

Code: SC/RES/1/1
Committee: Security Council A
Subject: Achieving Peace and Stability in Somalia

1 *Convinced* that having youth empowerment at the core of a development agenda has untapped
2 potential for destabilizing policies that marginalize youth, removing institutional barriers, and
3 buttressing bottom-up community led initiatives—ultimately reducing the root causes of conflict
4 such that youth may lead the lives they choose, and contribute to a more prosperous, peaceful
5 future,

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7 *Realizing* the future of Somalia and the well-being of its people strongly rests on empowering its
8 large youth population as they are a significantly underutilized asset in pursuing peace and
9 stability,

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11 *Understanding* that the empowerment of the youth will lead to the development of a state and
12 improve international security through education and cooperation between different states,

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14 *Believing* that coordinating education and employment policy with development policy is a
15 viable way of improving the peace and stability in Somalia,

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17 *Deeply concerned* that the unemployment rate for youth under the age of 30 is 67 per cent and
18 that this age group comprises 70 per cent of the Somali population,

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20 *Recognizing* the Youth Employment Network's (YEN) work in engaging, educating and
21 motivating actors to provide improved employment opportunities for youth, and providing a
22 platform for focusing on policy advice, innovative pilot projects, knowledge sharing, and
23 brokering partnerships,

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25 *Fully aware* that youth are major actors in the conflict, constituting the bulk of the participants in
26 militias and criminal gangs, including al-Shabaab,

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28 *Having studied* the International Labour Organisation (ILO) report in 2011, which identifies a
29 range of inadequacies in the job sector,

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31 *Recalling* a 2009 landmark study on youth vulnerability and exclusion in West Africa by the
32 Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG), which found that current state-led youth
33 programmes are supply driven, unresponsive and short lived, and do not target, leverage or
34 upscale the successful and durable initiatives of the private and voluntary sectors,

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36 *Affirming* the July 2011 African Union Summit where African leaders committed themselves to
37 creating quality employment opportunities for young people,

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39 *Emphasizing* the October 2012 International Economic Forum on Africa high-level summit on
40 economic development issues—focusing on promoting youth employment,

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42 *Noting with deep satisfaction* UN Development Group's UN Country Team in Somalia's
43 comprehensive capabilities in facilitating dialogue among all international aid agencies, donor

44 groups, and other development actors, as well as their success in establishing joint programs of
45 action geared towards a common agenda as a vehicle for Somalia economic transformation,
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47 *Noting further* the need to mobilize resources for youth livelihood interventions from all
48 stakeholders in a transparent and sustainable way,
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50 *Referring* to the UN Somali Assistance Strategy (UNSAS) 2011-2015, which focuses on social
51 services, poverty reduction and livelihoods, and good governance and human security by setting
52 out the humanitarian, recovery and development objectives of the UN in Somalia,
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54 *Guided by* the Somali Youth Charter (SYC), which was adopted by youth representatives from
55 Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia, for the first time in support of national
56 policies, programs and actions in favor of youth development during the consultative workshop
57 held in Garowe, Puntland on 24 September 2011,
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59 *Deeply convinced* by the Development Programme's (UNDP) 2012 Somalia Human
60 Development Report (HDR), which recommends that a coherent national youth policy
61 framework needs to be well integrated in the national development strategy and translated into
62 action, and that all international aid agencies should agree on a joint youth programme of action
63 geared towards a common youth agenda as a vehicle for transformation,
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65 *The Security Council,*
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- 67 1) *Recommends* the UN Development Group (UNDG) to initiate the seed capital and
68 technical support to the Somali Youth Council (SYC) via the UN Country Team (UNCT)
69 in Somalia in implementing and administering a co-managed National Youth
70 Empowerment Development Fund (NYED), in cooperation with the Somali government
71 and with the support of other relevant actors,
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- 73 2) *Further recommends* that the NYED raises funds from domestic and international donors
74 and disburses such funds to:
 - 75 a. be in accordance with frameworks established by the Somali Youth Charter, the
76 UNSAS, and other relevant, agreed upon frameworks;
 - 77 b. promote a national action plan (NAP) that advances youth employability and
78 entrepreneurship by;
 - 79 i. organizing events that give key stakeholders the opportunity to openly
80 discuss challenges and opportunities and commit to the development of a
81 NAP that coordinates youth education and training policy with
82 development policy;
 - 83 ii. offering funding competitions for engaging in initiatives determined by
84 the NAP to stakeholders such as Somali youth organizations, civil society
85 members, employers, trade unions as well as Government Ministries and
86 Departments, such as those responsible for employment, labor, youth,
87 education, finance and planning;

- 88 i. launching media and advocacy campaigns, initiated by youth, that
89 emphasize the strengths and opportunities for investing in, participating in,
90 and/or otherwise supporting youth empowerment initiatives;
- 91 c. support the delivery of, and increase access to, education, training and skill
92 development by working with the Youth Employment Network (YEN) to:
- 93 i. enhance the capacity of youth cooperatives/associations of promoting and
94 facilitating business relationships amongst youth across clan groups,
95 regions, and other divisions;
- 96 iii. invest in communications through radio, television, newspapers,
97 billboards, telephones and the internet to advertise employment services;
- 98 iv. explore strategies for establishing closer links between formal and non-
99 formal education as well as between classroom instruction and workplace
100 learning;
- 101 ii. subsidize businesses that provide mentoring/apprenticeship programs that
102 connect their employees with young entrepreneurs, or that enter into
103 arrangements with youth organizations to provide pro bono mentoring/
104 apprenticeship services for their young members;
- 105 d. provide a reliable and on-going labor market information system for relevant
106 policy and program formulation at the public and private sector levels by:
- 107 i. working with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of
108 the UN Secretariat in facilitating the development of national capacities to
109 collect and compile socioeconomic data such as: the distribution of youth
110 by primary activity, the youth unemployment rate, relaxed youth
111 unemployment rate, youth employment-to-population ratio, status of
112 young workers in employment, youth employment by sector, and
113 educational attainment of youth labor force;
- 114 ii. mapping economic opportunities for the youth cohort in a timely and
115 accurate manner to enable effective planning, target-setting, monitoring
116 and evaluation;
- 117 e. balances quick tangible results associated with low-skill employment generation
118 with medium and long-term objectives that:
- 119 i. supports and strengthens youth's Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
120 (MSMEs) in key value-chains;
- 121 ii. encourages public-private partnerships in the provision of basic services;
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- 123 3) *Further invites* the UNCT to assist NYED in developing a suitable monitoring and
124 evaluation system to ensure accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity and fairness
125 in the utilization of resources,
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- 127 4) *Decides* to remain seized in this matter.

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5 *Keeping in mind* the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia of 31
6 January 2013 (S/2013/69),
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8 *Saluting* the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia,
9 Mr. Augustine P. Mahiga,
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11 *Recognizing* that Somalia's nascent democracy is an ongoing process that calls for the
12 attention of the international community and the pressing time-frame of the Somalian
13 situation,
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15 *Stressing* the need to further enhance governance and larger recognition of Somalia's
16 democratic government by the larger international community and all the internal
17 political forces, and reiterate its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement
18 of the situation in Somalia,
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20 *Expressing* concern towards satisfying the basic needs of civilians, especially women and
21 children, adversely affected by the ongoing humanitarian situation in Somalia,
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23 *Believing* that stabilization in Somalia could not be achieved without sustainable and
24 inclusive economic growth, and recognizing that security and economic development
25 should go hand-in-hand,
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27 *Affirming* resolutely that in order to fully achieve a lasting and sustainable peace, we
28 must look into the medium and long term goals and tackle the foundational causes of
29 instability, economic weaknesses, political deficiencies and educational shortcomings,
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31 *Asserting* that in order to affect meaningful change on the renewal and improvement of
32 Somalia's infrastructure it is paramount to establish a favorable climate for growth,
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34 *Commending* the work already achieved by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
35 providing vital educational assistance in underdeveloped regions,
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37 *Deeply convinced* that an African approach towards the situation in Somalia constitutes a
38 major strength for a successful and sustainable peace-building process,
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40 *Calling* for strengthening the rule of law as well as creating strong institutions that will
41 foster social and economic development,
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43 *Recalling* Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which calls upon inclusion of
44 women within peacemaking, peace-building and peacekeeping processes,
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46 *Resolved* to favor regional and south-south cooperation in dealing with the issue of peace
 47 stabilization in Somalia,
 48
 49 *Recalling* Security Council Resolution 2067 (2012), which reaffirms the importance of
 50 securing a Somali-owned institutional-building process, under the lead of the
 51 democratically-elected Federal Government of Somalia,
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 53 *Recalling* the positive effects of the Djibouti Peace Process (2008), the Kampala Accord
 54 (2011), Somali National Reconciliation Conference (2007), as well as the achievements
 55 and ongoing progress of AMISOM,
 56
 57 *Renewing the appeal* to discourage individuals engaging in acts of piracy, and to provide
 58 those individuals with appropriate resources to acquire legitimate and sustainable income,
 59
 60 *Welcoming* the joint efforts of the international community in fighting piracy off the coast
 61 of Somalia, with particular recognition of the Atalanta and Ocean Shield operations,
 62
 63 *Fully aware* that the Democratic Federal Parliamentary elections of 2012 represent a step
 64 further in the political stabilization of Somalia, and the successful achievement of the
 65 political transition, in which the tasks commended by the UN-backed Roadmap for
 66 Political Reform were largely achieved,
 67
 68 *Commending* in this regard the presence of women in the recently-formed Somalian
 69 government,
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 71 *Recalling* the Somalia Human Development Report 2012 of the United Nations
 72 Development Program, believing that unemployment and poverty play a key role in
 73 turning large parts of the young population to piracy, crime and extremism, and
 74 addressing the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia,
 75
 76 *Applauding* the previous efforts put in place by A/RES/53/223 in reference to the role of
 77 microcredit in the eradication of poverty,
 78
 79 *Welcoming* the prioritization of the stabilization process by the new government, as well
 80 as the bottom-up, differentiated approach aiming at stabilizing and limiting the dire
 81 consequences of the political vacuum left by the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab in certain
 82 regions, through local administration action, as well as by training local forces under the
 83 supervision of the African Union,
 84
 85 *Concerned by* the dire humanitarian situation of the 1.1 million Internally Displaced
 86 People (IDP) in Somalia and the 1 million Somalian refugees in neighboring countries,
 87
 88 *Acknowledging* Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1897 (2009), S/RES/1976 (2011),
 89 S/RES/2020 (2011) and S/RES/2077 (2012) on the matter of piracy and its potential
 90 threat to international peace and security,
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92 *Stressing* that peacekeeping mandates, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia
93 (AMISOM), authorized by S/RES/1744 (2007) should uphold the principles of political
94 independence, territorial integrity, sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic
95 affairs, in accordance with Chapter I of the UN Charter,

