



NMUN • NY

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

BACKGROUND GUIDE 2011

WRITTEN BY: Charles Green, Katharina Schmidt, Michael Büchl, Bobby Valentine and Simon Saint-Pierre



NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS
nmun.org

CONTACT THE NMUN

Please consult the FAQ section of nmun.org for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

NMUN Director-General (Sheraton)
Holger Baer | dirgen@nmun.org

NMUN Director-General (Marriott)
Brianna Johnston-Hanks | dirgen@nmun.org

NMUN Office
info@nmun.org
T: +1. 612.353.5649 | F: +1.651.305.0093

NMUN Secretary-General
Ronny Heintze | secgen@nmun.org

NMUN•NY 2011 Important Dates

IMPORTANT NOTICE: To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at nmun.org and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

31 January 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm Attendance & Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March) • Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET! (We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)
15 February 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Committee Updates Posted to www.nmun.org
1 March 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early! Group Rates on hotel rooms are available on a first come, first served basis until sold out. Group rates, if still available, may not be honored after that date. See hotel reservation form for date final payment is due. • Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to: outreach@nmun.org • Preferred deadline for submission of Chair / Rapp applications to Committee Chairs • All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$125 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$150 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline.
15 March 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail (See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions).
NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS	<p>The 2011 National Model UN Conference</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 17 - 21 April – Sheraton New York • 19 - 23 April – New York Marriott Marquis <p>The 2012 National Model UN Conference</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 - 5 April – Sheraton New York • 3 - 7 April – New York Marriott Marquis • 30 March - 3 April – New York Marriott Marquis

POSITION PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 15 MARCH 2011

1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 15 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active when background guides are available. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment in the subject line (Example: GAPLEN_Greece).

2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org.

This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

Note: This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba_U_of_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

nmun.org
for more information

COMMITTEE

EMAIL - SHERATON

General Assembly First Committee	ga1st.sheraton@nmun.org
General Assembly Second Committee	ga2nd.sheraton@nmun.org
General Assembly Third Committee.....	ga3rd.sheraton@nmun.org
Human Rights Council.....	hrc.sheraton@nmun.org
ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	ccpcj.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women	csw.sheraton@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	escap.sheraton@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	escwa.sheraton@nmun.org
United Nations Environment Programme	unep.sheraton@nmun.org
United Nations Population Fund	unfpa.sheraton@nmun.org
United Nations Children's Fund.....	unicef.sheraton@nmun.org
World Intellectual Property Organization	wipo.sheraton@nmun.org
African Development Bank	afdb.sheraton@nmun.org
Group of 20.....	g20.sheraton@nmun.org
Organization of American States	oas.sheraton@nmun.org
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.....	osce.sheraton@nmun.org
Security Council.....	sc.sheraton@nmun.org
Security Council 2.....	sc2.sheraton@nmun.org
International Court of Justice.....	icj.sheraton@nmun.org
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference	npt.sheraton@nmun.org

COMMITTEE

EMAIL - MARRIOTT

General Assembly First Committee	ga1st.marriott@nmun.org
General Assembly Second Committee	ga2nd.marriott@nmun.org
General Assembly Third Committee.....	ga3rd.marriott@nmun.org
Human Rights Council.....	hrc.marriott@nmun.org
ECOSOC Plenary	ecosoc.marriott@nmun.org
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	ccpcj.marriott@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women	csw.marriott@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	escap.marriott@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	escwa.marriott@nmun.org
United Nations Environment Programme	unep.marriott@nmun.org
United Nations Population Fund	unfpa.marriott@nmun.org
United Nations Children's Fund.....	unicef.marriott@nmun.org
World Intellectual Property Organization	wipo.marriott@nmun.org
African Development Bank	afdb.marriott@nmun.org
Group of 20.....	g20.marriott@nmun.org
Organization of American States	oas.marriott@nmun.org
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.....	osce.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council.....	sc.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council 2.....	sc2.marriott@nmun.org
International Court of Justice.....	icj.marriott@nmun.org
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference	npt.marriott@nmun.org

OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
(send only to e-mail for your assigned venue).....	positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org
Secretary-General	secgen@nmun.org
Director(s)-General	dirgen@nmun.org
NMUN Office	info@nmun.org

Ronny Heintze
Secretary-General

Amanda Williams
Senior Director-General

Holger Baer &
Brianna Johnston-Hanks
Directors-General

Brianna Noler &
Miriam Mueller
Chiefs of Staff

Deena M. Kuko
Assistant Secretary-General
For External Affairs

Sameer Kanal &
Thera Watson
Under-Secretaries-General
General Assembly

Kristina Mader &
Vera Todorova
Under-Secretaries-General
Economic and Social Council

Katharina Weinert &
Daniel Lemay
Under Secretaries-General
Specialized Agencies

Lucas Carreras &
Nick Warino
Under-Secretaries-General
Inter-Governmental
Organizations

Amanda D'Amico &
Alistair Goddard
Under-Secretaries-General
Peace and Security

Eddie Cheung &
Laura O'Connor
Under-Secretaries-General
Conference Services

BOARD of DIRECTORS

Prof. Richard Reitano
President

Prof. Donna Schlagheck
Vice-President

Prof. Chaldeans Mensah
Treasurer

Prof. Kevin E. Grisham
Secretary

Ingrid Busson, Esq.

H. Stephen Halloway, Esq.
The Hon. Joseph H. Melrose, Jr.

Prof. Richard Murgu

Jennifer "J.J." Stewart

Adam X. Storm, Esq.

Prof. Karen Young

Members Ex-officio

Michael J. Eaton

Executive Director

Prof. Shelton Williams

Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to welcome to the 2011 National Model United Nations (NMUN). This year's staffs for the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are Katharina Schmidt, Charles Green, Bobby Valentine and Michael Büchel. Charles Green, who will serve as a director at the Sheraton Venue is a senior at State University of New York Geneseo finishing a double major in Philosophy and Political Science. This is his fourth year at NMUN and his second on staff. His Assistant Director, Michael Büchl, is finishing his Masters in Political Science and History at LMU Munich, and is currently an exchange student at Copenhagen University. This is his third year at NMUN and his first year on staff. Katharina Schmidt will serve as the director at the Marriott Venue. She graduated in Political Science and Economics from the University of Bonn and is currently studying in the Master of Environmental Governance at the University of Freiburg, Germany. It is her fourth year at NMUN and her second year on staff. Her assistant director Bobby Valentine is enrolled in a Ph.D. program in Political Science at the University of Chicago, with special interests in international security, theory, and Middle Eastern political economy. It will be his first year on staff.

The topics under discussion for OSCE at the 2011 NMUN are:

- 1.) Combating human trafficking.
- 2.) Supporting the post-conflict stabilization and institution-building in Kyrgyzstan.
- 3.) Energy supply as a factor of instability.

The origin of the OSCE dates back to the era of the cold war. Even though the conditions have changed tremendously over time, security and cooperation remains an important item on the agenda in Europe. With its power to supervise and to intervene the OSCE is given a wide range of instruments to fulfill its tasks. Being a delegate at the OSCE can therefore be a challenging but interesting task. In order to prepare for the task this guide will aid you in understanding the topics listed above. It will provide you with an overview over the topics as well as some suggestions for introductory readings to start off your preparation. It is not meant to be an inclusive analysis but as the starting point for your own research. We encourage you to consult scholarly materials, news media, the OSCE website, and the governmental websites of your Member State in order to prepare for the debate in the committee.

Each participating delegation will be required to hand in a position paper prior to attending the conference. Please refer to the message from you Director-General explaining NMUN's position paper requirements and restrictions, and review your paper before submission, as adherence to these guidelines is crucial.

As the directors and the assistant directors for the OSCE, we are excited to meet you in New York and to provide for you the elite setting for which NMUN is renown. Until then, we wish each of you the best for your preparation. Please do not hesitate to direct any questions or concerns via e-mail to your Director.

Sincerely yours,

Sheraton Venue

Charles Green

Director

Michael Büchl

Assistant Director

osce.sheraton@nmun.org

Marriott Venue

Katharina Schmidt

Director

Bobby Valentine

Assistant Director

osce.marriott@nmun.org

Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2011 NMUN Conference

At the 2011 NMUN New York Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs or judicial experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. ***The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.*** In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single spaced pages (one double sided paper, if printed)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at 1 inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page; the use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2010. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org. This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 15, 2010 (GMT-5) for delegations attending the NMUN conference at either the Sheraton or the Marriott venue.**

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU_Namibia_University of Caprivi)

A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Holger Baer, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Brianna Johnston-Hanks, Director-General, Marriott venue at dirgen@nmun.org. There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Sheraton Venue
Holger Baer
Director-General
holger@nmun.org

Marriott Venue
Brianna Johnston-Hanks
Director-General
briannaj@nmun.org

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a *maximum* of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards.

Delegation from
Canada

Represented by
(Name of College)

Position Paper for General Assembly Plenary

The topics before the General Assembly Plenary are: Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict; the Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy; and the Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa. Canada is dedicated to collaborative multilateral approaches to ensuring protection and promotion of human security and advancement of sustainable development.

I. Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict

Canada endorses the Kimberly Process in promoting accountability, transparency, and effective governmental regulation of trade in rough diamonds. We believe the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an essential international regulatory mechanism and encourage all Member States to contribute to market accountability by seeking membership, participation, and compliance with its mandate. Canada urges Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué to strengthen government oversight of rough diamond trading and manufacturing by developing domestic legal frameworks similar to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. We call upon participating States to act in accordance with the KPCS's comprehensive and credible systems of peer review to monitor the continued implementation of the Kimberley Process and ensure full transparency and self-examination of domestic diamond industries. We draw attention to our domestic programs for diamond regulation including Implementing the Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act and urge Member States to consider these programs in developing the type of domestic regulatory frameworks called for in A/RES/55/56. Canada recognizes the crucial role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the review of rough diamond control measures developed through the Kimberly Process and encourages States to include NGOs, such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, in the review processes called for in A/RES/58/290. We urge Member States to act in accordance with A/RES/60/182 to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal and alluvial diamond miners by establishing a coordinating mechanism for financial and technical assistance through the Working Group of the Kimberly Process of Artisanal Alluvial Producers. Canada calls upon States and NGOs to provide basic educational material regarding diamond valuation and market prices for artisanal diggers, as recommended by the Diamond Development Initiative. Canada will continue to adhere to the 2007 Brussels Declaration on Internal Controls of Participants and is dedicated to ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective regulation of the rough diamond trade through the utilization of voluntary peer review systems and the promotion of increased measures of internal control within all diamond producing States.

II. The Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy

Canada is dedicated to integrating alternative energy sources into climate change frameworks by diversifying the energy market while improving competitiveness in a sustainable economy, as exemplified through our Turning Corners Report and Project Green climate strategies. We view the international commitment to the promotion of alternative sources of energy called for in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) as a catalyst to sustainable development and emission reduction. Canada fulfills its obligations to Article 4 of the UNFCCC by continuing to provide development assistance through the Climate Change Development Fund and calls upon Member States to commit substantial financial and technical investment toward the transfer of sustainable energy technologies and clean energy mechanisms to developing States. We emphasize the need for Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2005 Beijing International Renewable Energy Conference to strengthen domestic policy frameworks to promote clean energy technologies. Canada views

dissemination of technology information called for in the 2007 Group of Eight Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy Declaration as a vital step in energy diversification from conventional energy generation. We call upon Member States to integrate clean electricity from renewable sources into their domestic energy sector by employing investment campaigns similar to our \$1.48 billion initiative ecoENERGY for Renewable Power. Canada encourages States to develop domestic policies of energy efficiency, utilizing regulatory and financing frameworks to accelerate the deployment of clean low-emitting technologies. We call upon Member States to provide knowledge-based advisory services for expanding access to energy in order to fulfill their commitments to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Canada urges States to address the concerns of the 2007 Human Development Report by promoting tax incentives, similar to the Capital Cost Allowances and Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses, to encourage private sector development of energy conservation and renewable energy projects. As a member of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Canada is committed to accelerating the development of renewable energy projects, information sharing mechanisms, and energy efficient systems through the voluntary carbon offset system. We are dedicated to leading international efforts toward the development and sharing of best practices on clean energy technologies and highlight our release of the Renewable Energy Technologies Screen software for public and private stakeholders developing projects in energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy. Canada believes the integration of clean energy into State specific strategies called for in A/62/419/Add.9 will strengthen energy diversification, promote the use of cogeneration, and achieve a synergy between promoting alternative energy while allowing for competitiveness in a sustainable economy.

III. Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa

Canada views the full implementation of the treatment and prevention targets of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Especially in Africa, as essential to eradicating malaria and assisting African States to achieve Target 8 of Goal 6 of the MDGs by 2015. We recommend Member States cooperate with the World Health Organization to ensure transparency in the collection of statistical information for Indicators 21 and 22 of the MDGs. Canada reaffirms the targets of the Abuja Declaration Plan of Action stressing regional cooperation in the implementation, monitoring, and management of malaria prevention and treatment initiatives in Africa. To fully implement A/RES/61/228, Canada believes developed States must balance trade and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian objective of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. We continue to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health into our compulsory licensing framework through the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. We urge Member States to support compulsory licensing for essential generic medicines by including anti-malarial vaccines and initiating domestic provisions to permit export-only compulsory licenses to domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, similar to Canada's Access to Medicines Regime. Canada calls upon Member States to establish advanced market commitments on the distribution of pneumococcal vaccines to developing States in cooperation with PATH and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. We emphasize the need for greater membership in the Roll Back Malaria initiative to strengthen malaria control planning, funding, implementation, and evaluation by promoting increased investment in healthcare systems and greater incorporation of malaria control into all relevant multi-sector activities. Canada continues to implement the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) New Agenda for Action on Health to reduce malaria infection rates among marginalized populations in Africa, increase routine immunizations rates, and reduce infection rates of other neglected infections. Canada will achieve the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008-2009 by providing assistance to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We urge Member States to increase donations to intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that support malaria programming in Africa, exemplified by CIDA's contribution of \$26 million to the Canadian Red Cross. We continue our efforts to provide accessible and affordable vector control methods to African States through the Red Cross' Malaria Bed Net Campaign and the African Medical Research Foundation Canada by supplying insecticide-treated mosquito nets and Participatory Malaria Prevention and Treatment tool kits.

History of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Introduction

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization in history.¹ It works to build on security modalities and to further the implementation of early warning systems, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation.² It was born out of the détente era of the Cold War.³ With few modes for dialogue in East-West relations, a broad interest loomed among nations embroiled in the Cold War divide to mutually affirm borders and develop a framework for economic cooperation.⁴ In 1973, participants began preparatory talks in Helsinki emphasizing state sovereignty, full equality, and consensus decision-making as the basis for cooperation.⁵ The process was organized in four “cooperative baskets:” security, economics, science/technology, humanitarian, and follow-up/implementation.⁶

The first Conference for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began in 1973.⁷ As the first multilateral East-West negotiation process, the 35 original Member States of the CSCE produced an ambitious declaration entitled the Helsinki Final Act (HFA) in 1975.⁸ Comprised of confidence- and security-building measures, the HFA also proclaimed a direct link between human rights and security.⁹ Perhaps the most significant aspect of the HFA is a framework on peaceful relations between participating sovereign states called the Decalogue.¹⁰ Early on, poor treatment of Helsinki monitoring groups in several Eastern bloc countries stunted the implementation of the HFA.¹¹ More generally, decision-makers were challenged to find consensus with such a comprehensive agenda within the Cold War climate.¹² Pessimism regarding progress among the CSCE members ran high in the context of international events including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the institution of martial law in Poland.¹³

But, progress was made.¹⁴ As dramatic changes swept the Soviet bloc, the CSCE expanded and shifted its commitments to liberalism.¹⁵ In 1986, all Member States affirmed the promotion of free elections, freedom of media, protection of national minorities, and peaceable assembly.¹⁶ In 1990, the CSCE even found consensus on promoting democracy, pluralism, and market economies.¹⁷ Envisioning a new European order and building on the foundations of the HFA, the CSCE produced the Charter of Paris for a New Europe that effectively enshrined these

¹ Center for Strategic & International Studies, *Kazakhstan to Assume Chair of OSCE, Europe's Largest Security Organization*, 2009

² Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*, 2010

³ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly, *Website History*, 2010

⁴ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*, 2010

⁵ The Helsinki Consultations, *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations* [Blue Book]. Helsinki, 1973

⁶ Bailey and Bailey-Wiebecke, 1977, *All-European Co-operation: The CSCE's Basket Two and the ECE*

⁷ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Facts and Figures*

⁸ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act* [Helsinki Final Act], 1975

⁹ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe. *OSCE Handbook*.

