



NMUN • NY

AFRICAN UNION
BACKGROUND GUIDE 2012

Written By: Cara Wagner, Doug Arseneault, Jennifer Villagomez, Sana Ibrahim



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CONTACT THE NMUN

Please consult the FAQ section of nmun.org for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

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NMUN•NY 2012 Important Dates

IMPORTANT NOTICE: To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at nmun.org and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

31 January 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March) • Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET! (We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)
15 February 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Committee Updates Posted to www.nmun.org
1 March 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early! Group Rates on hotel rooms are available on a first come, first served basis until sold out. Group rates, if still available, may not be honored after that date. See hotel reservation form for date final payment is due. • Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to: outreach@nmun.org • Preferred deadline for submission of Chair / Rapp applications to Committee Chairs • All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$125 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$150 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline. • Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail (See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions).
NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2012	<p>1 - 5 April – Sheraton New York 3 - 7 April - New York Marriott Marquis</p> <p>The 2013 National Model UN Conference 17 - 21 March & 24 - 28 March (both at Sheraton; Sun-Thurs)</p>

POSITION PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2012

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 1 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active when background guides are available. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment in the subject line (Example: GAPLEN_Greece).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org.

This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba_U_of_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

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for more information

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General Assembly Third Committee.....	ga3rd.sheraton@nmun.org
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ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women	csw.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on Narcotic Drugs.....	cnd.sheraton@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	escwa.sheraton@nmun.org
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Organization of American States	oas.sheraton@nmun.org
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	oic.sheraton@nmun.org
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ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.marriott@nmun.org
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Food and Agriculture Organization.....	fao.marriott@nmun.org
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	unesco.marriott@nmun.org
African Union.....	au.marriott@nmun.org
Organization of American States	oas.marriott@nmun.org
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	oic.marriott@nmun.org
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	apec.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council A	sca.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council B.....	scb.marriott@nmun.org
International Criminal Court	icc.marriott@nmun.org
Peacebuilding Commission.....	psc.marriott@nmun.org
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty	att.sheraton@nmun.org

OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
(send only to e-mail for your assigned venue).....	positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org
Secretary-General	secgen.ny@nmun.org
Director(s)-General	dirgen.ny@nmun.org
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THE 2012 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

1 – 5 April (Sheraton) & 3 – 7 April (Marriott) • www.nmun.org

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Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to the 2012 National Model United Nations (NMUN). This year's African Union staff is Directors Cara Wagner and Doug Arseneault and Assistant Directors Jennifer Villagomez and Sana Ibrahim.

Cara graduated from the University of Colorado-Boulder with a B.A. in International Affairs and Certificate of Peace and Conflict Studies. She is currently pursuing an M.S. in International Affairs at Northeastern University. This is her sixth year at the conference and third year on staff. Doug graduated from Chapman University with a B.A. in Political Science. He currently serves as Legislative Affairs Manager for the Valley Industry and Commerce Association and is active with the California Young Democrats. This is his fifth year at the conference and second year on staff. Jennifer recently graduated from the University of California at Santa Barbara with a B.A. in Political Science with an emphasis in International Relations. This is her fifth year participating in Model UN and second year on staff. Sana studied Communications and Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at California State University, San Bernardino. She works in the medical management and administration field and serves on the board of the Palestinian-American Women's Association. This is her fourth year at the conference and second year on staff.

The topics under discussion for the African Union at the 2012 NMUN conference are as follows:

1. Responding to Famine in Somalia
2. Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
3. Addressing the Use of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

At NMUN, you will be simulating the African Union Commission. The Commission is the primary governance body of the AU. As such, you will be researching and writing resolutions that directly affect the African political, economic, and social community. Keep this in mind while you research your topics and draft your position papers.

This background guide will serve as a brief introduction to the three topics listed. Accordingly, it is not meant to be used as an all-inclusive analysis but as the groundwork for your analysis and research. To conduct your research, please consult scholarly materials, including journals, international news and the United Nations and African Union websites. You will also need to familiarize yourself with the work and current operations of the African Union and its various bodies.

Each delegation must submit a position paper. NMUN will accept position papers via e-mail through March 1, 2012. Please refer to the message from your Directors-General explaining the NMUN position paper requirements and restrictions. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is crucial.

We hope that this year's conference will not only intrigues you to participate in further conferences and United Nations actions, but that you will find it as beneficial as we have in past years. If you have any questions regarding preparation, please feel free to contact any of the African Union substantive staff or the Under-Secretary Generals for the Department of Inter-Governmental Organizations, Lucas Carreras (Sheraton) and Katharina Weinert (Marriott).

Good luck in your preparation for the conference. We look forward to seeing you in April!

Sheraton Venue
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Director

Jennifer Villagomez
Assistant Director

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Director

Sana Ibrahim
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Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2012 NMUN Conference

At the 2012 NMUN New York Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee to which it is assigned. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee affects the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs, or judicial experts. To understand these differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and should establish precise policies and recommendations about the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in entirely original material. *The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.* In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and it may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single-spaced pages (one double-sided paper, if printed)
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at one inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page,
- The use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf format required) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2011. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2012 (GMT-5) for delegations attending the NMUN conference at either the Sheraton or the Marriott venue.**

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU_Namibia_University of Caprivi)

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Amanda D'Amico, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Nicholas Warino, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and it is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location, your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Sheraton Venue
Amanda D'Amico
Director-General
damico@nmun.org

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Nicholas Warino
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**Delegation from
The United Mexican States**

**Represented by
(Name of College)**

Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion; Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions; as well as The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. The Mexican Delegation first would like to convey its gratitude being elected and pride to serve as vice-president of the current General Assembly Plenary session.

I. The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion

The principles of equal sovereignty of states and non-interference, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, have always been cornerstones of Mexican foreign policy. The legitimate right to interfere by the use of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, is laid down in Article 41 of the UN-charter and reserves the right to the Security Council.

Concerning the violation of this principle by the application of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations, H.E. Ambassador to the United Nations Enrique Berruga Filloy underlined in 2005 that the Mexico strongly rejects “the application of unilateral laws and measures of economic blockade against any State, as well as the implementation of coercive measures without the authorization enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” That is the reason, why the United Mexican States supported – for the 14th consecutive time – Resolution (A/RES/60/12) of 2006 regarding the *Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba*.

In the 1990s, comprehensive economic sanctions found several applications with very mixed results, which made a critical reassessment indispensable. The United Mexican States fully supported and actively participated in the “Stockholm Process” that focused on increasing the effectiveness in the implementation of targeted sanctions. As sanctions and especially economic sanctions, pose a tool for action “between words and war” they must be regarded as a mean of last resort before war and fulfill highest requirements for their legitimate use. The United Mexican States and their partners of the “Group of Friends of the U.N. Reform” have already addressed and formulated recommendations for that take former criticism into account. Regarding the design of economic sanctions it is indispensable for the success to have the constant support by all member states and public opinion, which is to a large degree dependent the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. Sanctions must be tailor-made, designed to effectively target the government, while sparing to the largest degree possible the civil population. Sanction regimes must be constantly monitored and evaluated to enable the world-community to adjust their actions to the needs of the unforeseeably changing situation. Additionally, the United Mexican States propose to increase communication between the existing sanction committees and thus their effectiveness by convening regular meetings of the chairs of the sanction committees on questions of common interest. An example is the case of negative spill-over effects of economic sanctions on neighboring countries, in which affected countries additionally need to be enabled to voice their problems more effectively, as addressed in the resolution *Implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations related to assistance to third States affected by the application of sanctions* (A/RES/54/107). Non-state actors have in the last years tremendously grown in their political importance, especially with regard to the international fight against terrorism. Their position and the possibilities of the application of economic sanction on non-state actors is another topic that urgently needs to be considered.

II. Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions

As a founding member of the United Nations, Mexico is highly engaged in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights all over the world, as laid down in the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)* in 1948. Especially since the democratic transition of Mexico in 2000 it is one of the most urgent topics to stand for Democratization and Human Rights, and Mexico implements this vision on many different fronts.

In the Convoking Group of the intergovernmental Community of Democracies (GC), the United Mexican States uphold an approach that fosters international cooperation to promote democratic values and institution-building at the national and international level. To emphasize the strong interrelation between human rights and the building of democracy and to fortify democratic developments are further challenges Mexico deals with in this committee. A key-factor for the sustainable development of a post-conflict-region is to hold free and fair election and thus creating a democratic system. Being aware of the need of post-conflict countries for support in the preparation of democratic elections, the United Mexican States contribute since 2001 to the work of the International Institute for Democracy

and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an intergovernmental organization operating at international, regional and national level in partnership with a range of institutions. Mexico's foreign policy regarding human rights is substantially based on cooperation with international organizations. The Inter American Commission of Human Rights is one of the bodies, Mexico is participating, working on the promotion of Human Rights in the Americas. Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the regional judicial institution for the application and interpretation of the *American Convention of Human Rights*.

The objectives Mexico pursues are to improve human rights in the country through structural changes and to fortify the legal and institutional frame for the protection of human rights on the international level. Underlining the connection between democracy, development and Human Rights, stresses the importance of cooperation with and the role of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the reform of the Human Rights Commission to a Human rights Council.

Having in mind the diversity of challenges in enforcing democracy and Human Rights, Mexico considers regional and national approaches vital for their endorsement, as Mexico exemplifies with its *National Program for Human Rights* or the *Plan Puebla Panama*. On the global level, Mexico is encouraged in working on a greater coordination and interoperability among the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as the development of common strategies and operational policies and the sharing of best practices in civilian crisis management should be encouraged, including clear frameworks for joint operations, when applicable.

III. The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa

The United Mexican States welcome the leadership role the African Union has taken regarding the security problems of the continent. Our delegation is furthermore convinced that The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) can become the foundation for Africa's economic, social and democratic development as the basis for sustainable peace. Therefore it deserves the full support of the international community.

The development of the United Mexican States in the last two decades is characterized by the transition to a full democracy, the national and regional promotion of human rights and sustainable, economic growth. Mexico's development is characterized by free trade and its regional integration in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Having in mind that sustainable development is based not only on economic, but as well on social and environmental development, President Vicente Fox has made sustainable development a guiding principle in the Mexican Development Plan that includes sustainability targets for all major policy areas.

The United Nations Security Council has established not less than seven peace-keeping missions on the African continent, underlining the need for full support by the international community. In post-conflict situations, we regard national reconciliation as a precondition for a peaceful development, which is the reason why Mexico supported such committees, i.e. in the case of Sierra Leone. The United Mexican States are convinced that an other to enhance durable peace in Africa is the institutional reform of the United Nations. We therefore want to reaffirm our full support to both the establishment of the peace-building commission and the Human Rights Council. Both topics are highly interrelated and, having in mind that the breach of peace is most often linked with severest human rights' abuses, thus need to be seen as two sides of one problem and be approached in this understanding.

As most conflicts have their roots in conflicts about economic resources and development chances, human development and the eradication of poverty must be at the heart of a successful, preventive approach. Lifting people out of poverty must be seen as a precondition not only for peace, but for social development and environmental sustainability.

The United Mexican States want to express their esteem for the decision taken by the G-8 countries for a complete debt-relief for many African Highly-Indebted-Poor-Countries. Nevertheless, many commitments made by the international community that are crucial for Africa's sustainable development are unfulfilled. The developed countries agreed in the *Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development* (A/CONF.198/11) to increase their Official Development Aid (ODA) "towards the target of 0,7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries and 0,15 to 0,20 per cent of GNP of developed countries to least developed countries". Furthermore, the United Mexican States are disappointed by the result of the Hong Kong Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, which once more failed to meet the needs of those, to whom the round was devoted: developing countries and especially African countries, who today, more than ever, are cut off from global trade and prosperity by protectionism.

With regard to the African Peer Review Mechanism, the United Mexican States want to underline that good governance is an integral part of sustainable development. Therefore, we support all efforts by African countries to make the mechanism obligatory to increase transparency and accountability in all African countries.

Committee History

*The African Union is the world's only regional or international organization that explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a Member State on humanitarian and human rights grounds.*¹

History of the African Union

Although there were few regional Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) when the United Nations (UN) was established in 1945, Chapter VIII Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations notes the importance of IGOs in settling local disputes before reaching out to the Security Council.² Today IGOs such as the African Union (AU) work alongside UN development agencies by combining programs to focus within the regional context to overcome economic, security, and social problems.³ Before the African Union (AU) was founded, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was created to “rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African states; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.”⁴ In order to help African states transition into the global economy post-colonialism, the OAU recognized the need for self-sufficiency while promoting economic, social, and cultural development.⁵ The Abuja Treaty (1991), which established the African Economic Community (AEC), was ratified by African states in Abuja, Nigeria to foster social, cultural, and economic development in conjunction with the OAU.^{6 7} The AU was later established through the Constitutive Act (2000) with the purpose of creating “an integrated, prosperous, equitable, and well governed and peaceful United States of Africa, effectively managed by its own citizens and representing a creative and dynamic force in the international arena.”⁸ The AU was organized to establish greater solidarity, protect sovereignty, and help African states and its people overcome its economic obstacles of development, poverty, corruption, and integration into the global system.⁹

Structure of the African Union

The AU consists of 54 Member States with the addition of South Sudan on August 15, 2011.¹⁰ The organs of the AU include the Assembly, Executive Council, the Commission, Peace and Security Council, Pan African Parliament, Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), Court of Justice, Specialized Technical Committees, and the financial institutions. The Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) is comprised of all “the ambassador-level representatives of Member States” and has oversight on the running of the Commission.¹¹ The Executive Council consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and through the Constitutive Act has the power to “coordinate and make decisions” in matters such as foreign trade, food security, water resources and irrigation, humanitarian action, and disaster response relief.¹² The Assembly consists of the heads of state and government of all Member States and is the most influential organ as it determines the common policy of the Union and approves decisions and the budget.¹³ The AU holds semi-annual summits consisting of three two-day meetings in which the PRC meets, followed by the Executive Council and then the Assembly.¹⁴ The first summit, held in January, takes place at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, while the second summit, held in June or July, is held at a different Member State each year.¹⁵ Decisions made in both the Assembly and the Executive Council are reached by consensus; however if consensus is not reached, a two-thirds majority by Member States of the Union is needed.¹⁶

¹ Cohen, *The African Union*.

² United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VIII: Regional Agreements*, 2011.

³ Karns and Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and processes of Global Governance*, 2010, p. 142-143.

⁴ African Union, *AU in a Nutshell*, 2011.

⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs, *African Economic Community*, 2004.

⁶ Organization of African Unity, *Abuja Treaty*, 1991.

⁷ Organization of African Unity, *Sirte Declaration*, 1999.

⁸ African Union, *Vision and Mission of the African Union*, 2004.

⁹ African Union, *AU in a Nutshell*, 2011.

¹⁰ Ashine, *South Sudan: Nation Installed as AU Member*, 2011.

¹¹ OXFAM, *Strengthening Popular Participation in the African Union: A Guide to AU Structure and Processes*, 2009, p. 12.

¹² OXFAM, *Strengthening Popular Participation in the African Union: A Guide to AU Structure and Processes*, 2009, p. 10.

¹³ OXFAM, *Strengthening Popular Participation in the African Union: A Guide to AU Structure and Processes*, 2009, p. 6.

¹⁴ OXFAM, *Strengthening Popular Participation in the African Union: A Guide to AU Structure and Processes*, 2009, p. 49.

¹⁵ OXFAM, *Strengthening Popular Participation in the African Union: A Guide to AU Structure and Processes*, 2009, p. 49.

¹⁶ African Union, *Constitutive Act*, 2000, p. 4.

Initiatives and Key Documents

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was adopted by the leaders of the OAU in July 2001 as a strategic framework to help achieve sustainable growth and development while diminishing the marginalization of the African continent in the global economy.¹⁷ NEPAD's programs are designed to give African countries a more involved role in their economic policies and address its six main themes. Although NEPAD is a technical body of the AU, the UN supports it, and the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) publishes a yearly report on the progress and international support it receives.¹⁸ In 2010, organizations such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supported NEPAD's infrastructure development through its four sub-clusters of water, energy, information and communications technology (ICT), and transport.¹⁹ In addition to the OSAA, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an important component of NEPAD that allows participating members of the AU to have a self-monitoring mechanism while promoting transparency and good governance practices.²⁰ Focusing on good governance practices, the objectives of the APRM is to "foster the adoption of policies, standards, and practices that lead to high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through experience sharing and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessment of requirements for capacity building."²¹ The APRM consists of preparatory team meetings, a Review Mission that lasts two to three weeks in which meetings are conducted with stakeholders from all sectors of the country's economy and the writing of the Country Review Report.²² In addition to holding African countries responsible for good governance practices, the APRM can help ensure that participants also adhere to human rights accords supported by the AU.

With atrocities such as the genocide in Rwanda and the situation in Darfur, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on donor countries to "pay particular attention to the need for a 10-year plan for capacity building with the African Union" while asking regional organizations to implement and merge the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) with their already existing peacekeeping policies in his 2005 report.²³ The Heads of Government are to adhere to the three-pillar strategy of R2P, which includes: "the protection responsibilities of the state, international assistance and capacity-building, and a timely and decisive response."²⁴ Through Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, the AU has the right to intervene with or without the consent of the AU Member State in question, which creates the possibility for a faster response than allowed under R2P.²⁵ Although Article 4(h) has this advantage over R2P, the AU still faces limitations that create obstacles in its ability to implement R2P.²⁶ However there is speculation that R2P could work more effectively in conjunction with NEPAD and the APRM.²⁷ For African states that are not voluntary members of NEPAD and APRM, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) works closely with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights under Article 19 of the PSC protocol.²⁸ Another UN document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946), is referred to as the "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," and created the framework for the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.²⁹ African states also have protection through the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981), which grants rights and duties such as equal protection and security for all individuals under the law.³⁰

Conclusion

Today the growth of regional IGOs has the UN working with organizations like the AU to tailor regional approaches to solving major economic and social dilemmas that recognize the interdependence of the international system while bearing in mind the unique environments of each region. While the AU defied the odds to unify African states in a post-colonial world, there are still many challenges faced by the AU due to its financial constraints, history of

¹⁷ Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)*, 2010.

¹⁸ Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)*, 2010.

¹⁹ United Nations Economic and Social Council, *United Nations system support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development*, 2010, pp. 3-4.

²⁰ Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)*, 2010.

²¹ African Peer Review Mechanism, *FAQ*, 2011.

²² African Peer Review Mechanism, *FAQ*, 2011.

²³ Annan, *In large freedom: towards development, security, and human rights for all*, 2005, p. 52.

²⁴ Annan, *Implementing the responsibility to protect*, 2009, p. 2.

²⁵ Kuwali, *The African Union and the Challenges of Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 1.

²⁶ Kuwali, *The African Union and the Challenges of Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 2.

²⁷ Kuwali, *The African Union and the Challenges of Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 2.

²⁸ Kuwali, *The African Union and the Challenges of Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, p. 2.

²⁹ United Nations, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1946, p. 1.

³⁰ Organization of African Unity, *African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, 1981, p. 3.

corruption and civil unrest, and its mixed results on interventions. The AU is structured to handle a wide variety of issues but there limitations remain including 30 African countries qualifying for debt relief under the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.³¹ Africa still lacks the resources and finances to help its Member States in times of major crisis, even with humanitarian aid received from donor countries. The APRM and NEPAD bring hope to diminishing corruption in African states but progress is limited due to the voluntary nature of the APRM. Despite criticisms of the AU and its effectiveness as an organization, the African states still meet biannually to work towards that vision of a united, self-sufficient Africa.

Annotated Bibliography

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African Union. (2011). *AU in a Nutshell*. Retrieved August 26, 2011, from <http://au.int/en/about/nutshell>

The African Union Web site is helpful for explaining the basic functions of this IGO. The AU in a nutshell provides a simplified breakdown for a quick overview of the AU. The documents tab has a comprehensive overview of the charters, treaties, and documents spanning from both the OAU and the AU. In addition to finding more detailed information about organs in the AU, one can also find some information on the Member States.

Office of the Special Advisor on Africa. (2010). *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)*. Office of the Special Advisor on Africa: United Nations. Retrieved September 15, 2011, from <http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/nepad.html>

The OSAA's Web site offers a comprehensive overview of NEPAD and the mechanisms that help support it. The purpose of the OSAA is to monitor international support for NEPAD as well as support from United Nations development agencies. In addition to general information of NEPAD, there are presentations available that break down the functions of NEPAD in further detail. One can also access the OSAA's reports on promoting partnerships in the APRM.

Organization for African Unity. (1981). *African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*. Retrieved September 19, 2011, from http://www.africa-union.org/official_documents/treaties_%20conventions_%20protocols/banjul%20charter.pdf

This document is a central part of protection of human rights in the African Union. Throughout the document you can see similarities between this charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The document begins with the preamble and transitions into the rights and duties that are protected under the African Charter; it is essential for understanding the protections provided by the AU on human rights issues.

Oxfam and AfriMAP. (2009). *Strengthening Popular Participation in the African Union: A Guide to AU Structure and Processes*. Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. Retrieved August 28, 2011, from <http://www.afriMAP.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP-AU-Guide-EN.pdf>

This guide offers a very comprehensive overview of the AU. It is broken up into three parts and also gives some insight into the role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play within the African Union. The guide provides a breakdown of the organs, tables to outline the decision-making process, and different powers of the organs. At the end of the guide, there is also an appendix section that shows the main regions recognized by the AU and has a list of Web sites for further research.

United Nations Economic and Social Council. (2010, March 29). *United Nations system support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)*. ECOSOC. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/CPC_report_2010.pdf

This report gives great insight into the ways in which the international community is helping NEPAD under its main themes. The report also shows the ways in which United Nations

³¹ International Monetary Fund, *Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative*, 2011.

development agencies contribute their resources to making NEPAD more successful. The report focuses on the activities that occur in the time frame of May 2009 – April 2010.

I. Responding to Famine in Somalia

Above all, we need peace. As long as there is conflict in Somalia, we cannot effectively fight famine. More and more children will go hungry; more and more people will needlessly die. And this cycle of insecurity is growing dangerously wide.³²

Introduction

The drought in the Horn of Africa, declared in August 2010, is the worst that the region has seen in 60 years.³³ This drought has caused disruptions in food productions, the lives of millions of people, and in Somalia's civil war.³⁴ Moreover, the agricultural and livestock industry, which is directly reliant on consistent weather patterns, makes up 80% of income and food sources for the Horn of Africa.³⁵ The warning signs of famine – escalating temperatures, poor harvests, minimal rainfall, dying livestock, and conflict – were present. As early as August 2010, the international community, specifically the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), issued a drought warning and explained the impending effects.³⁶ On July 20, 2011, the United Nations (UN) declared a famine in the southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions of Somalia.³⁷ On August 3, 2011, famine was also declared in the Mogadishu, Afgoye, and Middle Shabelle regions, and by September 13, 2011 a sixth region, Bay, was added to the list.³⁸ This, however, is not the first famine the country has faced and not the first within the lifespan of its civil war.³⁹ In 1992, Somalia experienced a similar famine.⁴⁰ Having plunged into a chaotic civil war, and with no government to address the issue, an extreme famine was inevitable.⁴¹ Yet, this time, the international community was watching and was warned of the combined effects of a particularly bad drought, rising food prices, and a civil war.⁴² By definition, a famine is declared when “acute malnutrition rates among children exceed 30%, more than 2 people per every 10,000 die per day, and people are not able to access food and other basic necessities.”⁴³ In comparison, the 1992 famine, though in part a result of a drought was largely due to the initiation of the civil war.⁴⁴ Foreign food sources from places like Italy and Ethiopia had been disrupted by the conflict, and the drought harmed internal food sources.⁴⁵ So, famine ensued. A large burst of aid from the international community lifted Somalia out of the famine within six months, but the war continued.⁴⁶

Somalia's Civil War

To date, Somalia's Civil War has lasted for two decades and for the last four years Somalia has topped Foreign Policy's list of Failed States.⁴⁷ It began with the ousting of former Prime Minister Siad Barre from power in January 1991.⁴⁸ After Mr. Barre's removal from power, warlords competed over territory and control of the state.⁴⁹ The nature of the conflict shifted from competing warlords to a battle between Islamist militants and the Transitional

³² Ban, *Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

³³ BBC News, *Somali Famine: First UNHCR Airlift Arrives in Mogadishu*, 2011.

³⁴ Ighobor, *Famine in Somalia and the Horn of Africa: Tackling the Evils of Famine*, 2011.

³⁵ Food and Agricultural Organization, *Roadmap for Recovery in the Horn of Africa*, 2011.

³⁶ Ban, *Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

³⁷ United Nations News Center, *UN Declares Famine in Two Regions of Southern Somalia*, 2011.

³⁸ United Nations News Center, *UN Declares Famine in Another Three Areas of Somalia*, 2011.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011, p. 1.

³⁹ BBC News, *Q&A: East Africa Hunger Crisis*, 2011.

⁴⁰ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

⁴¹ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992, p. 1.

⁴² Ighobor, *Famine in Somalia and the Horn of Africa: Tackling the Evils of Famine*, 2011.

⁴³ United Nations News Center, *UN Declares Famine in Two Regions of Southern Somalia*, 2011.

⁴⁴ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

⁴⁵ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

⁴⁶ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

⁴⁷ Foreign Policy, *The 2011 Failed State Index*, 2011.

⁴⁸ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

⁴⁹ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

Federal Government (TFG), which was established and backed by the international community.⁵⁰ Originally the Islamists were a group called the Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC).⁵¹ The UIC later became known as Al-Shabab and officially confirmed its links to the terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda.⁵²

Over the past two decades there have been a number of failed interventions in Somalia in an attempt to end the conflict.⁵³ Between 1992 and 1993, a UN-US led operation failed with the retreat of both UN peacekeepers and US military from the state.⁵⁴ From 2006 to 2009 Ethiopian Troops occupied the state but encountered resistance by the Islamist militia that saw the Ethiopian troops as invaders due to the historical tensions between the two states.⁵⁵ In an attempt to bring about peace, Ethiopia answered the calls of the Islamist militia and international community by replacing their troops with African Union Peacekeepers.⁵⁶ The AU Peacekeepers operate as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has been in Somalia since 2007.⁵⁷ AMISOM's presence in Somalia is also acting as a conduit for developments in the AU Peace and Security Architecture, which mandated the creation of a new African Standby Force (ASF).⁵⁸ On August 19, 2011, the AU and the Eastern African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism signed a memorandum of understanding to send an ASF brigade to AMISOM.⁵⁹ This will be the first deployment of any ASF Brigade and a key test for the new and future plans of African Security.⁶⁰ In spite of the initiation of the ASF in Somalia, the famine has bolstered calls by African leadership for the UN to replace the AU in administration of AMISOM.⁶¹

Current Situation

The famine, begun in July 2011, in Somalia was caused by a severe drought combined with escalating food prices, an aid ban applied to the Al-Shabab controlled regions, and the inability of the TFG to protect the areas it does control.⁶² The worst of the drought has affected central and south Somalia.⁶³ Six children out of every 10,000 under the age of five are dying as a result of the famine and malnutrition.⁶⁴ Furthermore, 12.4 million people in the Horn of Africa need humanitarian assistance, and 25% of Somalia's 7.5 million people are considered displaced.⁶⁵ This puts Somalia well within the UN's criteria for declaring a famine. In September 2011, famine was declared in the Bay region.⁶⁶ This is of particular concern to the country as it produces 80% of Somalia's sorghum harvest making it one of the largest domestic suppliers of food in Somalia.⁶⁷

Food prices have been escalating for years, and although there has been a lot of discussion throughout the international community on curbing prices, they have continued to increase.⁶⁸ The rise of food prices has contributed greatly to the current situation. In the past year, according to the World Bank, "the two major commodities that are domestically produced, red sorghum and white maize, have increased by 30 to 240% and 50 to 154%, respectively, across Somali regions."⁶⁹ The FAO sponsored two emergency conferences in Rome on July 25, 2011 and August 18,

⁵⁰ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

⁵¹ BBC News, *Timeline: Somalia*, 2011.

⁵² BBC News, *Timeline: Somalia*, 2011.

⁵³ BBC News, *Timeline: Somalia*, 2011.

⁵⁴ Waal, and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

⁵⁵ BBC News, *Timeline: Somalia*, 2011.

⁵⁶ BBC News, *Timeline: Somalia*, 2011.

⁵⁷ BBC News, *Timeline: Somalia*, 2011.

⁵⁸ Dier, *The African Standby Force Put to the Test*. 2010, p.

⁵⁹ African Union, *The AU Commission and the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism Sign a Memorandum of Understanding to Deploy Personnel to AMISOM*, [Press Release], 2011.

⁶⁰ African Union, *The AU Commission and the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism Sign a Memorandum of Understanding to Deploy Personnel to AMISOM*, [Press Release], 2011.

⁶¹ African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia*, 2011.

⁶² Ban, *Famine in Somalia*. 2011.

⁶³ Ban, *Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

⁶⁴ United Nations News Center, *UN Declares Famine in Two Regions of Southern Somalia*, 2011.

⁶⁵ Ighobor, *Famine in Somalia and the Horn of Africa: Tackling the Evils of Famine*, 2011.

⁶⁶ United Nations News Center. *Horn of Africa Food Crisis Remains Dire as Famine Spreads in Somalia*, 2011.

⁶⁷ United Nations News Center. *Horn of Africa Food Crisis Remains Dire as Famine Spreads in Somalia*, 2011.

⁶⁸ World Bank and the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network, *Food Price Watch*, 2011.

⁶⁹ World Bank and the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network, *Food Price Watch*, 2011.

2011, to discuss the situation.⁷⁰ Participants included representatives from the UN, the AU, and leading governments.⁷¹ The FAO has produced a ‘roadmap to recovery’ and accordingly has stated there is currently a \$29.6 million funding gap to address the current needs in Somalia.⁷²

Regarding the security question in Somalia, AMISOM stated that 20,000 troops are required for the AU peacekeeping mission to be at full force, however there are currently only 9,000 troops present.⁷³ All 9,000 troops of those troops have been provided by Uganda and Burundi.⁷⁴ Yet for the first time in recent years, the TFG and AU Peacekeepers gained a tactical advantage.⁷⁵ On August 6, 2011 Al-Shabab pulled out of the capital Mogadishu, where it had held the majority of control in recent years, to the surprise of the international community.⁷⁶ Upon the withdrawal of Al-Shabab fighters from the capital, the TFG declared victory.⁷⁷ While the TFG works to secure and stabilize the capital, Al-Shabab has vowed to continue fighting.⁷⁸ On August 18, 2011, AMISOM reported that it found a bomb factory in the capital city Mogadishu and warned civilians to remain cautious in the immediate future after Al-Shabab’s withdrawal.⁷⁹

Violence and threats persist not solely between TFG forces and Al-Shabab fighters, but also within refugee camps. Pro-government soldiers have been accused of stealing the food aid being provided to camps.⁸⁰ The current system has aid delivered to those in charge of the camps and then dispersed to its inhabitants.⁸¹ However, this creates an opportunity for corruption, where aid is minimally delivered or withheld altogether.⁸² Such a situation can produce disastrous results for populations already suffering from starvation and effects of malnutrition. Furthermore, refugees are forced to remain in these camps because if they leave in search of alternate food sources, the aid flow would cease.⁸³

Threats

Somalia is at risk of a number of threats as a result of the famine. The most obviously is death. Growing numbers of people are dying of starvation and malnutrition with women and children being the most affected.⁸⁴ Of the malnourished children in Somalia, 75% are in the south.⁸⁵ Death results not just from a lack of food but also from disease, which is a grave concern during a famine.⁸⁶ This is because malnutrition increases risk of disease.⁸⁷ The lack of nutrients such as vitamins A, C, and E can lower the ability of the immune system to fight and a syndrome called Nutritionally Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome can develop.⁸⁸ Moreover, Somalia faces an increased risk of cholera, acute watery diarrhea (AWD), malaria, measles, and pneumonia outbreaks and as more people migrate into displaced and refugee camps, the spread of disease grows swifter.⁸⁹ The swift spread is a result of weak populations,

⁷⁰ Food and Agriculture Organization, *FAO & Emergencies: Horn of Africa: Funding for Agricultural Recovery Lagging*, FAO Warns, 2011.

⁷¹ African Union, *AU Pledging Conference on the Horn of Africa: More than US\$350 Million Dollars Pledged*, 2011.

⁷² Food and Agriculture Organization, *FAO & Emergencies: Crisis in the Horn of Africa*, 2011.

⁷³ BBC News, *South Sudan Offers Somalia African Union Troops*, 2011.

⁷⁴ BBC News, *South Sudan Offers Somalia African Union Troops*, 2011.

⁷⁵ BBC News, *Somalia's Al-Shabab Rebels Leave Mogadishu*, 2011.

⁷⁶ BBC News, *Somalia's Al-Shabab Rebels Leave Mogadishu*, 2011.

⁷⁷ BBC News, *Somalia's Al-Shabab Rebels Leave Mogadishu*, 2011.

⁷⁸ BBC News, *Somalia's Al-Shabab Rebels Leave Mogadishu*, 2011.

⁷⁹ African Union Mission in Somalia, *AMISOM Finds Bomb-making Factory in Mogadishu*, [Press Release], 2011.

⁸⁰ Warsameh, *Somalia: Armed Militia Grab the Famine Business*, IPS Inter Press Service, 2011.

⁸¹ Warsameh, *Somalia: Armed Militia Grab the Famine Business*, IPS Inter Press Service, 2011.

⁸² Warsameh, *Somalia: Armed Militia Grab the Famine Business*, IPS Inter Press Service, 2011.

⁸³ Warsameh, *Somalia: Armed Militia Grab the Famine Business*, IPS Inter Press Service, 2011.

⁸⁴ Bachelet, *Statement by Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women Michelle Bachelet on the Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

⁸⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011, p. 2.

⁸⁶ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011.

⁸⁷ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011.

⁸⁸ Torres, *Fighting Horn of Africa Famine Puts New Tactics to the Test*, 2011.

⁸⁹ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011.

lack of basic necessities and fleeing insecure conflict zones.⁹⁰ The World Health Organization has recommended placing a priority on the prevention of measles and diarrheal diseases.⁹¹ However, these are not the only severe disease threatening the vulnerable populations. This risk of pneumonia is double in refugee camps.⁹² There is also a risk of such diseases spreading across borders as populations travel from camp to camp.⁹³ This can become a serious risk when refugee camps in the region are swelling, as is the case at Dadaab, the world's largest camp with a population of approximately 500,000.⁹⁴ This process becomes a cycle where malnutrition risks disease, and disease increases the risk for malnutrition.⁹⁵

Across the Horn of Africa there are millions of food insecure populations.⁹⁶ Food insecure populations are in Ethiopia 4.56 million, in Kenya 2.4 million, and in Somalia 2.85 million.⁹⁷ As well, one of the greatest concerns throughout the region is the swell in the number of refugees in camps especially in neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Moreover, these states are dealing with their own food crises.⁹⁸ One camp, opened on July 12, 2011 in Somalia, had reached 21,000 people in less than two weeks.⁹⁹ Furthermore, as populations continue to migrate and residence camps increase through the Horn of Africa, sexual violence also becomes a growing concern.¹⁰⁰ In August 2011, Under-Secretary General and Executive Director of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, stated that women face increased threats especially of sexual violence while they are "attempting to save their children from starvation, malnutrition, and disease."¹⁰¹ In a conflict zone like Somalia, this vulnerability is further exacerbated.¹⁰²

Another threat, while more long-term, is of education stagnation.¹⁰³ During any conflict the number of children in schools drop and successfully providing quality education becomes difficult.¹⁰⁴ When children are malnourished and mass migrations of people occur, as is the case in Somalia, it becomes even harder.¹⁰⁵ There have been warnings by the UN of education stagnation throughout Somalia.¹⁰⁶ While, attendance in school is already low because of the civil war, the fear is that that number will decrease and that the current infrastructure will not be able to accommodate the fluctuations of children.¹⁰⁷ There are three reasons that stagnation in this situation is a concern. First, teachers and children are leaving to search for food and water and so abandoning education.¹⁰⁸ Second, as people come to urban areas such as Mogadishu, the number of children enrolled in those schools will swell and stretch the limits of already overburdened schools.¹⁰⁹ Third, in the case of Somalia, because the system's will not be

⁹⁰ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011.

⁹¹ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011.

⁹² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011.

⁹³ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011, p. 6.

⁹⁴ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011.

Williams, *Famine in Africa: Inside Dadaab, the World's Largest Refugee Camp*, 2011.

⁹⁵ World Health Organization, *Public health Risk assessment and Interventions - the Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3), 2011.

⁹⁶ Food and Agricultural Organization, *Roadmap for Recovery in the Horn of Africa*, 2011.

⁹⁷ BBC News, *Q&A: East Africa Hunger Crisis*, 2011.

⁹⁸ Food and Agricultural Organization, *Roadmap for Recovery in the Horn of Africa*, 2011.

⁹⁹ Ross, *Somalia's Hungry Head for a War Zone*, 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Bachelet, *Statement by Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women Michelle Bachelet on the Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

¹⁰¹ Bachelet, *Statement by Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women Michelle Bachelet on the Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

¹⁰² Bachelet, *Statement by Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women Michelle Bachelet on the Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

¹⁰³ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus*, UN Warns, 2011.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus*, UN Warns, 2011.

¹⁰⁵ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus*, UN Warns, 2011.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus*, UN Warns, 2011.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus*, UN Warns, 2011.

¹⁰⁸ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus*, UN Warns, 2011.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus*, UN Warns, 2011.

able to cope and there is growing tensions from the famine, an increase of children may leave school in search of other opportunities such as participating in the civil war therefore fueling the conflict.¹¹⁰

Responses to Famine

Historically, the response to famine, particularly in the Horn of Africa, is through aid.¹¹¹ On August 8, 2011, the UN airlifted aid to the country for the first time in five years, in spite of the aid ban placed on the country in 2010 by the Islamists.¹¹² However, this approach is not sustainable.¹¹³ There are greater, underlying issues present. These issues include climate change, escalating food prices, food insecurity, and armed conflict.¹¹⁴ Supporting the small landholding farmers has long been argued as a crucial aspect of famine prevention and in climate change adaptation strategy, especially in the areas that rely so heavily on season rainfall.¹¹⁵ Debate over early warning systems has persisted and in response the United States Agency for International Development established the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET).¹¹⁶ FEWSNET works closely with many experts, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations to provide crucial information regarding early warning signs of famine.¹¹⁷

As of September 9, 2011, various types of aid interventions had reached 690,000 people in Somalia, yet 750,000 people are still at risk of death.¹¹⁸ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has identified food assistance, health, clean water, shelter, education, and security as key areas needed in famine relief.¹¹⁹ Food assistance interventions range from general food distribution (GFD) and blanket supplementary feeding to enhanced supplementary feeding and targeted household rations.¹²⁰ As part of food assistance and in tackling malnutrition, the nutrition of the food assistance is crucial. Key medical support is also necessary as the number of medical patients spike.¹²¹ Outpatient therapeutic programs, that allow hospitals to treat more people and do so more efficiently, and stabilizations centers have been set-up in Mogadishu and throughout the other famine stricken regions.¹²² However, the conflict in Somalia has proven to be a large barrier obstructing intervention plans. According to OCHA, armed militias closed feeding centers in the Lower Shabelle and Gedo regions in September 2011.¹²³

African Union's Official Response

To date the African Union's (AU) official response has been two prong, provide the aid that is desperately needed in order to treat the immediate food shortage and address the underlying causes of the drought and famine, which includes increasing support for AMISOM to gain the advantage in Somalia's civil war.¹²⁴ On August 25, 2011, AU Member States met in a special pledge meeting to discuss the humanitarian crisis facing Somalia.¹²⁵ Ultimately \$350 million in aid was pledged to Somalia to fight the famine, \$300 million of which came from the African Development Bank.¹²⁶ Also, on August 9, 2011, the AU called for an immediate increase of 3,000 troops to bolster

¹¹⁰ United Nations News Center, *Somalia's Education Sector Further Threatened by Famine Exodus, UN Warns*, 2011.

¹¹¹ Waal and Leaning, *Somalia No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost of the Conflict and The Struggle for Relief*, 1992.

¹¹² BBC News, *Somali Famine: First UNHCR Airlift Arrives in Mogadishu*, 2011.

¹¹³ Thompson, *Food Aid and the Famine Relief Argument (Brief Return)*, 2010.

¹¹⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization, *FAO & Emergencies: Meeting on Horn of Africa Calls for Tackling Root Causes of Famine*, 2011.

¹¹⁵ Haile, *Weather Patterns and Food Security*, 2005, p. 2171.

¹¹⁶ Mayer, *Management of Famine Relief*, 1975, 188(4188).

United States Agency for International Development, *Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Web site*.

¹¹⁷ United States Agency for International Development, *Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Web site*.

¹¹⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011, p. 2. BBC News, *Somalia Famine: UN Warns of 750,000 Deaths*, 2011.

¹¹⁹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011.

¹²⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011, p. 2.

¹²¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011.

¹²² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011, p. 2.

¹²³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*, 2011, p. 2.

¹²⁴ African Union, *AU Pledging Conference on the Horn of Africa: More than US\$350 Million Dollars Pledged*, [Press Release], 2011.

¹²⁵ African Union, *AU Pledging Conference on the Horn of Africa: More than US\$350 Million Dollars Pledged*, [Press Release], 2011.

¹²⁶ African Union, *AU Pledging Conference on the Horn of Africa: More than US\$350 Million Dollars Pledged*, [Press Release], 2011.

African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia*, 2011.

the peacekeeping forces.¹²⁷ In response, Sierra Leone and Djibouti have pledged to send troops in to support AMISOM and AU Peacekeepers and will send them in late 2011.¹²⁸ South Sudan also pledged to send troops, but there has been internal controversy as to their ability to do so.¹²⁹ Of the remaining AU Member States, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Rwanda have all promised troops but have failed to send them.¹³⁰ On September 13, 2011, the chairperson of the AU Commission, Son Excellence Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, presented a report to the AU Peace and Security Council on the situation in Somalia. In this report he highlighted, among other recommendations, the responsibility of the AU to aid the Somali people in cultivating recent developments in the country from aiding humanitarian interventions to supporting the TFG and the future of Somalia.¹³¹

Challenges Facing Relief Efforts

There are a number of challenges facing relief workers. The ban of international aid organizations by al-Shabab is one of the greatest. Providing immediate relief through food assistance, medical care, and shelter grows significantly more difficult when the individuals and organizations that are trained and capable of providing it cannot reach the populations in need.¹³² Al-Shabab has stated that they believe international aid organizations are pursuing the agenda of Western countries that there is no crisis in Somalia.¹³³ Furthermore, as a result of the extended conflict in Somalia, the physical infrastructure is inadequate.¹³⁴ Roads are damaged or non-existent and medical facilities have not been kept up to date.¹³⁵ Reaching rural populations without proper access roads is difficult, takes longer, and more risky for the aid workers.¹³⁶ As evidenced by the experience of aid workers in past conflicts such as Darfur, administering vital and life-saving aid during a conflict is a dangerous activity.¹³⁷ Not only are the lives of relief workers in danger but they also face attacks in order to steal the aid they are dispersing and are often forced to pay bribes in order to carry out their work.¹³⁸ The international aid agency, CARE, is just one organization that has made adjustments as a consequence of violence in Somalia. On September 21, 2011, a Kenyan aid driver for the organization was abducted near the Dadaab refugee camp.¹³⁹ Subsequently, they have said, "We have suspended our programs [in Dadaab] except for the life-saving programs."¹⁴⁰ The life-saving services as defined by CARE are the distribution of food and water.¹⁴¹ All supplemental programs such as counseling, and education, however have been discontinued.¹⁴²

Conclusion

As detailed, the Horn of Africa is in a state of emergency. It is the responsibility of international organizations to provide all necessary humanitarian relief in order to prevent another million Africans from dying of preventable causes. The conflict in Somalia has lasted for two decades and in that time has been subject to two famines.¹⁴³ The ten-year anniversary of the African Union's founding is approaching. With the influx of aid and renewed attention on Somalia, the famine could prove to be a devastating blow to Al-Shabab and an imperative milestone for the AU's future.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, a successful deployment of an ASF brigade could shift circumstances regarding African security.¹⁴⁵ It is clear that Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa is in desperate need of immediate attention from the African and international community. But what can be done to provide support to famine relief efforts under the barriers and restrictions facing Somalia? What role should the African Union have in handling both the short term and long term issues facing Somalia during and after the famine? How can the African community respond to the

¹²⁷ BBC News, *Somalia 'Needs More AU Troops' After Al-Shabab Pullout*, 2011.

¹²⁸ Nuune, *AMISOM Set To Get More Troops in October*, 2011.

¹²⁹ *South Sudan Divided Over Sending Troops to AMISOM*, 2011.

¹³⁰ *South Sudan Divided Over Sending Troops to AMISOM*, 2011.

¹³¹ African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia*, 2011.

¹³² Mayer, *Management of Famine Relief*, 1975.

¹³³ BBC News, *Q&A: East Africa Hunger Crisis*, 2011.

¹³⁴ Ban, *Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

¹³⁵ Ban, *Famine in Somalia*, 2011.

¹³⁶ Mayer, *Management of Famine Relief*, 1975.

¹³⁷ BBC News, *Three Darfur Aid Workers are Kidnapped*, 2010.

¹³⁸ Gettleman, *Allegations of Food Aid Theft Resurface in Somalia*, New York Times, 2011.

¹³⁹ BBC News, *Somali Famine: Care Aid Driver Abducted in Kenyan Camp*, 2011.

¹⁴⁰ BBC News, *Somali Famine: Care Aid Driver Abducted in Kenyan Camp*, 2011.

¹⁴¹ BBC News, *Somali Famine: Care Aid Driver Abducted in Kenyan Camp*, 2011.

¹⁴² BBC News, *Somali Famine: Care Aid Driver Abducted in Kenyan Camp*, 2011.

¹⁴³ BBC News, *Timeline: Somalia*, 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Chothia, *Could Somali Famine Deal a Fatal Blow to Al-Shabab?* 2011

¹⁴⁵ Dier, *The African Standby Force Put to the Test*. 2010, p. 84.

famine in Somalia while also supplying resources to transform the civil war in Somalia and create a stable and secure state?

Annotated Bibliography

I. Responding to Famine in Somalia

African Union. (2011). *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia*. Presented at Peace and Security Council 293rd Meeting. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from <http://www.au.int/en/content/report-chairperson-commission-situation-somalia>

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission wrote this report on the situation in Somalia. It was then presented to the Peace and Security Council that subsequently released the communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM(CCXCIII)). In this report, the Chairperson highlights key developments in both the famine but also the security situation regarding Somalia's civil war.

African Union Mission in Somalia. (2011). *AMISOM Web site*. Retrieved August 31, 2011, from <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/amisom.htm>

This is the Web site for the AU's Mission in Somalia. It hosts all key documents relating to the past and present of the AU's operations in Somalia. News and press releases are also released on this site with up to date information on the current situation.

Ban, K. (2011). Africa Renewal - Famine in Somalia. *United Nations*. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/newrels/famine-somalia.html>

This feature article by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of the United Nations lays out the crucial points pertaining to the famine in Somalia. In the article Mr. Ban clearly states the objectives of the UN to end the famine and how the international community can achieve this. Specific topics such as food prices, refugees, health, and lack of aid are all addressed.

BBC News. (2011). *Timeline: Somalia*. Retrieved August 10, 2011, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm

The British Broadcasting Company provides excellent summaries of conflicts as well as country profiles. This timeline dates a history of the Somalia. It contains all major events throughout past conflict and of the current civil war. This timeline is a good overview of the events so far regarding Somalia's 20-year war.

Chothia, F. (2011, August 9). *Could Somali Famine Deal a Fatal Blow to Al-Shabab?*. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from the BBC News Web site: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14373264>

The retreat of Al-Shabab's from Mogadishu has sparked discussion about the fate of the Al-Qaeda linked organization. In this news article from BBC, the linkages between the security situation and the famine in Somalia are detailed. Ultimately, this news report is a good introduction into the debate among the international community of how to move forward and transform the conflict while simultaneously responding to the famine.

Food and Agricultural Organization, (2011). *Roadmap for Recovery in the Horn of Africa*. Food and Agricultural Organization. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from http://typo3.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/tc/tce/pdf/HoA_crisis_roadmap.pdf

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization is a key actor in any food related crisis, providing up to date information, statistics, and news about a crisis. The Roadmap for Recovery developed by FAO, is the most recent set of recommendations presented by the organization about how to end the crisis in the Horn of Africa. Not only does it address the famine in Somalia but also the whole region is discussed. The approach is comprehensive; covering immediate needs as well as underlying causes of the current situation and is a key starting point for research on the current responses.

Mayer, J. (1975). Management of Famine Relief. *Science, New Series*, 188(4188), 571-573+576-577.

Jean Mayer discusses the causes and effects of famine in this article. Following that, the crucial components needed to establish success relief efforts and save lives. It serves a succinct and strong argument for efficient famine relief management. The author ultimately, concludes with policy prescriptions for an ideal international famine relief management system including recommendations for early warning mechanisms.

Williams, S. (2011, September 17). *Famine in Africa: Inside Dadaab, the World's Largest Refugee Camp*. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/sally-williams/8762161/Famine-in-Africa-inside-Dadaab-the-worlds-largest-refugee-camp.html>

Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya is the largest in the world and has been called Kenya's third largest city at 500,000 residents. As the famine in Somalia worsens mass migrations of populations fleeing the conflict and searching for food come to camps like Dadaab. At such a large size it is prone to all of the worst threats facing refugee camps. This news article provides a first hand case study of those threats and what life is like living in a refugee camp in the Horn of Africa.

World Health Organization, (2011). *Public Health Risk Assessment and Interventions - The Horn of Africa: Drought and Famine Crisis* (WHO/HSE/GAR/DCE/2011.3). World Health Organization. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from http://www.who.int/diseasecontrol_emergencies/publications/who_hse_gar_dce_2011_3/en/index.html

Another key organization during humanitarian crises is the World Health Organization. In this July report, WHO explains the health risks associated with drought and famine. Of particular interest is WHO's recommendations about intervening in the region. As migrations increase among populations in search of survival and nutrition is low, the risk of disease grows. This is an important document to understanding the current health risks in the Horn of Africa.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2011, September 14). *Somalia: Famine & Drought Situation Report no. 13*. New York, NY. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OCHA%20Somalia%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2013_2011.09.13.pdf

The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) produced this report detailing the current situation in Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa region. After a brief summary the report is segmented into categories of relief efforts. The categories include, health, disease, education, food assistance, and water sanitation. In addition to current efforts, areas of need are identified by OCHA.

II. Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

Introduction

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) aims to establish sustainable political, social and economic structures.¹⁴⁶ Former UN Secretary-General and the first African to serve in the post, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, defines this process in his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* as the comprehensive effort to identify and support structures that will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.¹⁴⁷ The New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) views the process as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programs.¹⁴⁸ The World Bank stresses transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of socioeconomic framework of the society.¹⁴⁹

All of these conceptualizations call for synergy between internal and external actors, including top military, political and (in some cases) religious leadership; developed professional, ethnic and international actors; and the general population.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Kotzé, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: New Discourse, Old Theories*, 2008, p. 109-111.

¹⁴⁷ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda on Peace*, 2011.

¹⁴⁸ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2011.

¹⁴⁹ World Bank, *The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview*, p. 1999.

¹⁵⁰ Lederarch, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, 2008, p. 5.

History

African states arising from conflicts of independence, internal turmoil and transnational warfare throughout the twentieth century-suffered from an absence of democratic culture, rule of law, social accountability or wealth distribution.¹⁵¹ The formation of Organization of African Unity in 1963 marked the beginning of collaboration, yet could not act without total consensus.¹⁵² Peacekeeping mission into Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1978-1979 and Chad in 1979-1982 failed to facilitate lasting peace or reconstruction and development.¹⁵³

Regional warfare expanded dramatically in the Great Lakes region of central Africa throughout the 1990s and 2000s, leading to the dissolution of the OAU and the devolution of human security.¹⁵⁴ The AU's formation in 2002 marked the beginning of a new era.¹⁵⁵ The Peace and Security Council was formed in the model of the United Nations Security Council, allowing for more decisive action.¹⁵⁶ The United Nations also formed the Peace-Building Commission in 2006 with predominate initial focus on Burundi and Sierra Leone.¹⁵⁷

Basic Documents

African Union (AU) Policy Framework for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

Guiding the African Union's PCRD efforts, the framework focuses on five core principles: African leadership; national and local ownership; inclusiveness, equality and non-discrimination; cooperation and cohesion; and capacity-building for sustainability.¹⁵⁸

African leadership recognizes that PCRD is a political rather than a technical process.¹⁵⁹ National and local ownership means that activities must be aligned with local needs and aspirations.¹⁶⁰ Social concerns of inclusiveness, equality and non-discrimination require fair and equitable distribution of power and wealth through inclusion of women and girls, the elderly, the disabled and youth (especially child soldiers).¹⁶¹ Cooperation and cohesion center on transparency, mutual accountability and shared objectives.¹⁶² Finally, capacity building for sustainability links all the principles through support and legitimization of national processes.¹⁶³

The six indicative elements of successful achievement of these principles are security; humanitarian and emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and recognition of women and gender.¹⁶⁴ The framework outlines specific benchmarks for each element.

Security is established once the state establishes an appropriately-size security force and professionalizes their duties; establishes civilian oversight; involves the security sector in infrastructural and institutional reconstruction; and implements all African Union and international peace and security instruments, including the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the Windhoek Position on Small Arms and Light Weapons.¹⁶⁵

Humanitarian and emergency assistance is fully implemented once human rights abuses cease; basic food, clean water, basic health, sanitation, education and shelter services are provided; family members separated during conflict are reunified; affected populations are properly identified and receive medical care, trauma and psycho-social counseling, assistance and legal redress; gainful employment is available; women's groups, civil society organizations and other representatives of affected groups are granted permanent roles in reconstruction processes;

¹⁵¹ Kabemba, *Elections and Conflict in Africa, The State of Africa: Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2008, p. 31.

¹⁵² Schwartz-Barcott, *Conclusion: A Call from Arms?*, *Armed Conflict in Africa*, p. 191-193.

¹⁵³ Bassey, Introduction, *Conflict Resolution, Identity Crisis and Development in Africa*, 2007, p. xxvii-ix.

¹⁵⁴ Mazrui, *Conflict in Africa: An Overview*, *Armed Conflict in Africa*, 2003, p. 37-39.

¹⁵⁵ Gyong, *The Structure of Communication in Peace and Conflict Resolution*, 2007, p. 61-63.

¹⁵⁶ Gyong, *The Structure of Communication in Peace and Conflict Resolution*, *Conflict Resolution*, 2007, p. 63.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations Department of Public Information, *Security Council holds day-long debate on post-conflict rebuilding*, 2007.

¹⁵⁸ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁵⁹ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶⁰ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶¹ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶² African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶³ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶⁴ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶⁵ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

HIV/AIDS prevention methods are publicized; and African humanitarian NGOs and other relevant African institutions receive necessary resources to work concurrently with the government.¹⁶⁶

Socioeconomic reconstruction and development requires satisfactory progress toward the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals and all other African Union and international instruments for development; a thriving economy with macro-economic stability and micro-economic growth, reduced unemployment and inflation; general access to housing, health, water, education and employment; fiscal and budgetary discipline of public resources; and sustainable management of natural resources.¹⁶⁷

Political governance and transition is underway once the state engages in constitution formation; decentralization of power, public official transparency and accountability; installation of democratic institutions such as an electoral commission, office of the ombudsperson and public protector's office; cooperation with civil society and community-based organizations; promotion of women in decision-making positions; periodic, competitive, peaceful, free and fair elections; establishment of conflict management and resolution mechanisms; constitutional freedom of speech for the media; and implementation of African Union and international good governance/anti-corruption instruments, including the Constitutive Act of the African Union.¹⁶⁸

Human rights, justice and reconciliation can be assessed based on the level of equalizations among citizens; functioning judicial and reconciliation mechanisms; governmental tolerance across political, social and cultural divides in the country; the effectiveness of institutions that protect human rights such as a National Human Rights Commission and Office of the Public Protector; judicial independence; and implementation of all international instruments guaranteeing respect for human rights such as the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.¹⁶⁹

Women and gender recognition requires gender sensitive legal frameworks; constitutional provisions and laws that promote and protect the rights of women and girls; participation of women in the political and economic spheres; security and justice systems responsive to gender-based violence; and implementation of relevant African Union instruments including the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and United Nations instruments such as the Convention to End all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Security Council resolution 1325.¹⁷⁰

Collectively, these benchmarks serve as indicators of progress toward full reconstruction and development of the physical, social, political and economic structure of a state.¹⁷¹

New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework

Complimentary to the AU Draft Policy Framework, the NEPAD framework defines three phases of post-conflict reconstruction: the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase.¹⁷² During the emergency phase immediately following the end of hostilities, a secure environment is established for emergency response through humanitarian relief and food aid.¹⁷³ The transition phase consists of the formation of national unity and reconciliation under an interim government with the transfer of external actor responsibilities to internal actors.¹⁷⁴ The final stage, the development phase, establishes a permanent governance structure that fosters economic stabilization and ongoing development.¹⁷⁵

The NEPAD framework also outlines five dimensions of reconstruction and development that correspond with the AU policy indicators of success: security; political transition, governance and participation; socio-economic

¹⁶⁶ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶⁷ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶⁸ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁶⁹ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁷⁰ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁷¹ African Union, *Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, 2007.

¹⁷² New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁷³ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁷⁴ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁷⁵ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and coordination, management and resource mobilization.¹⁷⁶ The NEPAD framework adds two additional integrating principles: capacity-building through coordination between internal and external actors and mobilization of resources.¹⁷⁷ Unlike the AU framework, the NEPAD framework leaves the benchmarks for each dimension open to the uniqueness of each implementing state.¹⁷⁸

NEPAD adds to the AU's PCRD policy by listing several issues that impact implementation achievement, including the balancing of uniqueness with universality; regional conflict systems; complex programming; strategic coherence; the relationship between internal and external actors; aid harmonization; synchronizing delivery and absorption; special needs groups; and Diaspora.¹⁷⁹

Balancing uniqueness with universality concerns how national PCRD programs are designed.¹⁸⁰ According to the NEPAD framework, programming must meet the specific needs of its system while also incorporating the best practices and institutional memory generated by other PCRD experiences.¹⁸¹ Region conflict systems refer to groups of neighboring states that experience interlinked conflicts, such as the Great Lakes, Nile Basin and Mano River regions.¹⁸² NEPAD asserts that cross-border demand for weapons, soldiers and other war economy resources perpetuate national instability even during peace time.¹⁸³

The complex programming and strategic coherence aspects deal with external actors and their tendency toward mandate driven behavior.¹⁸⁴ According to NEPAD, one unified country-level strategic framework is the only viable model for PCRD success.¹⁸⁵ Closely linked to these aspects, NEPAD stresses that the relationship between internal and external actors must involve a gradual shift of control from the external actors - who typically lead initial efforts due to their consistency and distance from the conflict - to internal actors--who are responsible for long-term PCRD and prevention of resumed armed conflict.¹⁸⁶

Aid harmonization is the management of external aid by internal actors, specifically the balancing of community investment and the overwhelming and expensive task of completing regular progress reports required by international organs like the United Nations Development Programme and World Bank.¹⁸⁷ NEPAD endorses the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization, which centers on four principles: receipt countries coordinate development assistance (not donors); donors align their aid with recipient countries' priorities and systems; donors streamline aid delivery; and donors adopt policies, procedures and incentives that foster harmonization.¹⁸⁸ It must be noted that NEPAD only endorses the Rome Declaration for implementation during the development phase; the emergency and transitional phases require "creative ways" in the spirit of the Rome Declaration.¹⁸⁹

Tied to aid harmonization is the synchronizing of delivery and adoption, which can be difficult for external actors that favor a short-term, high-impact approach.¹⁹⁰ NEPAD notes that internal actors arising from conflict typically lack the capacity to deal with large sums of aid and the stipulated programming associated with these external investments.¹⁹¹ According to NEPAD, initial aid should go toward capacity building to establish structures to utilize later investments in four to seven years during the progression from the transitional period to the development phase.¹⁹²

¹⁷⁶ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 20-21.

¹⁷⁷ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 20.

¹⁷⁸ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 20.

¹⁷⁹ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁸⁰ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 20.

¹⁸¹ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁸² New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁸³ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁸⁴ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 21.

¹⁸⁵ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁸⁶ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 21.

¹⁸⁷ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁸⁸ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁸⁹ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁹⁰ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 21.

¹⁹¹ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁹² New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

Special needs groups are the internal actors that face unique post-conflict circumstances, including women, children, adolescents, the disabled, the elderly, female ex-combatants, child soldiers, refugees, single parent households, victims of sexual violence and the HIV-positive.¹⁹³ The framework calls for PCRD programs to address these groups' unique needs without making them more vulnerable to subjugation or losing sight of the overall program.¹⁹⁴ Investments by the Diaspora - national citizens voluntarily living outside of the country, can contribute both positive and negatively to PCRD through investments in development or "spoiler" investments for the perpetuation - and recommencing - of armed conflict.¹⁹⁵ NEPAD recognizes that these contributions can far exceed formally documented foreign aid and mitigation of these spoilers is an important role for the international community.¹⁹⁶

These issues emphasize the complexity of PCRD and the areas where the African Union has the potential of affecting the method, structure and relationships that determine program success or failure.¹⁹⁷

Recent Work

Beginning in March 2007, the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSRESA) began holding civil society organization consultative meetings to engage public discourse and general population inclusion.¹⁹⁸

Concurrently, the African Commission established the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development unit through technical resources from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.¹⁹⁹ The unit assesses post conflict needs and priorities and coordinates multi-level efforts between the international community, the AU, states and local communities in implementing the AU Policy on PCRD.²⁰⁰

The unit conducted multidisciplinary missions to the Central African Republic in 2006, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2009, DRC and Burundi in 2010 and the Sudan in 2011.²⁰¹ Taking a community-based approach, the Commission conducted quick impact projects (QUIPs) in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Comoros and South Sudan.²⁰² The unit established permanent Liaison Offices in these countries to facilitate follow up of developments on the ground and interaction with all stakeholders on post conflict reconstruction and development issues.²⁰³

As of September 2011, the African Commission is preparing for an African Solidarity Initiative beginning with a Solidarity Conference of AU Member States, the African private sector and relevant public enterprises.²⁰⁴ The African Solidarity Initiative will seek to maximally mobilize African capacity through financing by NEPAD, the Economic Community of Africa and the African Development Bank.²⁰⁵

In January 2011, the Republic of Egypt released a proposal for the establishment of an African Union Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, which will focus on research and a comprehensive strategy.²⁰⁶ The African Commission is currently undergoing a full analysis of the objectives, structure, financial implication, and the location of the proposed centre.²⁰⁷ Though the Commission was expected to report back at the June 30 meeting of the African Union Assembly, the popular uprising in Egypt disrupted the coordination with the Egyptian government.²⁰⁸

¹⁹³ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁹⁴ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁹⁵ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 21.

¹⁹⁶ New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, 2005.

¹⁹⁷ Murithi, *The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis*, 2006, p. 16-21.

¹⁹⁸ African Union, *Summary Report of the Consultative Meeting with Civil Society Organisations*, 2007.

¹⁹⁹ African Union, *Press Release: Donation of Information systems equipments by UNHCR to the PCRD unit*, 2007.

²⁰⁰ African Union, *Press Release: Donation of Information systems equipments by UNHCR to the PCRD unit*, 2007.

²⁰¹ African Union, *Press Release: AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development*, 2011.

²⁰² African Union, *Press Release: AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development*, 2011.

²⁰³ African Union, *Press Release: AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development*, 2011.

²⁰⁴ African Union, *Press Release: AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development*, 2011.

²⁰⁵ African Union, *Press Release: AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development*, 2011.

²⁰⁶ African Union, *Decision on the Establishment of an African Union Center for PCRD*, 2011.

²⁰⁷ African Union, *Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on Its Activities*, 2011.

²⁰⁸ African Union, *Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on Its Activities*, 2011.

The 2011 Report of the AU Peace and Security Council stresses the African Union's focus on reconstruction in Burundi, DRC and Sudan, as well as political reorganization in the Central African Republic and Somalia.²⁰⁹

Case Study: Burundi

The Burundi Civil War between 1993 and 2000 displaced about 1.3 million Burundians - about 16% of the population - internally and across borders in Uganda, DRC and Rwanda.²¹⁰ Since independence in 1962, an estimated 300 to 400,000 citizens have been killed by recurring conflict waves.²¹¹ By 2002, the GDP fell below USD 110, with international financial assistance reduced from USD300 million at the beginning of the civil war.²¹²

Burundi, like its Great Lakes neighbors, suffers from ethnic, clan-based, regional and class-based divisions.²¹³ Elite-driven and manipulated inter-communal massacres have left the Burundi population susceptible to ethnically-framed political appeals.²¹⁴ German and Belgian reliance on Tutsi-dominated aristocratic hierarchy from 1899 to 1962 created inequalities and stereotypes that continue to fuel conflict today.²¹⁵ Poor economic performance, failed governance and institutions and the spillover effects of regional conflicts deepen Burundi's conflicts.²¹⁶

Deemed the African Union's first mission, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was established immediately following the AU-coordinated signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000, with the ambitious goal of disarming 20,000 ex-combatants - approximately 300 per day.²¹⁷ A civil-military coordination center was constructed to coordinate NGOs and humanitarian agency operations, incorporating the elements of NEPAD's emergency phase strategy.²¹⁸

AU deployment ended on May 31, 2004 and the mission was transferred to the UN; however, the AU troops remained the only UN peacekeepers due to a lack of non-African member state response.²¹⁹ The UN officially shut down peacekeeping operations in 2007 and donated USD35 million to the Burundi state for infrastructure, democratic practices, military rebuilding and investment in human rights protections.²²⁰ The AU and nationally-coordinating Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) is currently working on capacity-building between groups for cooperative and effective management of the first post-transition elections in 2012.²²¹

AMIB evidenced both the potential and constraints of the AU.²²² DDR was stunted by the lack of facilities due to funding lapse from AU Member States and Western countries, leading to food, infrastructure, medical supply shortages that permitted only 200 ex-combatants to concurrently undergo DDR.²²³ The lack of bottom-up approaches to simulate local economic development left communities perpetually dependent on foreign aid.²²⁴

Conclusion

Unlike Western areas of post-conflict reconstruction, Africa suffers from a lack of development pre-dating conflicts.²²⁵ The need is not for reconstruction but for first generation construction.²²⁶ Many African states face regional conflict spillover with ongoing violence in Somalia, Sudan and DRC, as well as transitional democracy in

²⁰⁹ Security Council Report, *Special Research Report No. 2: Working Together for Peace and Security in Africa*, 2011.

²¹⁰ Ngosi, *The Voice of Civil Society in the Rebuilding of Burundi. Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa*, 2006, 224.

²¹¹ Ngosi, *The Voice of Civil Society in the Rebuilding of Burundi. Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa*, 2006, 226.

²¹² Ngosi, *The Voice of Civil Society in the Rebuilding of Burundi. Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa*, 2006, 229.

²¹³ Gurr, *Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflicts in the New Century, Turbulent Peace*, 2001.

²¹⁴ Gurr, *Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflicts in the New Century, Turbulent Peace*, 2001.

²¹⁵ Wright, *Ethnic Identity in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The State of Africa*, 2008, 82-84.

²¹⁶ Brachet, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Social Development Papers*, 2005.

²¹⁷ Brachet, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Social Development Papers*, 2005.

²¹⁸ Brachet, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Social Development Papers*, 2005.

²¹⁹ Brachet, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Social Development Papers*, 2005.

²²⁰ Brachet, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Social Development Papers*, 2005.

²²¹ Ngosi, *The Voice of Civil Society in the Rebuilding of Burundi, Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa*, 2006, p. 232.

²²² Brachet, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Social Development Papers*, 2005.

²²³ Brachet, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Social Development Papers*, 2005.

²²⁴ Ngosi, *The Voice of Civil Society in the Rebuilding of Burundi*, 2006, p. 236-238.

²²⁵ Kotzé, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: new discourse, old theories, The State of Africa*, 2008, p. 113.

²²⁶ Kotzé, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: new discourse, old theories, The State of Africa*, 2008, p. 113.

Egypt and Libya.²²⁷ While the absence of conflict falls primarily upon internal actors, security and development inevitably requires cooperation throughout the African community.²²⁸

Questions to Guide Research and Discussion

1. How should the African Union address the issues identified in the NEPAD African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework and achieve the benchmarks set forth by the AU Policy Framework for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development?
2. What steps should be taken by the African Commission and the Peace and Security Council to ensure more effective post-conflict reconstruction and development in states recently arising from conflict, such as the Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic?
3. What role should the African Commission's Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development unit play in countries with newly democratic governments, such as Egypt, Libya and South Sudan?
4. How should ex-combatants and victims of war be reintegrated into society and what role should civil society play in these efforts?
5. Are Western-style democracies viable in Africa or should a new African democratic model be created?

Annotated Bibliography

II. Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

African Union. (2011). *Press Release: AU intensifies its efforts towards post-conflict reconstruction and development*. Retrieved September 22, 2011 from http://www.au.int/en/dp/ps/sites/default/files/Press_Release-Technical_Mtg_Eng_14092011_2_%5B1%5D.pdf

This press release on the recent work of the African Commission's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development unit outlines the goals for the upcoming year, as well as the steps taken already to reach those goals. The release also includes relevant background information on the legal frameworks and how the African Commission is implementing them. While brief, this AU news item serves as a starting point for delegates to monitor the unit's work to ensure proposed strategies do not conflict with the ongoing work of the African Union's policy implementation arm.

Alidou, O. and A. Sikainga. (2006). *Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa*. Asmara, Eritrea: Africa. World Press. *Consisting of case studies, this anthology provides insight into the various methods each nation has recovered from conflict. The book centers around four central themes: ethnocultural coordination; gender and generation; DDR programs; and political and economic reconstruction. Delegates should pay special attention to Chapters 4-6 which detail national programs to reintegrate children affected by conflict. The successes and failures of each state to establish lasting reconstruction policies will inform discussion of best practices and lessons learned.*

Anand, P. (2005). *Getting Infrastructure Priorities Right in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Retrieved on October 11, 2011 from <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id3248.html>.

Addressing the need for physical infrastructure, this article details recommendations for construction policies and procedures, as well as appropriately financing mechanisms to invest in these critical resources. The study includes case studies from recent successful and failed PCRD infrastructure projects in Eastern Europe and Africa, in order to demonstrate best practices. Delegates should use this article to consider what role of the African Union in initiating construction of trade routes and basic development, while allowing internal actors to pursue a long-term infrastructure construction and modernization plan.

²²⁷ Security Council Report, *Special Research Report No. 2: Working Together for Peace and Security in Africa*, 2011.

²²⁸ Kotzé, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: new discourse, old theories*, *The State of Africa*, 2008, p. 113.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995). *Supplement to an Agenda on Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (A/50/60 - S/1995/1)*. Retrieved August 30, 2011 from <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html>.

A follow-up to former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's groundbreaking Agenda for Peace, this report details his perspective of the state of Africa in 1995 and his hopes for the continent. While the situation in several African states has changed over the last 15 years, the principles for Pan-African cooperation established by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali remain the same. Delegates should use this analysis to determine the African Union's successes and failures thus far and the potential for improvements to post-conflict reconstruction and development programs.

Collier, P. (2003). The Market for Civil War. *Foreign Policy*, 136: 38-46.

This analysis of goods movement during armed conflict will assist in differentiating the elements of war economies from peace economies. Delegates should play special attention to the sections on marketability of conflict-only goods and their regional movement. As PCRD requires the sustainability of a peace economy, this article will serve as an introduction to the factors working against national stability.

Kaufman, D. (2009). *Aid Effectiveness and Governance: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly*. Retrieved October 11, 2011 from http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0317_aid_governance_kaufmann.aspx.

Focusing on the relationship between internal and external actors regarding monetary aid, this article from the Brookings Institution outlines the challenges facing internal actors in managing large sums and the missteps taken by external actors that subvert the work of internal actors. The article also details recommendations for best practices in aid distribution to ensure effective use of the resources to serve the general population. Delegates should use this source as a guide when determining their state's position of external intervention by the regional banks and the African Commission, as well as Western NGOs and the World Bank.

Kotzé, D. and H. Solomon, (2008). *The State of Africa: Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development*. Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa.

An anthology of perspectives on post-conflict reconstruction and development process, this book serves as a standing point for understanding the political, social and economic factors that come into play. Delegates should focus on Chapter 2, which addresses the role of women in recovery and the lack of gender equality necessary to garner peace and security. Chapter 5 discusses the economic aspects of redevelopment with the transition from war economies to peace economies. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the African Union and international community's work in organizing post-conflict reconstruction and development and the continuing areas of improvement. The book also includes the AU and NEPAD frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Murithi, T. (2006). The AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis. *Conflict Trends* (1): p. 16-21.

This brief article on the AU and NEPAD frameworks provides a comparison of their goals and strategies that form the AU's policy for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Murithi stresses the strengths of the frameworks in providing vision to the AU, yet emphasizes the lack of specifics and policy guidance in the frameworks. A source for delegates to assess the AU's constraints and determine areas of potential for honing policies to increase the mission successfulness and intergovernmental coordination.

Pumphrey, C. and R. Schwartz-Barcott. (2003). *Armed Conflict in Africa*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow.

A collection of essays about turmoil in Africa throughout the twentieth-century, this book serves as a guide for understanding the state of Africa in the twenty-first century. Delegates should play special attention to Chapter 2 which outlines the links between conflict throughout east and central Africa, as well as the historical and cultural causes for conflict resulting from natural formations and European involvement. Chapter 6 addresses the role of nongovernmental organizations in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2010). *Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned*. New York, NY: United Nations.

Published by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, this guide discusses the formation of political structures that secure development and investment. Evaluating the experiences of varying nations in Africa, South America and Eastern Europe, the piece sets out the shortcomings and potential for more coordinated reconstruction through public sector organization, political transparency and civil society involvement. Delegates will find this guide helpful in evaluating areas for potential for democratic stability.

III. Addressing the Use of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

“The scourge of sexual violence traverses all of geography and history. But without the political leadership of Africa, we will not succeed in eradicating this international crime.”²²⁹

Introduction

As defined by the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action resulting from the Fourth World Conference on Women, the term "sexual violence" refers to the crimes of rape, sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation, forced prostitution, and forced pregnancy.²³⁰ In conflict, a culture of sexual entitlement can prevail among armed groups, in which women are exploited as “spoils of war.”²³¹ Sexual violence against women is used as a genocidal strategy to inflict physical, mental and emotional harm that creates conditions for the destruction of a society by destroying male and community pride.²³² Armies and militia groups use systematic sexual violence to demonstrate power and dominance over the targeted community; family members are forced to witness the rape to show their weakness and inferiority.²³³ The victims of sexual violence suffer from severe physical consequences including infertility, incontinence, sexually transmitted infections like HIV/AIDS, psychological suffering and fear of stigmatization.²³⁴

Despite several international agreements, illegal acts continue to be committed, including rape as a method of warfare and terrorizing people into submission or displacement. A 2003 sample of 388 Liberian refugee women living in camps in Sierra Leone found that 74% reported being sexually abused prior to displacement and 55% reported experiencing sexual violence during displacement.²³⁵

Basic Documents

Article Two of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 9 December 1948, defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.²³⁶ Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group, a result of sexual violence, is stipulated as part of genocide, as is deliberately inflicting a group to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.²³⁷

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 broadly defines the basic rights of prisoners during war and establishes protections for the wounded and civilians in and around a conflict zone. As stipulated in Article 27 of the Convention, “women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”²³⁸

²²⁹ UN News Centre, *UN envoy on sexual violence welcomes African commitment to eradicating the vice*, 2011.

²³⁰ Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action, 1998.

²³¹ Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, *Violence Against Women and Children in Armed Conflict*, 2008, p. 1.

²³² Stop Rape Now, *UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict*, 2011.

²³³ Dammers, *The response of the international community to sexual violence in conflict-affected states*, 2010, p. 2.

²³⁴ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Sexual violence in armed conflict*, 2006, p. 17.

²³⁵ UNFPA, *Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in War and Its Aftermath: Realities, responses, and Required Resources*.

²³⁶ Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, article 2

²³⁷ Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, article 2

²³⁸ Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949, article 27.

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA) was adopted by consensus at the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 to direct the work of the then-newly-created United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR).²³⁹ At the conference, non-governmental organizations were able to highlight the issue of violence against women and the VDPA proclaimed women's rights and gender-based exploitation as legitimate issue for the international community.²⁴⁰

Article 38 of the VDPA calls upon the UNGA and Member States to adopt the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.²⁴¹ The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women was adopted by acclamation on December 20, 1993 by the UNGA and defined violence against women as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."²⁴²

The AU Member States specifically addressed gender issues through the Protocols of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa adopted in 2003.²⁴³ Article 2 of the Charter calls for the elimination of the discrimination against women through legislative and institutional measures. Article Three of the Protocol specifies "the woman's right to respect for her dignity and protection of women from all forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence."²⁴⁴

Despite of all these commitments, there is little evidence of the AU following up with effective action. This is highlighted by the resistance of the AU to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir who was charged with five counts of crimes against humanity, including rape.²⁴⁵ Although 30 African states have signed up to the ICC which means that they have an obligation to arrest or surrender him if he enters their territory he was invited to Kenya and Chad and hosted by the respective governments.²⁴⁶

Sexual violence committed against children

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict currently identifies seven countries in Africa where sexual violence is perpetrated by armed groups against children: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia and Sudan.²⁴⁷ Violations against children often take the form of sexual slavery, forced prostitution and marriage or sexual mutilation, making the physical and mental consequences especially devastating for them.²⁴⁸

It should not be underestimated that men and boys are also victims of sexual violence, although the primary targets are girls and women. The Journal of the American Medical Association published a study estimating that nearly 40 percent of women and 23% of men in the DRC were victims of sexual violence.²⁴⁹ The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict highlights that not enough attention is paid to sexual violence against boys and criticizes that violations are often not documented.²⁵⁰ An underestimated aspect is the trauma boys experience as perpetrators or witnesses of sexual violence: they may be forced to commit rape by their commander or through peer pressure.²⁵¹

²³⁹ Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

²⁴⁰ Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

²⁴¹ Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

²⁴² United Nations General Assembly, *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women*, 1993, article 1.

²⁴³ The African Women's Decade, *Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment*, 2011.

²⁴⁴ Protocols of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.

²⁴⁵ Dammers, *The response of the international community to sexual violence in conflict-affected states*, 2010, p. 10.

²⁴⁶ Dammers, *The response of the international community to sexual violence in conflict-affected states*, 2010, p. 10.

²⁴⁷ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. *Rape and other grave sexual violences against children*, 2011.

²⁴⁸ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. *Rape and other grave sexual violences against children*, 2011.

²⁴⁹ Dammers, *The response of the international community to sexual violence in conflict-affected states*, 2010, p. 2.

²⁵⁰ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. *Rape and other grave sexual violences against children*, 2011.

²⁵¹ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. *Rape and other grave sexual violences against children*, 2011.

The Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict includes a list of parties that recruit or use children, kill or maim children, and/or commit rape and other forms for sexual violence against children in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council; this list is referred to as the list of shame.²⁵² Although women and men are also entitled to protection from sexual violence, the list of shame only includes armed groups that are perpetrators of sexual violence against children.²⁵³

Ongoing Initiatives

United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UNAASVC) is a body designed to create awareness about the abuses of sexual violence during and after conflict. One priority of UNAASVC is to prevent and respond to sexual violence making the world a safer place for women and girls.²⁵⁴ Another priority is to strengthen alliances for international action commensurate with the scale and magnitude of the threat.²⁵⁵ The initiative challenges international and regional security institutions to combat sexual violence by increasing resources for preventive programs and psychological and financial recovery for survivors.²⁵⁶ UNAASVC is committed to aligning the United Nations' work with national efforts to address sexual violence, and deepening partnerships with non-governmental and civil society organizations.²⁵⁷ UNAASVC recognizes that sexual violence is a security, humanitarian and developmental issue.²⁵⁸

UNAASVC launched the campaign Stop Rape Now which consists of three pillars: country-level action including joint strategies with UN country teams and peacekeeping missions; raising public awareness and generating political will; establishing knowledge hubs to identify the most effective practice by the UN and partners.²⁵⁹ However, incidents in the DRC prove that important lines of communication between different UN actors are not being effectively utilized: at least 154 civilians were raped in 13 villages in the North Kivu province and the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO did not find about it until over a week after it had occurred.²⁶⁰

The Peacebuilding Portal is a collaborative effort of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), regional organizations (such as the AU) and conflict prevention and peacebuilding NGOs around the world.²⁶¹ Peacebuilding Portal offers a database containing peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by international organizations, NGOs, academic institutions, taskforces, research institutions and promoting conflict management and peace building.²⁶² The objective is to promote collaboration and consultation among organizations working in peacebuilding and conflict prevention.²⁶³

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an interagency body serving UN agencies and NGOs which held a conference in 2008, entitled "Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict: Identifying Research Priorities to Inform More Effective Interventions." The objective was to review current research on sexual violence in armed conflict and identify program gaps.²⁶⁴ The research led to four main theories of motivations leading to sexual violence in conflict: gender inequality theory; psychosocial economic background theory; strategic rape theory, and biosocial theory. The study also made suggestions for moving forward in the fight against sexual violence.²⁶⁵ The report of the conference included nine key research priorities in understanding motivations for sexual violence in armed conflict.

Search For Common Ground (SFCG) is an NGO that uses a multifaceted approach between local partners in government and civil society to find culturally appropriate means to strengthen a society's means of dealing with

²⁵² United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict* 2011, Annex I.

²⁵³ Dammers, *The response of the international community to sexual violence in conflict-affected states*, 2010, p. 12.

²⁵⁴ UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, *UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict*, 2007.

²⁵⁵ Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations: *Violence Against Women and Children in Armed Conflict*, 2008.

²⁵⁶ UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, *UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict*, 2007.

²⁵⁷ Stop Rape Now, *UN Action against sexual violence in conflict*, 2011.

²⁵⁸ Stop Rape Now, *UN Action against sexual violence in conflict*, 2011.

²⁵⁹ Stop Rape Now, *UN Action against sexual violence in conflict*, 2011.

²⁶⁰ Dammers, *The response of the international community to sexual violence in conflict-affected states*, 2010, p. 8.

²⁶¹ The Peacebuilding Portal, *Peacebuilding Portal*, 2011.

²⁶² Institute for Environmental Security, *Peacebuilding Portal*, 2011.

²⁶³ The Peacebuilding Portal, *Peacebuilding Portal*, 2011.

²⁶⁴ OCHA-Policy Development and Studies Branch, *Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict*, 2008.

²⁶⁵ OCHA-Policy Development and Studies Branch, *Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict*, 2008.

conflicts. In 2003, Radio for Peacebuilding in Africa (RFPA) was launched by the SFCG with the aim of providing a resource for African journalists to produce radio programs that further peacebuilding initiatives. RFPA has made significant strides in using media to foster communication between policymakers and civil society. Because of this project, members of civil society have reported feeling more ownership over policies, greater confidence in the government and in its reforms and finding better socially-contextualized outcomes.²⁶⁶

Recent Work

The Second Open Session on Sexual Violence, Women and Children in Armed Conflict of the AU Peace and Security Council – the AU’s decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts – took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on March 28, 2011.²⁶⁷ Women survivors of sexual violence shared their experiences, made recommendations, voiced their disappointments and stressed the need for urgent action to enhance women’s participation in peace processes, ensure protection of women under the law and prosecute violators.²⁶⁸

The statement criticized the UN and AU for the lack of enforcement despite the numerous instruments available²⁶⁹ The survivors recommended that Member States put into place mechanisms that ensure full recovery of “the bodies, minds and souls” of the women and involve them in the planning, designing and implementing of the post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation process.²⁷⁰ Other recommendations included that Member States provide comprehensive medical care, coordinate with community-based women’s organizations on preventive and early response plans; and the Council vary their annual sessions among different conflict areas.²⁷¹

UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Margot Wallström of Sweden briefed the United Nations Security Council (SC) on recent developments in the protection of women in conflict zones and recommended that protection from sexual violence be automatically and systematically included in protective measures, such as cease-fire agreements.²⁷² Wallström urged full implementation of Security Council resolution 1960 adopted in December 2010, which calls for monitoring, analysis and reporting mechanisms on conflict-related sexual violence.²⁷³ Wallström also noted that Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 of 2011 on the protection of Libyan civilians did not address the risk of sexual violence.²⁷⁴ She also emphasized the appropriate shift by the Security Council in treating sexual violence as a security issue and that “the engagement of the Security Council represents a crucial shift in approach.”²⁷⁵ Wallström applauded the council’s “recognition that conflict-related sexual violence is a legitimate threat to international peace and security, which requires an operational security response.”²⁷⁶

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the AU issue a quarterly publication called “Walking the Talk: Gender Equality in the African Union.” The October 2010 issue discusses African Women’s Decade.²⁷⁷ The April 2011 issue praises the decision of the UNGA in making the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) operational in January 2011.²⁷⁸ The goal of UN Women is to bring gender issues to a higher level in the work of the UN and strengthening the partnership with the AU.²⁷⁹ The main roles of UN Women are to support inter-governmental bodies in their formulation of policies, global standards and norms, help Member States implement these standards and to hold the UN system accountable for its commitment on gender equality.²⁸⁰

In the case of the political revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter played a primary role in mobilizing people in demonstrations. Civil society was connecting via the Internet

²⁶⁶ Search for Common Ground, *Radio for Peacebuilding Africa*, 2011.

²⁶⁷ UN Women, *Survivors of Sexual Violence Testify Before the African Union Peace and Security Council*, 2011.

²⁶⁸ Peace and Security Council, *Oral Statement by Survivors of Sexual Violence Before AU Peace and Security Council*, 2011.

²⁶⁹ Peace and Security Council, *Oral Statement by Survivors of Sexual Violence Before AU Peace and Security Council*, 2011.

²⁷⁰ Peace and Security Council, *Oral Statement by Survivors of Sexual Violence Before AU Peace and Security Council*, 2011.

²⁷¹ Peace and Security Council, *Oral Statement by Survivors of Sexual Violence Before AU Peace and Security Council*, 2011.

²⁷² Security Council 6515th Meeting, 2011.

²⁷³ Security Council 6515th Meeting, 2011.

²⁷⁴ Security Council 6515th Meeting, 2011.

²⁷⁵ UN News Centre, *Countries must treat sexual violence as serious security threat*, 2011.

²⁷⁶ UN News Centre, *Countries must treat sexual violence as serious security threat*, 2011.

²⁷⁷ African Union, *Walking the Talk – Gender Equality in the African Union*, Issue Number 2, 2010.

²⁷⁸ African Union, *Walking the Talk – Gender Equality in the African Union*, Issue Number 2, 2010.

²⁷⁹ African Union, *Walking the Talk – Gender Equality in the African Union*, Issue Number 2, 2010.

²⁸⁰ UN Women, *About UN Women*, 2011.

to track recent developments or locate political actions. These tools assisted in education and action mobilization. In Egypt, activist Asmaa Mahfouz took to the airwaves via the Internet and called on Egyptians to meet in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011, mobilizing millions that turned up in Cairo.²⁸¹ Though Internet access is currently limited, it is a tool that could still be used to reach the population and keep them informed on serious issues such as sexual violence against women.

Conclusion

Both AU Member States and the international community at-large have significant work ahead of them, as they work to combat the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. As international actors strive to minimize shame felt by victims and increase rehabilitation, the African Union must continue to increase education regarding sexual violence in armed conflict.

Delegates should consider how the revolutions in North Africa challenge those that commit crimes of sexual violence against women. What initiatives should be taken to bring awareness to local communities about sexual violence? How can the international community prevent and respond to sexual violence in armed conflict?

Annotated Bibliography

III. Addressing the Use of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

Bastick, M, K Grimm, R Kunz. (2007). *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector*. Retrieved October 3, 2011 from <http://iansa-women.org/sites/default/files/newsviews/en-dcaf-sv-conflict-2007.pdf>

This article gives an introduction to the history of sexual violence against women during and after armed conflict. It also touches on motivations behind the crime of sexual violence, what gains the perpetrators may have and how the security sector has looked at the issue as a marginal one. Several options are proposed for the security and justice sectors to improve and develop strategies to prevent and respond to sexual violence in armed-conflict. The report looks to challenge States and security institutions to develop timely and efficient responses to conflict related sexual violence. The report discusses sexual violence across different nations and has proposals for policing sexual violence, bringing justice to victims of sexual violence, the role of peacekeepers and sexual violence in armed conflict, civil societies response to sexual violence and recommendations.

Prevent Genocide International. (2003). *Rome Statute of the International Criminal*. Retrieved September 28, 2011 from <http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm>

The Rome Statute entered into force 1 July 2002 and can only prosecute crimes committed on or after that date. Article 7 counts the crimes against humanity, which is defined as acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. According to the Rome Statute of the ICC, sexual violence against women as part of a mobilized effort is a crime against humanity.

United Nations General Assembly (12 July, 1993). *A/CONF.157/23 (1993)*. Retrieved October 7, 2011 from [http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(symbol\)/a.conf.157.23.en](http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en)

The Vienna Declaration was adopted by consensus at the World Conference on Human Rights and was created and endorsed by the UN General Assembly Resolution 48/121. The VDPA sought to reaffirm that human rights are universal and that all human rights are of equal importance. The VDPA draws attention to the importance of women's rights as "inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights." The VDPA recognizes gender-based violence, sexual harassment and exploitation. Paragraph 38 calls upon the GA to adopt the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and urges States to combat violence against women. Violating the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict is noted as violations of the

²⁸¹ Kligman, *Meet Asmaa Mahfouz: the woman who organized Egypt's historic demonstrations*, 2011.

fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law; these include murder, systematic rape sexual slavery and forced pregnancy.

United Nations General Assembly (20 December 1993). *A/RES/48/104 (1993)*. Retrieved October 7th 2011 from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm>

The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women recognizes that women have the right to a life free from violence is relatively new. The declaration defined violence against women as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women...” The challenge with this declaration is that some countries raise objections which make it a failure for the UN Commission on the Status of Women.

United Nations Office for Coordination of Human Affairs. (2008). *Use of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Identifying Gaps in Research to Inform More Effective Interventions UN OCHA Research Meeting*. Retrieved on September 30, 2011 from

http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/PWandUN/UNImplementation/Secretariat/DepartmentAndOffices/OCHA/ocha_reportusesexualviolenceinconflict.pdf

This policy paper begins with framing and defining the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict. It briefly discusses and explains different theories and why the issue exists. The report also outlines how the violence affects and changes communities. It offered priority areas and research priorities to further reach the goal of eradicating sexual violence against women. It also identified and explained key research priorities in understanding motivations of sexual violence. It concluded with research questions and ways to move forward and implement communities of practice.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (n.d.). *Peacebuilding Portal*. Retrieved September 23, 2011 from <http://www.peacebuildingportal.org/>

The aim of the Peacebuilding Portal is to support multilateral collaboration on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The goal is to offer local, national, and multi-lateral stakeholders a real-time web tool to strengthen their work and better respond to issues surrounding human security, peacebuilding & conflict. Peacebuilding Portal is a website is structured to fully incorporate data related to land and environment rights in conflict management and peacebuilding. The portal offers information on NGOs working on land and environmental rights and peacebuilding.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (1998). *Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response. Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action*. Retrieved on October 15, 2011 from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/cover.pdf>.

This was published to promote the goals of the 1998 Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action. It covers a brief history of sexual violence during conflict and how the effects vary between men and women. In this publication, consideration is given to the fact that the international has failed to address sexual violence in conflict in the past. It also covers the Geneva Conventions and other protocols on rape in conflict as well as UN responses to sexual violence. The sexual atrocities that took place in Yugoslavia is referenced as when consistent references throughout the UN began to appear in regard to the issue of sexual violence.

United Nations Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. (n.d.). *Stop Rape Now*. Retrieved on September 27, 2011 from <http://www.stoprapenow.org/about/>

UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict connects the work of 13 UN entities with the shared goal of ending sexual violence during and after conflict. This concerted effort by the UN system works to improve coordination and accountability, amplify programming and advocacy, and support national efforts to prevent sexual violence and respond effectively to the needs of survivors. The three main pillars of action include the country level which is to support strategy development and programming by UN Country Teams and Peacekeeping operations. The second pillar is advocating for action by working to raise public awareness and generate political will to address sexual violence. The third pillar is to create a knowledge center on the scale of violence against women in conflict.

United Nations News Centre. (2011). *UN envoy on sexual violence welcomes African commitment to eradicating vice*. Retrieved August 14, 2011 from

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37964&Cr=sexual+violence&Cr1>

The United Nations envoy on sexual violence in conflict underlined the role of the African leadership in combating sexual violence on the continent, and welcomed the commitment expressed by the AU to ensure that the problem is eradicated. The UN envoy also discusses the AU's decision to appoint a Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security and pledged support for the envoy, which will serve as a point of contact to strengthen AU-UN partnership on the issue.

United Nations Security Council. (2008, June 19.) *Resolution 1820 (2008.)* Retrieved October 3, 2011 <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1820>.

This resolution condemns all sexual and other forms of violence committed against civilians in armed conflict. It also recognizes that States bear primary responsibility to ensure the protection of the human rights of their citizens. It also requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the Security Council to develop and implement appropriate training programs for peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the UN to help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence against civilians. The resolution also urges regional and sub-regional bodies to consider developing and implementing policies and advocacy for the benefit of women and girls affected by sexual violence in armed conflict.

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III. Addressing the Use of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

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Rules of Procedure

The Assembly of the African Union

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Assembly of the African Union (hereinafter referred to as “the Assembly”) and shall be considered adopted by the Assembly prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Assembly.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - *Dates of convening and adjournment*

The Assembly shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - *Place of sessions*

The Assembly shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - *Provisional agenda*

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Assembly at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - *Adoption of the agenda*

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Assembly by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.

Rule 5 - *Revision of the agenda*

During a session, the Assembly may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Assembly so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Assembly decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an important and urgent character is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Assembly to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Assembly until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 6 - *Explanatory memorandum*

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if

possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Assembly.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Assembly and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Assembly, and shall distribute documents of the Assembly to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Assembly may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Assembly concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the President

The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Assembly for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the President

If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language

English shall be the official and working language of the Assembly.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 - Quorum

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Assembly are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Assembly shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, members of the Assembly means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.

Rule 15 - General powers of the President

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Assembly, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Assembly and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Assembly the closure of the list of speakers, a

limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to —propose to the Assembly entails her/his power to —entertain motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.

Rule 16

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Assembly.

Rule 17 - Points of order

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 18

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Rule 19 - Speeches

1. No one may address the Assembly without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Assembly, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Assembly may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Assembly in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.

Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Assembly, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Assembly.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Assembly. A motion to close the speakers' list is within the purview of the Assembly and the President should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 21 - Right of reply

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise

her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Assembly by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Assembly shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Assembly's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Assembly.

Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Rule 25 - Closure of debate

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Assembly favors the closure of debate, the Assembly shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 26 - Order of motions Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Assembly would like the Assembly to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Assembly unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Assembly for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Assembly by the Secretariat.

The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Assembly. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Assembly and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights

Each member of the Assembly shall have one vote.

This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Rule 31 - Request for a vote

A proposal or motion before the Assembly for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Assembly may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 32 - Majority required

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Assembly shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative States as “present and voting” during the attendance roll call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.

Rule 33 - Method of voting

1. The Assembly shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

Only those members who designate themselves as present or present and voting during the attendance roll

call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying pass, must, on the second time through, respond with either yes or no. A pass cannot be followed by a second pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Assembly votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Assembly shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 34 - Explanations of vote

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 35 - Conduct during voting

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Rule 36 - Division of proposals and amendments

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 37 - Amendments

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.

Rule 38 - Order of voting on amendments

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 39 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Assembly decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 40 - The President shall not vote

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VII. CREDENTIALS

Rule 41 - Credentials

The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General prior to the opening of a session.

Rule 42

The Assembly shall be bound by the actions of the General Assembly in all credentials matters and shall take no action regarding the credentials of any member.

VII. PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Rule 43 - Participation of non-Member States

1. The Assembly shall invite any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Assembly and any other State, to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
2. A committee or sessional body of the Assembly shall invite any State that is not one of its own members to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
3. A State thus invited shall not have the right to vote, but may submit proposals which may be put to the vote on request of any member of the body concerned.

If the Assembly considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Assembly according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Assembly is no longer required.

Rule 45 - Participation of national liberation movements

The Assembly may invite any national liberation movement recognized by the General Assembly to participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.

Rule 46 - Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies

In accordance with the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the specialized agencies shall be entitled: a) To be represented at meetings of the Assembly and its subsidiary organs; b) To participate, without the right to vote, through their representatives, in deliberations with respect to items of concern to them and to submit proposals regarding such items, which may be put to the vote at the request of any member of the Assembly or of the subsidiary organ concerned.

Rule 47 - Participation of non-governmental organization and intergovernmental organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations accorded consultative observer status by the General Assembly and other non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations designated on an ad hoc or a continuing basis by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Bureau, may participate, with the procedural right to vote, but not the substantive right to vote, in the deliberations of the Assembly on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations.