

NMUN · EUROPE

CZECH REPUBLIC 2010

2010 NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION



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NATIONAL MODEL
UNITED NATIONS

28 March - 1 April 2010 - Sheraton
30 March - 3 April 2010 - Marriott

Hynek Melichar, Secretary-General; Amanda Williams, Director-General
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Message from the Director-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2010 NMUN Conference

At the 2010 NMUN Europe Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee it is assigned to. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee impacts the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs or judicial experts. To understand these fine differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and establish precise policies and recommendations in regard to the topics before the committee.

International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as traditional position papers. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in material that is entirely original. ***The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.*** In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single spaced pages (one double sided paper, if printed)
- Font **must** be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at 1 inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page; the use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections
-

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee** should be sent to amanda@nmun.org.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **November 1, 2010**.

PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU_Namibia_University of Caprivi)

- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Sincerely yours,

Amanda Williams, LCSW
Director-General

amanda@nmun.org

Sample Position Paper

The following position paper is designed to be a sample of the standard format that an NMUN position paper should follow. While delegates are encouraged to use the front and back of a single page in order to fully address all topics before the committee, please remember that only a *maximum* of one double-sided page (or two pages total in an electronic file) will be accepted. Only the first double-sided page of any submissions (or two pages of an electronic file) will be considered for awards.

*Delegation from
Canada*

*Represented by
(Name of College)*

Position Paper for General Assembly Plenary

The topics before the General Assembly Plenary are: Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict; the Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy; and the Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa. Canada is dedicated to collaborative multilateral approaches to ensuring protection and promotion of human security and advancement of sustainable development.

I. Breaking the link between Diamonds and Armed Conflict

Canada endorses the Kimberly Process in promoting accountability, transparency, and effective governmental regulation of trade in rough diamonds. We believe the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an essential international regulatory mechanism and encourage all Member States to contribute to market accountability by seeking membership, participation, and compliance with its mandate. Canada urges Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué to strengthen government oversight of rough diamond trading and manufacturing by developing domestic legal frameworks similar to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. We call upon participating States to act in accordance with the KPCS's comprehensive and credible systems of peer review to monitor the continued implementation of the Kimberley Process and ensure full transparency and self-examination of domestic diamond industries. We draw attention to our domestic programs for diamond regulation including Implementing the Export and Import of Rough Diamonds Act and urge Member States to consider these programs in developing the type of domestic regulatory frameworks called for in A/RES/55/56. Canada recognizes the crucial role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the review of rough diamond control measures developed through the Kimberly Process and encourages States to include NGOs, such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, in the review processes called for in A/RES/58/290. We urge Member States to act in accordance with A/RES/60/182 to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal and alluvial diamond miners by establishing a coordinating mechanism for financial and technical assistance through the Working Group of the Kimberly Process of Artisanal Alluvial Producers. Canada calls upon States and NGOs to provide basic educational material regarding diamond valuation and market prices for artisanal diggers, as recommended by the Diamond Development Initiative. Canada will continue to adhere to the 2007 Brussels Declaration on Internal Controls of Participants and is dedicated to ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective regulation of the rough diamond trade through the utilization of voluntary peer review systems and the promotion of increased measures of internal control within all diamond producing States.

II. The Promotion of Alternative Sources of Energy

Canada is dedicated to integrating alternative energy sources into climate change frameworks by diversifying the energy market while improving competitiveness in a sustainable economy, as exemplified through our Turning Corners Report and Project Green climate strategies. We view the international commitment to the promotion of alternative sources of energy called for in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) as a catalyst to sustainable development and emission reduction. Canada fulfills its obligations to Article 4 of the UNFCCC by continuing to provide development assistance through the Climate Change Development Fund and calls upon Member States to commit substantial financial and technical investment toward the transfer of sustainable energy technologies and clean energy mechanisms to developing States. We emphasize the need for Member States to follow the recommendations of the 2005 Beijing International Renewable

Energy Conference to strengthen domestic policy frameworks to promote clean energy technologies. Canada views dissemination of technology information called for in the 2007 Group of Eight Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy Declaration as a vital step in energy diversification from conventional energy generation. We call upon Member States to integrate clean electricity from renewable sources into their domestic energy sector by employing investment campaigns similar to our \$1.48 billion initiative ecoENERGY for Renewable Power. Canada encourages States to develop domestic policies of energy efficiency, utilizing regulatory and financing frameworks to accelerate the deployment of clean low-emitting technologies. We call upon Member States to provide knowledge-based advisory services for expanding access to energy in order to fulfill their commitments to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Canada urges States to address the concerns of the 2007 Human Development Report by promoting tax incentives, similar to the Capital Cost Allowances and Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expenses, to encourage private sector development of energy conservation and renewable energy projects. As a member of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Canada is committed to accelerating the development of renewable energy projects, information sharing mechanisms, and energy efficient systems through the voluntary carbon offset system. We are dedicated to leading international efforts toward the development and sharing of best practices on clean energy technologies and highlight our release of the Renewable Energy Technologies Screen software for public and private stakeholders developing projects in energy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy. Canada believes the integration of clean energy into State specific strategies called for in A/62/419/Add.9 will strengthen energy diversification, promote the use of cogeneration, and achieve a synergy between promoting alternative energy while allowing for competitiveness in a sustainable economy.

