

National Model United Nations • New York

Conference A

30 March – 3 April 2014



Documentation of the Work of the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Summary Report

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons held its annual session to consider the following agenda: Ensuring the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. This session was attended by representatives of 107 Member States. The delegates began this session with eagerness and high energy, apparent by the first five speeches that discussed the setting of the agenda. Soon thereafter, the committee broke into their first suspension of the meeting for 30 minutes and discussed setting the committee's topics: Ensuring the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. By the end of the first committee session, the body voted to set the agenda to 2-1.

In the committee's second session, the dais was joined by their newly elected Chair, Tassilo Oxenius, and their Rapporteur, Nadezdha Vasileva. With 108 Member States present, the committee opened with a few speeches from the honorable delegates. In the following one hour suspension of the meeting, delegates began to form working blocs in an effort to begin their drafts of working papers. Upon return to formal session, the body heard various speeches to promote working papers dealing with an array of topics such as regional and interregional financial assistance strategy, export and import control mechanisms, dual-use item and Schedule Three Chemical Weapons tracking and technical training of internal personnel. By far the most impressive point of this session was the delegates' voluntary initiative to merge working papers before having even submitted the first draft working paper.

During committee session three, 106 Member States were present. More than one delegate expressed the desire to extend the speaker's time to 90 seconds in an effort to hear the ideas being generated throughout committee more thoroughly. Although this extension was not granted, it was a true testimony of the environment within all committee sessions: one which reflected the interest and respect each delegate displayed for one another. By this session, it was clear that the committee had kicked into full gear and were actively immersed in the development of their working papers. Generally, the committee was separated into 8 blocs of delegates. The first working paper was submitted to the dais before the end of session

A total of 106 Member States were present for committee session four. In true promotional spirit, the body moved for suspension of the meeting and once in informal session, hit the ground running in an effort to advance their working papers. Although the speaker's list was riddled with Member States, the body was more interested in continuing the progress on their working papers. At this point, working papers were constantly being submitted. At the conclusion of this committee session, there were a total of 10 working papers presented to the dais.

On April 1, 2014, OPCW committee session five commenced with a total of 99 Member States present. Before entering formal session, the dais was presented with an 11th working paper. It was clear that delegations were working hard to formulate conclusions and recommendations for their working papers. During the 60 minute suspension of the meeting and followed by a second suspension for 30 minutes, delegates received their revisions from the dais. At the height of the editing process, delegates caucused amongst themselves to address similarities within the working papers on the floor. Several groups initiated negotiations centered around merging working papers into one cohesive topic. Furthermore, delegates were determined to continue this work throughout their lunch break.

A total of 97 Member States were present for committee session six. The dais advised delegates that the deadline to submit new, unseen working papers was the end of the committee's seventh morning session. With this goal in mind, delegates worked steadily to meet this request. After two long, intense suspension of the meetings, the dais entertained the delegates on the speaker's list. Many speeches consisted of the work

the entire body was doing and detailed where to meet at the next suspension for purposes of gathering supporters. However, after committee session concluded, more than half the OPCW delegates remained in their committee room in hopes to merge their working papers into one, despite having worked a previous ten hours.

At its seventh session with a total of 106 Member States present, delegates worked extremely hard to merge with other like-minded working papers. There were two major mergers that increased sponsorship from 9 to over 30 on one working paper dealing with The Encouragement of Cooperation with Regions and the Training of Border Security Agencies for Chemical Weapons Control. The delegates originally discussed their concerns about having such a large sponsor group after their voluntary merge. The concern, however, was not about the amount of sponsors or who the sponsors were, but instead, was centered around the coordination amongst the group should there be any friendly amendments. The sponsors of this working paper took initiative to divide themselves into small groups by topic so that in the case an unfriendly amendment was submitted, they could quickly and easily address this purposed amendment. It proved to be a useful tactic seeing as how there were two amendments proposed for their draft report segment.

On April 2, the OPCW held its final session of this conference. After all working papers were submitted on time, the body had 6 draft report segments in total to vote upon. With a total of five amendments, two which were unfriendly, the committee was ready to go into voting procedures. The first draft report segment was successfully achieved by acclamation, officially making it OPCW Report 2/1. The second draft report segment was interesting because it did not pass by consensus. Due to OPCW Rules of Procedure, a draft report segment which is not passed by consensus is then voted on by a 2/3 majority, but not before the director exerts his discretion to call for a suspension to discuss the idea of passing the draft report segment by consensus. After having taken a short break to achieve this consensus, the vote by acclamation was still opposed by two delegations. After a 2/3 majority vote, the draft report segment was officially adopted as OPCW Report 2/2. The next two draft report segments were successfully voted on with an adoption by acclamation. Likewise, the last two draft report segments were voted on by 2/3 majority. In sum, all six draft report segments were accepted by the body and therefore became Reports.

Code: OPCW/02/001

Committee: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions

1 **I. Introduction**
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3 **A. BUILDING NATIONAL POLICE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPACITY IN PERIODS OF**
4 **POLITICAL TRANSITION**
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- 6 1. In accordance with the primary goal clearly stated in Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
7 furthering global disarmament and security.
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- 9 2. The OPCW is aware that many Member States are unable to train their security forces to properly react in
10 the event of a chemical weapons attack. In fact, State security forces often lack the funding and/or expertise
11 necessary to prevent the acquisition and development of chemical weapons by non-state actors on their
12 territory. Also, these security forces often also lack the ability to adequately respond in the aftermath of a
13 chemical weapons attack.
14
- 15 3. States undergoing political transition, including but are not limited to, elections, regime change and intra-
16 state conflict, are particularly vulnerable to the threat of chemical weapons. Politically unstable States are
17 likely to have relatively weak institutions and may lack control over some or all of their territory. This
18 weakness enables non-state or other hostile actors to acquire, develop or stockpile chemical weapons on the
19 territory of these states. Due to the weakness of state institutions, the case of Somalia has shown the
20 inability to prevent the militant group al-Shabaab from pursuing the development of chemical weapons on
21 Somali territory. Strengthening state institutions is not only a priority, but also a necessary step in
22 countering political instability. Ensuring the effectiveness of state security institutions will help to counter
23 the threat of chemical weapons.
24
- 25 4. The Organization recognizes the importance of U.N. Police as an on-the-ground monitoring, advising and
26 training force to restore the rule of law in unstable States. The UN Police has supported the reform,
27 restructuring and rebuilding of domestic police and other law enforcement agencies in conjunction with UN
28 peacekeeping operations including Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the Democratic Republic of the
29 Congo (MONUSCO), and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). This cooperation aims to reestablish police services
30 in order to create the conditions for sustainable peace and development, which the OPCW also recognizes
31 as an important step in mitigating the threat of chemical weapons.
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33 **II. Mandate**
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- 35 5. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has the power and capacity to address
36 the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. As stated on Article VIII of the Convention
37 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
38 their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC), the OPCW's object and purpose is to ensure
39 the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification, providing a forum for
40 consultation and cooperation among Member States.
41
- 42 6. For this purpose, the OPCW bases its actions on the provisions established in the Chemical Weapons
43 Convention (CWC). The priorities of the CWC are defined by the ultimate organization's goal to achieve
44 effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
45 control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same
46 time, any progress made on the issue at hand responds to the CWC's recognition that the complete and
47 effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of
48 chemical weapons, and that their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these
49 common objectives.
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- 51 7. Particularly during Political Transitions, Member States have to comply with its General Obligations
52 contained on Article 1, paragraph 2, of destroying chemical weapons in their possession or that are located
53 in any place under its jurisdiction or control. At the same time, the obligation contained on Article 1,
54 paragraph 4 relating to the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities have to be ensured. For
55 this purpose, Member States of the OPCW have the responsibility to cooperate in order to assist third
56 Parties to comply with its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
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- 58 8. For complying with its mandate the OPCW Conference of State parties shall consider any questions,
59 matters or issues within the scope of the CWC, making recommendations and taking decisions on any
60 questions matters or issues related to the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions.
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62 **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

63 **A. BUILDING NATIONAL POLICE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPACITY IN PERIODS OF** 64 **POLITICAL TRANSITION** 65

- 66
- 67 9. Upon the request of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), the OPCW's Technical
68 Secretariat is willing to host workshops to provide assistance in educating and training UN Police Forces to
69 recognize chemical weapons precursor agents and mechanisms for detecting the production and
70 compilation of chemical weapons. The OPCW further encourages the training of UN Police Forces include
71 safety measures for defending existing chemical production and storage facilities, which will help prevent
72 possible attacks on the facilities and potential acquisition or production of chemical weapons precursor
73 agents. Furthermore, the OPCW encourages the United Nations Institute for Training and Research
74 (UNITAR) partner with the OPCW in assisting UN Police on the training of local law enforcers and police
75 agencies. The collaboration between the OPCW and UN Police will consist on establishing protocols for
76 identifying and monitoring key chemical production and storage sites within host-states with reference to
77 the Chemical Material Prioritization Index for Security (CMPIS) and the CWC chemical schedules;
78 identification of potential threats to these chemical facilities specifically from non-state and other hostile
79 actors; contingency and response plans to defend against attacks or other attempts to acquire chemicals
80 from these key chemical sites; operations to disrupt chemical weapon development sites in conjunction
81 with local forces and government authorities; intelligence from regional border security agencies regarding
82 the trafficking of chemical weapons within the boundaries of the state; assistance in the means of
83 decontamination of the affected areas, medical assistance for victims and the management of the other
84 consequences that are the results chemical attacks.
85
- 86 10. The OPCW also suggests that the DPKO, in conjunction with the OPCW, further make available the
87 training of local police forces to perform the aforementioned functions. The ultimate goal of this program
88 will be to build the capacity of local law enforcement agencies to serve as the primary policing mechanism
89 within the State by the end of the UN Police deployment. Additionally, the UN should be prepared to
90 support the local police forces during training by procuring the same type of detection equipment to be used
91 in the country after the deployment ends. That equipment will be purchased using the Equipment-Exchange
92 Programme *outlined in S/307/2002/Rev.1* and donations from other member States of the OPCW. The
93 technical equipment and other resources for these missions include, but are not limited to: detection,
94 decontamination and protection of equipment, will be provided by the OPCW during and after training in
95 cooperation with the UN through several channels.
96
- 97 11. This program will be funded by grants and donations from member States including Canada's Global Peace
98 and Security Fund, under the auspices of the Protection Clause of Article X of the CWC, in order to
99 promote education initiatives for first responders to chemical weapons attacks. The program should also
100 make use of voluntary funds as required.

National Model United Nations • NY - Working Paper Template

Code: OPCW/02/002

Committee: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Topic: Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transition

I. Introduction

A. Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions

1. As stated in the amendments to the Financial Regulations and Rules of the OPCW (*C – 15/DEC.5*), the Voluntary Fund for Assistance is aimed at providing aid, under Article X of the Convention, to a State Party when requested. The Application of the Voluntary Fund for Assistance, used for the purpose of emergency assistance to be maintained by the OPCW. The Voluntary Fund for Assistance consists of voluntary contributions from Member States as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) and private parties.
2. Collaboration between regional and international financial institutions would initiate and encourage the formation of programs to promote CWC membership and the production of peaceful chemical resources. Financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and regional development banks would be vital in promoting research and development in the field of peaceful chemical production, border security, education for regional and local officials, victims’ assistance, and improvement of technological databases for the verification and tracking of chemical agents.
3. Understanding the role of the *AGResults Innovative Fund to Boost Food Security and Farmer Livelihoods Initiative* as a key market strategy to improve the livelihoods of the developing world, it should be used as a strong model to address the current issues at hand, as it can provide incentives for Member States when they reach milestones during implementation of the CWC and resolution 1540. *AgResults* was born out of the realization that there is a great need for increased investment in global food security and agriculture, in particular from the private sector. Utilizing their “pull mechanisms” as a means to encourage results through results-based payments, these financing mechanisms serve as a critical resource to stabilize and address chemical weapons safety in political transitions.
4. Recognizing the *Africa Programme*, more specifically the Equipment Exchange Programme, which is meant to facilitate the transfer of prevention and protection equipment from facilities located in industrialized States. This program has garnered much success and has received critical acclaim from the Technical Secretariat and Member States participating.
5. The OPCW notes that all Member States that are part of the CWC are required under Article X, to assist and provide equipment and monetary assistance to countries in order to further prevent and protect Member States from chemical weapons attacks, especially during political transition.
6. Drawing from experience of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) in granting technical assistance and financing to *Complementary Infrastructure PPP Projects* in Senegal, the General Conference suggests that Member States provide active support and involvement with their respective authorities, sponsors and other stakeholders in order to establish solid long-term relationships with them. This project demonstrates that regional public-private partnership projects can be applied likewise within the purview of the OPCW’s task, i.e. ensuring chemical weapons safety in countries experiencing political transition.
7. The OPCW recognizes the importance of *Vertic’s National Implementation Measures Programme*, a non-profit organization, which, at the demand of Member States, can provide legal and technical assistance for the implementation of national verification of facilities and arms control.

II. Mandate

8. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has the power and capacity to address the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. As stated on Article VIII of the Convention

52 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
53 their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC), the OPCW's object and purpose is to ensure
54 the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification, providing a forum for
55 consultation and cooperation among Member States.

- 56
57 9. For this purpose, the OPCW bases its actions on the provisions established in the Chemical Weapons
58 Convention (CWC). The priorities of the CWC are defined by the ultimate organization's goal to achieve
59 effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
60 control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same
61 time, any progress made on the issue at hand responds to the CWC's recognition that the complete and
62 effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of
63 chemical weapons, and that their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these
64 common objectives.
- 65
66 10. Particularly during Political Transitions, Member States have to comply with its General Obligations
67 contained on Article 1, paragraph 2, of destroying chemical weapons it own possesses or that are located in
68 any place under its jurisdiction or control. At the same time, the obligation contained on Article 1,
69 paragraph 4 relating to the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities have to be ensured. For
70 this purpose, Member States of the OPCW have the responsibility to cooperate in order to assist third
71 Parties to comply with its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- 72
73 11. For complying with its mandate the OPCW Conference of State parties shall consider any questions,
74 matters or issues within the scope of the CWC, making recommendations and taking decisions on any
75 questions matters or issues related to the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions.

76 77 **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

78 79 **A. Financial Assistance for the Promotion of Capacity-building in the context of Chemical Safety in** 80 **Political Transitions.**

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82 12. Recommends that Member States of the General Conference of the OPCW contribute more actively to the
83 Voluntary Fund to promote efforts in the areas of development and capacity building, and peaceful uses of
84 chemistry. The General Conference recommends the delineation of areas of assistance within the Voluntary
85 Fund to provide target assistance to States requesting aid in possible areas such as technical and equipment
86 assistance, legal and national implementation assistance, and humanitarian assistance in areas of victim's
87 assistance or medical related issues. By creating these different topical branches of funding within the
88 voluntary fund, Member States would be able to provide targeted voluntary financial contributions to the
89 fund in order to improve States ability to address chemical weapons and chemical safety in the context of
90 political transitions and further the goal qualitative universality.
- 91
92 a. Recognizing the untapped potential of voluntary donations made by civilians, the OPCW
93 recommends the creation of a Crowd-funding mechanism, termed "Help to free the world of
94 chemical weapons". The donations would go automatically to the Voluntary Fund for assistance.
95 Civilians would be able to donate via phone in the form of a phone call or SMS. The OPCW
96 should further inform the State Parties about this initiative. State Parties should in turn, promote
97 the crowd-funding to their respective citizenry.
- 98
99 13. Recognizing the need for the OPCW to focus on the issue of chemical safety in the context of political
100 transitions and how this also furthers the objective of qualitative universality for a world free of chemical
101 weapons, the Member States of General Conference call for the reorganization of the funds within the
102 OPCW Regular Budget to further increase support to the Department of International Cooperation and
103 Assistance and Support to the Policy Making Organizations section. This will allow for workshops,
104 programs, and seminars to address the benefits of the peaceful uses of chemistry for least-developed
105 countries (LDCs) and States requesting assistance. These workshops, funded from the reorganized Regular
106 Budget, should be jointly sponsored through various IGOs and NGOs such as but not limited to the

107 following: UN, OPCW, Australia Group, UNODA, WHO, UNEP to foster greater international and
108 regional cooperation.
109

110 14. Understanding the limited fiscal resources available to the OPCW, the Member States General Conference
111 call for regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and Organization of American States (OAS)
112 to take a more active role in the monitoring process of chemical facilities through their respective
113 hemispheric or peace and security departments. This greater role for the regional organizations would
114 garner additional direct financial support for the verification and inspections mission of the OPCW
115 Technical Secretariat. This enhanced role for regional organizations will allow the OPCW to commit
116 additional fiscal resources from its limited Regular Budget to the development of programs and
117 mechanisms that further assist States to utilize chemicals for peaceful purposes.
118

- 119 a. Recognizing the need for a regional and sub-regional categorization on the severity of risks to
120 chemical usage in terms of political instability regarding the immediate need for assistance in an
121 effort to prioritize our efforts in areas of the most need, the OPCW will use the Chemical Material
122 Prioritization Index for Safety (CMPIS) for risk assessment to better expedite efficient and
123 effective usage of the limited fiscal resources.
124

125 15. Believing that international and regional financial institutions provide an additional and useful avenue for
126 strengthening the link between disarmament and development to stabilize States undergoing political
127 transition and to further enhance Member State capacity, the Member States of the General Conference call
128 for additional cooperation between such institutions. These partnerships would incentivize programs that
129 highlight the benefits of CWC memberships and the peaceful uses of chemistry. The General Conference
130 strongly supports partnerships between financial institutions such as but not limited to the IMF, World
131 Bank and regional development banks to provide the Member States with enhanced economic resources to
132 pursue programs that promote the safe and responsible use of chemicals and further internal and regional
133 development. These partnerships would provide economic resources to address concern in the areas of
134 border security, education and training for officials, victims' assistance, and improvement of technological
135 databases for the verification and tracking of chemical agents. The following initiatives could be
136 successfully adapted as model programs for use in chemical safety, peaceful uses, and the promotion of
137 non-proliferation of chemical weapons.
138

139 16. The World Bank-sponsored AGResults Innovative Fund to Boost Food Security and Farmer Livelihoods
140 Initiative should be used as a model of success in creating a strong incentivized mechanism to address key
141 issues in this topic area. This program utilizes "pull mechanisms" to encourage innovation through results-
142 based payments that are paid out when designated benchmarks or milestones have been met. Such
143 financing mechanisms have seen success in generating innovation and would allow States access to
144 additional resources with which to stabilize political transition and further universality by improving State
145 structure and processes. AgResults also launches a series of targeted pilot projects that address some of the
146 biggest problems in global food security and agricultural development. Such pilot programs could be
147 adapted for use by the OPCW for chemical topics to address areas where there is a lack of adequate
148 resources or where more resources should be devoted into areas such as border security, victim's assistance
149 and other forms of international cooperation. The OPCW Technical Secretariat could work in conjunction
150 with the World Bank to develop such a program for future use.
151

152 17. Finally, the Member States of the General Conference should also draw attention to strengthening the
153 financial resources available to the Equipment Exchange Programme initiated by the Africa Programme.
154 As mentioned earlier in Paragraph 5.b, the AGResults Innovative Fund to Boost Food Security and Farmer
155 Livelihoods Initiative should be used as a model for the improved Equipment Exchange Program.
156 Countries who reach milestones in implementing resolution 1540 or show sufficient commitment in
157 implementing resolution 1540 should be given incentives such as but not limited to, equipment to help
158 prevent and protect from chemical weapon attacks, such as alarm systems, protective equipment,
159 decontamination, and decontaminant equipment, and antidotes. Such milestones will be addressed
160 alongside of the reports provided to the 1540 Committee from the Member States. This initiative will act in
161 accordance with the obligations of the State Members under Article X of the CWC, which asks member
162 states to assist and coordinate with equipment needed to protect against chemical weapon attacks.

