 *atmosphere of fear,*

- 24
25 1. *Endorses the use of Joint Investigative Mechanisms (JIM) and other investigative groups of the OPCW in:*
26
27 a. *Identifying compromised chemical weapons;*
28
29 b. *Implementing proper disposal methods for chemical weapons, taking into account environmental*
30 *impact;*
31
32 2. *Takes note of the classification, labeling and packaging regulations, as used in the European Union for defining*
33 *Chemical Weapons to identify and track dangerous chemicals across borders;*
34
35 3. *Calls for the update of the dual-use items database, taking as a reference the EU Council Regulation n°*
36 *428/2009, which offers coherent definitions of dual-use items and use of chemical weapons, as well as a*
37 *detailed list of dual-use items, and to undertake following measures to keep the database operative and efficient:*
38
39 a. *Allowing the Technical Secretariat to be in charge of updating the Database on an annual basis,*
40 *through coordination with all OPCW Member States;*
41
42 b. *Encouraging State Parties to fully integrate these provisions into their own national legislation;*
43
44 4. *Affirms the establishment of workshops organized by the OPCW, in which companies that deal with*
45 *transactions of schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals can request end-user research of exporting chemical*
46 *substances by:*
47
48 a. *Holding biannual workshops that give companies the opportunity to ask the OPCW to conduct “end-*
49 *user research” of the substances they are exporting;*
50

- 51 b. Allowing the technical secretariat to create the taskforce, and do end-user research for the request that
52 the OPCW receives during the workshop;
53
- 54 c. Sending warning once any suspicious flow of chemical substances are found in the process of the end-
55 user confirmation process;
56
- 57 5. *Encourages* the OPCW to implement reciprocity and compliance mechanisms by developing Protection and
58 Prevention Protocols, building upon the pre-existing CWC protocols, and defining a set of minimum security
59 standards for OPCW Member States to implement. preventing sheer negligence in protecting and securing
60 chemical weapons by any Member State;
61
- 62 6. *Supports* the technology precedents on disposing chemical weapons in a more eco-friendly way by:
63
- 64 a. Advocating further cooperation with scientific organizations such as, but not limited to, the
65 International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry and institutes such as academies and universities
66 for consultation;
67
- 68 b. Seeking more consultations and renewed methods from the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the
69 OPCW with the purpose of finding more environmental ways to destroy chemical weapons;
70
- 71 c. Implementing economical and contamination-free disposal methods for chemical weapons, taking into
72 account environmental impact;
73
- 74 7. *Further invites* the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to evaluate new developments in the chemical field to
75 screen for chemicals that can potentially be made into chemical weapons by involving the private sector as well
76 as public organizations such as International Council of Chemical Association (ICCA) by:
77
- 78 a. Recommending routine security inquiries of industrial and laboratory facilities to determine if they are
79 being misused for chemical weapon production, including routine inspections conducted by the OPCW
80 Inspectorate Division of the Technical Secretariat in potential factories and laboratories, such as
81 pesticide factories and former chemical weapon factories and laboratories;
82
- 83 b. Encouraging the use of challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use by OPCW Member
84 States to entities suspected of chemical weapon use;
85
- 86 8. *Further advocating* for diverse composition of advisory board, such as the SAB, made up of experts from each
87 State Party to evaluate the potential to be utilized for chemical weapon production of the certain emergence of
88 new technology;
89
- 90 9. *Expresses* its hope for collaboration between chemical industries and OPCW State Parties to strengthen
91 technological control, especially in the military sector, through means such as, but not limited to multilateral
92 negotiations; Proclaims the significance of improving the on-time detection technology by:
93
- 94 a. Calling for ongoing examination of air quality control conducted by national authorities in crowded
95 areas and areas of higher risk;
96
- 97 b. Encouraging the research on new technologies and devices such as sniffers conducted by countries to
98 sensitively identify and screen chemical weapon use in crowded areas such as airports;
99
- 100 10. *Recommends* the establishment of a voluntary trust fund by the OPCW, similar to the OPCW Special Trust
101 Fund for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, with the committee specifically devoted to the
102 elimination of chemical weapons in all areas, while supporting the creation of a forum with the purpose of
103 delegating funds and determining efficient spending patterns, to be hosted by member states and relevant NGOs
104 alike, which;
105
- 106 a. Would take place biannually in Berlin, Germany;

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- b. Would invite representatives from each Member State to contribute the statistics and the monetary budget of their respective state;
- c. Will help to better determine the needs of each member state;
- d. Is to be funded by regional banks such as European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.



Code: OPCW/1/7

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

2
3 *Guided by Article VI of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of*
4 *Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction (1993) (CWC), which requires Organisation for the Prohibition of*
5 *Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Member States to ascertain the legitimate use of chemical materials, and thereby*
6 *preventing third parties from acquiring and using chemical agents for purposes prohibited under the Convention, and*
7 *Paragraph 13 of Article IV which calls for every State Party who are either in bilateral or multilateral agreements to*
8 *uphold information sharing to prevent data duplication,*

9
10 *Acknowledging the OPCW Associates Programme, which enhances national capacities for peaceful uses of*
11 *chemistry and its applications and offers training to chemical industry and government personnel,*

12
13 *Emphasizing the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations (UN) and the OPCW, General Assembly*
14 *resolution 55/283 (2001), which conceptualizes an effective cooperation between the two bodies,*

15
16 *Reminding the international community of recent statements by the Secretary-General describing the use of*
17 *chemical weapons as “unjustifiable and abhorrent” in all instances,*

18
19 *Considering the need for greater cooperation between the OPCW and governments of States Parties in ensuring the*
20 *legitimacy of the international chemical trade,*

21
22 *Highlighting the need for greater OPCW oversight regarding dual-use chemical shipments to areas with ongoing,*
23 *wide-scale conflict,*

24
25 *Noting with concern the absence of a comprehensive index listing dual-use chemicals in the CWC, as well as*
26 *guidelines pertaining specifically to their management,*

27
28 *Acknowledging the potential benefits of a transparent version of the Scheduled Chemical Database extending access*
29 *to general public for reference,*

30
31 *Recalling Part VII, Section C, Clauses 31-32 of the Annex on Implementation and Verification which discusses*
32 *chemical transfers between OPCW Member States and states not party to this convention,*

33
34 *Reaffirming the OPCW’s cooperation with the Fact Finding Mission in the investigation of the use of chemical*
35 *weapons within conflict prominent areas in Syria,*

- 36
37 1. *Suggests an extension of the OPCW’s Associates Program to include a Train and Protect Program whose*
38 *responsibilities would include:*
39
40 a. *Expanding on the nine-week program to include an additional three weeks of personnel training to*
41 *focus on the security of the production, storage, and transportation of dual-use chemicals in chemical*
42 *industries;*
43
44 b. *Funding by the yearly budget through the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters;*
45
46 2. *Suggests expanding the Scheduled Chemicals Database through the Technical Secretariat with the purpose of*
47 *providing:*
48
49 a. *A public scientific and educational database to aid via transparent information sharing to chemical*
50 *facilities including the following:*

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- i. Building and examining chemical capacities for peaceful means;
 - ii. Standardizing chemical practices regarding safety;
 - iii. Training materials for professionals in the chemical field;
 - b. A restricted section of the Scheduled Chemical Database available to NGOs upon request and approval by the OPCW, including the overall quantity of dual-use chemicals being traded in order to monitor irregularities in chemical transfer;
 - c. An additional section only available to OPCW Member States, including sources of the production of the most abundant and prevalent Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals, and their appearance in global trade;
3. *Encourages* the OPCW to establish a joint mechanism called the Chemical Agents Monitoring via Export Licenses (CAMEL) with the purpose of preventing non-member states and non-state actors from brokering dual-use items for chemical warfare, which includes:
- a. Collaboration with the World Trade Organization to assist in the regulation of international trade and the World Customs Organization for practical provision of the licenses;
 - b. Encouraging multilateral harmonization by OPCW Member States of standards on the approval of export licenses;
 - c. Annual impact assessments of the implementation of CAMEL to amend and renew it in accordance with global export trends;
 - d. Funding through the regular budget of the OPCW;
4. *Calls upon* the Executive Council of the OPCW to help facilitate the improvement of the ability of OPCW Member States' National Authorities to prevent re-emergence of chemical weapons in OPCW Member States by:
- a. Improving national implementation of the licensing process amongst OPCW Member States;
 - b. Creating a list of reputable companies with trading practices, available internationally and created by OPCW Member States;
5. *Recommends* that the evaluation by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW Member States' chemical facilities, as outlined in Article VI of the CWC, be shared with the Chemical Industry Coordination Group to ensure they have updated intelligence regarding chemical usage;
6. *Supports* regional cooperation among OPCW Member States to promote safe forms of producing chemicals, and the maintenance of chemical research facilitated by decreasing the dangers associated with by-products of chemical processes through the expansion of International Chemical Safety Cards, which provide information on the hazards and precautions associated with each chemical;
7. Suggests that the training of the National Authorities of OPCW Member States, as established in CWC Article VII, Clause 4, be extended to include information which is necessary for proper management of dual-use chemicals;
8. *Calls for* the publication of a comprehensive guideline specific to dual-use chemicals by the Technical Secretariat in collaboration with the Scientific Advisory Board, including those that pose the most immediate threat to international security, such as, but not limited to, Chlorine and Synthetic Opioids;
9. *Encourages* OPCW Member States to explore the possibilities of reviewing Part VII, Section C, Clauses 31-32 of the Verification Annex and consider expanding upon the scope of end-use certificates to be utilized for

106 transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals between all Member States, in addition to transfers between Member States
107 and non-Member States;
108
109 10. *Supports* the cooperation of the international community with the OPCW to ensure universal ratification of the
110 CWC.



Code: OPCW/1/8

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon,*

2
3 *Noting with concern* the lack of universality to the sole chemical weapon disarmament agreement, the *Convention*
4 *on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their*
5 *Destruction* (1993) (CWC), which in turn threatens international peace and security highlighted in Article 1.1 of the
6 *Charter of the United Nations* (1945),

7
8 *Acknowledging* the World Health Organization's Concise International Assessment Documents which monitor the
9 movement of dual-use chemicals through their country's respective borders as well as a tool for decision and policy
10 making,

11
12 *Recalling* the work of International Council of Chemicals Association (ICCA) implementation of the Strategic
13 Approach to International Chemical Management and the Chemical Industry Coordination Group (CICG) which
14 shares information on dual use chemicals and chemical production,

15
16 *Fully aware* of the 2014 report requested by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General by the independent Expert
17 Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development (IAEG) titled, "A World that Counts:
18 Mobilizing the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development," which ensures that the data revolution reduces the
19 data divide between developed and developing countries,

20
21 *Recalling* the Advisory Panel of Future Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Priorities
22 and looking to their work as guidance in order to amend current CWC rules and norms to increase relevance,

23
24 *Recognizing* the importance of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force in combating Chemical
25 Terrorism (UN-CTITF) and improving UN coordination in planning responses to such attacks,

26
27 *Recognizing* the flexibility of internet tools such as the Legislative Assistance Support Tool (LAST), and its
28 effectiveness in providing information regarding legislation and information sharing to Member States,

29
30 *Highlighting* Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which calls for UN Member States to refrain from supporting
31 non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear,
32 chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery,

33
34 *Reaffirming* General Assembly resolution 60/288 (2006), which encourages more frequent exchanges of information
35 and technical assistance amongst OPCW Member States to ensure open lines of communication, the dissemination
36 of information and intelligence, to more effectively advance the mission of the OPCW to prohibit the proliferation
37 of Chemical Weapons modeled after the International Criminal Police Organization's (INTERPOL) Operation
38 Chase,

39
40 *Affirming* UN Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), and Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) as the guiding
41 tools of this document to define terrorism,

42
43 *Recalling* General Assembly resolution 55/283 (2001), which encourages greater cooperation and coordination
44 between the UN and the OPCW,

45
46 1. *Calls upon* all willing and able UN Member States who have not done so to sign and ratify the CWC as to solve
47 a root cause of chemical weapon proliferation;

48
49 2. *Recommends* the expansion of the LAST into the areas of dual-use regulation, as to:
50

- 51 a. Prevent the illicit trade and travel of dual-use chemicals that could be weaponized;
52
53 b. Improve regulations for export control;
54
55 c. Encourage OPCW Member States to increase compliance and cooperation of the regulation of dual-use
56 chemicals;
57
58 d. Monitor the chain of acquisition of dual-use chemicals;
59
- 60 3. *Urges* for the review of current chemical weapon destruction procedures to be conducted by the Technical
61 Secretariat, as to ensure the lowest level of environmental impact of chemical wastes and the most efficient
62 methods of destruction;
63
- 64 4. *Encourages* OPCW Member States to implement national legislation that monitors the movement of dual-use
65 chemicals through their countries respective borders, to be used as a tool for decision-making and policy-
66 making;
67
- 68 5. *Asks* the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to host workshops, funded through the Working Capital Fund, that
69 will teach valuable dual-use chemical trade procedures which will:
70
71 a. Educate national authorities on dual-use chemical export controls;
72
73 b. Educate chemical transport personnel on dual-use chemical and safety procedures;
74
75 c. Reference past successful multinational security programmes;
76
- 77 6. *Urges* the SAB to work in close conjunction with regional organizations, such as the African Union and the
78 European Union, in order to provide information in regards to rapid chemical advancements as to help States
79 use the most efficient means to contribute to chemical weapon non-proliferation;
80
- 81 7. *Encourages* all willing and able OPCW Member States to work in close conjunction with international
82 intelligence agencies and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to host capacity-building
83 initiatives which focus on training activities to increase knowledge and leadership capabilities for law
84 enforcement within border and chemical security, to enhance the operation capabilities of all states to prevent
85 the proliferation of chemical weapons:
86
87 a. The increase of technical assistance and the dissemination of standard operating procedures to enable
88 the process for collective action, which can be rapidly executed without a deliberate decision making
89 process to eliminate miscommunication and bureaucratic inefficiency;
90
91 b. The further distribution of training techniques, technical application and operational techniques to all
92 OPCW Member States, as a means to ensure efficient and effective response to chemical threats;
93
- 94 8. *Recommends* private chemical industries to work with the ICCA and cooperate with the OPCW by hosting
95 workshops, allowing information exchange on the production of chemicals, and paving the way for sound
96 chemical management and sustainable development by adopting necessary regulations on the industries
97 affiliated with the production of dual-use chemicals, in collaboration with the CICG;
98
- 99 9. *Encourages* all OPCW Member States to establish OPCW verified NBC decontamination units within their
100 national territory, which will:
101
102 a. Ensure the safe and timely destruction of chemical weapons to be overseen by the Technical
103 Secretariat;
104
105 b. Find necessary funding through Member States' own military budget or put in a request for assistance
106 from the OPCW Voluntary Trust Fund;