III. Implementation of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa

Canada views the full implementation of the treatment and prevention targets of the 2001-2010 International Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Especially in Africa, as essential to eradicating malaria and assisting African States to achieve Target 8 of Goal 6 of the MDGs by 2015. We recommend Member States cooperate with the World Health Organization to ensure transparency in the collection of statistical information for Indicators 21 and 22 of the MDGs. Canada reaffirms the targets of the Abuja Declaration Plan of Action stressing regional cooperation in the implementation, monitoring, and management of malaria prevention and treatment initiatives in Africa. To fully implement A/RES/61/228, Canada believes developed States must balance trade and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian objective of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. We continue to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health into our compulsory licensing framework through the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act. We urge Member States to support compulsory licensing for essential generic medicines by including anti-malarial vaccines and initiating domestic provisions to permit export-only compulsory licenses to domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, similar to Canada's Access to Medicines Regime. Canada calls upon Member States to establish advanced market commitments on the distribution of pneumococcal vaccines to developing States in cooperation with PATH and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. We emphasize the need for greater membership in the Roll Back Malaria initiative to strengthen malaria control planning, funding, implementation, and evaluation by promoting increased investment in healthcare systems and greater incorporation of malaria control into all relevant multi-sector activities. Canada continues to implement the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) New Agenda for Action on Health to reduce malaria infection rates among marginalized populations in Africa, increase routine immunizations rates, and reduce infection rates of other neglected infections. Canada will achieve the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008-2009 by providing assistance to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We urge Member States to increase donations to intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that support malaria programming in Africa, exemplified by CIDA's contribution of \$26 million to the Canadian Red Cross. We continue our efforts to provide accessible and affordable vector control methods to African States through the Red Cross' Malaria Bed Net Campaign and the African Medical Research Foundation Canada by supplying insecticide-treated mosquito nets and Participatory Malaria Prevention and Treatment tool kits.

History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Foundation

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), based in Brussels, Belgium, is a military alliance of countries in North America and Europe, was established based on the principle that the security of each region is inextricably linked to the other's.¹ Towards the end of the Second World War, Allied countries were also occupied with establishing a security regime to ensure the peace and prosperity of North America and Europe.² In August 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom met to sign the Atlantic Charter.³ The Atlantic Charter pledged its signatories to uphold the principles of self-determination, free trade, and non-aggression, amongst other democratic ideals.⁴ European Allied countries also began to grow weary of the threat from the Soviet Union, who was part of the Allied powers during the war.⁵ The 1948 Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade of the same year were signs of such Soviet aggression.⁶ Citing fears of German resurgence and Soviet invasion, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, creating the basis of the military alliance.⁷ The Atlantic Charter and the Treaty of Brussels would come together in 1949, when Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Benelux countries convened in Washington DC to sign the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.⁸

The North Atlantic Treaty is anchored in the principles of collective security and containment.⁹ Article V of the treaty affirms that “an armed attack against one or more [Member State] shall be considered an attack against them all” and as such Member States of NATO can choose to react individually or collectively under NATO.¹⁰ The treaty further commits Member States to place the alliance in the highest priority and not engage in other international commitments, which might contradict the spirit of the alliance.¹¹ The practice of collective security thus compliments the principle of containment.¹² As mentioned previously, Western Europe and North America were weary of Soviet advances in continental Europe.¹³ Containment, as prescribed by American diplomat, George Kennan, seeks to “confront the Russians... where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.”¹⁴ As such, during the first round of expansion, NATO admitted Greece and Turkey, both of which were fragile democracies, to halt Soviet expansionism.¹⁵

Events During the Cold War

Pursuing the principle of containment, NATO expanded strategically during the Cold War. In 1952, Greece and Turkey ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the alliance's southern flank.¹⁶ West Germany soon followed in 1955, immediately after the conclusion of its status as an occupied country.¹⁷ The last expansion of NATO during the Cold War took place in 1982, with Spain joining the alliance.¹⁸

¹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 30.

² Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

³ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁴ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁵ Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2002, p. 7.

⁶ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 29.

⁷ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁸ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 3.

⁹ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 4.

¹⁰ NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 1949.

¹¹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 30.

¹² Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 4.

¹³ Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2002, p. 7.

¹⁴ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 4.

¹⁵ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 5.

¹⁶ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

¹⁷ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

¹⁸ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

In October 1957, France and the United Kingdom, along with Israel, sought to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt; this prompted the United States to publicly condemn her European allies and to propose in the United Nations an immediate withdrawal of European troops from the Suez Canal.¹⁹ In fact, France, under President de Gaulle, had been pursuing a more independent stance towards NATO; as the United States and the Soviet Union had split Europe into two competing alliances, France attempted to assert itself as a third force.²⁰ The withdrawal of the French military from the integrated command began in February 1966, when French forces in Germany, except those stationed in West Berlin, were withdrawn.²¹ By March 1966, France had completely withdrawn from the integrated command, followed by the expulsion of foreign military personnel and equipment from France by April 1967.²²

Transformation and Recent Developments

The conclusion of the Cold War, as well as the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, had profound changes to NATO, as the alliance's foremost adversary no longer existed.²³ In 1991, for the first time since its inception, NATO renewed its Strategic Concept.²⁴ The 1991 Strategic Concept reaffirmed that the "threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts" has effectively disappeared", and that new sources of conflict, such as ethnic tensions and political instability, will become the focus of the alliance.²⁵ At the 1994 Brussels Summit, Member States of NATO officially invited former Warsaw Pact countries to join the alliance under its Partnership for Peace program.²⁶ Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became the first three countries to join the alliance after the Cold War.²⁷ The lack of an easily identifiable adversary also led to operational changes to NATO. In 1992, NATO announced that it would support, to the fullest extent possible, peacekeeping activities of the Organization for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on matters concerning the former Yugoslavia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).²⁸

While the global political climate experienced a dramatic shift, the foundations of NATO, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty, remain unchanged. Upon the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the alliance's Member States convened and invoked Article V for the first and only time.²⁹ In the short term the invocation of Article V proved to the world that NATO was still a relevant player in international politics, but such invocation also transformed the alliance's long-term political and military operations.³⁰ While the United States and the United Kingdom led the initial military operations in Afghanistan, other NATO Member States provided extensive support individually or under the NATO umbrella.³¹ NATO further streamlined or created processes related to its crisis management and military command and engaged in geographical expansion.³²

NATO's relations with Russia have been uneven since the end of the Cold War. In the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO identified Russia as a key partner in securing transatlantic peace.³³ The alliance and Russia founded the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 as a means of cooperation in areas such as terrorism, counternarcotics, missile defense, and environmental security.³⁴ Activities in the NRC were suspended from August 2008 to March 2009 as a result of Russia's military actions towards Georgia and Russia's diplomatic recognition of breakaway territories of Georgia.³⁵

¹⁹ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 7.

²⁰ Hodge, *Atlanticism for a New Century: the Rise, Triumph, and Decline of NATO*, 2005, p. 7.

²¹ Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2001, p. 165.

²² Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 2001, p. 165.

²³ NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 2009.

²⁴ NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 2009.

²⁵ NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 2009.

²⁶ NATO, *Partnership for Peace; Invitation*, 2000.

²⁷ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 64.

²⁸ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 107.

²⁹ Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 93.

³⁰ Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 95.

³¹ Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 95.

³² Göncz, *The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense*, p. 95.

³³ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 1999.

³⁴ NATO, *NATO's relations with Russia*, 2009.

³⁵ NATO, *NATO's relations with Russia*, 2009.

Structure

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the only governing body which the treaty explicitly created (Article IX), and thus has “effective political authority and powers of decision” over the alliance.³⁶ The Permanent Representatives of the Member States to NATO meet on a weekly basis to discuss political, military and strategic matters of the alliance.³⁷ Throughout the year, cabinet ministers of the Member States will also convene at the NAC.³⁸ Meetings of the NAC are presided by the Secretary-General, currently Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark.³⁹ Following the spirit of collective security, all decisions made at NATO, regardless of importance or committee level, are unanimous.⁴⁰ Thus, there is no “voting” in the NAC, and discussions will take place until all Member States come to an agreement, representing to collective will of the alliance.⁴¹ Two other important bodies of NATO are the Defense Planning Committee, which whose responsibility is the planning of collective defense, and the Nuclear Planning Group, during which Member States “discuss specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces.”⁴²

Membership Expansion and the Alliance’s Partners

As mentioned previously, Germany, Greece, Spain and Turkey became Member States of the alliance during the Cold War. There have been three waves of enlargement after the Cold War. The first wave included the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.⁴³ The second wave, which is also the single largest expansion in NATO’s history, saw Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia becoming Member States in 2004.⁴⁴ During the most recent expansion in 2009, Albania and Croatia joined the alliance.⁴⁵ The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia now remains as the only country on track towards being a Member State, having signed a Membership Action Plan with NATO in 1999.⁴⁶

NATO has created numerous opportunities for non-member countries to engage with the alliance. For Example, NATO at the 1994 Brussels Summit initiated the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.⁴⁷ NATO and each Partner country work to secure political stability, peace and security for the Partner country, and consequently the security throughout Europe.⁴⁸ The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 in order to engage in political discussions with participating countries and to allow such countries to receive training at NATO institutes in Europe.⁴⁹ Lastly, NATO has numerous engagements with Russia. Russia joined the PfP in 1994 and three years later, established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PCJ) with the alliance “to build confidence, overcome misperceptions, and develop a pattern of regular consultations and cooperation.”⁵⁰ The PCJ has been replaced by the aforementioned NRC to conduct all matters between NATO and Russia, but activities have been suspended.⁵¹

Looking Ahead

In 2009, at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, NATO announced the decision to formulate a new Strategic Concept for the alliance.⁵² As the previous Strategic Concept was written in 1999 under the auspices of nineteen Member States, there is clearly a need to introduce a new strategy for the alliance that encompasses the 28 Member States, new

³⁶ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 149.

³⁷ NATO, *The North Atlantic Council*, 2007.

³⁸ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 149.

³⁹ NATO, *The NATO Secretary General*, 2009.

⁴⁰ NATO, *Consensus decision-making at NATO*, 2007.

⁴¹ NATO, *Consensus decision-making at NATO*, 2007.

⁴² NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 151.

⁴³ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

⁴⁴ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

⁴⁵ NATO, *Member countries*, 2009.

⁴⁶ NATO, *NATO’s relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, 2009.

⁴⁷ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 67.

⁴⁸ NATO, *The Partnership for Peace*, 2009.

⁴⁹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 91.

⁵⁰ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 2001, p. 91.

⁵¹ NATO, *NATO’s relations with Russia*, 2009.

⁵² NATO, *What is NATO’s new Strategic Concept?*, 2009.

emphases on weapon proliferation, failed states, and terrorism, and an outlook that surpasses the borders of Europe.⁵³ As well, despite the initial withdrawal from the integrated command, France had been working towards closer cooperation, an example of which is the placements of French officers within the integrated military command in 2004 by former President Chirac.⁵⁴ President Nicholas Sarkozy has announced the reintegration of French forces into NATO command.⁵⁵ For European peace and security to progress, NATO must also reengage with Russia. These are but three important forces that will keep the alliance on a path of transformation and reinvention to remain relevant as it tackles problems in an ever-changing world.

I. Cyber Defense

Recent talks about the new strategic concept for NATO include discussions about cyber defense. Cyber defense being the anticipation and preparation for an attack on computers and computer networks. In this case, attacks on a large scale that may affect national security and the protection of information. In May of 2010, the 13th NATO Cyber Defense Workshop was held in Estonia and brought experts and allies in to discuss ways in which to protect against cyber attacks. As a military alliance, NATO's research in cyber defense mechanisms is an investment in the protection of its Member States. Working with the Co-operative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the workshop discussed such topics as: International Cyber Security, remedies for cyber attack victims, cyber war and the legal parameters of cyber defense. Additionally, this research includes defining and identifying cyber attacks and determining if they are state sponsored attacks.

At the workshop, Estonian Defense Minister, Jaak Aaviksoo addressed three key points regarding cyber threats, saying that "every NATO country needs to develop a national approach to cyber security that encompasses all important stakeholders."⁵⁶ The second point to which Minister Aaviksoo highlighted that the private sector in NATO nations is where most of the infrastructure exists and that the majority of Internet users are companies and individuals and are therefore the most vulnerable to cyber attacks.⁵⁷ And the last point he outlines was the need to develop partnerships, citing "prevention and cooperation" as keywords.⁵⁸

In the same month of the workshop, NATO released "NATO 2020" – a comprehensive document that was compiled by the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO. The document outlines how "NATO must accelerate efforts to respond to the danger of cyber attacks by protecting its own communications and command systems, helping Allies to improve their ability to prevent and recover from attacks, and developing an array of cyber defense capabilities aimed at effective detection and deterrence."⁵⁹

NATO's policy on cyber defense was approved in 2008 and sets up a consolidated approach to cyber defense and responses. The policy also contains individual advice to Allies regarding protection to their national communication systems.⁶⁰ The policy found its roots after a series of cyber attacks in Estonia took place in the Spring of 2007. Estonian public and private institutions were attacked, prompting NATO to take the matter more seriously.

Cyber Attacks?

To fully understand cyber defense, it is important to grasp the concept of a cyber crime. "Cybercrime is not a new phenomenon, rather an evolving one with respect to adoption of information technology for abusive criminal purposes."⁶¹

⁵³ NATO, *What is NATO's new Strategic Concept?*, 2009.

⁵⁴ Ambassade de France, *Discours du Président Sarkozy sur la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au 21^{ème} siècle [Speech by President Sarkozy on France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century]*, 2009.

⁵⁵ France Diplomatie, *Colloque « la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au XXI^{ème} siècle » – Intervention de Bernard Kouchner [“France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century” Symposium – Speech by Bernard Kouchner]*, 2009.

⁵⁶ NATO, *Experts Discuss Intensifying Cyber Defense Cooperation*, 2010.

⁵⁷ NATO, *Experts Discuss Intensifying Cyber Defense Cooperation*, 2010.

⁵⁸ NATO, *Experts Discuss Intensifying Cyber Defense Cooperation*, 2010.

⁵⁹ NATO 2020, *Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, May 17, 2010, page 11.

⁶⁰ NATO, *Defending Against Cyber Attacks*,

⁶¹ Encyclopedia of Cybercrime, *Computer Crimes*, p. 195-200.

Ways that cyber criminals go about their crime varies, sometimes they “try to slip information out slowly, hidden in ordinary internet traffic. At other times they have tried to break in by leaving infected memory-sticks in the car park, hoping somebody would plug them into the network. Even unclassified e-mails can contain a wealth of useful information about projects under development.”⁶²

In the United States, and other western nations, the threat is seen as high and dangerous. This new form of espionage jeopardizes the high-tech know-how of the West that could erode its economic lead or blunt its military edge.⁶³ “Cyber-espionage is the biggest intelligence disaster since the loss of the nuclear secrets [in the late 1940s],” says Jim Lewis of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, DC.⁶⁴

Examples of cyber warfare

Several international occurrences of cyber warfare have scared nations with fears of catastrophic consequences. Additionally, “according to one of the speakers at the conference, identity theft has outpaced illegal drugs in dollar volume.”⁶⁵ The following profiles of cyber attacks are some examples as to the impact that is plausible.

Estonia

In April of 2007, Estonian websites – including parliament, banks, ministries and newspapers – were hit with denial-of-service attacks, which disrupted web-based services and websites.⁶⁶ “Denial of service attacks happen when thousands of computers are linked together using software or an agent called a 'botnet' to overwhelm a website with requests, essentially crashing the servers that host the website.”⁶⁷ It is suspected the attack was Russian-based and that it stemmed from Estonia’s removal of a soviet war memorial from the city of Tallinn.⁶⁸ Some of the sites even directed users to propaganda images and Soviet quotations.⁶⁹ As a result of the attack, Estonia shut down the websites to the external world while they tried to fix the problem. The attack was likened, by the Estonian defense ministry, to terrorist attacks – something to be taken seriously by a country whose government is “paperless” and practices web-based banking.⁷⁰ It was fitting that NATO’s Cyber Defense Workshop took place in Estonia, a nation that felt the impact of a cyber attack.

China vs. Google

For actions that took place in 2009, China is accused of wholesale espionage and of attacking the computers of major Western defense contractors and reputedly taking classified details of the F-35 fighter – an American aircraft.⁷¹ China is said to have used Google and other IT companies to infiltrate these sites.⁷² It is suspected, however, that the main objective of the Chinese attack was to gain access to email accounts of Chinese human rights activists.⁷³ The incident, that is still under investigation, has prompted Google to question whether or not to drop service in China altogether.

North Korea hits the US?

⁶² The Economist, *Cyberwar, War in the Fifth Domain; Are the mouse and keyboard the new weapons of conflict?* 2010

⁶³ The Economist, *Cyberwar, War in the Fifth Domain; Are the mouse and keyboard the new weapons of conflict?* 2010

⁶⁴ The Economist, *Cyberwar, War in the Fifth Domain; Are the mouse and keyboard the new weapons of conflict?* 2010

⁶⁵ Valvur, *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*, 2010.

⁶⁶ *The cyber raiders hitting Estonia*, 2007.

⁶⁷ Valvur, *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*, 2010.

⁶⁸ Valvur, *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*, 2010.

⁶⁹ Valvur, *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*, 2010.

⁷⁰ Valvur, *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*, 2010.

⁷¹ Valvur, *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*, 2010.

⁷² Valvur, *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*, 2010.

⁷³ Meserve, *Google reports China-based attack, says pullout possible*, 2010.

In early 2010, The United States appointed its first military general to oversee cyber warfare. Keith Alexander is now the General of Cyber Command – the Pentagon’s new venture designed to conduct virtual combat across global computer networks.⁷⁴ Additionally, Air Force troops have also been reassigned from their posts in technical support, to join the force of cyber warfare. The appointment of this general and the emphasis on cyber defense comes after a feeling of increased vulnerability felt by western nations. An example of a threat came in 2009 when an attack hit many government and private sites in the US and shut many government sites down. The attack “underscored how unevenly prepared the U.S. government is to block such multi-pronged assaults.”⁷⁵ The attack was linked to North Korea because of internet addresses that linked back to North Korea as well as similar attacks simultaneously hitting South Korea. Such an attack is believed to merely disrupt service while also potentially gaining confidential information.⁷⁶ After such chaos, the U.S has taken precautionary measures to ensure safety, namely by appointing a military post to specialize in the matter.

NATO’s Role

As a military alliance, NATO may or may not take on a key role in the construction of any future international law regime or enforcement regarding cyber security. With its inclusion of cyber defense in its new strategic concept, NATO has demonstrated its commitment to combating and preventing cyber attacks. Being that cyber attacks are a newer threat to the international community, forms of cyber defense are still in development and NATO’s role will be shaped as the new strategic concept starts to take form. What do you think the exact role of NATO should be? Do you think NATO is doing enough to protect its Allies by including cyber defense in its new strategic concept? What obstacles might NATO encounter by trying to protect against cyber attacks?

II. The Future of NATO

On April 4th, 2009 at the NATO Summit held in Strasbourg and Kehl, NATO leadership charged the Secretary General with the task of preparing a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance.⁷⁷ Subsequently, the newly appointed Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, appointed a panel of leading international diplomacy experts to address the Strategic Concept and provide the Alliance by November 2010 a statement of the key concepts and principles that guide all NATO strategic and military action.⁷⁸ The Secretary General directive and the work by the Group of Experts reflects the continuing challenge of NATO’s attempt to define itself and the contours of mission while taking strategic action to defend the threatened interest of its members.

Amendment of NATO Strategic Goals

The most recent articulation of the Strategic Concept was formed at the Washington Summit in 1999.⁷⁹ While recognizing the end of the Cold War and development of the technology age required a major strategic shift in NATO objectives, this document was created before the 9/11 attacks on US soil and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Western Europe.⁸⁰ As a result, this strategic statement was non-specific and has received criticism as an inadequate basis for the necessary security actions taken with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.⁸¹

Much of the current debate of the 2010 revised Strategic Concept focuses on the need to identify particular threats, and take specific strategic actions, such as a strengthening of missile defense and closer cooperation and training of

⁷⁴ Beaumont, *US appoints first cyber warfare general*, 2010.

⁷⁵ *U.S. eyes N. Korea for ‘massive’ cyber attacks*, 2009.

⁷⁶ *U.S. eyes N. Korea for ‘massive’ cyber attacks*, 2009.

⁷⁷ Brookings, *NATO’s Strategic Concept: To Depend Everywhere is to Defend Nowhere*, 2010.

⁷⁸ NATO, *NATO launches public debate on the Strategic Concept*, 2009.

⁷⁹ NATO, *Official Text: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, 1999.

⁸⁰ NATO, *Official Text: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, 1999.

⁸¹ Schmidt, *Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11 2006-07*.

non-NATO organizations and groups.⁸² In turn, the argument for more specific targets and NATO action with non-state actors has led to concern that such action would supersede the legal limits of treaties that created NATO.⁸³

The Group of Experts appointed at the Summit started work on the new Strategic Concept in September of 2009 – led by chair Madeline Albright of the United States and vice-chair Jeroen van der Veer of the Netherlands. “In line with its mandate to encourage an open discussion of NATO’s organization and purpose, the group engaged in an extensive series of seminars and consultations with scholars and officials, civilian and military alike from within and outside the Alliance.”⁸⁴ The result is “NATO: 2020” a comprehensive document released in May of 2010 that outlines goals for the next ten years of NATO and leans in the direction of reigniting a “security mission” tactic to NATO, therefore justifying a presence outside of the NATO region. Emiliano Alessandri, of the Brookings Institute offers this analysis of the document, “The report is comprehensive and detailed. Its recommendations, however, do not always match the measure of vision and boldness that many think is needed to invigorate NATO and renew its sense of purpose.”⁸⁵

When Dr. Albright spoke of the document she underscored the two main points as being: the duty to guarantee safety and security to its members and to engage with countries and organizations outside of NATO in order to do so.⁸⁶

Additionally, Albright mentions NATO’s relationship with Russia as it relates to the future of NATO, “It is clearly in NATO’s best interest to work with Moscow to build a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security order and to respond to such shared concerns as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, piracy and drug trafficking. Partnership ... is a two way street – but from the Alliance perspective, the door to cooperation with Moscow should remain open at all levels.”⁸⁷

Partnerships and Expansion

Under the new Strategic Concept outlined in “NATO 2020”, there is an emphasis on partnerships. Essentially, “NATO has many more partners than members and that some of them, such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan, have contributed to the Alliance’s latest missions, including Afghanistan, more substantially than some Allies.”⁸⁸ Many partnerships have developed and evolved since the 1990s and with these “varying” degrees of cooperation, NATO 2020 suggests a way to manage these partnerships.⁸⁹ In NATO 2020, it is stressed that there should be a more defined differentiation between the types of partnerships NATO has and also an increase in the involvement certain partners have with the planning of NATO actions.

In terms of the expansion of NATO’s member states, the number of allies has almost doubled going from 12 to 28 since 1949 – the latest additions to the alliance being Albania and Croatia who became formal members in April of 2009.⁹⁰ Nations who wish to become a part of NATO participate in a Membership Action Plan – a program of advice, assistance and support for nations wishing to join NATO.⁹¹ NATO’s “Open door policy” does not come without limitations and the process for a nation to become a member of the Alliance can take years. For example, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been a participant of MAP since 1999 and has still not received a formal invitation to join NATO.⁹² When new Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovich, withdrew interests in joining NATO in June of 2010 in favor of negotiations with Russia⁹³ it seemed to emphasize the divide between Russia and NATO. In February of 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved a military doctrine that identified

⁸² Chivvis, *Recasting NATO’s Strategic Concept Possible Directions for the United States*, 2009; United States Department of Defense, *NATO Strategic Concept Seminar (Future of NATO)*, 2010.

⁸³ German Law Journal, *Merely a Landmark or a Change of Course: The Federal Constitutional Court Hears Arguments in the NATO Strategic Concept Case*, 2001.

⁸⁴ NATO 2020, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 2010, Pg 5.

⁸⁵ NATO Source, *Assessing NATO 2020*, 2010.

⁸⁶ Atlantic Council, *NATO 2020 Group of Experts Report*, 2010.

⁸⁷ Atlantic Council, *NATO 2020 Group of Experts Report*, 2010.

⁸⁸ Brookings Institute, *Assessing NATO 2020*. 2010.

⁸⁹ Brookings Institute, *Assessing NATO 2020*. 2010.

⁹⁰ NATO. *NATO Enlargement*. 2010.

⁹¹ NATO. *Membership Action Plan*. 2010.

⁹² NATO. *Membership Action Plan*. 2010.

⁹³ Reuters. *Ukraine ditches NATO goal*. 2010.

NATO expansion as a national threat, stating Russia's right to employ nuclear weapons if threatened.⁹⁴ How does this effect the expansion of NATO's membership?

Relevance of NATO Charter

If the apparent goals of the new NATO Strategic Concept do exceed the limitations of the Alliance's legal authority, it may be possible NATO member nations interests would be better served with a whole new treaty organization.⁹⁵ The military action taken by NATO in the wake of 9/11 in Afghanistan relied primarily on authorization under Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which establishes that the Alliance will take necessary military action in response to any attack on single member state.⁹⁶ While it is the common political consensus that under the particular circumstances of the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the invocation of Article 5 was appropriate, it remains that the new Strategic Concept may encompass goals that exceed the Article 5 authorization used during the invasion of Afghanistan.

The Future of NATO

Through the events of the last decade and the current debate surrounding Strategic Concepts, it is readily apparent that NATO is again at a major crossroad. The establishment of the new Strategic Concept will be key in defining legitimate the scope of NATO authority to act and the roles and privileges of its members. How, if at all, was the previous NATO Strategic Concept flawed? Does the Strategic Concept now need to be simply updated, or is a more substantial overhaul required? Should the new strategic goals of NATO be targeted at specific threats and endorse cooperation with specific non-state actors that hold security interests similar to NATO? Does such a policy risk an overstepping of legal authority? Would a new charter and treaty system beyond that of NATO be a more appropriate means to address the strategic interests of member nations?

⁹⁴ Reuters. *Russia names NATO expansion as a national threat*. 2010.

⁹⁵ Cuccia, *Implications of a Changing NATO*, 2010.

⁹⁶ NATO, *NATO Review: Invocation in context*, 2006.

Annotated bibliography

Committee History

Ambassade de France (2009). *Discours du Président Sarkozy sur la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au 21^{ème} siècle* [Speech by President Sarkozy on France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century]. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Discours-du-President-Sarkozy-sur.14609.html>.

In this speech, President Sarkozy affirms that France will be returning to the NATO integrated military command. His decision is based on the fact that France no longer needs to assert a third force in Europe, and that the country is not benefitting from isolating herself from NATO's military structure. In fact, by reintegrating France will gain more latitude in NATO by simply having a say in military matters.

Bozo, F. (2001). *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

This book describes the interactions between France and NATO during the years of the de Gaulle presidency. De Gaulle was weary of American and British leadership in Europe and sought to establish France's own sphere of influence, which ultimately led to the departure of France from the unified military command. As noted in the Committee History, President Nicholas Sarkozy has decided to reintegrate the French military into NATO command.

France Diplomatie (2009). *Colloque « la France, la défense européenne et l'OTAN au XXI^{ème} siècle » - Intervention de Bernard Kouchner* [“France, European Defense and NATO in the 21st Century” Symposium – Speech by Bernard Kouchner]. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/defense-securite_9035/france-otan_9044/france-defense-europeenne-otan-br-11.03.09_71337.html.

Bernard Kouchner is the French Minister for Foreign and European Affairs at the time of writing. In this speech, Minister Kouchner announces a drastic change in French foreign and military policy, allowing the French armed forces to once again be part of NATO's integrated command. France has not formally contributed forces to the integrated command since the 1960's, when former President de Gaulle sought an independent stance in North Atlantic affairs.

Kaufman, J. P. (2002). *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

While the purpose of this book is to trace the developments of NATO's actions in the former Yugoslavia, its introduction serves as a good retelling of NATO's history. Events prior to the intervention in Kosovo, such as the reunification of Germany and the 1991 Gulf War, have placed the alliance under incredible stress as it sought to revitalize itself with each major event.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1991). *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=en.

This iteration of the alliance's strategic concept was released in 1991, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of other Communist governments in Europe. The alliance promptly recognized that the disappearance of an ideological enemy meant NATO needed to identify a new focus. Likewise, it reached out to its former enemies by asking them to jointly participate in securing Europe's peace and stability.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2007). *Consensus decision-making at NATO*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html>.

NATO is a military alliance and as its decisions will affect all of its Member States, decisions reached at the NAC and other levels of governance are unanimous. While Member States will disagree on certain issues, the regularity of these meetings and the NATO consultation process allow Member States to understand where each other stand. The Secretary General is also in charge of conducting such consultations to ensure a smooth decision process.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2007). *The North Atlantic Council*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/nac/>.

The North Atlantic Council is the only deliberative body of NATO whose responsibilities are explicitly mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty. Representatives from Member States meet once a week to discuss political and military

matters concerning the alliance. Ministers or heads of state from Member States will also gather at council meetings on a regular occurrence; the level at which meetings are held does not represent its importance in the alliance's affairs.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *Member countries*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm.

NATO is currently a military alliance with 28 Member States. Its biggest wave of expansion happened in 2004, when several former Warsaw Pact countries joined the alliance. In 2008, NATO welcomed Albania and Croatia. Critics of the alliance have questioned whether an expansive membership will truly benefit the alliance, and in broader terms the stability and security of Europe.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *The Partnership for Peace*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html>.

The Partnership for Peace program is one of NATO's several programs catered towards cooperation with non-Member States. The alliance and the Partner Country establish a number of goals to work towards, such as training standards, security, and military affairs. Several former PfP Countries are now full Member States of NATO.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *NATO's relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_fyrom/index.html.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is currently the only country who has signed a Membership Action Plan with NATO. The MAP is an important prerequisite towards full membership. While the country has performed well in all aspects of the MAP, its naming dispute with Greece remains an obstacle towards full membership.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *NATO—Russia Council*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F03B7F54-23CF1D4A/natolive/topics_50091.htm.

The NATO—Russia Council is the latest iteration of the partnership between former enemies. While Russia is hesitant to become a full Member State, unlike its former allies in the Warsaw Pact, NATO and Russia still cooperate on several mutually beneficial fronts, such as antiterrorism and peacekeeping.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). *The NATO Secretary General*. Retrieved August 14, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50094.htm.

The Secretary General of NATO presides over meetings of the North Atlantic Council, is the main bureaucrat of NATO, and acts as the primary spokesperson for the alliance. While NATO is a military alliance, the selection process for the Secretary General does not necessarily consider military experience. This position is currently held by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark.

Cyber Defense

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2010, 26 May. –2010, 28 May). *Experts discuss intensifying cyber defence cooperation*. Retrieved July 5, 2010 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1F707162-403F8E14/natolive/news_63989.htm

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization website provides online access to current news and events with NATO. This link provides information about the 13th NATO Cyber Defense Workshop. Additionally, this page provides documents relating to the workshop and other related articles.

NATO 2020. (May 17, 2010). *Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*. May be retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm

This document was put out by the group of experts on the new strategic concept for NATO. It outlines a analysis for the future of NATO and recommendations for the year 2020. The document includes Cyber Defense in a list of goals for 2020 among other issues such as guidelines for operations outside the alliance borders, success in Afghanistan and new partnerships for NATO.

The Economist. (July 1, 2010). *Cyberwar, War in the Fifth Domain; Are the mouse and keyboard the new weapons of conflict?* ; Retrieved July 5, 2010 from, <http://www.economist.com/node/16478792>.

The Economist is a British magazine that covers analysis of world business, international news, current affairs,

world politics, science and technology. *The Economist.com publishes all of the articles found in the print edition of the publication as well as up to date news briefs.*

Deutsche Welle. (February 2, 2010). *Estonia shines light on reality of cyber threats*. Retrieved July 13, 2010 from <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5741561,00.html>.

Deutsche Welle is Germany's International broadcaster: online, on-screen and over the air. It provides a European perspective to audiences around the world. This link is an article about the Cyber Defense Workshop in Estonia and is organized under Science and Technology.

BBC. (May 17, 2007) *The cyber raiders hitting Estonia*. Retrieved July 6, 2010 from

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665195.stm>

The BBC is the world's largest broadcasting organization and covers world news in the forms of radio, television and the internet. This link is an article that covered the cyber attack in Estonia. It also provides Related articles and relevant links to the topic of Estonia's cyber attack.

Encyclopedia of Cybercrime. (November 11, 2008 CT: Greenwood Press). *Computer Crimes*. p. 195-200.

The Encyclopedia of Cybercrime is the first comprehensive publication to address cybercrime. Topical articles address all key areas of concern and specifically those having to with: terminology, definitions and social constructs of crime; national infrastructure security vulnerabilities and capabilities

The future of NATO – Strategic Goals

Brookings (July 27, 2010) *NATO's Strategic Concept: To Defend Everywhere Is to Defend Nowhere*. Retrieved July 19, 2010 from http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0528_nato_strategy_warren.aspx.

Editorial briefly the current debate and process toward the new NATO Strategic Concepts

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (07 Jul. 2009). *NATO launches public debate on the Strategic Concept*.

Retrieved July 10, 2010 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-C1914C70-4BBD9CD8/natolive/news_56326.htm

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization website provides online access to current news and events with NATO. This link announces and summarizes the final phase of public debates toward the November 2010 deadline for the creation of the Strategic Concept.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (24 Apr. 1999) *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Retrieved July 10, 2010 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization website provides online access to current news and events with NATO. This link provides the text of the 1999 Strategic Concept.

The Washington Quarterly. John R. Schmidt (WINTER 2006-07). *Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11*.

Retrieved July 10, 2010 from http://www.twq.com/07winter/docs/07winter_schmidt.pdf

Article that analyses the role of the 1999 Strategic Concepts after the 9/11 attacks.

Rand Project Air Force. Christopher S. Chivvis (2009) *Recasting NATO's Strategic Concept Possible Directions for the United States*. Retrieved July 10, 2010 from:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP280.pdf

This document was produced by the RAND Corporation for the US Air Force outlining the possible military implications of the new Strategic Concept. It indicated that the current debate includes prospective action in the Middle East, and other places outside the North Atlantic.

United States Department of Defense. Robert M. Gates (February 23, 2010) *NATO Strategic Concept Seminar*

(Future of NATO) Retrieved July 10, 2010 from: <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1423>

Transcript of a speech by Sec. of Defense Gates in which he states the DoD's specific goals for the Strategic Concept negotiations.

German Law Journal. (June 19 2001) *Merely a Landmark or a Change of Course: The Federal Constitutional Court Hears Arguments in the NATO Strategic Concept Case*. Retrieved July 10, 2010 from : <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=37>

A summary of a German constitutional law suit that brought into question whether the 1999 strategic concepts exceeded the authorization created by the original 1949 Washington Treaty that created NATO.

Rules of Procedure North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Introduction

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Alliance”) and shall be considered adopted by the Alliance prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Plenary Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the Alliance.

I. SESSIONS

Rule 1 - *Dates of convening and adjournment*

The Alliance shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

Rule 2 - Place of sessions

The Alliance shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

II. AGENDA

Rule 3 - Provisional agenda

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Alliance at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

Rule 4 - Adoption of the agenda

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Alliance by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, —those present and voting¹ means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.

Rule 5 - Revision of the agenda

During a session, the Alliance may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Alliance so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Alliance decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an —important and urgent character¹ is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Alliance to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Alliance until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting — means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 6 - Explanatory memorandum

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

III. SECRETARIAT

Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Alliance.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Alliance and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Alliance, and shall distribute documents of the Alliance to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Alliance may require.

Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Alliance

concerning any question under consideration.

Rule 10 - Selection of the President The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Alliance for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 - Replacement of the President If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

IV. LANGUAGE

Rule 12 - Official and working language

English shall be the official and working language of the Alliance.

Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Rule 14 – Quorum

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Alliance are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Alliance shall be required for any decision to be taken.

For purposes of this rule, —members of the Alliance means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.

Rule 15 - General powers of the President

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Alliance, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Alliance and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Alliance the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to —propose to the Alliance entails her/his power to —entertain motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.

Rule 16

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Alliance.

Rule 17 - Points of order

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any

questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, —the members present and voting mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.

Rule 18

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Rule 19 - Speeches

1. No one may address the Alliance without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Alliance, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Alliance may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Alliance in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.

Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Alliance, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Alliance.

The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Alliance. A motion to close the speakers list is within the purview of the Alliance and the President should not act on her/his own motion.

Rule 21 - Right of reply

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

For purposes of this rule, a remark that —impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Alliance by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.

Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present

and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Alliance shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Alliance's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Alliance.

Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

Rule 25 - Closure of debate

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Alliance favors the closure of debate, the Alliance shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

Rule 26 - Order of motions Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Alliance would like the Alliance to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Alliance unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Alliance for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

For purposes of this rule, all —proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Alliance by the Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Alliance. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Alliance and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.

Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Alliance, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who

voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

For purposes of this rule, —those present and voting‡ means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.

VI. VOTING

Rule 30 - Voting rights

Each member of the Alliance shall have one vote.

This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to —member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.

Rule 31 - Request for a vote

A proposal or motion before the Alliance for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Alliance may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

For purposes of this rule, —proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.

Rule 32 - Consensus required

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Alliance shall be made by a **consensus** of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase “members present and voting” means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

All members declaring their representative States as —present and voting‡ during the attendance roll call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.

Rule 33 – Omitted

Rule 34 - Method of voting

1. The Alliance shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply “yes,” “no,” “abstention,” or “pass.”

Only those members who designate themselves as —present‡ or —present and voting‡ during the attendance roll call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying —pass,‡ must, on the second time through, respond with either —yes‡ or —no.‡ A —pass‡ cannot be followed by a second —pass‡ for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.

2. When the Alliance votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Alliance shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 35 - Explanations of vote

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.

Rule 36 - Conduct during voting

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

Rule 37 - Division of proposals and amendments

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

For purposes of this rule, —most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is —most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 38 - Amendments

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.

Rule 39 - Order of voting on amendments

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

For purposes of this rule, —furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is —furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.

Rule 40 - Order of voting on proposals

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Alliance decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

Rule 41 - The President shall not vote

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.