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97 *The Security Council,*

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99 1) Urges that the AMISOM is further strengthened in order to build upon existing
100 progress, guaranteeing territorial control and a strong stance against transitional
101 terrorist organizations, by:
- 102 a. Allowing AMISOM forces the opportunity to recapture areas held by said
103 organizations over a period of eighteen months;
 - 104 i) Employing AMISOM ground forces to secure land with the assistance of
105 close air support to advance the borders of AMISOM controlled territories up
106 to internationally recognized Somalian borders;
 - 107 ii) Building physical, guarded bases of operation in said territories to house
108 and maintain regular fighting forces;
 - 109 iii) Using AMISOM forces to train future Somalian military personnel in
110 areas including, but not limited to: tactics, weapons, technology and military
111 organization, as well as transferring responsibilities for maintaining military
112 infrastructure to said Somalian military personal;
 - 113 b. Calling for the funds from the regular donating process for Somalia to go
114 through the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to maintain funding and
115 capacity towards AMISOM;
 - 116 c. Designating twenty five per cent of the funds from ECA to go towards
117 sustaining AMISOMs offensive capabilities, including transport;
 - 118 d. Encouraging AMISOM to train local police forces and the Somalian
119 coastguard under the guidance of the Somalian government in close
120 cooperation with local authorities;
- 121
- 122 2) *Calls for* the funds from the regular donating process for Somalia to go through
123 the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to maintain funding and capacity
124 towards AMISOM for the purpose of:
- 125 a. Advocating for a temporary expansion of AMISOM mandate to conduct
126 operations within Somalia against any transnational terrorist organizations for
127 a period of eighteen months,
 - 128 b. Designating twenty five percent of the funds from ECA to go towards
129 sustaining AMISOMs offensive capabilities, including transport;
 - 130 c. Encouraging the involvement of the local authorities to enforce security
131 through the improvement of the training of the local police and judicial
132 systems,
 - 133 d. Fostering the training and technical assistance for the Somalian coastguard in
134 its activities against the illegal practice of piracy off the coast of Somalia;
- 135
- 136 3) *Urges* the countries neighboring Somalia to develop solidarity and to contribute
137 to the stabilization process;

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- 4) *Suggests* a 15% reallocation of funding of the AMISOM force task in order to support the creation of an independent group of political, economic and social experts detached by the UN to the government of Somalia, monitored by the African Development Bank;
 - 5) *Requests* that the special representative of the Secretary General for Somalia, in coordination with Somalian authorities, elaborate a technical assessment on the ground of the practical needs of the Somalian coastguards to better enforce the rule of law in coastal areas;
 - 6) *Encourages* the implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes, especially regarding the underaged and handicapped;
 - 7) *Further urges* the international community to engage a larger number of actors and strengthen the contributions to the Common Humanitarian Fund for Somalia (CHF-Somalia), channeled mainly through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
 - 8) *Calls upon* all Somalian actors to enhance women participation in political processes;
 - 9) *Supports* an analysis of the Somalian government in accordance with the UN Transparency and Accountability Initiative,
 - 10) *Affirms* the need to provide the building of infrastructure, employment, education and rehabilitation of the Somalian society;
 - 11) *Encourages* the development of the needed infrastructures for the economic growth and development of the country; included but not limited to a modernized road network, a light railway system, improved telecommunication networks, modernized healthcare and maritime development, as part of which;
 - a. We recommend the creation of a Private-Public Investment Program, wherein private corporations shall invest, construct and manage infrastructure projects that shall be leased upon completion by the appropriate Somalian governmental authorities,
 - b. In order to incentivize such private investment, and at the discretion of the Somalian government, the Council encourages a system of tax incentives and subsidies for domestic companies and corporations,
 - i) A similar incentive scheme shall also be created, at a lower rate, for similar international corporations interested in investing in Somalian infrastructure;
 - c. Greatly encourages the continued co-operation between the Somalian government and the World Health Organization in developing an environment of progress in reconstructing the national healthcare system,

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- 12) *Recommends* that in order to compensate for current weaknesses in Somali infrastructure, non-governmental organizations, in partnership with the United Nations Member States, begin the processes of creating a widespread vocational education program in Somalia, of which shall include;
- a. A greater effort to bring basic education to refugee camps and lower-income rural areas of the nation,
 - b. Offering scholarships to foreign students and young professionals to travel to and gain employment in Somalia in order to improve the quality of the domestic educational system,
 - c. Encourage the UN Member States to offer training programs abroad for Somali public servants, with the purpose of transferring knowledge on government administration and political institutions,
 - d. Provide the adult population with training opportunities and vocational education including but not limited to;
 - i) Small business classes
 - ii) Programs that focus on successful agricultural processes
 - iii) Government and law
 - iv) Access to information on responsible and sustainable fishing practices
 - e. Further requests that the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), take action on implementing a community education program on conflict-resolution regarding the allocation of scarce resources,
 - f. Previously mentioned influxes of Non-Governmental Organizations shall come under the purview of the increased mandate of the AMISOM security mission, especially in areas of particular risk, including refugee camps and rural areas,
- 13) *Urges* the need for a conference, to be held no later than twelve months from now, hosted by the Kingdom of Morocco, and supported by the United Nations, that includes the constitutionally recognized government of Somalia and African Union officials and representatives of neighboring countries, meeting bi-annually to monitor and evaluate the Somali-led state-building processes themed “Achieving Peace and Sustaining Stability – Alliance for Somalia”, such that:
- a. The UN Ethics Office shall compile a bi-annual report, for the duration of five years, on the progress of the minutes of the aforementioned conference, to be submitted to the UN Peacebuilding Commission,
 - b. A concerted effort to include all aspects of Somalia society, including clan leaders and representatives from every department of Somali government and local authorities,
- 14) *Suggests* the future exploration by ECOSOC and additional related Non-Governmental Organizations for opportunities for microloans and in order to foster growth and success in small business prospects in Somalia,
- 15) *Noting* with due regard the necessity of investing full trust in the Federal Somali Government, as a means of strengthening the sovereign integrity of the

230 state, with the view that, on a discretionary basis, states may nominate to relocate
231 existing diplomatic missions outside Somalia, concerned with its affairs, to
232 Mogadishu, NMUN·NY

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16) *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the meeting of the Security Council on the 27th March 2013, in connection with the Council's discussions on the Situation in Mali, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on the behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council wholeheartedly reaffirms the notions and objectives set forth by S/RES/2085 and applauds the co-operation that fostered it.

“The Security Council deplores the kidnapping of the French, Malian and Chadian soldiers on the 26th March 2013 as a violent and unacceptable reaction against the mission for peace in Mali.

“The Security Council acknowledges the outrageous video sent by the Ansar ad-Dine terrorist group and is strongly critical of its messages.

“The Security Council strongly denounces the attempts to coerce this Council through the deplorable kidnapping of innocent civilians merely trying to create a continued peace for Mali.

“The Security Council reaffirms its dedication to both Operation Servál and ECOWAS mission in Mali, whilst unreservedly affirming its support for these programs to continue to remain in Mali.

“The Security Council acknowledges that the actions by the Ansar ad-Dine terrorist group is in direct violation of Geneva Conventions 13, 16, 17 & 20 stating that prisoners must be treated humanely and without any adverse discrimination, and suffering no physical or mental torture or coercion.

“The Security Council expands upon this, referring to the branch of Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, providing that any person deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and dignity.

“The Security Council reminds Ansar ad-Dine of the explicit measures detailed in Article 42 of the United Nations Charter and the availability of these measures to all Member States. These measures may include operations by land, sea or air forces by any member of the United Nations.

“The Security Council notes with deep concern the urgency of the recent events in Mali and the ongoing terrorist activities that pose a serious threat to peace and security in Mali and West Africa, which could affect the whole international community.

“The Security Council clearly reminds that under UN Charter articles 41, 42, 47(3) and 51, AFISMA enjoys full legal and multilateral support to, by all means available, carry out

operations on the ground in the best interest of the security of the Malian people and foreign citizens dwelling in the territory of Mali.

“The Security Council understands that, even with the assistance of a UN Peacekeeping Force, Mali still faces considerable threats to peace and security and acknowledges the necessity of parallel interventions in the areas of humanitarian aid and development.

“The Security Council recognizes the explicit request from the Malian government for a UN mandated peacekeeping force as suggested by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and strongly encourages the assessment of the viability of such a force.

“The Security Council encourages any such force to be focused towards a strong regional representation.

“The Security Council calls upon the Malian government to make a concerted effort to increase policing and security, especially in high-risk areas.

“The Security Council notes the desire for international support, as stated by Malian Minister of Communications, Manga Dembélé; “All friends of Mali are welcome”.

“The members of the Security Council welcomed the statement issued by the ECOWAS Chief of Defense Staff (CCDS), General Soumaila Babayoko, on the 26th of March 2013.

“The Security Council recalls the objectives and principles of S/RES/1325, deploring the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.

“The Security Council condemns the misappropriation of the peaceful religion of Islam for the purpose of committing acts of terrorism.

“The Security Council recalls the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes consistent with Article 33 of the UN Charter, the Security Council suggests a Roadmap for Political Stability (RPS).

“The Security Council emphasises that the ultimate goal of the RPS is to establish an independent and accountable Malian government through free and fair elections, and a constitutional order in accordance with the will of the Malian people.

“The Security Council endorses the establishment of a fact-finding mission (in accordance with Article 34 of the UN Charter), the latter building upon the existing Exploratory Mission to Mali, headed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, with a view to assess options for a possible future peacekeeping mandate, supervised and reported back upon to the Security Council regularly.

“The Security Council encourages the empowerment of legitimate local political actors, with the help and support of the international community, in order to uphold pluralism and inclusion of all political parties, clans and tribes, with special attention to the involvement of women.

“The Security Council encourages all neighboring states of Mali, especially all those not yet involved, to support the government in its efforts to secure shared borders and protect its citizens.

“The Security Council wholeheartedly commends progress made in bolstering the position of the Malian armed forces through the deployment of logistical support packages and seeks to make further use of training in order to increase the effectiveness of the domestic armed forces in maintaining incentive in the conflict against terrorism.

“The Security Council seeks to remind all participants within the conflict of the precarious situation in which they operate, and whilst progress has been made, there is a need to consider the challenges facing peacekeeping forces on a holistic level such that adequate support can be identified, coordinated, and deployed.

The Security Council would also like to note the urgent need for funding to the RPS, which may be channeled through the UN Trust Fund for AFISMA, inviting the UN Member States to contribute technically and financially to the successful achievement of the RPS goals.

“The Security Council recognizes the previous work done by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and encourages similar actions taken to assist the large numbers of Malian refugees as a result of the ongoing crisis. This council further recognizes the continued need for humanitarian relief for displaced persons in compliance with Chapter Nine, Article 55 of the UN Charter and Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. The members of the Security Council acknowledge the need for increased support of the emergency appeal by UNICEF for \$58 million, of which they have only received 28%, and therefore cannot adequately provide relief services for the affected Mali people.