- 107
108 c. Be implemented with the necessary infrastructure for these units by 2030;
109
110 10. *Further Recommends* the SAB to improve and encourage full adherence to the international licensing system
111 administered by the OPCW, which will aid in the efficient achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 12;
112
113 11. *Expands* the OPCW’s Fact Sheet 7 to include a collaborative and accessible resource that will be used as a
114 control list of dual-use chemicals, updated biannually, for the purpose of:
115
116 a. Include chemicals which involve a risk to international security and livelihood;
117
118 b. Differentiating between “dual-use chemicals” and “precursor” chemicals, as identified under Schedule
119 III of Article VI of the CWC;
120
121 12. *Expands upon* educational and operational programs with the intent of assisting in information and data
122 exchange and facilitating the implementation of the CWC through programs that:
123
124 a. Address the conditions conducive to and combating the spread of chemical terrorism;
125
126 b. Build States’ capacity and strengthening the role of the UN in supervising the production and trade of
127 dual-use chemicals;
128
129 c. Utilize the OPCW Associate Program and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach in their
130 capacity to assist Member States that have difficulty implementing changes within a national
131 framework;
132
133 d. Train analytical chemists by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to ensure proper safety standards
134 are enforced;
135
136 e. Fund activities through foreign-aid packages from willing and able OPCW Member States who would
137 be interested in fostering such activities in developing states who are in need of capacity-building
138 programs;
139
140 13. *Urges* the adaption of national transparency mechanisms to include activities of non-state actors to ensure
141 accountability, equality, and public trust by:
142
143 a. Reporting the transfer details of dual-use chemicals within the jurisdiction of OPCW Member States;
144
145 b. Announcing the acquisition of dual-use chemicals;
146
147 c. Flagging and monitoring the trade of Schedule I and II dual-use chemicals to all other States as to warn
148 the international community of the trade of potentially dangerous chemicals to States as to raise
149 international awareness and enhance transparency;
150
151 14. *Calls upon* OPCW Member States to collaborate their domestic and regional endeavors with counter-terrorism
152 efforts of the UN-CTITF and the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group within their States or regions to promote
153 inclusivity and collaboration between bodies reducing redundancy;
154
155 15. *Amends* the National Legislation Implementation Kit for the CWC to revise Article XVI, paragraph II to
156 include:
157
158 a. Dual-use chemicals are “chemicals used widely for peaceful and commercial purposes that can also be
159 used as chemical weapons” such as phosphine, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride;
160
161 b. Precursor chemicals are “chemicals involved the in production stages for toxic
162 chemicals” such as phosphoryl chloride, triethanolamine, and disulfur dichloride;

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16. *Recommends* that the OPCW include a definition of chemical terrorism, where:

- a. Chemical weapon is defined in Article II, Paragraph I of the CWC;
- b. Chemical terrorism be defined following Security Council resolutions 1566 (2204) and 1373 (2001) as committing the act of terrorism using chemical weapons.



Code: OPCW/1/9

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*
2
3 *Reaffirming the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical*
4 *Weapons and on their Destruction (1993) (CWC), which outlines a clear and cooperative foundation for the*
5 *decisions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),*
6
7 *Recalling the focuses of the Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (2013), which calls*
8 *upon remaining non-Member States to sign and ratify the CWC,*
9
10 *Acknowledging that Member States to the OPCW in the past have deviated from the rules sanctioned by Article I of*
11 *the CWC, which articulates that each State Party to the CWC must destroy all chemical weapons it owns or*
12 *possesses,*
13
14 *Realizing the difficulties for small and developing Member States regarding the resources, personnel, and*
15 *institutional influence necessary to achieve complete eradication of chemical weapons, and the importance of the*
16 *OPCW Executive Council to the consultations and questions that small and developing states are most likely to*
17 *require,*
18
19 *Alarmed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and*
20 *fissile materials development by armed non-state actors as identified in the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of*
21 *Weapons of Mass Destruction,*
22
23 *Reiterating Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) commending OPCW Member States to refrain from chemical*
24 *weapons development,*
25
26 *Recognizing the International Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the OPCW as mentioned in the note from the*
27 *Director General of the OPCW S/951/2011 (2011),*
28
29 *Noting the importance of fully participatory decision-making of international bodies in alignment with Sustainable*
30 *Development Goal 16,*
31
32 *Noting with satisfaction the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Hazard Communication*
33 *Standard 2012, which provides a common approach to classifying chemicals,*
34
35 *Affirming the efforts put forward in the establishment of the Prevent, Detect, and Respond Protocol, established*
36 *within the Needs and Best Practices on Chemical Safety and Security Management 2016 study conducted by the*
37 *OPCW in which each OPCW Member States put forwards their best practices on chemical agent in pursuit of risk*
38 *reduction of accidents and environmental hazards within the production and destruction of chemical material,*
39
40 *Further recalling Article 6 of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2004) referring to*
41 *chemicals listed within Annex A and B to be handled in a productive manner of human health and environment,*
42
43 *Observing the quantity of industrial wastewater produced by the neutralization process during the*
44 *destruction of chemical weapons known as hydrolysate which, if mishandled, can be prone to leakage,*
45
46 *Further recalling the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous*
47 *Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998) promoting shared responsibility regarding the trade of*
48 *hazardous chemicals,*
49