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- a. Utilize regional public-private partnership projects similar to the African Development Bank Group's (AfDB) *Complementary Infrastructure PPP Projects* like the one implemented in Senegal. Like this project, the OPCW calls for the Technical Secretariat to establish active dialogue and approval for as-needed loans or grants for infrastructure, security, or development projects relating to the safe handling of chemicals or the non-proliferation of chemical weapons in political transitions. This would allow the OPCW to broaden the scope of its technical assistance and foster greater regional cooperation and bilateral dialogue amongst Member States, which would contribute to qualitative universality and to mitigate the dangers posed to State bordering countries susceptible to destabilizing political transition. Such projects would utilize an active application system on a case-by-case basis with the OPCW Legal Assistance section acting as an intermediary between parties for the securing of the aforementioned loan and grant aid packages.

18. Recognizing the utility of economic incentives as a means of ensuring that States do not engage in the illicit utilization of weaponized chemical agents, the Member States of the General Conference encourage the creation of a new Plowshare Chemical Bank. These economic incentives, like aforementioned initiatives, act proactively to reduce the size and volatility of existing chemical stockpiles in stable but vulnerable States. Such an initiative will allow the international community to more efficiently address the issue of chemical agents in relation to development and instability. Retooling potentially dangerous manufacturing capacity and stockpiles can reduce their danger in the event of instability as a result of political transition.

19. Plowshare Chemical Bank incentivize the development of civilian chemical manufacturing, in lieu of chemical manufacturing for military purposes by acting as a market for chemical goods from CWC members. Joint-mission UN and OPCW Chemical Bank would purchase excess amounts of peaceful-use chemicals (fertilizers, sanitary products, pharmaceuticals, etc) from states that make meaningful strides to ratify the CWC but continue to face economic deterrents. Regulation by a UN body would ensure accountability of the Chemical Bank. Funding would be a joint commitment of the Voluntary Assistance Fund and the budget of the UN body administering the Chemical Bank. Purchase should be contractual, with set dates of phasing out and termination of aid.

20. The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW should be empowered to host yearly meetings with the specific mandate of informing about the benefits of peaceful use of chemicals and cost-saving processes. These meetings would invite educational institutions, experts on the retooling of military/dual-use chemical facilities into purely civilian use facilities, state actors, NGOs, international civil society organizations, and representatives of private industry for the purpose of civilian outreach and information. This would be done to facilitate the exchange of expertise on disarmament and civilian manufacturing as an incentive to disarm and allow for the sharing of best practices to harmonize expenditure in this area. The focus should be on creating general frameworks of economic development as an incentive for disarming, balanced with cost-saving measures for future implementation.

21. Aware of the need to further highlight the benefits of CWC membership, the Member States of the General Conference supports the implementation of a moratorium on assessed contributions for a period of one year for those States that exist outside of the CWC in order further incentivize the goal of quantitative universality.

B. Legal Assistance for the Promotion of Capacity-building in the Context of Chemical Safety and Political Transitions

22. The general Conference also draws attention to the Vertic National Implementation Measures Programme, as well as the National Legislation Implementation Kit for the Chemical Weapons Convention, which has provided countries experiencing budgetary restraints, a comprehensive and generalized draft legislation for the implementation of resolution 1540 as well for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Using these programs as models, a National Training Protection Plan should be recommended as a generalized plan that can be used by all states that are experiencing budgetary restraints. This plan would provide a plan for first responders, law enforcement, and chemical facilities to properly address safety of chemical weapons in the case of political transition. This initiative should also be flexible enough to allow Member States to address

219 their specific priorities, while also adhering to global standards with regards to National Protection Plan
220 training. This plan should be provided to Member States while attending regional workshops to facilitation
221 their comprehension of the National Protection Plan training initiative. This program will be both cost
222 effective and efficient to both member states and the OPCW as it decreases bureaucracy and also for a
223 further re-allocation of resources. It also allows for a strengthening of the legal apparatus of each State in
224 relation to chemical agents in political transitions.
225

226 23. Cognizant of the need to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations amongst Member States to further
227 financial and technical and legal support mechanisms and lessen the financial burden on the Technical
228 Secretariat, the General Conference recommends that Member States and regional organizations actively
229 work to cooperate in areas of verification and mutual assistance in the peaceful uses of chemicals and
230 promotion of such uses for development purposes. This will allow for additional verification measures that
231 have the possibility to be more stringent and occur more often than those conducted by the OPCW which
232 would close the gap on time between facility inspections. Such binational or multilateral legal arrangements
233 would allow for a harmonization of process for the safe handling of chemicals and allow mutual technical
234 assistance to be distributed more quickly and more efficiently. This increased collaboration will strengthen
235 ties between States and therefore will allow for greater communication between said States and their
236 regional partners while undergoing political transition. This has the overarching benefit of being cost-
237 effective for the OPCW Technical Secretariat and allow for the reallocation of funds elsewhere where such
238 agreements do not yet exist.
239

240 24. The Member States of General Conference draw attention to the Brazilian-Argentine Common System of
241 Safeguards (SCCC-ABACC) as a useful model for replication. This arrangement establishes a binational
242 entity tasked with further verifying the actives of each State Party and facilitates inspection missions with
243 representatives from both States present. It also provides for equipment exchange through the ABACC and
244 harmonization of safeguard procedures. A similarly modeled agreement would allow for Member States to
245 efficiently adapt a mechanism to combine national resources to further monitoring, verification, and
246 development initiatives. This would allow the OPCW to more effectively utilize its resources to reach a
247 wider array of Member States and provide accuracy for the dissemination of assistance to Member States.
248 These agreements could be concluded between friendly States within geographical regions in order to
249 create cost-effective additional oversight mechanisms. The cooperation involved would consist of the
250 aforementioned assistance as outlined by the ABACC.
251

252 25. Aware of the need to efficiently manage the financial resources of the OPCW and also pursue a legal
253 structure for more timely implementation of legal practices in States in order to codify State response to
254 chemical agents in political transitions and provide legislation for qualitative universality, the Member
255 States of the General Conference support the establishment of e-government initiatives that promote the
256 horizontal transfer of best practices in the area of legal assistance and legislation. The OPCW highlights the
257 Network of e-Government Leaders of Latin America and the Caribbean (Red GEALC) as an effective
258 model for the cost-effective dissemination of best practices regarding the implementation of national
259 legislation addressing chemical safety.
260

261 26. The network has put in operation a series of mechanisms that facilitate generating and disseminating
262 knowledge in the area of e-Government and national legislation. Such an adapted mechanism would
263 provide a cost-effective avenue for Member States to utilize to improve and harmonize their national
264 legislation more in-line with CWC mandates. The OPCW recommends that regional organizations such as
265 the Arab League and African Union implement such initiatives and include within them a voluntary fund
266 similar to The Horizontal Cooperation Fund, (FOCOH) of Red GEALC which would provide funding from
267 regional Member States to transport exports and promote the sharing of expertise on the management of
268 chemical safety and management legislation in an e-forum. This would ultimately prove cost-effective and
269 allow the OPCW to devote additional limited resources to States where such initiatives are lacking and
270 provide an additional option for States seeking to review and revise their national legislation in relation to
271 the sound management of chemicals in political transitions.
272

Code: OPCW/02/003

Committee: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Topic: Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transition

1 **I. Introduction**
2

3 **A. The Encouragement of Cooperation within Regions and the Training of Border Security**
4 **Agencies for Chemical Weapons Control**
5

- 6 1. International cooperation has increased international security. The Caribbean Community and Common
7 Markets' Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, or CARICOM IMPACS, is an example of such
8 cooperation. The effectiveness of training workshops and seminars, as the Assistance and Protection Training
9 for State Parties, and ensured personnel and officers have up-to-date information, training, and equipment (e.g.
10 by expanding OPCW Equipment Exchange Program or EEP). Such cooperation has also improved the ability of
11 States Parties to share best practices and experiences and has successfully addressed the issue of ensuring that
12 national authorities are properly equipped to handle CW emergencies. The training efforts of the OPCW
13 includes measures to impart substantive information on the nature of chemicals weapons and their precursors, as
14 well as how to ensure these dangerous substances are not illicitly traded and trafficked. In these training
15 workshops, the OPCW also provides practical experience in identifying prohibited chemicals and chemical
16 weapons. As such, it is a forum where trainees can discuss their experiences and methods with prevention in
17 their region.
18
- 19 2. The OPCW programme, the Chemical Safety and Security Management Programme (CSSMP), and their
20 contribution toward regional cooperation, safety management, and information sharing have been vital for the
21 progress of ridding the world of dangerous chemical weapons. From its establishment in 2009, there have been
22 a total of twenty effective projects all over the world, with the most recent project being the education of
23 chemical safety management for African Member States in November of 2013.
24
- 25 3. The OPCW currently holds annual training programs in different regions. The most recent of these programs
26 were held in Jamaica in 2013 for the CARICOM region, and is titled the Fifth Annual Training of Assistance
27 and Protection Program. In 2005, the OPCW created the official format for applying for assistance, and this was
28 recorded in the *C-10/DEC.8* decision.
29
- 30 4. During times of political transition, States may not have the proper amount of equipment or effectively trained
31 manpower to completely secure their borders. This increases the ability of non-state actors to transport illegal
32 material, possibly including chemical weapons, across the border. Consequently, helping neighbouring States
33 secure their borders and prevent illicit trade and trafficking during times of political transition will ensure the
34 safety and security of chemical stockpiles and/or the precursors listed in the Schedules of the CWC.
35
- 36 5. The OPCW training framework provides the necessary tools and information for the governmental officials
37 from Member States to return to their home units and train other personnel and subordinate on prevention of
38 proliferation of chemical weapons and prohibited material. This model is currently enacted by the OPCW in
39 both inspector-training sessions and in regional conferences. For example, the OPCW recently sponsored the
40 Regional Training Course of Customs Authorities of the States Parties in Eastern Europe on the Technical
41 Aspects of the Transfers Regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Baku, Azerbaijan, or (S/1059/2013).
42
- 43 6. To foster further progress in regional and global security, the OPCW encourages Member States, especially
44 States bordering countries experiencing political transition, to achieve a more comprehensive and effective
45 border control, or security circle, around those countries in tackling the problem of chemical materials and
46 weapons smuggling.
47
- 48 7. Considering the nature of limited resources in achieving the mission of OPCW initiatives, we are determined to
49 put lot of attention in allocation of such limited resources. Concretely, it means to review the spending areas of
50 the OPCW. This happens in two aspects: combining the segmented programs and assessing the risk of each

51 region.

