



# CONFERENCE B

**National Model United Nations • New York**  
**29 March - 2 April 2015 (Conf. B)**



**Documentation of the Work of the General Assembly First Committee**

## General Assembly First Committee (GA1)

### Committee Staff

<b>Director</b>	Stephan Berberich
<b>Assistant Director</b>	Angelina Pienczykowski
<b>Chair</b>	Dustin Cody
<b>Rapporteur</b>	Aaron Swift
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### Agenda

- I. Prohibiting Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
- II. The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era
- III. Confidence-Building Measures in a Regional and Subregional Context

### Resolutions adopted by the Committee

Code	Topic	Vote
GA1/1/1	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	91 votes in favor, 8 votes against, 71 abstentions
GA1/1/2	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	101 votes in favor, 12 votes against, 52 abstentions
GA1/1/3	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	92 votes in favor, 6 votes against, 92 abstentions
GA1/1/4	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	102 votes in favor, 20 votes against, 48 abstentions
GA1/1/5	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	95 votes in favor, 19 votes against, 56 abstentions
GA1/1/6	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	96 votes in favor, 27 votes against, 47 abstentions
GA1/1/7	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	88 votes in favor, 38 votes against, 44 abstentions
GA1/1/8	The Control Of Biological in Today's Modern Era	121 votes in favor, 21 votes against, 28 abstentions

## **Summary Report**

The General Assembly First Committee (GA 1) held its annual session to consider the following agenda items:

- I. Prohibiting Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
- II. The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era
- III. Confidence-Building Measures in a Regional and Subregional Context

The session was attended by representatives of 169 countries, and 2 observers. The first session opened with several statements concerning the adoption of the agenda. On Sunday, the committee adopted the agenda of II, I, III, beginning discussion on the topic of "The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era."

By Tuesday evening, the Dais received a total of 14 proposals covering a wide range of sub-topics, including preventative and reactive measures on the use of biological weapons through capacity building initiatives. Additional topics discussed included intensifying regulations on the production, development, and research of biological materials and toxins. The body worked throughout the day in a collaborative effort with the spirit of the United Nations in mind.

On Wednesday morning, the Dias had received a total of nine proposals that were all eventually approved as draft resolutions by the Dias, five of which contained amendments. The committee adopted eight draft resolutions, all by simple majority vote. These resolutions represented a wide range of issues, including: the promotion of public awareness through education in particular the areas of prevention and response to biological outbreaks, and recommending confidence-building measures specifically increasing accountability at the regional level for preventing the transfer and misuse of biological materials. Although the verification of biological research and materials can be a very difficult and sensitive political debate, the body embodied the spirit of consensus building in working towards adopting comprehensive resolutions on this matter.



## National Model United Nations • NY

**Code:** GA1/1/1

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

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1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*

2  
3 *Recalling* Security Council resolution 1540, which establishes the responsibility under Chapter VII of the *Charter of*  
4 *the United Nations* for all Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against  
5 the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons,

6  
7 *Further recalling* Security Council resolution 1540 which also calls upon Member States to prevent the proliferation  
8 of biological and toxin weapons by non-state actors, and reaffirms the need to combat threats to international peace  
9 and security caused by terrorist acts, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and  
10 international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law,

11  
12 *Also reaffirming* Security Council resolution 1540 enshrining the responsibility of individual states to contribute to  
13 ending the proliferation of biological weapons,

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15 *Reaffirming* resolution 69/39, which establishes measures to prevent terrorists and non-state actors associated with  
16 terrorist actions from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),

17  
18 *Observing* that secure and sustainable development of agriculture is essential to security of food and water, as stated  
19 in resolution 69/240, and *noting* the threat that an outbreak of a biological agent or toxin can pose to agricultural  
20 development,

21  
22 *Cognizant* of the role of science and technology in maintaining regional security and disarmament enshrined in  
23 resolution 61/55,

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25 *Concerned* with the lack of training and infrastructure necessary for medical and law enforcement personnel to  
26 mitigate a biological crisis and the importance of initiatives in place similar to Poland's CBRN emergency response  
27 workshop held in cooperation with Jordan,

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29 *Alarmed by* the insufficiently handled Ebola crisis in West Africa due to the lack of clear responsibilities, as it was  
30 not obvious, which states should have provided assistance to the affected states and the disability to provide  
31 appropriate and urgently necessary containment measures, in order to support mitigation and recovery of people's  
32 health and the stability of the states,

33  
34 *Noting* the need for cooperation between Member States and international organizations in order to exchange  
35 information on scientific and technological advancements in the fields of biological agents and toxins, as specified  
36 by Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as the report Right to Health by the  
37 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the World Health Organization (WHO),

38  
39 *Recognizing* the importance of sharing scientific and technological innovation between states in accordance with the  
40 Declaration on Social Progress and Development,

41  
42 *Bearing in mind* the purpose of the General Assembly as a body that addresses matters concerning the international  
43 community as stipulated by Chapter IV, Article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations,

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45 1. *Affirms* the importance of Security Council resolution 1540 in promoting the non-proliferation of biological and  
46 toxin weapons, and reiterates the importance of Member States to fully implement the resolution by meeting the  
47 objectives and the requirements of the resolution through:

- 48  
49 a. Promoting the universal adoption of multilateral treaties such as the BWC, whose aim is to prohibit the  
50 proliferation of biological and toxin weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction;

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- b. Adopting national regulations to ensure compliance with commitments of Member States under significant multilateral nonproliferation treaties, such as regional chemical and biological disarmament agreements and the BWC;
  - c. Committing to multilateral cooperation, particularly within the context of the BWC, in order to establish means of pursuing the collective objective of non-proliferation of biological and toxin weapons, and promoting international cooperation for the development of biological and toxin materials for peaceful purposes;
- 61 2. *Reaffirms* the need for all Member States to coordinate efforts to prohibit the proliferation of biological and  
62 toxin weapons by non-state actors, particularly in the context of preventing bioterrorism through:  
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- a. Strengthening national measures such as those suggested by WHO published in the technical report “Requirements for Biological Substances” which place guidelines placed on the biological and toxin materials that oversee the development, facilitation, and transfer of biological and toxin materials, as well as biotechnological facilities and research centers, to prevent non-state actors associated with terrorist actions from acquiring, delivering, and manufacturing weapons of mass destruction such a biological and toxin weapons;
  - b. Cooperating between regional and international organizations through bilateral and multilateral cooperation to strengthen national and regional capabilities to prevent the proliferation of biological and toxin materials by non-state actors associated with terrorist actions;
  - c. Coordinating among Member States in regional organizations through dialogue and the sharing of information on nation’s biological and toxin mate, such as catalogs that in order to provide transparency in the development, facilitation, and transfer of peaceful uses of biological and toxin materials, and ensure the non-proliferation of biological and toxin materials by non-state actors associated with terrorist actions;
  - d. Adhering to the BWC which calls for the elimination of existing stockpiles and manufacture of biological and toxin weapons, for further proliferation poses a potential threat to international peace and security in the case that non-state-actors with the intention of committing terrorist acts obtains stockpiled weapons and/or materials and technologies needed for the development of biological and toxin weapons;
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- 87 3. *Encourages* Member States to prevent the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons by non-state actors  
88 through ending the financing of such groups by:  
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- a. Refraining from providing any form of financial support to individuals or groups involved or may be potentially involved in biological warfare by eliminating financial resources used for the recruitment, and by preventing access to non-state actors the supply of biological and toxin weapons by adopting national safeguards on biological agents and toxins;
  - b. Accelerating multilateral and bilateral efforts, particularly at the regional level, to establish dialogue and exchange information on the actions or movements of non-states actors, and the transfer of armaments associated with materials categorized as biological and toxin weapons;
  - c. Sharing information on the development, facilitation, and transfer of biological and toxin materials being used for peaceful purposes that could potentially be compromised by non-state actors associated with bioterrorism;
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- 103 4. *Endorses* the Supporting Cooperative Operations in Potential Emergencies (SCOPE) initiative with the respect  
104 of national sovereignty and under the authority of the ISU to support workshops held within Member States to  
105 further develop emergency response mechanisms and to expedite response time of local military and law  
106 enforcement personnel through the creation of a local rapid response team which will receive:

