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SECURITY COUNCIL
BACKGROUND GUIDE 2013

Written By: Beatrice Soler, Lauren Shaw, Alexandra Samii,
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NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

• The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/ herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

• Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

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ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.nya@nmun.org
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Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	ccpcj.nya@nmun.org
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OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

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Dear Delegates,

It is our immense pleasure to welcome you to the 2013 National Model United Nations Conference held in New York this spring. You and your team are integral in making this conference a success. As previous participants ourselves, we promise an exciting learning experience.

The 2013 Security Council Directors are divided into Conference A and Conference B. Beatrice Soler, Lauren Shaw and Alexandra Samii are Directors for Conference A; while Bobby Valentine, June Findlay and Clarissa Manning are the Directors for Conference B. Beatrice Soler is Director of Security Council A. She has a Masters in Public Administration from Georgia Southern University as well as a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and International Studies. This is her fourth year as a staff member for NMUN. Lauren Shaw, Director of Security Council B, holds a BA in political science and is currently working towards a Masters in Public Policy from Georgetown University. This is her sixth year at NMUN-NY and her second year on staff. Alexandra Samii is the Director of Security Council C. She holds a Law degree from Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium and has led and assisted Delegations at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. This is her fourth year at NMUN-NY and her second year on staff. Bobby Valentine heads up the Security Council A for week two. Bobby holds an M.A in political science from the University of Chicago and is currently finishing a Ph.D. program there. This is Bobby's third year as a staff member with NMUN. June Findlay, Director of Security Council B, holds a Masters in Media, Journalism and Democracy from Mid Sweden University as well as a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and French-English Translation from York University. This is her fifth year at NMUN and fourth on staff. Clarissa Manning, Director of Security Council C, holds a B.A. in political science from the University of California - Los Angeles. This is her fifth year at NMUN and third year on staff.

The topics on the Security Council agenda for 2013 are:

1. Achieving Peace and Stability in Somalia
2. Women, Peace and Security: Reviewing SC Resolution 1325
3. Resource Scarcity and Its Relation to Conflict

The Security Council as one of the principal organs of the United Nations is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. As delegates simulating this body you are expected to strive towards excellence in your research, writing and most importantly in your teamwork during negotiations. This background guide is your first step in the preparation process up to the conference this spring. Your respective position papers have to be submitted by March 1, 2013. Please take note of the NMUN policies on the website and in the delegate preparation guide regarding plagiarism, codes of conduct/dress code/sexual harassment, awards philosophy/evaluation method, etc. Adherence to these guidelines is mandatory.

In the meantime, if you have any questions, feel free to contact us and the Under-Secretaries-General for Peace and Security, Cara Wagner (Conference A) and Katharina Weinert (Conference B). We wish you luck in your preparation for the conference and look forward to welcoming you in person to New York.

Sincerely,

Conference A
Beatrice Soler, Director Security Council A
Lauren Shaw, Director Security Council B
Alexandra Samii, Director Security Council C

Conference B
Bobby Valentine, Director Security Council A
June Findlay, Director Security Council B
Clarissa Manning, Director Security Council C

Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the
2013 NMUN Conference

For NMUN-New York 2013, each delegation submits one position paper for each assigned committee. A delegate's role as a Member State, Observer State, Non-Governmental Organization, etc. should affect the way a position paper is written. To understand these differences, please refer to the [Delegate Preparation Guide](#).

Position papers should review each delegation's policy regarding the topics of the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in entirely original material. ***The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism***. In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers may be given an award as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below and be of high substantive standard, using adequate language and showing in-depth research. While we encourage innovative proposals, we would like to remind delegates to stay within the mandate of their respective committee and keep a neutral and respectful tone. Similarly to the minus point-policy implemented at the conference to discourage disruptive behavior, position papers that use offensive language may entail negative grading when being considered for awards. Please refer to the sample paper following this message for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single-sided pages (one double-sided paper, if printed)
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at one inch for the whole paper
- Country/NGO name, school name and committee name must be clearly labeled on the first page,
- National symbols (headers, flags, etc.) are deemed inappropriate for NMUN position papers
- Agenda topics must be clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf format <u>required</u>) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2012. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.

2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue, Conference A: positionpapers.nya@nmun.org or Conference B: positionpapers.nyb@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2013 (GMT-5)**.

Please use the committee name, your assignment, Conference A or B, and delegation/school name in both the e-mail subject line and in the filename (example: GA1st_Cuba_ConfA_Mars College).

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Hannah Birkenkötter, Director-General (Conference A), or Nicholas Warino, Director-General (Conference B), at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and it is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location, your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Conference A	*Conference B*
Hannah Birkenkötter	Nicholas Warino
Director-General	Director-General
hannah@nmun.org	nick@nmun.org

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion; Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions; as well as The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. The Mexican Delegation first would like to convey its gratitude being elected and pride to serve as vice-president of the current General Assembly Plenary session.

I. The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion

The principles of equal sovereignty of states and non-interference, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, have always been cornerstones of Mexican foreign policy. The legitimate right to interfere by the use of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, is laid down in Article 41 of the UN-charter and reserves the right to the Security Council.

Concerning the violation of this principle by the application of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations, H.E. Ambassador to the United Nations Enrique Berruga Filloy underlined in 2005 that the Mexico strongly rejects "the application of unilateral laws and measures of economic blockade against any State, as well as the implementation of coercive measures without the authorization enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations." That is the reason, why the United Mexican States supported – for the 14th consecutive time – Resolution (A/RES/60/12) of 2006 regarding the *Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba*.

In the 1990s, comprehensive economic sanctions found several applications with very mixed results, which made a critical reassessment indispensable. The United Mexican States fully supported and actively participated in the "Stockholm Process" that focused on increasing the effectiveness in the implementation of targeted sanctions. As sanctions and especially economic sanctions, pose a tool for action "between words and war" they must be regarded as a mean of last resort before war and fulfill highest requirements for their legitimate use. The United Mexican States and their partners of the "Group of Friends of the U.N. Reform" have already addressed and formulated recommendations for that take former criticism into account. Regarding the design of economic sanctions it is indispensable for the success to have the constant support by all member states and public opinion, which is to a large degree dependent on the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. Sanctions must be tailor-made, designed to effectively target the government, while sparing to the largest degree possible the civil population. Sanction regimes must be constantly monitored and evaluated to enable the world-community to adjust their actions to the needs of the unforeseeably changing situation. Additionally, the United Mexican States propose to increase communication between the existing sanction committees and thus their effectiveness by convening regular meetings of the chairs of the sanction committees on questions of common interest.

II. Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions

As a founding member of the United Nations, Mexico is highly engaged in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights all over the world, as laid down in the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)* in 1948. Especially since the democratic transition of Mexico in 2000 it is one of the most urgent topics to stand for Democratization and Human Rights, and Mexico implements this vision on many different fronts.

In the Convoking Group of the intergovernmental Community of Democracies (GC), the United Mexican States uphold an approach that fosters international cooperation to promote democratic values and institution-building at the national and international level. To emphasize the strong interrelation between human rights and the building of democracy and to fortify democratic developments are further challenges Mexico deals with in this committee. A key-factor for the sustainable development of a post-conflict-region is to hold free and fair election and thus creating a democratic system. Being aware of the need of post-conflict countries for support in the preparation of democratic elections, the United Mexican States contribute since 2001 to the work of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an intergovernmental organization operating at international, regional and national level in partnership with a range of institutions. Mexico's foreign policy regarding human rights is substantially

based on cooperation with international organizations. The Inter American Commission of Human Rights is one of the bodies, Mexico is participating, working on the promotion of Human Rights in the Americas. Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the regional judicial institution for the application and interpretation of the *American Convention of Human Rights*.

The objectives Mexico pursues are to improve human rights in the country through structural changes and to fortify the legal and institutional frame for the protection of human rights on the international level. Underlining the connection between democracy, development and Human Rights, stresses the importance of cooperation with and the role of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the reform of the Human Rights Commission to a Human rights Council.

Having in mind the diversity of challenges in enforcing democracy and Human Rights, Mexico considers regional and national approaches vital for their endorsement, as Mexico exemplifies with its *National Program for Human Rights* or the *Plan Puebla Panama*. On the global level, Mexico is encouraged in working on a greater coordination and interoperability among the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as the development of common strategies and operational policies and the sharing of best practices in civilian crisis management should be encouraged, including clear frameworks for joint operations, when applicable.

III. The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa

The United Mexican States welcome the leadership role the African Union has taken regarding the security problems of the continent. Our delegation is furthermore convinced that The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) can become the foundation for Africa's economic, social and democratic development as the basis for sustainable peace. Therefore it deserves the full support of the international community.

The development of the United Mexican States in the last two decades is characterized by the transition to a full democracy, the national and regional promotion of human rights and sustainable, economic growth. Mexico's development is characterized by free trade and its regional integration in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Having in mind that sustainable development is based not only on economic, but as well on social and environmental development, President Vicente Fox has made sustainable development a guiding principle in the Mexican Development Plan that includes sustainability targets for all major policy areas.

The United Nations Security Council has established not less than seven peace-keeping missions on the African continent, underlining the need for full support by the international community. In post-conflict situations, we regard national reconciliation as a precondition for a peaceful development, which is the reason why Mexico supported such committees, i.e. in the case of Sierra Leone. The United Mexican States are convinced that an other to enhance durable peace in Africa is the institutional reform of the United Nations. We therefore want to reaffirm our full support to both the establishment of the peace-building commission and the Human Rights Council. Both topics are highly interrelated and, having in mind that the breach of peace is most often linked with severest human rights' abuses, thus need to be seen as two sides of one problem and be approached in this understanding.

As most conflicts have their roots in conflicts about economic resources and development chances, human development and the eradication of poverty must be at the heart of a successful, preventive approach. Lifting people out of poverty must be seen as a precondition not only for peace, but for social development and environmental sustainability.

The United Mexican States want to express their esteem for the decision taken by the G-8 countries for a complete debt-relief for many African Highly-Indebted-Poor-Countries. Nevertheless, many commitments made by the international community that are crucial for Africa's sustainable development are unfulfilled. The developed countries agreed in the *Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development* (A/CONF.198/11) to increase their Official Development Aid (ODA) "towards the target of 0,7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries and 0,15 to 0,20 per cent of GNP of developed countries to least developed countries". Furthermore, the United Mexican States are disappointed by the result of the Hong Kong Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, which once more failed to meet the needs of those, to whom the round was devoted: developing countries and especially African countries, who today, more than ever, are cut off from global trade and prosperity by protectionism.

Committee History

Introduction

The Security Council (SC) is one of the principal organs of the United Nations (UN) in charge of the maintenance of international peace and security.[1] Its history and the evolution of its powers are intertwined with the history of world politics.[2] From today's perspective, the history of the SC can be seen as having two parts: from the creation of the United Nations until the mid-1980s and post-Cold War.[3] Indeed, the Cold War induced an extensive use of the veto power from the United States and the Soviet Union blocking the smooth run of diplomatic dynamics.[4] General Assembly Resolution 377, known as the Uniting for Peace resolution, enabled a step forward and empowered the General Assembly (GA) to consider SC topics if the SC fails to act in order to maintain international peace and security.[5] This resolution was initiated by the United States in the context of the Korean War to circumvent Soviet vetoes.[6] Consequently, it shaped a balance between the powers of the GA and the SC and enabled the establishment of the first peacekeeping mission during the Suez crisis in 1956.[7] The end of the Cold War enabled a new arena of work and developed the focus of the SC.[8] A shift of focus from the 'security among states' to 'human security' has been observed, and now the SC addresses threats to security in regard to these two types of security.[9] Since then, peacekeeping operations have increased, economic sanctions have been inserted, and human security is being addressed, with great attention being brought to the issue of terrorism.[10]

A key tool of the SC regarding human security are peacekeeping operations. Since 1948, there have been 67 peacekeeping operations and currently, there are 15 active peacekeeping operations.[11] Additionally, the post-Cold War era saw the emergence of economic sanctions in order to respond to threats of international peace and security prior to using military intervention.[12] The attacks of September 11, 2011 in New York and Washington D.C. also marked a shift in behavior by the SC, moving from a case-specific approach to a general thematic approach. This can be seen in the consideration of the overarching issue of terrorism as a thematic topic: The SC reacted to the September 11 attacks by adopting Resolution 1373, which obliges all Member States to take action against terrorist activities in general, not limited to a specific incident.[13] It has therefore been criticized as overstepping its boundaries and acting as a "world legislator", a function not foreseen by the UN Charter.[14]

In a similar vein, SC Resolution 1540 regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was adopted unanimously in April 2004 and obliges Member States under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to take appropriate legal and regulatory measures to prevent the proliferation of biological, nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons and their delivery to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors.[15] Consequently, this resolution depicts a novel layer of the non-proliferation activity as it establishes a universal mandatory obligation for Member States to modify their domestic legislation to criminalize various forms of non-state actor involvement in weapons of mass destruction.[16] Additionally, the SC has also expanded its work in the area of civilian protection.[17] In SC Resolution 1208, adopted in 1999, the Council addressed the security of refugees in African refugee camps directly, whereas in years prior only humanitarian aid had been addressed in regard to the conflicts in Somalia and the Balkans.[18] These SC resolutions show the evolution of the work of the SC and how the

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[1] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VII, Art. 34.
[2] Malone, *Security Council*, 2007, p.117.
[3] Malone, *Security Council*, 2007, p.117.
[4] Malone, *Security Council*, 2007, p.121.
[5] United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution 377*, 1950.
[6] Williams, *Intergovernmental Military Forces and World Public Order*, 1971, p. 284.
[7] Zaum, *The Uniting for Peace Resolution*, 2008, p. 155.
[8] Greenstock, *The Security Council in the Post-Cold War World,* 2008, p. 248f.
[9] Hampson and Penny, *Human Security,* 2008, p. 539ff.
[10] Boulden, *The Security Council and Terrorism,* 2008, p. 611.
[11] United Nations Department on Public Information, *United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet*, 2012.
[12] Coertright, and Gerber, *The Sanctions Era: Trends in UN Security Council Sanctions since 1990,* 2008, p. 205.
[13] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1373,* 2001.
[14] Talmon, *The Security Council as World Legislature*, 2005.
[15] United Nations, *Security Council decides all states shall act to prevent proliferation of mass destruction weapons*, 2004, p. 1.
[16] Heupel, *Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A division of labour strategy*, 2007, p. 4.
[17] Security Council Report, *Cross Cutting Report No. 2 Protection of Civilians,* 2011.
[18] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1208*, 1998.

examination of its history in regards to the dynamics of diplomatic relations is important for understanding today's Security Council.[19]

Powers of the Security Council

The UN Charter affords unique powers to the Security Council.[20] The use of force and binding decisions of the SC for all UN Member States are sole characteristics of the SC that no other UN committee has.[21] Chapter VI and VII define measures that the SC can take to react to international conflicts.[22] In order to prevent conflict, Article 34 (Chapter VI) enables the SC to "investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."[23] Under Article 35, any state involved in a particular incident may seize the SC, whether it is a UN Member State or not.[24]

The response of the SC can then be either to encourage the parties to use peaceful measures to settle the dispute or to use military force itself in case of "any threat to the peace, breach to the peace or act of aggression."[25] Such peacekeeping operations, referred to as "Chapter VI ½", have become an important tool in addressing conflict; although peacekeeping operations are not addressed directly in the Charter.[26] The SC, under Article 41 of the UN Charter, may also use economic sanctions as a tool.[27] Article 41 specifically says that, "[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures."[28]

Moreover, the SC also recommends states to the GA for admission to the United Nations.[29] The Council further nominates the Secretary-General of the United Nations who has to be approved by the GA, it plays a vital role in electing the judges for the International Court of Justice, and it may request investigation by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court of alleged crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.[30]

Current Membership and Dynamics of the Security Council

The Security Council consists of 15 Member States: five permanent Members and ten non-permanent Members.[31] The five permanent Members (P5) are the United States of America, Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.[32] Under the 1945 Charter, reference is made to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).[33] Although the UN Charter has never been amended to refer the legal successor to the USSR, the Russian Federation is the current P5 member.[34] The GA selects the ten other Member States of the SC through a majority vote for two-year terms with five seats elected per year.[35] The ten non-permanent members currently are: Azerbaijan, Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, and Togo.[36] In 1963, resolution 1991 (XVIII) adopted by the GA established a regional allocation

[19] Malone, *Security Council*, 2007, p.117.

[20] Malone, *Security Council,* 2007, p. 117.

[21] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VII, Art. 51 and Art. 25.

[22] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapters VI and VII.

[23] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VII, Art. 34.

[24] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter V, Art. 35.

[25] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VI, Art. 33 (1). and United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VII, Art. 39.

[26] Berdal, *The Council and Peacekeeping*, 2008, p. 179.

[27] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VII, Art. 41.

[28] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VII, Art. 41.

[29] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter II, Art. 4 (2).

[30] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, Art. 97; United Nations, *Statute of the International Court of Justice,* Art. 4(1); International Criminal Court, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, 1998, Art. 13(b).

[31] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter V Art. 23 (1).

[32] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter V Art .23 (1).

[33] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapters V, Art. 23.

[34] *Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the President of the Russian Federation*, 1991.

[35] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter V Art. 23 (2).

[36] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter V Art. 23 (2).

system for these seats: two Asian states, two Latin American states, three African states, one Eastern European state, and two Western European and Other states.[37]

The voting procedure of the SC is specific and different from other UN committees: Every Member State of the SC has one vote and the majority needed for procedural votes in the SC is nine votes.[38] For substantive votes to pass, nine votes in favor are also needed but with no veto by a member of the P5. Today, the veto is rarely used and most of the SC decisions are based on consensus.[39] However, the impact of the threat of a veto is continually present during negotiations regarding wars or interventions in which its P5 members are involved as witnessed in the past in regard to Iraq (2003) and Georgia (2008).[40]

Criticisms and challenges of the Security Council

The SC has been criticized in regard to its composition, the veto power of the P5 and has been facing challenges recently with developments in Syria. With regard to the P5 composition of the Council, the SC has been heavily criticized as it is stated that it does not reflect an updated illustration of political dynamics of today but rather the dynamics of the creation of the UN after the Second World War.[41] There are several reforms that have been suggested by the Small Five, G4 and the 'Uniting for Consensus' group. The Small Five are in favor of a reform of the working methods of the Security Council to improve the way it works.[42] The G4 and the 'Uniting for Consensus' group are two opposing groups of Member States that seek a new system of permanent seats on a rotating regional basis, as well as renewable longer-term set of non-permanent seats, but through different means.[43] The veto power of the P5 has also been criticized as permanent members often use this power to stop measures contrary to their individual national interests: for instance, between 1982 and today, the U.S. vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel.[44] As a result of this immense power, P5 members now meet privately and then present their resolutions to the full Council. This practice, called the *fait accompli,* has been criticized by many states as well as independent institutions, including the Global Policy Forum.[45]

Additionally, the Security Council faces challenges in regard to its effectiveness. A recent example is the development of the Council's action regarding Syria. On July 19, 2012, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Syria because of the vetoes by P5 Member States Russia and China.[46] 11 of the Council's Members voted in favor of the resolution, with Pakistan and South Africa abstaining.[47] Following this vote, on August 19th, the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria expired.[48] On August 25, 2012 hundreds of civilians were massacred in Daraya and the Secretary-General condemned the crime and called for an immediate investigation.[49] This evidences how the effectiveness of the SC can be challenged and the impact of the consequences when vetoes are employed by P5 Member States. Finally, with the adoption of Resolutions 1373 calling upon Member States to implement measures intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability to counter terrorist activities, the SC has been criticized for imposing obligations on Member States as a 'world legislator' imposing new binding rules of international law such as criminalization of active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law and bringing violators to justice.[50]

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[37] United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution 1991*, 1963.
[38] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter V Art. 27 (2).
[39] Simma, Brunner, and Kaul, *Article 27,* 2002, p. 515.
[40] Simma, Brunner, and Kaul, *Article 27,* 2002, p. 515.
[41] UN News Center, *Security Council fails to adopt resolution*, 2012.
[42] Center for UN Reform Education, *S5 presents draft resolution on Improving Working Methods of the Security Council,* 2011.
[43] Secretaría des Relationes Exteriores, *Mexico's Position on UN Security Council Reform,* 2011.
[44] Mearsheimer, Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2006.
[45] Childers, *Empowering the Peoples in their United Nations (Global Policy Forum)*, 2011.
[46] UN News Center, *Security Council fails to adopt resolution,* 2012.
[47] UN News Center, *Security Council fails to adopt resolution,* 2012.
[48] Security Council Report, *September 2012 Monthly Forecast*, 2012.
[49] Security Council Report, *September 2012 Monthly Forecast*, 2012.
[50] Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 2005, p. 175.

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The American Journal of International Law (1949). In: Yuen-li Liang: *The So-Called Double Veto* (pp.134-144).
American Society of International Law.

> *The veto power of the permanent Member States is the most known characteristic of the Security Council. The term 'double veto' refers to two successive negative votes by a P5 member: a negative vote regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not a certain matter is a procedural one or not and a second negative vote regarding the substantive matter at hand. However the question of double vetoes is less familiar and thus delegates are encouraged to read this article. Double veto-situations occur exclusively with regards to setting the agenda. Delegates are encouraged to bear in mind that no double veto has been applied since 1959.*

Malone, D. (2004). *The Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st century.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener.

> *This book provides an overview of the Security Council internally and its role in regard to international relations. It assesses the objectives and performances of the Security Council during and after the Cold War. The contributors are practitioners who have served on the Security Council or in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics in order to provide a diverse and unbiased approach to the work of the Council.*

Security Council Report (2012). *September 2012 Monthly Forecast.* Retrieved August 28, 2012
from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-09/syria.php

> *This monthly issue enables access to the developments of the work of the Security Council. This the September issue focuses on Syria and the challenges the Security Council is facing. Delegates are encouraged to follow this report each month leading up to the conference for updates on the activity of the Security Council. focusing on a region, country, theme or framework of the Security Council.*

Security Council Report (2012). *Cross Cutting Report No. 2. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts.* Retrieved August 8, 2012 from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/XCutting%20POC%202012.pdf

> *This Security Council Report provides an update to keep track of the work of the Security Council. Country-specific analyzes relating to the protection of civilians together with an introduction to the latest dynamics of the Council and challenges are covered in this report. Delegates are strongly encouraged to read this document as a starting point to get insight into the work of the Security Council.*

United Nations Department on Public Information. (2012). *United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet.* Retrieved August 8, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml

> *The United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet provides an overview of current UN peacekeeping missions. As current operations might be subject to change until the conference, delegates are advised to consult this Web site to keep track of changes. Links to each peacekeeping mission are provided for further information on their most recent work.*

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I. Women, Peace and Security: Revisiting and Reviewing Security Council Resolution 1325

"The relationship between women, peace and security is not an automatic equation—peace must be made to work for women. It is not enough to assume that peace is women-friendly, or that is will necessarily guarantee the rights of women […] the reality for many women around the world is that they are excluded from the very structures that make the decision to sustain peace or engage in conflict."[51].

Introduction

The adoption of Security Council (SC) resolution 1325 (2000) was seen as a significant milestone and a rousing success for the advancement of women's issues in the context of international security. Women and girls have been especially affected by the changing nature of conflict since the 1990s, gender-based violence and sexual-based violence has increasingly been used as a method of war.[52] But women also face particular challenges during peace processes after the conflict has ended: Women face discrimination which often leads to problems in accessing education and gaining financial independence, sexual violence often continues after conflict resulting from insecurity and impunity, also women are poorly represented in formal peace processes.[53] Since SCR 1325 (2000) the Security Council has addressed the issue of women, peace and security in several resolutions, which focus on strengthening women's participation in decision-making, ending sexual violence and impunity and providing an accountability system.[54]

Security Council resolution (SCR) 1325 (2000) was the result of decades of advocacy, primarily driven by civil society which begun with the world conferences on women grounded in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).[55] Beginning in the mid-1990s the most important drivers for women's rights in peace and security were the 4th World Conference on Women, CEDAW and the *Beijing Platform for Action* along with the *Beijing Declaration*—a manifesto of the championing of women's rights as part of the UN's future activities.[56] It was the first document to explicitly mention the connection between Women and Armed Conflict. Five years later, the General Assembly held a Special Session to review the Beijing summit drafted and adopted a Political Declaration and outcome document, further reinforcing the importance of this issue.[57]

International Framework

Prior to the adoption of SCR 1325 (2000), the Members of the Security Council recognized the importance of equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their involvement in conflict resolution for sustainable peace and security.[58] Seven months later, SCR 1325 (2000) was adopted unanimously by the Council and "was hailed at the time as a vital and innovative political framework that enables the consideration of gender issues during periods of armed conflict as well as in the processes of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction."[59] It calls on the United Nations and Member States to "increase the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes, to ensure the protection of women and girls, and to institute gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping," among other target goals.[60]

In its ongoing discussion on the topic of women, peace and security, the Security Council has adopted five resolutions addressing various issues, actors and stakeholders: SCR 1325 (2000), SCR 1820 (2008), SCR 1888

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[51] NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. *From Local to Global: Making peace work for women, peace and security.* 2005, p viii.

[52] United Nations, *Women, Peace and Security*, 2002, p. 2.

[53] UN Women, *Women, War, Peace*, 2012.

[54] UN Women, *Women, War, Peace*, 2012.

[55] UN Women/UNIFEM, *The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Platform for action.* 1995. UN Women/UNIFEM, *The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Platform for action.* 1995.

[56] UN Women/UNIFEM, *The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Platform for action.* 1995. UN Women/UNIFEM, *The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Platform for action.* 1995.

[57] UN Women/UNIFEM, *Security Council Resolution 1325 Annotated and explained.*

[58] United Nations Security Council, *Press Release SC/6816.* 8 March 2000.

[59] Shepherd, L.J (2008). Power and Authority in the production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. *International Studies Quarterly,* 52, p. 383.

[60] NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (October 2005). *From Local to Global: Making peace work for women, peace and security.* p viii.

(2009), SCR1889 (2009), and SCR 1960 (2010). The first of the five to be adopted, SCR 1325 (2000), was necessary because "1 in 13 participants in peace negotiations since 1992 has been a woman; efforts to boost protection of women in conflict areas are insufficient to date (case in point: MONUSCO, heavily criticized for its slow response to mass rapes in eastern DR Congo); only slightly more than 3 percent of total military personnel in peace-keeping operations are women; and just 13 out of 34 peace-keeping and political missions have gender advisors."[61]

Since the adoption of SCR 1325 (2000), the SC has made efforts through meetings and sessions to address several aspects of this resolution as the various actors, stakeholders, and even history itself has instructed it to adapt to various changes and adjustments. SCR 1820 (2008) specifically focused on the use of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict; it focuses on a direct relationship between the widespread use of sexual violence as a method and tool of conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security.[62] SCR1888 (2009), in the same vein, directs and encourages Member States to "take effective steps to halt the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war."[63] It also established the post of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVIC).[64] SCR 1889 (2009) addresses "the participation of women in all phases of the peace process.[65] Most importantly, it calls for monitoring and introduces accountability mechanisms that SCR 1325 (2000) lacks.[66] The resolution strongly encourages cooperation with civil society, particularly women's organizations."[67] SCR 1960 (2010) established monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements (MARA) on conflict-related sexual violence in situation on the agenda of the Security Council.[68]

Such resolutions are meant to administer advocacy tools to civil society organizations and other actors involved in seeing various practices through to completion[69]. In essence, the Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security symbolize the focusing of the Security Council's inclusion of the concepts, aspects and practices of women, peace and security. However, these resolutions are only the blueprint in the building plans that are the involvement of women and gender issues in the international peace and security process.

More than a decade later, several challenges still remain to achieve the goals of SCR 1325 (2000). At the same time, the resolution still provides opportunities to foster, improve and implement the complex relationship between women, peace and security. Member States have been slow to actually implement national action plans (for example, targeting female police officers for recruitment of local police forces), if at all.[70] Several states have failed to fully implement certain aspects of SCR 1325 (2000), such as the use of gender-based violence in times of conflict, they have occurred repeatedly, even within UN peacekeeping troops while on duty.[71]

Women, peace and security has been widely researched and discussed within the academic realm, particularly in discourse surrounding feminist international relations. Recent discussions have point out that the Council tends to take, embodied in the statement "just add women and stir."[72] This phrase, referring to the notion that the women, peace and security debate is simply inserted in actual security resolutions and security policy without any real consideration for how a gender perspective is implemented, may be the difficulty when it comes to SCR 1325 (2000). In effect, the possible negative result of SC1325 and its subsequent activities involves the overall discussion

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[61] Women for Women International. *The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: Including women in peace-building efforts*.
[62] United States Department of State. *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820*.
[63] PeaceWomen. *Security Council Resolution 1888*.
[64] PeaceWomen. *Security Council Resolution 1888*.
[65] Hunt Alternatives Fund. *The Institute for Inclusive Security. Guide to UN Security Council Resolution 1889*.
[66] Hunt Alternatives Fund. *The Institute for Inclusive Security. Guide to UN Security Council Resolution 1889*.
[67] Hunt Alternatives Fund. *The Institute for Inclusive Security. Guide to UN Security Council Resolution 1889*.
[68] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1960 (20010).
[69] Hunt Alternatives Fund. *The Institute for Inclusive Security. Guide to UN Security Council Resolution 1889*.
[70] Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action*.
[71] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support. *Ten-year impact study on implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in peacekeeping*. p. 10
Dharmapuri, S. Just add women and stir? *Parameters,* p.65.
[72] Cohn, C, Kinsella, H. and Gibbings, S. Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 1325. *International Feminist Journal of politics,* p. 137.

of a "conceptualization of women as useless or useful to the current mode of operating in the peace and security field."[73]

Debate on Women, Peace and Security

Since the adoption of SCR 1325 (2000), the Security Council has adopted various measures, meeting tactics and actors to ensure that the policy embodied within resolutions on women, peace and security, including Open Debates and the so-called Arria Formula meetings between the Security Council and working groups such as the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in order to foster the integration of women into the context of international security.

Arria Formula meetings are a mechanism to foster discussion among various actors in the process (named after Venezuelan diplomat Diego Arria), they are defined as "an informal arrangement that allows the [Security] Council greater flexibility to be briefed about international peace and security issues, and is called for the purpose of a briefing given by one or more persons, considered as expert in a matter of concern to the Council."[74] This format allows for a member of the Security Council to invite other actors, including representatives from civil society organizations, to an informal meeting, usually held outside of the Council chambers.[75] In the context of women, peace and security, the Security Council has held approximately eight Arria Formula meetings from 2001-2012.[76]

To date, one of the more effective ways of identifying the actual problems and actors within an issue is going directly to the ground—that is, involving civil society in the decision-making processes when executing and implementing the aspects of Security Council resolutions. On the 10th anniversary of SCR 1325 (2000), civil society organizations together with the heads of peacekeeping and political missions attended two months of what was called "Open Days"— dedicated to the continued dialogue about women, peace and security which were organized by UN Women and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).[77] The aim behind these meetings was to look for the perspective of women in terms of a way to improve the application of SCR 1325 (2000); such inclusive forums for female peace-builders and activists also give an opportunity to enhance local ownership of the resolution."[78] Organized by a network of UN institutions and bodies including the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Women the Open Days saw more than 1,500 women from over 20 Member States and territories meet with high-level UN officials.[79] According to the corresponding report, "the Open Day events were heralded as a first step in this crucial partnership, providing the forum for meaningful dialogue with senior UN officials on matters of profound concern to women around the world."[80]

However, the Open Days were a positive forum in which all parties were eager to participate; individuals and community leaders as a whole recommended that in the future, "a) they be held again, not on an ad hoc basis, but as a regular, scheduled practice of UN mission organization, b) an annual review of the Open Day would be desirable, to allow for follow up on the implementation of commitments made by all stakeholders including senior UN leadership."[81]

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[73] Cohn, C, Kinsella, H. and Gibbings, S. Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 1325. *International Feminist Journal of politics,* p. 137.

[74] Paul, J.. *The Arria Formula*.

[75] Paul, J.. *The Arria Formula*.

[76] PeaceWomen. *Arria Formula Meetings*.

[77] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs, UN Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Development Programme. *Women Count for Peace: The 2010 Open Days on Women, Peace and Security*. 2010

[78] UNIFEM. *10th Anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution1325: Global Open Day.*

[79] UN Women. *About UN Women;* United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs, UN Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Development Programme. *Women Count for Peace: The 2010 Open Days on Women, Peace and Security*. 2010.

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[81] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs, UN Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Development Programme. *Women Count for Peace: The 2010 Open Days on Women, Peace and Security*. 2010, p. 10.

The Impact and Implementation of SC 1325 in the field

National governments implement SCR 1325 (2000) in the form of National Action Plans, varying by each Member State. National Action Plans are based on the elements included in specific paragraphs of SCR 1325 (2000), and generally center around the national implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in three areas; 1) women's participation in decision-making and peace processes, 2) the protection of women and girls, 3) gender training.[82] The focus in recent years emphasizes the potential that National Action Plans can offer as a means of advancing implementation of the resolution; however, the focus seems to have now turned to producing actual evidence that any national action plans have been put in motion. [83]

There are two principal challenges when implementing SCR 1325 (2000): 1) how to strengthen women's participation in decision-making; 2) security sector reform[84]. In response to paragraph 8 of SCR 1325 (2000) which addresses the adoption of gender perspectives when negotiating and implementing peace agreements,[85] various implementations have been put in motion by some national governments to address the aspect of security sector reform since it is seen as an important step in the direction towards the full participation of women in the construction of a communal sense of safety and a functional, inclusive community.[86]

Another important aspect is the justice system: sexual and gender based crimes have never been prosecuted or recognized as crimes of war until the 1990s, namely in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.[87] One of the most significant measures in eliminating the barriers to justice for women was the inclusion of sexual violence crimes in the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC).[88] SCR 1888 (2009) recognizes the destabilization of formal judicial systems during times of conflict, thus hindering the efforts to prosecute those responsible for committing crimes against women to the fullest extent.[89] The resolution highlights the importance of informal justice systems in the aftermath of conflict and notes that they can have the capacity to implement peace and restorative justice measures to support the peacebuilding process.[90]

Peace processes include the reconstruction of a formal and stable judicial system to prosecute violators of national laws, international tribunals prosecute those who contributed war crimes and crimes against humanity.[91] But in some instances women seeking to plead their cases of sexual violence to an international court have been referred to their respective national court, which may not have laws protecting them from sexual violence as a result of the tremendous workload of these courts.[92]

 The key to a successful implementation in this sense is to go "beyond the national level and involve considerations of the appropriate training and the composition of personnel that a Member State commits to peacekeeping operations".[93] Haiti represents an interesting cases for the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in terms of the success rate of women in security forces. It demonstrates the goals still faced; currently the Haitian police force

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[82] PeaceWomen. National Action Plans.

[83] Swaine, Aisling. *Assessing the potential of national action plans to advance implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325.* 2009, p. 403-433.

[84] Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action.* p. 6.

[85] United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1325 (2000).*2000, p 3.

[86] Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action.* P. 33

[87] Askin, K. Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles. *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, 2003. p.1.

[88] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1888 (2009)*, 2009.

[89] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1888 (2009)*, 2009.

[90] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1888 (2009)*, 2009.

[91] FRIDE. *Justice for Women: Seeking Accountability for Sexual Crimes in Post-Conflict Situations*, 2008, p.1.

[92] UN Research Institute for Social Development, Gender Equality: *Striving for Justice in an Unequal World*, 2005, p.227.

[93] Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action.* p. 33.

includes just 411 women out of a total 8,032 officers;[94] despite this, an initiative with the aim to encourage more female officers to sign up to join the force in August 2007 was a successful effort, culminating in recruitment numbers in the thousands.[95]. It was "an important effort to change gender stereotypes about policing."[96]

Women and DDR

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities are essential elements to achieve stabilization in post-conflict societies as well as the long-term development.[97] The primary goal of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post conflict environments so that the development and recovery process can begin.[98] The disarmament process foresees the "collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons"; combatants from armed forces and other conflict groups are discharged during the demobilization phase; reintegration activities aim to provide basic necessities to ex-combatants such as food, clothes, shelter and training.[99] Although women and girls play various roles in armed groups, as combatants, spies, medics, forced laborers or sexual slaves, they are often not included in the development of DDR processes or these processes do not address the specific challenges women are facing which include caring for children born of wartime rape, discrimination and other factors.[100]

In 2010, the DPKO released its *Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security in Peacekeeping*. The goal of this report was to highlight the gains, losses and works-in-progress regarding the implementation process of SCR 1325 (2000) (with particular focus on operative clause 13) in Africa and the Middle East since the resolution's inception ten years earlier. Of particular interest is the report's section which considers the actual impact of SCR 1325 (2000) on gender sensitivity and women's participation in DDR processes, one of the final and most crucial stages of peacekeeping operations in the field.[101]

The evaluation in this context looks at the extent to which peacekeeping missions have been able to apply gender concerns into DDR processes in conjunction with SCR 1325 (2000), and whether female ex-combatants and those in supportive roles in the conflict have improved at the same rate as their male counterparts from DDR initiatives.[102] On one hand, DDR efforts in Liberia in conjunction with United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) saw many women incorporated into DDR programs, making up about 20 percent of the beneficiaries of reintegration phase skills training. While in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a significant amount of women were excluded—18 out of 2,732 former soldiers—from DDR programs.[103] In this case, what seems to be occurring in various scenarios is that the functional definition of eligibility for DDR programs is quite restrictive—resulting in scores of women being excluded from the process overall.[104] Principal challenges remain in the context of DDR program delivery, along with eligibility criteria. The first is the preparation of local communities for the re-integration of ex-combatants; for example, demobilized women in Burundi were the subjects of mistreatment and a lack of trust from

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[94] Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action*. p. 35.

[95] Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action*, p. 34.

[96] Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action*. p. 34.

[97] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*.

[98] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*.

[99] UN Women. *Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration*, 2012.

[100] UN Women. *Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration*, 2012.

[101] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*.

[102] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support (2010). *Ten-year impact study on implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in peacekeeping*. p. 21

[103] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support. *Ten-year impact study on implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in peacekeeping*. 2010, p. 23.

[104] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support. *Ten-year impact study on implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in peacekeeping*. 2010, p. 23.

the community, and lacked the social and support networks so crucial to the DDR program process.[105] The second is that despite small gains and well-intentioned efforts, the majority of peacekeeping missions have been largely unable to ensure the fair treatment of women and girls in all three phases of DDR programs, leaving much to be desired in terms of actual implementation of SCR 1325 (2000).[106]

Conclusion

In the 12 years since SCR 1325 (2000) has been passed there have been many activities, actors and groups involved in the implementation of the agenda of women, peace and security. The Open Days have shown a great interest in bringing various community issues where women are concerned to light, especially on a grassroots level. Despite the successful dialogue and evidence of successful implementation in some communities, much work is yet to be done. As in Haiti, there have been small gains, yet at the same time significant challenges which present themselves in the implementation of the elements of SCR 1325 (2000). It appears, therefore, that while vigorous discussion has occurred on all levels of the UN system and in the communities of Member States, continuous and consistent action and improvement have yet to be seen at a level which all involved parties can be satisfied. Even so, a "satisfactory" level may not be enough. The challenge going forward is not to continue to proclaim things at a higher level, but to bring the language of the Security Council resolutions that have been adopted in the past on this issue as well as other documents relating to women, peace, and security down to a grassroots level in order for its good intentions to be realized. It is vital that in order for the progress to continue, the universal languages of fairness, tolerance, inclusion and participation must be spoken among all affected. Delegates may want to think about the following when considering their positions on the overall agenda of women, peace and security:

1. Has there been enough legislation that addresses all aspects of the issue of women, peace and security? If so, why? If not, what could be contributed to the discussion?
2. How can further success stories such as Haiti be repeated in other Member States? How can peacekeeping operations better implement the key issues of SCR 1325 (2000) within DDR programs, especially in the communities where it is severely lacking?
3. What needs to be addressed in the Member States that have stagnant or negative reactions to SC1325, regardless of other activities afterwards? How can the overall gender agenda continue to be remembered and stay relevant to all involved?

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[105]United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support. *Ten-year impact study on implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in peacekeeping*. 2010,p. 24.
[106]United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support. *Ten-year impact study on implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in peacekeeping*. 2010,p. 24.

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Cohn, C, Kinsella, H. and Gibbings, S. (2004). Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 1325. *International Feminist Journal of politics,* 6:1, 130-140

> *This introduction to the 6th volume of the International Feminist Journal of Politics addresses the impact of the cooperation that takes place between various stakeholders in the resolution creation process. Including representatives from the UN, NGOs and academia, the discussion reflects on the important implications of 1325. The representatives address the importance of the recognition of the adoption of 1325 and the subsequent proclamation by the Security Council that gender issues were now a set part of its agenda; they also identify that what is important to do now is to follow through by having all interested parties and stakeholders work together to make sure the momentum started by 1325 is not lost.*

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.(October 2005) *From Local to Global: Making peace work for women, peace and security*. Retrieved August 31, 2012 from: http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-fiveyearson.pdf

> *A document created as a way to maintain check and balances five years after SC1325 was adopted by the Security Council, this report recognizes the previous achievements acquired in the first five years while also addressing the challenges that remain in the implementation of the key issues embodied in the resolution. It identifies the particular actors, stakeholders and processes involved thus far and particularly addresses each type in its chapters. Chapter 1 looks at the beginning of implementation at the United Nations system level; chapter 2 of the role of Member States in the implementation of SC1325; chapter 3 observes the increasingly crucial role of civil society in the process, particularly in the aspects of communication. Overall, the report asks "what would a world in which the principles enshrined in 1325 look like?"*

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. (October 2010) *Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council Report of the NGOWG Monthly Action Points, 2009-2010*. Retrieved September 5, 2012 from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-NGOWG_MAPReport_2009-2010.pdf

> *A key aspect of the NGOWGW's mandate at the United Nations, this report summarizes the activities and processes undertaken by the Security Council in the implementation of the Fantastic Four, and SC1325 in particular. The primary goal and purpose of the MAP is to "provide information from conflict-affected areas on key actions the Security Council can and should take regarding Women, Peace and Security". Through an examination of thematic issues such as conflict prevention and settlement of disputes, protection of civilians and of course women, peace and security, the MAP is a poignant, independent and accurate snapshot of the Security Council's progress, accomplishments and shortcomings—all the while providing a path and possible methods to improve the implementation of SC1325.*

Shepherd, L.J. (2008). Power and authority in the production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. *International Studies Quarterly,* 52, 383-404.

> *This article examines the inner workings of the drafting and adoption process behind 1325. The author's main argument is that "an alternative agenda might wish to investigate how the discourse terrain of a given institution contains and permits behavior and this engages with the questions of how it becomes possible that institutions make the policies they do." Part of the solutions proposed by the author include keeping a close eye on the implementation of international policy (and the people formulating such policy) and stressing the importance of maintaining a balance within the process to ensure that its execution is properly applied and implemented in the communities it addresses.*

Swaine, A. (2009). Assessing the potential of national action plans to advance implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325. *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law,* 12, pp. 403-433.

> *This academic article focuses on the aspect of national action plans implemented in communities in accordance with SC1325. The author's main examination point is whether or not such action plans truly reach the people that they are designed for, and the steps needed to improve the situation for such people. Four aspects of national action plans are examined; 1) a look into SC1325 itself as a starting point for the implementation process; 2) a background of SC1325 and the Fantastic Four; 3) the actual implementation*

of SC1325in terms of the actual measures Member States take into applying the key aspects of the resolutions into their particular context; and finally the drawbacks of such measures, especially when it comes to the transition from words to action.

Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. *National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key Areas of Concern and Model Plan for Action*. Retrieved August 6, 2012 from:
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/wps/Final_report_on_needs_assessment.pdf

> *A report from a joint alliance of three UN agencies (ECLAC, OSAGI and DESA), this document narrows its focus on the Latin American region in regards to the issues surrounding 1325 and its implementation. According to the report, the main concern is that despite the recognition of women and their role in peace and security, "the role of women in peace processes generally continues to be viewed as a side issue rather than as fundamental to the development of viable democratic institutions and the establishment of sustainable peace." As a result, the purpose of this report is to examine the reasons why this is so, and takes several examples from countries in the Latin American region. Topics addressed include strengthening women's participation in decision-making, security sector reform (in terms of police, the electoral system, and the justice system), and gender-based violence in war and peace.*

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs, UN Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Development Programme (September 2010). *Women Count for Peace: The 2010 Open Days on Women, Peace and Security*. Retrieved September 2, 2012 from:
http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/WomenCount4Peace_OpenDays_Report_en.pdf

> *The Security Council, as part of its implementation process of SC1325 and its subsequent resolutions, sent representatives into the communities of United Nations Member States to assess the situation of women first-hand in terms of the inclusion of women in decision-making processes, direct involvement in rehabilitation, and those who continue to experience distress despite any UN efforts. This report is the account, analysis, and projection for future efforts on behalf of the United Nations, its Member States, and the civil society actors who collaborated-and continue to collaborate- to see the key aspects of SC1325 realized in every community. Delegates will find this report particularly useful in that rare first-hand accounts of individuals at the grassroots-level are taken into account for future discussions on Security Council programs, activities, and policies.*

United Nations Security Council. (31 October 2000). *Resolution 1325 (2000).* Retrieved August 30, 2012 from:
http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf

> *This resolution, being the primary catalyst for all activities by the Security Council concerning gender within the security agenda, is mandatory reading for any delegate wishing to know the initial motivation of the Council's strategies and the activities of various UN bodies thereafter. The key issues embodied here, such as the application of gender-sensitive perspectives in training of personnel, the protection of women and girls from sexually-based violence and consultation with women's groups to gain a gender perspective, are vital information for delegates to be aware of in their preparation before debate.*

UN Women (UNIFEM).*Security Council Resolution 1325 Annotated and Explained.* Retrieved September 1, 2012 from: http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/BasicWPSDocs/annotated_1325.pdf

> *This document can be seen as a companion and step by step guide to SC1325 in order for delegates to fully understand the meanings behind the language used in the landmark resolution. It is a helpful guide to dissipate the legal jargon that may prevent delegates from applying the meanings of the operative clauses to their debate preparations. What is also beneficial here is that this document can be seen as a background guide, in that it gives small pieces of information, clause by clause, as to what the motivation was behind the drafting of certain clauses and the potential that such words held at the time of drafting.*

UN Women, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (September 1995). *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.* Retrieved September 1, 2012 from:
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf

> *This document can be seen as the cornerstone of the debate on women, peace and security; without this document, the process to which SC1325 was drafted would not have been possible. Drafted during the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995, the Declaration and Platform for Action culminated 10 days of discussion concerning women's economic issues, sexual rights and reproductive health among many other gender issues, and the over-arching theme of "women's rights are human rights". The result was a document that proclaimed that while women were seen as vital aspects of many global issues, they were ultimately undermined—and this must change in order to improve global issues. Covering subjects such as women and poverty, education and training of women, and violence against women, the Declaration is essential reading for full knowledge and understanding of the history of the women, peace and security debate at the United Nations.*

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http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-NGOWG_MAPReport_2009-2010.pdf

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II. Achieving Peace and Stability in Somalia

"The introduction of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops into Somalia was supposed to be the first of many such operations in the 'new world order' as the global community expanded the scope and capacity of the UN efforts to meet threats to international security and well-being."[107]

Introduction

The state of Somalia has been unstable for more than two decades as a result of a power vacuum left after the ousting of Siad Barre, the former President of Somalia.[108] As Somalia attempts to evolve towards stability, there are issues that remain abreast that hold the balance of the country in its hands. Over time, there have been several peacekeeping operations that have attempted to help Somalia succeed after the collapse of the government and spiral into warfare. The overall goal, to unite under one name with a centralized government and create some form of stability for its civilians, will ideally provide economic funding and boost the country.[109] Like any country, the path to peace and strength will not be easy, and has not proven to be thus far. Somalia has served as a blue print of failed humanitarian missions and transitional authorities. However, currently, there are promising advances being made to move Somalia out of its transitional period and, hopefully, into a time of peace and prosperity.

Historical Development

Prior to the 1960s, Somalia's land was divided and ruled by Italy in the South and Great Britain in the North.[110] After World War I and World War II, Africa began to decolonize and in 1960, the Somali Republic was formed.[111] In 1969, General Mohammed Siad Barre, Commander of the Army from the Somali Democratic Republic, gained control of the state through a military coup.[112] When Barre came into power, Somalia entered into a period of civil strife as a result of his dictator style of leadership; this led to the destruction of the political, social and economic roots of the country.[113] Barre used the term "scientific socialism" to refer to the granting of national access to land, water, banks, and other assets.[114] However, this system ultimately redistributed the wealth to General Barre's clan and supporters while the rest of the country and economy declined and suffered.[115] In order to survive, civilians established small arms and heavy weapons trade known as "technical" and formed their own organized militias that replaced the national police force.[116] In 1991, an opposing group led by Farrah Addid and the United Somali Congress, ousted Siad Barre from power.[117] Barre was forced into exile shortly thereafter.[118] Due to heavy weapons trade, and the unrest in the government, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 733 (1992) that placed a complete arms embargo on the country.[119] In UN Security Council Resolutions 1356 (2001), 1725 (2006), and 1744 (2007), the Council allowed certain exemptions to the original arms embargo, while Security Council Resolutions 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008) authorized additional exemptions to respective efforts in order to combat piracy on the Somali coast, but yet Somalia still remained in an unstable state.[120]

United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II

By 1992, Somalia had no single state authority able or willing to accomplish legitimate functions of a government, but rather individual tribes with weapons were spread throughout the country, and all were vying for power.[121] The

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[107] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 153.
[108] White, *Civil Affairs in Somalia*, 2006.
[109] African Mission in Somalia, *Somali Peace Process*, 2008.
[110] White, *Civil Affairs in Somalia*, 2006.
[111] White, *Civil Affairs in Somalia*, 2006.
[112] White, *Civil Affairs in Somalia*, 2006.
[113] *African Union Mission in Somalia, Background and Political Developments*, 2008.
[114] Kimenyi, Mbaku, Moyo, *Reconstituting Africa's Failed State: The Case of Somalia*, 2010, p. 1350.
[115] Kimenyi, Mbaku, Moyo, *Reconstituting Africa's Failed State: The Case of Somalia*, 2010, p. 1350.
[116] *African Union Mission in Somalia, Background and Political Developments*, 2008.
[117] *African Union Mission in Somalia, Background and Political Developments*, 2008.
[118] *African Union Mission in Somalia, Background and Political Developments*, 2008.
[119] United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea*, 2012.
[120] United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea*, 2012.
[121] Kimenyi, Mbaku, Moyo, *Reconstituting Africa's Failed States: The Case of Somalia*, 2010, p. 1342.

developing civil war had a combination of a civil strife, corruption among government officials, economic collapse, poor infrastructure, poverty, little or no rule of law, lack of territorial control, and political instability.[122] Historically in Africa, this combination often included destructive ethnic mobilization.[123] However, Somalia can be considered to have one of the most homogenous populations in regards to ethnicity and language (85% Somali) as well as religion (99% Sunni Muslim) in Africa, making this an atypical form of conflict for the continent.[124] Therefore, the issues present in and the solutions appropriate for this conflict have eluded the international community.

In the early 1990s, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that an estimated one-third and later on two-thirds of the Somali people were in danger of dying from malnutrition.[125] Subsequently, the Security Council mandated the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) as a response to the humanitarian crisis of the Somali people.[126] It represented the first attempt of a peacekeeping strategy to deal with a purely humanitarian operation in that it was specifically designed for the protection and relief of the indigenous population who were threatened by civil war, lack of food, and medical care.[127] Additionally, it was meant to be the example and the blueprint for the UN in response to a "failed state." While civil war pursued, the Security Council sent an estimated 3,000 peacekeepers to safeguard the distribution of humanitarian aid.[128] However, the distribution of supplies was nearly impossible because shipments entering Mogadishu were attacked, looted, and placed on the black market.[129] Finally as UNOSOM I was dwindling, United States President George H.W. Bush offered to send 30,000 American troops to Somalia in a joint effort with UN troops; the Security Council endorsed this in December of 1992.[130] Security Council Resolution 814 then established UNOSOM II, which included an additional 28,000 troops to alleviate the United States Marines.[131] Notably, a significant part of the rules of engagement established by the UNOSOM I provided that UNOSOM soldiers had the power to use offensive action in order to disarm Somali factions, something that was a significant departure from traditional peacekeeping practices.[132] While this proved to be successful for a short period of time, the violence continued thus resulting in the Battle of Mogadishu also known as Black Hawk Down, an operation involving US soldiers that was endorsed by UNOSOM II.[133] During Black Hawk Down, American Special Forces were put into positions that the soldiers were not trained for such as urban fighting and mob control.[134] A significant problem was that the US soldiers could not distinguish who was to be considered the enemy combatant and which people were civilians, which resulted into a mission of survival and rescue.[135] As a result, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali changed the tactics of UNOSOM II to the original role of assisting and protecting humanitarian relief as opposed to the offensive side of going after Somali factions.[136] UNOSOM II officially ended in 1994, with Security Council resolution 954 extending its mandate for a last time in order to ensure safe withdrawal of the troops.[137] UN presence was confined to the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), established by Boutros-Ghali in 1995 to help advance peace and reconciliation in Somalia.[138] Since the Office does not have any military power, its impact has been limited.

African Union Mission in Somalia
The formation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) for Somalia was completed in October 2004 with the election of Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed as interim President of Somalia.[139] However, by that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had gained control over Mogadishu.[140] In

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[122] Kimenyi, Mbaku, Moyo, *Reconstituting Africa's Failed States: The Case of Somalia*, 2010, p. 1344.
[123] Kimenyi, Mbaku, Moyo, *Reconstituting Africa's Failed States: The Case of Somalia*, 2010, p. 1344.
[124] Kimenyi, Mbaku, Moyo, *Reconstituting Africa's Failed State: The Case of Somalia,* 2010, p. 1348.
[125] White, *Civil Affairs in Somalia*, 2006.
[126] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 154.
[127] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from the UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 154.
[128] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from the UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 155.
[129] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from the UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 155.
[130] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from the UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 155.
[131] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 814 on Somalia*, 1993, part B.
[132] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from the UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 156.
[133] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from the UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p. 156.
[134] Alex, D., *Battle of Mogadishu,* 2012.
[135] Alex, D., *Battle of Mogadishu,* 2012.
[136] Diehl, *With the Best Intentions: Lessons from the UNOSOM I and II*, 1996, p.157.
[137] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 954 on Somalia*, 1994.
[138] United Nations Political Office for Somalia, *Our Background in Somalia*, 2012.
[139] African Union Mission in Somalia, *Background and Political Developments,* 2008.
[140] African Union Mission in Somalia, *Background and Political Developments*, 2008

December of 2006, Ethiopia and the TFG launched an attack against the ICU causing them to splinter off into various factions and allowing the TFG to govern in Mogadishu in June 2006.[141] During this time, Kenya and Ethiopia argued that the ICU posed a threat to regional stability and decided to forego support of the ICU in favor of the TFG.[142] Another notable event, in support of the TFG, was that in January of 2007, the Transitional Federal Parliament removed Sharif Hassan Sheik Adan from his position as speaker of parliament because of his ICU engagement.[143] By February 2007, the UN Security Council mandated the African Union (AU) in its resolution 1744 (2007) to launch a peacekeeping mission that would support Somalia's TFI; thus the African Union Commission established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[144] This in turn removed Ethiopian troops from Somalia leaving only AMISOM peacekeepers in the country to maintain peace and stability.[145]

AMISOM can be divided into four phases: initial deployment, expansion of deployment, consolidation, and redeployment/exit phase.[146] The mandate supports the national reconciliation of Somalia through the assistance of free movement, safe passage, protection to the TFIs in order for them to carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure.[147] Additionally, AMISOM will provide within their capabilities, assistance and coordination with parties for the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan specifically the education and training of the Somali security forces."[148]

While AMISOM tried to provide the necessary means of progress to Somalia, a more radical branch known as al-Shabaab evolved from the splintered faction of the ICU and has spread terror in Somalia since.[149] Al-Shabaab, like the Somali Islamist group of which it was once part, the ICU and the Islamic Union, supports the idea of implementing Shari'a (Islamic) law, but where the latter two agree on the idea of Somalia, it is al-Shabaab that differs in their belief of a global jihad.[150] Al-Shabaab believes in a strong adherence to Islamic law and enforces a strict policy within the parts of Somalia that they control. While the UN Security Council had authorized the AU to send troops into Somlaia, al-Shabaab continued to win military victories and strategic towns and ports located in central and southern Somalia. Eventually, al-Shabaab received endorsement from and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.[151] Nonetheless, gains have been made on the path to peace.

Djibouti Peace Process 2008 and the Kampala Accord 2011

As mentioned, former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had created the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) on April 15, 1995 in order to further attempts of a peace process, with limited success.[152] The most success has come about during the last five years. The Djibouti Peace Process of 2008 was an accord between the TFI and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in order to cease all armed conflict in Somalia.[153] Part of the stipulations within the agreement was the creation of the most recent TFG and the increase of Parliament from 275 to 550 members in order to incorporate the ARS.[154] This accord had the backing of the international community and attempted to build upon the achievement of previous efforts.[155]

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia (SRSG) heads the UNPOS, closely observes the situation in Somalia and writes briefs and reports to the Security Council.[156] More recently, UNPOS supported the *Kampala Accord* in 2011, which was an agreement between the president of the TFG of Somalia and the speaker of

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[141] Dagne, *Somalia: Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, 2009.
[142] Dagne, *Somalia: Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, 2009.
[143] Dagne, *Somalia: Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, 2009.
[144] Bakonyi, *Moral Economies of Mass Violence,* 2009.
[145] African Mission in Somalia, *Brief History*, 2008.
[146] *African Union Mission in Somalia, Concepts of Operations,* 2008.
[147] Kasaija, *The UN-led Dijibouti Peace Process for Somalia*, 2010, 268
[148] Kasaija, *The UN-led Dijibouti peace process for Somalia*, 2010, 268.
[149] African Mission in Somalia, *Brief History*, 2008.
[150] Garstein-Ross, D., *The Strategic Challenge of Somalia's Al-Shabaab*, 2009.
[151] African Mission in Somalia, *Brief History*, 2008.
[152] United Nations Political Office for Somalia, *Background in Somalia,* 2012.
[153] African Mission in Somalia, *Somali Peace Process*, 2008.
[154] African Mission in Somalia, *Somali Peace Process*, 2008.
[155] African Mission in Somalia, *Somali Peace Process*, 2008.
[156] United Nations Political Office for Somalia, *Background in Somalia*, 2009.

the Transitional Federal Parliament.[157] The agreement followed a significant split between the President and the Speaker of the Parliament, which hindered the work of the TFG.[158] In this Accord, both parties agreed to defer elections of the President and the Speaker for one year beginning in August 2011 so that both parties could adequately have time to prepare and complete the transitional tasks.[159] The *Kampala Accord* also extended the transitional period until August 20, 2012.[160] The *Kampala Accord* brought the parties together to further progress for Somalia by creating cooperative relationships and has remained conducive to a working environment that has allowed Somalia to flourish more than it has in two decades.[161]

Current Issues

While Somalia has had an eventful history, it resonates in its current issues of today. Because of its unstable state and lack of authority, al-Shabaab has controlled the central and southern regions of Somalia with jihad principles, but according to several reports, has lost much of its former power when one of their last strategic points, the port Kismayo in the South, was lost in October 2012.*[162]*Achieving lasting peace has become more realistic with the adoption of a new constitution, elections of a new parliament as well as the decrease of piracy among the Somali coast because of increased actions taken by the UN Security Council and the international community.[163]

African Union Mission in Somalia and al-Shabaab

With the new constitution in place, Somalia is on the road to stability. Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu in August 2011 arguing that it was a "strategic tactic."[164] However, despite being driven from Mogadishu, al-Shabaab continues to control much of the southern and central parts of Somalia.[165] In January of 2012, AMISOM increased their troops from 12,000 to 17,731 uniformed personnel that would help increase the effectiveness of the Somali National Security Forces.[166] In spite of this increase, within the months of August and September of 2012, AMISOM and al-Shabaab have aggressively fought in the southern regions of Somalia.[167] AMISOM, along with the Somali National Security Forces, is trying to expand its control while al-Shabaab is attempting to maintain its strongholds.[168] On September 30, 2012, Somali forces and AMISOM gained city control of yet another crucial city, Kismayo, which deprives al-Shabaab of a key source of revenue such as charcoal exports and the ability to tax local traders.[169] In spite of al-Shabaab's loss of Kismayo, al-Shabaab has certainly not been defeated; but rather they are re-aiming their forces.[170] The group has restructured its forces making it more versatile for warfare; with the establishment of four regions, all under an overall commander, it resembles AMISOM's disposition.[171] Al-Shabaab relocated its forces towards Bulo-Burte and Golis Mountains (Puntland) because the Somali National Security has limited presence within the area.[172] What measures then should the Security Council take in order to hinder any warfare or aggression from al-Shabaab and how can the international community assist?

Piracy

In 2008, Somali pirates had intensified attacks within the Gulf of Aden by increasing hijacking attacks on more than ninety commercial ships.[173] In 2009 and 2010, Somali pirates were able to hijack 46 and 47 commercial ships, respectfully.[174] Many benefited from the business of piracy, but the numbers today are dwindling.[175] In 2011, there

[157] United Nations Political Office for Somalia, *Kampala Accord*, 2011.
[158] United Nations Political Office for Somalia, *Kampala Accord*, 2011.
[159] *Kampala Accord*, 2011.
[160] Kasaija, *The UN-led Dijibouti peace process for Somalia*, 2010.
[161] Safeworld, *Back to Basics: The trust deficit and what the Kampala Accord tells us about the need for more inclusive decision Making process in Somalia*, 2011.
[162] BBC News, *Somalia profile*, 2012.
[163] United Nations Security Council, Letter From the Secretary-General to the President of Security Council, 2012.
[164] Pflanz, M., *Analysis: Al-Shabaab will already be planning its next move*, 2012.
[165] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.
[166] United Nations Security Council, Letter From the Secretary-General to the President of Security Council, 2012.
[167] United Nations Security Council, Letter From the Secretary-General to the President of Security Council, 2012.
[168] United Nations Security Council, Letter From the Secretary-General to the President of Security Council, 2012.
[169] Smith, D. *Somalia overpowering Al-Shabaab but old rivalries pose New Threat*, 2012.
[170] Pflanz, M., *Analysis: Al-Shabaab will already be planning its next move*, 2012.
[171] United Nations Security Council, Letter From the Secretary-General to the President of Security Council, 2012.
[172] United Nations Security Council, Letter From the Secretary-General to the President of Security Council, 2012.
[173] Dagne, *Somalia: Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, 2009, p. 104.
[174] Guled, A & Straziuso, J., *Party over for Somali Pirates? Attacks Down*, 2012.
[175] Guled, A & Straziuso, J., *Party over for Somali Pirates? Attacks Down*, 2012.

were an estimated 176 launched pirate attacks, but only 25 ships were actually commandeered.[176] This is a result of countries such as the United States, Russia, India and the European Union deploying warships to fight piracy in the Horn of Africa area.[177] The Security Council seeks to criminalize piracy and prosecute those responsible for acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia.[178] In 2008, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, passed two resolution that authorized the use of "all necessary measures" of foreign military to stop pirates in Somalia; allowing Member States to enter coastal waters and even Somali soil with the permission of the TFG in order to combat piracy.**[179]** Security Council Resolution 1897 (2009) invited states and other regional areas and organizations that are fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia to help facilitate arrangements for those captured.[180] Germany, Kenya, Djibouti, Seychelles, the Netherlands, Mauritius, Yemen, and the United States have all attempted to bring to justice Somali pirates.[181] The Security Council further approved Resolution 1976 (2011) that in turn would create specialized laws and prisons for piracy off the coast of Somalia.[182] By adopting this Resolution, the Security Council is assisting the international community by giving new measures to peacekeeping.[183] The most recent UN Security Council resolution, Resolution 2020 (2011) reiterated and renewed the call on all Member States as well as regional organizations to become active in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia.[184] Particularly, it expresses its concerns with child involvement in piracy and authorizes the taking of "all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery within the territorial waters of Somalia."[185]

Politics and Somalia's New Constitution
For the first time in two decades, Somalia has approved a new constitution after years of negotiation with the backing of Somali leaders.[186] The new constitution consists of 141 articles that allows for this multi-party system to exist, with free and fair elections all based on Islamic law.[187] This was approved without a secret ballot and will fall under the federal government of Somalia.[188] Noteworthy elements of the constitution are: equal rights regardless of clan or religion, the declared national religion is Islam and no other religion can be promulgated in the country, female genital mutilation is illegal, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be established, citizens have the right to a secondary education, and territorial disputes are to be handled peacefully.[189] The constitution establishes Somalia as a federal system.[190] With the creation of a centralized federal system, political analysts believe this is a milestone for the country.[191] However, this action could result in the expansion of autonomous and semi-autonomous regions if not handled delicately.[192] Analysts argue that the Somali government lacks the public support to push the agenda of getting the constitution approved.[193] Somaliland, a declared independent but not internationally recognized state, as well as Puntland and Galmudug, did not attend the conference on Somalia held in June 2012 in Istanbul due to not being recognized by Somalia as independent states. [194]

Somalia's move toward a federal government has increased tension among the clan-based regions; instead of uniting, it is creating tension and has the potential to generate clan-based wars, which will only elongate the Somali conflict.[195] Moreover, within the southern and central regions of Somalia, al-Shabaab reign in key areas, although weakened, is making it difficult to further progress.[196] Neighboring states of Somalia fear that if a strong federal

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[176] Guled, A & Straziuso, J., *Party over for Somali Pirates? Attacks Down*, 2012

[177] Guled, A & Straziuso, J., *Party over for Somali Pirates? Attacks Down*, 2012

[178] UN Security *Council Resolution 1918*, 2010.

[179] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1816, Resolution 1851*, 2008.

[180] UN Security Council *Resolution 1897,* 2009.

[181] Haggerson, M., *UN Security Council to consider special maritime piracy courts*, 2012.

[182] Haggerson, M., *UN Security Council to consider special maritime piracy courts*, 2012.

[183] Haggerson, M., *UN Security Council to consider special maritime piracy courts*, 2012.

[184] Haggerson, M., *UN Security Council to consider special maritime piracy courts*, 2012.

[185] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2020*, 2011.

[186] Harper, M., *Somali Leaders Back New Constitution*, 2012.

[187] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.

[188] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.

[189] *Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia,* 2012.

[190] Harper, M., *Somali Leaders Back New Constitution*, 2012.

[191] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.

[192] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.

[193] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.

[194] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.

[195] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.

[196] Harper, M., *Somali Leaders Back New Constitution*, 2012.

Somalia were to arise it would cause fragmentation to weaker states.[197] Yet, Puntland adopted a multi-party system shortly after the vote was taken for the new constitution with the help of the TFG, and 500 representatives from the Puntland region were incorporated.[198] In August of 2012, Boubacar Diarra, head of the African Union Special Envoy for Somalia, celebrated the people of Somalia for the agreement and adoption of a provisional constitution.[199] In addition, the UN Security Council supports the inception of the constitution of Somalia.[200] Based on Resolution 2067 (2012), the Security Council emphasizes the role of the new Somali authority and how it plays a critical role in the future of lasting peace and stability.[201] The Security Council looks forward to Somalia implementing the elements of the road map that conducts transparencies for finances and holds the government accountable as well as the signing of the National Security and Stabilization Plan while yielding responsibility to the Somali government.[202] The plan will put into place priority actions that create short-term to long-term goals in order to strengthen the security and justice institutions of Somalia.[203] Therefore, how can the current government handle the remaining peace and security issues facing Somalia and what role does the Security Council play in supporting it?

Conclusion

The Security Council has witnessed Somalia's progress into a new era of peace and stability. The constitution has been approved; however al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to the state's well-being. While researching, delegates must keep in mind that Somalia is in a delicate stage of formation. The decisions that are being made now pertaining to its stability will drastically resonate among the international community. Delegates therefore need to closely monitor the situation in Somalia as it evolves over the months to come. How can the Security Council further guide Somalia into a better status of stability? What role does the Security Council play in combating groups affiliated with terrorist organizations that threaten the lives of civilians and international peace and security? As al-Shabaab remains a steadfast militant Islamic group, how can the Security Council prevent them from siphoning the current peace and progress being made among the traditional clans and regional groups?

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[197] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.
[198] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.
[199] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.
[200] Africa Research Bulletin, 2012.
[201] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2067*, 2012.
[202] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2067*, 2012.
[203] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2067*, 2012.

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> *This Web site provides an outlined and informative breakdown of the issues in Somalia and how they have developed since 1992. It provides background information as well as all developments that have occurred and have been affected by the African Union Mission in Somalia. The Web site itself provides resources such as important documents and up-to-date news and actions done by the transitioning state of Somalia.*

Diehl, P. (1996). With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*,19(2), 153-177.
> *This author provides an in-depth analysis as to why UNOSOM I and II did not work in Somalia. Being the first of its kind in terms of humanitarian aid, he examines the different facets of both and provides a history of the unsettled era of Somalia. Additionally he gives recommendations as to what could have been done better all around.*

Kimenyi, M., Mbaku, J., & Moyo, N. (2010). Reconstituting Africa's Failed States: The case of Somalia. *Social Research*, *77*(4), 1339-1366.
> *This article gives insight to delegates on the topic of a"failed state." As the definition remains controversial, it is unclear as to what exactly outlines the premise of a 'failed state.' There are several criteria that a state can meet in order to qualify as a "failed state." Many countries in Africa fall under this terminology and the authors bring to light what can be done in order to alleviate the issue or prevent it altogether. Additionally, they provide recommendations as to how a state can get out of such a failed state.*

Stogdon, H. (2011). Back to basics: The trust deficit and what the Kampala Accord tells us about the need for more inclusive decision making processes in Somalia. *Safeworld*, Retrieved August 24, 2012.
> *Safeworld is an independent, non-governmental organization that assists in the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of cooperative approaches to security. They act as a liaison in policy dialogue and their particular program that pertains to Somalia and Somaliland. This briefing provides more detail as to how the Kampala Accord affects Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government. It yields a brief history that led to the creation of the Kampala Accord, the implications as well as the lack of trust between Somali civil and national society.*

United Nations Security Council. (2012). *Report on Somalia*. Retrieved August 23, 2012 from: http://undocs.org/S/2012/643.
> *This is the report from the Secretary-General as part of the Road Map. It is the most updated report as to what is currently going on in Somalia and what actions the Security Council has taken. Issues such as African Union Mission in Somalia, Piracy and the Transitional Road Map are topics that play a vital role to Somalia's current state. This report is a great starting point for your research in order to decipher what policies to steer your focus towards.*

United Nations Security Council. (2012). *Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea*. Retrieved August 8, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/index.shtml.
> *The Web site of the Security Council provides the entire first actions of the UN once civil strife started in Somalia. It breaks down all the Security Council resolutions that established embargos. It comes with a graph that outlines the type of embargos throughout time with an unofficial description and the exceptions to those types of embargo. Additionally, it provides what paragraphs within the resolutions provide said information and can give more detail on the matter.*

United Nations Security Council. (2009, May 26). *Resolution 1872(2009).* Retrieved August 9, 2012 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/1872(2009)
> *This Security Council resolution, which was adopted May 26, 2009, calls for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to outline and develop a form of national security strategy as well as*

the legal framework for operations that should include governance and the respect of human rights as well as support the Djibouti Agreement. It touches upon the complete embargo originally set to cease arms trade in early years. Additionally, it gives responsibility to the Secretary-General to follow through with his report to check progress by certain dates as stated in the resolution and emphasizes long-term peace.

United Nations Political Office for Somalia. (2009). *UNPOS Background in Somalia*. Retrieved August 9, 2012 from: http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9707&language=en-US

> *From the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which was established in April 1995, this Web site delivers its mandate as stated by Security Council Resolution 1863(2009). The UNPOS continues to further peace through the Djibouti Peace Agreement (2008) and the Kampala Accord (2011), and provides political support for immediate recovery and long-term economic development. With the support of said agreements, UNPOS extended the transition period to August 20, 2012 and the "Roadmap on Ending the Transition."*

United Nations Department of Political Affairs. (2009). *Somalia*. Retrieved August 8, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/somalia

> *This is the Web site for the United Nations Department of Political Affairs established by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). This Web site is broken down into regions and touches upon how and why the UNPOS came about as well as the continued work that this UN organization does. Specifically, it touches upon what actions are put into place to cease Somali piracy and armed robbery. Additionally, it discusses the Transitional Federal Government and what part it played in Somali affairs in terms of establishing some form of government.*

White, J. (2009). Civil Affairs in Somalia. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Retrieved August 24, 2012 from: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090130_somalia_study.pdf

> *From the Center of Strategic and International Studies, the author provides insight into the complicated history of Somalia. The author gives detail and analysis of civil affairs with Somalia and its government. This article provides graphic organizers that help organize past UN resolutions dealing with Somalia and its civil battles as well.*

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III. Resource Scarcity and its Relation to Conflict

"The adverse effects of changing weather patterns, such as floods and droughts, and related economic costs, including compensation for lost land, could risk polarizing society and marginalizing communities. This, in turn, could weaken the institutional capacity of the State to resolve conflict through peaceful and democratic means, to ensure social cohesion, and to safeguard human rights".[204]

Introduction

The scarcity of natural resources has long been a cause of conflict around the world. In some cases, the overabundance of a given resource has led to its mismanagement through corrupt practices in a way that limits access to the resource for certain groups within a State.[205] Scarce resources can arise as a result of both environmental degradation and increased demand for a given resource as well.[206] In each of these instances, the management, or mismanagement, of the resource will have a major influence on both present conflict and the likelihood of future conflict erupting.[207]

While the amount of any given resource can cause conflict, this guide will focus primarily on natural resources that are necessary to meet basic human needs of food, water, shelter, and energy.[208] Although excessive consumption of any of these resources may be desirable, the lack of excess supply will not tend to incite conflict in the same way that the lack of a basic supply would.[209]

The perception of scarcity can have an equally detrimental influence on the threat of conflict, as would actual resource scarcity.[210] The mismanagement or unequal distributions of an abundant resource can lead to a perception of scarcity.[211] This perception may drive groups to conflict in two ways: First, there may be fighting between members of a given population in an attempt to gain a greater share of the resource that is perceived to be scarce.[212] Second, that same group may incite a conflict against the group of people that they hold responsible for the mismanagement or unequal distribution of the resource.[213]

Increased demand that exceeds the supply of a natural resource will tend to increase tensions between user groups that are competing for their necessary share of the resource.[214] Recent trends in climate change indicate that a decrease in supply of certain natural resources will act as a threat multiplier in unstable regions.[215] North Africa will face increased water and food shortages as a result of decreased agriculture output; Central and South Asia will face an increase in identity-based conflicts as a result of misappropriation of resources and the migration of thousands in

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[204] United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Holds First Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers*, 2007.

[205] Koning, *Resource-Conflict Links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2008, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, p. 3.

[206] Koning, *Resource-Conflict Links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2008, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, p. 4.

[207] Koning, *Resource-Conflict Links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2008, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, p. 4.

[208] Matthew, *Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge*, 2008, p. 7.

[209] Matthew, *Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge*, 2008, p. 7.

[210] Evans, *Resource Scarcity, Climate Change, and the Risk of Violent Conflict*, 2010, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, p. 4.

[211] Evans, *Resource Scarcity, Climate Change, and the Risk of Violent Conflict*, 2010, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, p. 4.

[212] Evans, *Resource Scarcity, Climate Change, and the Risk of Violent Conflict*, 2010, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, p. 5.

[213] Evans, *Resource Scarcity, Climate Change, and the Risk of Violent Conflict*, 2010, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, p. 5.

[214] Evans, *Resource Scarcity, Climate Change, and the Risk of Violent Conflict*, 2010, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, p. 1.

[215] Matthew, *Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge*, 2008, p. 9.

search of better prospects.[216] Central America, already poor and vulnerable, will see a rise in tensions as groups compete for limited resources following severe weather catastrophes.[217]

Interpretations of Resource Scarcity

The neo-Malthusian interpretation of resource scarcity finds that an abundance of any one resource inhibits innovation and ultimately leads to a growth collapse, especially in states whose economies lack diversity, due to unsustainable practices.[218] As a result of the growth collapse, scarce resources are hoarded and unevenly distributed, ultimately leading to conflict.[219] This theory arose from Thomas Malthus' study *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, in which he claimed the exponential growth of population combined with the arithmetic growth of resources, will lead to "subsistence crises".[220] The adherents to this theory also generally contend that conflict based on resource scarcity is primarily internal as a result of flawed policies allowing for the mismanagement of resources.[221]

An opposing viewpoint presents the issue in a more optimistic light, arguing that resource scarcity actually encourages innovation because populations are constantly trying to find new ways to make the most out of what they have.[222] However, states that have historically lacked the adequate capital necessary for innovation and research may continue to lag behind. Further, they may face even greater hardships as a result of natural disasters or other internal conflicts.[223] In either case, it will be imperative for states to address resource scarcity not only as an economic or health issue, but also as an emerging cause of conflict.

Conflict as a Result of Resource Scarcity

In its *Declaration on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Security Council's Role in Conflict Prevention* (Security Council Resolution 1625), the Security Council reaffirmed its "determination to take action against illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources and high-value commodities in areas where it contributes to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict".[224] In 2007, Belgium circulated a paper that sought to frame the Security Council's role in preventing conflict that arose as a result of resource scarcity.[225] Previous Security Council responses to armed conflict arising from the illicit extraction of natural resources and the mismanagement of scarce resources included implementing sanctions, establishing committees and groups of experts, imposing embargoes, and authorizing peacekeeping operations.[226] In the following cases, the Security Council took action to secure and maintain peace in states that had become war-torn by resource driven conflicts.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

On November 30, 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) through Security Council Resolution 1279 in order to monitor the disengagement of forces as part of the *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* from June 1999.[227] The mandate was later expanded to allow peacekeeping forces to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.[228] On May 28, 2010, it was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).[229] This mission was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary

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[216] Matthew, *Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge*, 2008, p. 9.

[217] Matthew, *Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge*, 2008, p. 9.

[218] Theisen, *Renewable Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict: A Quantitative Reassessment*, 2006, p. 8.

[219] Theisen, *Renewable Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict: A Quantitative Reassessment*, 2006, p. 8.

[220] Theisen, *Renewable Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict: A Quantitative Reassessment,* 2006, p. 8.

[221] Theisen, *Renewable Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict: A Quantitative Reassessment*, 2006, p. 8.

[222] Theisen, *Renewable Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict: A Quantitative Reassessment*, 2006, p. 32.

[223] Theisen, *Renewable Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict: A Quantitative Reassessment*, 2006, p. 32.

[224] United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1625*, 2005.

[225] Security Council Report, *Update Report No. 2: Natural Resources and Conflict*, 2007.

[226] Security Council Report, *Update Report No. 2: Natural Resources and Conflict*, 2007.

[227] United Nations Security Council, *MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2010, MONUC Background.

[228] United Nations Security Council, *MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2010, MONUC Background.

[229] United Nations Security Council, *MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2012, MONUSCO Background.

means to "protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence".[230] The Security Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO until June 30, 2013 in Security Council Resolution 2053.[231] This conflict arose from the mismanagement of mining resources, which fueled a civil war from 1998 to 2003, with repercussions that are still ongoing.[232] Despite the peacekeeping operation undertaken through MONUC, little could be done to monitor the illicit extraction of natural resources without an adequate sanctions regime in place, thus allowing for internal conflict to continue.[233] In this case, the mismanagement of resources by certain groups was a key component, therefore targeted sanctions against known affiliates of these groups were though t to be an effective step in regaining and maintain peace.[234] In 2007, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted a report to the Security Council pursuant to Security Resolution 1698 finding that the sanctions that were in place were not adequately enforced.[235] The Group recommended expanding its mandate to include the assessment of capacity needs in order to improve the ability of Member States to enforce the sanctions.[236] The most recent interim report submitted to the Security Council by this group in 2012 has placed an emphasis on the need to maintain an updated list of the people and entities that will be sanctioned to improve enforcement measures against them.[237]

Rwanda

Popular depictions of the Rwandan conflict tell a story of ethnic tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis as the sole cause of the violence.[238] However, environmental causes played a major role in this conflict as well.[239] The scarcity of natural resources such as land and firewood due to population pressure and soil degradation produced a situation that would inevitably lead to conflict.[240] In the mid-1980's famine ensued, causing the death of hundreds of people while thousands of refugees attempted to flee to Tanzania.[241] Following this, the National Agricultural Commission warned the Rwandan government that conflict was inevitable unless steps were taken to improve access to food.[242] Although no single issue can be cited as the sole cause of the 1994 genocide, the lack of protection afforded to both ethnic groups over history in the face of scarce resources was a major contributor to the conflict.[243] Had the appropriate safeguards been in place that guaranteed protection to all people, regardless of which group was in power, the resulting genocide could likely have been avoided.[244]

Water Scarcity as a Threat Multiplier

Water is an essential element in promoting socio-economic development.[245] The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) notes that water scarcity arises from the "imbalances between availability and demand, the degradation of groundwater and surface water quality, intersectoral competition, interregional and international conflicts".[246] This is

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[230] United Nations Security Council, *MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2012, MONUSCO Background.

[231] United Nations Security Council, The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2012, S/RES/2053.

[232] United Nations Security Council, *MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2010, MONUC Background.

[233] Security Council Report, Update Report No. 2: Natural Resources and Conflict, 2007.

[234] Security Council Report, Update Report No. 2: Natural Resources and Conflict, 2007.

[235] United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Report 2007/423*, 2007.

[236] United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Report 2007/423*, 2007.

[237] United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Report 2012/348,* 2012.

[238] Gasana, *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda,* 2002, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Conserving the Peace, p.g 206.

[239] Gasana, *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda,* 2002, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Conserving the Peace, p.g 206.

[240] Gasana, *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda,* 2002, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Conserving the Peace, p.g 206.

[241] Gasana, *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda,* 2002, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Conserving the Peace, p.g 207.

[242] Gasana, *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda,* 2002, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Conserving the Peace, p.g 206.

[243] Gasana, *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda,* 2002, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Conserving the Peace, p.g 206.

[244] Gasana, *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda,* 2002, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Conserving the Peace, p. 231.

[245] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 4.

[246] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 4.

not to say that water scarcity will always be a cause for conflict. In fact, the reality of scarce water resources can be a cause for cooperation if the right legal instruments are put in to place to allow for innovative strategies to be undertaken in order to alleviate the issue.[247] Various water allocation agreements, such as the *Nile Waters Treaty* and the *Israeli-Palestinian Water Accords*, can and have been reached, even under the tensest of circumstances.[248]

Recent studies indicate that nearly one-fifth of the world's population is currently faced with water scarcity.[249] Current projections also anticipate that by 2025, nearly 1.8 billion people worldwide will be living in regions facing water scarcity.[250] Although current global estimates give an impression that there is an abundance of freshwater available, the highly unequal distribution of fresh water has created a situation where the extreme scarcity of water in arid regions has become an integral link in various conflicts.[251] Densely populated areas, such as urban cities, often struggle with the allocation of water, especially those that are lacking in the availability of freshwater.[252] The increasing urbanization of the world will continue to pressure the availability of water resources in the years to come.[253]

The Impact of Water Scarcity on Agricultural Output
A lack of freshwater has a negative impact on nearly every facet of development and well-being, including agricultural output.[254] A reduction in agricultural output due to a lack of freshwater increases the likelihood of famine while placing an economic strain on those populations whose livelihoods are dependent on the export of agricultural products.[255] In rural Africa, most households rely upon their ability to produce their own food for consumption.[256] In these areas, there are few alternative economic opportunities other than taking up a profession in the agriculture sector.[257] Current projects aimed at providing these areas with adequate irrigation systems may prove successful in reducing the strain in areas facing water scarcity.[258]

Water Scarcity and Poverty
The lack of available freshwater disproportionately affects impoverished people in both urban and rural areas.[259] While large-scale water development projects have been successful in promoting socio-economic development the inability of impoverished states to fund such projects has diminished their population's ability to escape the cycle of poverty.[260] Furthermore, people in poverty pay an estimated "five to ten times more per unit of water than do people with access to piped water."[261] The implementation of transparent institutions to guarantee fair and equitable access to freshwater may be the first step in alleviating tensions caused by the misappropriation of freshwater in arid regions.

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[247] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 12.
[248] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 12; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *International Decade for Action "Water for Life" 2005 – 2015,* 2012, Transboundary Waters.
[249] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 7.
[250] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 10.
[251] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 9.
[252] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 4.
[253] United Nations Water, *Coping* with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century, 2007, p. 9.
[254] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *Natural Resources and Environment Department,* 2012, Hot Issues: Water Scarcity.
[255] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *Natural Resources and Environment Department,* 2012, Hot Issues: Water Scarcity.
[256] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *Natural Resources and Environment Department,* 2012, Hot Issues: Water Scarcity.
[257] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *Natural Resources and Environment Department,* 2012, Hot Issues: Water Scarcity.
[258] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *Natural Resources and Environment Department,* 2012, Hot Issues: Water Scarcity.
[259] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *Natural Resources and Environment Department,* 2012, Hot Issues: Water Scarcity.
[260] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 6.
[261] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *Natural Resources and Environment Department,* 2012, Hot Issues: Water Scarcity.

Early Warning Systems as a Means of Predicting and Preventing Conflict

In light of current climate changes, it is inevitable that states will face various natural disasters in the future. Frequent periods of drought are expected to increase as a result of varied precipitations in arid regions.[262] Displacement of populations due to floods, fires, hurricanes, and earthquakes may place a strain on natural resources to a level of scarcity due to increase demand in relocation areas.[263] While these disasters cannot be prevented, the effects of them, especially as they relate to violent conflict, can be mitigated through improved mechanisms by which necessary resources, like food and water, are distributed to disaster zones.[264]

Conflict that arises from these various forms of resource scarcity may be predicted and possibly prevented if the right tools are utilized to gauge tensions in an area facing a shortage of resources.[265] Similar to disaster early warning systems that allow for the prediction of weather patterns, conflict early warning systems may be used to diminish the negative effects of an impending crisis.[266] The collection and analysis of relevant data to detect the threat of violent conflict while a crisis is still in its infancy can provide valuable information to policy makers necessary to alleviate the problems associated with a given conflict.[267] Levels of available natural resources and a figure denoting the equality of distribution of said resources would be useful in potentially prompting an adoption of policies that allow for more equitable distribution of resources that are found to be scarce.[268]

Case Study: Senegal River Valley

The Senegal River, which is shared by Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and Guinea, has long been used to alleviate pressure on scarce water resources in the arid basin.[269] In 1982, the Food and Agriculture Organization conducted a study whose findings indicated that at current output levels, the croplands of both Mauritania and Senegal would not be sufficient to support the projected population growth.[270] Several projects were undertaken to alleviate this issue, most notably being the construction of the Manantali Dam and the Diama salt-intrusion barrage along the Senegal River.[271] Although these projects were initially successful in spurring development, water management in the area is lacking.[272]

In 1989, the Mauritanian government decided to undertake a dam construction project in an attempt to combat agriculture shortages as a result of land degradation.[273] Although the government had good intentions in this endeavor, the outcome was not quite as expected.[274] News of the dam led to increased land values along the Senegal River. At the same time, elite in Mauritania, primarily consisting of white Moors, "rewrote legislation governing land ownership, effectively abrogating the rights of black Africans to continue farming, herding, and fishing along

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[262] United Nations Water, *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, p. 10.
[263] United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, *Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: Guidance Note for Practitioners*, p. 2.
[264] United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, *Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: Guidance Note for Practitioners*, p. 2.
[265] United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, *Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: Guidance Note for Practitioners*, p. 1.
[266] United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, *Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: Guidance Note for Practitioners*, p. 2.
[267] United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, *Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: Guidance Note for Practitioners*, p. 2.
[268] United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, *Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: Guidance Note for Practitioners*, p. 2.
[269] Varis, Stucki and Fraboulet-Jussila, *Case Study for 2006 HDR: The Senegal River Case,* 2006, p. 1.
[270] Homer Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, Part 1*, 1994, p. 5 – 40.
[271] Homer Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, Part 1*, 1994, p. 5 – 40.
[272] United States Agency for International Developmen, *The Future of the Senegal River Basin*, 2009, p. 2.
[273] Homer Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, Part 1*, 1994, p. 5 – 40.
[274] Homer Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases*, Part 1, 1994, p. 5 – 40.

the Mauritanian riverbank."[275] With ethnic tensions already high, the killing of Senegalese farmers by Mauritanians along the river bank became a catalytic event for the border dispute between Senegal and Mauritania.[276]

In Senegal, Moor-owned shops were destroyed and their owners were deported to Mauritania.[277] Likewise, in Mauritania, some 70,000 people living along the river were declared "Senegalese" through revised legislation and were subsequently expelled to Senegal.[278] Although diplomatic relations between the two countries have since improved, those who were expelled during the conflict have yet to be allowed to return to their homes or be given compensation for their losses.[279]

This conflict is demonstrative of the role that resource scarcity plays in promoting conflict. While ethnic tensions were stable prior to the increased valuation of land along the Senegal River, the sudden displacement of thousands of farmers so that the elite could obtain desirable land channeled those tensions into a violent and gruesome conflict.[280] If the appropriate safeguards had been in place that allowed for a more peaceful migration of the displaced farmers, or better yet, disallowed their displacement by arbitrary legal means in the first place, this conflict may have been avoided.[281]

Conclusion

While conflict can arise for any number of reasons, its eruption as a result of resource scarcity can be particularly dangerous.[282] Populations that enter into conflict as a result of scarce resources will generally continue to lack access to necessary basic resources during the conflict. If they are not successful in attaining their goals in the conflict, they may find themselves further marginalized and worse off than before. Involvement by the Security Council, especially in the form of targeted and effective action, at every step of a conflict arising from resource scarcity may be necessary to facilitate transitions from conflict to peace in areas found to be either lacking in or mismanaging basic resources.

Currently, the Security Council has taken some steps to address the issue of resource scarcity and its relation to conflict. Is the threat of conflict from climate change and resource scarcity at a level that justifies increased attention by the Security Council to this issue? In what ways has the Security Council addressed climate change and its relation to past and current conflicts? What improvements can be made to existing mechanisms by which conflict is mitigated to adequately address resource scarcity as a threat multiplier?

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[275] Evans, *Resource Scarcity, Climate Change, and the Risk of Violent Conflict*, 2010, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, p. 8.

[276] Evans, *Resource Scarcity, Climate Change, and the Risk of Violent Conflict, 2010*, World Development Report 2011, Background Paper, p. 8.

[277] Homer Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, Part 1*, 1994, p. 5 – 40.

[278] Homer Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, Part 1*, 1994, p. 5 – 40.

[279] Homer Dixon, *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases, Part 1*, 1994, p. 5 – 40.

[280] Magistro, Crossing Over: *Ethnicity and Transboundary Conflict in the Senegal River Valley*,1993, p. 206.

[281] Magistro, *Crossing Over: Ethnicity and Transboundary Conflict in the Senegal River Valley*,1993, p. 206.

[282] Gendron, Renee and Evan Hoffman, *Peace and Conflict Review,* 2009, p. 2.

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> *The genocide in Rwanda did not arise spontaneously. The driving forces behind this conflict are more complex than is portrayed by popular media. Most depictions ignore the struggle for resources that occurred between warring factions within and around Rwanda. This report will provide delegates with an in-depth view of the history and political climate surrounding the conflict.*

Maxwell, John W. and R. Reuveny. (2000). Resource Scarcity and Conflict in Developing Countries. *Journal of Peace Research,* Volume 37, No. 3: p. 301 – 322.
> *This article provides a thorough analysis of the effects of resource scarcity prior to, during, and after a violent conflict occurs. It also discusses various methods of monitoring resource scarcity and the general costs associated with each method. It concludes with various policy recommendations that may be useful for delegates in determining their own state policies.*

Security Council Report Inc. (2007) *Update Report NO. 2, Natural Resources and Conflict, 20 June 2007.* Retrieved August 5, 2012 from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2822787/k.CEE6/Update_Report_No_2BRNatural_Resources_and_ConflictBR20_June_2007.htm
> *This Web site provides an overview of Security Council actions concerning natural resources and conflict up until 2007. The NGO carefully follows various topics as they progress each year within the Security Council. This particular page provides links to key documents relating to the resource scarcity and additional sources that delegates may find useful in their research. The summarized overview of the Security Council's work on the topic is helpful in understanding the direction that has been taken regarding natural resources, resource scarcity, and conflict.*

UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventative Action. (2010). *Environmental Scarcity and Conflict.* Retrieved August 4, 2012 from: http://www.unep.org/conflictsanddisasters/Portals/6/ECP/4page_Scarcity_LowRes.pdf
> *This relatively short guidance note provides delegates with a quick facts sheet on the drivers of natural resource scarcity. It also provides information on various methods of intervention that can be used to either prevent or alleviate conflict that has arisen from environmental scarcity. Delegates will find this document a useful beginning step in researching possible ways to improve upon current intervention methods.*

UN Water. (2007). *Coping with Water Scarcity, Challenge of the Twenty-first Century.* Retrieved August 6, 2012 from: http://www.fao.org/nr/water/docs/escarcity.pdf
> *This report provides an analysis of water scarcity and its relation to violent conflict. One of the highlights of this source is the link between the social and economic sector. By this, the authors call for a multi-faceted approach to alleviating the problem of water scarcity while nothing that integration (within multiple sectors) is the only way to move forward to solve this issue. With the great impact water scarcity has on reducing quality of life for vulnerable populations, by reducing the availability of already scarce resources such as food, this report will provide delegates with an excellent insight into overall resource scarcity.*

United Nations. (2012) *United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* Retrieved August 8, 2012 from: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/index.shtml
> *This Web site provides in-depth information on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democrat Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), formerly known as MONUC, which had been in operation since 1990. This operation is important in understanding the link between violent conflict and resource scarcity, which was a driving force in the conflict. Delegates will also*

find the information valuable in researching how the Security Council carries out peacekeeping operations.

United Nations Security Council. (2011, July 20). Security Council, in Statement, Says 'Contextual Information' on Possible Security Implications of Climate Change Important When Climate Impacts Drive Conflict. Retrieved September 30, 2012 from:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10332.doc.htm
This press release includes the full text of the presidential statement S/PRST/2011/15 from the Security Council debate, "maintenance of international peace and security: the impact of climate change". It also includes statements made by various United Nations Member States at the debate. This an excellent resource that allows delegates to get a closer view of their State's policies regarding the impact of climate change on security.

United States Agency for International Development. (2009). *The Future of the Senegal River Basin*. Retrieved October 19, 2012 from:
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADA284.pdf
This report on the Senegal River basin provides an insight into the origins of resource mismanagement. Those directly affected by a lack of freshwater in the area have historically been given little say in projects in the area meant to promote development. Water, being a vital resource, must be carefully managed and this report demonstrates how mismanagement of a resource can prove very detrimental to vulnerable populations.

United Nations Security Council. (2012, June 21). *Report 2012/348 (2012).* Retrieved October 15, 2012 from:
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/348
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United Nations Security Council. (2007, June 6). *Report 2007/334 (2007).* Retrieved October 19, 2012 from:
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NRC%20S2007%20334.pdf
This report contains the letter circulated by the Permanent Representative of Belgium that includes a concept paper for Security Council debate. The concept letter sought to investigate the link between natural resources and conflict, a topic that has rarely been undertaken by the Security Council. This letter was important in initiating a new era for the Security Council in which resource scarcity was viewed as a potential conflict multiplier.

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Rules of Procedure
Security Council

Introduction
1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Security Council (hereinafter referred to as "the Council") and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the "Secretariat."
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, "President" shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Council.

I. MEETINGS

Rule 1
Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred in rule 4, be held at the call of the President any time her or she deems necessary.

Rule 2
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any of its members.

Rule 3
The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any questions to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4
Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held at least once a year at such times the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5
Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations. Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such a place.

II. AGENDA

Rule 6
The Secretary-General, or his or her designate, shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7
The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives of the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8
The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives of the

Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9
The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, it requires nine votes in favor to pass in accordance with Article 27 (2) of the United Nations Charter. The veto does not apply for procedural votes.

Rule 10
Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless otherwise decided, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11
The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.

III. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Rule 12
Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative of the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he or she takes her/his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 13
Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting, which he or she is invited to attend.

IV. PRESIDENCY

Rule 14
The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, preside over the meetings of the Security Council for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

V. SECRETARIAT

Rule 15
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

Rule 16
The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 17
The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 18
The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 19
The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 20
The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 21
The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 22
The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 23
If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 24
Proposals and amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat. Any proposal or amendment that relates to the substance of any matter under discussion shall require the signature of twenty percent of the members of the Council [sponsors]. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Council unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Council for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution during formal speeches. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 25
Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 26

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. To suspend the meeting;
2. To adjourn the meeting;
3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

As the motion to adjourn the meeting, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council's next regularly scheduled meeting the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.

Rule 27
It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 28
A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

Rule 29
If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 30
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

The Secretariat will determine which specific member of a delegation to approach. If the Council considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Council according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Council is no longer required.

Rule 31
The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

Rule 32
The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least nine members of the Council are present. The presence of nine representatives of the Council shall be required for any decision to be taken.

Rule 33
In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Council, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules,

shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Council and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Council the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference and is limited to entertaining motions.

Rule 34
During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 35
A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Rule 36

No representative may address the Council without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, the Secretariat will set a time limit for all speeches which may be amended by the President at his/her discretion. Consequently, motions to alter the speaker's time will not be entertained by the President.

Rule 37
Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Council, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Council.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Council. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Council and the President should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 38
If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that —impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Council by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the

discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 39

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 40

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Council shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Board's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Board.

Rule 41

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of nine of the members to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Rule 42

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, but at least nine members of the Security Council. If the Council favors the closure of debate, the Council shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 43

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Rule 44

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Council, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting but at least nine members of the Security Council, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

<div align="center">VII. VOTING</div>

Rule 45

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

According to Article 27 (2) decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Article 27 (3) states that all (substantive) decisions shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, which is interpreted as to refer to no vetoes.

Rule 46

A proposal or motion before the Council for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Council may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 47

1. The Council shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply "yes," "no," "abstention," or "pass."

   Only those members who designate themselves as ─present or ─present and voting during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying ─pass, must, on the second time through, respond with either ─yes or ─no. A ─pass cannot be followed by a second ─pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Council votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Council shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.

3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 48

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 49

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Rule 50

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, ─most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is ─most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 51

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.

Rule 52

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, ―furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is ―furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 53

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Council decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 54

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VIII. LANGUAGE

Rule 55

English shall be the official and working language of the Security Council.

Rule 56

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than English. In this case, he or she shall herself/himself provide interpretation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

Rule 57

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the language of the Council.

Rule 58

All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the language of the Security Council.

Rule 59

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the language of the Council.