52 53 **II. Mandate**

- 54
- 55 8. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has the power and capacity to address the
56 issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. As stated on Article VIII of the Convention on the
57 Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
58 Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC), the OPCW's object and purpose is to ensure the
59 implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification, providing a forum for
60 consultation and cooperation among Member States.
61
- 62 9. For this purpose, the OPCW bases its actions on the provisions established in the Chemical Weapons
63 Convention (CWC). The priorities of the CWC are defined by the ultimate organization's goal to achieve
64 effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
65 including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, any
66 progress made on the issue at hand responds to the CWC's recognition that the complete and effective
67 prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical
68 weapons, and that their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common
69 objectives.
70
- 71 10. Particularly during Political Transitions, Member States have to comply with its General Obligations contained
72 on Article 1, paragraph 2, of destroying chemical weapons it own possesses or that are located in any place
73 under its jurisdiction or control. At the same time, the obligation contained on Article 1, paragraph 4 relating to
74 the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities have to be ensured. For this purpose, Member States
75 of the OPCW have the responsibility to cooperate in order to assist third Parties to comply with its obligation
76 under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
77
- 78 11. For complying with its mandate the OPCW Conference of State parties shall consider any questions, matters or
79 issues within the scope of the CWC, making recommendations and taking decisions on any questions matters or
80 issues related to the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions.
81

82 **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

83 84 **A. The Encouragement of Cooperation within Regions and the Training of Border Security** 85 **Agencies for Chemical Weapons Control**

- 86
- 87 12. Although the CSSMP has proven to be an effective institution in terms of regional cohesion, it should be noted
88 that all CSSMP sponsored events are not distributed evenly by region. This results in a discrepancy of events
89 being held, some regions have an overabundance of events while other regions are neglected. Furthermore, the
90 current focus of these events is on chemical industry-related aspects. The Conference of States Parties to the
91 OPCW suggests the expansion of the CSSMP mandate, recommending the organisation hold regional fora at
92 least twice a year, which do not solely concentrate on peaceful chemical industry aspects but rather adopt a
93 more comprehensive approach encompassing a wide array of stakeholders, including but not limited to
94 designated national points of contact, chemical industry experts and OPCW technical experts. These fora shall
95 have the specific purpose of increasing regional transparency and cooperation between Member States in the
96 event of a political transition within the region with the purpose of decreasing the risk of a chemical attack,
97 similar to the *Programme to strengthen Cooperation with Africa*. The fora will discuss current issues involving
98 the safe use of industrial chemical agents and involve multilateral dialogue exploring issues critical to attaining
99 the safe use of chemicals. The proposed fora should not be limited in their form, but are rather a standard that
100 regions may adjust according to their needs and existing partnerships.
101
- 102 13. The Conference of States Parties recommends the CSSMP to further collaborate with established regional
103 entities such as the Arab league, European Union or the African Union to support the implementation of the
104 proposed regional fora. These fora shall take example on existing regional fora including the ASEAN regional
105 forum, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Southern Regional Forum, and the United Nations Regional Centre for

106 Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) for the structure of the regional groups. In
107 preparation for the fora, collaboration with existing OPCW groups specializing in doing research and
108 investigations on the use of chemicals is imperative. Member States participating in the forum shall provide
109 national reports that include personnel-training developments, innovations in chemical substance trade,
110 smuggling of chemical substances and other relevant national data, and proposals to ensure chemical weapons
111 safety in political transition. This would facilitate intra-regional harmonization of practices and knowledge-
112 sharing. The fora shall encourage cooperation between States through the planning of additional future regional
113 workshops, each workshop correctly addressing every State's priorities. These priorities should be assessed
114 according to the provided national reports.
115

116 14. The Conference of States Parties recommends these fora engage in the efficient and effective training of
117 emergency responders and the utilization of national experts in the field of chemistry to educate national law
118 enforcement officials in order to help them better respond to the potential use or threat of use of chemical
119 weapons. These fora should also invest in a regional simulation system, to bolster regional training, highlighting
120 the Exercise Bio-Shield Crisis Management Simulation as a mechanism that could be adapted for use in
121 chemical weapons incidents or emergency situations involving chemical agents.
122

123 15. The Conference of States Parties also calls upon the creation of an annual summit consisting of representatives
124 from every regional forum, in order to unite the efforts of regional cooperation. Within the framework of the
125 summit, regional representatives from both public and private industrial bodies will have the ability to voice
126 concerns over the potential weaponization of chemicals as addressed in regional fora. The summit will allow
127 such bodies to exchange information on successful provisions discussed during regional fora aimed at curtailing
128 the weaponization of industrial chemical agents. By the end of the summit, the OPCW will publish a detailed
129 document encompassing all recommended preventive actions, security details and further recommendations.
130 This will enable regional fora to stay informed of the potential dangers of chemical use and create preventive
131 procedures to be implemented by all sides involved in political transitions.
132

133 16. Already existing programmes with the purpose of increasing chemical safety and the peaceful use of chemicals,
134 such as the OPCW Associate Program for Chemists and Chemical Engineers from Developing Countries and
135 Countries in Transition and the temporary Group on Education and Outreach in Science and Technology,
136 should be expanded in order to not only effectively promote chemical weapons safety and address strategies to
137 increase State capacity, but also to utilize regional cooperation to advance the achievement of their purpose.
138 This collaboration would encourage knowledge-sharing between Member States, which could provide a wider
139 expert selection and a diversification of the issues addressed by such programmes. Consequently, more
140 adequate response would be provided to the regions according to their particular needs and appropriate
141 suggestions to chemical industry experts could be made. Furthermore these people shall be provided within this
142 framework with the skills to act as a trainer for the trainers. Also OPCW encourages Corporations and
143 governments for a better cooperation to share their experiences and actively engage regionally and
144 internationally within the training process.
145

146 17. The OPCW recommends Member States and regional organizations to hold workshops and seminars
147 specifically focused on border control in order to strengthen national authorities responsible for borders in
148 tracking and stopping the illegal transport of chemical weapons and prohibited chemical materials and the
149 implementation and promotion of education and information-sharing workshops within the regional training
150 framework outlined for the national authorities controlling national borders to strengthen civil awareness and
151 support of the CWC, international security and the protection of civilians from trafficked chemical weapons.
152 These workshops and seminars would ensure personnel and officers have updated information, training, and
153 equipment (e.g. by expanding OPCW EEP). In addition, experience and best practice sharing can also take
154 place on an on-line forum, for officials in States to communicate and exchange effectively.
155

156 18. The OPCW employs training programs in order to prepare national authorities in charge of border security to
157 strengthen their ability to enforce the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The OPCW proposes the
158 implementation and the further development of the already existing training programs, and an increase of the
159 involvement of national and regional organizations in these programs. Those trained through such programs
160 will be expected to report the results and outcomes of the training in their home states to their designated
161 OPCW national authority. Moreover, because the 1540 Committee has extensive resources of experts provided

162 by volunteer Member States, the OPCW should encourage further cooperation with the committee and utilize
163 their expertise in training sessions.
164

- 165 19. In order to enable UN peacekeeping forces to respond to chemical weapon incidents within regions, the
166 Conference of States Party calls upon the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to
167 add a further component of training with the purpose of educating, containing, and responding to chemical
168 weapons incidents when training UN peacekeeping forces. The OPCW will provide chemical expert personnel
169 to assist in the training of peacekeepers.
170
- 171 20. The Conference of States Parties to the OPCW recommends the amendment of the CWC Annex on verification
172 to adopt a universal measuring criteria to be developed by the Technical Secretariat to assess Member States.
173 There has not been an uniform criteria for identifying and reporting on the import and export of scheduled
174 chemicals by Member States within the OPCW. This results in critical discrepancies in national reports to the
175 OPCW and has posed significant challenges for the OPCW to verify the amounts of Member States' imports
176 and exports. An adoption of a universal measuring standard will promote international information sharing
177 regarding the import and export of chemicals and will lead to a more transparent system of tracing chemical
178 trade.
179
- 180 21. National authorities responsible for border security should also cooperate frequently if possible, with national
181 law enforcement institutions to identify weaponized chemical components. For the interest of minimizing the
182 risk of the use of chemical weapons, national law enforcement organizations should also be able to
183 independently identify harmful and weaponized chemical substances if necessary. Additionally, national law
184 enforcement should be prepared to share any intelligence they gather regarding chemical weapons with the
185 respective national authorities responsible for border security and the OPCW. This type of cooperation is akin
186 to the Proliferation Security Initiative's (PSI) information sharing activities between States with regard to the
187 different types of chemical weapons and their methods of transport, including land, air and sea transportation.
188 This type of information sharing network will not be centrally run, but instead rely on individual States to
189 supply the other regional members with helpful information regarding the possible trafficking of chemical
190 weapons. In effect, this would create a regional network to share information between law enforcement bodies,
191 border security agencies, and the OPCW.
192
- 193 22. For States in political transitions and their neighbors, security enforced by national authorities is the highest
194 priority. Therefore, it is essential to properly monitor the borders in order to ensure that chemical weapons are
195 not trafficked. The implementation of the above measures would ensure that these states are appropriately
196 prepared to face the danger of chemical weapons being transported across the borders. However, these measures
197 will not infringe on the transportation of peaceful chemistry between States Parties.
198
- 199 23. The necessary funding would be provided by voluntary contributions within regional organizations such as the
200 African Union Foundations established in 2013, and also North South Cooperation initiatives like the Export
201 Control and Related Border Security Program. This funding method would only entail the restructuring of
202 existing regional training conference and workshop models (e.g. *S/1059/2013*). It does not require the
203 implementation of new expensive structures or personnel. However, if unexpected costs arise, the OPCW
204 warmly welcomes and encourages national contributions to the Voluntary Fund for Assistance to ensure a
205 continuous and global training program. As such, this policy will not requiring restructuring the budgeting
206 system or allotments.
207
- 208 24. Combining the segmented region can save the resources of OPCW and contribute to a more efficient
209 organization. For example, there are different training programs in individual countries, and the respective
210 OPCW body, the Inspection Team Leader and Personnel, costs \$20.6 million per year, far exceeding the
211 average cost of \$1.5 million of each body. Instead of having a segmented, separate training program for each
212 state, building a common training program can reduce the expenditure for training and reallocate the money to
213 other fields where needed more. Risk assessment can also enhance the efficiency of bureaucracy, by
214 distinguishing those states with a minimum or nonexistent opportunity for a chemical attack from other states
215 with higher risk. In the status quo, the aforementioned Inspection Team Leader and Personnel are equally
216 distributed in these two distinctly different regions in their chemical weapons safety. By assessing the risk,
217 utilizing the index of Chemical Materials Prioritization Index for Security (CMPIS) as a model to prioritize

218 needs of assistance during political transitions where chemical weapons are of concern. This utilization of
219 resources can assist in moving underutilized personnel from less dangerous regions to more dangerous regions
220 based on the mutual agreements.
221

Code: OPCW/02/004

Committee: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Topic: Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transition

1 **I. Introduction**
2

3 **A. Reform of the OPCW Database for Expanded Information Sharing for Party State**
4 **Capacity Assistance**
5

- 6 1. The Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) recognizes the significance of
7 international cooperation and information sharing in promoting and maintaining global peace and security.
8
9 2. The OPCW recognizes the utmost importance of continued cooperation between the United Nations (UN)
10 and the OPCW, such the OPCW-UN Joint Mission in Syria, which represented the collaborative efforts of
11 intergovernmental organizations promoting international peace and security for the economic, social, and
12 cultural development and the preservation of the environment and the world’s human resources.
13
14 3. The OPCW recalls the Conference of the State Parties First Session on 22 May 1997, which adopted the
15 document, *“Procedure for the provisional certification of the Central OPCW Analytical Database” (C-*
16 *I/DEC.63)* and the subsequent adoption of the Central OPCW Analytical Database during the Fourth
17 Session on 29 June 1999 by the decision, *“Certification Procedure for the Central OPCW Analytical*
18 *Database and on-site databases” (C-IV/DEC.11)*.
19
20 4. Member States experiencing civil unrest or institutional instability have diminished capacity to maintain
21 their own updated or effective database of information concerning chemical safety. This limits the ability
22 for Member States to detect, monitor, and report the presence of potentially dangerous chemicals to their
23 national authorities or the OPCW. Member States experiencing this particular lack of capacity rely heavily
24 upon the information and resources provided by the OPCW or regional databases. Improving upon the
25 OPCW Analytic Database’s existing schedules, integration of regional databases, and mechanisms for
26 updating chemical agent definitions serves to strengthen the ability for Member States to access these
27 benefits.
28
29 5. The OPCW recalls the Central OPCW Analytical Database’s documentation of statistical data and best
30 practices, along with suggestions provided by the Executive Council and Party States on best practices and
31 the ISO 9001 guidelines. The reforms to the Central OPCW Analytical Database will be approved by the
32 Executive Council, which would streamline information available to States Party to the CWC.
33
34 6. The OPCW recalls further Article X of the CWC, which supports the cooperation of State Parties and the
35 OPCW by the provision of tools, such as: detection equipment and alarm systems, protection equipment,
36 decontamination equipment and decontaminators, medical antidotes and cure; the CWC does not prohibit
37 the development and research of chemical elements, if it is not in contrast with the principals of the
38 Convention.
39
40 7. The OPCW recalls also Article XI Paragraph 2, sub clause b, which declares that within the scope of the
41 principles and applicable rules of International Law, Party States shall be able to facilitate and have the
42 right to participate in, to the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, scientific and technical
43 information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this
44 Convention.
45
46 8. The OPCW acknowledges the expertise of independent organizations, not-for-profit and non-partisan
47 groups such as Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) work to raise
48 awareness of nuclear deterrence and index construction, respectively, and their innovative Nuclear
49 Materials Security Index in 2012, now recognized worldwide by leaders as a tool in assessing the status of
50 nuclear materials safety.
51

- 52 9. The OPCW further acknowledges the expertise of independent organizations, not-for-profit and non-
53 partisan groups such as Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) work to
54 raise awareness of nuclear deterrence and index construction, respectively, and their innovative Nuclear
55 Materials Security Index in 2012, now recognized worldwide by leaders as a tool in assessing the status of
56 nuclear materials safety
57

58 **II. Mandate**

59

- 60 10. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has the power and capacity to address
61 the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. As stated on Article VIII of the Convention
62 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
63 their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC), the OPCW's object and purpose is to ensure
64 the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification, providing a forum for
65 consultation and cooperation among Member States.
66
- 67 11. For this purpose, the OPCW bases its actions on the provisions established in the Chemical Weapons
68 Convention (CWC). The priorities of the CWC are defined by the ultimate organization's goal to achieve
69 effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
70 control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same
71 time, any progress made on the issue at hand responds to the CWC's recognition that the complete and
72 effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of
73 chemical weapons, and that their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these
74 common objectives.
75
- 76 12. Particularly during Political Transitions, Member States have to comply with its General Obligations
77 contained on Article 1, paragraph 2, of destroying chemical weapons it own possesses or that are located in
78 any place under its jurisdiction or control. At the same time, the obligation contained on Article 1,
79 paragraph 4 relating to the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities have to be ensured. For
80 this purpose, Member States of the OPCW have the responsibility to cooperate in order to assist third
81 Parties to comply with its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
82
- 83 13. For complying with its mandate the OPCW Conference of State parties shall consider any questions,
84 matters or issues within the scope of the CWC, making recommendations and taking decisions on any
85 questions matters or issues related to the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions.
86

87 **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

88

89 **A. Reform of the OPCW Database for Expanded Information Sharing for Party State Capacity** 90 **Assistance**

91

- 92 14. The reform and reconstruction of the Central OPCW Analytical Database would aim for a standardization
93 and centralization of the analytical database. The reformed database will offer a powerful and easily
94 available tool for all State Parties, centralizing all relevant information and resources regarding chemical
95 weapon safety, including definitions and information about the scheduled chemicals and their precursors;
96 General training schemes for officials of the National Authorities of the respective State Parties; General
97 assistance and protection schemes; Trade catalogs.
98
- 99 15. The OPCW recognizes the necessity of working with States Parties during and after political transitions,
100 particularly those of a volatile nature. Thus, the OPCW requests the State Party, which is undergoing or has
101 undergone a political transition, to verify current information present within the Central OPCW Analytical
102 Database on their chemical state of affairs. If there is a discrepancy between the information present in the
103 Central OPCW Analytical Database and the actual situation on the ground, the State Party in question
104 should submit revised information to the OPCW. Any OPCW State Party may request an inspection to
105 confirm the information provided by the State Party undergoing or having undergone a political transition.
106 This is a legitimate action if the challenging State Party can provide sufficient evidence contrary to the

107 information given by the State Party undergoing or having undergone a political transition. In this manner,
108 the Central OPCW Analytical Database serves at all times as a point a reference for State parties to verify
109 their chemical stocks after a transition, as well as for State Parties which have concerns over official reports
110 and wish to issue a challenge.

111
112 16. The OPCW further recognizes that transitioning governments may face difficulties during both the
113 transitional and post-transitional periods; thus, the OPCW recommends the expedition of the necessary
114 assistance and resources to transitioning governments. The OPCW reconfirms its commitment to assisting
115 every State Party to the CWC in upholding the rights and responsibilities of State Parties. The OPCW
116 requests the Executive Council develop an assistance format document, much like the document used for
117 State Parties to request assistance upon the suspicion of the use of chemical weapons. The OPCW further
118 requests that upon the submission of the assistance request form by a transitioning State Party, the Director-
119 General submit an assistance strategy for the particular transitioning State Party within the period of 12
120 months, which would include an investigation of the situation within the State Party and supporting the
121 State Party in the collection and submission of data to the Central OPCW Analytical Database.

122
123 17. The reform of the Central OPCW Analytical Database includes the uses of various chemical agents, which
124 would be available through the internet to civil society, including, but not limited to non-governmental
125 organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other relevant organizations regarding
126 dismantlement of chemical weapons, such as the OPCW International Union of Pure & Applied Chemistry
127 (IUPAC) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) for the purpose of
128 continued efforts in raising awareness for peaceful uses of chemical materials and production of goods.

129
130 18. This reconstruction of the database is crucial for providing all State Parties readily available access to vital
131 information regarding a wide array of aspects related to chemical weapons safety. By having a central
132 source for this vital information, all State Parties will be able to unite under these universal definitions and
133 shared best practices. By having all this information available through the same portal, implementation
134 becomes easier and faster for all State Parties seeking help and information as well. This should in turn
135 benefit the goal of prevention, by helping State Parties to have quick access at all times. In this manner,
136 State Parties undergoing political transition should be better prepared to handle potentially dangerous
137 situations regarding the safety of chemical substances in general and chemical weapons safety in particular.
138 State Parties can add information and resources to the OPCW Analytical Database on a voluntary basis, to
139 the benefit of the OPCW as well as all State Parties.

140
141 19. The current allocated funds within the Programme and Budget of the OPCW for maintaining the Central
142 OPCW Analytical Database should suffice to finance the reconfiguring of the Central OPCW Analytical
143 Database, as the reform is spread out over a period of three years. Nonetheless the OPCW further
144 encourages State Parties to donate additional funds on a voluntary basis.

145
146 20. The Central OPCW Analytical Database reconstruction is expected to last for three consecutive years.
147 Three years is considered an appropriate period of time for such a reconstruction. It constitutes a
148 compromise between the need for a fast paced reform due to the pressing nature of problems related to
149 chemical weapons safety, and the need to stay within existing yearly budget boundaries. Upon the
150 completion of the Central OPCW Analytical Database reconstruction, the Executive Council will convene
151 and provide a report, which assesses the progress of the reconstruction process and provides further
152 recommendations to be made for the future. The Executive Council will thereafter adopt the evaluation of
153 the working of the Central OPCW Analytical Database as an agenda item in every subsequent regular
154 session.

155
156 21. The reform of the Central OPCW Analytical Database would ideally include enhanced streamlining and
157 sharing of information between the Central OPCW Analytical Database and already existing and operating
158 regionally focused databases on chemicals of a hazardous, as well as non-hazardous, nature.

159
160 22. Examples of such regional databases are Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
161 (OECD) Existing Chemicals Database, the Classification and Labelling Inventory database of the European
162 Chemicals Agency and the Toxicology Data Network of the United States National Library of Medicine. In

163 this manner much duplicative efforts can be avoided. The goal for the Central OPCW Analytical Database
164 would be obtaining full disclosure of information present in those regionally established databases,
165 ultimately benefiting not just the Central OPCW Analytical Database, but all State Parties.
166

167 23. Cooperation between the Central OPCW Analytical Database and other regionally established databases is
168 of an entirely voluntary nature. The organizations managing the regionally established databases cannot in
169 any way be enforced to share information with the OPCW against their will. In order to facilitate
170 cooperation and the sharing of information, the OPCW and State Parties should contact those
171 organizations, making clear the objective and stressing its concomitant benefits for State Parties and
172 chemical weapons safety.
173

174 24. The reform of the Central OPCW Analytical Database would include standardized procedural guidelines to
175 prepare Member State Parties' officials as well as certain civilians concerning the appropriate actions to
176 follow when dealing with aspects of chemical weapons safety such as the transportation, deconstruction,
177 and disposal of hazardous chemical weapons. It will also be used when responding to emergencies and/or
178 attacks involving chemical weapons during times of volatile, unstable, or dangerous political transitions or
179 conflict. The training procedures will be structured to follow current guidelines written and agreed upon by
180 all Member States in the OPCW. The OPCW and State Parties should cooperate intensively while focusing
181 on achieving the uploading of these standardized procedural guidelines to the Central OPCW Analytical
182 Database as soon as possible.
183

184 25. Participation with the reformed Central OPCW Analytical Database will include the sharing of information
185 concerning the safe uses of the scheduled chemicals identified by the OPCW, the chemical agents
186 identified by the OECD, statistical analysis of the criminal activity corresponding to certain chemical
187 agents and equipment, and recent updates of the mandate of the OPCW. This information will also be
188 shared to OPCW approved non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations
189 (IGOs), and other relevant entities regarding the dismantlement and disposal of chemical weapons and
190 chemical weapons precursor agents. These organizations should be based in or operating within the borders
191 of State Parties.
192

193 26. The reform of the OPCW Analytical Database will include cataloguing of imports and exports of hazardous
194 chemicals and chemical weapons precursors, which will consist of a series of receipts of scheduled
195 chemicals that have been sent or received by any State Party. This ensures that State Parties and other
196 interested parties and organizations can effectively monitor their chemical uses and production, preventing
197 illicit transfers of dangerous chemicals for prohibited activities. This is in line with obligations as set forth
198 under Article VI paragraph 2 of the CWC. The aim of this cataloguing will be to ensure transparency in the
199 shipment of dangerous chemicals and chemical weapons precursors, as to hold states accountable for the
200 production, management, and use of these chemicals in their respective chemical industries.
201

202 27. The OPCW recognizes the utmost importance of the collaboration between the UN Scientific Advisory
203 Board and the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board and calls for closer cooperation to facilitate ongoing
204 research into the weaponization of existing and newly developed industrial chemical agents to prevent
205 nation-states and companies belonging to the chemical industry sphere from skirting international law by
206 altering chemical structures without altering the purpose or efficacy of such chemical agents, the reform of
207 the Central OPCW Analytical Database will include:
208

209 28. Possible peaceful uses of chemical agents, which would be available upon request to civil society
210 organizations including, but not limited to, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), inter-governmental
211 organizations (IGOs), and other relevant organizations regarding dismantlement of chemical weapons, such
212 as the OPCW International Union of Pure & Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and the United Nations Institute
213 for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) for the purpose of continued efforts in raising awareness for peaceful
214 uses of chemical materials and production of goods.
215

216 29. The integration of precursor chemical agents, as well as common industrial chemicals into the existing
217 catalogue of definitions of the OPCW's chemical schedules. Industrial chemicals and precursor chemicals
218 are not explicitly defined as Schedule 1 chemical weapons.

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30. The reformed Central OPCW Analytical Database will share information concerning the safe uses of the scheduled chemicals identified by the OPCW: the chemical agents, statistical analysis of the criminal activity corresponding to certain chemical agents and equipment, and recent updates of the mandate of the OPCW to approved non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other relevant entities regarding the dismantlement and disposal of chemical weapons and chemical weapons precursor agents. This information will be readily available to all states from one centralized database, states will voluntarily offer this information to the OPCW database, who will then manage this information and compile it for all to see.
31. The OPCW further supports the creation of a Chemical Materials Prioritization Index for Security (CMPIS) within the Central OPCW Analytical Database, which will be comprised of four main categories guided by the Nuclear Materials Security Index to the chemical weapons context, *mutatis mutandis*:
32. Declared quantities and sites of States for Schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals and chemical precursors;
33. Security and control measures;
34. Global norms, domestic commitments and capacity;
35. Risk environment.
36. The OPCW affirms the accessibility of the Central OPCW Analytical Database and CMPIS to only State Parties and OPCW recognized entities.



National Model United Nations • NY - Working Paper Template

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Committee: The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Topic: Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transition

1 **I. Introduction**

3 **Dual Use Item Monitoring, and Control of Imports and Exports Concerning Industrial** 4 **Accountability**

- 6 1. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits Chemical and Biological Weapons (CW), the 1972 Biological and Toxin
7 Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the use and production of toxic and biological weapons, and the CWC
8 does the same regarding chemical weapons; yet, incidences have occurred involving usage of Chemical
9 Weapons, especially in times of significant civil unrest. These actions have been directly related to the usage of
10 so-called dual use items, which may be defined as items that can be used for both civil and military purposes,
11 acquired by legal international trade. Therefore, the OPCW recognizes the importance of ensuring that while
12 dual-use items exist, they are simultaneously monitored and controlled carefully by putting particular emphasis
13 on states experiencing political transitions, that result in significant political regime changes. This includes, but
14 is not limited to: coups and revolutions, or reconstruction of failed states.
15
- 16 2. UN Security Resolution 1540 (S/RES/1540) emphasizes obligations on all UN Member States to enforce
17 appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including
18 developing “*appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including*
19 *appropriate laws and regulations to control export*”.
20
- 21 3. Article I, Section 1a of the CWC, states that each State Party shall not “*transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical*
22 *weapons to anyone*”, and may be taken in conjunction with Article XI, Section 1 which ensures the continued
23 trade of peaceful chemistry and “*avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States*
24 *Parties*”, as well as Article XI, Section 2c, which prohibits unilateral acts, “*which would restrict or impede*
25 *trade and development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge*”, in the domain of peaceful
26 chemistry to the effect that many dual-use chemicals have not been monitored in an efficient manner by many
27 States Parties, and have on occasion been used to create Chemical Weapons.
28
- 29 4. Additionally, States undergoing political transitions that are not party to the CWC cannot be aided by the
30 OPCW. Increasing incentives for non-member states to ratify the OPCW, especially in times of political
31 upheavals, must precede any OPCW intervention goals. Currently, importation and transfers of Schedule 3
32 chemicals are available to Member States not party to the CWC, which is of great concern to the international
33 community.
34
- 35 5. The example of the OPCW/UN joint mission in assisting Syria in 2013 with chemical weapon use within its
36 borders is a powerful precedent that the international community can learn, regarding the organization and
37 stability that was provided to Syria by the aforementioned mission. Reports found that Syrian stockpiles
38 included Schedule 3 chemicals such as Phosgene and Hydrogen Cyanide.
39
- 40 6. As a result of the joint effort, Syria joined the CWC, and agreed to the destruction of their chemical weapons
41 stockpiles. Prior to September 2013, Syria had not admitted to possessing chemical weapons, and in October
42 2013, the OPCW and the UN established a joint mission to oversee the elimination of the remaining chemical
43 weapons stockpiles in Syria’s possession, as reported in S/2013/629. This endeavor prevented the potential
44 acquisition of chemical weapons by non-State actors.
45

- 46 7. Based on the the Decision of the Fifth Session of the Conference of the States Parties on the *Implementation of*
47 *Restrictions on Transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 Chemicals To And From States Not Party To The*
48 *Convention*, the OPCW looks to further its efforts to implement these restrictions.
49
- 50 8. The inability of certain governments in political transitions to enforce the rule of law further enables non-state
51 actors, including terrorist groups and transnational organizations, to acquire dual-use chemicals to create
52 weapons. By assisting in the implementation and reinforcement of UNSCR 1540, the OPCW can work towards
53 the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. The threat of chemicals
54 being used for hostile purposes is a great concern to regional partnerships.
55
- 56 9. The OPCW recognizes the efficacy of collaboration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
57 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other relevant organizations regarding dismantlement of chemical
58 weapons, such as the OPCW International Union of Pure & Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and the United
59 Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) for the purpose of continued efforts in raising awareness
60 for peaceful uses of chemical materials and production of goods.

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62 **II. Mandate**

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64 10. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has the power and capacity to address the
65 issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. As stated on Article VIII of the Convention on the
66 Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
67 Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC), the OPCW's object and purpose is to ensure the
68 implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification, providing a forum for
69 consultation and cooperation among Member States.

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71 11. For this purpose, the OPCW bases its actions on the provisions established in the Chemical Weapons
72 Convention (CWC). The priorities of the CWC are defined by the ultimate organization's goal to achieve
73 effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
74 including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, any
75 progress made on the issue at hand responds to the CWC's recognition that the complete and effective
76 prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical
77 weapons, and that their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common
78 objectives.

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80 12. Particularly during Political Transitions, Member States have to comply with its General Obligations contained
81 on Article 1, paragraph 2, of destroying chemical weapons it own possesses or that are located in any place
82 under its jurisdiction or control. At the same time, the obligation contained on Article 1, paragraph 4 relating to
83 the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities have to be ensured. For this purpose, Member States
84 of the OPCW have the responsibility to cooperate in order to assist third Parties to comply with its obligation
85 under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

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87 13. For complying with its mandate the OPCW Conference of State parties shall consider any questions, matters or
88 issues within the scope of the CWC, making recommendations and taking decisions on any questions matters or
89 issues related to the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions.

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91 **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

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93 **A. Export Controls Regarding States in Political Transition**

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- 95 14. The OPCW recommends that at the Fourth Review Conference, to be held in 2018, the States Parties consider
96 amending the following issues regarding export and import controls of dual-use items by increasing the number
97 of chemical components regulated by the OPCW to include the dual-use chemicals which may be used as CW
98 precursors, and which are currently not in any of the three chemical schedules outlined in the CWC. In effort to
99 remain current, the OPCW recommends taking into account the latest developments in the field by constantly
100 updating the list of the regulated and monitored dual-use items.
101
- 102 15. Strengthening the export and import controls of the dual-use items, particularly concentrating on states currently
103 undergoing political transitions. The chemicals which do not fall under the Convention but which are known to
104 be useful for the building of Chemical Weapons are currently not monitored by the majority of Member States
105 of the CWC. Therefore, the idea of such weapons being built and used is relatively realistic. Possible measures
106 that may be applied in order to strengthen the control of dual-use items include primarily the application of the
107 licensing measures to control exports of dual-use items. These licenses should be understood as permissions
108 granted by the national authorities to private actors based on an agreement between the both parties. The
109 agreement may also serve as a legal instrument to keep the national government informed of all the activities
110 related to the production, development, trade and exports of dual-use items.
111
- 112 16. The OPCW considers the licensing measures to be effective and economically beneficial; therefore, it stresses
113 the importance of this inclusion to the OPCW mandate regarding the international trade of dual-use items. The
114 universal licensing system (in coordination with the regional body) should:
115
- 116 a. Not in any way undermine the free trade in chemicals, exchange of scientific and technical
117 information, or national development in this field as a basic non-discriminatory right explicitly
118 embedded in the CWC Art. XI.
 - 119 b. Call upon the States Parties to closely coordinate their national license monitoring systems with
120 regional license administrators, such as the European Union, African Union, regional Chemical,
121 Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Centers of Excellence (hereafter CBRN), in reference to
122 the CBRN's Project 038 which enhances the effectiveness of export control systems of dual-use items
123 in the beneficiary countries. If such multilateral regional administrators do not exist, it should be under
124 the OPCW mandate to establish these facilities. It is recommended that regional bodies collaborate
125 voluntarily with the WTO, especially regarding the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
126 The funding should be ensured by voluntary States Parties' financial input as well as support by
127 regional organizations.
 - 128 c. Provide the intelligence and coordinate with the OPCW technical secretariat to assure that public and
129 private producers of dual-use items and chemical components adherence to the CWC and OPCW
130 frameworks.
 - 131 d. Have the authority to coordinate succeeding investigations, and review their regional policies on a 5
132 year basis, and on a "as-needed" basis. The regional body will be in charge of reporting the results of
133 licensing investigations to the OPCW in an effort to further expose weaknesses within industry and
134 recommend effective solutions. The OPCW will then have the mandate to disseminate the information
135 concerning investigation results to the regional body and subsequent Member States.
 - 136 e. Create a recognizable designation for producers of dual-use chemical items to allow legitimate
137 consumers of such chemical items the trust necessary for sustainable economic growth and
138 collaboration.
 - 139 f. Encourage governments to utilize their license authority, while bearing in mind obligatory minimum
140 regional standards, to establish their own regulations, conditions, limitations, and any related
141 legislation concerning licenses. The system shall also provide these governments, in accordance with
142 regional bodies, discretion to set their own charges of licensing services for private enterprises

- 143 involved in the production, development, trade and export of dual-use items. The OPCW would
144 recommend that these services remain free.
- 145 g. Be responsible for sharing relevant information with the reformed OPCW analytical database,
146 providing the OPCW with supervisory and cataloguing authority. Developing this multi-level
147 approach would drive the strategic orientation of the OPCW towards regional capacity building which
148 is particularly important for countries facing not only political transitions, but also financial and
149 administrative difficulties.
- 150 h. In order to prevent the exploitation of varied regulation across borders, the movement of organizations
151 are encouraged to stay within Specialized Economic Zones (SEZs), under the criteria of legitimacy as
152 set forth within this report.

154 **B. Addressing Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions**

- 156 17. In accordance with the Agreement concerning the relationship between the UN and the OPCW Article IV and
157 Articles VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council retains the authority
158 to enforce the following recommendations:
- 159 i. Bearing in mind Part VIII, Section C of the Verification Annex, recommends investigations be
160 launched in order to verify the validity of the aforementioned section by VERTIC's National
161 Implementing Measures Programme.
- 162 j. All importation of Schedule 3 chemicals cease until ratification of the CWC takes effect.
- 163 k. Recommended Schedule 3 Chemicals for proposed trade restrictions:
- 164 i. Phosgene CAS Registry Number 75-44-5
165 ii. Cyanogen chloride CAS Registry Number 506-77-4
166 iii. Hydrogen cyanide CAS Registry Number 74-90-8
167 iv. Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane CAS Registry Number 76-06-2

168 And their precursors, as well as any future Schedule 3 and higher-level chemicals declared by the OPCW.

- 169
- 170 18. States affected by the aforementioned provisions are thus set a limit on the development of their chemical
171 industry, the effects of which include, but are not limited to:
- 172 l. Limited access to precursors to certain non-essential pharmaceutical drugs
173 m. Limited access to precursors to specific polymer construction materials

174 These effects can however be circumnavigated by ratifying CWC at any time, at which point the trade restrictions
175 would cease immediately.

177 **C. Regional Cooperation for Industrial Accountability and Monitoring of Dual Use Chemicals**

- 178
- 179 19. There is a lack of preparedness and standardization in the chemical industry in regards to political transition.
180 The OPCW calls upon member states in political transitions to fully comply with the Convention on the
181 prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.
- 182
- 183 20. There is a necessity for regional cooperation and accountability in order to address the potential threat posed by
184 the illicit acquisition of dual use chemicals by non-state actors. Eliminating the potential threat from non-state
185 actors, preempting the distribution of chemicals to hostile parties through regional accountability, is imperative.
186 When a dual use good is reported as stolen or lost by the local government, the regional government should be
187 aware of the loss. If dual use goods in nearby states are also lost, the region can then focus on finding the non-
188 state actor responsible before the stolen chemicals can be weaponized.
- 189
- 190 21. There should be the voluntary use of an updated database system housed at OPCW headquarters to receive the
191 reports generated by participating member states concerning the creation, transport, trade, and purpose of

192 chemicals . The Verification Annex of the CWC provides the means for member states to have verification on
193 an individual bases; therefore, the precedent for verification on a regional basis has been set:

194

195 a. From the industrial level, reports will be sent to the regional group, the regional group would then
196 transcribe the report and input it to a standardized format to be included into the OPCW database
197 enabling the OPCW to make effective assessments.

198 b. Promoting education initiatives to provide sufficient training of all personnel who compile the reports
199 as a means to ensure that the reports are consistent.

200

201 22. The OPCW directs the Scientific Advisory Board to facilitate ongoing research into the weaponization of
202 existing and newly developed industrial chemical agents to prevent nations and industry from skirting
203 international law by altering chemical structures without altering the purpose or efficacy of such chemical
204 agents. The chemical research arm of the Scientific Advisory Board will be composed of a multinational group
205 of individuals chosen from a variety of regions to prevent any one nation from using the Scientific Advisory
206 Board to prevent the discovery of the potential weaponization of a chemical agent, negating the progress made
207 within this arm of the OPCW.



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Code: OPCW/02/006

Committee: OPCW

Topic: Addressing the Issue of Actors Not Allied to Any Party or State

I. Introduction

ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF ACTORS NOT ALLIED TO ANY PARTY OR STATE

1. In promoting Security Council Resolution 2118, which the UN Security Council unanimously passed as of September 27, 2013, the OPCW notes that the current transport, development, and use of chemical weapons is a direct threat to international peace and security.
2. The most efficient way to directly confront such acts of violence are through multilateral diplomacy with the assistance of State Parties, Non-governmental organizations, subsidiaries of the OPCW, and other UN bodies to secure and dismantle chemical weapons in current and emerging situations of political transition that have the potential to lead to a catastrophic event.
3. The OPCW believes that through mobilization of multilateral organizations, State Parties and the combined efforts of UN bodies, are the foundation for a standard for providing the ultimate safety and security of all innocent persons enhanced cooperation between these entities will expedite the efforts already in place by these parties to effectively provide the best assistance to all innocent persons of the international system.
4. The OPCW acknowledges the expertise of independent organizations, not-for-profit and non-partisan groups such as Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) work to raise awareness of nuclear deterrence and index construction, respectively, and their innovative Nuclear Materials Security Index in 2012, now recognized worldwide by leaders as a tool in assessing the status of nuclear materials safety.
5. The OPCW recognizes the importance of the disarmament of chemical weapons is achieving global peace and security, and highlights the urgent need to abolish all chemical weapons stockpiles, to promote non-proliferation and disarmament under the international verification of the OPCW as the primary objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention . Further, the OPCW reiterates that Member States in "hostile political unrest" are defined as countries facing the destruction of their current political system and those perpetrating crimes against humanity.
6. A cooperation of this inclusive foundation, will inhibit the re-emergence of chemical weapons from being produced, transported and used for methods of violent actions. Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention provides the priorities of the OPCW with the overall objective of eliminating all chemical weapons through a peaceful dismantling transition with the objective these weapons will not re-emerge.
7. The OPCW bears in mind the threats posed by the illicit proliferation and acquisition of chemical materials and weapons and by this means the general threat posed by terrorism in all its forms, the OPCW shall raise its awareness towards the following issue.
8. The OPCW recognizes the lack of legal framework in the CWC to support all parts of the CWC and S/RES 1540, A/RES/60/288 (2006). Specifically, there is a lack of focus on Actors not allied and the need for all Member States to have legislation on this topic.
9. The complete destruction of all chemical weapons has to be the central goal for all efforts of the Member States to the Chemical Weapons Convention and there is the implicit need that the remaining States, which have not signed the Convention sign and ratify it as soon as possible.
10. By acknowledging the crucial role of the already existing treaties and conventions, namely the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as held down in

52 A/RES/60/288 (2006) we highlight the spirit of the legal framework measures included in the creation of a
53 new Annex.
54

- 55 11. The reconciliation process is defined by the United Nations Institute for Democracy and Electoral
56 Assistance (IDEA) as the process of addressing the legacy of past violence and rebuilding the broken
57 relationships it has caused. The OPCW emphasizes the peaceful settlement of disputes which would
58 prevent the usage of chemical components meant to cause harm upon a population and the environment.
59 Reconciliation would be reached by a regional approach to the situation through disarmament and
60 verification.
61
- 62 12. It is based on the cohesive society concept meaning working towards the well-being of all the Member
63 States . The scope of the reconciliation process is to fight exclusion and marginalization, create a sense of
64 belonging, promote trust, facilitate international multilateralism, which will in turn offer its members the
65 opportunity of upward mobility.
66
- 67 13. The OPCW recognizes that it would be difficult for terrorist groups to use chemical agents as weapons of
68 mass destruction, instead chemical agents might be effectively used as weapons of terror. Usage of
69 chemicals as instruments of terror will destabilize the states in transition even more and worsen the regional
70 stability. Therefore, it is urgent to secure the stockpiles of chemical agents and to implement an
71 international database to prevent extremist entities from spreading terror.
72
- 73 14. The OPCW proposes that an international task force for reconciliation be implemented that focuses on
74 article X (assistance and protection against chemical weapons) to help clarify procedures in the event of
75 political transition such as elections , regime change, or even intra-state conflict. This approach has been
76 proven to help mitigate chemical weapons attacks, keeping the countries where transitions occur safe from
77 crisis.
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79 **II. Mandate**

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- 81 15. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has the power and capacity to address
82 the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions. As stated on Article VIII of the Convention
83 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
84 their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC), the OPCW's object and purpose is to ensure
85 the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification, providing a forum for
86 consultation and cooperation among Member States.
87
- 88 16. For this purpose, the OPCW bases its actions on the provisions established in the Chemical Weapons
89 Convention (CWC). The priorities of the CWC are defined by the ultimate organization's goal to achieve
90 effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
91 control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. At the same
92 time, any progress made on the issue at hand responds to the CWC's recognition that the complete and
93 effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of
94 chemical weapons, and that their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these
95 common objectives.
96
- 97 17. Particularly during Political Transitions, Member States have to comply with its General Obligations
98 contained on Article 1, paragraph 2, of destroying chemical weapons it own possesses or that are located in
99 any place under its jurisdiction or control. At the same time, the obligation contained on Article 1,
100 paragraph 4 relating to the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities have to be ensured. For
101 this purpose, Member States of the OPCW have the responsibility to cooperate in order to assist third
102 Parties to comply with its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
103
- 104 18. For complying with its mandate the OPCW Conference of State parties shall consider any questions,
105 matters or issues within the scope of the CWC, making recommendations and taking decisions on any
106 questions matters or issues related to the issue of Chemical Weapons Safety in Political Transitions.
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III. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Addressing the Issue of Actors Not Allied to Any Party or State

19. As a benchmarking tool to address the issue of Actors Not Allied, the OPCW will be utilizing information in existing databases such as the Central OPCW Analytical Database, and information from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), as well as the proposed index for chemical weapons called the Chemical Materials Prioritization Index for Security (CMPIS), the OPCW shall enhance its operations in dealing with Non Allied parties.
20. The CMPIS shall be used as a tool by Party Members for the purposes of risk assessment of chemical safety during political transition. National authorities and government bodies can then use this to inform their respective decision-making processes for intervention of actions by Actors not allied for the purposes of securing stockpiles, legal frameworks and preventing access to chemical weapons.

B. Securing Stockpiles During Political Transitions

21. The OPCW recommends further cooperation between OPCW and any working governments during political transition to ensure follow up with securing declared weapons and allow governments to satisfy declaration obligations about suspected or possibly undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles.
22. Establishing bilateral and multilateral briefings is also recommended between agents and facility representatives to contribute the appropriate resources in order to implement safety measures and administrative and logistic arrangements necessary to inspection.
23. Further cooperation is sought between UN bodies such as ECOSOC and the Security Council in order to adequately utilize benchmarking tools in identifying the level of threat that Actors not allied play in acquiring chemical weapons during political transition.
24. A strengthened mandate of the OPCW through provisions proposed in a new Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention will ensure maximum compliance during times of challenge in order to:
 - a. further support activities of the inspection team to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State Party
 - b. bolster voluntary funding programs for assistance as outlined in the CWC Article X, clause 7.

C. Annex for Legal Framework against Chemical Terrorism

25. The OPCW proposes the creation of a new Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention dealing specifically with the Proliferation, Illicit Trade, Fabrication of Chemical Weapons and Materials by Actors not allied, pursuant to Article I. This submission for new Annex will take place under the mechanism of Article XV at the next meeting of the OPCW.
26. The OPCW recalls Article IX of the CWC, which grants Party States the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location within Party States speculated to be in violation or noncompliance with the CWC. Per Article IX, the OPCW further recommends that if the evidence found during the inspection finds the party in question in violation or noncompliance to the CWC, the Party State, which issued the challenge inspection, may file an application with the International Court of Justice against the state in question.
27. The OPCW recognizes the necessity of regional, national, and local law enforcement, which monitor the inter and intra flow of chemical agents within regions and States, particularly in regions and States with high concentrations of Actors not allied. Therefore, the OPCW calls for greater regional cooperation in establishing policing mechanisms, and for States to maintain their obligations to Article VII, Paragraph I of

163 the CWC. The OPCW reaffirms its commitment to providing States with the necessary technical assistance
164 in developing such policing and law enforcement models.
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- 166 28. The OPCW further recommends that regional organizations, such as, but not limited to the Organization of
167 American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), League of Arab States, African Union (AU), and the
168 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continue their efforts in international transparency by
169 providing greater channels for communication and information sharing, particularly in the transit of
170 chemical materials and assisting Member States in enforcing the international standards provided by the
171 CWC. Furthermore, the OPCW recommends the regional organizations take the appropriate measures in
172 holding accountable their Member States when failing to comply to standards established by the CWC.
173

174 **D. Preventing acquisition and Use of Chemical Weapons** 175

- 176 29. Advising countries in hostile political unrest to secure the chemical weapons stockpiles. A recent example
177 being the Syrian conflict with the unanimously adopted S/RES/2118 (2013). Therefore, for the purposes of
178 incentivizing the peaceful surrender of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical agents that can be used
179 for the production of chemical weapons, the OPCW encourages the surrender of all chemical weapons, and
180 in cases of violence, have a cease-fire at a mutually agreed-upon date to do so. If this is not respected, the
181 OPCW Technical Secretariat will recommend to the UN Security Council to refer these parties to the
182 International Criminal Court (ICC) for the violation of international humanitarian law.
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- 184 30. Calls for the control of the hazardous chemicals in countries in which conflict enables the potential use of
185 chemical as weapons by either party will allow the different actors to benefit from the OPCW trust/
186 emergency FUND. The FUND based on the voluntary contribution of the state parties will be used to
187 provide technical training, the development of the peaceful chemical industry, and protection
188 and assistance against in case of the use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the FUND will help in
189 information transit, bilateral assistance, and the engendering of reconciliation processes.
190

- 191 31. The OPCW invites state parties to allocate funds to countries in political transition following the principle
192 of cohesive society. Therefore, in the interests of better supporting the goals of the OPCW, particularly in
193 relation to renewed goals discussed in this report, OPCW state parties should reaffirm their commitment to
194 chemical weapons elimination through greater allocation of the already existing Voluntary Assistance
195 Fund.
196

- 197 32. This committee encourages an improvement in UN management of critical and unstable situations in which
198 there is a concrete threat of Actors not allied acquiring or using chemical weapons. The OPCW invites the
199 Security Council to adopt measures to increase communication during peacekeeping operations between
200 UN military forces and the regional organization present in conflict areas in order not to duplicate their
201 efforts in managing such treats.
202

- 203 33. The OPCW will continue its work in the UN Working Group on Preventing and Responding to chemical
204 weapons attacks as well as the UN Disarmament Commission and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force
205 established by the Secretary General in 2005 for the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
206 adopted by consensus in order to promote coordination at different levels between States, regional actors
207 for counter-terrorism activities.
208

- 209 34. The OPCW wishes to ensure the security of civilians in any case, especially during political transition. It is
210 fully convinced that it is necessary to enhance the role of UN police forces in protecting civilian
211 population in countries during political transition in case of chemical weapons attacks coming from Actors
212 not allied. The plans provided to the UN police to face those situations are to be transmitted to the
213 governments of the countries in order to be used in the future by the local police forces.