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- a. Training in all manners of disaster control and counter terrorism measures from representative from organization such as the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the International Society of the Red Cross (ICHR);
  - b. Funding from individual Member States own self-defense budgetary allowances, Regional organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the United Kingdom's RedR initiative;
5. *Calls upon* the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) to extend their actions that shall aim at creating cooperation groups of shared responsibilities for the purpose of promoting friendly and balanced cooperation among Member States, to share disease management in order to isolate and eliminate potential, highly contagious disease agents, and they shall work as follows:
- a. It is recommended to create trilateral groups of shared responsibility consisting of three states being, at the best, chosen based on the following indicators: economic strength, for instance the GDP, geographical location, level of development, infrastructure - especially the medical infrastructure;
  - b. The preferred constitution of the groups shall consider the geographical location of the states in a way that the three cooperating states are not located in the same region and thus ensuring that they cannot be affected by the same outbreak at the same time;
  - c. Each individual member state has the responsibility to help its collaborative states in case of an incident in which biological agents are involved;
  - d. These shared responsibility groups shall in the best case base on pre-existing partnerships, for the purposes of sustainable relationships, which would be activated in case of a biological incident;
  - e. A system shall be provided in which the help consists of technical and logistical support and humanitarian assistance such as medication, provisionally emergency accommodations and trained medical personnel;
  - f. GOARN is suggested to act as a mediator when it comes to find matching partners for the cooperation groups of shared responsibilities and the mediation and compiling of the groups shall take place immediately so that the cooperation groups of shared responsibilities will be able to act preventively and not as a reaction of a crisis;
6. *Recommends* the creation of national measures to prevent the maltreatment of minority groups through exposure to biological agents and toxins, such as refugees, nomadic groups, and indigenous peoples, as well as other vulnerable populations targeted on the basis of race, ethnic identity, religion, and national origin, through:
- a. Cooperation between Member States and NGOs at the national level for the purpose of reaffirming the rights of vulnerable people, such as their right to life, freedom from discrimination and torture, freedom to express religion and culture, and the right to be seen as a person before the law, as is being done between the government of Colombia and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia;
  - b. Cooperation between Member States and NGOs at the regional level, such as between the government of India and the Resist Initiative International, in order to assess the level of protection afforded to minority groups and strengthen national efforts to safeguard the rights and survival of minority peoples, especially in the context of advocating vulnerability that certain minority populations, particularly indigenous peoples, may have to certain biological and toxin materials;
7. *Emphasizes* the need for cooperation between and among Member States at the regional and sub-regional level for the purpose of preventing agricultural and human devastation caused by an outbreak of a biological agent or toxin, and to this end Member States shall:

- 163 a. Exchange information on outbreaks of a biological agent or toxin in agricultural fields or water supply  
164 existing in a Member State's territory for the purpose of:  
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- 166 i. Alerting neighboring Member States to initiate defensive measures that may prevent harm to  
167 civilian and combatant populations;
  - 168 ii. Preventing non-state actors from proliferating biological and toxin weapons released by  
169 outbreaks of biological agents and toxins;
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- 171 b. Consider the use of bio-detection technology such as Sensitive Membrane Antigen Rapid Test  
172 (SMART) which efficiently and inexpensively detects bacterial diseases found within agriculture  
173 specifically affecting developing countries whom are more susceptible to these contagions;  
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  - 175 c. Promote the need to develop biological threat detection methods, specifically, methods found in dry  
176 detection technology, such as flow cytometer and laser technology, that may detect biological agents  
177 and toxins found in water and agriculture so that these technologies may eventually be used at the sub-  
178 regional level;
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- 180 d. Collaborate at the regional level with international organizations such as the Food and Agricultural  
181 Organization (FAO) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to provide  
182 knowledge on use and implementation of bio-detection technologies, such as in the FAO-BioDeC  
183 which seeks to disseminate information on existing biotechnological capabilities in developing  
184 Member States;  
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  - 186 e. Work to improve its capabilities to respond in the event of a biological agent or toxin attack on the  
187 agriculture by training civilian populations to be able to recognize food that has been tampered with by  
188 biological and/or toxin material, and collaborate with the United Nations Department of Public  
189 Information (UNDPI) to train civilians on safety measures needed to properly identify the different  
190 colors and coded used by national governments to categorize safe and unsafe plants, animals, and  
191 insecticide or pesticide sprays;
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- 193 8. *Implores* Member States enhance transparency with the transfer of dual-use goods and to increase confidence  
194 with their efforts to eliminate biological weapons by:
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  - 196 a. Supporting relevant international frameworks including ratification of the BWC and the BWC  
197 Implementation Support Unit (ISU) through providing funding to the BWC ISU;
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  - 199 b. Enhancing regional agreements in transparency of transfer of dual-use goods akin to the Regional  
200 Disarmament Branch of the UNODA, promoting best-practice sharing among States to assist with  
201 disarmament, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict peace-building;
  - 202
  - 203 c. Enacting domestic legislation supporting the international and regional frameworks parallel to  
204 Mongolia's Law on Protection Against Toxic Chemicals and the Netherlands' Military Manual  
205 ensuring that the Dutch army will only use legitimate weapons instead of biological weapons;
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- 207 9. *Further implores* Member States to work towards the strengthening of the BWC and the BWC ISU through:
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  - 209 a. The establishment of a national surveillance mechanism to monitor research institutes, ensuring the  
210 legitimate scientific use of dual-use goods by ensuring that trade of dual-use goods is with States that  
211 have been verified by the State of origin similar to the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of  
212 Chemicals through the European Union, funded through the States party to the BWC and using the  
213 International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) as an enforcement and tracing mechanism;
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  - 215 b. Enacting or enhancing regional emergency facilities mirroring Oman's Bio Emergency Aid Research  
216 Center in order to address the dire consequences of biological outbreaks on a regional level;
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- 218 c. Development of domestic initiatives to allow for vetting research candidates similar to the  
219 Netherlands' Working Protocol for Processing Applications for Permission to Study Certain Subjects  
220 to ensure that only legitimate scientists have contact with dual-use goods;  
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- 222 10. *Urges* the creation of multilateral research unit called the Biological Certification Program (BioCert) similar to  
223 the Netherlands' General Intelligence and Security Services (AIVD) under the UNODA who deals with all  
224 WMDs to monitor and promote safe, secure and peaceful use of research for biological agents by implementing  
225 methods for Member States to exchange medical and research experts between certified facilities in  
226 coordination with programs and initiatives such as SCOPE and by:  
227
- 228 a. Creating an international certificate program to share and disseminate research and promote security  
229 and effective facilities that allows States party to submit themselves to inspections to determine the  
230 security of biological research and prevent the creation or use of biological agents for hostile purposes  
231 and verify that facilities are not creating or intending to create weaponized biological agents and  
232 preventative measures that secure materials and data from hostile uses;  
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- 234 b. Allowing Member States that acquire a certificate to gain access to the collective research and data of  
235 the expanded ISU program without additional cost and allow States to be eligible to take part in an  
236 improvement program allowing access to funding for lab equipment and research facilities for  
237 developing States while allowing developed States to increase economic and intellectual prospects;  
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- 239 11. *Further calls* upon the Secretary-General to publish a report concerning the status of the control of biological  
240 and toxin materials at the next session of the General Assembly.

**Code:** GA1/1/2

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

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1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*  
2

3 *Stressing* the importance for all Member States to act in concordance with the United Nations Charter, especially by  
4 article 1 to maintain international peace and security,  
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6 *Reaffirming* that the universal goal of all Member States should be the protection and preservation of human life in  
7 accordance with Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),  
8

9 *Recognizing* the ever-present threat that biological materials have within the modern world, and the capacity they  
10 have to cause unprecedented damage to innocent lives,  
11

12 *Bearing in mind* the need for Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in particular the voluntary exchange of best  
13 practices of States' biological research,  
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15 *Reminding* the international community that the proliferation of biological weapons is a serious threat to regional  
16 peace, security, and stability,  
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18 *Noting* the importance of transparency through cooperation and information sharing while maintaining state  
19 sovereignty,  
20

21 *Further noting* the specific importance of articles 1, 2, and 10 of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)  
22 pertaining to the activities on promoting universalization and strengthening the defensive research of technological  
23 developments,  
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25 *Deeply alarmed* by the growing threat of bioterrorism and non-state actors obtaining biological materials,  
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27 *Expressing* its appreciation for States that have ratified the BWC,  
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29 *Acknowledging* that accession to the BWC provides of acceptance within the international community leading  
30 towards the additional development of economic and social arrangements,  
31