- 50 1. *Urges* all OPCW Member States which have not yet complied with their chemical weapons destruction
51 obligations to do so by 2025;
52
- 53 2. *Encourages* that for the Fourth Review Conference of the CWC, an invitation will be extended to all States that
54 have not yet signed the CWC to discuss the possibility of their future commitment to the CWC, and any barriers
55 that may be preventing them from joining at the present time;
56
- 57 3. *Calls upon* the Security Council to consider extending the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism
58 established in Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), and as proposed in Security Council draft resolution 962
59 (2017);
60
- 61 4. *Supports* the establishment of a Special Representative for Universality in the following, reporting directly to
62 the Director General with the mission of achieving complete international accession to the CWC through duties
63 including:
64
- 65 a. Direct negotiation towards ratification of the CWC with head representatives and diplomats of Non-
66 OPCW Member States;
67
- 68 b. Conducting research into the institutional, political, social, cultural, and regional factors that influence
69 the discussion regarding possible accession to the CWC in countries which have not yet ratified;
70
- 71 c. Building relationships with non-governmental organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, the
72 International Red Cross, Christian Aid, and the Royal Society, which may have strong relationships
73 with states that have not yet ratified the CWC and could encourage them toward ratification;
74
- 75 5. *Suggests* the Conference of States Parties inquire into the appointment of OPCW Executive Council members to
76 better incorporate the interests and voices of small and developing Member States to the OPCW for the purpose
77 of increasing their ability to resist non-state actors seeking to use or proliferate chemical weapons on their
78 territory:
79
- 80 a. Encouraging all OPCW Member States to consider small and developing states in Executive Council
81 voting;
82
- 83 b. Advising the possibility of regularly giving the regionally rotating Executive Council seat to a
84 developing OPCW Member States;
85
- 86 6. *Advises* the OPCW Member States to hold a summit discussing the formation of a working group through the
87 Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to analyze and update the development of chemical technologies including
88 dual use chemical compounds, in collaboration with the private sector and regional bodies databases:
89
- 90 a. Members of the group are to be decided upon based on the same geographic division of the Executive
91 Council:
92
- 93 i. Consisting of 82 research and industrial experts representing every region;
94 ii. Each Member State may renew its membership in the working group annually to be approved
95 by a vote from the Conference of the State Parties;
96
- 97 b. It should submit bi-annual reports to the Director-General on the research developments on dual use
98 chemical compounds;
99
- 100 7. *Highly recommends* utilizing the SAB working group Updates and Developments (UDs) studies to additionally
101 review and update new findings into the Annex of the CWC into the already existing three schedules, which
102 would:
103

- 104 a. Include arising chemical toxic materials, precursors and dual use chemicals including but not limited to
105 Novichok and its raw components and others in the categories already scheduled within the CWC
106 schedules, for the purpose to minimize threats of chemical weapon production;
107
- 108 b. Ensure that Member States which have stockpiled chemical agents newly added to the Annex of the
109 CWC, will receive financial compensation for the increased security measures that need to be
110 implemented regarding production, transport, storage, and consumption in case a chemical compound
111 receives a higher security status through the update based on the review of the working group UD's
112 findings:
113
- 114 i. Depending on the increase in security measures necessary based on changes made within the
115 schedules of the Annex financial compensation vary;
116 ii. Financial compensation will be provided by the Working Capital Fund;
117 iii. Non-State Parties will receive higher compensation for the destruction of all scheduled
118 chemical materials with the purpose to provide additional incentives for Non-State Parties to
119 ratify the CWC;
120
- 121 8. *Suggests* the adoption of a Universal Labelling System of chemical agents, in accordance to the *United Nations*
122 *Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals 2011*, which would standardize the
123 information on chemical labels:
124
- 125 a. Said labels will be applied to chemical schedules 1, 2, and 3 used within the chemical industry and
126 retail to ensure transparency about components, quantities, usage, origin and destination location
127 including:
128
- 129 i. Name of said chemical;
130 ii. Schedule of concerning chemical;
131 iii. Address and telephone number of the manufacturer;
132 iv. Batch number;
133 v. Product identifier;
134 vi. Signal word;
135 vii. Hazard statement(s)/warnings;
136 viii. Precautionary Statements(s), including information regarding prevention, response, storage,
137 stockpiling, disposal, and consumption;
138 ix. Pictogram(s);
139
- 140 b. Funded by the Working Capital Fund;
141
- 142 9. *Suggests* the implementation of the proven Prevent, Detect, and Respond safety protocol, by seeking to:
143
- 144 a. Prevent chemical accidents, and security incidents, from occurring at chemical processing and
145 destruction facilities by providing:
146
- 147 i. More streamlined information technology inventory management systems focusing on
148 harmonization, standardization, and integration such as a hybrid cloud computing
149 environment which could provide better flexibility to industries by orchestrating between
150 onsite premises, private, third party, and public cloud systems;
151 ii. Control banding hazard assessment protocols to selectively control risks and hazards by
152 prioritizing them based on levels of risk exposure;
153
- 154 b. Detect chemical accidents, and security incidents, in chemical production facilities by forming
155 strategic partnerships with key players in the Global Chemical Detection Technology market to
156 provide chemical detection and identification technologies through the installation of:
157
- 158 i. Aspiration Ion Mobility Spectrometry;
159 ii. Surface active micro sensors;

