

National Model United Nations

Week B

March 24 – March 28, 2013



**Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations (C-34)**

Documentation

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)

Committee Staff

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Agenda

1. Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts
2. Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements
3. Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations

Report segments adopted by the committee

Document Code	Topic	Vote (Y/ N/ Abstention/ Non-Voting)
C-34/1/1	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	68/23/15
C-34/1/2	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	87/10/8
C-34/1/3	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	80/18/7
C-34/1/4	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	89/8/9
C-34/1/5	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	80/12/14
C-34/1/6	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	79/3/24
C-34/1/7	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	30/62/14
C-34/1/8	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	80/12/14
C-34/1/10	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	84/16/6
C-34/1/11	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	98/3/5
C-34/1/12	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	63/18/25
C-34/1/13	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen</i>	74/13/19

	<i>Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	
C-34/1/14	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	52/35/19
C-34/1/15	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	82/7/17
C-34/1/16	<i>Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts</i>	78/12/16

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) Summary Report

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations held its annual session to consider the following agenda items: *I. Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts; II. Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements; and III. Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations.* The session was attended by 114 Member States and 2 Observers. The committee adopted the agenda in the order of 1, 2, 3.

The second day, comprised of two committee sessions, began with the body splitting into Working Groups focused on some of the more common facets of this topic. As an ad hoc report-writing committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations witnessed coalitions forming with greater attention to shared interest in specific solutions rather than geographic parameters. Some key sub-topics included: increasing information sharing and multilateralism among Member States; developing rapid deployment capabilities and cultural awareness of peacekeepers; increasing gender sensitivity in peacekeeping forces; reformed standards and themes exhibited by training of both peacekeepers and civilians; and establishing measures within post-conflict states that would help native citizens perpetuate the peace and stability established by United Nations forces. Delegations repeatedly stressed the importance of collaboration among Member States. By the end of the second day, ten working papers were submitted to the dais, each offering specialized solutions to an aspect of the topic at hand.

The third day was comprised of three additional committee sessions, commencing with the distribution of several edited papers from the day before and the submission of eight new working papers for a total of eighteen working papers. Debate elaborated thoroughly on issues raised and solutions proposed the day before and delegates introduced to the body several new and creative topics, including but not limited to: infringement of state sovereignty in post-conflict peacekeeping operations, taking into account the environmental aspects of peacekeeping, financial recommendations for peacekeeping operations of post-conflict stabilization, the establishment of culture centers to educate peacekeepers, and suspending economic sanctions from post-conflict areas. As work continued, four working groups discussed and negotiated a combination of their papers after realizing that they were highly complementary to each other. Many delegations shared two common interests, in light of the topic: improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping troops and establishing measures to ensure a long-lasting peace. By the end of the third day, the eighteen working papers had become fifteen, with one of them even managing to become a draft working segment.

The fourth and final day saw two extremely eventful committee sessions. The first of these sessions was laden with three to four rounds of editing on nearly each working paper/draft working segment, resulting in some very clear, direct, and constructive conversations between the dais and the working groups. By the end of the first session, all fifteen working papers had finally become draft working segments. The second session was fully occupied by the duties of voting procedures, of which the result was fourteen approved report segments.

Code:

Committee: Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Subject: Reforming Peacekeeping Operations to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts

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1 **I. Introduction**

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3 **A. REGIONAL RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE PEACEKEEPING FORCES**

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5 1. This committee acknowledges the respect for the entire Charter of the United Nations, most
6 specifically Article 1, which notes respect for Member States sovereignty, Article 51,
7 which gives Member States the right to self-defense, and Article 53 which lays forth the
8 principles of peacekeeping.
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10 2. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi
11 Report, as well as the report of this committee of September 2012 observed that there was a
12 need for a rapidly deployable force to assist in stabilizing suddenly arising crises.
13
14 3. The United Nations Special Peacekeeping Committee acknowledges the failures of United
15 Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda and United Nations Protection Force as
16 unforgettable tragedies within the international community. It is this Special Committee's
17 duty to contribute towards preventing such miscommunications from occurring again.
18 Recognizing that the failure to commit to a solution for the conflict led to the devastating
19 loss of millions of lives, it is this committee's duty to ensure the rapid deployment of
20 peacekeeping troops to ensure stability as soon as possible in post-conflict regions.
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23 **B. STRUCTURAL REFORMATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

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25 4. This Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recognizes the shortcomings of
26 peacekeeping operations such as United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the
27 United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR). In contrast, this committee
28 acknowledges the success of operations, such as United Nations Assistance Mission in
29 Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as well as the joint commission by the Stand-by High Readiness
30 Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE).
31 As our committee directive states, it is vital that past and current suggestions for
32 peacekeeping reform be handled with vigilance in an effort to meet the growing needs of
33 the world.
34
35 5. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges the positive efforts by
36 peacekeeping forces during the past few decades but also notes that several peacekeeping
37 interventions did not have significant effects on the maintenance of peace after conflicts or
38 did not achieve the intended goals. One reason for the unsatisfactory results of these
39 missions is a lack of attention given to environmental issues during and after conflict.
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41 6. The current ad-hoc system has demonstrated internal problems, which require reformation
42 so as to ensure the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations. As an example of

successful reform, we note the successes of SHIRBRIG, such as its ability to rapidly deploy troops, integrate peacekeeping personnel local to said region of conflict, as well as its capacity to establish common standards and procedures. Furthermore, we recall its successes in the joint training of headquarters staff and the officers of the SHIRBRIG assigned units.

7. The direct communication between peacekeeping officers and all relevant actors within the respective conflict is of the utmost importance for the efficiency of peacekeeping operations. We reaffirm, the necessity of communication efforts between all parties relevant to the peacekeeping operation, but we also recognize that issues with legitimacy and transparency pose threats to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, referencing Security Council Resolution 1353
8. This Special Committee draws attention to the importance of adherence to international agreements aimed at the facilitation of peacekeeping efforts and the stabilization of post conflict areas, such as the verdict of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC) as well as the 1997 Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron.
9. We understand the guidelines and protocols stated in the Brahimi Report, which respects State sovereignty and calls for the support of the UN to finance and operate a legitimate peacekeeping operation.
10. The Special Committee acknowledges and commends the work of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), especially their work in helping states create sustainable frameworks for protecting the environment and vital natural resources in post-conflict situations as they often are essential to the survival of the civilian population and must be protected as referenced by 1977 Protocol 1 to the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949. However, we note that without sufficient enforcement capacity, training, and personnel, these frameworks are at high risk of failure. We recognize the capability for peacekeepers to play a role in fulfilling these requirements for mission success.
11. The Special Committee recalls the 2010 report of the Secretary-General SG/SM/13126 ENV/DEV/1159, which reaffirms the right of clean access to water and sanitation, and acknowledges that specifically in Post-Conflict areas, there is inadequate access to water for most civilians. This inhibits long-term security for civilian populations, which rely on clean water for sanitation, drinking, cooking and agriculture. We furthermore recognize past actions by the International Medical Corps at rebuilding water lines in urban areas in order to provide clean, potable drinking water to cities at a reasonable price, especially to the urban poor, and the risks these teams face as they move through hostile territory and are unable to protect themselves. Damage to these teams has a direct negative impact on restabilization efforts.

C. REFORMING THE ROLE OF WOMEN AS PEACEKEEPERS

12. Since its creation in 1965, under the General Assembly Fourth Committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has been highly dedicated to the inclusion of a gender perspective in peacekeeping and peace building.

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13. This body notes the significant strides made in the direction of increasing the number of women in peacekeeping forces since 1993, such as the increase in deployed personnel from 1% in 1993 to 13% in 2012. Additionally, the committee acknowledges the current work being done to increase this number to a blanket percentage of 20% by 2020, but notes that past overarching increases have not been distributed proportionally among deployed and non-deployed personnel.
 14. This committee would additionally like to note Resolutions S/RES/1325 on Women, Peace and Security, S/RES/9753 and S/RES/1820 which discuss the importance of women in peacekeeping, and documents such as the Agenda for Peace and the New Horizon Report which outline goals for the integration of women into the peacekeeping process. Also, this committee finds the work of the Global Effort Initiative commendable in increasing the number of women in peacekeeping roles and similar military roles.
 15. Although women comprise the majority of the world’s population, they are still a minority in many respects. This is the concept of the 51% minority. The first step toward combating the issue would be to empower women into positions of lawful authority, to grant economic stability, and to involve women in the negotiations following a conflict, specific to the mandate of our body.
 16. Seeing the report of the UN Women entitled Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence, we would like to expand the ideals compiled and published in this report in order to stabilize post-conflict areas, such as increasing the number of women in official roles and integrating them into the peace processes.
 17. Addressing the gender perspective and role of women as peacekeepers supports the stabilization of post conflict areas because women can be more sensitive to sexual abuse victims, more able to aid women and families, mitigate confrontation, and improve access to aid for the local population.
 18. This body would also like to draw attention to the Bangladeshi all-female unit in Haiti and the Indian all-female unit in Liberia as examples of case where the presence of women peacekeepers have significantly decreased the number of cases of sexual violence and boosted the morale and sense of security of women in the local community. These two cases show the success of all-female units and the possibility of future success if these projects were imitated in other peacekeeping missions.

127 **D. COMMUNICATION**
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19. Communication in peacekeeping operations is vital to the success of peacekeeping operations as a whole. In the past, peacekeeping missions have failed or broken down due to a lack of communication, such as United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) failed in part due to the breakdown of

135 communication lines between political and military leaderships and ground troops. As
136 mentioned in the Peace Building Commission (PBC) Working Group on Lessons Learned
137 summary, strengthening communication methods within peacekeeping operations is
138 necessary for achievement. This body acknowledges the increased frequency, complexity
139 and intensity of modern peacekeeping missions as noted by S/RES/2086 of 2013 and
140 A/RES/66/265 of 2012.

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- 142 20. The Emergency Preparedness for International Crises (EPIC) telecommunication platform
143 has been used effectively in Haiti, South Sudan, Venezuela and Mali. In Haiti, EPIC
144 permitted Luxembourg to deploy humanitarian aid within hours of the earthquake because
145 the system notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs overnight of the disaster. This system is
146 based off a satellite that can establish interim telecommunications via inflatable antenna, or
147 monitor the movement of rebel groups or troops on the ground. Currently EPIC is owned
148 and operated solely by the Luxembourg government.
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- 150 21. The United Nations (UN) launched this program in 2012 to capture multiple types of
151 experience and institution-building so countries have a more diverse base for a solid post-
152 conflict foundation. So far, over a dozen Member States and organizations have engaged in
153 using CAPMATCH to share and learn from past experience. Often peacekeeping missions
154 are all constructed in the same manner, despite the unique situations on the ground, and
155 experience gained by Member States through their own conflicted times is lost.
156 CAPMATCH provides an online partnership based approach built to disperse civilian skills
157 and exchange experience with other countries through matching the supply and demand of
158 specialized civilian capacities for countries emerging from conflict.
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- 160 22. The European Commission Task Force has explored establishing links of communication
161 between military bodies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Serbia,
162 Montenegro and Central America. Past and current situations in the missions show the
163 necessity for increasing communication between troops in the field and involved NGOs
164 because of their interacting and sometimes overlapping functions.
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- 166 23. The Kofi Annan International Peace and Training Centre in Ghana, founded in 2004,
167 provides meaningful training to those about to be deployed on UN missions provided by
168 those returning from the same mission. In this way, troops are informed about the situations
169 they are going into and have more thorough situational awareness.
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- 171 24. The Special Committee realizes that peacekeeping missions contain certain gaps in
172 situational awareness and information resources that would facilitate decision making in
173 the field. The response to this would be to utilize the emerging technologies to their full
174 extent, including but not limited to technologies that are available now but were not in
175 former situations, such as aerial imaging and United Nations Platform for Space-based
176 Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER).
177 Sovereignty remains of utmost concern to this body, and consent of Member States will be
178 crucial in the development of these technologies, which will only be used and expanded
179 upon for purposes within the scope of peacekeeping.
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E. REVIEW OF RECENT PEACEKEEPING PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF MANDATE AND OBJECTIVE FULFILLMENT

- 25. Pursuant of the goals and provisions of Articles 34 and 39 of the United Nations Charter, underlining the importance of pacific settlement of disputes and the need of maintained situational awareness; and committed to the preservation, protection and promotion of international peace and security, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has carefully observed and evaluated the entirety of the United Nations’ peacekeeping effort since the conclusion of its previous session.
- 26. Following thorough evaluation of ongoing peacekeeping initiatives and programs, including the sixteen mandates currently being implemented by UN missions, the Committee has closely observed the response of the international community, noting the achievements attained in the area of peace promotion and post-conflict stabilization; including the ongoing United Nations Mission to South Sudan, established by Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011) and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, based upon Resolution 2009 (2011).
- 27. Nonetheless, the Committee draws attention to the fact that a number of pressing challenges remain unresolved, having identified substantial deficiencies in mandate clarity and specificity, with special regard to competence delimitation. These shortcomings threaten to result in creating an atmosphere of ambiguity, exaggerated caution and uncertainty over the definitive authority among the policymakers and peacekeeping personnel alike, as demonstrated, most recently, by the events of November 20th, 2012, pertaining to the *UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (MONUSCO). Despite having overcome prior resource constraints, the mission has proven ineffective in preventing substantial advances by the insurgent forces of the *March 23 Movement*, exposing civilian population to significant risk of injury and material harm.
- 28. The issues identified are further exacerbated by the apparent recurrence of incidents, the root cause whereof can be traced to command-level uncertainty over rules of engagement, having observed a similar state of ambiguity within the execution of MONUSCO’s direct predecessor, the *UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (MONUC) in May 2002, allowed the massacre of more than one hundred civilians in Kisangani as a result of the mission command’s lack of understanding of the mandate in place, hindering its decision-making capability.
- 29. It is with this rationale in mind, referencing the New Partnership Agenda: Charting a new Horizon for UN Peacekeeping report by the DPKO, as with regard to Security Council Resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (1999), 1327 (2000), and 1353 (2001) that the Committee brings forward a number of recommendations, aiming to alleviate the formal constraints that have adversely affected peacekeeping effectiveness in the past and to facilitate improvement based on the lessons learned by other missions.

F. ENHANCED COLLABORATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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30. The Special Committee recognizes that post-conflict stabilization efforts will not be fruitful as long as leadership and peacekeepers from different countries do not share the same vision of peacekeeping operations as reflected in the New Horizon report that acknowledges that the first step in building the capabilities for the future is to set out clear operational standards for critical mandate tasks.
 31. The Special Committee takes into account the difficulties of past UN Peacekeeping missions, such as the ongoing United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) mission, where different visions of the peacekeeping mission led to breakdown in troop integrity.
 32. The Special Committee takes into consideration the limited possibilities of some Member States to provide comprehensive training to their troops and builds upon General Assembly resolution 65/290 (A/RES/65/290), calling for a more efficient management of peacekeeping operations, to remedy the training imbalance in contributions to peacekeeping.
 33. The Special Committee, in recognition of paragraph 190 of its 2010 report (A/64/19), acknowledges the relevance of the Integrated Training Service and acknowledges the implementation of the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials in the Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
 34. The Special Committee affirms the importance of the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials in reducing ambiguities and redundancies between the Pre-Deployment Training and Mission-Specific Induction Training modules of the Integrated Training Service.
 35. The Special Committee takes note of the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission in the stabilization efforts to Post-Conflict areas and their relevance to expanding the capabilities of Peacekeeping Operations through training and information sharing.
 36. The Special Committee acknowledges the work of Department of Peacekeeping Operations regarding matters of reconstruction and development, and their work in establishing forums to host experts from the law-enforcement agencies, government agencies, and military of post-conflict areas. Experts from the DPKO create a two-way information exchange, where members of the DPKO share best practices and new research.

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G. STRENGTHENING STABILITY THROUGH ENHANCING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND RULE OF LAW BY MEANS OF PEACEKEEPING

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37. In order to create a secure environment from which post-conflict regions can recover, effective rule of law must be established. In report A/67/632, this body noted that, “The provision of support to rule of law and security institutions is an area of growing demand.” Unfortunately, while UN peacekeeping operations are established to assist in maintaining peace, the UN has failed to define establishing rule of law as a primary goal for peacekeeping. As a result, peacekeeping operations have been left struggling to secure

273 peace due to unclear directives from above. Furthermore, peacekeeping efforts are unable
274 to create or implement uniform practices on establishing rule of law due to the lack of a
275 clear mandate.

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277 38. We would like to remind and reinforce the rule of law definition given in 2004 by the
278 Secretary General of the United Nations, in order to clarify the role of peacekeepers in
279 enforcing rule of law.

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281 39. Additionally, this body would like to point out the issues with rule of law mandates,
282 funding, enforcement, and the role of peacekeepers that occurred in the UN peacekeeping
283 missions in Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia. These missions show the weaknesses in carrying out
284 rule of law through peacekeeping, noted in the 2006 report entitled Legal and Judicial Rule
285 of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Lesons-Learned Study.

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287 40. This Special Committee addresses the difficulties in promoting the Rule of Law by
288 traditional systems of justice in conflict-ridden areas. The UN Organization Stabilization
289 Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) is an example of such
290 difficulties. Alternative forms of justice are affective in addressing the dichotomy of Rule
291 of Law and peace.

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293 **H. TRAINING OF PEACEKEEPERS AND STRENGTHENING RELATIONS**
294 **BETWEEN PEACEKEEPERS AND POST-STABILIZATION EFFORTS**

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296 41. Recognizing the UN Charter, this segment fully recognizes and respects the sovereignty of
297 all nations, as indicated in Article 2 of the UN Charter.

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299 42. This committee believes that proper attention to Article 53 of the UN Charter is warranted,
300 which states that "The Security Council Shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
301 arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority...". Through this
302 segment, the respect of not only the UN Charter, but specifically, Article 53, will be given
303 and enforced

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305 43. This committee would further like to recognize the failures of numerous United Nations
306 Peacekeeping efforts. These failed efforts such as Srebrenica, the Sudan, Somalia, Congo,
307 Mali, and Rwanda, directly led to political instability and hindered stabilization efforts.
308 Post-Stabilization efforts were, therefore, not fully applicable due to the violence left
309 unattended by said peacekeepers. We firmly believe that had these peacekeepers had the
310 following been established: a UN principles abiding mandate, better and proper cultural,
311 ethnic, and geographical sensitivities training, military training, training in policing, and
312 enforcing the rule of law, post-stabilization efforts would have been made easier, and
313 would have allowed for a seamless and efficient transition from anocracy to democracy.

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315 44. This committee would like to further recognize the flaws of United Nations peacekeeping
316 effort as it currently stands, as well as allowing regional arrangements to do what they were
317 designed to do: mediate conflicts within their geo-political region, with the last-resort
318 option of military force as an available tool for Regional Arrangements. Through

319 reforming how regional arrangement peacekeepers can be deployed and used, it is the
320 belief of this committee that aid and post-stabilization efforts can be efficiently and
321 proficiently done. Through the idea of “robust” peacekeeping, we believe that NGO’s and
322 UN development programs can more swiftly deliver the aid and assistance that the civilian
323 population of crisis-ridden areas so desperately need.
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325 45. Much work has been done on to promote reform of peacekeeping in post-conflict situations
326 at the regional level, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’s
327 African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework.
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329 46. Inconsistent training causes problems at every level of peacekeeping, such as inconsistent
330 interpretation of rules of engagement and misconduct of peacekeeping personnel. The Kofi
331 Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana has made great progress in
332 standardizing the training of Economic Commission Of West African States troops, and so
333 have other regional programs such as the training centers in Fiji. Sub-regional bodies
334 would greatly benefit from forming similar training institutions.
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336 47. Regional forces and developing countries have benefitted greatly from training assistance
337 from developed countries. North-South partnerships that have partnered several Member
338 States with varying experience levels have had the most success. The Steppe Eagle
339 program is a training collaboration in which several nations conduct training exercises
340 within Kazakhstan and has been used several times over the last two decades. The
341 Peacekeeping Exercise in the Americas has effectively improved training of troops through
342 cooperation between Latin America, the Caribbean and the USA.
343

344 48. The last decade has seen an increase in joint-missions with regional actors, as well as
345 intervention by sub-regional actors. These have proven to be more effective due to the
346 cultural and political ties to the conflict area. Additionally, the UN Department of
347 Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has recently been increasing partnerships with UN
348 entities, such as the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections partnership
349 between the DPKO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Bearing in
350 mind the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) 2003 report “Global
351 Project on Strengthening the Legal Regime Against Terrorism” which highlights the
352 contribution of the illicit drug trade in perpetuating conflicts, it is critical for peacekeeping
353 operations to reform their relationship with transnational organized crime.
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355 49. The Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections (GFP) was formed in September
356 2012 as a partnership between the DPKO and UNDP. The GFP works to integrate early
357 justice institution building into peacekeeping operations, to better prepare conflict-areas for
358 post-conflict stabilization. The DPKO and UNDP have joint ownership of the organization,
359 with each organization in charge of its respective area of expertise. The GFP, as a new
360 organization, has already shown great promise in integrating development and
361 peacebuilding early in the peacekeeping process.
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363 50. In 2006, the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel published *Delivering as*
364 *One*. This report outlined a mechanism for coordination of UN aid in developing countries

365 in order to improve the efficiency and coherency of agency efforts. The program has had
366 tiered implementation, with more offices opening each year. This model is currently not
367 utilized in conflict-areas or in partnership with peacekeeping operations.
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369 51. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is aware that resources are a central
370 issue on peacekeeping operations. Wealth stemming from the exploitation of Africa's
371 plentiful natural resources is sometimes a reason for instability or intervention. While the
372 Kimberly Process has made progress in managing conflict-diamond trade, there is much
373 work to be done in creating a framework for other conflict-fueling resources. During the
374 conflict in Sierra Leone, the illicit trade of diamonds was a major factor propagating
375 conflict. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) provided critical
376 assistance with monitoring the diamond trade, implementing regulations, and preventing
377 diamond trade profits from reaching criminal factions.
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379 52. The reform of peacekeeping has been an ongoing process, and the major reforms proposed
380 in the Brahimi Report are still being implemented. Although, the New Horizon Initiative
381 furthered these reform efforts there is still much room for improvement, both operationally
382 and structurally. The Secretary-General of the United Nations outlined some of these areas
383 for future reform in his bulletin ST/SGB/2010/1
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385 53. The "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,"
386 published in July 2009 by the DPKO and the DFS, affirmed that the effectiveness of UN
387 peacekeeping "is often exacerbated by limited understanding of local culture: diversity of
388 views in the population, and divisions along ethnic, gender and other lines." The cultural
389 barriers to which the Agenda refers currently divide peacekeepers from the civilians they
390 are serving, hindering their ability to effectively facilitate post-conflict stabilization
391 because they are not aware of the particular character and needs of the host State. Issues of
392 communication and language have long plagued peacekeeping operations by reducing the
393 ability of peacekeepers to relate to the community.
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395 54. The Brahimi Report states: "Differences in language, culture, custom and experience mean
396 that the learning process could easily take six months or longer. The UN currently has no
397 answer to the question of what such an operation should do while its rule of law team
398 inches up such a learning curve." It is clear that the United Nations currently has no
399 solution to the issues in peacekeeping with regard to cultural sensitivity.
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401 55. The current standard operating procedures as outlined by the United Nations Department of
402 Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) for training
403 peacekeepers includes little social training. Training standards include a brief discussion of
404 language tools for peacekeepers but do not mention cultural understanding or
405 communication abilities. The peacekeepers' aptitude for communication with the civilian
406 population is crucial in the success of collaborative efforts to rehabilitate States post-
407 conflict.
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409 56. The President of the Security Council's note on 27 December 2004 illustrates the lack of
410 attention to cultural sensitivity in peacekeeping operations. Out of fifty-seven notes on

411 peacekeeping, only one focused on cultural sensitivity. The Security Council has identified
412 the issue as a priority and held meetings on the topic, but little has been done.

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414 57. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recognizes the success of the AU
415 Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in which the majority of troop-contributing countries were
416 neighboring States. The common cultures and lack of a language barrier provided the
417 peacekeepers more legitimacy and cultural sensitivity, which expedited the post-conflict
418 stabilization efforts. The Committee also recognizes the efforts of South Africa, Canada,
419 Australia, Chile, Germany, and Bangladesh in establishing regional training centers.

420 421 **I. CHILDREN AND PEACEKEEPING**

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423 58. The Special Committee considers the safety and security of children to be of the utmost
424 priority in future peacekeeping reform. We recognize that protecting the rights of children
425 is crucial for sustainable and lasting peace in post-conflict zones. Furthermore, such
426 protection measures are a key part of establishing and maintaining the rule of law and
427 justice in post-conflict societies and regions.

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429 59. In this regard, the Special Committee recognizes the past actions undertaken by the
430 Secretariat on the rights of children in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. We affirm
431 the past General Assembly resolutions adopted under the promotion and protection of the
432 rights of children, as well as the Security Council resolutions 2086 (2013), 1998 (2011),
433 1882 (2009), 1612 (2005), and 1539 (2004) on the topic.

- 434
435 60. This Committee recognizes the past work of United Nations Peacekeeping in protecting
436 children in particular, the work of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in
437 mainstreaming child protection into peacekeeping missions and the implementation of the
438 policy directive on the protection, rights, and well-being of children affected by armed
439 conflict.

440 441 **J. FINANCING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FOR** 442 **POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION EFFORTS**

- 443
444
445 61. The peacekeeping operations for post-conflict stabilization efforts that the Special
446 Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) looks to improve upon hinge on an
447 appropriate funding structure that all Member States can benefit from. Currently, there is an
448 issue with Member States falling behind on their dues and therefore are highly encouraged
449 to pay their dues in a timely manner. In order to secure funding for any peacekeeping
450 operation, the UN must look not only to certain regions for financial support but to the
451 entire world. Member States acknowledge that funding for peacekeeping operations should
452 be enhanced and improved. This Special Committee must acknowledge the discrepancies
453 on the peacekeeping funds in order to improve post-conflict stabilization efforts. Therefore,
454 addressing the financial needs of peacekeeping operations is critical to the missions, and to
455 the United Nations as a whole.

456

457 62. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been an active player in
458 supporting post-conflict reconstruction. Its Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and
459 Recovery (CPR TTF) is currently used as fast, flexible funding to respond to crisis
460 prevention and recovery. It was formed in 2000, and has since mobilized 1 billion USD to
461 work in over one hundred countries.
462

463 **K. UTILIZING PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO AID INTEGRATION AND**
464 **PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN POST-**
465 **CONFLICT**
466

467 63. Refugees—both internally and externally displaced—present a delicate issue in post-
468 conflict situations. Usually defenseless, refugee populations are extremely vulnerable in the
469 event of conflict yet their continued displaced, and often underprivileged, existence can be
470 destabilizing and lead to further conflict. Historically, refugee populations have been the
471 source of and motivation for armed rebellion resulting in long-term cycles of conflict and
472 the diffusion of local conflicts into previously uninvolved regions.
473

474 64. This Special Committee recognizes that problems implicit in refugee situations cannot be
475 handled solely by the involved states. 5.8 million people are currently registered as
476 refugees with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Since 2010,
477 the ongoing conflict in Syria has added an estimated 2 million internally displaced Syrians
478 bringing the total estimate of internally displaced persons close to 30 million people.
479

480 65. While a variety of tactics have been adopted by various bodies and agencies within the
481 United Nations system to deal with the problems associated with refugees and internally
482 displaced persons—including the efforts of the UNHCR and, most recently, A/RES/66/165
483 which calls upon states to develop a more comprehensive approach when dealing with
484 IDPs—and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has prioritized providing
485 safe havens for displaced persons in conflict situations, in post-conflict situations a more
486 integrative approach needs to be adopted. The African region has done much work on
487 addressing the rights of refugees and IDPs, such as the creation of the African Union
488 Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.
489

490 66. In the spirit of the Brahimi (2003) and New Horizons (2011) Reports this Special
491 Committee calls upon United Nations (UN) entities to work with greater coordination and
492 collaboration in finding permanent solutions for refugees and displaced populations which
493 challenge stability in post-conflict situations. Additionally, this report encourages the
494 DPKO and other UN entities to work closely with relevant non-UN actors to support the
495 needs of the displaced migrants from conflict.
496

497 **L. INFRINGEMENT ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN POST-CONFLICT**
498 **PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**
499

500 67. In recent operations, the undermining or complete removal of structures of governance in
501 Member States has led to anarchy and a deterioration of security situations. The UN
502 Charter enshrines the principles of state sovereignty as outlined in Article 2. Peacekeeping

503 operations have historically addressed sovereignty within their operational mandates,
504 including S/RES/2086 (2013), which recognizes the importance of the development and
505 advancements in post-conflict peacebuilding operations by extending mandates of existing
506 operations and creating of new ones. However, state sovereignty has not been universally
507 respected in peacekeeping operations.

508 68. When government structures are not preserved throughout intervention, post-conflict
509 stabilization is severely compromised, as seen in modern Libya. When state authorities are
510 undermined, post-conflict stabilization is threatened by the difficulty in restoring the
511 people's faith in good governance and the rule of law. The recent events in Libya serve as a
512 primary example of violation of state sovereignty that eventually deteriorated the security
513 situation.

514
515 **M. SOCIOECONOMIC PROGRAMS AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS IN**
516 **PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

517
518 69. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations stresses the relationship between
519 peacekeeping operations and successful instances of post-conflict peacebuilding in regard
520 to the prevention of repeated armed conflicts and the pursuit of sustainable peace and
521 development, as we have highlighted in our own report (A/66/19).

522
523 70. The need for standby arrangements for the recruitment of civilian personnel in substantive
524 and support areas has been introduced in the *Brahimi Report* (A/55/305). In the same
525 regard, the *New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*
526 *Operations* (2009) placed emphasis on the importance of civilian leadership within the
527 United Nations peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the General Assembly of the 66th
528 Session adopted A/66/255, which stressed the significance of civilian capacity development
529 and institution-building through peacekeeping operations in accordance with its mandates.

530
531 71. The importance of a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping aimed at facilitating the
532 peacebuilding process was highlighted with the adoption of S/RES/2086 (2013), and the
533 efforts of the World Bank in incorporating post-conflict reconstruction in their poverty
534 reduction mandate are recognized as an important example of how members of the
535 international community are essential in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process.

536
537 72. The stimulation of the economy in the long-term may prevent conflicts resulting from
538 socioeconomic disparities. Programs such as *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil attempt to uplift the
539 population in poverty by addressing the short-term needs of impoverished individuals by
540 way of direct cash transfers, as well as the long-term needs by improving family welfare
541 through conditional cash transfers. One of the qualifications of this program is that the
542 youth in the families receive an education.

543
544 73. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund's (PBF) classification of disarmament,
545 demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes as a "Priority Area One" project in
546 addressing peace-sustaining processes is of paramount importance to the development of
547 peace and security.

548

549 74. Consistent with the statement of Mohammed Loulichki of Morocco, Security Council
550 President for December 2012 (S/PRST/2012/29), we underline the need to incorporate
551 socioeconomic and disarmament programs for the stabilization of post-conflict regions
552 from the very inception of a peacekeeping operation.
553

554 **N. STANDARDIZATION OF TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES FOR** 555 **CIVILIAN PERSONNEL** 556

557 75. We recall A/RES/63/287, which in 2009 highlighted the need to make a priority the
558 pressing need for adequately-trained personnel in peacekeeping missions, including those
559 firmly in the civilian sector.
560

561 76. This Special Committee acknowledges that in the past, developing nations such as Haiti
562 and Togo have become dependent on aid and workers from the United Nations.
563

564 77. The Special Committee also highlights the statement in the Report of the Secretary General
565 on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/66/311) that the development of
566 consistent training and recruitment standards then and now remains a pressing priority.
567

568 78. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations further notes the Report of the
569 Secretary-General on Peacebuilding on the Immediate Aftermath of a Conflict (A/63/881),
570 which covers the problems of recruitment, processing and selection of adequately-qualified
571 civilian personnel in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.
572

573 79. Since 2009, reforms to the recruitment approach by the DPKO have addressed a range of
574 problems with recruitment, by abandoning the practice of direct secondment of personnel;
575 however, significant problems persist, including bureaucratic delays in processing
576 applications for relevant positions, ensuring that potential selections are qualified for the
577 position, and conclusive fulfillment of the post.
578

579 80. The DPKO report, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon for UN
580 Peacekeeping, highlights the lack of coordination with the often overlapping plethora of
581 rostering agencies, which assemble the lists of candidates for consideration, and the various
582 agencies which seek to fill vacant civilian capacity positions.
583

584 **II. Mandate** 585

586
587 81. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was established in 1965 through
588 General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX) and was originally tasked to undertake a
589 comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects
590 in order to facilitate consultations on peacekeeping within the General Assembly.
591

592 82. In 1996, the General Assembly adopted resolution 51/136, which decided that the Special
593 Committee, in accordance with its mandate, should continue its efforts for a comprehensive
594 review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, and should