32 *Bearing in mind* the dual-use capacity nature of biological agents and the potential that future research may have on  
33 reducing threats from biological weapons and outbreaks,  
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35 *Expressing* the importance of non-proliferation of harmful resources and material and the monitoring of production  
36 of biotechnology on a voluntary basis by introducing a new sovereign Bioweapons governance approach;  
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- 38 1. *Encourages* the World Health Organization (WHO) to focus on purposeful, accidental, and natural threats posed  
39 by biological agents, in order to facilitate humanitarian efforts aimed at protecting sovereign states against  
40 biological threats and connect these efforts through utilizing the ability to draw upon multiple regional and  
41 international bodies for resources and development;  
42
  - 43 2. *Recommends* the mandate of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to include  
44 research and share information on biological agents with the WHO and Member States in order to prepare and  
45 react appropriately for any emergency;  
46
  - 47 3. *Recommends* Member States to look to a three prong approach for before and after a biological attack modeled  
48 after the CBRN Polish Defense Program regarding biological crises:  
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    - 50 a. Promotion of CBM's regarding the peaceful use of biotechnology;
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- 52           b. detection, identification, monitoring, reorganizing potential biological crises and working actively to  
53           prevent crisis;  
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- 55           c. response, investigation, and mitigation of outbreaks of disease including those due to biological and  
56           toxin weapons;  
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- 58 4. *Further recommends* regional bodies to effectively share information, detect threats, and report technological  
59           developments by enhancing interconnectivity within the global community, by way of:  
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- 61           a. cooperation between regional organizations and the WHO, by incentivizing through the sharing of  
62           technology and information for states lacking regional development to engage the global community  
63           for the sake of mutual protection;  
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- 65           b. the formation of an annual meeting for WHO experts to share expertise with leaders of confidence-  
66           building organizations, economic partnerships, and political unions;  
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- 68           c. existing educational program of the General Secretariat with hopes of a curriculum expansion to  
69           include vulnerable populations with aspirations to inform them of the biological weapons regarding to  
70           what they are, the dangers they pose, and what to do when they believe a group or individual is  
71           associated with the creation or distribution of such weapons in order to foster multilateral  
72           interconnectivity;  
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- 74 5. *Encourages* able states to conduct further research into the human genome, as well as the various viral and  
75           bacterial genomes in order to address the threat of biological weapons by developing new vaccines, boosting the  
76           immune system, and creating better systems of detection for bio-agents;  
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- 78 6. *Suggests* Member States share research of biological materials through the Seventh Review Conference  
79           database on a regional voluntary basis located in Kazakhstan, Oman, Uruguay, Poland, Egypt, and China as a  
80           first step, focusing on:  
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- 82           a. detection for prevention and development of vaccines;  
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- 84           b. providing assistance in case of attack;  
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- 86           c. improving the capacities of response, investigation, and mitigation of outbreaks of diseases including  
87           those due to biological and toxin weapons;  
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- 89 7. *Further suggests* the private sector to voluntarily share information pertaining to the advancement of biological  
90           research through the Seventh Review Conference database;  
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- 92 8. *Invites* the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and WHO to provide online training resources to  
93           inform the population on preventative education on risk management regarding biological technology;  
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- 95 9. *Further invites* states participating in biological research to adhere to WHO and UNIDIR guidelines pertaining  
96           to the education of researchers through provisions of workshops in order to prevent the misuse and spread of  
97           biological agents;  
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- 99 10. *Encourages* all Member States engaging in the research of biological agents to participate in annual peer  
100           reviews as defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, consisting of a 3-step  
101           program inspired by the recommendations made by UNIDIR and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva  
102           including:  
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- 104           a. Peer reviews to be performed by both a group of experts from the international community and the  
105           Member States requesting the review;  
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- 107           b. The production of a report by this peer review group which would be registered in the database agreed  
108           upon at the Seventh Review Conference in order to provide a factual description and analysis of  
109           measures currently in place to further recommendations and provide a plan to support capacity  
110           building;  
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- 112           c. Publication of results of the report be shared and made available for viewing by the international  
113           community on a voluntary basis;  
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- 115 11. *Recommends* Member States to implement a national legal framework as well as best practices to enable and  
116           enhance the control of the acquisition of resources, ingredients and entire biological weapons, for the purpose of  
117           non-proliferation;  
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- 119 12. *Urges* all Member States to introduce a national registry that will track the trade, production, and acquisition of  
120           biological weapons as defined by the BWC in the private sector;  
121
- 122 13. *Calls upon* Member States to strengthen capacity building among developing nations with the goal of  
123           improving border monitoring, to prevent illicit trafficking of biological weapons;  
124
- 125 14. *Suggests* that the United Nations Institute on Disarmament Research collaborate with the Biological Weapons  
126           Convention review conference to recommend ways in which the BWC can be made more inclusive to the States  
127           that have not ratified it;  
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- 129 15. *Welcomes* an initiative made by the involved parties on the Korean peninsula to establish a conference entitled  
130           “The Future of Peaceful use of Biotechnology in the Korean Peninsula and Other Historically Conflicted Areas”  
131           to be hosted in the peninsula for the purpose of finding common ground with hopes of serving as a best practice  
132           example for CBMs contributing to stability to the region;  
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- 134 16. *Requests* the Secretary General to foster a proposal for the best course of action in facilitating the further  
135           ratification of the BWC to comprise the collective interest of all Member States, and whereby the Secretary  
136           General:  
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- 138 17. *Drafts* a formal assessment of the BWC to review individual Member State’s rationale to their status of  
139           maintaining or garnering ratification;  
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- 141 18. *Limits* any proposal on the substantive amendments to the BWC to circumvent the infringement of the  
142           convention’s capacity to operate in a sovereign and efficient manner;  
143
- 144 19. *Shall* present the proposed assessment and proposition to the General Assembly by the 70th plenary session;  
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- 146 20. *Requests* the Secretary General to submit a report to the General Assembly plenary at the 70th session.



## National Model United Nations • NY

**Code:** GA1/1/3

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

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1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*

2  
3 *Guided by* Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) that preserves the purpose of the UN to maintain  
4 international peace and security, in addition to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that  
5 established the right to life, liberty, and security of person, and freedom from arbitrary death,

6  
7 *Acknowledging* the gravity of the threat posed by biological weapons as an indiscriminate threat not only directly to  
8 human lives, but also the integrity of global food and water resources, as well as global stability,

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10 *Affirming* the 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of  
11 Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (BWC), that prohibited the development, production,  
12 stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, as well as weapons,  
13 equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes,

14  
15 *Deeply concerned* that many Observing and Member States still lack the capability and resources to comply with the  
16 BWC,

17  
18 *Referencing* especially BWC Article X, which states that all actions must be taken in a way that protects and  
19 encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology,

20  
21 *Aware of* the “Dual-Use Dilemma” in biology due to the fact that materials including seed cultures of pathogens and  
22 toxins, equipment including centrifuges and fermenters, technology and knowledge are key components of public  
23 health, pharmaceutical, and agriculture sectors, as well as key components of biological weapons,

24  
25 *Concerned* that the provisions of the BWC and the domestic law derived from the BWC among the scientific  
26 communities is weakly exemplified by surveys undertaken by Bradford University in 2005, which concluded that  
27 the vast majority of life scientists are unaware of the provisions of the BWC and potential dual-use aspects of their  
28 work,

29  
30 *Taking into consideration* the importance of preserving the sovereignty of each Member State while highlighting the  
31 necessity of proper preventative measures and response mechanisms on a global and regional scale,

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33 *Affirming further* the necessity regional cooperation among Member States and confidence building measures to  
34 mitigate the proliferation and use of biological weapons while recognizing the significance of transparency between  
35 Member States through the free exchange of information,

- 36  
37 1. *Recommends* enhancing the already existing structure outlined in the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in  
38 order to add an information sharing forum (ISF), which will be tasked with providing recommendations to  
39 Member states regarding how to better uphold the mandate of the BWC;
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41 2. *Suggests* that the ISF operate under the auspices of the ISU and convene biannually, beginning after the Eighth  
42 Review Conference of the BWC in 2016;
- 43  
44 3. *Calls upon* Member States working under the framework of the BWC to create an International Code of  
45 Conduct for Scientists and Research Facilities (ICCSRF) as recommended in the 2014 report to the BWC by the  
46 Meeting of States Parties to the BWC, which will standardize safe research and laboratory practices as well as  
47 enhanced monitoring of bacteriological and biological materials that have potential to be used as bio-weapons  
48 or for bioterrorism, by:
- 49

- 50 a. Implementing a standardized and international bio-safety quantification policy which clearly  
51 establishes the different levels of biohazards used in research laboratories;  
52
- 53 b. Promoting ethical behavior in laboratories to further the goal of scientific research to benefit humanity;  
54
- 55 4. *Recommends* that the ISF is comprised of:  
56
- 57 a. An ISF Chair, who will be the representative to the ISF from the Member State in which the ISF  
58 meeting is held, who will be tasked with mediating dialogue and setting the agenda for discussion at  
59 ISF meeting;  
60
- 61 b. Representatives from volunteering Member States;  
62
- 63 c. Representatives of non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and scientists in the  
64 fields of biology, microbiology, chemistry, biotechnology, and other scientific fields relevant to  
65 biological warfare and the control of biological weapons, who have accepted the terms of and adhere  
66 to the all public and private conducted research in order to prevent the development, stockpiling,  
67 production, acquisition and retention of biological weapons;  
68
- 69 5. *Further Recommends* that the ISF submit recommendations to Member States regarding:  
70
- 71 a. The ways to increase effectiveness of detection, vaccination, and response, including personnel,  
72 equipment, and monitoring of locations and threat levels of bacteriological agents and toxins in the  
73 event of a bioterrorist attack, or bacteriological outbreak;  
74
- 75 b. The effectiveness of monitoring strategies implemented in research laboratories or facilities that  
76 develop or work with bacteriological and biological agents that may be misused in the event that non-  
77 state actors or terrorist organizations acquire them or may pose a threat to international peace and  
78 security, development, and public health in the event of an outbreak;  
79
- 80 c. Member States' adherence to the policies, procedures and safety guidelines outlined by the ICCSRF;  
81
- 82 6. *Encourages* international scientific research grants to be issued in support of research performed by Member  
83 States who comply with the ICCSRF and do not risk the acquisition of potential bio-weapons by non-state  
84 actors and terrorist organizations, in order to favor legal research which aims to protect public health by  
85 decreasing the potential for bacteriological or biological outbreaks and epidemics;  
86
- 87 7. *Encourages* the ISF to submit new research presented during forum meetings to an information sharing archive  
88 that will ensure transparency and give access to Member States to adhere to the ISF in order to publicly share  
89 information on bio-security and biotechnology with other Member States, NGOs and scientists in the fields of  
90 biotechnology and bioterrorism;  
91
- 92 8. *Urges* Member States to report to the ISF biannually on progress and implementation of ISF recommendations,  
93 to ensure the appropriate use of research funding and information sharing.



## National Model United Nations • NY

**Code:** GA1/1/4

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

---

1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*

2  
3 *Guided by* Article 1.1 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which calls for international cooperation for the  
4 maintenance of international peace and security based on respect among nations for the principles of equal rights  
5 and self-determination of peoples, as well as taking other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace,  
6

7 *Reconsidering* Article IV of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as it helps to fight against bioterrorism  
8 through the necessary measures to prevent acquisition of biological material,  
9

10 *Further recalling* the BWC that prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and  
11 that requires their destruction,  
12

13 *Welcoming* domestic implementation measures for the BWC, particularly to combat bioterrorism and utilize  
14 confidence-building measures (CBMs) as proposed by the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC,  
15

16 *Recognizing* resolution 66/50 which calls upon Member States to increase safeguards surrounding dual-use material  
17 that could be used by terrorist organizations to make weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),  
18

19 *Further recalling* resolution 68/38, which addresses CBMs in a regional and subregional context and reaffirms the  
20 necessity of negotiations and of peaceful settlements of disputes,  
21

22 *Recalling* resolutions 69/82, 61/102, and 67/77, which call for efforts towards achieving the universality of the  
23 Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and  
24 on their Destruction (BWC),  
25

26 *Recalling* resolution 69/64 that highlights the necessity of implementing bilateral and multilateral CBM agreements  
27 to prevent potential hostilities,  
28

29 *Acknowledging* resolution 69/43 which follows up on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on  
30 the legality of nuclear weapons, in respect to biological weapons stockpiling, development, and use,  
31

32 *Recalling* Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls for national efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs  
33 and material, including biological substances,  
34

35 *Noting* Security Council Resolution 2171, which reaffirms the importance of regional CBM agreements in  
36 peacefully preventing disputes,  
37

38 *Emphasizing* the desire expressed by the Secretary-General during the State Parties Conference in Geneva to work  
39 together in developing practical proposals for achieving biological disarmament,  
40

41 *Stressing* that inspection protocols on domestic, regional and international levels remain inadequate and insufficient,  
42

43 *Reaffirming* that inter-community and intergovernmental communication is vital in preventing the proliferation of  
44 biological weapons, for the respect of state sovereignty should be maintained,  
45

46 *Acknowledging* the potential for a catastrophe resulting from misuse of biological materials or from a biological  
47 weapons attack and especially considering the vulnerability of people everywhere to such a catastrophe due to the  
48 ease of exposure and rapid spreading from local to global,  
49

50 *Noting* the significance of credible verification measures in promoting confidence between Member States, as  
51 exemplified by verification visits of multiple international supervision groups such as the Organization for the  
52 Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),  
53  
54 *Fully aware* of the structure of the OPCW, which relies on subsidiary branches to provide up to date information on  
55 recent developments in the chemical products industry, facilitate communications between Member States, and  
56 develop publications on the safe storage of chemical material,  
57  
58 *Recognizing* the OPCW and its thorough chemical databases, as it is useful in addressing the issue of possession and  
59 transfer of chemical material and can be used as a model for biological databases,  
60  
61 *Noting* the importance of the efforts made by the World Health Organization (WHO) to prevent and respond to the  
62 outbreaks and spread of communicable diseases through establishing networks that detect the spread of epidemics,  
63  
64 *Recognizing* the risk of linkages between terrorism and biological weapons,  
65  
66 *Noting* the importance of the efforts made by WHO to prevent and respond to the outbreaks and spread of  
67 communicable diseases through establishing networks that detect the spread of epidemics,  
68  
69 *Affirming* the joint WHO and United Nations Children’s Fund Reaching Every District initiative and the importance  
70 of reducing mortality among nationals within the international community in the event of biological weapons usage,  
71  
72 *Noting* the threat that biological weapons pose to food security, especially in developing and least developed  
73 countries, and the work done by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in this area,  
74  
75 *Acknowledging* the vulnerability of water sources to be targeted by biological weapons use and the widespread  
76 negative impact it has on the targeted population and international community as a whole,  
77  
78 *Observing* the need to address a proper and universal definition in regards to specific biological weapons,  
79 considering the regions in the world that are especially vulnerable to potential escalation of conflict and attack,  
80  
81 *Noting* that CBMs between regional bodies can help Member States work together to combat non-state actors whose  
82 efforts are not limited by borders,  
83  
84 *Considering* the Wassenaar Arrangement as an example of a framework for ensuring transparency and responsibility  
85 in the importation and exportation of dual-use material among Member States, as this will be useful as a CBM for  
86 biological weapons and material transfer,  
87  
88 *Expressing* concern with the inability of Member States to arrive at a consensus for supplementation to the BWC  
89 with verification protocol, as exemplified by the failure of the Ad Hoc Group in 2001,  
90  
91 *Further noting* with approval of all work currently being conducted by the UN in the area of weapons disarmament  
92 including the UN Institute for Training and Research, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs  
93 (UNODA), the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the BWC, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and  
94 Cultural Organization (UNESCO),  
95  
96 *Recognizing* that education on significant international issues in the area of future technologies such as bioweapons  
97 is necessary for all peoples,  
98  
99 1. *Encourages* states that have not done so to sign and ratify the BWC in order to fight against bioterrorism on a  
100 global level;  
101  
102 2. *Calls for* the international community to support Member States that have not signed or ratified the BWC  
103 through capacity building and financial assistance, in order that universality of the BWC will be achieved and  
104 international peace and security may be maintained;  
105



- 106 3. *Emphasizes* the need to address a proper and universal definition in regards to specific biological weapons,  
107 considering the regions in the world that are especially vulnerable to potential escalation of conflict and attack,  
108
- 109 4. *Emphasizes* the need for cooperation among the scientific community to converge in discussion, to strengthen  
110 Article VI in regards to transparency and data-sharing, and Article X in regards to outbreak response support by  
111 the international community, of the BWC;  
112
- 113 5. *Understands* that the respect of sovereignty is of utmost importance in relation to monitoring and inspecting  
114 dual-capable facilities;  
115
- 116 6. *Calls upon* the next Review Conference of the BWC to establish a verification team comprised of experts from  
117 multiple Member States, under the oversight of the ISU, which would:  
118
- 119 a. Conduct verification visits on a voluntary basis in respecting the bounds of national sovereignty, these  
120 visits being:  
121
- 122 i. Routine without evidence of treaty violation and short-notice challenge investigations;  
123 ii. By request by Member States to the Security Council and ISU when facilities are suspected of  
124 alleged uses and manufacture of biological weapons, or of a suspicious outbreak of disease;  
125
- 126 b. Publish a document summarizing the material and information found during a verification visit to be  
127 made public to the international community to promote transparency and ensure the peaceful uses of  
128 biological material;  
129
- 130 c. To have the effectiveness of this verification organization evaluated after a period of 10 years by the  
131 BWC review conference to appraise the worthiness of its renewal;  
132
- 133 d. To encourage the ISU to carry out the monitoring of state-based research facilities at regional and  
134 international levels;  
135
- 136 7. *Suggests* that Member States utilize domestic-level licensing systems for the declaration and inspection of dual-  
137 capable facilities, in which facilities will provide the following information, first listed in the Seventh Review  
138 session of the BWC, in Confidence Building Measure “A,” part ii:  
139
- 140 a. Location of facility;  
141
- 142 b. Size of facility;  
143
- 144 c. Number of personnel;  
145
- 146 d. Personnel division;  
147
- 148 e. Scientific specialization;  
149
- 150 f. Sources of funding;  
151
- 152 g. Publication policy;  
153
- 154 h. Biological defense work and type of micro-organisms and/or toxins studied;  
155
- 156 8. *Urges* Member States to establish a biological suppliers group modeled off of the nuclear technology export  
157 policies of the Zanger Committee, in order to monitor manufacturers of dual-use biological substances and  
158 equipment as well as to create a comprehensive “Trigger List” of dual-use biological material that could be used  
159 to manufacture weapons;  
160

- 161 9. *Recommends* the discussion of a legally binding protocol for verification to be added to the BWC at the next  
162 BWC Review Conference, in addition to the voluntary inspections under the jurisdiction of the ISU of the  
163 BWC;  
164
- 165 10. *Encourage* all willing and able Member States to improve and increase funding to the ISU of the BWC in order  
166 to allow it to expand and be able to best provide:  
167
- 168 a. Technical assistance to Member States requiring information on the safe storage and transport of  
169 biological material;
  - 170
  - 171 b. Facilitate discussions between Member States attempting to establish bilateral and multilateral  
172 agreements;
  - 173
  - 174 c. Invites Public and Private Sector Biological experts to publish material in a peer reviewed journal  
175 published by the ISU, with the intent on the dissemination of information on biological security;  
176
- 177 11. *Recommends* to improve the partnership between willing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the UN  
178 concerning the control of biological weapons, in order to better integrate NGOs focused on disarmament issues  
179 into the UN system through:  
180
- 181 a. Established monthly meetings between the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security and  
182 the General Assembly (GA) First Committee to inform the UN;
  - 183
  - 184 b. Published quarterly reports to the Secretary-General by the meetings about the worldwide situations  
185 concerning biological weapons in order to fight against bioterrorism;  
186
- 187 12. *Recommends* the UN Sixth Committee to draft and submit a report to the Security Council on punitive measures  
188 for non-state actors illegally acquiring and utilizing biological material and technology with accordance to the  
189 Geneva Protocol, BWC, and relevant international humanitarian law, such report should recommend:  
190
- 191 a. A legal framework to be implemented by national legislation to combat the illicit sale of dual-use  
192 biological material and technology;
  - 193
  - 194 b. Cooperation by Member States with the values of the BWC by considering a biological weapons attack  
195 by non-state actors to be a crime against humanity in the form of bioterrorism;  
196
- 197 13. *Encourages* Member States to establish a standard concerning voluntary national reporting mechanisms to the  
198 ISU and border controls on the transfer of biological materials, in order to monitor the import and export of  
199 these substances and to prevent non-state actors, especially terrorist groups and transnational criminal  
200 syndicates, from acquiring and manufacturing weapons of this source;  
201
- 202 14. *Further encourages* all Member States to voluntarily submit annual reports on the production, import, export  
203 and transit of dual-use biological technology and material within the international community to the ISU, and to  
204 establish a revision and best-practice exchange mechanism within the scope of the BWC Review Conferences;  
205
- 206 15. *Reaffirms* that transparency of dual-use biological material transfer is crucial to preventing the acquisition and  
207 misuse of these substances by non-state actors, while keeping in mind the sovereignty of Member States;  
208
- 209 16. *Suggests* Member States to support the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network as an early warning  
210 system and response force through financial, technical, and logistical means, in order to facilitate the rapid  
211 response to national and regional disease outbreaks, especially those that occur due to biological attacks;  
212
- 213 17. *Recommends* that the Meeting of Experts of the BWC include in their report measures States must take in the  
214 event of an emergency, how the international community can support affected areas, and how spreading can be  
215 prevented, and in the event that a country does not have the necessary technologies to implement the

216 recommendations in the document produced by experts, more technologically advanced countries can help  
217 states who request it through technical assistance with:  
218  
219 a. Technology transfer;  
220  
221 b. Prevention;  
222  
223 c. And disaster management;  
224  
225 18. *Encourages* Member States to include immunization regulations in their national preventative action plans  
226 against biological outbreaks, as well as establish National Expanded Programs on Immunization, as a way to  
227 improve national health and resilience against biological outbreak and attack;  
228  
229 19. *Calls upon* Member States to consider enacting national legislation and programmes modeled off of the FAO's  
230 Strategic Program on Cassava Disease in Africa, which stressed the importance of biodiversity and sustainable  
231 agricultural practices in preventing the spread of disease in staple crops;  
232  
233 20. *Further calls upon* the members of the international community who use Genetically Modified Organisms  
234 (GMO's) to ensure that this practice is used peacefully;  
235  
236 21. *Recognizes* the potential for GMO's to be used as biological weapons, and therefore recommends Member  
237 States who use GMO's to adapt their practices and ensure that they are used peacefully in order to prevent:  
238  
239 a. The spread of these agents across international borders, whether intentionally or unintentionally  
240 through means such as weather patterns, seed dispersion, and cross-fertilization;  
241  
242 b. The destabilization and damage to the viability and sustainability of local ecosystems and soils and  
243 biodiversity;  
244  
245 c. Potential harm to populations who consume or are exposed to GMO's;  
246  
247 22. *Suggests* that Member States work in collaboration with relevant existing national and regional organizations  
248 such as the African Council Minister on Water (AMCOW), which provides water testing material to Member  
249 States, in order to detect the use of biological weapons and spread of dangerous biological materials within  
250 water on a national level;  
251  
252 23. *Encourages* the creation of an annexed database to the BWC by the ISU, similar to the OPCW's chemical  
253 annexes and along the lines of WHO and its biological databases, which would work as follows:  
254  
255 a. List of bacteria, toxin and fungus:  
256  
257 i. Divided from level 1 to 3 of contamination;  
258 ii. Divided from level 1 to 3 of communicability;  
259  
260 b. Updated every 5 years at the BWC Review Conferences;  
261  
262 24. *Wishes* to see the continuation of intersessional process as noticed in resolution 67/77 to retain the previous  
263 structure from the 2003-2010 intersessional process, consisting of annual Meetings of State Parties (MSP)  
264 preceded by the Meeting of Experts (MX);  
265  
266 25. *Establishes* a permanent continuation of the intersessional process meetings, consisting specifically of the MX  
267 and the annual gathering and submission of reports from the MSP, and requests the annual MX reports to  
268 incorporate and specify on additional facility and regional findings in regard to biological technology, violations  
269 and weaponry;  
270

- 271 26. *Supports* the establishment the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG), as proposed at the Meeting of States  
272 Parties in 2014, that would report intersessional updates and innovations in the fields of science of technology  
273 relevant to articles XI and X to the Review Conferences to the BWC, and encourages support and funding from  
274 Member States before the time of the Eighth Review Conference in 2016;  
275
- 276 27. *Further endorses* the OEWG to comprise of scientific advisers from academia, industry and government, with  
277 input from a wide range of sources including national academies of science and NGOs such as International  
278 Academy of Science, the Board on International Scientific Organizations, and others;  
279
- 280 28. *Highlights* the success and usefulness of the VERTIC database and education methods, specifically the National  
281 Implementation Measures Programme that seeks to expand its efforts to document biological weapons research,  
282 biosecurity, and biosafety measures based off of the provisions of the BWC, in hopes of achieving greater  
283 transparency amongst Member States;  
284
- 285 29. *Encourages* increased technology transfer between Member States promoting the peaceful use and research of  
286 biotechnology, such as medical advancement purposes, in order to allow biological material to be used for  
287 development and the benefit of mankind;  
288
- 289 30. *Further encourages* increasing transparency of the transfer and use of dual-use biotechnology through the  
290 development and maintenance of effective measures to account for and secure items in production, use, storage,  
291 or transport that are required in Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding dual-use biotechnology;  
292
- 293 31. *Recommends* the use of CBMs to combat bioterrorism, specifically these CBM programs:  
294
- 295       a. An agreed innovative financing plan, such as the loan conversion mechanisms using as demonstrated  
296 by Japan with official development assistance to Nigeria for the purpose of funding polio vaccines, to  
297 be repaid by private foundations;  
298
- 299       b. Determining priorities at the outset of CBM prospects, especially regarding joint military operations  
300 like those set out by the Lake Chad Basin Commission to combat non-state actors like Boko Haram;  
301
- 302 32. *Suggests* that regional organizations establish agreements modeled off of Association of Southeast Asian  
303 Nations (ASEAN)'s Convention on Counter Terrorism, which established a rapid response communication  
304 network between member state's security sectors to address breaches of bio-security in a collaborative effort;  
305
- 306 33. *Endorses* regional organizations establish bio-security review conferences modeled after the Middle East and  
307 North Africa (MENA) Biosafety and Biosecurity International Conference, which discussed a regional strategy  
308 to combat non-state actors from acquiring dual-use biological goods;  
309
- 310 34. *Recommends* supporting the work of the ISU, focusing on defining standards for participant nations, particularly  
311 through the formation of national frameworks with clearly defined steps to promote domestic legislation in  
312 accordance with sovereign states' policies, which should include:  
313
- 314       a. BWC, 1540 Committee, and OPCW goals of preventing and prohibiting producing, acquiring,  
315 retaining, using and proliferation of WMDs, as well as increased transparency, particularly regarding  
316 dual-use biological weapons technology, reduction of bioweapons and biological hazards;  
317
- 318       b. Comprehensive law containing criminal provisions, control measures, safety and security measures as  
319 well as enforcement measures;  
320
- 321       c. State-specific standards, with ISU-led review meetings to ensure adequate progress in National State  
322 Action plans, with such meetings beginning before the 2016 BWC Review Conference and meeting on  
323 a semiannual basis;  
324
- 325       d. Plans to enhance national legislation to foster the development and improvement of biological  
326 technologies with peaceful goals, such as medical advancements;

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366
35. *Encourages* the establishment of trans-boundary CBMs to establish, develop, review and maintain effective national export and transfer controls over transshipments to ensure the reduction of biologically contaminated products and transparency of all such shipments;
  36. *Calls upon* Member States to support the ISU in coordination with regional organizations (i.e. African Union, European Union), in the collaborative dissemination of knowledge and skills relevant to biological weapons and dual-use materials as a confidence-building measure with a specific emphasis on:
    - a. The nature, content, origin and destination of international shipments of dual-use biological materials and technologies;
    - b. Biosafety and biosecurity best-practices for laboratories and research facilities handling dual-use materials and technologies;
    - c. The utilization of a database with information pertaining to biological agents and possible weaponry, and specifically helping to provide this to the developing countries;
    - d. Helping bordering countries strengthen cooperation on the aspects of control of dual-use biological materials' transportation and trade;
    - e. The increasing monitoring of water resources and food processing plants by states in order to decrease the chance of contamination;
  37. *Further invites* stronger partnerships with regional organizations and their various established structures to serve as information centers and hubs for the BWC, UNODA, and UN Institute for Disarmament Research, working through all relevant international and regional bodies;
  38. *Calls upon* the UN organizations UNITAR, UNESCO and UNODA to work together to develop an educational and public awareness program for Member States on the current status of the BWC and new developments in the areas of biotechnology, in order to ensure public understanding of potential threats, protections, mechanisms, safe solutions, and peaceful applications in the area of biotechnology;
  39. *Calls upon* UNODA, the ISU, and regional organizations to conduct, with the consent of Member States, regular and regional-specific reviews on biological weapons and biological technologies related issues including, but not limited to, security, weapons monitoring, community level involvements, and regional responses;
  40. *Recommends* the members of the next BWC Review Conference in 2016 to discuss the matters referenced herein.



## National Model United Nations • NY

**Code:** GA1/1/5

**Committee:** The General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

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1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*

2  
3 *Noting with satisfaction* that many Member States voluntarily send reports to the Implementation Support Unit,

4  
5 *Regretting* the lack and inconsistency of reporting to the Implementation Support Unit,

6  
7 *Recognizing the need* for annual updates on the development of educational programs on the prevention of the  
8 spreading of diseases and acknowledging the importance of educational programs such as the Roll Back Malaria  
9 partnership in forming effective partnerships both globally and nationally in the fight against malaria as well as  
10 The World Health Organization's Global School Health Initiative to mobilize and strengthen health education in  
11 communities through schools,

12  
13 *Noting with deep concern* the lack of education in regards to the prevention of the spreading of diseases in many  
14 instances in developing countries, such as the recent Ebola outbreak, where the lack of education led to a rampant  
15 spread of the disease,

16  
17 *Increasingly alarmed* of the threat that genetically modified organisms pose as a potential delivery mechanism for  
18 biological agents and deeply concerned with the lack of information concerning with the potential threat of  
19 weaponized biological technology,

20  
21 *Noting with appreciation* the work done in determining whether Member States adhere to the implementation of the  
22 *Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC),*

23  
24 *Recognizing the importance* of Field Epidemiological Training Programs in the education of doctors and public  
25 health officials,

- 26  
27 1. *Recommends* the Implementation Support Unit to expand its scope to include an incentive for Member States to  
28 report to the Implementation Support Unit, this incentive would be a compiled annual report on all advances  
29 made in the study of biological agents for peaceful purposes, this report will be distributed to all Member States  
30 who report to the Implementation Support Unit and encourages Member States who receive the Implementation  
31 Support Unit's (ISU) annual report, as called for above, to include in their voluntary report, information on the  
32 development of education pertaining to biological agent knowledge and safety;
- 33  
34 2. *Encourages* Member States who do not voluntarily report to the Implementation Support Unit to reconsider on  
35 the basis of working towards the ultimate goal of transparency;
- 36  
37 3. *Emphasizes* the establishment of a Biennial Review Committee (BRC) to:
- 38  
39 a. Assess the health and safety standards of voluntarily participating states in regards to hazardous  
40 biological materials;
- 41  
42 b. Invite Member States to voluntarily report their progress on applying the Biological Weapons  
43 Convention;
- 44  
45 c. Suggest that to qualify as the host nation in regards to the biannual review committee, Member States  
46 comply with the qualification of the UN Scale of Assessments;
- 47  
48 4. *Encourages* the World Health Organization (WHO) to work with non-governmental organizations and UNICEF  
49 in regions that are especially prone to disease outbreaks, specifically one caused by biological agents, in the  
50 promotion of Focusing Resources on Effective School Health (FRESH) in informing school children starting at

- 51 age eight of practices that should be adopted when a disease threatens to spread and providing technical  
52 knowhow to local civil society and populations;  
53
- 54 5. *Encourages* the expansion of Article 2 in the Cartagena Protocol to recognize the potential threat of genetically  
55 modified organisms in the hands of non-state actors, invites Member States to contribute to an expert group of  
56 scientists working together with non-governmental organizations, specifically those involved in conflict  
57 management and environmental issues, that will further elaborate on the potential threat of biological  
58 technology;  
59
- 60 6. *Further hopes* that the WHO will aid the BWC in continuing research of the tremendous impact of genetically  
61 modified organisms on the everyday life of citizens of the international community due to the spread across  
62 international borders through weather patterns, cross fertilizations, and seed dispersion;  
63
- 64 7. *Encourages* all Member States to participate in the promotion and use of the Field Epidemiological Training  
65 Programs as a comprehensive capacity building mechanism for training in disease surveillance, outbreak  
66 control, and response;  
67
- 68 8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue rendering support to the BWC as well as to provide services that  
69 may be required for the implementation of the decisions made in this resolution.



## National Model United Nations • NY

**Code:** GA1/1/6

**Committee:** The General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

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1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*

2  
3 *Noting with satisfaction* that many Member States voluntarily send reports to the Implementation Support Unit

4  
5 *Regretting* the a lack and inconsistency of reporting to the Implementation Support Unit,

6  
7 *Recognizing the need* for annual updates on the development of educational programs on the prevention of the  
8 spreading of diseases and acknowledging the importance of educational programs such as the Roll Back Malaria  
9 partnership in forming effective partnerships both globally and nationally in the fight against malaria as well as  
10 The World Health Organization's Global School Health Initiative to mobilize and strengthen health education in  
11 communities through schools,

12  
13 *Noting with deep concern* the lack of education in regards to the prevention of the spreading of diseases in many  
14 instances in developing countries, such as the recent Ebola outbreak, where the lack of education led to a rampant  
15 spread of the disease,

16  
17 *Increasingly alarmed* of the threat that Genetically Modified Organisms pose as a potential delivery mechanism for  
18 biological agents and deeply concerned with the lack of information concerning with the potential threat of  
19 weaponized biological technology,

20  
21 *Noting with appreciation* the work done in determining whether Member States adhere to the implementation of the  
22 Biological Weapons Convention,

23  
24 *Recognizing the importance* of Field Epidemiological Training Programs in the education of doctors and public  
25 health officials,

- 26  
27 1. *Recommends* the Implementation Support Unit to expand its scope to include an incentive for Member States to  
28 report to the Implementation Support Unit, this incentive would be a compiled annual report on all advances  
29 made in the study of biological agents for peaceful purposes, this report will be distributed to all Member States  
30 who report to the Implementation Support Unit and encourages Member States who receive the Implementation  
31 Support Unit's (ISU) annual report, as called for above, to include in their voluntary report, information on the  
32 development of education pertaining to biological agent knowledge and safety;
- 33  
34 2. *Encourages* Member States who do not voluntarily report to the Implementation Support Unit to reconsider on  
35 the basis of working towards the ultimate goal of transparency,
- 36  
37 3. *Emphasizes* the establishment of a biannual review committee (BRC) to;
- 38 a. Assess the health and safety standards of voluntarily participating states in regards to hazardous  
39 biological materials,
- 40 b. Invite Member States to voluntarily report their progress on applying the Biological Weapons  
41 Convention,
- 42 c. Suggest that to qualify as the host nation in regards to the biannual review committee, Member States  
43 comply with the qualification of the UN Scale of Assessments,
- 44  
45 4. *Encourages* the World Health Organization to work with Non-Governmental Organizations and UNICEF in  
46 regions that are especially prone to disease outbreaks, specifically one caused by biological agents, in the  
47 promotion of Focusing Resources on Effective School Health (FRESH) in informing school children starting at  
48 age eight of practices that should be adopted when a disease threatens to spread and providing technical  
49 knowhow to local civil society and populations,
- 50



- 51 5. *Encourages* the expansion of Article 2 in the Cartagena Protocol to recognize the potential threat of  
52 Genetically Modified Organisms in the hands of non-state actors, invites Member States to contribute to an  
53 expert group of scientists working together with Non-Governmental Organizations, specifically those involved  
54 in conflict management and environmental issues, that will further elaborate on the potential threat of biological  
55 technology;  
56
- 57 6. *Further hopes* that the World Health Organization will aid the Biological Weapons Convention in continuing  
58 research of the tremendous impact of Genetically Modified Organisms on the everyday life of citizens of the  
59 international community due to the spread across international borders through weather patterns, cross  
60 fertilizations, and seed dispersion;  
61
- 62 7. *Encourages* all Member States to participate in the promotion and use of the Field Epidemiological Training  
63 Programs as a comprehensive capacity building mechanism for training in disease surveillance, outbreak  
64 control, and response;  
65
- 66 8. *Requests* the Secretary General to continue rendering support to the Biological Weapons Convention as well as  
67 to provide services that may be required for the implementation of the decisions made in this resolution.



## National Model United Nations • NY

**Code:** GA/1/7

**Committee:** The General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

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1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*

2  
3 *Reiterating* the principles outlined in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations (UN), specifically in Chapter IV,  
4 authorising the General Assembly to discuss issues relating to peace and security and Chapter VII, authorising the  
5 Security Council to take active measures in case of threats to peace and security,

6  
7 *Reaffirming* Article 3 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that everyone has the right to life,  
8 liberty and security of person, and Article 25.1, that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the  
9 health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food,

10  
11 *Recalling* Article 1.2 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “that all peoples  
12 may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations  
13 arising out of international economic cooperation based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law”,  
14 Article 11.1, “that state parties to the covenant recognise the right to an adequate standard of living for himself and  
15 his family, including adequate food”, Article 12.1, “that state parties to the Covenant recognise the right of everyone  
16 to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”, and Article 12.2 b), “the  
17 improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene”,

18  
19 *Reaffirming* the definition of biological weapons and dual use items as described by the 1996 Wassenaar  
20 Arrangement,

21  
22 *Reiterating* the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of  
23 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), more specifically Article 1, which  
24 prohibits states from producing, developing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining biological weapons,

25  
26 *Recalling* its resolution 43/196 in which it recognises that the majority of toxic and hazardous waste originated in  
27 developed countries and recognised that those countries have the main responsibility for combating such hazards,

28  
29 *Bearing in mind* the principles set forth by the Security Council resolution 1540, specifically Articles 1 to 3, which  
30 forbids States from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture,  
31 possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, encourages  
32 States to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire,  
33 possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and  
34 to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their  
35 means of delivery,

36  
37 *Emphasising* Chapter 20 of the Agenda 21 developed during the 1992 Rio Conference about the environmentally  
38 sound management of hazardous waste, including prevention of illegal and international traffic in hazardous wastes,

39  
40 *Recognising* the need to safeguard the environment and reduce contamination risk with the transport of dual risk  
41 items, hazardous waste materials and biological weapons,

42  
43 *Recognising* resolution 67/35 which upholds the principals set forth by the Geneva Protocol for the non-proliferation  
44 of weapons of nuclear and biological weapons,

45  
46 *Having considered* the threat to international peace and security posed by biological weapons,

47  
48 *Noting* with deep concern the lack of advanced medical infrastructure, specifically in developing nations,

49

50 *Fully believing* that enhancing the availability of medical technology is crucial to mitigating the threat posed by  
51 biological weapons,  
52

53 *Realising* the value of further exploration on this topic and noting the possibilities of developing institutions, such as  
54 research centres and academic institutes for the promotion and expansion of the benefits and access to life sciences,  
55 research and biological technologies,  
56

57 *Reaffirming* the benefit that development and implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs) have upon  
58 the existing framework surrounding biological threats,  
59

60 *Taking into consideration* the value that CBMs and multilateral co-operation plays with respect to maintaining  
61 friendly state relationships,  
62

63 *Emphasising* the value of cooperation between local, national and regional training programs, including  
64 organisations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United  
65 Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), World Health Organization (WHO) and relevant non-  
66 governmental organizations (NGOs) in sharing their expertise in the fight against biological weapons in today's  
67 modern era,  
68

69 *Seeking* to increase global readiness in responding to crises, especially those caused by weaponised biological agents  
70 and understanding the dire need for rapid response in the case of a biological weapons attack,  
71

72 1. Urges all Member States to comply with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and  
73 Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction;  
74

75 2. Reiterates the prohibition on the use of and research on biological weapons for the purpose of using on any kind  
76 of crops or fields for malicious purposes;  
77

78 3. *Reminds* Members States of its commitment to the environment in regards to resolution 2997 and to the Rio  
79 Conference of 1992 and the transportation of hazardous biological materials, dual items and biological weapons  
80 themselves;  
81

82 4. *Encourages* the international community to facilitate the improved dissemination of vital medical supplies to  
83 states as is applicable through increased cooperation and funding to NGOs such as the International Dispensary  
84 Association Foundation;  
85

86 5. *Recommends* voluntary international funding by member states for regional NGOs and pre-existing national  
87 organisations for responsive research purposes in order to:  
88

89 a. Reduce levels of disorder and casualties, in case of biological incidents;  
90

91 b. Further universalize regional research facilities through technological and information sharing  
92 programs through online medical information exchange networks;  
93

94 6. *Suggests* the reaffirmation of the role for UN emergency response organizations to collaborate in working with  
95 relevant organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), United Nations  
96 Environment Programme (UNEP), and the WHO's International Health Regulation Focal Points in regards to  
97 any toxic biological crises within Member States;  
98

99 7. *Further Recommends* the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to develop a better relationship with NGOs, such  
100 as Doctors Without Borders, and the Health Action International to improve cohesive collaboration with the  
101 WHO in order to:  
102

103 a. Integrate regional response mechanisms for the promotion of measured response protocols in the event  
104 of disease outbreaks;  
105

- 106           b. Increase emergency response training initiatives to biological research technicians for accident  
107           prevention;  
108
- 109 8. *Recommends* the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to develop a better relationship with NGOs, such as  
110 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Health Action International, to improve cohesive collaboration with  
111 the WHO in order to:  
112
- 113           a. Integrate regional response mechanisms for the promotion of measured response protocols in the event  
114           of disease outbreaks;  
115
- 116           b. Increase emergency response training initiatives to biological research technicians for accident  
117           prevention;  
118
- 119 9. *Emphasises* the need for education in the area of response to biological incidents in order to prevent  
120 contamination of water supplies, agricultural resources, crops, and fields by:  
121
- 122           a. Cooperating with non-governmental organisations such as the Counterterrorism Education Learning  
123           Lab (CELL) to enhance public safety through education;  
124
- 125           b. Training first responders to respond to biological incidents, modelled after programs such as the  
126           United States' Indiana's National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Training provided by the Centre  
127           for Domestic Preparedness and the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC), which  
128           seeks to train first responders, NGOs and the private sector to reduce vulnerability involving Weapons  
129           of Mass Destruction (WMDs), terrorism and all high-hazard events by training technical assistants and  
130           exercises;  
131
- 132           c. Advancing the WHO guidelines on the proper disposal of biohazards;  
133
- 134           d. Collaborating with the WHO to enhance public initiatives through the establishment of public call  
135           centres and the broadcast of behavioural messages;  
136
- 137           e. Utilising WHO International Health Regulations (IHR) focal points as a tool for providing knowledge  
138           in order to better understand biological crises;  
139
- 140 10. *Suggests* that Member States share research pertaining to waterborne and foodborne illnesses through online  
141 platforms, the FAO and the WHO and refer to the Water Safety Planning for Small Communities Water  
142 Supplies (2012);  
143
- 144 11. *Hopes* that a critical function of International Human Rights facilities increase mobile capabilities in order to  
145 handle and respond to hazardous biological threats through:  
146
- 147           a. Promoting the exchange of knowledge and technological resources between global experts and  
148           regional research facilities;  
149
- 150           b. Further encouraging the collaboration between local medical and specialized personnel and domestic  
151           emergency response units with the UN, in order to best prepare for the event of a biological crisis,  
152           when applicable, keeping in mind existing models for health and military co-operation;  
153
- 154           c. Training local medical staff on training those afflicted by biological agents, resulting from hazardous  
155           biological incidence;  
156
- 157           d. Educating local citizens in reasonable precaution measures and procedures to undertake in the extent of  
158           a biological crisis or crises;  
159
- 160 12. *Stresses* the critical importance that inter-state transparency and trust play in order to increase confidence  
161 among states regarding the peaceful emphasis on scientific advancement;

- 162  
163 13. *Encourages* Member States to utilise objectives combine research in the development of biological security  
164 technology as well as the transfer of emergency reaction procedures and practices in order to promote capacity-  
165 building in regional locations that are unable to adequately address biological threats alone;  
166  
167 14. *Invites* the Office of the UN Secretary-General to produce a report on the current States of the control of  
168 biological agents and toxins on an annual basis.



## National Model United Nations • NY

**Code:** GA/1/8

**Committee:** General Assembly First Committee

**Topic:** The Control of Biological Weapons in Today's Modern Era

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1 *The General Assembly First Committee,*

2  
3 *Recalling* the fundamental principle of ensuring and fostering international peace and security among all states, as  
4 manifested in Article I of the Charter of the United Nations,

5  
6 *Fully alarmed* by the increasing threat of misuse of biological and toxic substances imposed by expanding terrorist  
7 organizations and non-state actors, which menace global security and peace,

8  
9 *Deeply concerned* about the recent outbreaks of severe epidemics caused by biological substances, particularly the  
10 recent outbreak of Ebola in Africa,

11  
12 *Noting with concern* the increased need for adjustment and update of implementation measures of the Convention on  
13 the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons  
14 and on their Destruction (BWC), due to the fundamentally changed circumstances of today's modern era,

15  
16 *Recognizing the* existing dilemma of the dual-use of biological agents, with use for scientific innovation and  
17 epidemic protection on the one hand and harmful misuse for military and terrorist purposes on the other hand,

18  
19 *Taking into account* the necessity of sufficient public awareness about bioweapons in order to combat public  
20 hysteria, so that civilians know how to react in the case of a biological crisis, for diminishing security risks,

21  
22 *Furthermore recognizing*, in the purpose of extending awareness, the benefits of educational resources pertaining to  
23 the proper laboratory training and educational programs,

- 24  
25 1. *Encourages* Member States to collaborate with biological research departments and associations of laboratory  
26 management in order to improve laboratory skills by providing standardized trainings and further instructions  
27 for laboratory personnel, such as:
- 28
- 29 a. Research scientists;
  - 30
  - 31 b. Post-doctoral fellows;
  - 32
  - 33 c. Undergraduate and graduate students;
  - 34
  - 35 d. Laboratory technicians, coordinators, and managers;
  - 36
- 37 2. *Suggests* the establishment of seminars organized by biological research departments with the collaboration of  
38 the World Health Organization Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Network (EDLP) which aim to  
39 inform laboratory personnel about the harmful potential of biological substances as biological weapons, to  
40 better instruct them on biological laboratory security standards such as proposed by the:
- 41
- 42 a. National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC);
  - 43
  - 44 b. International Organization of Biological Control (IOBC);
  - 45
  - 46 c. European Union Non-Proliferation Consortium;
  - 47
- 48 3. *Suggests* Member States to implement courses regarding health-related issues in the field of biology in local  
49 educational institutions that corresponds with the current framework of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU)

50 in order to educate civilians concerning the dangers of biological weapons and the potential benefits of  
51 biological agents in regards to scientific research, thus:

- 52
- 53 a. Increasing citizens' knowledge about emergency responses in case of a biological attack;
- 54
- 55 b. Encouraging secure behavior of civilians contributing to a safer environment;
- 56
- 57 c. Advocating for confidence-building measures within communities, such as establishing
- 58 communication channels between civilians and biological institutions;
- 59

60 4. *Calls upon* Member States to implement a national control unit with the advice and support of International  
61 Secure Systems Lab that will assist computer engineers in the strengthening and promoting the security of  
62 laboratories systems, such as:

- 63
- 64 a. The ventilation of laboratories, like fume hoods which filter toxins of contaminated air;
- 65
- 66 b. Automatic security doors which limits non-staff members to get access to biological substances;
- 67
- 68 c. Modern automatic locking systems which prevents the spread of toxin leaks outside laboratories;
- 69

70 5. *Suggests* that Member States who have signed the BWC encourage research laboratories to provide information  
71 on biological-related projects which would be used in interactive platforms, such as the digital map created for  
72 the Ebola crisis in West Africa, including the following:

- 73
- 74 a. The main field of research;
- 75
- 76 b. The budget used;
- 77
- 78 c. The received funding;
- 79
- 80 d. The involved personnel;
- 81

82 6. *Recommends* Member States to collaborate and communicate with agencies such as the International Criminal  
83 Police Organization (INTERPOL), the European Police Office (EUROPOL) among others in order to promote  
84 transparency and judicial cooperation during the hiring process of laboratory personnel with the goal of  
85 ensuring that they do not have any personal ties with terrorist or extremist organizations;

86

87 7. *Further suggests* that all current and prospective personnel pass a psychological assessment, similar to the  
88 International Aviation Safety Assessment Program (IASA) which would be evaluated by national mental health  
89 organizations in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Department of Mental  
90 Health (DMH) who are capable of estimating whether an employee should or should not be given clearance to  
91 work in laboratories that deal with hazardous materials;

92

93 8. *Encourages* security clearance to delicate information should only be given to personnel that have significant  
94 years of experience at the research laboratories in question through the work of national structures and  
95 organizations such as the Belgium Biosafety Organization which works to maintain restrictions regarding the  
96 use and the production of biological agents;

97

98 9. *Recommends* the elaboration on a clear differentiation between the definitions of the research on biological  
99 agents for "hostile purposes" and for "peaceful purposes", which should be conducted by the United Nations  
100 Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the ISU until the next Review Conference in 2016;

101

102 10. *Supports* the strengthening of the ISU's cooperation with the Verification, Research, Training and Information  
103 Centre (VERTIC), for enhancing the capability to adequately facilitate the BWC's implementation, especially  
104 through fostering an exchange of best practices, information sharing and an augmentation of communication  
105 capacities;

106  
107  
108

11. *Ensures* its continued commitment to the process of biological weapons control and requests the Secretariat to address the related issues in future sessions.