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- c. Respond to chemical accidents, and security incidents, by providing better personal protective and decontamination equipment and secondary containment to protect against leakage of hazardous waste such as:
 - i. Polypropylene and high-density polyethylene for halogenated hydrocarbons as well as caustic and other corrosive chemicals;
 - ii. Stainless steel for when chemical purity is critical;
 - d. Monitor the safe destruction of chemical agents in an environmentally sustainable manner by:
 - i. Referring to the safe storage of hydrolysate produced by neutralization of chemical agents in secure, predestinated hazardous waste treatment plants;
 - ii. Ensuring the strategic placement of chemical incineration plants downwind from major population and urban areas to reduce the impacts of such activities by closely collaborating with the World Health Organisation to reduce air pollution;
10. *Encourages* the participation of Member States to strengthen their national security through the Assistance and Protection Branch of the Technical Secretariat, and regional organizations, by adhering to PIC standards, and the main focus of controlling the imports and exports of chemical toxic materials, precursors, and dual-use chemicals as well as combating money laundering that would otherwise be used to finance armed non-state actors by requesting the annual reports of trade transactions in the chemical industries including, but not limiting to:
- a. The information with regards to the purchaser and supplier including:
 - i. The stakeholders involved;
 - ii. The identity of the particular purchaser and supplier;
 - iii. The way the chemicals were delivered;
 - b. Details concerning transactions and costs, such as:
 - i. The transactions amount;
 - ii. The date and time of the export or import of the chemical materials;
 - iii. The purpose of the trade of the chemical materials.



Code: OPCW1/10

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: The Complete Eradication of Chemical Weapons

1 *The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,*

2
3 *Recalling the Geneva Protocol (1992), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,*
4 *Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993) (CWC), General Assembly resolution*
5 *67/44 (2004), General Assembly resolution 71/59 (2016), General Assembly resolution 71/69 (2016), and Security*
6 *Council resolution 2118 (2013),*

7
8 *Guided by the values outlined in Articles 3 and 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which*
9 *entitles all persons right to life, liberty and security of person,*

10
11 *Recognizing that since the ratification of the CWC 96 percent of declared chemical weapon stockpiles have been*
12 *destroyed according to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Director General in*
13 *November 2017,*

14
15 *Noting further the necessity for cooperation and assistance under Article X, section 7, of the CWC with OPCW*
16 *Member States that possess inadequate resources to safely produce, store, and transport industrial chemical materials*
17 *to ensure they are not used for harmful intentions,*

18
19 *Noting with deep concern the possibility of states and violent non-state actors obtaining and using weapons of mass*
20 *destruction including but not limited to chemical weapons,*

21
22 *Recognizing the continued disarmament and non-proliferation efforts involving chemical weapons are essential to*
23 *international security and United Nations (UN)-wide peace efforts,*

24
25 *Further taking note of the role of non-governmental organizations such as the Organization for Defending Sardasht*
26 *Victims of Chemical Weapons, South Asian Strategic Institute, Society for the Study for Peace and Conflict and the*
27 *Association for the Defense of the Rights of Veterans and Victims and Victims of Chemical Weapons in Fars*
28 *Province various aspects of chemical weapons issues including discouraging the use of chemical weapons and*
29 *providing assistance to victims of chemical weapons,*

30
31 *Underlining the importance of international organizations dealing with the eradication of Weapons of Mass*
32 *Destruction including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs*
33 *(UNODA), the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, all facing similar challenges and the*
34 *need to approach similar states but with different areas of expertise in the field of eradication and ensuring*
35 *compliance,*

36
37 *Reaffirming the important roles played by the Chemical Industry Collaboration Group and the International Council*
38 *of Chemical Associations (ICCA) in regards to industrial production of dual-use chemicals,*

39
40 *Concerned by the results of the OPCW Report on the Needs and Best Practices on Chemical Safety and Security*
41 *Management (2016) and Engaging the Chemical Industry Associations (2016) which emphasize the importance of*
42 *efficient communication systems between OPCW Member States monitoring the status of chemical substances,*

43
44 *Acknowledging the list of toxic chemicals defined in the CWC Annex B, Schedules on Chemicals listed under the*
45 *Scheduled Chemicals Database,*

46
47 *Expressing grave concern that the OPCW Member States have yet to fully abide by the provisions delineated in the*
48 *CWC,*

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Calling attention to the lack of communication between the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and OPCW Member States as collective regional groups regarding the research and specification of new chemical substances, with a special focus on areas wherein non-compliance exists,

1. *Recommends* regional utilizations of the Global Harmonizing Standards System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals that will:

- a. Call upon OPCW Member States to cooperate with the Chemical Industry Collaboration Group to enhance the group's efforts on the domestic level in order to strengthen industry inspection for the production of dual-use chemicals and ensure the effective implementation of CWC's provisions regarding such chemicals in accordance with Article 2 and 5, which define and discuss "Toxic Chemicals" and "Chemical Weapons Production Facilities;"
- b. Encourage OPCW Member States to cooperate with the Chemical Industry Collaboration Group in order to strengthen industry inspection for the production of dual-use chemicals and ensure the effective implementation of CWCs provisions regarding such chemicals in accordance with Article 2, which defines "Toxic Chemicals" and "Chemical Weapons Production Facility", and Article 5 that further discusses chemical weapons production facilities;
- c. Promote the use of the chemical substance (CAS) registry, which tracks all precursor chemicals identified by the CWC in order to promote global identification of known scheduled chemicals;
- d. Recognize the limitations of the previously mentioned CAS registry and work toward the promotion of regional cooperation of groups to form customs agreements on newly registered PSF-chemical (containing phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine), also known as discrete organic chemicals, to the CAS Registry in a timely manner;
- e. Intervene in the industrial sectors where dual use chemical elements are exploited by providing incentives and recognition for those biochemical companies that try to reduce the use of such chemical agents where possible;

2. *Further encourages* OPCW Member States to coordinate with the ICCA and incorporate their projects which include establishing information sharing platforms for the global chemical industry, within national or regional action plans and frameworks;

3. *Urges* OPCW Member States to implement the CWC in a timely manner through:

- a. Higher attention and security in public and private laboratories where chemicals are used as raw materials, with renewed anti-terrorism security standards in order not to undervalue the potential risk of terrorist cell actions under this point of view;
- b. Awareness and promotion about the fundamental importance of the mission of CWC aiming at inviting non-state parties to the CWC;

4. *Recommends* the establishment of an advisory Panel, called the advisory Panel of Experts for an Agenda on the Complete Eradication of weapons of mass destruction (PEACE), that will meet bi-annually at the OPCW headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands, consisting of members from the OPCW and different UN entities dealing with the eradication of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons by:

- a. Including UNODA, the IAEA and the BCW ISU;
- b. Aiming to:

- 104 i. Improve the coordination between the aforementioned agencies to address the similar
105 challenges that arise in achieving the eradication of the different types of weapons of mass
106 destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons;
107 ii. Ensure compliance with international treaties on weapons of mass destruction such as but not
108 limited to the CWC, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Nuclear
109 Test Ban Treaty by discussing, exchanging and evaluating different practices and expertise on
110 compliance mechanisms;
111 iii. Incentivize the ratification of such treaties through joint incentives of all entities such as but
112 not limited to the offer of capacity building programs as well as exchange of food and
113 technology for peaceful purposes and thus;
114 iv. Combine efforts regarding the complete eradication of all weapons of mass destruction and
115 achieve the full ratification of the CWC;
116

117 5. *Proposes* the international adoption and expansion of the Scheduled Chemicals Database by:

- 118
119 a. Including an integrated communications system, allowing for efficient communication between OPCW
120 Member States, chemical enterprises, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), military and law
121 enforcement;
122
123 b. Streamlining communication between all parties, bypassing any third-party systems to;
124
125 c. Ensuring ease in the sharing of crucial information and new developments;
126
127 d. Developing effective tracking methods for both new and existing substances and materials;
128
129 e. Establishing a group of advisors under the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW in cooperation with
130 chemical scientist and experts from the chemical industry to perform research on newly synthesized
131 chemicals as well as on the chemicals already scheduled to enable continuous updates of the database
132 through scientific research:
133
134 i. by conducting monthly reviews of the chemicals already scheduled and;
135 ii. by expanding research on and risk assessment of newly synthesized, possible dual-use
136 chemicals, based on scientific publications worldwide;
137 iii. in order to allow governments and law enforcement to efficiently adapt to emerging security
138 concerns;
139
140 f. Encouraging that non-compliant parties exceeding a defined period of stockpiling without a declared
141 friendly usage be inspected by PEACE with high precedence;
142

143 6. *Calls upon* a timely restriction of stockpiling of dual use chemicals defined under the CWC Annex B Schedules
144 of Chemicals by:

- 145
146 a. Ensuring the permission of stockpiling of toxic chemicals is limited gradually with respect to the
147 defined schedule of chemical weapons and category of severity to be assessed by the Scientific
148 Advisory Board of the OPCW;
149
150 b. Stressing that non-compliant parties exceeding a defined period of stockpiling without a declared
151 friendly usage should be inspected by PEACE with high precedence;
152
153 c. Recommending that the OPCW conduct an audit of member states to determine those of the utmost
154 necessity for assistance;
155

156 7. *Recommending* that the OPCW conduct an audit of OPCW member states to determine those of the utmost
157 necessity for assistance;
158

- 159 8. *Suggests* to work accordingly to the updates of the Scheduled Chemical Database to assure that OPCW Member
160 States, non-OPCW Member States, NGOs and chemical producer all have the same information which will
161 facilitate the cooperation between the relevant actors by:
162
- 163 a. Facilitating communication between all beneficiaries and the transparency of the dual-use chemicals’
164 trade and the eradication of chemical weapons and;
 - 165 b. Cooperation with the newly established group of advisors under the SAB of the OPCW aiming to:
166
 - 167 i. Study all chemical elements and find those that, having the same effectiveness, are successful
168 to replace the so called “dual-use elements” in their employment;
 - 169 ii. Emanate recurrent reports, at least once a year, showing the results of the studies done by
170 chemists and scientists on these chemical elements;
 - 171 iii. Emanate recurrent programs, at least once a year, having analyzed these reports, that provide
172 a way to do so that dual-use chemicals could be replaced;
 - 173
 - 174
- 175 9. *Suggests* OPCW Member States provide further attention and assistance for the eradication of chemical
176 weapons, and requests further attention towards the purpose of improving the resource and training of nations
177 with chemical industries that possess limited means of safe production, storage, and transportation of
178 aforementioned hazardous chemicals through:
179
- 180 a. Providing logistic services through OPCW-centered assistance such as transportation operations,
181 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Team, as well as air transport capacity;
182
 - 183 b. Encouraging OPCW Member States to establish robust connections with partner institutions of OPCW,
184 such as the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons
185 Convention (VERIFIN), dedicated to providing technical support for chemists from developing
186 countries based on research and experience on the Chemical Weapons convention (CWC) and training
187 courses such as;
188
 - 189 i. Courses on National Authorities and Chemical Databases, which mainly focuses on the duties
190 of national authorities (for the CWC), legislative issues concerning the national
191 implementation of the CWC, collection of data, declarations, and inspections;
 - 192 ii. Spectral Interpretation and Reporting of Chemicals related to the Chemical Weapons
193 Convention in the framework of OPCW SIR Course which aims at preparing the trainees for
194 the participation of the OPCW proficiency testing program, as well as follow guidelines from
195 EU or other customers;
 - 196 iii. Expertise Workshop on the CWC (tailored courses) which seeks to improve practical skills in
197 analyzing chemicals related to the Convention through such techniques as gas
198 chromatography and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry;
 - 199
 - 200 c. Expanding available financial services to OPCW Member States requiring assistance from the OPCW
201 in order to negate the financial drawbacks this body’s suggestions, and recommends that all
202 transactions done be appropriately documented in the interest of Article X, section 4, of the CWC to
203 ensure transparency of the program;
204
- 205 10. *Supports* the continued efforts to better promote dialogue between both public and private sectors in order to
206 encourage compliance of OPCW States that have economic restraints by:
207
- 208 a. Establishing partnerships with the International Chemical Safety Council to continue to expand its
209 cooperation between industry leaders and producers of chemicals;
210
 - 211 b. Encouraging public-private partnerships modeling after the Duvale Partnership and inviting investors
212 to fund local schools and businesses;
 - 213
 - 214 c. Encouraging advising financial experts in regulating trade practices and partners;

- 215
216 11. *Encourages* cooperation between the SAB and the Executive Council of the OPCW to establish regional
217 scientific bodies that are:
218
219 a. Dedicated to publishing regional opinions in regard to chemical agents as well as chemical activities
220 and reporting to the SAB aiming at improving trans-levels communications;
221
222 b. Formed by at least 15 professionals with firm knowledge and expertise about the region they come
223 from as well as the prominent substances and/or chemical activities;
224
225 c. Encouraged to publishing their own opinions and recommendations concerning regional regulations in
226 the management of chemical industries within the region;
227
228 d. Required to organize a regional summit biannually to inform States Parties to the CWC within the area
229 about the latest chemical discovery as well as the results of studies conducted over time after getting
230 approval from the SAB Chairperson;
231
- 232 12. *Encourages* all OPCW Member States to expand education and capacity opportunities for their scientists and
233 others by hosting OPCW lab assistance courses and improving the training with the intent of increasing the
234 number of designated OPCW laboratories by:
235
236 a. Recommending educational programs inviting all OPCW Member States parties to participate in a
237 course for the training of instructors in order to directly addresses the issue of the complete eradication
238 of chemical weapons and non-compliance by advancing the efforts of non-proliferation by urging
239 participating groups to destroy stockpiles and refrain from acquiring requisite materials for the creation
240 of chemical weapons;
241
242 b. Organizing lab assistance programs between OPCW Technical Secretariat and OPCW Distinguished
243 Labs for testing to promote a foster ship program to better prepare future participants to thrive;
244
245 c. Supporting this program will be supporting by the technical secretariat via both the associate program
246 to and the equipment programs to bridge the gap of capacity in national implementation that many still
247 face;
248
249 d. Implementing the use of inquiry kits that can be fulfilled by regional designated laboratories to more
250 aptly determine most relevant testing materials upon selecting a foster-laboratory;
251
252 e. Encouraging OPCW Member States to further cooperate with OPCW programs, including the
253 Advisory Board on Education and Outreach to empower and ensure inclusivity, especially OPCW
254 Member States who lack the ability to comply to the CWC, as well as utilizing the aforementioned
255 existing bodies;
256
- 257 13. *Endorses* the Framework for Accountability and Transparency program with the usage of Radio Frequency
258 Identification Tags to ensure that the tagged chemical weapons or materials being sent for destruction reach the
259 processing facilities and are then properly destroyed;
260
- 261 14. *Establishes* a formal group within the OPCW modeled after the Group of Governmental Experts from other UN
262 bodies with the responsibility of:
263
264 a. Approaching non-compliant OPCW Member States prioritizing diplomatic fashion and;
265
266 b. Requesting sanctions to the UN Security Council in the event of repeated non-compliance after
267 diplomatic action has been exhausted;
268

269 15. *Insists* all UN Member States ratify the CWC in order to promote international cooperation and transparency
270 among all UN Member States against the re-emergence of chemical weapons so as to provide a peaceful
271 environment for human development.