¹⁰ European Navigator, *The Authoritative Multimedia Reference on the History of Europe*, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE)

¹¹ National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 191, *The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files*, 2006

¹² Snyder, S. B., The CSCE and the Atlantic alliance: Forging a new consensus in Madrid, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 8(1), p.56-68

¹³ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. *Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-Up of the Conference*. Belgrade, 1978

¹⁴ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, Vienna, 1990

¹⁵ Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe, *European Journal of International Relations*, 1995, 1(2) 157-189

¹⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Representative on the Freedom of Media. *Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, Freedom of Media: CSCE/OSCE Main Provisions 1975-2007*, 2007

¹⁷ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. *Document of the Bonn Conference*, 1990

rights as an edifice for a new European society.¹⁸ Today, the Charter serves as a compendium of common European values, considered by some as a prototype framework of a European Constitution.¹⁹

The end of a bipolar world swiftly changed the security theater for Europe and transitioned the CSCE into a more operational organization.²⁰ The CSCE rapidly institutionalized in order to manage the emerging ethnic/separatist conflicts.²¹ Toward regional stability, the CSCE developed mechanisms for emergencies regarding violations of the HFA.²² It also began to focus on more long-term missions to give assistance and expertise.²³ In 1995, the CSCE converted to the OSCE.²⁴ It was not without limits; challenges and shortcomings regarding several OSCE missions taught that it cannot be an exclusive guarantor of European security as envisioned at the Paris Summit.²⁵

Membership and Structure

Considered an ad hoc organization under the United Nations Charter (Ch. VIII), the OSCE is comprised of negotiation and decision-making bodies as well as operational structures and institutions.²⁶ It currently has 56 participating states, encompassing most of the Northern Hemisphere.²⁷ For negotiation and decision-making, the OSCE hosts conferences comprised of participating states that develop political commitments enshrined in declarations and resolutions.²⁸ First, summits are held occasionally composed of the OSCE Heads of State or Government.²⁹ The last summit took place in Istanbul in 1999.³⁰ Second, the Ministerial Council of OSCE member Foreign Ministers meets annually, except in summit years.³¹ Third, the OSCE has a Permanent Council of member delegates and consultants that meet weekly in Vienna.³² Fourth, the Forum for Security Co-operation meets weekly in Vienna to discuss and make decisions regarding military aspects of security in the OSCE area, in particular confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).³³

The OSCE Chairman in Office (CiO) is an annually rotating position chosen by the ministerial council.³⁴ The current CiO is Kazakhstan's Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev. The CiO is assisted by both the previous and succeeding Chairpersons called the Troika to assure continuity of the Organization's activities.³⁵ The previous and succeeding Chairpersons assist the CiO; the three of them together constitute the Troika.³⁶ The origin of the institution lies with the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), and the Helsinki Document 1992 formally institutionalized this function.³⁷

¹⁸ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, 1990

¹⁹ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, 1990

²⁰ Silber, Laura, and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1995

²¹ Stern, Paul C. and Daniel Druckman, *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, Washington, D.C.: National Academy, 2000.

²² Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *First Meeting of the Council Summary of Conclusions Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia*, Berlin, 1991

²³ Bothe, Michael, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas, *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997

²⁴ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe. *OSCE Handbook*.

²⁵ Bothe, Michael, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas, *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997

²⁶ United Nations Security Council. *S/RES/1631*, 2005

²⁷ BBC. Profile: *The OSCE*, 2010

²⁸ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*.

²⁹ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³⁰ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Istanbul Summit, 1999

³¹ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³² Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³³ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³⁴ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³⁵ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³⁶ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³⁷ Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Helsinki Summit, *Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change* 1992

For carrying out the OSCE's decisions, the OSCE Secretariat provides operational support.³⁸ The Secretary General acts as both the representative of the CiO and as the organization's chief administrative officer.³⁹ French Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut currently holds this position.⁴⁰

In order to incent participating countries to stay to task, the OSCE has a parliamentary assembly made of members of parliament from each county.⁴¹ The primary task of the 320 member Assembly is to facilitate inter-parliamentary dialogue, an important aspect of the overall effort to meet the challenges of democracy throughout the OSCE area.⁴² The provisions of the OSCE's declarations, documents, and resolutions are political commitments but not legally binding, minimizing disputes among Member States.⁴³

Today

Since 1999, the OSCE has developed a new platform for cooperative security, highlighting principles and modalities for working with other international and regional organization and avoiding redundancies.⁴⁴ Today, the OSCE works faithfully along its three operational dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human rights. Further, in the nimbly evolving security climate the OSCE is also managing threats that do not neatly fit the three dimensions, namely international terrorism, human trafficking, and border security.⁴⁵ Though conventional inter-state negotiation such as that of the OSCE long proved to be a viable mode of confidence- and security-building, the OSCE realized the exigency to meet these emergent transnational threats.⁴⁶ To specifically address the post Cold-War security challenges, the OSCE shifted from emergency interventions toward long-term projects of building democratic institutions, the rule of law, and economic development.⁴⁷ In 2003, it built new strategies on democracy, pluralism, and market economies.⁴⁸

Today, the OSCE conducts nearly two dozen active field operations assisting participating states in tasks ranging from disarmament and transparency to civil reform and election monitoring.⁴⁹ With an operational focus in Eastern European and Central Asian Member States, the OSCE promotes democratization, election preparation and monitoring, legal and judicial reform, enforcement, and capacity-building measures.⁵⁰ The organization has trended toward aspects relating to the Human Dimension in developing security and cooperation in Europe.⁵¹ Guided broadly by the 2003 Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, the OSCE has set itself a wide mandate for the future.⁵² Furthermore, 2010 OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum is working to promote "... good governance at border crossings, improving the security of land transportation and facilitating international transport by road and rail in the OSCE region."⁵³

³⁸ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

³⁹ Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*

⁴⁰ Murphy, Richard and Walter Kemp. *Marc Perrin de Brichambaut is Appointed OSCE Secretary General*, 2005

⁴¹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly, *About OSCE PA*, 2009

⁴² Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly, *About OSCE PA*, 2009

⁴³ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), *OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Reference Guide*, 2001

⁴⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Charter for European Security* [Istanbul Summit], 1999

⁴⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, 2003

⁴⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, 2003

⁴⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *The Charter for European Security of 1999*, 1999

⁴⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*, Maastricht, 2003

⁴⁹ The Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre, *Survey of OSCE Field Operations*, 2009

⁵⁰ The Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre, *Survey of OSCE Field Operations*, 2009

⁵¹ Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe. U.S. Helsinki Commission, *The Year in Review: OSCE Human Dimension Activities in 2009*, 2010

⁵² Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, 2003

⁵³ Secretariat – Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, *OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum*

Inquiry and exploration continue regarding the shape and scope of the OSCE's international legal personality, capacity, privileges, and immunities.⁵⁴ The OSCE has endeavored to continue the work it started. Current Chairperson in Office Kanat Saudabayev declared, "for the 35 years of its existence, the Helsinki Final Act has not lost its relevance and topicality. The innovative and comprehensive concept of security that was established by the leaders of 35 states in Helsinki remains today an important factor of security and co-operation in the OSCE."⁵⁵

I. Combating Human Trafficking

Boutros Boutros-Ghali "It has long been recognized that an essential element in protecting human rights was a widespread knowledge among the population of what their rights are and how they can be defended." – Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Introduction

Human trafficking predates modern history, but only in the past 50 years has the international community begun to recognize the problem as a human rights issue, and only in the past decade have there been serious efforts to prevent human trafficking.⁵⁶ Even with significant international focus on the issue, there is still a dearth of analysis and data on the issue.⁵⁷ It is estimated that more than 2.4 million people are currently being exploited as victims of trafficking, and nearly every country in the world is currently involved as a source, transit, or destination of human traffickers and their victims.⁵⁸

Human Trafficking in the OSCE Region

Since the 1990's, human trafficking in Europe, especially South East Europe (SEE), has been increasing rapidly.⁵⁹ The collapse of the Soviet Union, civil wars and civil conflict in South East Europe in the early 1990's created an economic, social, and political situation that deteriorated rapidly and left millions of people without a civil society to support them.⁶⁰ States in the region were also left without significant law enforcement capabilities, leaving them unable to effectively police their borders, a service that the Soviet Union had performed, enforced, and paid for during the cold war.⁶¹ The inability of law enforcement to prevent criminal activity from crossing borders illegally and the end of Soviet restrictions on travel allowed traffickers and victims to move across border with little risk, and few consequences should they be caught.⁶² The rapidly worsening situation created a vast pool of potential victims for existing traffickers, and created incentives for international criminal networks to begin trafficking in human beings.⁶³

Human Trafficking Under International Law

The first international agreement addressing trafficking was the United Nations Convention on the Suppression of Trafficking in Women and the Exploitation of Prostitution of Others.⁶⁴ The convention was the first to link slavery and prostitution, but did little to address the transport of victims or the cross-border aspects of trafficking.⁶⁵ In the 1990's, the situation in South East Europe brought renewed interest to the problem of human trafficking, and the United Nation's addressed the problem in the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) in 2000. The convention was the first international law to codify the term "Trafficking";

⁵⁴ Barry, Robert L, *The Future of the OSCE*, 2003.

⁵⁵ Kanat Saudabayev, *Astana Conference*, 2010.

⁵⁶ Omelaniuk, *Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2005.

⁵⁷ Omelaniuk, *Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2005.

⁵⁸ UNODC, *International community broadens efforts to help victims of human trafficking*, 2010.

⁵⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Report on Trafficking in persons*, 2009.

⁶⁰ Goodey, Jo, *Human Trafficking: Sktechy data and policy responses*, 2008, p. 3.

⁶¹ Marko Hajdinjak, *Smuggling in Southeast Europe*, 2002, p. 5.

⁶² Marko Hajdinjak, *Smuggling in Southeast Europe*, 2002, p. 5.

⁶³ Goodey, Jo, *Human Trafficking: Sktechy data and policy responses*, 2008, p. 3.

⁶⁴ Goodey, Jo, *Human Trafficking: Sktechy data and policy responses*, 2008, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Goodey, Jo, *Human Trafficking: Sktechy data and policy responses*, 2008, p. 3.

“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.⁶⁶

The Palermo Convention was soon followed by the supplementary Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, (the trafficking protocol) and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air in 2003.⁶⁷ The supplementary protocols were the first international instruments to call for the criminalization of all acts of trafficking, known as the “3ps”: prevention, prosecution, and protection.⁶⁸ Prior to 2000, states had focused overwhelmingly on prosecution and prevention. Although all three aspects of combating trafficking in human beings (THB) are essential to combating THB, the Palermo Protocol encouraged states to increase their commitment to protection and prevention in order to reduce the number of victims of trafficking. Kofi Annan noted the importance of this changing approach after the convention was passed:

With the signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in Palermo, Italy, in December 2000, the international community demonstrated the political will to answer a global challenge with a global response. If crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement. If the rule of law is undermined not only in one country, but in many, then those who defend it cannot limit themselves to purely national means. If the enemies of progress and human rights seek to exploit the openness and opportunities of globalization for their purposes, then we must exploit those very same factors to defend human rights and defeat the forces of crime, corruption and trafficking in human beings.⁶⁹

States that ratified the convention and its subsequent protocols were committing themselves to a series of measures aimed at combating transnational organized crime, including human trafficking. These measures included newly broadened extradition frameworks, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation, and training and technical assistance in order to create or improve upon the existing capabilities of national authorities.⁷⁰ As of today, 113 states are signatories to the convention, which entered into force on in 2003.⁷¹

The OSCE Action Plan: Prevention, Protection, Prosecution

OSCE member states have worked hard to combat human trafficking through the OSCE, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and NGOs, and nearly every OSCE has signed and ratified the Palermo Protocol. According to OSCE statistics, these efforts have had a modest effect on human trafficking in the region, but the number of trafficked persons continues to rise in Europe and the World as a whole. One of the most telling statistics is the number of prosecutions of traffickers. In 2008 there were 5,212 prosecutions, and based on best estimates, this number represents fewer than 1 in 800 traffickers.⁷² The OSCE’s role in combating THB is to support, upon request, states which are implementing anti-human trafficking legislation and policies, to analyze the commitments of governments to the issue of human trafficking, and to promote a human rights-based approach to the problem.⁷³

⁶⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime*, 2005.

⁶⁷ OSCE, *From Policy To Practice: Combating Trafficking In Human Beings In the OSCE Region*, 2006.

⁶⁸ United States Department of State, *Trafficking In Persons Report 10th edition*, 2010, p. 7.

⁶⁹ UN General Assembly, *Resolution 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime*, 2005, p. iii.

⁷⁰ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols*, 2008.

⁷¹ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *CTOC Status*, n.d.

⁷² Lehti, M., *Trafficking in Women and Children in Europe*, 2003.

⁷³ OSCE, *Combating Trafficking in the OSCE Region*, 2007, p. 3.

The OSCE has been involved in the fight against trafficking in human beings (THB) since its creation in 1973.⁷⁴ The numerous political agreements signed by the member states of the OSCE form the basis for an international commitment to combating THB, and states party to those agreements have tasked the OSCE and its various sub-organs, with assisting in the implementation of those agreements.⁷⁵ In 2003, the OSCE's Permanent Council adopted the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings in order to incorporate the best practices and to facilitate co-operation among participating states.⁷⁶ The action plan is the key document providing the framework for the anti-trafficking efforts of the OSCE, and it was the first attempt at a comprehensive solution to THB, covering "The protection of victims, the prevention of THB and the prosecution of those who facilitate or commit the crime".⁷⁷ At the international level, the plan provided recommendations "as to how participating states and relevant OSCE institutions, bodies and field operations may best deal with political, economic, legal, law enforcement, educational and other aspects of the problem".⁷⁸ Finally, the Action Plan authorized the creation of a sub-organ, the Office of the Special Representative and co-coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR CTHB).⁷⁹

The Special Representative and Co-coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

The Office of the Special Representative is headed by Maria Grazia Giammariano, who represents the OSCE at the political level in policies involving THB. The main purpose of the office of the special representative is to implement OSCE commitments, including the OSCE action plan, as well as to create and implement new strategies for combating THB.⁸⁰ The OSCE coordinates with relevant OSCE institutions, structures, and field operations in order to combat trafficking and assists states in their anti-trafficking efforts by providing four levels of support; policy-making, field work, technical expertise, and co-ordination of international actors.⁸¹ The OSR CTHB gives the OSCE the ability to focus resources on the problem of THB in an efficient and effective manner by preventing duplication of efforts in manpower, logistics, training, or funding.⁸² Ms. Giammariano has said that in order to eradicate human trafficking "the same level of commitment as witnessed in the case of historical slavery is needed."⁸³ The powers given to the OSR CTHB makes this level of commitment possible and the OSCE has been an active and effective member of the fight against THB since the action plan was created. In 2004, the ODIHR developed a handbook to assist states in creating a National Referral Mechanism, or "NRM".⁸⁴ An NRM is a "co-operative framework through which state actors fulfill their obligations to protect and promote the human rights of trafficked persons, co-coordinating their efforts in a strategic partnership with civil society".⁸⁵ According to Christian Strohal, the ODIHR Director, the purposes of NRM's are to "provide a practical tool for the countries in the OSCE region and beyond to meet challenges connected to trafficking in human beings."⁸⁶ The OSCE's focus on NRM's represented a major shift in the methodology of the international community, from policies which were often unable to deal with emerging or changing problems such towards a series of policies which are designed to be flexible and regional in their methods and goals. The NRM handbook built upon the practical experiences gained in states which had begun to create or had successfully used NRM's to combat THB, and assisting states in creating NRM's has become a key focus of the OSCE's work at the state level.⁸⁷

⁷⁴ OSR CTHB Website, *Overview*, n.d.

⁷⁵ OSR CTHB Website, *Overview*, n.d.

⁷⁶ OSCE, *Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2003, p. 2.

⁷⁷ OSCE, *Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2003, p. 3.

⁷⁸ OSCE, *Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2003, p. 3.

⁷⁹ OSR CTHB Website, *Overview*, n.d.

⁸⁰ OSCE, *Combating Trafficking in the OSCE Region*, 2007, p. 2.

⁸¹ OSR CTHB Website, *Policy and Practice*, n.d.

⁸² OSR CTHB Website, *Overview*, n.d.

⁸³ OSR CTHB Website, *Overview*, n.d.

⁸⁴ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 1.

⁸⁵ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 1.

⁸⁶ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 9.

⁸⁷ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 9.

OSCE Field Operations

The OSR CTHB maintains field offices in 17 European States, assisting OSCE Member States in their efforts to combat THB in conjunction with the Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit and the ODIHR.⁸⁸ Together, these OSCE bodies represent the majority of the OSCE field efforts to combat THB. OSCE efforts across Europe include diverse activities and programs such as training courses for Judges in Albania, establishing an SOS hotline for victims in Montenegro, and organizing rock concerts in Kosovo to raise awareness of the campaign to end violence against women.⁸⁹ The OSCE's field operations are not intended to be a catchall solution to the problems of each Member State. The goal of field operations are to work *with* existing government offices and organizations, as well as NGOs and civil society, in order to accomplish goals which are as varied as the problems facing each state.⁹⁰ Like the NRM's, OSCE field offices are designed to be flexible in their planning, methods, and resources, depending on the conditions they encounter. OSCE Field offices have had many successes like the programs mentioned above, but there is clearly much more that needs to be done. First and foremost, the OSCE must ensure that their programs focus on the humanitarian and human rights aspect of the problem.⁹¹ In the past, efforts to combat THB have resulted in harsh draconian law-enforcement measures in order to combat only the effects of trafficking, while doing nothing to prevent or protect victims.⁹² Working with states to establish effective humanitarian methods to combat THB is an ongoing struggle for OSCE field offices; throughout the OSCE area, protection mechanisms continue to be deficient in critical areas and are often insufficient in their protection of victims.⁹³ Furthermore, many states continue to utilize anti-trafficking measures which fail to address the problem of THB comprehensively, specifically failing to address gaps in victim-protection legislation and immigration laws.⁹⁴ Although civil society actors have worked hard to identify such deficiencies and the issue is recognized at the international level, without a cohesive and co-ordinate strategy between all member states, traffickers will continue to find and exploit loopholes in state frameworks.⁹⁵

In addition to field offices, the OSCE employs various task forces and regional sub-organizations in order to effectively manage Anti-trafficking efforts. One of the more important regional task forces in the OSCE region is the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings (SPTF).⁹⁶ The SPTF was created in 2000 in order to streamline and accelerate co-operation between the countries of South Eastern Europe.⁹⁷ In order to achieve these goals, the SPTF works directly with international organizations and regional NGO's, and facilitates funding and logistical support between states.⁹⁸ After its creation in 2000, the SPTF began fact-finding missions to analyze the capabilities, needs, and deficiencies of anti-trafficking measures in southeast Europe (SEE).⁹⁹ The resulting recommendations were made into the Multiyear Anti-trafficking Action Plan for South Eastern Europe, which was adopted by every country in SEE.¹⁰⁰ The recommendations of the action plan were to appoint a national co-ordinator for anti-trafficking measures, to establish multidisciplinary national working groups on human trafficking, and to participate in yearly SPTF task force meetings.¹⁰¹ These meetings have resulted in significant progress at the ministerial level in SEE, and in 2003 resulted in a Working Group on Victim/Witness Protection, which called upon SEE governments to adopt a victim-centered law enforcement approach in order to respond to victim/witness protection issues.¹⁰² Unfortunately, The recommendations of the working group did not result in significant changes to governmental policy in SEE; in 2003, fewer victims of trafficking were identified and assisted, prosecutions of

⁸⁸ OSCE, *Annual Report 2009, 2010*, p. 30-39

⁸⁹ OSCE, *Annual Report 2009, 2010*, p. 30-39.

⁹⁰ United States Institute of Peace, *OSCE Mission and other Field Activity Structures and Functions*, n.d. p. 2-4.

⁹¹ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 19.

⁹² OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 19.

⁹³ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 19.

⁹⁴ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 19.

⁹⁵ OSCE, *National Referral Mechanisms*, 2004, p. 19.

⁹⁶ SPTF, *The Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2004.

⁹⁷ SPTF, *The Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2004.

⁹⁸ SPTF, *The Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2004.

⁹⁹ SPTF, *The Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2004.

¹⁰⁰ SPTF, *The Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2004.

¹⁰¹ SPTF, *The Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2004.

¹⁰² SPTF, *The Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2004.

traffickers were no higher than in 2002 (even while the number of traffickers and victims increased) and there were no significant changes to the law-enforcement frameworks of states in SEE.¹⁰³

The Effectiveness of Anti-Trafficking Legislation

In light of their mandate to assist states with the creation and implementation of anti-trafficking legislation, the OSCE actively works to assist in the full implementation of the Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, (TIP Protocol) which requires that states implement laws which can properly respond to trafficking.¹⁰⁴ Creating and implementing effective anti-trafficking legislation has been an ongoing challenge for governments and the IGO's supporting them. While governments have found it easy to create and enforce laws designed to combat trafficking, it has proven extremely difficult to create and implement laws that are at once broad enough to cover the myriad ways that people are being trafficked and exploited, while simultaneously being focused enough to address the intricate nature of trafficking as a crime that often occurs in a legislative "grey area". Traffickers are often able to circumvent laws that are too broad, work through loopholes in laws that are not comprehensive, or simply use methods which are unregulated or remain legal. Compounding these problems are legal systems often designed to work against victims, who are often illegal immigrants employed in illegal activities and therefore commonly considered to be criminals *prima facie* or through association with their traffickers.¹⁰⁵

The need for a human rights approach in the fight against trafficking in human beings is based on both the mandate of the OSCE and the practicality of such an approach; although there have been strong legislative measures passed throughout Europe dealing with prevention and prosecution, these have clearly been ineffective.¹⁰⁶ The tendency of states to respond with policies that place illegal immigration, human smuggling and human trafficking in the same category is understandable given the inherent overlap between all three activities, but such policies tend to overemphasize the security aspect of trafficking and distract from the need for victim protection.¹⁰⁷ Attempts to create effective legislation have also been hampered by a lack of legislation harmonization between European states, especially the Stability Pact region. In 2001 the OSCE Ministerial Council released a statement which reaffirmed the need for a "more comprehensive and co-ordinated response from participating States and the international community, as well as a more co-operative approach among countries, in particular those origin, transit and destination".¹⁰⁸ More specifically, the Ministerial Council urged states to create comprehensive legislation that would address the human rights standpoint of trafficking, in order to more effectively and ethically combat THB.¹⁰⁹

What the OSCE can do

Though the issue has received increased attention at the political level over the past decade, the problem of human trafficking is still far from being solved. The cross-border nature of human trafficking, its complex causes and a public that is largely unaware and uneducated about the problem, combined with a dearth of effective legislation across the world has made trafficking a difficult activity to combat.¹¹⁰ The Palermo Protocol was intended to create a basis for legislation that emphasized a human rights approach to the problem, but prevention programs and victims' rights protection programs continue to receive inadequate funding and attention.¹¹¹ In the face of strong internal pressure to curb illegal immigration, many European nations continue to pass legislation intended to combat illegal migration, organized crime, and prostitution. Such strategies have thus far been ineffective and frequently counterproductive to victim identification, assistance, and rehabilitation.¹¹² By focusing on the criminality of victims' actions without acknowledging the causes of such actions, states have created criminals out of the victims and made the criminals anonymous, making it less likely that future victims will contact or cooperate with law enforcement.¹¹³ In order for the OSCE to effectively combat human trafficking in Europe, Member States will need

¹⁰³ Linanowska, *Anti-trafficking action in South-Eastern Europe*, 2003, p. 13.

¹⁰⁴ UN.GIFT, *The Vienna Forum to fight Human Trafficking*, 2008, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ UN.GIFT, *The Vienna Forum to fight Human Trafficking*, 2008, p. 3.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Report on Trafficking in persons*, 2009.

¹⁰⁷ Goodey, Jo, *Human Trafficking: Sketchy data and policy responses*, 2008, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸ OSCE, *Decision No. 1*, 2000, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ OSCE, *Decision No. 1*, 2000, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ OSCE, *Reference Guide For Anti-Trafficking Legislative Review*, 2001, p. 3.

¹¹¹ AWID, *Human Trafficking in South Eastern Europe*, 2008.

¹¹² UN General Assembly, *United Nations Global Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons*, 2010, p. 1-4.

¹¹³ OSCE, *Reference Guide For Anti-Trafficking Legislative Review*, 2001, p. 3.

to fundamentally alter the way they consider the problem of trafficking at a national and international level. At the national level, the rights and needs of victims must be better understood and supported. At the international level, states must work to break the link between human traffickers and transnational organized crime, which will require greater co-operation at the international and regional level between NGOs, IGOs, and states.¹¹⁴ The failure of the international community to achieve universal ratification and observance of all international treaties and protocols is an ongoing concern; in order to prevent traffickers from finding safe havens for recruiting and transit, the legal framework to fight human trafficking must extend beyond national borders.¹¹⁵ Until governments, NGOs, and IGOs establish a framework that allows the international community to fight trafficking cooperatively and effectively across borders, human traffickers will continue to outmaneuver and outrun the reach of the international community. Traffickers use the openness of society and opportunities of globalization to violate the rights of millions of people each year, and the international community must act in kind to stop them.¹¹⁶ Only with a unified approach, fully addressing prevention, prosecution, and protection will this happen.

II. Supporting the Post-Conflict Stabilization and Institution-Building in Kyrgyzstan

Introduction

In April 2010, Kyrgyzstan, a small post-soviet state in Central Asia, became the headline of newspapers around the world.¹¹⁷ At least seventeen people were killed during anti-government protest in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan.¹¹⁸ These riots were the starting point for a crisis in Kyrgyzstan during which the president resigned, ethnic tensions turned violent, and an interim government held a referendum over a new constitution.¹¹⁹ In the evaluation of these events, a comparison was often made to the Tulip Revolution of 2005, the revolutionary regime change where Kurmanbek Bakiyev, came into power.¹²⁰ In its twenty year history, the small Central Asian republic changed regimes violently twice, even though it was celebrated as an island of democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹²¹ There are no answers for those curious how a country with one of the greatest democratic perspectives of all post-Soviet States and immense international support could turn into an authoritarian regime.¹²² With the regime change and the referendum over a new constitution in 2010, new hopes are rising that Kyrgyzstan might find its way back to the path of democracy.¹²³

These hopes are also shared by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Since 1998, the OSCE has been mandated to support Kyrgyzstan in its developments towards a stabilized democratic nation.¹²⁴ Alarmed by the recent developments, the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE agreed in the *Oslo Declaration of 2010* that next year's geographic focus should lay on Central Asia and especially Kyrgyzstan.¹²⁵ With this decision, the OSCE recognizes the strategic importance of Kyrgyzstan for a stable Central Asian region and therefore justifies its efforts in post-conflict stabilization and institution-building in the country.¹²⁶

Kyrgyzstan and its Conflict Potential

In order to understand the difficulties of the work of the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan, one must take a closer look at the roots of the conflict potential within the state. As the developments of the past month have shown, the challenge for

¹¹⁴ OSCE, *Decision No. 557, OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2003, p. 1.

¹¹⁵ Annan, *Resolution 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime*, 2005, p. iii.

¹¹⁶ Annan, *Resolution 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime*, 2005, p. iii.

¹¹⁷ Harding, *Kyrgyzstan riot police open fire as protesters storm government building*, 2010

¹¹⁸ Harding, *Kyrgyzstan riot police open fire as protesters storm government building*, 2010

¹¹⁹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Kyrgyzstan: Full Coverage*

¹²⁰ Olcott, *Lessons of the "Tulip Revolution,"* 2005

¹²¹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan Understanding politics*, 2003, p.27

¹²² Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan Understanding politics*, 2003, p.27

¹²³ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *The Kyrgyz Republic - Constitutional Referendum*, 2010

¹²⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Decision No. 245*, 1998

¹²⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Oslo Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Nineteenth Annual*, 2010

¹²⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Oslo Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Nineteenth Annual*, 2010

the OSCE lies not only in the political system of Kyrgyzstan, but also in regional disparities and ethnic tensions within the state.¹²⁷ To understand these challenges, one has to take a look back to the emergence of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Ethnic tensions were present since the creation of the state, but the roots of conflict are deeper than that.¹²⁸ Within the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was ruled through indirect rule.¹²⁹ With the permission of Moscow, the Kyrgyz Communist Party controlled the Republic, and as long as the leaders obeyed Russian orders, it had a limited degree of freedom to preserve a national identity.¹³⁰ This system expressed a dual and often contradictory policy from Soviet leaders.¹³¹ On the one hand, a homogenous Soviet society with Russian domination over indigenous people was created; on the other hand, traditions of pre-Soviet ethnic identities were preserved.¹³² The process of cultural and linguistic Russification of the Soviet republics simultaneously happened to the preservation of old and invention of new local traditions.¹³³ This so-called indigenization was only a privilege of titular nations such as the Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan.¹³⁴ Other ethnic groups like Armenians, Chechens, Slavs, Germans, and Uzbeks, which immigrated to Kyrgyzstan during the Soviet period, were not involved in this process of creating local political and intellectual elite.¹³⁵ Since the Russification secured an integrative role for all ethnic groups, ethnic tensions during the Soviet period were limited.¹³⁶ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, multi-ethnic states were created.¹³⁷ But by naming the titular state after the Kyrgyz nation, this state was designated to this particular group.¹³⁸ The Kyrgyz represent only a little more than fifty percent of the population, while Uzbeks, Russians, Europeans and other nations make up the rest.¹³⁹ Even though Russian, which had an integrative role during the time of the Soviet Union, was also in the new state a common and widely accepted daily language, an ethnic divide between the different nations developed all the same.¹⁴⁰ This divide was even implemented in the constitution due to the fact that the Kyrgyz president needed to be fluent in Kyrgyz language.¹⁴¹ With these laws the majority of the population was excluded from the political elite.¹⁴² Ethnic tensions and the dispute over identity were the logical consequences, a situation exacerbated by traditional clan structures.¹⁴³ Tribes, as well as extended family groups such as clans, play an important role in life opportunities in the region.¹⁴⁴ Access to education, to a job with sufficient income, and to social services can be limited due to ethnic and family background, because informal politics determine daily life.¹⁴⁵

Since tribes in Kyrgyzstan are linked to geographic landmarks, tribalism and clans also intensify regional disparities.¹⁴⁶ A major source of regional tension is the North-South dichotomy.¹⁴⁷ While the richer northern region includes the capital, people from the South believe that politics brought greater prosperity to the North due to their access to political institutions.¹⁴⁸ It is indeed a fact that the South is underrepresented in politics and therefore has very limited control over resources.¹⁴⁹ But this dichotomy is also pronounced because of rural and urban disparities.¹⁵⁰ While the North is more urbanized, people in the South still live a very nomadic and agricultural

¹²⁷ Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p.3 -13

¹²⁸ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.17

¹²⁹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.17

¹³⁰ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.17

¹³¹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 21

¹³² Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 21

¹³³ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 21

¹³⁴ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22

¹³⁵ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22

¹³⁶ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22

¹³⁷ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22 and p.11

¹³⁸ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22 and p.11

¹³⁹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22 and p.11

¹⁴⁰ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22

¹⁴¹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22

¹⁴² Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.22

¹⁴³ Temirkouklov, *Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the Kyrgyz Republic*, 2004, p.95

¹⁴⁴ Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p8

¹⁴⁵ Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p8

¹⁴⁶ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.26

¹⁴⁷ Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p.2

¹⁴⁸ Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p.6

¹⁴⁹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.7

¹⁵⁰ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.7

life.¹⁵¹ Since only seven percent of the land in Kyrgyzstan is arable, poverty is more common in the South.¹⁵² These economic differences have led to several violent riots in the history of Kyrgyzstan and are still a major factor of the conflict potential in the country.¹⁵³

In the current crisis in Kyrgyzstan, non-violent protest began in southern regions in January 2010 after the decision of the government to sell the biggest state-owned electricity company far under value.¹⁵⁴ Since rumors spread that the company was sold to a member of the president's family, people started a street protest against the government and demanded the resignation of the government.¹⁵⁵ These protests turned into a violent outbreak in a southern province between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, which are competing ethnic groups in the regional government.¹⁵⁶ The recent developments in Kyrgyzstan show how closely ethnic tensions, regional disparities and tribalism are linked, and how each factor has its own conflict potential.

Kyrgyzstan and the Development of its Political System

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was considered a democratic role model in Central Asia.¹⁵⁷ This evaluation was made after president Asker Akayev opposed the military-communist coup in Moscow in August 1991.¹⁵⁸ He was the only Central Asian president that took action through banning the Communist Party and therefore preventing a coup in its own country.¹⁵⁹ After Kyrgyzstan's independence, Akayev encouraged liberal political and socio-economic reforms in the country.¹⁶⁰ He therefore became the hope of the international community, which started to believe that the transition of post-Soviet states into a democracy would be possible.¹⁶¹ These hopes were further encouraged through a relatively liberal constitution, which was approved in 1993.¹⁶² The constitution divided the government into legislative, executive and judicial branches, and created some checks and balances on presidential power.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, it gave the president broad political power to dominate the government, which turned out to be the basis of domination by the executive.¹⁶⁴ Through several constitutional amendments at the end of the 1990s, the power of the parliament was reduced while the power of the presidency expanded.¹⁶⁵ The former island of democracy with a parliamentary system turned into a presidential system with an authoritarian president.¹⁶⁶ The reelection of President Akayev in 2000 was only possible after a terminological manipulation.¹⁶⁷ The Kyrgyz constitution allows a president to serve only for two terms.¹⁶⁸ Serving as a candidate for the third time was verified by the fact that a new constitution was installed during the first period of Akayev's presidency and therefore would not count officially as first period.¹⁶⁹ President Akayev was reelected in elections that, according to the OSCE, failed to meet international standards.¹⁷⁰ This election was a conclusive indicator that Kyrgyzstan left the path of democracy.

In 2005, the Kyrgyz people rebelled against the authoritarian regime of Akayev in the Tulip Revolution.¹⁷¹ After the manipulation of parliamentary elections street protests forced the president to resign.¹⁷² As his successor Bakiyev

¹⁵¹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.7

¹⁵² Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.10

¹⁵³ International Crisis Group, *Kyrgyzstan*

¹⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, *Kyrgyzstan*

¹⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, *Kyrgyzstan*

¹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Kyrgyzstan: Urgent Need for OSCE Police*, 2010

¹⁵⁷ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 27

¹⁵⁸ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 27

¹⁵⁹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 27

¹⁶⁰ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 27

¹⁶¹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p. 27

¹⁶² Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.30

¹⁶³ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.30

¹⁶⁴ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.30

¹⁶⁵ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.30

¹⁶⁶ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.32

¹⁶⁷ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.30

¹⁶⁸ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.30

¹⁶⁹ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.30

¹⁷⁰ Dukenbaev and Hansen, *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*, 2003, p.32

¹⁷¹ Olcott, *Lessons of the "Tulip Revolution,"* 2005

¹⁷² Olcott, *Lessons of the "Tulip Revolution,"* 2005

was elected in, according to the OSCE, free and fair elections.¹⁷³ This again raised hopes for a democratic future of Kyrgyzstan, which again were disappointed by a president who further expanded presidential power and limited the growth of an independent society.¹⁷⁴

The recent developments in Kyrgyzstan seem to have obvious similarities to the Tulip Revolution of 2005. For the second time a president is violently chased out of office after great hopes for democracy and a lot of disappointment.¹⁷⁵ This regime change is again accompanied by violence against ethnic minorities and a large number of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries.¹⁷⁶ The interim government, which took control in April 2010, is challenged with the stability of the country and implementing democratic principles.¹⁷⁷ In June, a referendum was held on a new constitution.¹⁷⁸ Through this referendum, which was observed by the OSCE, Kyrgyzstan adopted a constitution designed to lead back to the path of democracy.¹⁷⁹ According to the new constitution, presidential power will be reduced in favor of the prime minister's office.¹⁸⁰ The parliament will be expanded from 90 to 120 seats and its importance shall be increased.¹⁸¹ While these developments seem to be favorable for the country, Kyrgyzstan still suffers from ethnic violence, especially in the South.¹⁸² Any attempt at democratization therefore seems to be dependent on the ability to engage ethnic minorities into power. Since the interim government is conscious of the danger of instability, it asked for international assistance from the OSCE, among others.¹⁸³

The Role of the OSCE

As stated in the *Ministerial Declaration on the Corfu Process*, the OSCE has a "vision of a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area [...] free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security."¹⁸⁴ Since Kyrgyzstan is a member of the OSCE, the organization has a striking interest in its political stability and therefore tries to promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments through the OSCE Center in Bishkek.¹⁸⁵ With the "emphasis on the regional context, in all OSCE dimensions, including the economic, environmental, human and political aspects of security and stability" the focus of the work is laid on improved communication with regional authorities, local non-governmental organizations and other authorities of major importance.¹⁸⁶ From bolstering the investment climate in the country, to the promotion of human rights, to assisting in the development of a free media, the OSCE organized dialogues, round tables and technical assistance.¹⁸⁷ Special attention is paid to politico-military activities.¹⁸⁸ Under this aspect of the mandate, activities considered conflict prevention, institution building, political monitoring, and/or reporting are of major importance.¹⁸⁹

In the area of institution building, the OSCE draws its attention to the establishment of a multi-party system and to the implementation of further constitutional and legislative reforms.¹⁹⁰ As a post-Soviet state, Kyrgyzstan's multi-party system is rather limited.¹⁹¹ Even though the country does not face a domination of one party, the infrastructure of most parties is limited to the capital.¹⁹² In elections many candidates are independent, so that ethnicity becomes a

¹⁷³ Olcott, *Lessons of the "Tulip Revolution,"* 2005

¹⁷⁴ Olcott, *Lessons of the "Tulip Revolution,"* 2005

¹⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, *Kyrgyzstan*

¹⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Kyrgyzstan: Urgent Need for OSCE Police*, 2010

¹⁷⁷ Council on Foreign Relations, *Kyrgyzstan Needs Return to Democratic Path*, 2010

¹⁷⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *The Kyrgyz Republic - Constitutional Referendum*, 2010

¹⁷⁹ Stemple, *Kyrgyzstan voters approve new constitution*, 2010

¹⁸⁰ Stemple, *Kyrgyzstan voters approve new constitution*, 2010

¹⁸¹ Stemple, *Kyrgyzstan voters approve new constitution*, 2010

¹⁸² Stemple, *Kyrgyzstan voters approve new constitution*, 2010

¹⁸³ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Police Advisory Group: Full coverage*

¹⁸⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu-Process*, 2009

¹⁸⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Decision No. 245*, 1998

¹⁸⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Survey of OSCE field operations*, 2009; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Survey of OSCE field operations*, 2009

¹⁸⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

¹⁸⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

¹⁸⁹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

¹⁹⁰ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

¹⁹¹ Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p.11

¹⁹² Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p.11

major attribute for a candidate and puts ethnic tensions at risk.¹⁹³ Since parties constitute the foundation for political discussions, the OSCE has a major interest in improving the party infrastructure. In advance of elections these efforts are increased.¹⁹⁴ An example is the code of conduct for parties, which was discussed and signed by the major parties in August 2010 in advance to the presidential elections in fall.¹⁹⁵ In order to assist Kyrgyzstan in constitutional and legislative reforms, the OSCE organizes regular dialogues between all involved parties. The process for the newly adopted constitution, for example, was not only monitored, but it was also supported through the organization of a discussion forum on amendments on the draft.¹⁹⁶

In the field of conflict prevention, ethnic tensions and the risk of an outbreak of violence constantly accompanies the work of the OSCE. To take this into account, the OSCE opened a field office in Osh, one of the major cities in southern Kyrgyzstan.¹⁹⁷ Monitoring as well as mediation between involved parties on the ground is simplified through this office.¹⁹⁸ Through the training of local police and military staff, the OSCE tries to establish a sustainable security system, which will be able to preserve public order and national security and hence prevent conflicts.¹⁹⁹

As recent developments have shown, conflict prevention is not always successful.²⁰⁰ In these cases, the OSCE still has the opportunity to send police missions to the ground in order to stabilize the situation.²⁰¹ In July 2010, the interim government of Kyrgyzstan officially requested assistance by the OSCE to handle the outbreak of ethnic violence in the south.²⁰² The foreign ministers of all OSCE countries agreed to send out a police advisory group to Kyrgyzstan with a mandate to facilitate strengthening trust, stability and order in the country.²⁰³ The mandate is limited to observing; taking action is not allowed.²⁰⁴ Overall, the OSCE tries to further a holistic approach in order to secure peace and stability in Kyrgyzstan.²⁰⁵

International Aspects

Even though the OSCE aims to be a partner for security and political dialogue for Kyrgyzstan, the country does not fully accept all efforts made by the organization. Prior to the request of assistance by the OSCE, Kyrgyzstan was rejected twice by the Russian Federation in its request for assistance.²⁰⁶ As the successor of the Soviet Union and with a major military presence to secure borders and protect Russian minorities, the Russian Federation still plays a major role in Kyrgyz security structure.²⁰⁷ Russia itself considers Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan as its back yard and a type of buffer zone that separates Russian territory from its rivals.²⁰⁸ Preserving influence in the region is therefore a major concern of the Russian government.²⁰⁹

Another important partner in security questions for Kyrgyzstan is Uzbekistan. Uzbeks are the largest minority in Kyrgyzstan, who live on the border of the two countries.²¹⁰ Any outbreak of ethnic violence between these two ethnic groups within Kyrgyzstan can easily escalate to a border conflict.²¹¹ These conflicts could destabilize the whole region, an outcome that cannot be tolerated by either country.

¹⁹³ Huskey, *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*, 1997, p.11

¹⁹⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

¹⁹⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Code of Ethical Conduct of Political Parties in Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic*, 2010

¹⁹⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *The Kyrgyz Republic - Constitutional Referendum*, 2010

¹⁹⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

¹⁹⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

¹⁹⁹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

²⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Kyrgyzstan: Urgent Need for OSCE Police*, 2010

²⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, *Kyrgyzstan: Urgent Need for OSCE Police*, 2010

²⁰² Human Rights Watch, *Kyrgyzstan: Urgent Need for OSCE Police*, 2010

²⁰³ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Police Advisory Group: Full coverage*

²⁰⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Police Advisory Group: Full coverage*

²⁰⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Police Advisory Group: Full coverage*

²⁰⁶ Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

²⁰⁷ Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

²⁰⁸ Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

²⁰⁹ Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

²¹⁰ Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

²¹¹ Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

Since Kyrgyzstan is a neighbor state of Afghanistan, the Republic gained in strategic importance for parties that are involved in the Afghan conflict.²¹² The United States recognized the geopolitical importance of Kyrgyzstan and created a military base in the country.²¹³ The European Union also recognized the geopolitical importance of Kyrgyzstan just recently, and is trying to develop a Central Asia strategy. How this strategy looks is still a question of debate.²¹⁴ All in all, international actors have different interests in Kyrgyzstan, and the ways in which these interests compete with those of the OSCE vary. The OSCE has to be careful, that individual interests of its Member States do not jeopardize the work of the OSCE.

Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan is again in a state of transition. After the collapse of the regime in April 2010, it is still suffering from violent ethnic conflicts in some parts of the country, but it also seems to be using the crisis as a turning point towards democracy.²¹⁵ The referendum and the adoption of the new constitution are steps in this direction. In this process the OSCE can play an important role in the development of democratic structures.²¹⁶ If the committee monitors the developments carefully and finds sustainable solutions, the high hopes of stabilization and democratization can come true. In order to find these solutions, delegates can raise the following questions: Are the latest developments really a hint of democratization? Can the OSCE catalyze the process of implementing legislative and constitutional changes? Do the new developments indicate new aspects for democratization? How can the ethnic tensions in the South be sustainably mediated? Is there any possibility of a long-term solution such as an improved sharing of power? And how can individual interests of OSCE members be channeled towards the interests of the OSCE?

III. Energy supply as a factor of instability

*We recognize that a high level of energy security requires a predictable, reliable, economically acceptable, commercially sound and environmentally friendly energy supply, which can be achieved by means of long-term contracts in appropriate cases. We will encourage energy dialogue and efforts to diversify energy supply, ensure the safety of energy routes, and make more efficient use of energy resources. We will also support further development and use of new and renewable sources of energy.*²¹⁷

Introduction

Today's highly developed economies rely on a constant supply of cheap energy. Since the first oil crisis in 1973, Western States are aware of their dependency of energy imports from potentially unstable regions. However today's term energy security refers to a multidimensional problem covering the issue of the security of supply, the question of competitiveness, but also the aim for sustainability in the field of energy production and consumption.²¹⁸ Thus it involves topics from political stability of energy producing countries to possible threats to the energy transit be it political conflict, terrorism or natural disasters to questions of diversification of energy sources of the net consuming countries and the development of a more sustainable use of energy.

Eurasia includes some of the world's major net energy consuming countries, such as Germany and France, and major net energy producers besides the Russian Federation notably the Central Asian States Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but also Azerbaijan and Norway.²¹⁹ Oil and natural gas still remain the main energy sources within the European Union (EU) with oil having a share of 36.4% respectively 24% of the EU's total energy

²¹² Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

²¹³ Mihalka, *Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia*, 2007

²¹⁴ Niepagenkemper, *Wo steht die Zentralasienstrategie der EU?*, 2007

²¹⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

²¹⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*

²¹⁷ OSCE, *Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*, 2003, operative clause 2.1.12.

²¹⁸ OSCE, *Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*, 2003, operative clause 2.1.12.

²¹⁹ European Union, *Europe's Energy Portal – dependency*, n.d.

consumption.²²⁰ Most countries of the European Union (EU), despite vast oil and natural gas reserves in the North Sea, are dependent on energy imports from non-EU-countries, with the average EU-27 Member State relying to 53.8% of its energy consumption on imports.²²¹ The most important energy exporter to the EU is the Russian Federation providing about 33% of the EU's oil imports and about 40% of the natural gas imports.²²² Concerning crude oil the other main supplier countries are the OPEC states with 37% of EU's crude oil imports, Norway with 15% and Kazakhstan with 18.3%. In terms of natural gas imports Russia is followed by Norway (27%) and Algeria (17%).²²³

Dangers for Europe's energy supply

European energy security is first and foremost endangered by its dependency on only few main suppliers especially the Russian Federation that is pumping its oil and gas resources mainly through pipelines in only two energy corridors towards central Europe, mainly the Northern Lights/Jamai-Europa Pipeline running through Belarus and the Brotherhood/Druschba Pipeline running through Ukraine.²²⁴ The possible vulnerability of the pipeline system both through manmade and natural disasters, conflicts between the Russian Federation and the transit countries, but also the instability of other possible energy suppliers in Central Asia can be seen as the main threats.

Relying on only a couple of transit corridors, Europe is especially vulnerable in case of any interception of one of the main pipelines. Pipelines are rather fragile systems that can easily be harmed by natural disasters or also terrorism. In recent years the threat of terrorism against important infrastructure has become an increasingly important issue.²²⁵ There have been terrorist attacks reported against pipeline systems in Nigeria, Iraq, Turkey, India and also the Russian Federation.²²⁶ Facing the continuing unrest in Russia's Caucasus provinces and Republics, especially in Dagestan, the threat of an attack against a crucial pipeline infrastructure remains immanent.²²⁷

Furthermore possible threats to Europe's energy security are political conflicts and unstable governments both in energy supplier state as well as in major transit countries. Although they are not yet fully included in the European pipeline system the oil and gas rich Central Asian and Caspian states play or will play an increasingly important role in delivering hydrocarbons to the EU.²²⁸ Among these states Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are believed to possess both huge natural gas and crude oil reserves, mainly in the Caspian Sea.²²⁹ All these states except Kazakhstan are listed in the 2010 Foreign Policy Failed State Index as "in danger" with Uzbekistan being number 36 of the list of failed states and can thus be described as fragile states.²³⁰ Political turmoil as just recently seen in Kyrgyzstan can lead to delivery problems and contribute to an increase of the oil and gas price.

Conflicts between the Russian Federation and transit countries

Europe's vulnerability in terms of energy supply was demonstrated during the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes beginning in 2005 and lasting until 2008, as well as the Russia-Belarus gas disputes of 2004, 2007 and 2010. The Russia-Ukraine gas disputes are basically disputes between the Russian state run gas supplier Gazprom and the Ukrainian energy company Naftogaz Ukrainy about gas prices for the Ukrainian home market, transit costs for the

²²⁰ European Commission, *Europe's energy position markets and supply - Market Observatory for Energy Report*, 2009, p. 7.

²²¹ European Commission, *Europe's energy position markets and supply - Market Observatory for Energy Report*, 2009, p. 7.

²²² European Union, *Europe's Energy Portal*, n.d.

²²³ European Commission, *Europe's energy position markets and supply - Market Observatory for Energy Report*, 2009, p. 7.

²²⁴ Der Spiegel, *Europe's Pipeline War*, 2009.

²²⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006, operative clause 18.

²²⁶ Luft, *Pipeline Sabotage is Terrorist's weapon of Choice*, 2005.

²²⁷ BBC News, *Twelve killed in twin bombing in s in Russia's Dagestan*, 2010.

²²⁸ European Commission, *Europe's energy position markets and supply - Market Observatory for Energy Report*, 2009, p. 61.

²²⁹ US Energy Information Administration, *Kazakhstan Energy Profile*, 2010;

US Energy Information Administration, *Azerbaijan Energy Profile*, 2010;

US Energy Information Administration, *Uzbekistan Energy Profile*, 2010.

²³⁰ Foreign Policy, *Failed States Index*, 2010; International Crisis Group, *Europe Report No207 Azerbaijan: Vulnerable Instability*, 2010.

Ukrainian part of the Druschba pipeline and Ukrainian debts.²³¹ The conflict began in March 2005 with Gazprom claiming Ukraine not having paid for delivered gas and furthermore diverting gas that was intended for the EU gas market.²³² On January 1, 2006 the conflict escalated when Gazprom cut all gas transmission to and through Ukraine.²³³ This move caused a downfall in the amount of gas being pumped from Russia to the EU.²³⁴ On January 4, 2006 Ukraine agreed on a preliminary agreement on the Ukrainian gas prices and Gazprom reopened the pipelines.²³⁵ However, in October 2007 the tensions between the countries rose again due to lasting debts of the Ukrainian side escalating in new gas cuts in March 2008. The conflict continued during the whole year and reached another peak in 2009 with Gazprom once more decreasing the gas supply leading to cut offs in the gas supply for Bulgaria, Greece, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic Slovakia of at least 70% of the normal supply and also disruptions in France, Germany, Italy and Poland.²³⁶

Another conflict arose between Russia and Belarus in 2007. Again, as in the Ukrainian case, Gazprom demanded higher prizes for the gas it delivered to Belarus.²³⁷ To put pressure on the Belarusian State the Russian state owned company Transneft, which runs the Druschba pipeline, stopped pumping oil into the pipeline on January 8, 2007.²³⁸ The parties finally agreed on higher prizes for Russian crude oil and gas.²³⁹ Nevertheless the conflict remains still unsolved but re-erupted in 2010 when both Belarus and Gazprom cut the energy supply lines running through Belarus.²⁴⁰

The Russian side pointed out that in both cases the move was due to the unwillingness of Ukraine respectively Belarus in paying higher energy prices.²⁴¹ Both countries indeed received highly subsidized oil and gas due to contracts going back to the soviet era.²⁴² Additionally, Belarus used the cheap Russian oil as a major source of income by refining it and selling it on higher prices to Europe.²⁴³ However, the Russian gas policy is accused of being a tool to enforce the Russian policy on the former soviet sphere of influence.²⁴⁴ The Ukrainian gas conflict just arose after the so-called Orange Revolution, establishing a pro-Western government. Indeed on April 21, 2010 Russian President Medvedev and his “pro-Russian” Ukrainian counterpart Victor Yanukovych signed an agreement leading to a 30% drop of the price paid for gas by the Ukraine in exchange for the extension of the lease for the Russian Naval base at Sevastopol for 25 years.²⁴⁵

Europe’s diversification efforts – Southstream, Nord Stream, Nabucco and the pipeline struggle

Facing the effects of the Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus gas disputes Europe is currently working on the build-up of three completely new major energy supply corridors in order to diversify the transport routes and bypass the traditional transit countries Ukraine and Belarus. The Nord Stream pipeline project is being built to deliver Russian gas from the Siberian Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field to Germany under the Baltic Sea.²⁴⁶ On the southern route via the Balkans the Russian supported South Stream pipeline project competes with the EU’s Nabucco pipeline project that intends to bring gas from the Caspian Sea to Central Europe and would make the EU less dependent on Russian gas.²⁴⁷

Nord Stream is a currently built pipeline directly linking the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field in Western Siberia to the German and Dutch gas market. The pipeline is built by Gazprom with a share of 51% and in conjunction with a

²³¹ Götz, *After the Gas Conflict*, 2006, p. 1.

²³² BBC News, *Ukraine 'stealing Europe's gas'*, 2006.

²³³ BBC News, *Ukraine takes extra Russian gas*, 2006.

²³⁴ Götz, *After the Gas Conflict*, 2006, p. 2.

²³⁵ Götz, *After the Gas Conflict*, 2006, p. 2.

²³⁶ EU Observer, *EU considers emergency measures as gas crisis intensifies*, 2009.

²³⁷ BBC News, *Russia oil row hits Europe supply*, 2007.

²³⁸ BBC News, *Russia oil row hits Europe supply*, 2007.

²³⁹ BBC News, *Russia-Belarus oil blockade ends*, 2007.

²⁴⁰ Schwirtz, *Belarus Escalates Dispute With Russians Over Gas*, 2010.

²⁴¹ Götz, *After the Gas Conflict*, 2006, p. 1.

²⁴² Götz, *After the Gas Conflict*, 2006, p. 1.

²⁴³ BBC News, *Russia oil row hits Europe supply*, 2007.

²⁴⁴ Litvin, *Oil, gas and imperialism*, 2006.

²⁴⁵ Kyiv Post, *Update: Ukraine, Russia ratify Black Sea naval lease*, 2010.

²⁴⁶ Nord Stream, *Nord Stream*, n.d..

²⁴⁷ BBC News, *Balkan boost for Russian Gas Plan*, 2008.
Nabucco Gas Pipeline, *Overview*, n.d.

consortium of German and Dutch energy companies.²⁴⁸ By taking the direct way through the Baltic Sea the pipeline bypasses the traditional transit countries Belarus and Ukraine and thus creates an all-new energy corridor. However, as the pipeline also bypasses Poland as well as the Baltic states its construction has caused some discomfort in these states and was thus labeled as a German-Russian ‘go it alone project’.²⁴⁹ Nevertheless EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger regards the pipeline as “[...] a EU priority energy project and important in complementing the European energy grid” as he pointed out during the official launch of the construction on April 09 2010.²⁵⁰

The other two big European gas pipeline projects are located in South-Eastern Europe. The South Stream Pipeline, which is planned by Gazprom, would run under the Black Sea via Bulgaria to Central Europe, possibly delivering gas to Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Hungary, Austria and the Western Balkans.²⁵¹ The pipeline is therefore a direct competitor to the EU’s Nabucco project, a planned gas pipeline from Azerbaijan through Turkey, Bulgaria and Hungary to Austria.²⁵² It would also be possible to feed in gas from the Central Asian States, notably Turkmenistan via a pipeline through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan into the Nabucco pipeline.²⁵³ Additionally, despite failed negotiations in 2009, a link to Iran remains theoretically an option for the Nabucco project.²⁵⁴ Integrating Iran and Iraq, with their vast oil and natural gas reserves, would greatly revalue the Nabucco pipeline as two other major energy producers would be directly linked to the European energy market while Azerbaijan seems to be unable to cover the European energy demand that should be supplied by Nabucco.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, due to the tension between European states and Iran and because of political pressure from the United States, such a move seems very unlikely in the future.²⁵⁶

Both pipelines would serve the same market and thus it is possible that only one project will be realized.²⁵⁷ All the more, both parties heavily fight for their projects, which can be seen in Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent comment on Nabucco as a “senseless and dangerous” project.²⁵⁸ However, Gazprom apparently is taking the lead as the Russian Federation has already made major energy deals with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan probably to cut off Nabucco from plausible suppliers.²⁵⁹

The DESERTEC Project

In 2008 the EU adopted a plan to increase the overall use of renewable energies on the European energy market from 9.2% of the overall energy consumption in 2006 to 20% of the overall energy consumption by 2020.²⁶⁰ The aim is not only to foster the EU’s goals to reduce CO₂ emissions but also to diversify the EU’s energy sources.²⁶¹ Additionally to large programs in all EU countries European energy companies are pursuing plans to use North Africa’s vast renewable energy sources for the European market. Most prominently is the DESERTEC Industrial Initiative (DII), a consortium of European and North African companies, most notable Munich Re, Siemens, Deutsche Bank and the energy companies E.On, RWE, Enel, Électricité de France (EDF) and Red Eléctrica, but also companies and state agencies from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan plans to largely increase the share of renewable energy supply.²⁶² DII plans to supply Europe and the North African and Middle Eastern States with solar and wind power from the Sahara desert via high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission lines. The plan suggests that the project should provide 20 gigawatts by 2020 and have a share of 15% of Europe’s overall

²⁴⁸ Nord Stream, *Facts and Figures*, n.d.

²⁴⁹ Warsaw Business Journal, *Putin shocked at Poland’s Nord Stream „request“, says Russian daily*, 2010.

²⁵⁰ Nord Stream, *Press Release: Official launch of Construction of North Stream Natural Gas Pipeline*, 2010.

²⁵¹ South Stream, *Gas Pipeline Route*, n.d.

²⁵² Nabucco Gas Pipeline, *Route*, n.d.

²⁵³ Downstream Today, OMV, *RWE Launch Caspian Pipeline JV*, 2008.

²⁵⁴ The Independent, *Nabucco needs Iran and Iraq*, 2010.

²⁵⁵ The Independent, *Nabucco needs Iran and Iraq*, 2010.

²⁵⁶ The Independent, *Nabucco needs Iran and Iraq*, 2010.

²⁵⁷ Der Spiegel, *Europe’s Pipeline War*, 2009.

²⁵⁸ Reuters, *Putin wins Austrian gas deal, scorns EU pipeline*, 2010.

²⁵⁹ BBC News, *Russian gas deal dashes EU hopes*, 2007;

BBC News, *Gazprom in Azerbaijan gas deal*, 2009.

²⁶⁰ European Union, *Europe’s Energy Portal – Renewables*, n.d.

²⁶¹ European Union, *Europe’s Energy Portal*. n.d.

²⁶² European Union, *Europe’s Energy Portal – Renewables*, n.d.

electricity consumption by 2050.²⁶³ Theoretically the project is feasible with today's technology.²⁶⁴ However, it still faces many financial and political problems. First of all, the realization of the concept makes extremely large investments necessary.²⁶⁵ This is still slightly hindered by political problems. States like Algeria, but also Egypt with its aging autocratic ruler can be seen as fragile states and thus may have problems in the future.²⁶⁶ Additionally the cooperation between the Northern African States is still problematic.²⁶⁷ Nevertheless despite these problems the DESERTEC and similar projects are likely to become a major factor in Europe's energy supply in the next decades.²⁶⁸

OSCE and energy security

The OSCE Member States decided to make energy security one of the organizations working fields in 2003 when the Ministerial Council decided on the OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension at the annual OSCE meeting.²⁶⁹ The Document states in paragraph 2.1.12. (Energy) that a high level of energy security requires a predictable, reliable, economically acceptable, commercially sound and environmentally friendly energy supply and further underlines the need to ensure the safety for the energy routes.²⁷⁰ OSCE's concept of Energy Security thus goes beyond the security of supply and also includes the concept of security of demand, security of transit and energy efficiency. OSCE energy security policy is part of basket two – the Economic and Environmental activities of the organization.²⁷¹

The OSCE Energy Security Dialogue was founded by the OSCE Ministerial Council in 2006 to foster cooperation among Member States in the field of energy security.²⁷² The Ministerial Council committed itself to the goals of the G8 Petersburg summit, tasking the Permanent Council and the OSCE Secretariat on the G8 Plan of Action on Climate change, clean energy and sustainable development and the G8 Plan on energy security.²⁷³ Furthermore an expert level dialogue among the member states is fostered. The document also underlines the importance of renewable energy sources and the need of long term contracts and dialogue between energy producing, consuming and transit countries.²⁷⁴

At the 2007 OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Madrid the Ministerial Council approved of OSCE decision No. 06/07 Protecting Critical Energy Infrastructure from Terrorist Attack, underlining the importance to protect critical energy infrastructure from possible terrorist attacks.²⁷⁵ The Ministerial Council therefore urged its Member States to continue cooperation and to better coordinate measures and to increase the protection of critical energy infrastructure from terrorist attack and also consider exchanging of best practices and sharing of information.²⁷⁶ The 2009 Athens ministerial meeting passed OSCE Decision No. 6/09 Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area.²⁷⁷ In the decision the Member States are encouraged to increase transparency, improve the investment climate in the energy sector, enhance energy efficiency and energy saving, diversify their energy mix, ensure physical security of critical energy infrastructure, reduce energy poverty and address climate

²⁶³ DESERTEC Foundation, *Clean Power From the Desserts, The DESERTEC Concept for Energy, Water and Climate Security*, 2009, p. 36.

²⁶⁴ German Aerospace Center (DLR) Institute for Technical Thermodynamics, Section Systems Analysis and Technology Assessment, *Trans-Mediterranean Interconnection for Concentrating Solar Power final Report*, 2006.

²⁶⁵ Werenfels & Westphal, *Solar Power from North Africa, Frameworks and Prospects*, 2010, p. 24f.

²⁶⁶ Foreign Policy, *The Failed State Index*, 2010.

²⁶⁷ Werenfels & Westphal, *Solar Power from North Africa, Frameworks and Prospects*, 2010, p. 26.

²⁶⁸ Werenfels & Westphal, *Solar Power from North Africa, Frameworks and Prospects*, 2010, p. 35.

²⁶⁹ OSCE, *Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*, 2003.

²⁷⁰ OSCE, *Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*, 2003, operative clause 2.1.12..

²⁷¹ OSCE Secretariat, *Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities*, n.d..

²⁷² OSCE, *Energy Security Dialogue in the OSCE (Decision No. 12/06)*, 2006.

²⁷³ G8, *Gleneagles Plan of Action – Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development*, 2005;

G8, *St. Petersburg Plan of Action – Global Energy Security*, 2006;

OSCE, *Energy Security Dialogue in the OSCE (Decision No. 12/06)*, 2006, operative clause 2.

²⁷⁴ OSCE, *Energy Security Dialogue in the OSCE (Decision No. 12/06)*, 2006.

²⁷⁵ OSCE, *Protecting Critical Energy Infrastructure from Terrorist Attacks (Decision No. 06/07)*, 2007.

²⁷⁶ OSCE, *Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area (Decision No. 6/09)*, 2009, operative clauses 3, 4. and 5.

²⁷⁷ OSCE, *Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area (Decision No. 6/09)*, 2009.

change and sustainable development.²⁷⁸ The Member States are further encouraged to strengthen cooperation in the energy field.²⁷⁹ In the field of cooperation the Ministerial Council decided to hold an expert meeting on the cooperation in the field of energy security in 2010 with the results being subsumed in a report by the OSCE Secretary General.²⁸⁰

The 2010 Kazakh OSCE chairmanship did not place energy security in the very center of its work, however it still stated that „We must continue to pay attention to migration issues and to ensuring energy security in line with the decisions adopted at the Ministerial Council meeting in Athens.“²⁸¹

Based on the 2009 Athens Decision on Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE area on September 13, the 2010 Kazakh and the 2011 Lithuanian OSCE chairmanship organized an expert meeting on energy security challenges in the OSCE area and developed the organization's role as a platform to promote cooperation.²⁸² Based on the outcome of the conference the OSCE Secretary General is currently preparing a report on the organization's role in addressing the issues of energy security.²⁸³

Conclusion

The upcoming 2011 Lithuanian OSCE chairmanship has already stated that it plans to give energy security a high priority on the agenda, fostering further diversification, development of energy infrastructure and protection from international threats, as well as promotion of fair competition and more efficient use of available resources through international and national cooperation.²⁸⁴ Although other international and regional organizations, such as the G8, EU and International Energy Agency (IEA) are dealing with the topic of energy security OSCE combining both security and economical cooperation aspects can play a distinctive role in bringing together Europe's main energy suppliers, transit countries and consumers.²⁸⁵ OSCE's ability to bring the conflicting parties in the energy struggle together and foster cooperation both on a political and technical level is hereby the organizations major strength. OSCE will need to deal with worldwide increasing energy demand, EU's lasting dependency on external energy sources despite its efforts to diversify and create more sustainable energy but also the dependency of the Russian Federation and the Central Asian States on energy exports will keep the topic of energy security on OSCE's agenda for a long time. So far OSCE only provides a platform for discussions and expert meeting on the topic but the organization plays no role when it comes to decisions on cooperation in large-scale energy projects.

²⁷⁸ OSCE, *Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area (Decision No. 6/09)*, 2009, operative clause 1.

²⁷⁹ OSCE, *Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area (Decision No. 6/09)*, 2009, operative clause 2.

²⁸⁰ OSCE, *Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area (Decision No. 6/09)*, 2009, operative clause 3 and 4.

²⁸¹ Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *The Republic of Kazakhstan's Programme for its Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010*, 2009.

²⁸² OSCE, *Expert meeting on assessing the OSCE's future contribution to international energy security co-operation, Vilnius, 13-14 September 2010*, 2010.

²⁸³ The Baltic Course, *Lithuania's OSCE chairmanship has a goal to include energy security into organization's activities*, 2010.

²⁸⁴ The Baltic Course, *Lithuania's OSCE chairmanship has a goal to include energy security into organization's activities*, 2010.

²⁸⁵ Snoy, *Energy security an OSCE perspective*, 2006, p. 297f.

Annotated Bibliography

Committee History of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Bailey, Paul J. and Ilka Bailey-Wiebecke. (1977). All-European Co-operation: The CSCE's Basket Two and the ECE. *International Journal*, 32(2), 386-407. Canadian International Council. Retrieved on September 4, 2010, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40200895>

This article was one of the first to analyze Basket Two of the Helsinki Final Act. It compares the goals and trajectories between the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and "cooperation in the field of economics, of science and technology, and of the environment." It is useful in considering the points of departure in economic goals between Western European countries and the Soviet Union.

BBC (N.D). *Profile: The OSCE*. (2010). Retrieved on August 1, 2010 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3183718.stm

BBC News' online resources provide excellent summary briefs on many political topics. This page is a convenient précis of the organization's background, structure, and field operations. Use the site to filter relevant news related to the topic of inquiry.

Bothe, Michael, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas. (1991). *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997. Print.

Produced by The Hague, this book provides all information on the history, development, mechanisms, and challenges of conflict prevention, crisis management, and dispute settlement. The authors are internationally reputed authorities on international law and work closely and frequently with UN bodies and well as the OSCE. If print copies are unobtainable, portions of the book can be found on Google Books.

Center for Strategic & International Studies. (2009). *Kazakhstan to Assume Chair of OSCE, Europe's Largest Security Organization*. Retrieved on August 1, 2010 from [http://csis.org/publication/kazakhstan-assume-chair-osce - europe%E2%80%99s-largest-security-organization](http://csis.org/publication/kazakhstan-assume-chair-osce-europe%E2%80%99s-largest-security-organization)

CSIS is a highly respected bi-partisan foreign policy think tank, based in Washington D.C. They provide strategic insights and policy solutions to decision makers among government bodies, international institutions, and the private sector. This question-answer document is provided by Janusz Bugajski, director of the New European Democracies Project and senior fellow in the Europe Program at CSIS

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1990). *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*. Paris,. Retrieved July 30, 2010, from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf

The Charter of Paris is perhaps the second most important document created by the CSCE. Pivotal in scope, the Charter envisioned a new role as the sole guarantor of security in Europe. It also demarks the structural change toward the OSCE. It was a major ideological commitment toward the virtues of pluralist democracy and market economies in the face of Soviet dissolution.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1977). *Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-Up of the Conference*. Belgrade,. Retrieved on August 9, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1977/10/4222_en.pdf

This concluding document of the CSCE in 1977 serves as one of numerous examples of the diplomatic impasse members of the CSCE experienced. For years, members effectively agreed to disagree. Delegate may find value in seeing one example of how these councils concluded and get a perspective on the pessimistic mood in these documents that underscore the era.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1975). *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act [Helsinki Final Act]*. Retrieved July 3, 2010, from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf

The Helsinki Final Act (HFA) is the product of the first CSCE between 1973 and 1975. It included ambition 'Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States' (The Decalogue) signed by 35 Member States. The HFA is seen as a significant negotiative step in reducing Cold War tensions and diplomatic boost for the Soviet Union in future diplomacy with other Western European countries. The HFA provides the lens through which all future work was channeled.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1990). *Document of the Bonn Conference*. Bonn. Retrieved on August 2, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/1990/04/13751_en.pdf

The details of the Document of the Bonn Conference clearly show the CSCE's shift to achieving greater security through the recognition of democratic institutions and economic freedom. The Document outlines progress for members via market-based economies, individual enterprise, and multi-party democracy. Delegates will want to see this important shift in stated guideline for the organization and view it in the context of Eastern bloc quiescence.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1991). *First Meeting of the Council Summary of Conclusions Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia*. Berlin. Retrieved on August 9, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1991/06/4138_en.pdf#page=5

The dissolution of Yugoslavia fomented numerous ethno-separatist conflicts and the CSCE rose to meet them. This is the first of several mechanisms to provide consultation and cooperation regarding emergency situations. Delegates will find the responses to these regional emergencies insightful as to the shape and trend of the CSCE's institutionalization.

Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Helsinki Summit (1992). *Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change*. Retrieved on September 6, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4048_en.pdf

The Paris Summit of 1990 had proven too optimistic in its proclamation of a new peaceful and prosperous Europe. With the dissolution of communism came severe interethnic war in the Balkans. This Final Document in 1992 acknowledges the challenges and opportunities, serious difficulties and disappointments.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1990). *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*. Vienna,. Retrieved on August 18, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/doclib/1990/11/13752_en.pdf

Building on the Stockholm Conference in 1986, a new round of confidence- and security-building negotiations ensued. This treaty built through the CSCE advanced clear guidelines for quantities of conventional armed forces and detailed the modes for disarmament and arms limitation. This is an important and binding treaty that resulted from the negotiations in the CSCE. Delegates can use this to consider the concrete example of progress the organization made in improving security in the region.

De Leon, Philip H. Energy Hedge Fund Syndicate. (2010). *Land-locked Central Asian Oil Country Plays Important Role from Vancouver to Vladivostok*. Retrieved on September 9, 2010 from <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Asia/Land-locked-Central-Asian-Oil-Country-Plays-Important-Role-from-Vancouver-to-Vladivostok.html>

This article is a product of the OSINT group, a intelligence-gathering think tank for business operations. It is published here on oilprice.com, intimating its significance on investment decisions pertaining to Kazakhstan as it take the chairmanship of the OSCE for 2010.

Dora Bakoyannis. Greek Foreign Minister. (2009). *Concluding Statement to the Press by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, 2009*. Retrieved on September 1, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2009/06/38505_en.pdf

As a concluding statement of the Corfu Informal Meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers for the Future of European Security, it sets the agenda of Corfu Summit. The objective it twofold: 'building a whole lasting security in Europe for all and ensuring the security of Europe against common threats and challenges. The Concluding Statement discusses the Member States' pursuit to renovate their mechanisms to deal with traditional and new challenges.

European Navigator: The Authorative Multimedia Reference on the History of Europe. (2010). Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE). Retrieved on August 17, 2010 from <http://www.ena.lu>

The European Navigator (ENA) is a robust online multimedia reference, providing research and educational material on the history of European integration. Its digital library contains more than 16,000 documents that from 1945 to today on European organizations as they relate to integrations. It is an easy site to navigate and useful in finding corollary material to any given document.

Ghebali, Victor-Yves. The CSCE in the Post Cold-War Europe. (1991). *NATO Review (web edition)*, 2(39) 8-. Updated April 10, 2002. Retrieved on August 7, 2010 from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9102-2.htm>

This is an article the official NATO website online library. Considering major institutional transitions of the CSCE and behavior transition of many participating states, this article details the process of the new post Cold-War trajectory. As well, it briefly discusses the Valetta Mechanism of 1991 that details the process for dispute resolution and negotiation relating to the Charter of Paris.

The Helsinki Consultations. (1973). *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations* [Blue Book]. Helsinki, Retrieved on August 14, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1973/07/4136_en.pdf

The Blue Book was the first major document derived from the Helsinki Consultations that established the structure of the CSCE, set its agenda, and detailed its rules of procedure. The CSCE relied on the Blue Book as the basis for its structure through the 1990s as well as its rules through 2006.

Kanat Saudabayev. (2010). Chairperson-in-Office for OSCE; Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister and Secretary of State. Astana Conference.. Retrieved on August 25, 2010 from

<http://www.kazakhstanlive.com/2.aspx?sr=100&CatID=9f9f8034-6dd6-4f7e-adcf-0f6a7c0406d9&ProdID=883b00ac-ead8-44c1-b0b6-ce79db6ece7e>

Kazakhstan Live is a news site for Kazakhstan hosted on behalf of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This particular webpage lists the cultural and material exploits of the country, including information on Kanat Saudabayev, the new Chairperson-in-Office for OSCE. This is a useful resource for non-controversial information relating to various points of interest of the country.

Leatherman, Janie. (2003). *From Cold War to Democratic Peace: Third Parties, Peaceful Change, and the OSCE*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP. Print.

This book offers a standard theory of third-party mediation, which provided a special window for the development and restructuring of the OSCE. Leatherman, professor at Illinois State University argues that the CSCE led the participating states from Cold War confrontations toward a democratic peace by forging and standard of cooperative security and embracing human rights as well as the primacy of democratic government.

Moravcsik, Andrew. (1995). Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe. *European Journal of International Relations*. . 1(2) 157-189. Retrieved on September 4, 2010 from

<http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/explain.pdf>

Moravcsik is professor and director of the European Union Program at Princeton University. This article evaluates what conditions are required to create effective international regimes that promote human rights. He considers the CSCE as an proper example of a successful institution that enables adherence, not by sanctions or reciprocity, but by shaming and co-opting domestic decision makers who pressure compliance. This is a scholastic work, but highly rewarding.

Murphy, Richard and Walter Kemp. (2005). *Marc Perrin de Brichambaut is Appointed OSCE Secretary General*. OSCE Magazine.. Retrieved on August 23, 2010 from

http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2005/07/15621_422_en.pdf

OSCE Magazine is a decent resource for emerging news on the organization. This particular periodical gives a great overview of Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, his history, and qualifications. Additionally, this issue takes a look back at outgoing OSCE Secretary General, Ján Kubiš.

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 191. (2006). *The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files*. Retrieved on August 15, 2010 from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/index.htm>

This briefing from George Washington University examines the oldest human rights group in the Soviet Union and their efforts to hold the Soviets accountable to the HFA. Apart from the relevance for the reference, this particular site is a great resource with direct links to numerous translated Russian documents regarding human rights efforts following the HFA. It underscores some of the major setbacks in implementing the HFA.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (1999). *The Charter for European Security of 1999*. Istanbul Summit. 1999. Retrieved on August 3, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf

At the Istanbul Summit, Member States adopted three important documents: The Charter for European Security, the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Istanbul Summit Declaration. The Charter for European Security moves to strengthen the organization's ability to prevent conflicts, settle them and rebuild societies torn by war.

Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2010). *Facts and Figures*. Retrieved on July 30, 2010 from <http://www.osce.org/about/19298.html>

The OSCE website is home base for all major resources pertaining to the organization. Major documents, budgets, and proceedings details will be found here. The Facts and Figures pages offer a quick breakdown of current budget, staffing, and history.

Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2010). *OSCE Handbook*. Retrieved on July 2, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2007/10/22286_1002_en.pdf 0

This handbook is an essential start point for delegates who seek a clear overview of the OSCE beyond this background guide. Its topics range from history, structure, missions, successes to shortcomings. It is easy to engage and a core resource to basic fact about the organization.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2003). *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*. Retrieved on September 6, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2003/12/17499_en.pdf

Adopted in Maastricht in 2003, the strategy explicitly noted that the changing trends of security no longer fit neatly into the dimensions. It observed that new threats are more likely to arise as 'negative, destabilizing consequences of developments that cut across the politico-military, economic and environment and human dimensions, than from any major armed conflict.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2003). *OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*. Maastricht. Retrieved on August 17, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2004/01/1865_en.pdf

This document updated and advanced the commitments to, and modes of democracy, pluralism, and market economies found in the Bonn Document. Furthermore, it serves as the principle economic guide for Member States of the OSCE relating to the economic and environmental dimension. It details commitments of cooperation, good governance, and sustainable development.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2007). *The Representative on the Freedom of Media. Freedom of Expression, Free Flow of Information, Freedom of Media: CSCE/OSCE Main Provisions 1975-2007*. Retrieved on September 2, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/publications/rfm/2008/03/30426_1084_en.pdf

This is a very convenient document that compiles the most important provisions relating to the human dimension of the work of the OSCE. Included are 17 documents, including The

Establishment (and mandate) of the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (1997). Dunja Mijatovic serves as the current OSCE representative on Freedom of the Media.

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). (2001). *OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Reference Guide*. Warsaw. Retrieved on August 29, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/odhr/2001/01/1764_en.pdf

This document provides a comprehensive overview of the commitments to all that fall within the ambit of the Human Dimension. The compilation of material includes provisions for mechanism to monitor the implementation of the commitments and the mandates of the OSCE. The goal of the publication is to present a comprehensive account of the OSCE's normative basis in the field of the human dimension.

Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly.(N.D.) Website History. Retrieved on August 14, 2010 from http://www.oscepa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57&Itemid=101

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's website provides useful resources for the inter-parliamentary dialogue of Member State delegates. This dialogue is an important aspect of the overall effort to meet the challenges of democracy throughout the OSCE area. Further, this website is the best source for information regarding the work by national parliaments (legislative bodies) of OSCE's participating states, enabled by the 1990 Paris Summit.

The Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre. (2009). *Survey of OSCE Field Operations*. Retrieved on September 2, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/cpc/2008/10/3242_en.pdf

This document provides an excellent overview of every OSCE field operation effort, both active and closed. There are currently 17 active operations across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It also provides all pertinent technical data and gives a concise reference to the documents and decisions related to the active operations.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. (1995). *The Death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin, 1995. Print.

'Death of Yugoslavia' is considered one of the few authoritative books analyzing the end of the Yugoslav state. Made into a television documentary, this book highlights how the ensuing civil war was largely due to elite appeals to nationalism in the face of a missing state apparatus. The extensity and intensity of the European civil wars of the 1990's will show the new and massive challenge to all European security institutions.

Snyder, S. B. (2010). The CSCE and the Atlantic alliance: Forging a new consensus in Madrid. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 8(1), 56-68. doi:10.1080/14794010903534048

Sarah Snyder is postdoctoral fellow and professor at Yale University. This article analyzes how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) delegations coalesced behind a common stance at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Madrid Review Meeting held from 1980 to 1983. With this article, delegates should be able to quickly get the background behind the difficulty in consensus building and how NATO members responded.

Stern, Paul C. and Daniel Druckman. (2000). *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy, 572-580. Retrieved on September 2, 2010 from <http://books.google.com/books?id=Nhp5eBhembgC&lpg=PA572&ots=Jst8Obt0f9&dq=csce%20institutionalized%20osce&pg=PA572#v=onepage&q=csce%20institutionalized%20osce&f=false>

This book is a collaboration of research by the Committee on International Conflict Resolution, and edited by the National Research Council. Inside are helpful data on negotiation strategies for the OSCE. The bulk of the contribution relating to the CSCE/OSCE is by P. Terrance Hopmann, professor of International Relations and Director of the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins University.

United Nations Security Council. S/RES/1631 (2005). Retrieved on September 2, 2010 from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm

In the context of combating terrorism, this resolution expresses the Security Council's determination to cooperate closely with regional and subregional organizations in maintaining

international peace and security. Consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the council urges the strengthening of the capacities of organizations that focus on conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilization.

U.S. Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe. U.S. Helsinki Commission. (2010). *The Year in Review: OSCE Human Dimension Activities in 2009*. Retrieved on August 27, 2010 from http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=472&Region_id=96&Issue_id=0&ContentType=G&ContentRecordType=G&CFID=39418006&CFTOKEN=53583609

The U.S. Helsinki Commission is an independent agency of the U.S. Government charged with monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accords. This website has all documents from the U.S. Commission, highlighting the U.S. role and adherence. This document details all the issues of 2009 that pertain to the human dimension of the OSCE, including apparent human rights violations in Kazakhstan.

I. Combating Human Trafficking

Apap, Joanna Cullen, Peter and Medved, Felicita. (n.d.). *Counteracting Human Trafficking: Protecting the Victims of Trafficking*. Center for European Studies. Retrieved August 20, 2010 from http://www.childtrafficking.org/pdf/user/counteracting_human_trafficking_protecting_victims.pdf

This paper advocates combating human trafficking from a migration standpoint and using a single long-term, multilateral strategy instead of short term unilateral reactionary methods. It is an excellent analysis of the legal and practical problems inherent in creating such strategies in an IGO as complex as the European Union and OSCE. The authors of this paper present ideas and views which are, in comparison to IGO's such as the OSCE and EU, either radical or forward thinking depending on the perspective of the reader.

Association for Women's Rights in Development. (2008). *Human Trafficking in South Eastern Europe*. Retrieved October 16, 2010 from <http://www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/Human-trafficking-in-South-Eastern-Europe>

In 2003, Barbara Limanowska began researching human trafficking in south east Europe. Limanowska's research was one of the few academic sources that focuses on the demand side of trafficking and analyzes possible responses to curbing such demand. She found that human trafficking was still being addressed from an anti-immigration and illegal migration framework, and that states focus more on 'repressive' strategies in an effort to curb trafficking.

Goodey, Jo. (2008). Human Trafficking: Sketchy data and policy responses. *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, Retrieved October 12, 2010, from <http://crj.sagepub.com/content/8/4/421.abstract>

Goodey's article presents an overview of the history of legislative and policy responses to trafficking and looks at the possible future developments at the international, European and UK level. His examination of the evolving struggle between states, IGO's, and NGO's versus trafficking organizations is aimed at identifying what, if any, steps have effectively controlled trafficking, and what steps should be taken in the future. He concludes is that the international community must begin gathering better data on trafficking in order to create better legislation and policy responses.

Hajdinjak, Marko. (2002). *Smuggling in Southeast Europe*. Center for the Study of Democracy. Retrieved October 12, 2010 from http://sel.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/28955/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/F82EB40E-A4C9-4079-B577-7ABAEDB96DAA/en/14.pdf

Smuggling operations in south east Europe grew exponentially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Going state by state, this document provides an excellent insight in the complex and multifaceted issues that plague attempts to stop transnational criminal activities in Europe. Some of the more surprising conclusions findings of the paper include the manner in which some states have become "specialized" in terms of their use by traffickers.

Lehti, Martti. (2003). *Trafficking in Women and Children in Europe*. The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. Retrieved August 12, 2010 from <http://www.heuni.fi/uploads/to30c6cjxyah11.pdf>

This report gives a detailed breakdown of the trafficking routes in Europe on a state by state basis, and also contains analysis of the problems which allow such routes to be profitable and efficient for traffickers. Page 8 of this document contains an excellent chart which breaks down the trafficking data for every European Country by type, number, and proportion. No other report gives a more detailed state-by-state analysis of human trafficking while providing further sources for research.

Limanowska, Barbara (2003). *Anti-Trafficking Action in south-eastern Europe: Lack of effectiveness of law enforcement and migration approaches*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/meetings/consult/CM-Dec03-EP6.pdf>

Limanowska's research in south-east Europe on behalf of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights in Bosnia Herzegovina resulted in a harsh review of current anti-trafficking measures. Her findings and recommendations are thorough and well thought out extensions of the themes and issues brought up by many other sources dealing with THB. This is an excellent document to read for information on SEE policies and data.

Miko, Francis T. (2002). *Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. And International Response*. Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Retrieved August 12, 2010 from <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9107.pdf>

This is a report delivered to the United States Congress in 2002 which details the worldwide human trafficking trade by region and type. Although the report focuses heavily on the U.S. Response to the problem, there are many worthwhile statistics and data points which make this report an invaluable reference. The report has an especially good section on the social, political, and economic causes of the rise of trafficking in the 1990's on page 5.

Omelaniuk, Irena, (2005) *Trafficking in Human Beings*. United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development. Retrieved August 12, 2010 from http://www.pfcmc.com/esa/population/meetings/ittmigdev2005/P15_IOMelaniuk.pdf

This paper looks at some of the key aspects of trafficking, including the links to development, responses by governments and the international community, and data and research issues. It also analyzed responses by various governments, and the effectiveness that such responses have had, if any, on trafficking. This is an excellent resource for researching and understanding the difficulties in obtaining valid data and statistics on trafficking.

OSCE. (2009). *Annual Report 2009*. Retrieved September 3, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2010/04/43589_1451_en.pdf

The OSCE Annual Report is a publication detailing the actions of the OSCE over the past year. It contains information on the OSCE's anti-trafficking efforts in each of its field offices. Delegates should consult this report in order to understand the differing needs of each state and the effectiveness of the resulting programs.

OSCE. (2008). *Current NRM Developments in the OSCE Region*. Retrieved August 21, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2008/10/36928_en.pdf

This paper was originally an annex to the OSCE Special Representative's report on trafficking in the OSCE region. It provides an analysis of ODIHR activities and achievements in 2007 and 2008 as they relate to national anti-trafficking structures and national review-mechanisms. Delegates should read this paper in order to familiarize themselves with NRM's and gain and understanding of the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.

OSCE. (2001). *Reference Guide for Anti-Trafficking Legislative Review, With Particular Emphasis on South Eastern Europe*. Retrieved October 3, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2001/09/12357_136_en.pdf

As the title suggests, this guide was created in order to assist states in creating a framework for comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation. It is meant as a guide for legislators, but contains a great deal of analysis useful to a delegate interested in researching past legislation on THB. It is an excellent

[reference for information on the OSCE's early attempts to integrate the Palermo Protocol into national anti-trafficking frameworks.](#)

OSCE. (2003). *Decision No. 557 OSCE Action Plan To Combat Trafficking in Human Beings*. OSCE Permanent Council. Retrieved August 12, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/press_rel/2003/pdf_documents/07-3447-pc1.pdf
The OSCE Action Plan is the primary document guiding OSCE efforts to combat human trafficking in Europe. It was based largely on the UN Palermo Protocol and its supplementary protocols. Like the Palermo Protocol, it categorizes human trafficking as a criminal issue as well as a human rights issue and emphasizes the need for a cooperative framework, but the OSCE's regional focus allows it to be more specific in calling for National Review Mechanisms to analyze the effectiveness of State Programs to combat human trafficking and recommend new measures.

OSCE. (2004). *National Referral Mechanisms-Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons: A Practical Handbook*. Retrieved August 12, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/publications/odhr/2004/05/12351_131_en.pdf
National Referral Mechanisms are an important tool used by the OSCE and member States to effectively combat THB. This handbook contains an explanation of NRM's and a guide for states explaining the general points that should be addressed in an NRM. It also contains historical analysis and information regarding past OSCE efforts addressing THB.

OSCE Ministerial Council. (2000). *Decision No. 1 Enhancing The OSCE's Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings*. Retrieved October 12, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2000/11/13756_en.pdf
The emphasis that the Ministerial Council placed on co-operation and legislative harmony made Decision No. 1 a crucial point in the OSCE's efforts to combat THB. Many of the clauses in this decision form the basis for policies of states throughout the OSCE region and have influenced other institutions to push for states to change their focus from preventative measures to protective human rights measures over the past decade. As one of the key topics in the ongoing debate on THB, delegates should read through this document and those referenced in it.

OSCE Secretariat. (2006). *From Policy to Practice: Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in the OSCE Region*. OSCE Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit, Retrieved August 21, 2010 from http://www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/knowledge/23613_en.pdf
This report is a broad but well organized and extremely well written review of all anti-trafficking efforts in Europe from 2004-2006 by the OSCE Anti-trafficking unit. It addresses anti-trafficking measures in 3 parts; national measures, the OSCE Operational Framework, next Steps, and concludes with an analysis of the various challenges facing countries going forward. This is an excellent document for anyone needing an in depth review of the issue of trafficking from the IGO/NGO perspective.

Scanlan, Shivaun, (2007). *The Identification of Trafficked Persons in the Face of Conflicting Agendas*. OSCE/ODIHR Anti-Trafficking Programme. Retrieved August 20, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/odhr/2007/09/27237_en.pdf
Scanlan's report was delivered to a panel on Victim Identification, Protection and Assistance at the "Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons Conference" sponsored by the OSCE and ODIHR in 2007. The report deals mainly with identifying and assisting victims of human trafficking and the difficulties facing Human Rights workers. It also details the difficulties inherent to making status determinations on victims of human trafficking versus illegal migrant workers/internal slave labor, etc.

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. (2004). *Anti-Trafficking Task Force General Information*, Retrieved October 7, 2010 from <http://www.stabilitypact.org/trafficking/info.asp>
The Stability Pact is a crucial part of the OSCE's efforts to combat trafficking in south east Europe. They coordinate all anti-trafficking efforts in SEE and assist states in creating unique frameworks to address local trafficking issues. Their website contains historical information and news relating to the OSCE's regional anti-trafficking programs, as well as background information on the creation of the task force.

The National MultiCultural Institute. (2010). *Human Trafficking Search*. Retrieved August 6, 2010 from <http://www.humantraffickingsearch.net/>

This Web site contains a search engine where detailed, up to date information on the “overall picture” of a state’s Human Trafficking issues can be obtained easily. Facts and Figures, News, Government publications and programs, as well as international involvement is linked through the United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs. This is an excellent point to start off on researching any nation’s policies on Human Trafficking.

United Nations. (2000). *Chapter XVII: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. Retrieved August 4, 2010 from <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-12-a.en.pdf>

The TIP protocol entered into force in December of 2003. It was a watershed moment in the effort to eliminate Human Trafficking and is an excellent introduction to the definitions and specific problems of Human Trafficking. As it one of the most important documents in the international community’s efforts against THB, delegates should be familiar with the main points and goals of this Protocol.

United Nations. (2010). *Global Plan of Action against trafficking in Persons*. Office of the President. Retrieved August 21, 2010 from <http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/letters/trafficking290710.pdf>

The Global Plan of Action was essentially an update to the 2003 Palermo protocol, with an attached annex detailing a new plan of action to combat trafficking in persons. The plan advocates strengthening cooperation at all levels of government. It also calls for renewed statistics and better data analysis of the issue in order to develop modern strategies for combating human traffickers.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2004) *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto*. Retrieved August 20, 2010 from <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>

The UN Palermo Protocol was the first document to define the term “human trafficking” under international law. The Palermo Protocol is widely recognized as the beginning of the international campaign to end human trafficking. It established a cooperative framework for combating trafficking that encourages humanitarian efforts in addition to law-enforcement measures, an important step in the fight against THB which was lauded by Kofi Annan in a brief but important forward.

UNODC. (2009). *Global Report on Trafficking in persons*. Retrieved August 20, 2010 from http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Country_profiles/Eastern_Europe_Central_Asia.pdf

The UNODC is the primary UN body responsible for combating human trafficking. Their global report on trafficking in persons is one of the most thorough and up to date sources for data and research on individual countries. Because this document is designed for the general public in addition to UN personnel, it presents information in much the same format as an online encyclopedia, but it is a better source for trafficking data because of the quality of the source material and research.

UNICEF. (2004). *Trafficking in Human Begins in South Eastern Europe*, Retrieved August 20, 2010 from <http://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=18&subid=A&lang=en>

This report is a massive collection of information from three separate UN agencies as well as the OSCE and regional UN offices detailing all human trafficking operations in South Eastern Europe. The amount of data provided, as well as a thorough analysis of it, should be useful in researching trafficking trends and changes after the implementation of the Palermo Protocol. The report also serves as a review of many of the documents and protocols discussed in the background guide.

UN.GIFT. (2008). *The Vienna Forum to fight Human Trafficking 13-15 February 2008*. Austria Center Vienna Background Paper. Retrieved October 3, 2010 from <http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Marika-Misc/BP023TheEffectivenessofLegalFrameworks.pdf>

The Vienna forum was a conference to fight human trafficking by raising awareness of the problem and, facilitating cooperation between stakeholders. This background paper provides information on the legal frameworks of various states and analyzes their effectiveness, and addresses some of the legislative challenges that states have faced in the past. Delegates should consult this document for information on the challenges that have faced individual states over the past decade.

United States Institute of Peace. (N.D.). *OSCE Mission and other Field Activity Structures and Functions*. Retrieved September 3, 2010 from <http://react.usip.org/downloads/Module2.pdf>

This document has an excellent history of OSCE field operations, and an explanation of how the focus and activities of OSCE field offices have changed over time. Finally, there are many case studies included with relevant analysis on the effectiveness of each field office. Delegates should read this document in order to gain a better understanding of how OSCE field offices operate and how their role has changed in the past 20 years.

II. Supporting the post-conflict stabilization and institution-building in Kyrgyzstan

Connery, J. (2000). Caught Between a Dictatorship and a Democracy: Civil Society, Religion and Development in Kyrgyzstan. *The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies*. 16. pp. 1-18.

The main focus of this article lies in the ethnic and religious roots of Kyrgyzstan's conflict. It follows the developments of democracy in the country. The main question of the article is, if this path of democracy leads to dictatorship. Even though it is a ten-year-old article, it might help to evaluate the current situation and its possible outcome and to revise the options of post conflict stabilization.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2010). Kyrgyzstan Needs Return to Democratic Path. Retrieved on September 8, 2010 from http://www.cfr.org/publication/21857/kyrgyzstan_needs_return_to_democratic_path.html

The Council on Foreign Relations is a think tank, non-partisan membership organization and publisher, that wishes to contribute to the public debate on foreign relations and all related topics such as security, partnership and the international community. In this article a senior fellow of the CFR for east, central and south Asia is interviewed about the violent outbreaks in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. From his point of view the riots are another turning point for Kyrgyzstan and in order to restore public order, the interim government has to bring Kyrgyzstan back on the path of democracy. The interview gives a good summary of current problems in Kyrgyzstan, which might be helpful for the discussion in the committee.

Dukenbaev A. and Hansen W. (2003). Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan. DEMSTAR Research Report No 16. Retrieved on August 18, 2010 from <http://www.demstar.dk/papers/UPKyrgyzstan.pdf>

Kyrgyztani politics is reviewed from every perspective in this report. It gives a very good insight on the history of the country, the creation of its identity, the political system and economic problems. Since one of the authors is a professor from Kyrgyzstan the value of the article lays in the detailed first hand information. This article provides wide background knowledge in a very understandable way and is therefore a must read for delegates. It provides all information needed to put discussions on a substantive ground.

Harding, L. (2010). Kyrgyzstan riot police open fire as protesters storm government building. *The Guardian*. Retrieved on August 18, 2010 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/07/kyrgyzstan-protests-17-killed>

The article covers the outbreak of violence right at the beginning of April in Kyrgyzstan. It is the first news about killed demonstrators and therefore becomes newsworthy worldwide, even though it is not the beginning of the protests. The website of the guardian offers further research and gives a good overview over media coverage of Kyrgyzstan.

Human Rights Watch. (2010). Kyrgyzstan: Urgent Need for OSCE Police. Retrieved on August 18, 2010 from <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/30/kyrgyzstan-urgent-need-osce-police>

Human Rights Watch provides detailed information on the situation in southern Kyrgyzstan. Due to its employees in the region, it has detailed and non-biased information on the violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. It describes the situation still as very tensed and therefore supports the idea of a police mission from the OSCE to stabilize the region. It might be worth it to follow the news of human rights watch for delegates in order to get an idea of the violent developments in the country.

Huskey, E. (1997). *Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study for Conflict Potential*. *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review*. 24(3). 229-249.

This article reviews the conflict potential of Kyrgyzstan. Even though the article is from 1997 most of the structural conditions that are discussed still apply to the current situation in Kyrgyzstan. Due to the well structured argumentation, the contribution to the conflict potential of relevant factors (environment, economics, political system, and ethnicity) is easy to understand. Especially the link between these factors and possible ethnical tensions is made. Therefore the article is a great basis to study the background for practical solutions.

International Crisis Group (N.D.). Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved on August 3, 2010 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan.aspx>

The International Crisis group is a non-governmental organization which reviews crisis and conflicts all over the world in order to help preventing major outbreaks. It is recognized by the United Nations and many other Organizations and governments as a reliable source. The Kyrgyzstan coverage is very detailed and gives a detailed overview over the development of the current crisis.

Mihalka, M. (2007). Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*. 5 (2). 21-39

Security interest of world and regional powers within Central Asia are various. The article especially evaluates the interests of the US, the EU, and Russia considering natural resources, Islamic tendencies and Realpolitik. Following the author's argumentation, Russia has the biggest interest in the region, since it considers Central Asia as its back yard, while geopolitically the United States should not have a deeper interest in the region. The author also discusses the absence of a Central Asia strategy of the EU and considers this as a big mistake for European countries. In general the article is US biased, nevertheless it gives a good clue about possible strategies for discussions during the simulation.

Niepagenkemper E. (2007). Wo steht die Zentralasienstrategie der EU?. Retrieved, August 3, 2010 from http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/focus/5_zentralasien/focus_5_zentralasien.pdf

For a long time the EU was criticised for the lack of a profound Central Asia Strategy. The paper revises possibilities and actions of the EU in Central Asia. It especially draws attention to the different interests in the different countries of Europe. This discussion helps to understand the importance of Kyrgyzstan for the region. In combination with the work of Mihalka (2007) it excellently outlines how the EU developed its strategy on Central Asia and what this strategy might be missing.

Olcott, M. (2005). Lessons of the "Tulip Revolution". Testimony prepared for the Commission of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Retrieved August 18, 2010 from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/olcotttestimony-April7-05.pdf>

This Testimony is prepared for the Commission of Security and Cooperation in Europe for the hearing of Kyrgyzstan's Revolution: Causes and Consequences. It follows the developments of the Tulip revolution very detailed and covers every aspect of it. For the understanding of how revolutions arise in Kyrgyzstan the article provides a great source. It might also give hints to current developments in Kyrgyzstan since the aim was to cover revolutionary tendencies.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (N.D.). Kyrgyzstan: Full Coverage. Retrieved August 18, 2010 from <http://www.osce.org/cio/43441.html>

All information on current activities of the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan can be researched on this website. It is constantly updated and within the press release sections all new activities and statements can be found. It also provides all links to the official statements and documents by the OSCE. This website should therefore be constantly observed in order to be updated on all measures taken in Kyrgyzstan.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2010). *Oslo Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Nineteenth Annual*. Retrieved, August 3, 2010 from

http://www.oscepa.org/images/stories/documents/activities/1.Annual%20Session/2010_Oslo/Final_Declaration/FINAL_Oslo_Declaration_English.pdf

The Oslo Declaration concludes last year's work of the OSCE and outlines future interests. From special importance are the resolutions on the situation in Kyrgyzstan and the awareness of the importance of the Central Asian region. The OSCE clearly states that Kyrgyzstan is one of the main factors for security in Central Asia. The detailed resolution on the situation provides short term as well as long term goals and practices for the work of the OSCE, which might help to understand how the field work of the OSCE might look like in the future.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2010). *The Kyrgyz Republic - Constitutional Referendum*. Retrieved on August 3, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/odhr/2010/07/45515_en.pdf

The Limited Referendum Observation Mission by the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan oversaw the constitutional referendum in June 2010. This document contains all details about the campaigning and the referendum itself. Due to the fact, that ethnic violence was appearing before and during the referendum, the OSCE could not send mobile staff to the observation mission, which limited the access to information. Nevertheless the OSCE evaluates the procedure of the referendum as positive.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 179th meeting. PC.DEC/245. (1998). *Decision No. 245*. Retrieved on August 3, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/1998/07/4128_en.pdf

Decision No 245 covers the mandate of the OSCE in Bishkek and establishes the OSCE centre in Kyrgyzstan. It aims to support the promotion of OSCE values and commitments in the country in order to establish an improved OSCE membership of Kyrgyzstan. The center is established in the capital and has so far no terminated mission.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. SEC.GAL/165/9. (2009). *Survey of OSCE field operations*. Retrieved on August 18, 2010 from <http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/kyrgyzstan-voters-approve-new-constitution.php>

Field Operations by the OSCE are held in various countries. This document gives an overview over all field operations in the year. It evaluates its needs and outputs while giving further inspiration for missions and changes. Delegates might not only want to read the section on Kyrgyzstan, but they might also want to get an insight of the work in other Central Asian states. This can help to understand the OSCE's regional approach and might give ideas for further discussion.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (N.D.). *Police Advisory Group: Full coverage*. Retrieved on August 18, 2010 from <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/45652.html>

The police advisory group in Kyrgyzstan is a very good example of OSCE field work. This website offers the full coverage of the police advisory group, which is established to stabilize southern regions of the country in particular. It provides an overview of the process of such field work and gives an update on the work and the success of the police group.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Second day of the Seventeenth Meeting. MC.DOC/1/09. (2009). *Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu-Process*. Retrieved on August 3, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2009/12/41848_en.pdf

The Corfu Process is the renewed commitment of all member states towards security. It follows the declaration of Helsinki and wants to improve the establishment of a stabilized security zone from equal quality in all member states. This declaration is the new guideline for all OSCE field operations, including the ones in Kyrgyzstan.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (N.D.). *OSCE Centre in Bishkek*. Retrieved on August 3, 2010 from <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/>

The OSCE center in Bishkek was established in 1999 in order to coordinate fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan. It has a sub office in Osh, a city in the south of Kyrgyzstan, which focuses on ethnic tensions between north and south. Most information on developments of the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan can be found here. It should be one of the major resources for delegates in their preparation.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2010). Code of Ethical Conduct of Political Parties in Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic. Retrieved on August 10, 2010 from http://www.osce.org/documents/cib/2010/08/45743_en.pdf

The Code of Ethical Conduct was agreed upon by major Kyrgyz parties. The process was developed and supervised by the OSCE, who is trying to strengthen a multi-party system within the country. Due to ethnical tensions within the country the party system was disrupted. The OSCE tries to implement rules and a code of conduct to limit these tensions.

Stemple, H. (2010). *Kyrgyzstan voters approve new constitution*. Jurist Legal News and Research. Retrieved on August 3, 2010 from <http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/kyrgyzstan-voters-approve-new-constitution.php>

The article covers the outcome of the constitutional referendum on June 27, 2010. It gives a brief summary over the main changes in the new constitution. Following the article's argumentation, the new constitution on Kyrgyzstan will be more liberal and democratic than the old one. Mainly responsible for this conclusion is a shift of power from the president to the prime minister.

Temirkouklov, A. (2004). *Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the Kyrgyz Republic*. Berliner Osteuropa Info. 21 (). 94-99

The article covers all relevant details on tribalism, clans and regional identities and how these are involved in the state. It draws a very interesting line between clan-based networks and the state structure and points out the rivalry between these traditional structures and state structures. Since informal politics are of major importance in Kyrgyzstan today, delegates might find this article helpful for politics in practice in Kyrgyzstan.

III. Energy Supply as a factor of instability

BBC News. (2006, January 2). *Ukraine 'stealing Europe's gas'*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4574630.stm>

The report is related to the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian Gas dispute. The article was published on the climax of the 2006 gas dispute with Russia accusing Ukraine of stealing natural gas from the pipeline network and gas supplies to Europe were dramatically influenced. The article gives a good overview of the situation of that time and on the impact of the dispute on the EU countries.

BBC News. (2007, January 09). *Russia oil row hits Europe supply*. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6240473.stm>

A short BBC News report on the 2007 Russia Belarus energy conflict, when Russian State owned Transneft stopped pumping oil through the Druschba pipeline accusing Belarus of illegally siphoning off oil intended for the German, Polish and Ukrainian market. The report focuses on the impact of the move on the EU states and the reaction as well as its impact on the oil price.

BBC News. (2007, January 11). *Russia-Belarus oil blockade ends*. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6248251.stm>

Brief report on the end of the 2007 Russia Belarus energy conflict. The article again puts its main focus on the reaction of the European and international community on the conflict and mentions the apparently damaging effect it had on the perception of Russia as a reliable energy partner.

BBC News. (2008, January 18). *Balkan boost for Russian Gas Plan*. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7195522.stm>

BBC News reports on Russia's 2008 agreement with the Bulgarian government to support the Russian dominated South Stream Pipeline approving its route through Bulgaria. The report further points at the problems of the Nabucco pipeline project and considers the Bulgaria deal as a Russian win, as Bulgaria is a key state of the project.

BBC News. (2007, December 20). *Russian gas deal dashes EU hopes*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7153769.stm>

Report on the 2007 pipeline deal between the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The report regards the deal as a major setback in the EU's efforts to diversify its oil and gas supply through getting access to the Central Asian and Caspian energy reserves, and pumping them to Europe in new pipelines avoiding the traditional Russian dominated European pipeline system.

BBC News. (2006, January 24). *Ukraine takes extra Russian gas*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4642684.stm>

This report verifies Russian reproaches towards Ukraine of withholding Russian Gas that was intended for customers in the EU during the 2006 Russian Ukrainian gas crisis. According to the report this move was admitted by a speaker of the Ukrainian state-owned Naftogaz. This action taken by the Ukrainian side is crucial in evaluating the 2006 gas dispute.

BBC News. (2009 June 29). *Gazprom in Azerbaijan gas deal*. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8124809.stm>

Short report on a deal between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan on buying Azerbaijani gas and pumping it to Europe via the Russian pipeline network. The deal is seen as a setback for the European aspirations to become less energy dependent on Russia by building an own pipeline system avoiding Russian territory.

BBC News. (2010, March 31). *Twelve killed in twin bombing in s in Russia's Dagestan*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8596084.stm>

BBC News reports on a bombing in the Russian Caucasus Republic Dagestan. The report includes an overview of other recent attacks in the region, a more general analysis of the unstable North Caucasus region and the reaction of the Russian authorities.

DER SPIEGEL. (2009, January 27). *Europe's Pipeline War*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,603803,00.html>

English version of an article published in the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL. The article examines the political conflicts about three big plans for new energy routes to Europe. It hereby gives a good overview of the contesting projects and can be used to get a first impression of the ongoing pipeline struggles.

DESERTEC Foundation. (n.d.). *Clean Power From the Desserts. The DESERTEC Concept for Energy, Water and Climate Security - White Book*. 4th Edition. Protext Verlag. Bonn. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.desertec.org/fileadmin/downloads/DESERTEC-WhiteBook_en_small.pdf

The DESERTEC White Book sums up the plans of the DESERTEC initiative. It gives an impression of the vision that drives the advocates of the project through many graphics. The White Book can be seen as advertisement and puts DESERTEC in a very positive light concerning its goals and prospects.

Downstream Today. (2008, December 22). *OMV, RWE Launch Caspian Pipeline JV*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=14357

This is an article on plans by the Austrian oil company OMV and the German energy company RWE to build a trans-Caspian pipeline to connect Central Asian Gas fields to the planned European Nabucco pipeline. A connection to the Central Asian gas fields would greatly enhance Nabucco, which until now will only be connected to Azerbaijani fields. Delegates are advised to keep track on future gas deals between Europe and Central Asian states.

European Commission Directorate-General for Energy. (2009). *Market Observatory for Energy Report 2009 Europe's energy position – markets and supply*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from http://www.energy.eu/publications/KOAE09001_002.pdf

The European Commission's Market Observatory Energy Report is a very useful document for getting an overview of the situation of the European energy sector, the EU energy policy and the European energy market. Of special interest to the committee will also be section 4 of the report

focusing on oil and gas sector of both the EU's main supplier and emerging supply and transit countries such as Turkey and the Caspian and Central Asian region.

EU Observer. (2009, January 6). *EU considers emergency measures as gas crisis intensifies*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://euobserver.com/9/27353>

A short article giving a brief overview of the position and reaction of the European states on the 2009 Russian Ukrainian gas crisis. Many EU Member States were heavily by the Russian gas cut with Bulgaria being hit hardest. The event gave energy security a highly prominent status in European policy.

European Union. (2010). *Europe's Energy Portal*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.energy.eu/>
The Energy Portal of the EU will be the first destination to get information on the status of the EU energy policy, energy strategy, the EU Member States energy dependency, the status of renewable in the EU, the EU's CO2 emissions, fuel prices and so on. It is highly recommended for all delegates to have a look at this page to get a first impression of the complex field of EU energy policy.

Foreign Policy. (2010). *Failed States Index 2010*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings

Foreign Policy's Failed States Index is probably the most known – although also criticized - statistic on state failure and fragile states. States are ranked in the categories demographic pressures, refugees/IDP's, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention.

G8. (2005). *Gleneagles Plan of Action – Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development*. Gleneagles. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/tackling%20climate%20change/intl_strategy/gleneagles/gleneagles-planofaction.pdf

The G8 Gleneagles Plan of Action is one of the basic documents on Climate Change, clean energy and sustainable development. It thus serves as a reference in the aim of OSCE to promote sustainable energy production and consumption.

G8. (2006). *St. Petersburg Plan of Action – Global Energy Security*. St. Petersburg. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from <http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/11.html>

The G8 St. Petersburg Plan of Action on Global Energy Security also serves as a point of reference for the OSCE energy security policy. Delegates are thus requested to have knowledge on this document. The document pledges for transparent, efficient and competitive global energy markets, the development of clean and sustainable energy, enhancing energy efficiency and energy saving, an improvement of the investment climate in the energy sector, securing critical energy structure, reducing energy poverty and addressing climate change and sustainable development.

German Aerospace Center (DLR) Institute for Technical Thermodynamics Section Systems Analysis and Technology Assessment. (2006). *Trans-Mediterranean Interconnection for Concentrating Solar Power final Report*. Stuttgart. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.dlr.de/tt/Portaldata/41/Resources/dokumente/institut/system/projects/TRANS-CSP_Full_Report_Final.pdf

A very detailed scientific report on the possibilities and prospects of Solar Power from the Sahara desert, with a special focus on high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission lines. As the conclusion of the German Aerospace Center is generally positive in terms of technical feasibility this report is one of the decisive documents that led to the launch of the DESERTEC Initiative. The German Aerospace Center also provides an executive summary version lining out the basic conclusions on its Web site.

German Aerospace Center (DLR) Institute for Technical Thermodynamics Section Systems Analysis and Technology Assessment. (2005). *Concentrating Solar Power for the Mediterranean Region - Executive Summary*.

Stuttgart. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.nerc.gov.jo/Download/MED-CSP_Executive_Summary_Final.pdf

Executive Summary of the 2006 DLR Trans-Mediterranean Interconnection for Concentrating Solar Power final Report. The Executive Summary presents the main results of the 2006 study in a less scientific but for the reader sufficient form. The Executive Summary is thus a good start to concern oneself with the technical aspects of the DESERTEC project.

Götz, Roland. (2006). *After the Gas Conflict*. SWP Comments 8. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Götz provides a short overview of the 2005/2006 Russian Ukrainian gas conflict. In the commentary section he analyses the situation from the European point of view. Additionally he pays special attention to identifying Gazprom's strategy on the energy market and points out the implications of this strategy for the European states.

International Crisis Group. (2010). *Europe Report No. 207 - Azerbaijan: Vulnerable Instability*. Baku/Tbilisi/Brussels. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/caucasus/azerbaijan/207-azerbaijan-vulnerable-stability.aspx>

The current report of International Crisis Group on Azerbaijan. The Article argues that despite or because of its ability to keep opposition forces down the Azerbaijani government remains vulnerable. The regime relies on a delicate balance between its often opposed elites. However the regime seems to be unable to necessary reforms to its state apparatus and the economy nearly solemnly relying on oil revenues. Generally International Crisis Group can be considered as a good address for analysis of current conflict regions.

Kyiv Post. (2010, April 27). *Update: Ukraine, Russia ratify Black Sea naval lease*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/65128>

An Article on the Russian Ukrainian deal on an extension of the lease for the Sevastopol Navy base, the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, in change of lower gas prices for Ukraine, by the Ukrainian newspaper Kyiv Post. Kyiv Post reports of massive protests of the parliamentarian opposition against the deal, which was achieved by the new 'pro-Russian' Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovich. The protests once again showed the lines between 'pro Russian' and 'pro Western' or nationalist fractions. Generally it is recommendable to use not only Western sources in doing research for NMUN. There are often English versions of national quality newspapers as well as newspapers that do only publish in English.

Litvin, Daniel. (2006). *Oil, gas and imperialism*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/04/russia.ukraine2>

Comment by Daniel Litvin, who argues that the Russian Ukrainian gas conflict is classical imperialism policy from the Russian side in order to get Ukraine back into Russia's sphere of influence. Litvin generally see's a trend towards what he calls energy imperialism. Russia's gas politic in the post-soviet sphere is often described as imperialism by commentators. Litvin's analysis of energy imperialism can therefore be seen as rather mainstream.

Luft, Gal. (2005). *Pipeline Sabotage is Terrorist's weapon of Choice*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.iags.org/n0328051.htm>

This article points out that the vulnerability and importance of pipelines makes them an attractive target for terrorist attacks. Luft argues that despite pipelines in the Western countries are rather secure the important pipelines in less stable countries are at high risk of attacks. He underlines his thesis with examples from Iraq, Russia, India, Turkey, and Colombia and pledges for increased security measures.

Nabucco Gas Pipeline. (2010). *Overview*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/overview>

This is the main page for the Nabucco pipeline project. It gives a basic overview of the project: Information on the estimated route, the constructing consortium, environmental and social impact

assessment objectives etc. For better understanding the struggle between Nabucco and South Stream it is important to keep in mind their planned routes.

Nord Stream. (2010, April 09). *Press Release: Official launch of Construction of North Stream Natural Gas Pipeline*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.nord-stream.com/en/press0/press-releases/press-release/article/opening-ceremony.html>

This press release by the Nord Stream consortium on the official launch of construction of the pipeline reflects the Russian-German perspective on the Nord Stream pipeline. The article deserves attention as through his presence and his speech during this event EU energy Commissioner Oettinger upgraded the project by giving it also a European coat.

Nord Stream. (2010). *Facts and Figures*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.nord-stream.com/en/the-pipeline/facts-figures.html>

This is the main page of the Nord Stream pipeline project that gives a basic overview of the project, information on the estimated route, the constructing consortium, environmental concerns etc. The page further provides the Delegates with the arguments used by the Nord Stream supporters. When discussing Nord Stream Delegates should always be aware of the strongly criticized route of the pipeline and the still ongoing discussion on this topic, especially in Poland and the Baltic States.

OSCE Secretariat. (2010). *Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities*. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from <http://www.osce.org/eea/29041.html>

This is the main page of the OSCE energy security dialogue. The page gives a short introduction to the history and efforts of OSCE in the field of energy security. This Web page should be the initial point for delegates to do research on OSCE and energy security. The OSCE decisions on energy security issues are listed as links on the right side.

OSCE. (2010). *Expert meeting on assessing the OSCE's future contribution to international energy security cooperation, Vilnius, 13-14 September 2010*. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.osce.org/conferences/en_vilnius_2010.html

This is the web page of the 2010 Expert meeting on assessing the OSCE's future contribution on international energy security cooperation. The web page provides agenda as well as a draft annotated agenda. The expert meetings are the most visible of the OSCE's Member States efforts to better cooperate in the field of energy security. The OSCE Secretary General is advised to produce a report based on the Vilnius expert meeting. Delegates are therefore advised to check for the Secretary General's report to come out.

OSCE. (2003). *Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*. Maastricht. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2004/01/1865_en.pdf

The 2003 Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension establishes in operative clause 2.1.12. energy security as a field of action for the OSCE. The document defines energy security in a broad way and already puts a special focus on energy security dialogue among OSCE Member States. The Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension is thus the key document in all further OSCE action in the field of energy security.

OSCE. (2006). *Energy Security Dialogue in the OSCE (Decision No. 12/06)*. Brussels. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2006/12/22735_en.pdf

This is the OSCE Ministerial decision establishing the OSCE Energy Security Dialogue. The Energy Security Dialogue remains at the moment the most prominent OSCE effort in the field of energy security. Delegates must therefore be familiar with this document.

OSCE. (2007). *Protecting Critical Energy Infrastructure from Terrorist Attack (Decision No. 6/07 Protecting)*. Madrid. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2007/12/28636_en.pdf

The OSCE Ministerial decision on Protecting Critical Energy Infrastructure from Terrorist Attack is the OSCE decision in the field of energy security, which most closely is related to the security aspect of OSCE. The decision calls to foster cooperation in protecting critical energy structure

from terror attacks and suggests the share of information and best practices. Delegates must be familiar with this document. The decision can be the starting point for further OSCE policy that directly addresses the security aspect of energy transportation.

OSCE. (2009). *Strengthening Dialogue and Co-operation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area (Decision No. 6/09)*. Athens. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2009/12/41863_en.pdf

The Athens Ministerial Council decision is the newest in the line of OSCE decisions on energy security. It underlines the importance of cooperation and reaffirms the energy security dialogue. Furthermore it calls for an expert meeting, which than actually took place in Vilnius, and for the OSCE Secretary General to prepare a report on the expert meeting. Delegates must be familiar with this document.

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Organization for Security and Co-operation Europe. (2009). *The Republic of Kazakhstan's Programme for its Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from http://www.osce2010.kz/en/kazakhstan_osce/priorities_challenges

The program of the current OSCE Chairman country Kazakhstan. Despite energy security is not in the primary focus of the Kazakh chairmanship it still has a prominent place on the agenda. Delegates should also inform themselves on the agenda of the upcoming 2011 Lithuanian OSCE chairmanship.

Reuters. (2010, April 24). *Putin wins Austrian gas deal, scorns EU pipeline*. Retrieved October 23, 2010 from <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63N1N920100424>

The article gives an insight into the difficult nature of European-Russian relations of energy supplies. A conflict erupted during the visit with Russian Prime Minister Putin arguing on behalf of the Gazprom-dominated Southstream pipeline that is competing with the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project. During his visit, Putin declared in referring to the Nabucco project that "building a pipeline without supply contracts is pointless and extremely dangerous." The Nabucco pipeline would allow Central Asian countries to export gas to European markets independent of Russia.

Schwartz, Michael. (2010). *Belarus Escalates Dispute With Russians Over Gas*. New York Times. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/europe/23belarus.html>

This article highlights the conflict between the Russian Federation and Belarus on the background of rising tensions between the two states. Delegates are advised to keep on track in the Russian Belarusian relationship on the background of ongoing conflict over energy prices and the transit costs for Russian oil and gas.

Snoy, Bernard. (2006). *Energy security: An OSCE perspective*. *Helsinki Monitor*, 17, 4, 291-294.

Snoy argues for a broader definition of energy security beyond the aspects of geographical characteristics of oil and gas pipelines and price stability. He further praises the possibilities of a multinational dialogue on energy security in the OSCE frame uniting producers, consumers and major transit countries. Snoy herby gives some thought-provoking impulses on where to go in the field of OSCE and energy security.

South Stream. (2010). *Gas Pipeline Route*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=10&L=1>

This is the Main Page of the South Stream pipeline project internet appearance giving a basic overview of the project. Information on the estimated route, the constructing consortium, environmental concerns etc. For better understanding the struggle between Nabucco and South Stream it is important to keep in mind their planned routes.

The Baltic Course. (2010). *Lithuania's OSCE chairmanship has a goal to include energy security into organization's activities*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/baltic_states/?doc=31564

The article lines out that the upcoming 2011 Lithuanian OSCE chairmanship plans to place energy security on top of the 2011 agenda. Hereby the focus shall lie in guaranteeing the diversification of energy resources' supply and their variety, the development of energy

infrastructure and protection from international threats, as well in promoting fair competition and more efficient use of available resources. Delegates should therefore keep track with this development.

The Independent. (2010, March 21). *Nabucco needs Iran and Iraq*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/nabucco-needs-iran-and-iraq-1924612.html>

Report on a statement by Azerbaijani President Aliyev claiming that Azerbaijan will not be able to supply enough natural gas for the planned European Nabucco pipeline. He instead suggested to connect the pipeline further to Iran and Iraq, as soon as the countries are more politically stable.

United Nations General Assembly. (2006, September 20). *The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/60/288>

A/RES/60/288 is one of the basic documents in dealing with terrorism within the United Nations (UN) framework. For the case of energy Security operative clause 18 on the protection of vulnerable targets such as infrastructure is most relevant. It's relevance highlights the fact that energy security is indeed of paramount importance.

United States Energy Information Administration. (2010). *Country Energy Profiles*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm>

The Web page of the US Energy Information Administration is one of the primary addresses to do research on a countries energy profile. Every country is listed and can be checked on petroleum, natural gas and coal production consumption net exports/imports, proved reserves. Furthermore the Web site provides statistics on electricity, total primary energy and carbon dioxide emissions. The US Energy Information Administration web page is therefore the place to go when looking for general statistics on a countries energy market.

Warsaw Business Journal. (2010, September 21). *Putin shocked at Poland's Nord Stream „request“, says Russian daily*. Retrieved October 14, 2010 from <http://www.wbj.pl/article-51246-putin-shocked-at-polands-nord-stream-request-says-russian-daily.html>

This article in a Polish newspaper on a recently published and apparently wrong statement by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin provides a general in view on the Polish position on the Nord Stream pipeline. The article hereby makes clear the problems Poland is facing concerning the Nord Stream pipeline and gives an impression on the Polish position. Additionally the article also shows that the struggle over Nord Stream is not quite over yet and still an ongoing issue.

Werenfels, Isabelle & Westphal, Kirsten. (2010). *Solar Power from North Africa - Frameworks and Prospects*. SWP Research Paper. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=7043

A well-balanced analysis of the possibilities and problems of the DESERTEC project by a leading German Think Tank. Werenfels and Westphal give an introduction to the idea of the DESERTEC project as well as a quick historical overview of the project. They further lay out the political and structural Problem the project is facing or will have to deal with but conclude positively. Delegates are highly recommended to read the study in order to better understand the difficulties the project will have to face in the future.

Westphal, Kirsten. (2009). *Russian Gas, Ukrainian Pipelines, and European Supply Security. Lessons from the 2009 Controversies*. SWP Research Paper. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved October 14, 2010, from http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6381

Westphal offers a good and balanced analysis of the Russian Ukrainian 2009 Gas dispute. Westphal gives an overview of the conflict, illuminates the background and positions of the conflict parties and explains the energy cooperation in the post soviet space. The Paper further covers the European reaction on the gas shortages, gives an overview over the complex European-Russian Pipeline network and also presents and analysis possible future energy cooperation between the EU states, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Rules of Procedure

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Ministerial Council meeting (hereinafter referred to as “the Council”) and shall be considered adopted by the Council prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Council.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - *Dates of convening and adjournment*

The Council shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - *Place of sessions*

The Council shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - *Provisional agenda*

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Council at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - *Adoption of the agenda*

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Council by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, —those present and voting¹ means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.

Rule 5 - *Revision of the agenda*

During a session, the Council may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Council so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Council decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an —important and urgent character¹ is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Council to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Council until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting — means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to

vote.

Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Council.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Council and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Council, and shall distribute documents of the Council to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Council may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Council concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the President The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Council for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the President If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language

English shall be the official and working language of the Council.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 - Quorum

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Council are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Council shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, —members of the Council means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.

Rule 15 - General powers of the President

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Council, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules,

accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Council and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Council the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to —propose to the Council entails her/his power to —entertain motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.

Rule 16

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Council.

Rule 17 - Points of order

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 18

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Rule 19 - Speeches

1. No one may address the Council without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Council, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Council may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Council in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.

Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Council, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Council.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Council. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Council and the President

should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 21 - Right of reply

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that —impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Council by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Council shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Council's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Council.

Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Rule 25 - Closure of debate

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Council favors the closure of debate, the Council shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 26 - Order of motions Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Council who would like the Council to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Council unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be

taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Council for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all —proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Council by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Council. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Council and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Council, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

For purposes of this rule, —those present and voting means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights

Each member of the Council shall have one vote.

This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to —member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Rule 31 - Request for a vote

A proposal or motion before the Council for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Council may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, —proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 32 - Consensus required

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Assembly shall be made by consensus of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative States as “present and voting” during the attendance role call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.

Rule 33 - Method of voting

1. The Council shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply "yes," "no," "abstention," or "pass."

Only those members who designate themselves as —present or —present and voting during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying —pass, must, on the second time through, respond with either —yes or —no. A —pass cannot be followed by a second —pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Council votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Council shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 34 - Explanations of vote

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 35 - Conduct during voting

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Rule 36 - Division of proposals and amendments

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, —most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is —most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 37 - Amendments

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.

Rule 38 - Order of voting on amendments

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on

first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, —furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is —furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 39 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Council decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 40 - The President shall not vote

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

VII. CREDENTIALS

Rule 41 - Credentials

The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General prior to the opening of a session.

Rule 42

The Council shall be bound by the actions of the General Assembly in all credentials matters and shall take no action regarding the credentials of any member.

VII. PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

Rule 43 - Participation of non-Member States

1. The Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Council and any other State, to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
2. A committee or sessional body of the Council shall invite any State that is not one of its own members to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
3. A State thus invited shall not have the right to vote, but may submit proposals which may be put to the vote on request of any member of the body concerned.

If the Council considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Council according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Council is no longer required.

Rule 45 - Participation of national liberation movements

The Council may invite any national liberation movement recognized by the General Assembly to participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.

Rule 46 - Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies

In accordance with the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the specialized agencies shall be entitled: a) To be represented at meetings of the Council and its subsidiary organs; b) To participate, without the right to vote, through their representatives, in deliberations with respect to items of concern to them and to submit proposals regarding such items, which may be put to the vote at the request of any member of the Council or of the subsidiary organ concerned.

Rule 47 - Participation of non-governmental organization and intergovernmental organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations accorded consultative observer status by the General Assembly and other non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations designated on an ad hoc or a continuing basis by the Council on the recommendation of the Bureau, may participate,

with the procedural right to vote, but not the substantive right to vote, in the deliberations of the Council on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations.