



NMUN • NY

## ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION BACKGROUND GUIDE 2012

Written By: Sabrina Grover, Clarissa Manning, Carolina Contreras, Colin Hale



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Please consult the FAQ section of [nmun.org](http://nmun.org) for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

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### NMUN•NY 2012 Important Dates

**IMPORTANT NOTICE:** To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at [nmun.org](http://nmun.org) and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

31 January 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confirm Attendance &amp; Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March)</li> <li>• Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET! (We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)</li> </ul>
15 February 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Committee Updates Posted to <a href="http://www.nmun.org">www.nmun.org</a></li> </ul>
1 March 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early! Group Rates on hotel rooms are available on a first come, first served basis until sold out. Group rates, if still available, may not be honored after that date. See hotel reservation form for date final payment is due.</li> <li>• Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to: <a href="mailto:outreach@nmun.org">outreach@nmun.org</a></li> <li>• Preferred deadline for submission of Chair / Rapp applications to Committee Chairs</li> <li>• All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$125 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$150 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline.</li> <li>• Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail (See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions).</li> </ul>
NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2012	<p>1 - 5 April – Sheraton New York 3 - 7 April - New York Marriott Marquis</p> <p>The 2013 National Model UN Conference 17 - 21 March &amp; 24 - 28 March (both at Sheraton; Sun-Thurs)</p>

## POSITION PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

**Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2012**

### 1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 1 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active when background guides are available. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment in the subject line (Example: GAPLEN\_Greece).

### 2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org.

This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

*Note:* This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba\_U\_of\_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

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Security Council B.....	scb.marriott@nmun.org
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Peacebuilding Commission.....	pbcs.marriott@nmun.org
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### OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers .....	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
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Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to the 2012 National Model United Nations (NMUN). This year's Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) staff is: Directors Clarissa Manning and Sabrina Grover and Assistant Directors Colin Hale and Carolina Contreras. Clarissa is currently attending the University of California, Los Angeles and majoring in Political Science with an emphasis in International Relations. This is her second year on staff. Sabrina is currently finishing up her undergraduate degree in Political Science and Economics at the University of Calgary. This is her third year on staff. Colin graduated from California State University, San Bernardino with a degree in political science, focusing on Islam & the Middle East. He currently works as a special projects coordinator in Los Angeles and this is his second year on staff. Carolina graduated with a BA in International Relations at Universidad San Francisco de Quito (USFQ). Currently, she is pursuing her MA in Environmental Studies at Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. This is Carolina's first year on staff.

The topics under discussion for the OIC at the 2012 NMUN are:

1. Targeting Religious Intolerance
2. The Humanitarian and Socioeconomic Impact of Israeli Settlements in Palestinian Quality of Life
3. Promoting Order for Regimes in Transition

The OIC is an intergovernmental organization that addresses a number of issues affecting Islamic states. There have been a number of developments and changes within our Member States this past year that lend themselves to solidarity and cooperation amongst the organization. This is a dynamic time and we encourage delegates to follow developments as they occur.

The background guide will serve as a brief introduction to the three topics listed. Accordingly, it is not meant to be used as an all inclusive analysis for research, but rather the groundwork for your own analysis and research. To conduct your research, please conduct scholarly materials including journals, international news, state websites and the United Nations Website amongst others. You will also need to familiarize yourself with the work and current operations of the OIC.

Each delegation must submit a position paper. NMUN will accept position papers via email until March 1, 2012. Please refer to the message from your Directors-General explaining the NMUN position paper requirements and restrictions. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is very important. NMUN can be one of the most rewarding experiences of your college career. We hope that this year's conference will not only provide you with exciting opportunities and encourage you to participate again, but will provide you with beneficial and valuable experiences for your future. If you have any questions regarding preparation, please feel free to contact any of the OIC substantive staff or the Under-Secretaries General for the Department of Intergovernmental Organizations, Katharina Weinert, Marriot and Lucas Carreras, Sheraton. Good luck in your preparations for the conference and we look forward to seeing you in April!

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## Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2012 NMUN Conference

At the 2012 NMUN New York Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee to which it is assigned. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee affects the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs, or judicial experts. To understand these differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and should establish precise policies and recommendations about the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in entirely original material. *The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.* In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and it may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single-spaced pages (one double-sided paper, if printed)
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at one inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page,
- The use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf format required) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2011. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: [positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org) or [positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org). This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2012 (GMT-5) for delegations attending the NMUN conference at either the Sheraton or the Marriott venue.**

**PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU\_Namibia\_University of Caprivi)**

*A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Amanda D'Amico, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Nicholas Warino, Director-General, Marriott venue at [dirgen@nmun.org](mailto:dirgen@nmun.org). There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.*

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and it is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location, your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

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**Delegation from  
The United Mexican States**

**Represented by  
(Name of College)**

### ***Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary***

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion; Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions; as well as The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. The Mexican Delegation first would like to convey its gratitude being elected and pride to serve as vice-president of the current General Assembly Plenary session.

#### **I. The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion**

The principles of equal sovereignty of states and non-interference, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, have always been cornerstones of Mexican foreign policy. The legitimate right to interfere by the use of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, is laid down in Article 41 of the UN-charter and reserves the right to the Security Council.

Concerning the violation of this principle by the application of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations, H.E. Ambassador to the United Nations Enrique Berruga Filloy underlined in 2005 that the Mexico strongly rejects “the application of unilateral laws and measures of economic blockade against any State, as well as the implementation of coercive measures without the authorization enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” That is the reason, why the United Mexican States supported – for the 14th consecutive time – Resolution (A/RES/60/12) of 2006 regarding the *Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba*.

In the 1990s, comprehensive economic sanctions found several applications with very mixed results, which made a critical reassessment indispensable. The United Mexican States fully supported and actively participated in the “Stockholm Process” that focused on increasing the effectiveness in the implementation of targeted sanctions. As sanctions and especially economic sanctions, pose a tool for action “between words and war” they must be regarded as a mean of last resort before war and fulfill highest requirements for their legitimate use. The United Mexican States and their partners of the “Group of Friends of the U.N. Reform” have already addressed and formulated recommendations for that take former criticism into account. Regarding the design of economic sanctions it is indispensable for the success to have the constant support by all member states and public opinion, which is to a large degree dependent the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. Sanctions must be tailor-made, designed to effectively target the government, while sparing to the largest degree possible the civil population. Sanction regimes must be constantly monitored and evaluated to enable the world-community to adjust their actions to the needs of the unforeseeably changing situation. Additionally, the United Mexican States propose to increase communication between the existing sanction committees and thus their effectiveness by convening regular meetings of the chairs of the sanction committees on questions of common interest. An example is the case of negative spill-over effects of economic sanctions on neighboring countries, in which affected countries additionally need to be enabled to voice their problems more effectively, as addressed in the resolution *Implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations related to assistance to third States affected by the application of sanctions* (A/RES/54/107). Non-state actors have in the last years tremendously grown in their political importance, especially with regard to the international fight against terrorism. Their position and the possibilities of the application of economic sanction on non-state actors is another topic that urgently needs to be considered.

#### **II. Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions**

As a founding member of the United Nations, Mexico is highly engaged in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights all over the world, as laid down in the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)* in 1948. Especially since the democratic transition of Mexico in 2000 it is one of the most urgent topics to stand for Democratization and Human Rights, and Mexico implements this vision on many different fronts.

In the Convoking Group of the intergovernmental Community of Democracies (GC), the United Mexican States uphold an approach that fosters international cooperation to promote democratic values and institution-building at the national and international level. To emphasize the strong interrelation between human rights and the building of democracy and to fortify democratic developments are further challenges Mexico deals with in this committee. A key-factor for the sustainable development of a post-conflict-region is to hold free and fair election and thus creating a democratic system. Being aware of the need of post-conflict countries for support in the preparation of democratic elections, the United Mexican States contribute since 2001 to the work of the International Institute for Democracy

and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an intergovernmental organization operating at international, regional and national level in partnership with a range of institutions. Mexico's foreign policy regarding human rights is substantially based on cooperation with international organizations. The Inter American Commission of Human Rights is one of the bodies, Mexico is participating, working on the promotion of Human Rights in the Americas. Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the regional judicial institution for the application and interpretation of the *American Convention of Human Rights*.

The objectives Mexico pursues are to improve human rights in the country through structural changes and to fortify the legal and institutional frame for the protection of human rights on the international level. Underlining the connection between democracy, development and Human Rights, stresses the importance of cooperation with and the role of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the reform of the Human Rights Commission to a Human rights Council.

Having in mind the diversity of challenges in enforcing democracy and Human Rights, Mexico considers regional and national approaches vital for their endorsement, as Mexico exemplifies with its *National Program for Human Rights* or the *Plan Puebla Panama*. On the global level, Mexico is encouraged in working on a greater coordination and interoperability among the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as the development of common strategies and operational policies and the sharing of best practices in civilian crisis management should be encouraged, including clear frameworks for joint operations, when applicable.

### **III. The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa**

The United Mexican States welcome the leadership role the African Union has taken regarding the security problems of the continent. Our delegation is furthermore convinced that The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) can become the foundation for Africa's economic, social and democratic development as the basis for sustainable peace. Therefore it deserves the full support of the international community.

The development of the United Mexican States in the last two decades is characterized by the transition to a full democracy, the national and regional promotion of human rights and sustainable, economic growth. Mexico's development is characterized by free trade and its regional integration in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Having in mind that sustainable development is based not only on economic, but as well on social and environmental development, President Vicente Fox has made sustainable development a guiding principle in the Mexican Development Plan that includes sustainability targets for all major policy areas.

The United Nations Security Council has established not less than seven peace-keeping missions on the African continent, underlining the need for full support by the international community. In post-conflict situations, we regard national reconciliation as a precondition for a peaceful development, which is the reason why Mexico supported such committees, i.e. in the case of Sierra Leone. The United Mexican States are convinced that an other to enhance durable peace in Africa is the institutional reform of the United Nations. We therefore want to reaffirm our full support to both the establishment of the peace-building commission and the Human Rights Council. Both topics are highly interrelated and, having in mind that the breach of peace is most often linked with severest human rights' abuses, thus need to be seen as two sides of one problem and be approached in this understanding.

As most conflicts have their roots in conflicts about economic resources and development chances, human development and the eradication of poverty must be at the heart of a successful, preventive approach. Lifting people out of poverty must be seen as a precondition not only for peace, but for social development and environmental sustainability.

The United Mexican States want to express their esteem for the decision taken by the G-8 countries for a complete debt-relief for many African Highly-Indebted-Poor-Countries. Nevertheless, many commitments made by the international community that are crucial for Africa's sustainable development are unfulfilled. The developed countries agreed in the *Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development* (A/CONF.198/11) to increase their Official Development Aid (ODA) "towards the target of 0,7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries and 0,15 to 0,20 per cent of GNP of developed countries to least developed countries". Furthermore, the United Mexican States are disappointed by the result of the Hong Kong Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, which once more failed to meet the needs of those, to whom the round was devoted: developing countries and especially African countries, who today, more than ever, are cut off from global trade and prosperity by protectionism.

With regard to the African Peer Review Mechanism, the United Mexican States want to underline that good governance is an integral part of sustainable development. Therefore, we support all efforts by African countries to make the mechanism obligatory to increase transparency and accountability in all African countries.



## Committee History

*"And those who believe and do good are made to enter gardens, beneath which rivers flow, to abide in them by their Lord's permission; their greeting therein is, Peace!" – The Holy Qur'an 14:23<sup>1</sup>*

### Introduction

With over 1.5 billion followers, Islam is the world's second largest religion and is the fastest growing in Europe and North America.<sup>2</sup> While it remains incredibly diverse around the globe, the idea of a singular, unified Islamic community, or *Ummah*, is the guiding force behind the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).<sup>3</sup> The OIC is the second-largest intergovernmental organization aside from the United Nations (UN) with 57 Member States from Africa, the Middle East, Europe, the Caucasus, and Southeast Asia, and several Observers, including the UN, League of Arab States, African Union (AU), Non-Aligned Movement, and the Economic Cooperation Organization.<sup>4</sup> Any Member State of the UN can apply for membership to the OIC as long as said state has a Muslim majority, abides by the *Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference* (OIC Charter), and is approved by consensus by the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM).

The OIC was first established in Rabat, Morocco on September 25, 1969, following a summit of Muslim foreign ministers organized in response to the arson of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.<sup>5</sup> This summit in Rabat eventually led to the establishment of an intergovernmental organization tasked with being the "collective voice of the Muslim world," and in 1970, the first meeting of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where a permanent secretariat and secretary general were selected from the original 25 Member States present.<sup>6</sup> The OIC Charter was formally adopted and registered in conformity with the UN on February 1, 1974.<sup>7</sup> A revised OIC Charter was adopted on March 14, 2008 in Dakar, Senegal.<sup>8</sup>

On June 28, 2011 the organization officially changed its name from the *Organization of the Islamic Conference* to the *Organisation of Islamic Cooperation* to reflect its changing priorities and goals.<sup>9</sup>

### The OIC Charter

The OIC Charter, similar to the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), seeks to establish a connective document between all Member States and, uniquely, establish "bonds of fraternity and solidarity."<sup>10</sup> The OIC Charter affirms the principles of the UN Charter and international law, particularly in regards to the rights of people and the right of self-determination and non-interference in the affairs of individual Member States. The OIC Charter also calls for all Member States to "uphold and promote, at the national and international levels" good governance principles, democratic values, human rights and basic freedoms, the rule of law, and perhaps most paramount, to protect and defend Islam and combat all forms of defamation, Islamophobia, discrimination, and to "encourage dialogue among civilizations and religions."<sup>11</sup>

The OIC Charter focuses heavily on the unification of Member States and the strengthening of intra-Islamic economic and trade cooperation, and ultimately, the establishment of an Islamic Common Market (ICM).<sup>12</sup> The concept of the ICM calls for Islamic countries to unite under a common socio-economic value system, a common currency, monetary union, and establish an intra-Islamic trade zone and has led to the development of several agreements, including the General Agreement for Economic, Technical and Commercial Cooperation among the OIC Member States (1977), the Statute of the Islamic States Telecommunications Union (ISTU), the Trade

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<sup>1</sup> Malik, *The Holy Qur'an*, 1997, Ayat 14, Surah 23.

<sup>2</sup> Esposito, *The Middle East*, 2008, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Preamble.

<sup>4</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Member States of the OIC*, 2011.

Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Observers of the OIC*, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *OIC Media Guide*, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 271*, 1969.

Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *About OIC*, 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Article 39

<sup>8</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Article 39

<sup>9</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Address of H.E. Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, OIC Secretary General, To the 38<sup>th</sup> Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers*, 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *About OIC*, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *About OIC*, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *About OIC*, 2011.

Preferential System among the Member States of the OIC (TPS-OIC) (1990) and more recently, the Second Round of Trade Negotiations in 2006 which established the TPS-OIC Rules of Origin (TPS-OIC RoO) (2007).<sup>13</sup>

### ***Main Bodies of the OIC***

The OIC consists of several main bodies, standing committees, and secondary organs and institutions, all tasked with various responsibilities. The highest authority is the Islamic Summit, consisting of Kings and Heads of State and Government.<sup>14</sup> While the Islamic Summit only meets triennially, it is tasked with the responsibility of deliberation, consultation, policy decisions, and providing guidance for issues “pertaining to the realization of the objectives as provided for in the OIC Charter and consider other issues of concern to the Member States and the *Ummah*.”<sup>15</sup> Similar in scope and mandate of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the CFM meets on an annual basis and implements the general policy of the organization through the adoption of resolutions and decisions “on matters of common interest in the implementation of the objectives and the general policy of the Organization.”<sup>16</sup> The CFM also reviews the progress of such resolutions and decisions, approves the budgetary and other financial and administrative reports of the General Secretariat and subsidiary organs (as well as the establishment of any new organ or committee), and considers “any issue affecting one or more Member State” or “any other issue it deems fit.”<sup>17</sup> The CFM also elects and appoints the General Secretariat, consisting of the Secretary General and Assistant Secretaries General.<sup>18</sup> The General Secretariat is entrusted with the implementation of the decisions of the Islamic Summit and the CFM.<sup>19</sup>

### ***Transitioning into a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Organization: Ten-Year Programme of Action***

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has greatly expanded the role of OIC Member States in international and regional affairs.<sup>20</sup> Since the 1970s, Member States have emerged as leaders in the fields of energy, infrastructure, telecommunications and finance.<sup>21</sup> However, Member States continue to face grave political, socio-economic, cultural, and scientific challenges that affect the OIC’s “unity, peace, security, and development.”<sup>22</sup> In 2004, King Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia called upon Muslim leaders to establish an Extraordinary Conference of the leaders of the OIC Member States to “consider the issues of solidarity and Joint Islamic Action.”<sup>23</sup> The subsequent conference of Muslim scholars and intellectuals in 2005 developed a *Ten-Year Programme of Action* (TYPoA).<sup>24</sup> Similar to the UN’s *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs), the TYPoA identifies the “most prominent challenges facing the Muslim world today, as well as ways and means to address them in an objective and realistic way in order to serve as a practicable and workable program for all OIC Member States.”<sup>25</sup>

The TYPoA has several areas of focus, including the establishment of the values of moderation and tolerance within the *Ummah*, as well as combating extremism, violence, Islamophobia, and terrorism.<sup>26</sup> As seen in the recent protests and internal political shifts involving the Member States of Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, and Libya, the importance of combating extremism, violence, and terrorism has never been more critical. The OIC encourages dialogue and consultation between parties and condones all forms of violence and terrorism, particularly those based on extremism, as stated in the *Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam* in 1990 and reaffirmed in the *Convention of*

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<sup>13</sup> Parker, [\*Idea of an Islamic Common Market Unsustainable at the Moment, 2008.\*](#)

Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *General Agreement for Economic, Technical, and Commercial Cooperation among the OIC Member States*, 1977.

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Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *TPS-OIC Rules of Origin*, 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Chapter 4, Article 6

<sup>15</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Chapter 4, Article 7

<sup>16</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Chapter 5, Article 10

<sup>17</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Chapter 5, Article 10

<sup>18</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Chapter 5, Article 10.

<sup>19</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *About OIC*, 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Long, *The Contemporary Middle East*, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 2004, p. 71.

<sup>22</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Introduction.

<sup>23</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Introduction.

<sup>24</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Introduction.

<sup>25</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Introduction.

<sup>26</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Introduction.

the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism in 1999.<sup>27</sup> The TYPoA also calls for Islamic solidarity through Joint Islamic Action in all issues affecting Member States, including the issues of reform in the UN, expanding the UN Security Council (SC) membership, and supporting candidacies of OIC Member States to international and regional organizations.<sup>28</sup>

Within this joint action, the TYPoA calls for all efforts to be made to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, in compliance with the various UN resolutions in regards to the Palestinian question, particularly *S/RES/242*, *S/RES/425*, *S/RES/338*, *S/RES/1515*, and *GA/RES/194*.<sup>29</sup> Along with the OIC Charter, the TYPoA affirms the inalienable rights and right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, “who are under foreign occupation.”<sup>30</sup> The OIC calls for the immediate establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with *Al-Quds Al-Sharif* as the capital and for the protection of all historic and holy places within *Al-Quds Al-Sharif*.<sup>31</sup> *Al-Quds* remains a primary focus of the OIC and is addressed through the *Al-Quds* Committee and the *Bayt Mal Al-Quds* Agency.<sup>32</sup>

Cooperation via trade and economic agreements and unified support of the Islamic Development Bank is also a critical focus of the TYPoA. Through a coordinated effort to alleviate poverty in the Muslim world, the TYPoA calls for the assistance of countries affected by natural disasters, the support development and poverty reduction in Africa, particularly Somalia, through capacity-building, the cancellation of bilateral and multilateral debts, and the contribution to various funds and special programs established by the international community.<sup>33</sup> The TYPoA also places heavy emphasis on the sciences, emerging technology, educational reform, literacy efforts, and the expedition of *The Covenant on the Rights of Women in Islam*.<sup>34</sup>

With the emphasis on modernization and reform in the OIC, along with an ever-changing political and economic landscape, there is little doubt that the issues facing the international community will also be of critical importance to the Muslim world, and vice versa.

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*The Charter of the OIC was amended in 2008 and is the basic framework for the second-largest intergovernmental organization in the world. The Charter also provides a good understanding of*

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<sup>27</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam*, 1990, Preamble.

Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism*, 1999, Preamble.

<sup>28</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Introduction.

<sup>29</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Point 1/9.

<sup>30</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Chapter 1, Article 1

<sup>31</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008, Chapter 1, Article 1

<sup>32</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *About OIC*, 2011.

<sup>33</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Point 2/1-4.

<sup>34</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Ten-Year Programme of Action*, 2005, Point 2/5-6.

*the focus and mission of the OIC. Objectives of OIC are clearly laid out in the 39 articles, divided by 18 chapters.*

Organization of the Islamic Conference. (2005). *Ten-Year Programme of Action*. Retrieved August 07, 2011 from <http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/10-years-plan.htm>.

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## I. Targeting Religious Intolerance

*"Let us not speak of tolerance. This negative word implies grudging concessions by smug consciences. Rather, let us speak of mutual understanding and mutual respect."<sup>35</sup>*

### **Introduction**

Religious intolerance is a multifaceted issue affecting members of religious minorities throughout the world. It manifests itself in many forms, including physical violence, defamation of holy sites, discrimination in employment, and destruction of religious symbols.<sup>36</sup> To say that religious intolerance is afflicted solely upon a single religion would be false; targets of religious intolerance range from Muslims to Jews to Orthodox Christians.<sup>37</sup> The common factor behind the religious intolerance of these religions is a matter of numbers; observers of these religions are generally targeted because they are considered to be of the minority religion within their region.<sup>38</sup> Despite Islam being the second largest religion in the world, Muslims that live in areas where they are considered to be a minority are frequently faced with discrimination.<sup>39</sup> This is especially true throughout Europe and the United States. A 2007 estimate places the percentage of Muslims in the United States at a mere 0.6%.<sup>40</sup> The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) regards religious intolerance and the grievous acts associated with it, especially as they relate to Islam, as a priority of their work.<sup>41</sup> The intolerance that arises from the discrimination of communities with a minority Muslim population has come to be unofficially labeled as Islamophobia. Described as a "contemporary form of racism and xenophobia motivated by unfounded fear, mistrust and hatred of Muslims and Islam," Islamophobia is of the utmost concern to the OIC.<sup>42</sup> Despite the widespread usage of the term, Islamophobia does not have an internationally agreed-upon definition, thereby making the recognition and subsequent elimination of it more difficult.<sup>43</sup> In a statement made during the 15<sup>th</sup> session of the Human Rights Council, OIC Secretary

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<sup>35</sup> Pire, G. Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1958.

<sup>36</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011, 2011*, pgs.11 – 27.

<sup>37</sup> Human Rights First, *Violence Based on Religious Intolerance 2008 Hate Crime Survey*, 2008, p.1.

<sup>38</sup> Human Rights First, *Violence Based on Religious Intolerance 2008 Hate Crime Survey*, 2008, p.1.

<sup>39</sup> United States Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook: World*, 2011.

<sup>40</sup> United States Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook: United States*, 2011.

<sup>41</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011, 2011*, p.1.

<sup>42</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011, 2011*, p.5.

<sup>43</sup> European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Muslims in the European Union, Discrimination and Islamophobia*, 2006, p.15.

General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu laid down an eight-point proposal for action to combat religious intolerance.<sup>44</sup> In addition, the Secretary General called for the High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish an Observatory to monitor acts of religious intolerance.<sup>45</sup>

In order to eradicate religious intolerance, the traditional belief and definition of tolerance must first be addressed. The word tolerance is defined as “a sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one’s own”.<sup>46</sup> However, the notion of tolerance is used to mean “suffering” the existence of a minority while simultaneously regarding persons belonging to that minority as inferior beings.<sup>47</sup> This view of tolerance is counterproductive in the eradication of intolerance because it allows discrimination to exist under the guise of forced acceptance. The OIC strives in its work to change this view of tolerance to one of mutual understanding and respect.<sup>48</sup>

### ***Islamophobia***

While Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York City and Washington D.C., March 11, 2004 in Madrid, and July 7, 2005 in London serve to reinforce discriminatory tendencies against Muslims.<sup>49</sup> The growth of Islamophobia throughout the world is evidenced by the uptick in discriminatory actions taken against Muslims in recent years.<sup>50</sup> The legislative bans on religious and cultural traits, the desecration of religious symbols, and perpetuated misunderstandings of Islam as barbaric and primitive in comparison to Western civilization are just a few examples of discrimination that Muslims face in their daily lives.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, documented cases of housing and employment discrimination are increasing at a rapid rate.<sup>52</sup> This discrimination seen throughout the world is further influenced by the ongoing instability in the Middle East.<sup>53</sup> The instability has allowed the media to play on the fears of the international community in a way that has inbred a deep suspicion of the Middle East and, by association, Islam.<sup>54</sup> This suspicion of Islam has allowed it to be characterized as having values opposed to that of the West, giving political actors a platform by which to garner support through the denouncement of Islam.<sup>55</sup>

As a result of Islamophobia becoming more deeply-rooted into society, acts of violence and discrimination against Muslims have become common-place events.<sup>56</sup> For example, the forced removal of veils worn by Muslim women such as the *hijab* and *burqa*, and the following verbal attacks are often times dismissed by authorities as being trivial and harmless acts.<sup>57</sup> The recent ban by Switzerland on Minarets, a distinctive architectural feature of Mosques, will directly affect the availability of places to worship for Muslims in the country.<sup>58</sup> Finally, the frequency by which racial profiling of persons looking to be of Middle Eastern descent, with the assumption being that they are also followers of Islam, is cause for concern as it pertains to basic human rights.<sup>59</sup> Individuals fitting the stereotypical description of a Muslim are most often discriminated against in airports, with reported incidences ranging from pilots calling airport security about Muslim passengers to the removal of the security clearance for several Muslim

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<sup>44</sup> United Nations, Human Rights Council, *Statement of the OIC Secretary General His Excellency Prf. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu before the 15<sup>th</sup> Session of Human Rights Council*, 2010.

<sup>45</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.70.

<sup>46</sup> Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2011.

<sup>47</sup> Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Challenging Stereotypes in Europe and the Muslim World: Working Together for Constructive Policies and Partnerships*, 2006, p.1.

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<sup>53</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/6/6 (2007)*.

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employees at the Paris Charles de Gaulle airport in 2006 because they were thought to constitute a threat to passengers.<sup>60</sup>

The manifestations of Islamophobia are both far too common and abhorrent as they exist in the international community. However, such acts seem to manifest with a slight variance between the United States and Europe, with most Muslim Europeans facing a higher degree of poverty and legal discrimination than their counterparts in the United States.

### *Islamophobia in the United States*

To some extent, Muslims in the United States have faced a greater degree of scrutiny throughout their daily lives since the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.<sup>61</sup> A 2011 report published by the Pew Research Center shows that nearly 40% of Americans believe that Islam is more likely than any other religion to incite violence.<sup>62</sup> However, the same report is quick to point out that this sentiment is largely generated by Conservative Republicans and those associated with the Tea Party.<sup>63</sup> In 2010, politicians belonging to these same groups began calling for a complete ban on *Sharia* law, or Islamic law that governs Muslims in their daily lives in areas such as religious practice, personal conduct, and criminal codes.<sup>64</sup> Although *Sharia* law is similar to current United States constitutional law in that it is likewise open to interpretation, opponents of the inclusion of such law point to its most extreme interpretations as being the true face of the law.<sup>65</sup>

The construction of Park51, originally named the Cordoba House, drew widespread criticism and protests in 2010.<sup>66</sup> The planned location of Park51 made its construction particularly controversial. Project developers planned to construct the Muslim community center at 51 Park Place Avenue, relatively close to the World Trade Center site.<sup>67</sup> Nicknamed the “Ground Zero Mosque”, opponents of Park51 claimed it to be “insensitive to the families” and “like putting a Nazi sign next to the Holocaust Museum”.<sup>68</sup> This discriminatory rhetoric, used during the 2010 United States midterm elections, highlights the extent to which religious intolerance dominates the recent political debates. In 2010, Pastor Terry Jones of the Dove World Outreach Center announced the creation of the “International Burn a Koran Day”.<sup>69</sup> The actions of Jones and his followers received international condemnation from public figures and entities such as United States President Barack Obama, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the Vatican.<sup>70</sup> However, Jones was able to achieve the notoriety and fame for his ideas just as he wished; his idea was carried out both in various parts of the United States and in Europe.<sup>71</sup>

Each of these events is demonstrative of the wide-spread political and social discrimination that Muslims face in the United States. Despite having the “second-highest level of education among major religious groups in the United States” and being generally more affluent than in European countries, most Muslims still report feeling alienated.<sup>72</sup> Additionally, most Muslims in the United States question to what extent they should integrate the local culture into their daily lives.<sup>73</sup> These beliefs, held by the majority of Muslims in the United States, indicate that much work still remains to be done to integrate Muslims into society in a way that is respectful of their cultural needs.

### *Islamophobia throughout Europe*

The presence of a large Muslim population throughout Europe can be attributed to the influx of a Muslim immigrant labor force following World War II.<sup>74</sup> At that time, these immigrants faced discrimination based solely on ethnicity.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/6/6 (2007)*.

<sup>61</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, *Muslims in the United States*, 2011.

<sup>62</sup> Pew Research Center, *Continuing Divide in Views of Islam and Violence*, 2011.

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<sup>64</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, Johnson, *Muslims in the United States*, 2011.

<sup>65</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, Johnson, *Muslims in the United States*, 2011.

<sup>66</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.13.

<sup>67</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.13.

<sup>68</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.13.

<sup>69</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.11.

<sup>70</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.12.

<sup>71</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.12.

<sup>72</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, *Muslims in the United States*, 2011.

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<sup>74</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, T. *Europe: Integrating Islam*.

However, due to the recent increase in terrorism and the “rise of Islamic regimes”, European society began regarding Muslims immigrants as “different” primarily because of their religion.<sup>76</sup> Today, experts believe that the Muslim population will significantly increase over the next few decades due to “higher immigrant birth rates and lower native European birth rates”.<sup>77</sup> Due to this likely increase in the overall number of Muslims being present in Europe, it is necessary to address the obstacles facing Muslims in their daily lives as related to the religious intolerance they encounter.

The OIC attributes the recent increase in Islamophobia in Europe to the ascendance of far-right political activists to high-ranking positions throughout the region.<sup>78</sup> Muslim immigrants are the primary targets of discrimination promulgated by the polarized politics that play on people’s fear of what is unknown to them.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, Muslims are frequently portrayed in the media as holding beliefs and customs that are contrary to European values.<sup>80</sup> This media frenzy that, when speaking of Islam, tends to concentrate on topics such as “radicalization, extremism, alienation, terrorism...poverty and gender equalities” tends to further exacerbate the acts of discrimination that Muslims face in their daily lives.<sup>81</sup> These factors contribute to the belief held by analysts that Muslims, despite demonstrating some success in academic and business, are poorly integrated into European society.<sup>82</sup>

Muslims in Europe are frequently confronted with obstacles to carrying out their cultural rites. Several European countries, including France and Spain have banned the use of a *hijab*, the head covering worn by some Muslim women, in public places.<sup>83</sup> Other concerns facing Muslims is the ability to attend mosque on Fridays for weekly congregational prayer and the availability of *halal* foods, ones that are permitted under Islamic dietary guidelines, in public areas such as schools and the military.<sup>84</sup> Finally, the accessibility to mosques throughout Europe has become a two-fold issue. The prevalence of public prayer by Muslims in the streets of several European countries is being targeted. On September 16, 2011, a law banning Muslim street prayers in France came in to effect.<sup>85</sup> However, the Muslim street prayers are a result of too few Mosques being present in the area to accommodate the growing number of Muslims in Europe.<sup>86</sup> As a result, many Muslims are now left unable to pray at the necessary times due to a lack of appropriate accommodations to do so.<sup>87</sup>

### ***Eradicating Religious-based Discrimination***

The Islamophobia Observatory monitors Islamophobic acts and catalogues them into Annual Reports presented to the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers.<sup>88</sup> However, methods of reporting and monitoring religious-based hate crimes, particularly those committed against Muslims, at the state level are inefficient.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, religious-based hate crimes, rather than being tracked as a unique category of crime, are lumped in with all hate crimes.<sup>90</sup> Very few countries track religious-based hate crimes, and as a result, they are limited in their ability to compile and

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<sup>75</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, T. *Europe: Integrating Islam*.

<sup>76</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, T. *Europe: Integrating Islam*.

<sup>77</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, T. *Europe: Integrating Islam*.

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<sup>82</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, T. *Europe: Integrating Islam*.

<sup>83</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.20.

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<sup>85</sup> Kern, S. *France Bans Muslim Street Prayers*. 2011.

<sup>86</sup> Kern, S. *France Bans Muslim Street Prayers*. 2011.

<sup>87</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/6/6 (2007)*.

<sup>88</sup> Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, *Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims) May 2010 to April 2011*, 2011, p.28.

<sup>89</sup> European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Muslims in the European Union, Discrimination and Islamophobia*, 2006, p.16.

<sup>90</sup> European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Muslims in the European Union, Discrimination and Islamophobia*, 2006, p.17.

disseminate such information.<sup>91</sup> Instead, the international community currently relies on information provided by Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to develop policies aimed at eradicating religious-based discrimination. The OIC's commitment to eradicating Islamophobia is further represented in several resolutions it sponsors, including *Human Rights Council 7/19 and A/HRC/10/22* and *General Assembly Resolution 62/154*.<sup>92</sup> Each of these resolutions, having been titled as "Combating defamation of religions", expresses concern for the negative stereotype promulgated through the media of Muslims as being inextricably linked to terrorism.<sup>93</sup> However, while each of these documents recognizes the need to combat the defamation of religions through both legislative and non-legislative means, *A/RES/62/154* emphasizes the importance on respecting the right of freedom of expression and the responsibility associated with this right of maintaining respect for the rights and reputations of others.<sup>94</sup>

*A/HRC/16/18, Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief*, further solidified the OIC's cooperation with the West in combating religious intolerance.<sup>95</sup> This resolution, sponsored by the OIC with collaborative efforts made by the US and the European Union, stepped away from the well-known "defamation of religions" resolutions that had been sponsored by the OIC during previous HRC sessions.<sup>96</sup> By eliminating the term "defamation" from the resolution, the OIC was able to garner support for the cause from a greater number of Member States.<sup>97</sup>

Despite this support, there are still some opposed to protecting religion under traditional defamation laws. L. Bennett Graham of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty believes that by including religion under such laws, the "idea that there is a right not to be offended" is created and could potentially "provide legal cover to states seeking to suppress peaceful religious speech."<sup>98</sup> He further argues that by adding religion in discussions on racism is dangerous because "we are no longer talking about the protection of individuals, we're talking about the protection of concepts."<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, documented cases of assault, murder and mob violence have occurred as a result of accusations of blasphemy.<sup>100</sup> A 2011 report from Human Rights First supports Graham's claim that laws against the defamation of religion create an atmosphere in which a government is permitted to restrict the freedom of expression of a minority religion by stifling legitimate claims of discrimination being committed on behalf of the national or majority religion.<sup>101</sup>

There is little reason to claim that progress towards the eradication of religious intolerance and the violence and defamatory acts associated with it is impossible despite the obvious difficulties that defamation of religion laws have encountered since their inception. In September 2003, the first ever Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions was held in Astana, Kazakhstan at the initiative of President Nursultan Nazarbayev.<sup>102</sup> Senior clerics from many religions, including Islam, Christianity, and Judaism met to establish an interdenominational dialogue as a means of combating "violence, fanaticism, extremism and terrorism."<sup>103</sup> This first congress aimed to "[search for] universal guidelines in world and traditional forms of religion, [create] permanent international interdenominational institute for realizing the religious dialogue and accepting coordinated decisions."<sup>104</sup> Additionally, the representatives present agreed to hold the Congress no less than once every three years and has since met in September, 2006 and

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<sup>91</sup> European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Muslims in the European Union, Discrimination and Islamophobia*, 2006, p.17.

<sup>92</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/7/19 (2008)*.

United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/10/22 (2009)*.

United Nations General Assembly, *A/RES/62/154 (2008)*.

<sup>93</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/7/19 (2008)*.

United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/10/22 (2009)*.

United Nations General Assembly, *A/RES/62/154 (2008)*.

<sup>94</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/7/19 (2008)*.

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<sup>95</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/16/18 (2011)*.

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<sup>97</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *A/HRC/16/18 (2011)*.

<sup>98</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Graham, The Problem with UN Resolution on Defamation of Religions.

<sup>99</sup> Council on Foreign Relations. Graham, The Problem with UN Resolution on Defamation of Religions.

<sup>100</sup> Human Rights First. Blasphemy Laws Exposed: The Consequences of Criminalizing "Defaming of Religions", 2011.

<sup>101</sup> Human Rights First. Blasphemy Laws Exposed: The Consequences of Criminalizing "Defaming of Religions", 2011.

<sup>102</sup> Parliament of Kazakhstan, About Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.

<sup>103</sup> Parliament of Kazakhstan, About Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.

<sup>104</sup> Parliament of Kazakhstan, About Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.



July, 2009.<sup>105</sup> The work of the First Congress and its subsequent meetings is demonstrative of the progress that is possible through collaboration and open dialogue.

### **Conclusion**

The argument made by Bennett that the protection of religion is inherently a protection of concepts and ideas rather than facts and therefore dangerous because of the potentially disastrous effects that doing so may have on the exchange of ideas and free speech is important to consider. Can the defamation of religion be eliminated through legal means without having a chilling effect on the exchange of ideas? If not, what non-legislative steps can be taken towards the eradication of religious intolerance? Moreover, how can the OIC encourage the expansion of such strategies to other non-Muslim-majority States?

It is true that there is no simple solution that will completely eliminate religious intolerance throughout the world. This issue is a complex one requiring the implementation of strategies at all levels of society. The implementation of national policies cannot be guaranteed to affect change at the local level. Likewise, local initiatives aimed at combating religious intolerance cannot be assumed to be effective across an entire State simply because they were so in a particular region. It is not enough to simply implement national policies, provide improved education to the population or to begin social campaigns deploring religious intolerance. Each of these strategies, along with various others, must be collectively implemented and embraced by a State and its population in order to effectively target religious intolerance and eradicate the defamation of religion. The challenge here will be to develop methods that will eliminate stereotypes and discriminatory tendencies in the minds and actions of people from all walks of life in order to see the vision of total religious tolerance become a reality.

## **Annotated Bibliography**

### ***I. Targeting Religious Intolerance***

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*This report, updated in 2011, provides a general overview of how Muslims communities grew in Europe. It also delves into the issues facing European Muslims today including poverty and segregation, terrorism, democracy, cultural identity, and general discrimination. The claim made here is that a lack of integration, whether self-imposed or not, has led to the marginalization of Muslims throughout Europe.*

Council on Foreign Relations. Johnson, T. *Muslims in the United States*, Retrieved on September 23, 2011 from <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/muslims-united-states/p25927>

*Johnson provides several statistics regarding the demographics of Muslims in the United States including immigrant status, general locations and population growth. He also provides poverty rates and general educational attainment levels of U.S. Muslims. These statistics then allow him to discuss how discrimination in the U.S. negatively impacts Muslim communities, although to a lesser extent than is seen in Europe.*

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*In this interview of Vali R. Nasr, key points of the divide in Islam between Sunnis and Shiites are discussed. Nasr gives a fair and unbiased explanation of the origins of this conflict and where they have led the followers of these sects today. The focus of this interview is on how this conflict is being played out in modern-day Iraq. However, the key understandings of this conflict and how they may apply to the greater Muslim world are important parts of this discussion.*

Esposito, J. (2002) *What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam*. New York City: Oxford University Press

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<sup>105</sup> Parliament of Kazakhstan, About Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.

*This book provides a detailed overview of the many unique characteristics, customs and concepts of Islam. It provides a key understanding to Islam that counters many misperceptions of the religion and its practices.*

European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. (2006). *Muslims in the European Union, Discrimination and Islamophobia*. Retrieved August 10, 2011 from

[http://www.oicun.org/uploads/files/articles/Manifestations\\_EN.pdf](http://www.oicun.org/uploads/files/articles/Manifestations_EN.pdf)

*This report provides detailed information on the situation of Muslims in the European Union in various areas, including education, housing and employment. In particular, this document tracks the manifestation of Islamophobia in select EU countries by providing specific examples of events as they relate to religious intolerance of Muslims. It also highlights the progress of the EU in combating Islamophobia by tracking initiatives that address Muslim integration.*

Human Rights First, *Blasphemy Laws Exposed: The Consequences of Criminalizing "Defaming of Religions"*,

Retrieved on September 20, 2011 from [http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/Blasphemy\\_Cases.pdf](http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/Blasphemy_Cases.pdf)

*This report takes a firm position against the criminalization of defamation of religion by providing detailed descriptions of the acts of violence committed against those accused of blasphemy. It further highlights the shortcomings of legislation that was originally intended to protect against the defamation of religion. Such legislation, the report claims, is frequently used as a tool to suppress free speech rather than as a means of promoting peaceful communication. The overarching claim of this report is that legislation concerning the defamation of religions is detrimental to basic human rights and the freedom of expression.*

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[oci.org/uploads/File/humanrightsfirst-fd-080924-muslims-web.pdf](http://www.oic-oci.org/uploads/File/humanrightsfirst-fd-080924-muslims-web.pdf)

*Human Rights First put forward this report following the 2008 Hate Crime Survey to document specific instances of religious intolerance aimed at Muslims. It gives detail of specific instances of violence targeting Muslims and their cemeteries and places of worship. Also, this report highlights the backlash that Muslims face following major terrorist attacks, whether a Muslim is responsible for the attack or not.*

Human Rights First. *Violence Based on Religious Intolerance*. Retrieved August 11, 2011 from

<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/fd-080924-religious-web.pdf>

*This report, published in 2008 by the NGO Human Rights First, documents violent acts committed against people for holding particular religious beliefs. This report highlights the true nature of religious intolerance as being part of the daily lives of countless minorities across the world, regardless of the religion they practice.*

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[oci.org/uploads/file/Islamphobia/2011/en/islamphobia\\_rep\\_May\\_2010\\_to\\_April\\_2011\\_en.pdf](http://www.oic-oci.org/uploads/file/Islamphobia/2011/en/islamphobia_rep_May_2010_to_April_2011_en.pdf)

*The Fourth OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, presented during the annual meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, provides information on recent manifestations of Islamophobia throughout the United States and Europe. It also lists positive actions that were recently taken around the world that took steps to combat religious intolerance and Islamophobia. Finally, this document provides the recommendations of the Islamophobia Observatory on the best methods towards the elimination of Islamophobia.*

United Nations, Human Rights Council, *Statement of the OIC Secretary General His Excellency Prf. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu before the 15<sup>th</sup> Session of Human Rights Council*, Retrieved August 20, 2011 from

<http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/8864sggenevaaic.pdf>

*This is the speech made by the OIC Secretary General at the 15<sup>th</sup> session of the Human Rights Council. It primarily covers the discrimination and intolerance facing Muslims. In this speech, the Secretary General lays out an eight point plan aimed at promoting religious tolerance. In addition, the High Commission for Human Rights is called upon to establish an Observatory in the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights to document acts as they relate to religious intolerance and discrimination. Although some of what the Secretary General called for has been achieved, there is still much to be done in the eradication of religious intolerance.*

## II. The Humanitarian and Socioeconomic Impact of Israeli Settlements in Palestinian Quality of Life

### *Introduction*

According to the United Nations *Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)*, *Israeli settlements are conceived as* “residential, industrial, and farming colonies built on land annexed/occupied with the ‘approval and direct or indirect support of the Israeli government [...]’.”<sup>106</sup> Based upon a recent report issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, around 144 settlements are located in the West Bank, mostly concentrated in Jerusalem governorate: 26 of which 16 have already been annexed to Israel.<sup>107</sup>

Together, East Jerusalem and the West Bank are home to approximately 500,000 Jewish settlers.<sup>108</sup> These settlements, according to the United Nations (UN), have created “multi-layered restrictions,” referencing the different checkpoints, road gates, roadblocks, and a large network of road closures that cause severe difficulties for Palestinians.<sup>109</sup> The West Bank is also affected by the construction of the Separation Barrier, which circles between 70% and 80% of the territory, and is 707 km long, more than twice the length of the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line) between the West Bank and Israel.<sup>110</sup> According to OCHA, “approximately 28,000 Palestinians in nine communities in the Az Zawiyah and Bir Nabala enclaves will be surrounded on four sides by the Barrier, with a tunnel or road connection to the rest of the West Bank.”<sup>111</sup> As a result, Palestinians living under these restrictions may fall under a permit regime, where their right to freedom of movement – among others – will respond to a bureaucratic decision of the occupying force.<sup>112</sup>

The barrier is of particular interest when evaluating the humanitarian and socioeconomic impact of Israeli settlements. Regarding the legality of the West Bank Barrier, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) through its Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004) on the Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, has clearly stated that “construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law.”<sup>113</sup> Furthermore, the ICJ declared Israel’s obligation to cease the construction of the barrier, which severely limits the freedom of movement of the Palestinian people.<sup>114</sup> Finally, the body argues, “Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem.”<sup>115</sup>

### *History of the conflict*

Following the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli settlements began their establishment and expansion.<sup>116</sup> This began with the creation of the Israeli Ministerial Committee for Settlements in charge of the management of the settlements constructed throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt).<sup>117</sup> Now, 42% of the West Bank is allegedly under the Israeli control.<sup>118</sup> According to the Oslo Accords, the oPt that were part of Area A, were to be ruled by the Palestinian National Authority (PA), controlling security and civilian issues; and in Area B the PA would only have a civilian presence; and Area C would fall under Israeli control.<sup>119</sup> In response to several international rulings about the illegality of the Israeli settlements, and in accordance to the Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Article 1, Objective 8, the OIC must “support and empower the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination and establish their sovereign State with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, while safeguarding its

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<sup>106</sup> The Ireland Palestinian Alliance, *Israeli Settlements and Settler Roads in the West Bank*, 2009.

<sup>107</sup> The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Press Release about Israeli Settlements in the Palestinian Territory*, 2011.

<sup>108</sup> McCarthy, *How settlements in the West Bank are creating a new reality, brick by brick*, 2009.

<sup>109</sup> McCarthy, *How settlements in the West Bank are creating a new reality, brick by brick*, 2009.

<sup>110</sup> United Nations Office for the coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA), *West Bank Barrier Route Projections*, 2010.

<sup>111</sup> United Nations Office for the coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA), *West Bank Barrier Route Projections*, 2010.

<sup>112</sup> B’Tselem and Bimkom, *The establishment and expansion plans of the Ma’ale Adummim settlement: Spatial and human rights implications*, 2009, p. 36.

<sup>113</sup> International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2004.

<sup>114</sup> B’Tselem, *Restriction of Movement*, 2011.

<sup>115</sup> International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2004.

<sup>116</sup> The Ireland Palestinian Alliance, *Israeli Settlements and Settler Roads in the West Bank*, 2009.

<sup>117</sup> The Ireland Palestinian Alliance, *Israeli Settlements and Settler Roads in the West Bank*, 2009.

<sup>118</sup> The Ireland Palestinian Alliance, *Israeli Settlements and Settler Roads in the West Bank*, 2009.

<sup>119</sup> The Ireland Palestinian Alliance, *Israeli Settlements and Settler Roads in the West Bank*, 2009.

historic and Islamic character as well as the Holy places therein (...).<sup>120</sup> This issue area is of significant importance to the backbone of the OIC, which is to protect and safeguard the values and interest of the Muslim of world.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, the OIC has approached to this particular problem from a human rights perspective, the one that raises the attention to the conditions of Palestinian living within the oPt, as well as from the principle of self determination, by envisioning a future Palestinian State.<sup>122</sup>

### **Core Issues**

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) *Resolution 65/104* notes, “Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law.”<sup>123</sup> UN Member States have not only called for the freezing of settlement activity but also for the dismantling of constructions built since March 2001.<sup>124</sup> In response to this resolution and several others, Israel has claimed that the increase of settlements is a result of “natural growth.”<sup>125</sup> However, as reported by the Israeli group Peace Now, “at least 40% of settler population growth in recent years has been from immigration from Israel or abroad, not from children born in settlements.”<sup>126</sup>

Another area of concern to the international community is the E-1 Plan, where the major objective is to prevent Arab Jerusalem from growing by building a physical link between Ma’ahle Adumim and Jerusalem.<sup>127</sup> In 2003, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon implemented the disengagement plan in Gaza, but at the same time he made it clear that part of that plan would involve strengthening major settlement blocks in the West Bank.<sup>128</sup> Ma’ahle Adumim, the main artery of the E-1 Plan, is not only considered the largest but also the most sensitive construction project in the West Bank.<sup>129</sup> UNGA *Resolution 65/104*, has expressed its serious concern “in particular about Israel’s construction and expansion of settlements in and around occupied East Jerusalem, including the E-1 plan that aims to connect its illegal settlements around and further isolate occupied East Jerusalem.”<sup>130</sup> The major distress is focused on the systematic demolition of Palestinian properties, ones which will lead to internal displacement, exposing Palestinians to several conditions of insecurity. For example, 3,000 Beduin Palestinian people from the community of Jahalin, who have lived over 60 years in the area between East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley, currently face a threat to their livelihood.<sup>131</sup> Initially expelled from the “Naqab (Negev) in 1948, the Jahalin, many of whom were again displaced from the area of Ma’ale Adumim in 1998, are once again under threat of forced displacement due to the expansion of Ma’ale Adumim and ongoing construction of E-1 and the Adumim Wall.”<sup>132</sup>

A third focus of discussion responds to the construction of the wall; though it has been ruled as unlawful, it has followed an established route that goes inside the oPt, including the interior and perimeter of East Jerusalem.<sup>133</sup> UN Member States have conveyed that the wall “is causing humanitarian hardship and a serious decline of socio-economic conditions for the Palestinian people, is fragmenting the territorial contiguity of the Territory and undermining its viability and could prejudice future negotiations and make the two-State solution physically impossible to implement.”<sup>134</sup> In 2004, OCHA in its report on the humanitarian crisis in the oPt calls Israeli authorities to abide by the ICJ Advisory opinion by not only ceasing but also dismantling the existent barrier.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, *Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference*, 2008.

<sup>121</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 2010-2011.

<sup>122</sup> Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 2010-2011.

<sup>123</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan (A/RES/65/104)*, 2011.

<sup>124</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan (A/RES/65/104)*, 2011.

<sup>125</sup> McCarthy, *Netanyahu: Israel will still build on Jewish settlements*, 2009.

<sup>126</sup> McCarthy, *How settlements in the West Bank are creating a new reality, brick by brick*, 2009.

<sup>127</sup> Berg, *Israel's 'linchpin' settlement*, 2005.

<sup>128</sup> Berg, *Israel's 'linchpin' settlement*, 2005.

<sup>129</sup> Berg, *Israel's 'linchpin' settlement*, 2005.

<sup>130</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan (A/RES/65/104)*, 2011.

<sup>131</sup> PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, *The Adumim “Bloc” and the E-1 Expansion Area*, 2009.

<sup>132</sup> PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, *The Adumim “Bloc” and the E-1 Expansion Area*, 2009.

<sup>133</sup> PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, *The Adumim “Bloc” and the E-1 Expansion Area*, 2009.

<sup>134</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan (A/RES/65/104)*, 2011.

<sup>135</sup> United Nations News Centre, *Israeli Barrier isolates Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem*, 2011.

Suggesting that “only then will Palestinian communities cut off by the barrier be able to exercise their rights to freedom of movement, work, education, health and enjoy an adequate standard of living.”<sup>136</sup>

The fourth concern is related to the day-to-day living inside the oPt, which has been characterized by an increase of incidents of violence, harassment, provocation, and incitement by illegal armed Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem.<sup>137</sup> The quality of life that Palestinians face has become a high priority to the international community, due to the fact that current conditions could lead to a complicated humanitarian crisis that has already started in different areas of the oPt. The international community has acted in a variety of ways, one of which was the initiation of the UN Gender Task Force in Gaza which responded to the consequences of the operation Cast Lead.<sup>138</sup> The amount donated reached \$404.5 million in 2010, 82% inside the Consolidated Appeal (CAP).<sup>139</sup> Humanitarian workers being interviewed “have voiced concerns that international humanitarian assistance is simply serving as a sticking plaster to avert the absolute collapse of living conditions in Palestine as the political crisis deepens.”<sup>140</sup>

### ***Access and management of water***

In accordance with the *Monthly Humanitarian Monitor* published by OCHA, herder communities throughout Area C of the West Bank are confronted with a serious water scarcity created by the absence of adequate infrastructure, which is compounded by the low average rainfall during the 2010-2011 rainy season.<sup>141</sup> In other cases, projects related to water management have been put on hold, because Israeli authorities have not yet approved them.<sup>142</sup> This is directly connected with the amount of agricultural production of the oPt, which is responsible for supplying food for the inhabitants of these areas. Moreover, in some communities, the scarcity has been compounded by the demolition of water harvesting structures by the Israeli authorities over the past year, due to the lack of building permits.<sup>143</sup> As a result of these conditions the consumption of water of these communities is estimated to be low, less than 30 liters per capita per day below the 100 liters the World Health Organization (WHO) recommends.<sup>144</sup>

### ***Access to quality education***

With 16 years of existence, the oPt education system has endured several obstacles such as restricted building permits and the increased violence, all being consequence of the occupation, conflict and internal division reported in the area.<sup>145</sup> However, studies show that school enrollment is high, with around 90.9% of adult literacy, where the principal beneficiaries are women.<sup>146</sup> Also, in the period between 2008 to 2009, the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics has reported the existence of 2,488 schools: 75% being governmental, 13% provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and 11% being private.<sup>147</sup> In the period of 2008 to 2009, around a million of Palestinian children were enrolled in the basic education system.<sup>148</sup>

However, the Second Intifada (2000-2005) caused major damages to the system, which provoked a setback regarding the progress accomplished in prior years. As a result, “much of the school infrastructure was damaged, students and teachers were psychologically affected, and children missed months of schooling due to military operations, curfews and closures.”<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, Gaza was affected by the Israeli military operation Cast Lead, which destroyed around

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<sup>136</sup> United Nations News Centre, *Israeli Barrier isolates Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem*, 2011.

<sup>137</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan (A/RES/65/104)*, 2011.

<sup>138</sup> DARA, *The Humanitarian Response Index 2011: Focus on Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt)*, 2011, p. 6.

<sup>139</sup> DARA, *The Humanitarian Response Index 2011: Focus on Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt)*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>140</sup> Mountain, *Humanitarian Aid for Palestinians shouldn't be necessary*, 2011.

<sup>141</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor: July 2011*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>142</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor: July 2011*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>143</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor: July 2011*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>144</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor: July 2011*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>145</sup> United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 9.

<sup>146</sup> United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 9.

<sup>147</sup> United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 9.

<sup>148</sup> United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>149</sup> United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 10.

280 schools in the area.<sup>150</sup> The latter conditions have persisted, characterized by a shortage of educational facilities – provoking that the existing ones cope with overcrowded classrooms; lack of school supplies such materials are not considered as humanitarian aid by Israeli authorities; and the increasing violence rates that affect the whole oPt, which vary accordingly. In response to this situation, UNGA through *Resolution 65/100*, has expressed its “concern about the severe classroom shortage in the Gaza Strip and the consequent negative impact on the right to education of refugee children as a result of the inability of the Agency to construct new schools owing to Israel’s ongoing restrictions impeding the entry of necessary construction materials into the Gaza Strip.”<sup>151</sup> Because of the circumstances discussed above dropout rates have increased to 0.6% at the primary-school level (girls, 0.5%; boys, 0.8%) and 2.6% at the secondary level (girls, 2.9%; boys, 2.3%).<sup>152</sup> Consequences are more evident by analyzing the period of 1999 to 2008, where the Net Enrollment Rates (NER) decreased from 97% to 75% in a matter of nine years.<sup>153</sup>

The principal factors affecting the quality of education are threefold: infrastructure, teachers, and violence. The current infrastructure situation responds directly to two circumstances: funds and the current blockade on materials. Currently the existing number of schools does not meet the demand of the Palestinian people. As a consequence “about 80 % of all schools in Gaza now run double shifts to accommodate students, reducing class time by almost one-third. Classroom shortages are also prevalent in Area C and in East Jerusalem.”<sup>154</sup> Another pressing concern remains the level of hygiene that current educational institutions offer to their students. In this regard the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, through a survey conducted in 2008, determined that “27% of schools in the West Bank and 30% of those in Gaza did not meet territory-wide standards for water and sanitation facilities in schools of 1 toilet per 30 students.”<sup>155</sup>

The situation concerning teachers is closely related to the quality of education offered to students in the oPt. The number of teachers seems to respond quite well to the demand of students. Currently 28,000 teachers work in government schools in the West Bank and 9,096 in Gaza for 1.1 million students.<sup>156</sup> In addition, it has been calculated that 1,800 new teachers joined the active teaching force through 16 Education Directorates in the oPt.<sup>157</sup> However, the problem does not rest in the number of teachers available but rather in their preparation and training prior exercising educational activities. UNICEF has observed with concern, that the teaching force is comprised by teachers specialized in certain areas of study instead of being prepared on a variety of fields, and most of all teachers lack training based on teaching methodologies.<sup>158</sup> Therefore, it has been reported that the educational system implemented in the Occupied Palestinian Territory schools is structured to teacher-centered approaches. Because of this, in 2008 the *Palestinian Teacher Education Strategy* was launched, with the main objective to develop the Palestinian teaching force through programmes that focused on enhancing teaching methodologies that incorporate the student to the activity developed at every session. The following year, as a complementary strategy, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education created the Commission in charge of the development of the Teaching Profession.<sup>159</sup> The Commission’s major goal is to promote the active and sustained training of teachers, in order to develop a high standard educational system for the Palestinian people.<sup>160</sup>

The most pressing problem is related to the violence that is felt throughout the oPt. Due to the insufficient number of schools, “children often travel long distances or cross military checkpoints to reach school (...) Children’s right to education in the oPt is also affected by armed conflict, with a greater frequency in incidents resulting in damage or threats of damage to schools documented in the first half of 2011, as compared to the same period in 2010.”<sup>161</sup> As a result, children and young adolescents lack information about their right to be protected, whether it is at school or

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<sup>150</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 10.

<sup>151</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works (A/RES/65/100)*, 2011.

<sup>152</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p.10.

<sup>153</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 10-11.

<sup>154</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>155</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>156</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>157</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>158</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>159</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>160</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>161</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor: July 2011*, 2011, p. 2.

anywhere else. This situation takes place due to the permanent conflict that children face on a daily basis. Moreover, the high rates of violence keep escalating due to deficient, or non-existing, mechanisms of law enforcement.<sup>162</sup>

### ***Violence and aggression***

Violence has been reported from both sides, including Israeli military actions as well as rocket attacks coming from the oPt.<sup>163</sup> According to OCHA, “since the escalation of violence on 18 August, 14 Palestinians have been killed, including four civilians, and 41 injured, including 35 civilians, and nine Israelis have been killed, including seven civilians, and approximately 35 have been injured.”<sup>164</sup> Regarding the acts of violence reported the UN General Assembly has recently expressed “grave concern at the firing of rockets against Israeli civilian areas resulting in loss of life and injury.”<sup>165</sup> Another pressing concern responds to the current situation throughout the oPt, where OCHA has reported that “violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and their property continued during th(e) month(s). So far this year there have been 237 such incidents, approximately 46% above the figure for the equivalent period in 2010.”<sup>166</sup>

### ***The OIC and the Palestinian Cause***

The OIC through the Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs has managed to keep pace with the development in the Occupied Arab Lands in general and in the Palestinian cause in particular.<sup>167</sup> Since 2008, the Department has focused its efforts in several areas of interests, among which the highlights include the following: political situation, development and the escalating violence.<sup>168</sup> Regarding the political situation, the OIC has shown deep commitment to work towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict.<sup>169</sup> However, “the opportunities of progress in the political file decreased as a result of the rejection of the occupying force, Israel, to the diplomatic efforts which were aimed at freezing settlements and also for resuming the final situation negotiations.”<sup>170</sup>

In 2003, the Quartet – comprised by the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations – presented “its Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis.”<sup>171</sup> The so-called ‘Roadmap for Peace’ was a goal-driven effort, which established clear guidelines to be followed by Israel as well as Palestine, in order to reach a sustainable peace.<sup>172</sup> The plan drafted “clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields...”<sup>173</sup> Even though in December 2009, the Administration of the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, vowed to freeze the construction of settlements for a 10 month period, Israel has failed to comply with the principles of the Roadmap. According to Peace Now, with the expiration of the freeze order the construction of some 2,000 units in 75 different settlements and outposts have begun.<sup>174</sup>

The OIC Secretariat has focused its efforts on promoting political talks with Heads of Government and with the influential organizations of the international community. The OIC is also continuing to support the Palestinian stance in the international forums.<sup>175</sup> The OIC has built support for the Palestinian cause, mainly through regional and

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<sup>162</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), *Child Friendly Schools: Case Study Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, p. 14.

<sup>163</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian (OCHA), *Protection of Civilians Report: Update on Escalation of Violence in the Gaza Strip and Southern Israel*, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>164</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian (OCHA), *Protection of Civilians Report: Update on Escalation of Violence in the Gaza Strip and Southern Israel*, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>165</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (A/RES/65/105)*, 2011.

<sup>166</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor: July 2011*, 2011, p. 4.

<sup>167</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>168</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>169</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>170</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>171</sup> Global Policy Forum, *The Roadmap*, 2005.

<sup>172</sup> Global Policy Forum, *A Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 2002.

<sup>173</sup> Global Policy Forum, *A Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 2002.

<sup>174</sup> Peace Now, *Interim Report: Settlement Activity since the End of Moratorium*, 2011.

<sup>175</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

international conferences, such as Annapolis (2007), Sharm El-Sheikh (1999), Paris, and Vienna.<sup>176</sup> At an internal level of the Palestinian cause, the OIC has conducted an ongoing process between the warring factions, in order to “restor(e) unity and end the political rift among Palestinians.”<sup>177</sup> On the issue of violence, the OIC has undertaken a dynamic strategy, which focuses on promoting international pressure on Israel to stop the aggressions, both in the oPt and Gaza.<sup>178</sup> In July 2009, the OIC Executive Committee “held an extensive meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers to deal with the implications of the Israeli invasion of Gaza.”<sup>179</sup> As a result, the Human Rights Council started an investigation on the crimes attributed to Israel.<sup>180</sup>

### **Considerations**

The OIC has devoted its political efforts to confirm “the importance of the Palestinian cause to the organization and to the Islamic Ummah as a whole.”<sup>181</sup> In this regard, the OIC works not only towards the protection and respect of rights of the Palestinian people, but also the Organization is committed to the Palestinian cause and its goal to establish a Palestinian State within a just and sustainable peace.<sup>182</sup> Within a changing world, the Muslim community faces multidimensional challenges in the areas of politics, economics, culture and technology, the ones that influence its capacity to promote unity within a secure and peaceful environment. Therefore, cooperation among the OIC Member States is pivotal in order to take unified strategic actions to overcome obstacles. The responsibility of OIC Member States is to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to reach a sustainable peace based upon the respect of the inalienable Palestinian rights, as well as working towards the efforts to connect Gaza with the West Bank; thus assuring the freedom of movement of Palestinians. In addressing these challenges, the OIC foresees two major obstacles: the ongoing expansion of Israeli settlements, and the Separation Barrier. Humanitarian issues that are further affecting the Palestinian quality of life compounds the situation. In front of these living conditions, the OIC needs to undertake a permanent and sustained strategy, which allows the Organisation to attain not only international funds, but support from IGOS as well as the international community towards the Palestinian cause.

Many pivotal details need a proper discussion within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the humanitarian conditions that Palestinians face on a daily basis, is a crisis that only aggravates the current features of the conflict. Key questions include: What are the challenges that the Palestinian cause presents to the OIC? What is the applicability of the concept of human security in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? What is the current position of International Society towards the Israeli settlements? How sustainable are the Israeli settlements in a long-term period? What development alternatives do Palestinians have? What is the current status of Hamas and Fatah ‘reconciliation deal’?

## **Annotated Bibliography**

### ***II. The Humanitarian and Socioeconomic Impact of Israeli Settlements in Palestinian Quality of Life***

Aoun, E. (2009). Assessing International Peace Efforts in Palestinian-Israeli Affairs: A Human Security Perspective. *Human Security Journal*. 8(8): 73-89. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from [http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/journal/issue8/hsj\\_elena.pdf](http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/journal/issue8/hsj_elena.pdf)

*Today, the individual must be the principal concern of each and every state, requiring that the decisions made respond to the necessities and different realities of its inhabitants. Therefore, Human Security plays a major role regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, where major interests are at stake. In consequence, the author analyzes the different discourses that explain the ongoing conflict. While some identify Palestinian violence as the major cause of the conflict, others consider that the occupation is. However, this article introduces the concept of “securing human security for all” as the ultimate solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; thus, building social and economic conditions for a shared and sustainable development.*

<sup>176</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>177</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>178</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>179</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>180</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>181</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.

<sup>182</sup> OIC Journal, *Department of Palestine and Al-Quds Affairs*, 2011.



Bajpai, K. (2000). Human Security: Concept and Measurement. *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper*. 19 (1): 2-63. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from

[http://www.hegoa.ehu.es/dossierra/seguridad/Human\\_security\\_concept\\_and\\_measurement.pdf](http://www.hegoa.ehu.es/dossierra/seguridad/Human_security_concept_and_measurement.pdf)

*The following document talks about the conceptualization of Human Security, and its meaning and previous bases of formulation. In this context, the author explains the process of conceptual construction, analyzing the Human Development Report and the influence that it had in the elaboration and mechanisms of measurement of Human Security. Additionally, Bajpai explains the different dimensions of security that may lead to a global human security, mainly by: implementing sustainable development; reducing arms; equitable access to global markets; restructuring global institutions; and promoting civil participation within a democratic government.*

B'Tselem and Bimkom. (2009). *The establishment and expansion plans of the Ma'ale Adummim settlement: Spatial and human rights implications*. Retrieved September 2, 2011, from

[http://www.jmcc.org/documents/Bimkom\\_-\\_MA\\_Eng7\\_for\\_pdf.pdf](http://www.jmcc.org/documents/Bimkom_-_MA_Eng7_for_pdf.pdf)

*The Report analyzes the establishment and implications of the Ma'ale Adummim settlement. The document is not only one of the largest, but also the most controversial settlement, was created in 1975. The authors explain how Ma'ale Adummim construction was achieved, making an important distinction between requisitioned and expropriated land. Additionally, the report discusses the consequences that the settlement has over Palestinian lifestyle, not only due to the expropriation measures, but also for the ongoing construction of the settlement, the one that is suppose to divide the West Bank into two cantons.*

Brauch, H. (2007). Environment and security in the Middle East: Conceptualizing Environmental, Human, Water, Food, Health and Gender Security. In: C. Lipchin et al. (eds.). *Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East* (121–161). Germany: Springer. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from

<http://waterandlivelihoods.pbworks.com/f/Environment+and+Security+in+the+Middle+East.pdf>

*Brauch analyzes the evolution that security worldwide has experienced overtime. Since the end of the Cold War, other interests arose. Therefore, the conception of security became more inclusive, having a more inclusive perspective. In consequence, the environment is taken into consideration as a matter of not only state security but of human security.*

Dudai, R. (2007). A Model for Dealing with the Past in the Israeli-Palestinian Context. *Oxford Journal: The International Journal of Transnational Justice*. 1 (2): 249-267.

*The author analyzes the possibilities and benefits that applying the mechanisms of transitional justice might have within the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this context, Dudai discusses previous experiences where long processes have actually led to a positive post-conflict stage. Also, this article underlines the importance of the role of civil society, where the initiatives created should be composed of two vital elements: truth and reconciliation.*

Gold, D. (2002). From “Occupied Territories” to “Disputed Territories.” *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp470.htm>

*This document discusses the presence of Israeli forces in the Occupied Territories from several different perspectives. It analyzes the situation from Israeli and the Palestinian narrative as well, providing interesting conclusions, the ones that are able to facilitate the comprehension of this particular conflict. The author endorses an interesting study about the terminology used while discussing the conflict, and how discourse reflects each party's perspective, the one that is based on several cultural conjunctions.*

Halperin, E., D. Bar-Tal, K. Sharvit, N. Rosler, and A. Raviv. (2010) Socio-psychological implications for an occupying society: The case of Israel. *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (1): 59-70. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from

[http://www.eranhalperin.com/JPR\\_-\\_Psychology\\_of\\_Occupation\\_2010.pdf](http://www.eranhalperin.com/JPR_-_Psychology_of_Occupation_2010.pdf)

*This article brings together different analysis of the occupation, viewing it from a socio-psychological perspective, where the author analyzes the implications that an “occupation” provokes in a society. Halperin talks about the challenges that this signifies for the individual and how people manage to understand this reality as an occupying society. Therefore, this paper*

*examines the case of Israel from a socio-psychological perspective, and discussing why Israel became an occupying force, while many countries of the world were moving towards a different direction.*

Secretariat of the Human Rights & Good Governance. (2009). *The State of Human Rights in East Jerusalem: Facts and Figures*. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from <http://www.humanrights.ps/node/205>

*This report provides important information about the conditions of the inhabitants of East Jerusalem. In this sense, the most important topics under analysis respond to: house demolitions and movement restrictions, which are two of the main problems that have affected Palestinians life conditions for several years. The report facilitates the understanding of the Palestinian's lifestyle, by analyzing figures that portray the current challenges facing the inhabitants of the oPt.*

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian Territory. (2011). *Humanitarian Fact Sheet on Area C of the West Bank*. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from [http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_Area\\_C\\_Fact\\_Sheet\\_July\\_2011.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_Area_C_Fact_Sheet_July_2011.pdf)

*This particular document provides useful information about the current status at the Area C of the West Bank, which provides with statistics and data that reflects the conditions of Palestinians living in this zone. In this sense, this document talks about the following pivotal topics. First, it discusses the difficulties that Palestinians have in order to construct their homes, while the Israeli settlers are benefitted with construction permits. Second, it raises attention to the fact that demolitions have increased, causing distress among Palestinians, forcing them to leave their hometowns. As a result, this document exposes a brief look to the complexity of the problematic, underlining the unequal access to land, and how forced migration affect Palestinians living under the control of Israeli military.*

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian Territory. (2011). *Displacement and Insecurity in Area C of the West Bank*. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from [http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_area\\_c\\_report\\_august\\_2011\\_english.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_area_c_report_august_2011_english.pdf)

*The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian Territory analyses 13 Palestinian communities located within the Area C of the West Bank, focusing in the conditions of housing. In this spirit, this report provides updated material that makes reference to the current condition of displacement that Palestinians live. This report draws the attention to the "way forward", discussing the difficulties that humanitarian organizations face in order to meet the urgent need of communities that inhabit Area C.*

### III. Promoting Order in Transitioning Regimes

*"From Tunis to Cairo, from Tripoli to Damascus, from Benghazi to Sanaa, populations too long crushed by oppression, rose up and claimed the right to be free at last."<sup>183</sup>*

#### ***The Call for Reform***

The past year has been one of dramatic change for numerous states within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).<sup>184</sup> Arab states across North Africa and the Middle East are experiencing public calls for reform and grappling with questions of what comes next.<sup>185</sup> From Egypt to Tunisia, Libya to Yemen, the context and resulting scenarios that has surrounded the political uprisings has been far from uniform.<sup>186</sup> Political change and revolution has come about differently in each of the above countries, and will, as a result, mean that each state will have a unique experience in shaping new governance.<sup>187</sup> The new political landscape, which is taking shape in the Arab world, requires an informed and balanced response from local, regional, and international organizations to adequately transition states into new governments. For the OIC this will be a true test on the organization's ability to respond to

<sup>183</sup> Snow, *UN Chief Urges support for Arab Spring Nations*, 2011.

<sup>184</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>185</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>186</sup> Council On Foreign Relations, *Libya's Precarious Transition Ahead*, 2011.

<sup>187</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Transitional Failure in Egypt and Tunisia*, 2011.

and manage state transitions, and to ensure that it has the adequate capacity to work through development and democratic challenges.<sup>188</sup> From within the OIC Ten Year Program of Action, the goal has been to “enlarge the scope of political participation, ensure equality, civil liberties and social justice, and to promote transparency and accountability, and eliminate corruption in OIC Member States” – a goal which has never been more relevant to the region than now.<sup>189</sup>

Possibly the most important aspect of this issue will be the recognition of the unique qualities of each event, and further the understanding that each situation will require a different response.<sup>190</sup> For Egypt and Tunisia the road to toppling regimes was marked with much less violence than what has been experienced throughout Syria and Libya.<sup>191</sup> In addition to considering the path to political change within states, there must also be an awareness of what different changes have resulted.<sup>192</sup> In Egypt for example, while Hosni Mubarak has been ousted, the military has remained as a fixture within the state, whereas in Libya all signals point to a complete regime and political overhaul.<sup>193</sup> It will be important for the OIC to address the differences in each of these states and provide help for recovery from revolution and future development accordingly. Promoting order in each of these states will mean something different, but in each situation the organization will need to toe the line of assistance and sovereignty of state affairs.<sup>194</sup>

## Case Studies

### *Tunisia & Egypt*

Tunisia and Egypt have followed similar paths in their calls for reform this past year.<sup>195</sup> In Tunisia, protests began in December of 2010, as unemployment, corruption, and dissatisfaction with President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali reached a tipping point.<sup>196</sup> By January 14, 2011, Ben Ali was forced to resign, and taking his place was the transitional, interim government formed under Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, as the plans for future elections take shape.<sup>197</sup> Mr. Ghannouchi left the government shortly after the transitional government formed, as calls rang out that his leadership was too close to that of Ben Ali's.<sup>198</sup> He was replaced by Beji Casid Essebsi.<sup>199</sup> Initially elections had been scheduled in Tunisia to take place on July 24, 2011, which have since been rescheduled for the end of October.<sup>200</sup> While some changes have been slower to take hold in Tunisia, one of the most progressive changes to date has been the elimination of the Rally for Constitutional Democracy party (RCD), the ruling party under Ben Ali.<sup>201</sup> The Tunisian Courts dismantled the RCD in March of 2011.<sup>202</sup> One of the most important things that will need to be reconciled under the elections of a new Tunisian government is the balance between conservative and progressive politics in the country, which will have significant effects on issue areas such as women's rights.<sup>203</sup> With the prospect for democracy and a renewed electoral process, women are hoping for new rights and opportunities that were previously not present under Ben Ali.<sup>204</sup> Further, elections will need to ensure that they resolve the current power vacuum which has resulted following the revolutions, ensuring that the newly elected government will have the capacity to bring about changes within the country that will quell the current state of protests and unrest, and bring back functionality to the top ranks of government and policing services.<sup>205</sup>

Egypt has followed a relatively similar path as Tunisia, where violent protests and the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak all occurred within the timespan of approximately one month, from January 25 to February

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<sup>188</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *Address Of H.E. Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, OIC Secretary General, To The 38Th Session Of The Council Of Foreign Ministers*, 2011.

<sup>189</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *Ten Year Program of Action*, 2011.

<sup>190</sup> Council On Foreign Relations, *Libya's Precarious Transition Ahead*, 2011

<sup>191</sup> Council On Foreign Relations, *Libya's Precarious Transition Ahead*, 2011

<sup>192</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, *Spring Tide: Will the Arab Risings yield democracy, dictatorship or disorder?*, 2011, pg 4

<sup>193</sup> Cook, *After the Arab Spring*, 2011.

<sup>194</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *OIC Establishes and Independent Human Rights Commission*, 2011.

<sup>195</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Transitional Failure in Egypt and Tunisia*, 2011.

<sup>196</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>197</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>198</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>199</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>200</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Transitional Failure in Egypt and Tunisia*, 2011.

<sup>201</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>202</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>203</sup> Ryan, *Women's Rights Hang in the Balance*, 2011.

<sup>204</sup> Ryan, *Women's Rights Hang in the Balance*, 2011.

<sup>205</sup> New York Times, *Tunisia*, 2011.

11, 2011.<sup>206</sup> Since then power has been in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military arm of Egyptian government.<sup>207</sup> SCAF has to this point encouraged the fall elections in Egypt, and has seemed eager to encourage the formation of a new, elected government to take charge in the Egyptian parliament, an eagerness promoted at least partially by the desire to avoid blame for rising social and economic problems taking place within the state.<sup>208</sup> Reconciliation with the military and ensuring cooperation and effective government coordination of SCAF will be important for any newly elected President in Egypt.<sup>209</sup> Over the Mubarak era, the military had enjoyed a relatively powerful place in Egyptian politics marked with privileges and perks that they are eager to see continue; yet this must be balanced by the rise of democracy and the transition from an authoritarian to democratic system of power.<sup>210</sup> One of the important changes taking place under the interim rule of SCAF has been the shaping of the landscape of political parties to ensure that elections that take place in the fall do so with some legitimacy.<sup>211</sup> Significant changes have included the legalization of formerly banned parties and the ability for the formation of new parties to challenge the elections.<sup>212</sup> The trial of Hosni Mubarak, as well as other former members of government is one of the key points of transition to a new democratic government in the country.<sup>213</sup> The trial for Mubarak began in early August, and has been a slow process, which has been further complicated by the health problems plaguing the former President.<sup>214</sup> There is expected testimony at the trial from former high-ranking officials that will then be followed by Mr. Mubarak's responses, which will certainly be designed to illuminate the corruption and problems of the former regime.<sup>215</sup> To this point, several of Mubarak's former ministers have already been tried and convicted, including Habib al-Adly, former interior minister, Ahmed Nazif, former Prime Minister, Rachid Mohammed Rachid, former trade minister, for charges including money laundering, profiteering, and corruption.<sup>216</sup>

### *Libya*

Protests in Libya for reform began shortly after those in Egypt, but have wrangled on much longer, and with much more violence.<sup>217</sup> Libyan rebels were fighting against the authoritarian rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who had been in power of the country since 1969.<sup>218</sup> Between February and March 2011, rebels advanced slowly past Benghazi, their home base, westward and from Zawiya eastward, gaining some control, but ultimately facing challenges from both the military and Gaddafi loyalists.<sup>219</sup> Unlike the situations in Egypt and Tunisia, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was quick to act in the Libyan situation with *Resolution 1973*, which expressed concern for the situation in the country and called for an immediate ceasefire and end to violence, established a no-fly zone over the region, and, most importantly, "authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary..."<sup>220</sup> The role of NATO has seemingly expanded over the duration of the Libyan conflict, and in the later months, "the UK has confirmed that NATO is providing "intelligence and reconnaissance" to help the rebels track down Col Gaddafi."<sup>221</sup> Within the country, since the August 2011 entrance of rebels into Tripoli on the ground, supported by NATO air forces, Gaddafi's regime has been considered toppled, and there has been recognition across both the Arab world and the larger international community of the legitimacy of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the official governing body, including recognition by the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>222</sup> On October 20, 2011, Colonel Gaddafi was declared dead, and the country is, at time of posting, transitioning to a new and stable government, focused on the promotion of social, political, cultural and human rights.<sup>223</sup>

<sup>206</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>207</sup> Martini and Taylor, *Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future*, 2011.

<sup>208</sup> Martini and Taylor, *Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future*, 2011.

<sup>209</sup> Martini and Taylor, *Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future*, 2011.

<sup>210</sup> Martini and Taylor, *Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future*, 2011.

<sup>211</sup> Martini and Taylor, *Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future*, 2011.

<sup>212</sup> Martini and Taylor, *Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future*, 2011.

<sup>213</sup> Martini and Taylor, *Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future*, 2011.

<sup>214</sup> *Revolution and Aftermath*, 2011.

<sup>215</sup> *Revolution and Aftermath*, 2011.

<sup>216</sup> *Egypt Trials: Mubarak Officials charges and verdicts*, 2011.

<sup>217</sup> Bowen, *Libya Crisis: The story so far*, 2011.

<sup>218</sup> Bowen, *Libya Crisis: The story so far*, 2011.

<sup>219</sup> Bowen, *Libya Crisis: The story so far*, 2011.

<sup>220</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1973 (S/RES/1973)*, 2011.

<sup>221</sup> Bowen, *Libya Crisis: The story so far*, 2011.

<sup>222</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The end of Qaddafi's Regime*, 2011.

United Nations News Centre, *World's Countries Pledge Support for Libyan Transition at UN Summit*, 2011.

<sup>223</sup> *Libya's Col Muammar Gaddafi killed, says NTC*, 2011.

### ***Internal Reform within the OIC***

Over the past year, the OIC has made internal reforms that serve to strengthen its ability and mandate as an intergovernmental organization.<sup>224</sup> One of the key changes was made recently at the 38<sup>th</sup> Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which officially changed the name of the organization from the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.<sup>225</sup> This change reflects a key progression in the structure and expansion of the OIC and places recognition on the growing mandate of the organization over the last 40 years.<sup>226</sup> A second important development at the meeting was the creation of an Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission, designed to protect and promote human rights within the Organization and its Member States.<sup>227</sup> The commission has several key objectives including the advancement of human rights in Member States, the consolidation of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the OIC Charter, and promoting legislation within states to advance political and social rights.<sup>228</sup> Further, the mandate of the commission stresses the importance of supporting national institutions and existing civil society organizations in the area of human rights and is encouraged to execute research and studies on priority issues.<sup>229</sup> The development of this council signifies that the OIC is now prepared to take control of international concerns and issues and indicates a promising move forward in unifying OIC interests.<sup>230</sup> Additionally, the creation of the commission means a new empowerment for the OIC and its Member States to gather information and create solutions from the situations currently arising with the developments of the Arab Spring.<sup>231</sup> The last key development out of the 38<sup>th</sup> Session was the establishment of a “Trust Fund for Somalia.”<sup>232</sup> The trust fund is designed in accordance with Chapter 15, article 2 of the OIC Charter, which allows the organization to from time to time establish special funds or endowments.<sup>233</sup> The fund was created with the intent to “relieve suffering of the Somali people and to contribute to peace-building, rehabilitation, and development processes within the country.”<sup>234</sup> The establishment of such a fund indicates the OIC’s ability to harness resources and demonstrates its capability to respond to civil strife and recovery, which will be important in the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. The OIC’s establishment of funds has been previously used to aid Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>235</sup>

### ***International Support***

The OIC is only one of many organizations responding to the challenges of political change within Arab states. Notably, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) have historically been the most involved with states facing development challenges and democratic transitions.<sup>236</sup> At the “Forum on Pathways of Democratic Transition” held in Cairo in June 2011, Helen Clark, UNDP administrator noted several areas which the UNDP has come to see as key to smooth democratic transitions: economic models, political inclusion and participation, justice and reconciliation, and advancing human rights and the basic rule of law.<sup>237</sup>

As Ban Ki-Moon noted in his annual report to the UN General Assembly, “as the next five years will be crucial in determining the path that many transitions will take, it is essential that we rapidly upgrade our abilities to support countries engaged in building democratic structures and processes.”<sup>238</sup> His report highlights the most important aspect that international and regional responses must focus on at this time, the support and building for new

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United Nations News Centre, *World’s Countries Pledge Support for Libyan Transition at UN Summit*, 2011.

<sup>224</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The OIC Changes its name to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation*, 2011.

<sup>225</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The OIC Changes its name to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation*, 2011.

<sup>226</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The OIC Changes its name to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation*, 2011.

<sup>227</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *OIC Establishes and Independent Human Rights Commission*, 2011.

<sup>228</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *OIC Establishes and Independent Human Rights Commission*, 2011.

<sup>229</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *OIC Establishes and Independent Human Rights Commission*, 2011.

<sup>230</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The 38<sup>th</sup> CFM Adopts a Resolution on Follow up and Coordination of Work on Human Rights*, 2011.

<sup>231</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The 38<sup>th</sup> CFM Adopts a Resolution on Follow up and Coordination of Work on Human Rights*, 2011.

<sup>232</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *Establishment of a Trust Fund for Somalia*, 2011.

<sup>233</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *Establishment of a Trust Fund for Somalia*, 2011.

<sup>234</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *Establishment of a Trust Fund for Somalia*, 2011.

<sup>235</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *Establishment of a Trust Fund for Somalia*, 2011.

<sup>236</sup> United Nations Development Program, *Overview*, 2011.

<sup>237</sup> United Nations Development Program, *Opening statement by UNDP Administrator Helen Clark on the occasion of the “Forum on Pathways of Democratic Transition,”* 2011.

<sup>238</sup> United Nations News Centre, *At time of global transition UN more necessary than ever to tackle challenges*, 2011.

democratic structures.<sup>239</sup> Transitioning states at the most base level indicate some political switch to a democratic system of government, and ensuring a stable environment for that transition to occur is key amongst goals of promoting order and development.<sup>240</sup>

The UNDP and the UNDPA have been integral to ensuring the stability and legitimacy of resulting elections in transitioning states.<sup>241</sup> The UNDPA has offered electoral assistance in the past to states such as El Salvador, Cambodia, Timor Leste, and South Africa, including technical assistance, elections administration, election observation, and other assessments.<sup>242</sup> This type of past experience in elections administration will be integral in assisting current states in transition and maybe an important measure that the OIC will observe for future events. Importantly, any assistance which is provided by the UNDPA or the UNDP is generally at the request of states in which assistance may be needed, hence preventing an over exertive influence and muddling in internal state affairs.<sup>243</sup>

A secondary consideration within promoting order is the reconciliation and justice with respect to former regimes, governments, and individuals within that government that states must deal with. Both Egypt and Tunisia, for example, have set the stage for trials for their former leaders, Hosni Mubarak and *Zine El Abidine Ben Ali*.<sup>244</sup> *Transitioning states must carefully handle trials and justice carried out for former government leaders, ensuring that justice is handed down appropriately and without rapid-fire judgment.*<sup>245</sup> Steven Cook, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, states that “there is a tremendous desire in Egypt for accountability and justice, but there is also this slippery slope to revolutionary justice, or retribution,” highlighting the delicate balance that new governments must strike when evaluating accountability versus retributive justice.<sup>246</sup> This aspect will be something that the OIC will have to consider and address strategically, drawing on the experience of other OIC states that have been through similar experiences, including the trail and execution of former Iraqi Leader, Saddam Hussein.

For the OIC, it will be important for the organization to draw upon both the resources and the experiences that the international community has to provide. For a regional organization, the OIC is facing the challenges of transitioning states in large mass for the first time, and certainly other international and regional organizations will have much to offer the organization in assistance.<sup>247</sup> Some of the key subsidiaries of the OIC, such as the Islamic Development Bank, may look to organizations such as the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF) for support and assistance in fiscally responsible infrastructure and development plans and may further seek resources and ideas on past UNDF projects which have dealt with transitioning states.<sup>248</sup>

With international support and organization, the OIC will need to carve out its own role in the region and address its goals and initiatives in these transitioning states.

### ***Implications of Regime Change***

For the OIC, the implications of regime change within the organization and its Member States are significant.<sup>249</sup> The key consideration in this context will be how Member States within the organization react to transitioning regimes both within and externally to the cooperation.<sup>250</sup> Arab states have been historically non-democratic states, and the organization must address with Member States the growing dichotomy between new democratic states and historical autocracies or pseudo-democracies.<sup>251</sup> Specifically, the OIC as an organization will need to address how Member States have approached the idea of regime transition and what their response has been outside of the cooperation. Iran, for example, has shifted tones slightly as the continuation of violence in Syria prevails, and in August 2011 Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi stated, “Either in Yemen, Syria, or any other country, people have some

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<sup>239</sup> United Nations News Centre, *At time of global transition UN more necessary than ever to tackle challenges*, 2011.

<sup>240</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, *Spring Tide: Will the Arab Risings yield democracy, dictatorship or disorder?*, 2011, p. 3.

<sup>241</sup> United Nations Development Program, *Overview*, 2011.

<sup>242</sup> UN Department of Political Affairs, *Electoral Assistance*, 2011.

<sup>243</sup> UN Department of Political Affairs, *Electoral Assistance*, 2011.

<sup>244</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Egypt's Post-Mubarak Political Uncertainty*, 2011.

<sup>245</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Egypt's Post-Mubarak Political Uncertainty*, 2011.

<sup>246</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *Egypt's Post-Mubarak Political Uncertainty*, 2011.

<sup>247</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *Establishment of a Trust Fund for Somalia*, 2011.

<sup>248</sup> United Nations Democracy Fund, *Democratic Transformation of Egypt*, 2011.

<sup>249</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>250</sup> Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, *The People Spoke Reform*, 2011.

<sup>251</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, *Spring Tide: Will the Arab Risings yield democracy, dictatorship or disorder?*, 2011, p. 6.

legitimate demands and governments should answer them as soon as possible” – a change from the Iranian governments distinct support of the Syrian Assad Government.<sup>252</sup>

This shift within state foreign policies will be reflected dramatically within the OIC, especially in negotiations for development and assistance to transitioning regimes. The consolidation of opinions and policies of Member States within the cooperation will be important and will require the OIC to negotiate an understanding and separation of development assistance and political will.<sup>253</sup> Further, the organization must consider what external support Member States have been providing to states in conflict (for instance, claims that Iran had initially attempted to prop up the Assad regime through financial support) and how that support may impact the organizations claim to support democratic transition, good governance, and the promotion of human rights.<sup>254</sup>

One of the significant issue areas that must be considered with all of the changes in the region is the precarious economic situation and the place of oil wealth both within government’s influx and the newly transitioned governments.<sup>255</sup> Oil wealth and revenues has been one of the premier sources of income for several authoritarian states within the area, and has been one of the main reasons that some authoritarian states were able to retain power for such time.<sup>256</sup> The ability to spend on military resources and internal policing has meant some states have wielded much greater power over quelling protests and silencing calls for reform as opposed to others.<sup>257</sup> Consider for instance the drastic difference in military spending in 2008 between Libya, a state with high access to oil resources and Tunisia, a state with relatively low access; in 2008 Libya was able to spend \$1.1 billion as compared to Tunisia’s \$550 million, nearly double the expenditure.<sup>258</sup> The ability to bolster the military with such spending was key in Gaddafi’s ability to prolong the revolution in contrast to the relatively quick end to Tunisia’s revolution.<sup>259</sup> The need to reconcile this wealth in states experiencing revolution will be key in the ability for a new transitional government to shed the blankets of corruption and provide for the economic and social well being for citizens.<sup>260</sup> Further, it will be monumentally important to ensure that future governments do not fall into the same trap of oil wealth and corruption, and that states be able to follow a path of democratization that uses resources and revenues to the advantage of all public welfare without the air of secrecy.<sup>261</sup>

### ***Future Considerations***

One of the most important considerations for the OIC will be to assess its own resources and ability to reconcile development, democratic transition, and capacity building in states. The OIC will also need work cooperatively with international organizations, including the United Nations and humanitarian organizations, to ensure the legitimacy of newly formed governments, mediate violence, and prevent an enormity of humanitarian tragedies in transitioning states. Importantly, the OIC will need the ability to address the separation of policies from itself as an organization, and the individual Member States, which comprise the organization, in setting up the direction of policies that it will adopt in this changing political landscape. The OIC’s ability to negotiate a uniform approach and response to the events will be the true test in the OIC’s reaction to dramatic political change and the disjoint between governance within Member States. The internal reforms within the organization this past year demonstrate an adaptability and responsiveness to the changing conditions of the region and the expanding mandate of the OIC. The OIC’s ability to continue on this path of change and reform will be important if the organization is going to attempt to reconcile the situation in states undergoing reform.

Key questions for consideration will be: How will the OIC harness its resources to effectively reconcile and capacity build in states undergoing reform? What support will the OIC need from the international community? How will the organization respond if there are conflicting interests with in the cooperation? What will be the key objectives for the OIC to ensure reform and order?

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<sup>252</sup> NPR, *Iran warns of Crisis in the Region if Syria Falls*, 2011.

<sup>253</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, *Spring Tide: Will the Arab Risings yield democracy, dictatorship or disorder?*, 2011.

<sup>254</sup> NPR, *Iran warns of Crisis in the Region if Syria Falls*, 2011.

<sup>255</sup> Ross, *Will oil drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the resource curse*, 2011.

<sup>256</sup> Ross, *Will oil drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the resource curse*, 2011.

<sup>257</sup> Ross, *Will oil drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the resource curse*, 2011.

<sup>258</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, 2011.

<sup>259</sup> Ross, *Will oil drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the resource curse*, 2011.

<sup>260</sup> Ross, *Will oil drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the resource curse*, 2011.

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### III. Promoting Order in Transitioning Regimes

Cook, S. (2011) After the Arab Spring. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved August 25, 2011, from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/after-the-arab-spring/73086/>

*This is an important article that attempts to foresee what may happen following the Arab spring events within the Middle East and North Africa. The article is good for delegates to read and get a sense of how dramatically and quickly the situation and events have altered, and where they may possibly be headed, specifically by looking at how other states in the region have responded. Additionally this article provides an overview of the region rather than a specific focus on one state, which is beneficial for contrast and comparison.*

Council On Foreign Relations. (2011). *Libya's Precarious Transition Ahead*. Retrieved August 28, 2011, from <http://www.cfr.org/libya/libyas-precarius-transition-ahead/p25712>

*The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) will be an important resource for delegates as this topic will be changing rapidly in the next few weeks and months, and the up-to-date analysis provided by the fellows from the CFR is most useful in having the most current response to the issue. This interview in particular describes the current transition in Libya and what is predicted for the future of the NTC and the expected fall of the Gadhafi government. It outlines what the results of revolution have meant in Libya and where the country will need to go in order to experience stability in the future.*

Martini, J. and J. Taylor. (2011). Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved September 19, 2011, from <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/08/25/FA.html>

*Academic sources will be the best for delegates in their research to gain a sense of what the early and initial analysis is on the Arab Spring. This commentary from Julie Taylor and Jeffery Martini gives a brief overview on the current state of Egyptian politics under the interim leadership of the SCAF. Further it looks to the future of Egyptian government and attempts to predict what role the military might play under a new democratic system, an important question in all states that experience democratic reform.*

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. (2011). Address Of H.E. Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, OIC Secretary General, To The 38th Session Of The Council Of Foreign Ministers. Retrieved August 15, 2011, from [http://www.oic-oci.org/topic\\_detail.asp?t\\_id=5460&x\\_key](http://www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id=5460&x_key)

*This is an important speech for delegates to look at when researching this topic. The speech reflects the initial responses of the OIC and specifically the Secretary-General to the situations and events occurring throughout the Arab world. As the events change and the response from the OIC becomes more coherent, delegates can see how the addresses, and plans of the organization shift over time.*

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. (2011). *Ten Year Program of Action*. Retrieved August 13, 2011, from [http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/ex-3/TYOAP\\_Makkah\\_2005.pdf](http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/ex-3/TYOAP_Makkah_2005.pdf)

*This document from the OIC lays out quite clearly what their goals, initiatives, and ideas are and how those things will be achieved over the next years. This will be helpful for delegates in getting a base understanding of the OIC as an organization and understanding what its focus has been on in the past, where it sees itself going, and what tools will be used to accomplish these things.*

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. (2011). *The People Spoke Reform*. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from <http://www.oic-oci.org/journal.asp>

*The OIC is a critical source in researching this topic further as it provides a look at the reaction from within the bureaucracy to the Arab Spring. This article in particular is an early piece, which looks at each of the states that have experienced revolutions and calls for reform and examines what the future might hold. While this article has only preliminary information, as the situation is rapidly changing, it provides an important resource on establishing a foundation of information.*

Ross, M. (2011). Will oil drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the resource curse. *Foreign Affairs*, 90.5.



*This article is an important perspective that looks at other external forces influencing the regime change and former regimes of transitioning states. It will provide delegates with the basic information on how economic revenues and oil wealth have shaped Arab states, and what this has meant for their historic political and economic culture. Further it provides delegates with important questions such as 'what types of changes can the international community effect, to ensure that democracy within these states is not overshadowed by resource corruption.'*

Ryan, Y. (2011). *Women's Rights Hang in the Balance*. Retrieved August 20, 2011, from the Al-Jazeera Web site: <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/08/201181617052432756.html>

*Women's rights are one of the key issues in the transitioning regimes, as women in each of the states experiencing reform hope to gain a new semblance of rights. In this article, Yasmin explores specifically the case of Tunisia and examines what prospects hang for women in the event of elections, and what will be the best possible outcome for women to look to. In addition she balances the progressive parties against the conservative parties and looks to what the future of the Tunisian government might look like.*

United Nations Development Program. (2011). *Opening statement by UNDP Administrator Helen Clark on the occasion of the "Forum on Pathways of Democratic Transition."* Retrieved August 28, 2011, from <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2011/june/forum-on-pathways-of-democratic-transitions.en>

*The UNDP is an important international source of information on the details of how government's transition and what international support is allocated to ensure the legitimacy of incoming democratic systems. This statement by Helen Clark illustrates what the future horizon looks like for the states in turmoil in the Arab Spring, and what sorts of democratic transitions can be expected. Further, she provides important analysis on what specific types of changes states and governments must implement in order to ensure democracy may thrive.*

United Nations General Assembly. (2009). *Resolution 64/12*. Retrieved on August 22, 2011, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=a/res/64/12>

*This is an important resolution from the UNGA which delegates will find useful. This is a more recent resolution from the UN which means that the information committed to is more up to date and will provide delegates with a more reasoned understanding from recent developments within the UN. The resolution outlines the UNGA's approaching to promoting order and reform in new democracies, which is something that delegates may consider modeling their own OIC resolutions after.*

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# **Rules of Procedure**

## **Organisation of Islamic Cooperation**

### ***Introduction***

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as “the Organisation”) and shall be considered adopted by the Organisation prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Organisation.

### **I. SESSIONS**

#### **Rule 1 - *Dates of convening and adjournment***

The board shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

#### **Rule 2 - *Place of sessions***

The Board shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

### **II. AGENDA**

#### **Rule 3 - *Provisional agenda***

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Organisation at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

#### **Rule 4 - *Adoption of the agenda***

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Organisation by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

*The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.*

#### **Rule 5 - *Revision of the agenda***

During a session, the Organisation may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Organisation so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Organisation decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

*For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an important and urgent character is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Organisation to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Organisation until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.*

**Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum**

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

**Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General**

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Organisation.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Organisation and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

**Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat**

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Organisation, and shall distribute documents of the Organisation to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Organisation may require.

**Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat**

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Organisation concerning any question under consideration.

**Rule 10 - Selection of the President** The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Organisation for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

**Rule 11 - Replacement of the President** If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

**Rule 12 - Official and working language**

English shall be the official and working language of the Organisation.

**Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)**

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

*This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.*

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

**Rule 14 - Quorum**

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Organisation are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Organisation shall be required for any decision to be taken.

*For purposes of this rule, members of the Organisation means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.*

**Rule 15 - General powers of the President**

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Organisation, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Organisation and over the maintenance of order at its meetings.

He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Organisation the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

*Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to —propose to the Organisation entails her/his power to —entertain motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.*

#### **Rule 16**

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Organisation.

#### **Rule 17 - Points of order**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

*Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.*

#### **Rule 18**

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

#### **Rule 19 - Speeches**

1. No one may address the Organisation without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Organisation, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Board may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

*In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Organisation in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.*

#### **Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers**

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Organisation, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Organisation.

*The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Organisation. A motion to close the speakers' list is within the purview of the Organisation and the President should not act on her/his own motion.*

**Rule 21 - Right of reply**

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

*For purposes of this rule, a remark that impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Organisation by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.*

**Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

**Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Organisation shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

*As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Organisation's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Organisation.*

**Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate**

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

**Rule 25 - Closure of debate**

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Organisation favors the closure of debate, the Organisation shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

**Rule 26 - Order of motions** Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

**Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments**

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Organisation would like the Organisation to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Organisation unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Organisation for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

*For purposes of this rule, all proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Organisation by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft report segment. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft report segment and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Organisation. These draft report segments are the collective property of the Organisation and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.*

**Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions**

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

**Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic**

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Organisation, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

*For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.*

## VI. VOTING

**Rule 30 - Voting rights**

Each member of the Organisation shall have one vote.

*This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft report segments, and portions of draft report segments divided out by motion. As such, all references to member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.*

**Rule 31 - Request for a vote**

A proposal or motion before the Organisation for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Organisation may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

*For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft report segment, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft report segment divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.*

**Rule 32 - Majority required**

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Assembly shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

*All members declaring their representative States as “present and voting” during the attendance role call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.*

**Rule 33 - Method of voting**

1. The Board shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be

called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

*Only those members who designate themselves as present or present and voting during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying pass, must, on the second time through, respond with either yes or no. A pass cannot be followed by a second pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.*

2. When the Organisation votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Organisation shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

***Rule 34 - Explanations of vote***

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

*All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.*

***Rule 35 - Conduct during voting***

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

***Rule 36 - Division of proposals and amendments***

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

*For purposes of this rule, most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft report segment, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

***Rule 37 - Amendments***

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

*An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.*

***Rule 38 - Order of voting on amendments***

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

*For purposes of this rule, furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft report segment. The determination of which amendment is furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

**Rule 39 - Order of voting on proposals**

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Organisation decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

**Rule 40 - The President shall not vote**

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VII. CREDENTIALS

**Rule 41 - Credentials**

The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General prior to the opening of a session.

**Rule 42**

The Board shall be bound by the actions of the General Assembly in all credentials matters and shall take no action regarding the credentials of any member.

VII. PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS OF THE BOARD

**Rule 43 - Participation of non-Member States**

1. The Board shall invite any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Organisation and any other State, to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
2. A committee or sessional body of the Organisation shall invite any State that is not one of its own members to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
3. A State thus invited shall not have the right to vote, but may submit proposals which may be put to the vote on request of any member of the body concerned.

*If the Organisation considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Organisation according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Organisation is no longer required.*

**Rule 45 - Participation of national liberation movements**

The Board may invite any national liberation movement recognized by the General Assembly to participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.

**Rule 46 - Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies**

In accordance with the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the specialized agencies shall be entitled: a) To be represented at meetings of the Organisation and its subsidiary organs; b) To participate, without the right to vote, through their representatives, in deliberations with respect to items of concern to them and to submit proposals regarding such items, which may be put to the vote at the request of any member of the Organisation or of the subsidiary organ concerned.

**Rule 47 - Participation of non-governmental organization and intergovernmental organizations**

Representatives of non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations accorded consultative observer status by the General Assembly and other non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations designated on an ad hoc or a continuing basis by the Organisation on the recommendation of the Bureau, may participate, with the procedural right to vote, but not the substantive right to vote, in the deliberations of the Organisation on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations.